Defence and Security of India - Feb/Mar 2013

ARMY DOLDRUMS

MODERNISING THE ARMY In this era of modernising the armed forces, Indian Army has proved to be the laggard | RAHUL BEDI NETWORKED WARFARE

ARMED FORCES AND NCW The armed forces of the country are approaching technology rich environments | ARUN SAHGAL FEBRUARY 2013

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 3 • ` 250

URGENT IMPERATIVE: ARMY AVIATION Inter-service rivalry that bedevil armed forces of those countries who still have not grown the capacity to mount joint operations in peace and war have afflicted India equally. | Lt Gen (Retd) Vijay Oberoi

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FEBRUARY 2013

LETTER FROM THE

DSI

editor

O

n 8 January, as is well known now, two soldiers of the Indian Army were killed in a border skirmish. One of the soldiers, Lance Naik Hemraj’s corpse was found headless by the unit of the soldiers that was patrolling the area, when they discovered a Pakistan Army contingent having crossed the Line of Control had entered about 400 metres into the Indian territory.

A firefight that followed killed the two soldiers, whose bodies were found mutilated.

This created a sharp reaction not just from the Indian Army or the government, but by the people who were enraged at this gross mistreatment of fallen soldiers. The act by Pakistan’s soldiers contravened the Geneva Convention’s Laws of War of 1949. It stated: Article 3: In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion, or faith, sex, birth, or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

In view of the provisions of this Act, the Indian army has the option of moving the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

Pakistan continues to deny that they violated the sanctity of the LOC on 8 January, 2013. In fact, it seeks an investigation of the incident under the United Nations auspices.

If one investigates a motive behind that expressed desire, one can see an attempt by Islamabad/ Rawalpindi to bring the international focus back to Jammu and Kashmir. Its talk of making the moribund, United Nations Military Observer Group on India, Pakistan (UNMOGIP), to wake up to its previous task of monitoring the 1949 Line of Control. But as a diplomat at the United Nations has pointed out that after 1971, a LOC was defined on which it had no role.

Clearly, this posturing game will continue for some time, before this incident is overtaken by other developments.

A firefight that followed killed the two soldiers, whose bodies were found mutilated.This created a sharp reaction not just from the Indian Army or the government, but by the people who were enraged at this gross mistreatment of fallen soldiers.

Pinaki Bhattacharya 01

LETTER FROM EDITOR2ndtime.indd 1

30/01/13 4:56 PM

CONTENTS

FEBRUARY 2013

COVER STORY 13

URGENT IMPERATIVE: ARMY AVIATION Inter-service rivalry that bedevil armed forces of those countries who still have not grown the capacity to mount joint operations in peace and war have afflicted India equally. This is the main factor that has stymied the growth of Army Aviation that can significantly add to the combat capabilities of the ground level commanders in war

WARSHIP BUILDING 34

WARSHIP DESIGN AND WEAPONISATION MODERNISATION 06

INDIAN AIR FORCE: PATH TO MODERNISATION

Warship design is a complex exercise of fitting in disparate pieces together, thus requiring more efforts

Indian Air Force seems to be in fine fettle, emerging as an air force with ‘strategic reach;’ no longer a handmaiden of the army providing only close air support in battle

POLICY 40

DEFENCE OFFSETS AND DPP For the first time, the defence ministry has created a policy framework that could guide the defence materiel procurement process into a more institutionalised structure

ARMY DOLDRUMS 20

IN DEEP WATERS: MODERNISING THE ARMY In this era of modernising the armed forces, Indian Army has proved to be the laggard. While it withstands shortages in all the arms, the infantry and the artillery are the worst hit 02

contents2ndtime.indd 1-2

DSI

WARFARE 26

ARMED FORCES AND NCW The armed forces of the country are fast approaching technology enriched environments for fighting both Third and Fourth Generation Wars. The sensor-shooter loop is getting shortened with advancement in hand-held data, voice and video receivers, which allow tactical usages

DEFENCE TIES 46

INDO-US DEFENCE TIES, POST-COLD WAR In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the decision to engage then sole superpower

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CONTENTS

FEBRUARY 2013

COVER STORY 13

URGENT IMPERATIVE: ARMY AVIATION Inter-service rivalry that bedevil armed forces of those countries who still have not grown the capacity to mount joint operations in peace and war have afflicted India equally. This is the main factor that has stymied the growth of Army Aviation that can significantly add to the combat capabilities of the ground level commanders in war

WARSHIP BUILDING 34

WARSHIP DESIGN AND WEAPONISATION MODERNISATION 06

INDIAN AIR FORCE: PATH TO MODERNISATION

Warship design is a complex exercise of fitting in disparate pieces together, thus requiring more efforts

Indian Air Force seems to be in fine fettle, emerging as an air force with ‘strategic reach;’ no longer a handmaiden of the army providing only close air support in battle

POLICY 40

DEFENCE OFFSETS AND DPP For the first time, the defence ministry has created a policy framework that could guide the defence materiel procurement process into a more institutionalised structure

ARMY DOLDRUMS 20

IN DEEP WATERS: MODERNISING THE ARMY In this era of modernising the armed forces, Indian Army has proved to be the laggard. While it withstands shortages in all the arms, the infantry and the artillery are the worst hit 02

contents2ndtime.indd 1-2

DSI

WARFARE 26

ARMED FORCES AND NCW The armed forces of the country are fast approaching technology enriched environments for fighting both Third and Fourth Generation Wars. The sensor-shooter loop is getting shortened with advancement in hand-held data, voice and video receivers, which allow tactical usages

DEFENCE TIES 46

INDO-US DEFENCE TIES, POST-COLD WAR In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the decision to engage then sole superpower

03

30/01/13 4:57 PM

CONTRIBUTORS

FEBRUARY 2013

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA FEBRUARY 2013 VOLUME 5, NUMBER 3

RAHUL BEDI

AMIT COWSHISH

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK, and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters. He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London, and the Irish Times.

Amit Cowshish served as Additional Controller General of Defence Account for thirtyfive years. He served on deputation to the Ministry of Defence as Under Secretary. Between 2005 and 2012, he served for almost seven years on deputation with the Finance Division, first as Additional Financial Advisor and Joint Secretary and later as Financial Advisor (Acquisition) & Additional Secretary and Member Defence Procurement Board. He is a Post Graduate in Political Science from Jawahar Lal Nehru University and also holds an M.Phil degree.

LT GEN (RETD) VIJAY OBEROI Vijay Oberoi, founderdirector for the Centre for Land and Warfare Studies (CLAWS) four over four years is also the founderpresident of the War Wounded Foundation which works for the rehabilitation of war disabled personnel.

A post graduate in Defence Studies and an International Fellow at the Army War College in USA, he was commissioned into Army in 1961. He retired as Vice-Chief of Army Staff in 2001 and has travelled extensively, including to Pakistan in 2003, as a part of the track II level talks. He has also edited several books on security and intelligence.

BRIG (RETD) ARUN SAHGAL

REAR ADMIRAL (RETD) S KULSHRESTHA

Arun Sahgal , was Joint Director of Net Assessment, Technology, and Simulation at the Institute of National Security Studies in New Delhi and Founding Director of the Indian Net Assessment Directorate, created to assess long-term strategy.

Following a distinguished 36-year career in the Indian Army, he served as head of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, and Deputy Director of Research at the United Services Institution of India. Brigadier Sahgal was a member of the National Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation, under India’s National Security Council, and continues to support Council through consultancy assignments.

Sanatan Kulshrestha joined Indian Navy in the year 1975 and served as Director General of Naval Armament Inspection (DGNAI) at the Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Navy). As DGNAI, he was directly responsible for timely availability of reliable and safe naval armaments. He has two MPhil degrees pertaining to nanotechnology; has a Doctorate from ‘School of International Studies’ at the Jawaharlal National University (JNU). He is also an alumnus of the prestigious National Defence College (NDC). He has superannuated from Indian Navy in 2011 and has been writing in defence journals on issues related to Navy, Armament technology and indigenisation.

AIR MARHAL (RETD) PRANAB KUMAR BARBORA Pranab Kumar Barbora was commissioned into the Indian Air Force in June 1970 as a fighter pilot. Amongst all his appointments in the IAF the prestigious ones have been formation of the first Jaguar Squadron, staff atTactics and Combat Development Establishment and Staff at Directorate of Air Staff Inspection. He commanded a fighter squadron, inducted and commanded the first Air Combat Simulator and also a premier fighter base of the IAF in the Northeast.

For his contribution to the IAF and to the nation he was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal and the Param Vishisth Sewa Medal. He retired as Vice Chief of Staff, IAF in 2011. He was also appointed as the Honorary Aide De Camp to the President of India.

Pinaki Bhattacharya CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGNER

Arijit Das Choudhury JR. FEATURES WRITER

Anandita Bhardwaj SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta (E-Mail: vishalmehta@mtil.biz) DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING

Tarun Malviya (E-Mail: tarunmalviya@mtil.biz) SALES & MARKETING COORDINATOR

Atul Bali (E-Mail: atul@mtil.biz) CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Sunil Gujral PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MTC PUBLISHING LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMAN

J. S. Uberoi PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Latd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, BLESSALL Media LLC. Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/South West)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to MTC Publishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html http://www.defencesecurityindia.com

04

contributors2ndtime.indd 1-2

EDITOR

05

30/01/13 4:59 PM

CONTRIBUTORS

FEBRUARY 2013

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA FEBRUARY 2013 VOLUME 5, NUMBER 3

RAHUL BEDI

AMIT COWSHISH

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK, and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters. He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London, and the Irish Times.

Amit Cowshish served as Additional Controller General of Defence Account for thirtyfive years. He served on deputation to the Ministry of Defence as Under Secretary. Between 2005 and 2012, he served for almost seven years on deputation with the Finance Division, first as Additional Financial Advisor and Joint Secretary and later as Financial Advisor (Acquisition) & Additional Secretary and Member Defence Procurement Board. He is a Post Graduate in Political Science from Jawahar Lal Nehru University and also holds an M.Phil degree.

LT GEN (RETD) VIJAY OBEROI Vijay Oberoi, founderdirector for the Centre for Land and Warfare Studies (CLAWS) four over four years is also the founderpresident of the War Wounded Foundation which works for the rehabilitation of war disabled personnel.

A post graduate in Defence Studies and an International Fellow at the Army War College in USA, he was commissioned into Army in 1961. He retired as Vice-Chief of Army Staff in 2001 and has travelled extensively, including to Pakistan in 2003, as a part of the track II level talks. He has also edited several books on security and intelligence.

BRIG (RETD) ARUN SAHGAL

REAR ADMIRAL (RETD) S KULSHRESTHA

Arun Sahgal , was Joint Director of Net Assessment, Technology, and Simulation at the Institute of National Security Studies in New Delhi and Founding Director of the Indian Net Assessment Directorate, created to assess long-term strategy.

Following a distinguished 36-year career in the Indian Army, he served as head of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, and Deputy Director of Research at the United Services Institution of India. Brigadier Sahgal was a member of the National Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation, under India’s National Security Council, and continues to support Council through consultancy assignments.

Sanatan Kulshrestha joined Indian Navy in the year 1975 and served as Director General of Naval Armament Inspection (DGNAI) at the Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Navy). As DGNAI, he was directly responsible for timely availability of reliable and safe naval armaments. He has two MPhil degrees pertaining to nanotechnology; has a Doctorate from ‘School of International Studies’ at the Jawaharlal National University (JNU). He is also an alumnus of the prestigious National Defence College (NDC). He has superannuated from Indian Navy in 2011 and has been writing in defence journals on issues related to Navy, Armament technology and indigenisation.

AIR MARHAL (RETD) PRANAB KUMAR BARBORA Pranab Kumar Barbora was commissioned into the Indian Air Force in June 1970 as a fighter pilot. Amongst all his appointments in the IAF the prestigious ones have been formation of the first Jaguar Squadron, staff atTactics and Combat Development Establishment and Staff at Directorate of Air Staff Inspection. He commanded a fighter squadron, inducted and commanded the first Air Combat Simulator and also a premier fighter base of the IAF in the Northeast.

For his contribution to the IAF and to the nation he was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal and the Param Vishisth Sewa Medal. He retired as Vice Chief of Staff, IAF in 2011. He was also appointed as the Honorary Aide De Camp to the President of India.

Pinaki Bhattacharya CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGNER

Arijit Das Choudhury JR. FEATURES WRITER

Anandita Bhardwaj SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta (E-Mail: vishalmehta@mtil.biz) DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING

Tarun Malviya (E-Mail: tarunmalviya@mtil.biz) SALES & MARKETING COORDINATOR

Atul Bali (E-Mail: atul@mtil.biz) CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Sunil Gujral PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MTC PUBLISHING LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMAN

J. S. Uberoi PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Latd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, BLESSALL Media LLC. Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/South West)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to MTC Publishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html http://www.defencesecurityindia.com

04

contributors2ndtime.indd 1-2

EDITOR

05

30/01/13 4:59 PM

MODERNISATION

FEBRUARY 2013

INDIAN AIR FORCE: PATH TO MODERNISATION

Pranab Kumar Barbora

KEY POINTS

As the country emerged from of its low economic growth years, more and more resources have been available to the military for modernisation.

While indigenous military research, development and production have suffered from technology denial regimes, the local organisations have not also served the forces well enough.

The future of the air force with continuous modernisation looks well on its way to take on the best in business

T AFP

RAC MiG began to supply upgraded MiG-29 fighters to the Indian Air Force

Indian Air Force seems to be in fine fettle, emerging as an air force with ʻstrategic reach;ʼ no longer a handmaiden of the army providing only close air support in battle. The new-look IAF is well poised to be fully equipped with frontline fighter aircrafts, support aircrafts for air lifting; and mid-air refuellers to extend range and time of flight.

06 6

Airforce_Modernisation2ndtime.indd 6-7

he policies of the armed forces on its levels of readiness, its equipments in use and in procurement, training, even the way it fights in battles are determined by the country’s foreign policies, threat perceptions and its national power, in peace or in war.

Considering the fact that the country’s defence allocation from the central budget is at about 2-2.5 per cent of the GDP, it always puts a constraint on fulfilling the wish-lists of armed forces like the air force. In fact, the whole of the 1990s the defence budget had to make do with levels of allocation that were less than the two per cent marker on a low GDP. But we never found the Union government wanting to financially support the armed forces at a crunch time. Case in point: the Kargil conflict, when the armed forces were virtually given a blank cheque to acquire whatever their needs.

DSI

In that context, it has to be kept in mind that force ‘modernisation’ is a continuous process, though there could be an added fillip added to it occasionally. This ‘modernisation’ of the IAF in terms of ideas for procurement of such force multipliers like the IsraeliRussian AWACs, or the Russian IL-78 midair refuellers, Aerostat radars and UAVs began in the mid/ late 1990s. For the medium, multi-role fighter aircraft (MMRCA) and the FGFA in early 2000, gestation time from idea to fructification is generally close to a decade.

But the process really got going in 2004 for all the three services, when the work on the 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) began. Even in the early 1980s, the IAF had a debate whether the force structure should be fixed at a lowend of 39.5 squadrons or at a high- end of 55 squadrons. The government approved Key Location Points (KLP) are fixed for 42 squadrons. Each fighter squadron strength is generally 18 aircrafts.

Since the possibility of a two front war, simultaneously with Pakistan and China has entered the defence minister’s ‘Operational Directive,’ the debate of the number of squadrons has been re-opened again by Air Chief Marshal (ACM) NAK Browne pushing for providing resources towards building 42 squadrons by 2022, from its present strength of 33-34 squadrons.

The figure of 55 squadrons is also being raked up, though, in my opinion, there is no such necessity of that level of strength, especially with the inductions of force multipliers, presently in the pipeline, and also in the future.

How the IAF’s procurement process works: The process really begins at the vice chief’s office where all decision-options about operations are made and presented to the chief for his final ratification. That is where the projections of the IAF’s future technology needs are made. In effect, the ideation process also includes the Command chiefs.

The ideas are then put on paper and sent for processing by the Deputy Chief.

The Deputy Chief’s office then begins a global hunt for companies that deal with the technologies identified by the vice

7 07

30/01/13 5:03 PM

MODERNISATION

FEBRUARY 2013

INDIAN AIR FORCE: PATH TO MODERNISATION

Pranab Kumar Barbora

KEY POINTS

As the country emerged from of its low economic growth years, more and more resources have been available to the military for modernisation.

While indigenous military research, development and production have suffered from technology denial regimes, the local organisations have not also served the forces well enough.

The future of the air force with continuous modernisation looks well on its way to take on the best in business

T AFP

RAC MiG began to supply upgraded MiG-29 fighters to the Indian Air Force

Indian Air Force seems to be in fine fettle, emerging as an air force with ʻstrategic reach;ʼ no longer a handmaiden of the army providing only close air support in battle. The new-look IAF is well poised to be fully equipped with frontline fighter aircrafts, support aircrafts for air lifting; and mid-air refuellers to extend range and time of flight.

06 6

Airforce_Modernisation2ndtime.indd 6-7

he policies of the armed forces on its levels of readiness, its equipments in use and in procurement, training, even the way it fights in battles are determined by the country’s foreign policies, threat perceptions and its national power, in peace or in war.

Considering the fact that the country’s defence allocation from the central budget is at about 2-2.5 per cent of the GDP, it always puts a constraint on fulfilling the wish-lists of armed forces like the air force. In fact, the whole of the 1990s the defence budget had to make do with levels of allocation that were less than the two per cent marker on a low GDP. But we never found the Union government wanting to financially support the armed forces at a crunch time. Case in point: the Kargil conflict, when the armed forces were virtually given a blank cheque to acquire whatever their needs.

DSI

In that context, it has to be kept in mind that force ‘modernisation’ is a continuous process, though there could be an added fillip added to it occasionally. This ‘modernisation’ of the IAF in terms of ideas for procurement of such force multipliers like the IsraeliRussian AWACs, or the Russian IL-78 midair refuellers, Aerostat radars and UAVs began in the mid/ late 1990s. For the medium, multi-role fighter aircraft (MMRCA) and the FGFA in early 2000, gestation time from idea to fructification is generally close to a decade.

But the process really got going in 2004 for all the three services, when the work on the 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) began. Even in the early 1980s, the IAF had a debate whether the force structure should be fixed at a lowend of 39.5 squadrons or at a high- end of 55 squadrons. The government approved Key Location Points (KLP) are fixed for 42 squadrons. Each fighter squadron strength is generally 18 aircrafts.

Since the possibility of a two front war, simultaneously with Pakistan and China has entered the defence minister’s ‘Operational Directive,’ the debate of the number of squadrons has been re-opened again by Air Chief Marshal (ACM) NAK Browne pushing for providing resources towards building 42 squadrons by 2022, from its present strength of 33-34 squadrons.

The figure of 55 squadrons is also being raked up, though, in my opinion, there is no such necessity of that level of strength, especially with the inductions of force multipliers, presently in the pipeline, and also in the future.

How the IAF’s procurement process works: The process really begins at the vice chief’s office where all decision-options about operations are made and presented to the chief for his final ratification. That is where the projections of the IAF’s future technology needs are made. In effect, the ideation process also includes the Command chiefs.

The ideas are then put on paper and sent for processing by the Deputy Chief.

The Deputy Chief’s office then begins a global hunt for companies that deal with the technologies identified by the vice

7 07

30/01/13 5:03 PM

MODERNISATION

Airbus A330 MRTT, a tanker-trasporter expected to join the fleet of the air force AFP

chief’s office as future needs of the IAF. For example, the AWACS were sought to be a part of the IAF in mid-1990s. The vice chief’s office then decided upon the numbers and the configuration of the C3I aircrafts.

Typically, a procurement process takes too much time. The process of issuing a Request for Information (RFI) and Request for Proposal (RFP) may be time bound; the process of trial and in case of major purchases, the contract negotiations takes five years or so. Then the delivery date can be another few years ahead. So, in effect from the point of technology selection to operationalisation of equipment is really long.

Once they have done that job, the proposal made by them now goes to the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), who in turn places it in the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) chaired by the defence minister. After their approval, the proposal then becomes an

AON (Acceptance of Necessity), following which the RFI is issued. After the companies express their interests, they are short-listed on the criterion of technology availability, the RFP is issued to some of these companies.

The IAF can always demand the best in the business. But that demand has to be matched by the performance of the overall economy.

There have been times recently when some of the services had to return their budgetary allocations, unspent. The IAF had an advantage. We have Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), of which we are a captive customer. So come the January-March quarter, when there still remained marginal excesses even after the procurements got bunched up and paid for, we would park those unspent funds with the HAL. After all, they were still producing under license the aircrafts we needed.

The IAF started thinking about strategic

reach in the 80s. Remember Kuwait war in 1990? Remember the huge air-lifting exercise that was undertaken for the Indian migrants stuck there as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq army invaded the country? That was possible because of the Il-76 heavy lift aircrafts we had procured a little while before.

When this writer was an air attaché at the Indian embassy in Moscow between 1998-2001 the Russians, for instance, were desperate to give us their grounded AWACs. But they were mostly of old technology.

The IAF was looking for a platform on which the Israelis had promised to put the C3I. So one had to argue with the Russians that India would not buy their AWACS, but the country would onsider buying their Il-76s being used as a base for fitting in the Israeli equipments.

The Russians finally agreed.

But then, still another problem remained.

For the Israelis to fit the rotodome on top of

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FEBRUARY 2013

35

MODERNISATION the aircraft, the Il-76 had to be cut in half.

Only a few of the engineers in Russia could do the job. A ding dong battle continued for a long time. The Russians were still pitching for their AWACS. After a lot of deliberations and convincing the MoD the IAF finally got what it wanted.

The Il-78 refuelling tanker acquisition is another story. Earlier, even when we bought the Jaguars and the Mirage-2000s, they came with refuelling pods. We isolated the facility as we had no tankers. But then, when we had the resources we bought the Il-78MKIs or MARS as the IAF calls it, in 1990s. The full form of MARS is Mid-Air Refuelling System.

That was when we reactivated the refueling probes on those aircrafts. And now, we have the capability to refuel about six to eight Su30MKIs, on a mission.Of course, with the European consortium winning the MRTT (Multi-role Tanker Transport) contract, we will have the Airbus refuellers, which is a new generation of refuellers.

Modernisation and Force Structure: The goal of the IAF is to become a force with a ‘strategic reach,’ both in peace and war. The future force structure of the IAF will be the following with minor variation. Here I would like to state that the indefinite delay in the LCA project has forced the IAF to juggle around with our holding. The IAF is considering having three different baskets of fighters and fighter bomber aircraft i.e. light, medium and heavy weight class. The present and future inventory of types of aircraft is enumerated below.

Present holdings: MiG 21 Bison, MiG 29, MiG 27, Mirage 2000, Jaguar and SU-30s.

Future holdings: MiG 21Bison, LCA, Upgraded MiG 29, Upgraded Mirage 2000, Upgraded Jaguar with new engines, Rafale, Su 30 and the FGFA. The Hawk advanced jet trainer could be inducted into the force in a crunch.

A reader may notice the absence of the DRDO-developed LCA in the present holding list of the inventory. This writer does not consider that the LCA and LCA, Mark II, to ever be included in the IAF’s wish-list. In my opinion, LCA is unlikely to be a part of our modern fighting force because the technology used in its development is going to be close to

The IAF can always demand the best in the business. But that demand has to be matched by the performance of the overall economy. There have been times recently when some of the services had to return their budgetary allocations, unspent. The IAF had an advantage. We have Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), of which we are a captive customer.

being outdated by the time it becomes ready to be operationally flown by the IAF. However two squadrons of the same may join up in the Light Weight Fighter Aircraft category as and when Final Operational Clearance is given to the LCA. But it must be emphasised that the IAF is only considering two squadrons of the same.

The modernisation of other assets is also taking place simultaneously. The IAF has already inducted few C-130Js, with some more in the pipeline. Orders for the C-17 heavy transport aircraft have been placed.

Apache attack helicopter and heavy lift Chinook helicopters are on the cards to join the force soon. Indigenous Light Combat Helicopter hopefully will fructify soon.

There are on going projects to induct various types of ground based sensors along with new surface-to-air missiles and air-toground weapons of different ranges. The list is a long one but it is no longer a wish list.

The nation supports the defence services, although finances, at times, do not match the time lines envisaged by us in the forces.

Today, it can be said that the technology is no longer the constraint, but the human endurance has limits. So in effect, a fighter aircraft can fly round-the-clock with it being refueled mid-air, unless the pilot falls asleep at the controls.

As a force, the IAF safeguards the country’s national interests, which can mean that it is capable of deploying off-shore, in distant places as India globalises. It also guards the national resources that may be located abroad. The IAF’s goal is also to add to the aggregate national power.

Though this writer sounds disparaging about HAL or the DRDO, there is no denying the fact that the country for long has been at the receiving end of technology denial regime.

Let us begin with the Indo-British aircraft building process that HAL had undertaken soon after Independence. They were building an aircraft that came to be called Marut.

As the process of building were going on, the British realised that the India’s own work-force was quite skilled both in the actual process of building the aircraft and also in learning the new technologies and harnessing them. Result: They refused to give the aircraft engine as agreed to earlier.

Although the Marut did play its vital role during the 1971 war it had to be junked as it lacked in the thrust to weight ratio. The technologists who had worked on the project died away, without passing on their knowledge to the next generation. The same was the case with the Americans; they denied India critical technologies in mid 1960s because the country was not their ally. After the 1974 Pokhran I blast, the US-led economic and trade sanctions only aggravated the situation. We saw it too post-1998 Pokhran II. Of course, it has to be acknowledged that India is not a country of high managerial capacities or skilled system integrators.

The HAL or the DRDO is not devoid of technological and scientific talent. But they lag behind in terms of skilled managers. In our game of aviation, more so military aviation, time, tide and technology wait for none.

Now coming to the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft ( FGFA). When this

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FEBRUARY 2013

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MODERNISATION When this writer was an air attaché at the Moscow embassy, the deal was literally conceived at a restaurant in the centre of the city.

Accompanying me was the head of Sukhoi Design bureau. He told me that they were designing a futuristic aircraft with stealth features and latest technology.

Dassault Rafale during Aero India at Bengaluru

writer was an air attaché at the Moscow embassy, the deal was literally conceived at a restaurant in the centre of the city.

Accompanying me was the head of Sukhoi Design bureau. He told me that they were designing a futuristic aircraft with stealth features and latest technology. But, he also told me that his country did not have the finances to fully develop the aircraft. Can India help? This was a golden opportunity for the country.

Right there and then, we began drafting the various letters that had to be exchanged between the two countries for the collaboration to begin. So when Jaswant Singh (then defence minister) visited, a memorandum of understanding was ready for signing. The minister asked: “What is this that I am being made to sign.” The task of explaining to the minister fell on this writer.

After the concept of the idea was explained to him about the basics of the FGFA, he was also told that he was only signing a paper with no immediate commitments. Thus was

born the Russo-Indian collaboration on the FGFA. The IAF has come a long way in its modernisation programme. Today we are not only the 4th largest air force in the world but also at par with the best. The process of modernization takes a long time and costs a lot to the national exchequer.

Credit for where we stand today goes to our predecessors who had the vision and also to the nation for giving the financial support; more so when India had to grow amongst all odds to become the power that she is today.

Every aspiring nation must have a strong defence force to match its growing economic power, e.g. China. Procurements ex-abroad is an expensive game and to overcome this indigenisation is a must.

But somehow we are lacking in this field.

Not that talent is lacking (more than half of NASA work force comprises South Asians).

Lack of motivation, strong leadership and patriotism may be the root cause of the problem.

Yes, India missed out on mid-level technology pre- and post-independence.

This was ensured by the West so that we would always be a market for them in this very expensive arena of defence equipment procurement. India must break out of the shackles if we are truly looking for our rightful place in the comity of nations. If technology is being denied to us, so be it.

Reverse engineering is one of the answers.

Look at China, they were in the same state as us 50 years ago and see where they are today. They dared the world and moved forward, rightly or wrongly.

Today, the IAF is not the tactical air force of yester years. It has all the ingredients of a strategic air force, which has been tested from time to time with envious results.

Foreign air forces that have exercised with us have some good comments to make in this regards. The Indian Air Force has always kept the national flag flying high as we aim to serve the nation to the best of our ability in DSI peace and war.

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DSI

URGENT IMPERATIVE: ARMY AVIATION

AFP

Inter-service rivalry that bedevil armed forces of those countries who still have not grown the capacity to mount joint operations in peace and war have afflicted India equally. This is the main factor that has stymied the growth of Army Aviation that can significantly add to the combat capabilities of the ground level commanders in war.

Eurocopter’s attack helicopter

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ARMY AVIATION A soldier stands guard as a weaponised combat Dhruv helicopter flies past in Bengaluru

Vijay Oberoi

KEY POINTS

Though Indian Air Force (IAF) believes itself to be a force with ‘strategic reach’ it remains stuck in a groove of protecting its turf.

The multiple tasks that a dedicated aviation corps of the army can do, a fledgling air force seeking to fight wars on its own cannot hope to achieve.

Army aviation should put emphasis on acquiring more air assets to match its mission profiles; build organisations; and, have necessary staffing.

T

he aviation component of the Indian Army came into existence in 1986, after a great deal of procrastination and considerable opposition from the Indian Air Force (IAF). It continues to be a force that is unable to provide comprehensive aviation support to the army, as its current capabilities are severely limited.

The biggest reason for this is the opposition bordering on paranoia from the IAF. Army aviation is a force multiplier, on account of its ability to quickly engage, disengage and regroup in the battle zone. Integral aviation assets enable field commanders to exploit fleeting opportunities. This is also true for subconventional operations.

Emerging challenges require major restructuring and redefining of the roles and the manner of functioning of this extremely important arm. This needs to be formalised in the context of the likely threats to the nation, keeping in view the changing nature of war and conflicts, and the impact of technology.

There are four players responsible for the growth or lack of it of Army Aviation.

These are Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC); Indian Army; IAF; and Ministry of Defence (MoD). The COSC, being a toothless organisation is incapable of taking any meaningful decisions, as only single service views prevail.

The Historical Context Indian Army pilots had been flying both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters for air observation post duties since 1942. These were Air Force units manned and maintained

by Air Force personnel except for pilots who were artillery officers.

The need to have its own aviation arm was apparent soon after the 1947-48 War in J & K, but in the 1950’s it was only flagged inhouse within the army. Even though the IAF was not employed during the 1962 war with China, the need for an air arm for the army was acutely felt. Soon after the 1962 War, the proposal for an aviation corps for the army was mooted in 1963. However, it was only in 1986, after 23 years, that it saw the light of the day, after considerable opposition and great reluctance from the IAF. At that time, only light helicopters, already being flown by army pilots, were transferred to the army, while attack and utility helicopters remained with the IAF. Thereafter, the growth of army aviation has been slow and tardy.

Current Status In the 27 years of its existence, army

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www.russianhelicopters.aero

Art of Victory Ad Size 216x276.indd 1

29/01/13 12:19 PM

ARMY AVIATION

FEBRUARY 2013

A security official walks among a group of Dhruv Helicopters of India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL)

AFP

Army Aviation must provide combat, combat support and combat service support capabilities, across the full spectrum of operations, to all field commanders. Its inherent versatility, manoeuvre advantage and effectiveness in battle must influence all dimensions of the future battle space. Highly motivated army aviators, equipped with modern aviation platforms and related systems, and trained to world class proficiency, must provide commanders at all levels an exponential increase in lethality, a force multiplier of the highest level and a technologically competent leadership, to achieve decisive

aviation is still stuck in a changeless groove.

As presently structured, it has a number of limitations in aerial platforms, manpower and organisational structures. It continues to be a force that is unable to provide comprehensive aviation support to the army, as its capabilities are severely limited.

The army wants its aviation component to grow but it has not displayed adequate vigour in pushing for a decision on account of a self-imposed policy of ‘staying of its hands’, being the senior and the bigger service. This false sense of not ruffling the feathers of smaller services even when it costs an arm and a leg has served the army badly, not only in ensuring the legitimate growth of army aviation but also in other important spheres.

The IAF is the biggest stumbling block in the growth of army aviation. Its obduracy and opposition are a meaningless and repetitious litany of excuses. The last player the MoD, is unconcerned and is blasé about the army’s requirements. A great pity indeed!

Presently, army aviation flies

predominantly light helicopters. It has only about a dozen squadrons and less than 50 Reconnaissance and Observation (R&O) flights, equipped with about 200 Chetak and Cheetah helicopters of 1960 and 1970 vintages, as well as a few utility flights, equipped with the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH). The few armed light helicopters (Ranjit and Lancer) are now defunct, though plans exist to arm some ALH (Dhruv) with weapons. The irony is that the attack helicopters currently held have been paid from the army budget, but continue to be with the IAF, despite strong objections from the army. Army aviation does not have its own pilot’s cadre and the existing 460 officer pilots are all seconded from other arms/corps.

The Army Aviation Corps (AAC) needs to perform a variety of roles to be called a complete force, but the present structure of the AAC inhibits it from performing them. The roles it must perform are attack; combat fire support; electronic and visual surveillance; as well as aerial photography; tactical lift; logistical functions; communications;

16

Army Aviation2ndtime.indd 16-17

casualty evacuation; provision of airborne command posts; electronic warfare; and monitoring of the nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) environment. However, its present structure and aviation platforms inhibit it from performing all roles.

Unless army aviation starts growing rapidly, the army will not be able to exercise many operational options in future conflicts.

The loser will be the nation, but the army will get the blame.

Stance of the IAF The IAF still thinks that the growth of army aviation is a wasteful process, as the IAF is capable of providing all types of support to the ground forces. It also argues that all air components must be centrally controlled for optimum functioning, costeffectiveness and best results. At one time they floated the absurd argument that any object that flies must be under the IAF, till it was pointed out that all projectiles of the army delivered from the lowly rifle to guns, rockets and missiles fly through the air.

IAF also argues about the difficulties of air

space management, forgetting that this is not a problem peculiar to only our air space; militaries of most important countries have found answers, which are efficient and fool-proof.

In actuality, these are mere excuses and the main reason for their inordinately rigid position is the misconception that the growth of army aviation will reduce the size of the IAF. Institutionally, this is anathema to them, as their aim has always been to grow bigger and bigger. It is of course a baseless fear; there is plenty of room for both to grow in their respective spheres.

The IAF had used the same approach earlier to stymie the establishment and later growth of naval aviation, but the navy stuck to its guns, like limpet mines on the hull of ships and did not accept any dilution in their visualisation of the size and shape of the naval air arm. The result is that it has a full-fledged air component, which has contributed immensely to the all round development of the Indian Navy.

While one can sympathise with the aspirations of the IAF to grow to a large and formidable force, it must not usurp the

genuine operational requirements of army aviation. Diminishing the fighting potential of ground forces, on account of the grandiose turf considerations of the IAF is not only incorrect but is self-serving.

The army’s treatment of the IAF with kid gloves for maintaining inter-service harmony and not pushing hard enough was with the hope that better sense will prevail. In hind-sight, although altruistic, it has been a wrong policy.

Aviation Corps of Selected Armies All professional armies of the world have their own fully equipped aviation arm, because even the best air forces have severe limitations in carrying out many tasks which are intimately concerned with the land battle.

While their organisations may differ, they all have a combination of reconnaissance; attack; utility; and medium lift helicopters, as well as a small proportion of fixed wing aircraft for meeting functional requirements of aerial command posts; communications; electronic warfare; casualty evacuation; and some logistics functions. They are thus immediately available to the land forces commanders for operational tasks of great importance that influence the outcome of battles.

Space does not permit a listing of the structures and organisations of the army aviation components of selected countries in detail.

However, the following table not only lists the army aviation platforms of selected countries, but also juxtaposes them with the strength of their militaries and their holding of major equipment in terms of tanks, other armoured fighting vehicles (AFV’s) and aircraft: (Table 1) It would be clear from the table that our army aviation is minuscule when compared to the size of our army and the long and geographically dispersed and varied borders we have to guard.

Rationale for Growth of Army Aviation The question usually asked by persons who do not understand the intricacies of the land battle is why does the army, or for that matter the navy, need their own aviation arms, especially when we have a first class IAF. The answers are actually quite simple.

DSI

First, there are certain operational and logistics tasks which are best performed by integral resources of the army or the navy, because of the intimate nature of support and the need for immediate application of aviation assets. It is not possible for air forces to carry out such tasks, however efficient they may be.

Secondly, it is only army pilots who can correctly read the ground and the actions taking place in real time on the ground by rival armies.

Even the best air force pilots cannot do so, despite considerable practice. Consequently, the army aviation pilots must man the aerial platforms, which are going to support the operations taking place on the battlefield.

Conflicts in various parts of the world have further reinforced this, as it is only integral aviation resources which would provide the field force commander real time battlefield flexibility and consequent enhancement in combat power.

The roles and tasks of army aviation in the coming decades need to be derived by looking at the battlefield milieu of the future. Proxy war, including terrorism by non-state actors are major challenges, which would increase in lethality and vigour. These are in addition to the ever present danger of fighting a conventional war, in the backdrop of a nuclear threat.

Army aviation gives additional tactical capabilities to the field commanders, as their areas of influence increases. It does so by a combination of reconnaissance, mobility and firepower, which enable commanders to exploit fleeting opportunities. Army aviation expands the ground commander’s battle space well beyond the effective range of ground manoeuvre forces at successive echelons of command and enables them to achieve the effects of mass without massing weapons systems.

Army aviation’s greatest contribution to battlefield success is the ability it gives the commander to apply decisive combat power at critical times, virtually anywhere on the battlefield. This may be direct fire from aviation maneouvre units or the insertion of major infantry forces or artillery fires, delivered into combat. This versatility is the very essence of army aviation.

Army aviation plays an important role in counter-insurgency operations too.

17

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ARMY AVIATION

FEBRUARY 2013

A security official walks among a group of Dhruv Helicopters of India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL)

AFP

Army Aviation must provide combat, combat support and combat service support capabilities, across the full spectrum of operations, to all field commanders. Its inherent versatility, manoeuvre advantage and effectiveness in battle must influence all dimensions of the future battle space. Highly motivated army aviators, equipped with modern aviation platforms and related systems, and trained to world class proficiency, must provide commanders at all levels an exponential increase in lethality, a force multiplier of the highest level and a technologically competent leadership, to achieve decisive

aviation is still stuck in a changeless groove.

As presently structured, it has a number of limitations in aerial platforms, manpower and organisational structures. It continues to be a force that is unable to provide comprehensive aviation support to the army, as its capabilities are severely limited.

The army wants its aviation component to grow but it has not displayed adequate vigour in pushing for a decision on account of a self-imposed policy of ‘staying of its hands’, being the senior and the bigger service. This false sense of not ruffling the feathers of smaller services even when it costs an arm and a leg has served the army badly, not only in ensuring the legitimate growth of army aviation but also in other important spheres.

The IAF is the biggest stumbling block in the growth of army aviation. Its obduracy and opposition are a meaningless and repetitious litany of excuses. The last player the MoD, is unconcerned and is blasé about the army’s requirements. A great pity indeed!

Presently, army aviation flies

predominantly light helicopters. It has only about a dozen squadrons and less than 50 Reconnaissance and Observation (R&O) flights, equipped with about 200 Chetak and Cheetah helicopters of 1960 and 1970 vintages, as well as a few utility flights, equipped with the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH). The few armed light helicopters (Ranjit and Lancer) are now defunct, though plans exist to arm some ALH (Dhruv) with weapons. The irony is that the attack helicopters currently held have been paid from the army budget, but continue to be with the IAF, despite strong objections from the army. Army aviation does not have its own pilot’s cadre and the existing 460 officer pilots are all seconded from other arms/corps.

The Army Aviation Corps (AAC) needs to perform a variety of roles to be called a complete force, but the present structure of the AAC inhibits it from performing them. The roles it must perform are attack; combat fire support; electronic and visual surveillance; as well as aerial photography; tactical lift; logistical functions; communications;

16

Army Aviation2ndtime.indd 16-17

casualty evacuation; provision of airborne command posts; electronic warfare; and monitoring of the nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) environment. However, its present structure and aviation platforms inhibit it from performing all roles.

Unless army aviation starts growing rapidly, the army will not be able to exercise many operational options in future conflicts.

The loser will be the nation, but the army will get the blame.

Stance of the IAF The IAF still thinks that the growth of army aviation is a wasteful process, as the IAF is capable of providing all types of support to the ground forces. It also argues that all air components must be centrally controlled for optimum functioning, costeffectiveness and best results. At one time they floated the absurd argument that any object that flies must be under the IAF, till it was pointed out that all projectiles of the army delivered from the lowly rifle to guns, rockets and missiles fly through the air.

IAF also argues about the difficulties of air

space management, forgetting that this is not a problem peculiar to only our air space; militaries of most important countries have found answers, which are efficient and fool-proof.

In actuality, these are mere excuses and the main reason for their inordinately rigid position is the misconception that the growth of army aviation will reduce the size of the IAF. Institutionally, this is anathema to them, as their aim has always been to grow bigger and bigger. It is of course a baseless fear; there is plenty of room for both to grow in their respective spheres.

The IAF had used the same approach earlier to stymie the establishment and later growth of naval aviation, but the navy stuck to its guns, like limpet mines on the hull of ships and did not accept any dilution in their visualisation of the size and shape of the naval air arm. The result is that it has a full-fledged air component, which has contributed immensely to the all round development of the Indian Navy.

While one can sympathise with the aspirations of the IAF to grow to a large and formidable force, it must not usurp the

genuine operational requirements of army aviation. Diminishing the fighting potential of ground forces, on account of the grandiose turf considerations of the IAF is not only incorrect but is self-serving.

The army’s treatment of the IAF with kid gloves for maintaining inter-service harmony and not pushing hard enough was with the hope that better sense will prevail. In hind-sight, although altruistic, it has been a wrong policy.

Aviation Corps of Selected Armies All professional armies of the world have their own fully equipped aviation arm, because even the best air forces have severe limitations in carrying out many tasks which are intimately concerned with the land battle.

While their organisations may differ, they all have a combination of reconnaissance; attack; utility; and medium lift helicopters, as well as a small proportion of fixed wing aircraft for meeting functional requirements of aerial command posts; communications; electronic warfare; casualty evacuation; and some logistics functions. They are thus immediately available to the land forces commanders for operational tasks of great importance that influence the outcome of battles.

Space does not permit a listing of the structures and organisations of the army aviation components of selected countries in detail.

However, the following table not only lists the army aviation platforms of selected countries, but also juxtaposes them with the strength of their militaries and their holding of major equipment in terms of tanks, other armoured fighting vehicles (AFV’s) and aircraft: (Table 1) It would be clear from the table that our army aviation is minuscule when compared to the size of our army and the long and geographically dispersed and varied borders we have to guard.

Rationale for Growth of Army Aviation The question usually asked by persons who do not understand the intricacies of the land battle is why does the army, or for that matter the navy, need their own aviation arms, especially when we have a first class IAF. The answers are actually quite simple.

DSI

First, there are certain operational and logistics tasks which are best performed by integral resources of the army or the navy, because of the intimate nature of support and the need for immediate application of aviation assets. It is not possible for air forces to carry out such tasks, however efficient they may be.

Secondly, it is only army pilots who can correctly read the ground and the actions taking place in real time on the ground by rival armies.

Even the best air force pilots cannot do so, despite considerable practice. Consequently, the army aviation pilots must man the aerial platforms, which are going to support the operations taking place on the battlefield.

Conflicts in various parts of the world have further reinforced this, as it is only integral aviation resources which would provide the field force commander real time battlefield flexibility and consequent enhancement in combat power.

The roles and tasks of army aviation in the coming decades need to be derived by looking at the battlefield milieu of the future. Proxy war, including terrorism by non-state actors are major challenges, which would increase in lethality and vigour. These are in addition to the ever present danger of fighting a conventional war, in the backdrop of a nuclear threat.

Army aviation gives additional tactical capabilities to the field commanders, as their areas of influence increases. It does so by a combination of reconnaissance, mobility and firepower, which enable commanders to exploit fleeting opportunities. Army aviation expands the ground commander’s battle space well beyond the effective range of ground manoeuvre forces at successive echelons of command and enables them to achieve the effects of mass without massing weapons systems.

Army aviation’s greatest contribution to battlefield success is the ability it gives the commander to apply decisive combat power at critical times, virtually anywhere on the battlefield. This may be direct fire from aviation maneouvre units or the insertion of major infantry forces or artillery fires, delivered into combat. This versatility is the very essence of army aviation.

Army aviation plays an important role in counter-insurgency operations too.

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FEBRUARY 2013

The operational diversities of the Indian Army, coupled with the variety of terrain; extensive deployment in mountainous and high altitude areas; need for over the crest line observation for reconnaissance by field commanders.

Tasks include detection by sensors, raids by armed helicopters, quick positioning of infantry to seal escape routes, aerial assault where feasible, and movement of reinforcements speedily by utility and medium-lift helicopters.

Boeing AH-64 Apache Longbow AFP

Suggested Areas of Growth Reconnaissance, attack, utility, and medium lift helicopters; medical evacuation platforms; and air traffic control units are all required to support the army.

The Special Forces (SF) need dedicated aviation assets for the successful conduct of operations. Army aviation must also provide aerial platforms for command, control and communications, as well as for electronic warfare. In addition, intuitive and versatile leaders, staff officers and welltrained soldiers are also essential for future operations.

In the Indian Army, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) are presently grouped with the artillery. This needs to be changed.

UAV’s are best grouped with aviation units, especially as UAV’s and manned attack helicopters have successfully conducted hunter-killer joint operations in the US and other armies. It is a logical and a costeffective option, which is likely to give better pay-offs.

The operational diversities of the Indian Army, coupled with the variety of terrain; extensive deployment in mountainous and high altitude areas; need for over the crest line observation for reconnaissance by field commanders; direction of artillery fire; casualty evacuation from inaccessible areas; and speedy move of commanders to the forward posts which are difficult to access; make the need for a dedicated aviation unit for every infantry and mountain division and in some cases to independent brigade group levels too a necessity.

In plains and deserts, the integration of the third dimension with mechanised forces by way of attack and scout helicopters is essential.

All armoured divisions need a dedicated attack helicopter squadron, in addition to a reconnaissance and observation squadron.

The following recommendations are made to enhance the combat potential of Army Aviation:

TABLE 1

Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV’s) and Aircraft COUNTRY

STRENGTH

TANKS

AFV’S

AIRCRAFT

AVIATION

INDIA

1,325,000

3,215

1,810

632

(<) 250

CHINA

2,285,000

7,550 (+)

5,150 (+)

2,554

522

619,000

2,640 (+)

I,266

376

550

USA

1,477,896

9,573

26,653

4,269

5,263

RUSSIA

I,200,000

23,000 (+)

27,190 (+)

2,080

1,700

UK

2,24,500

420

4,347

1,300

350

FRANCE

3,62,485

406

8,468

1,300

424

GERMANY

1,48,496

408

1,794

780

568

PAKISTAN

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Army Aviation2ndtime.indd 18-19

DSI

• AAC must have a mix of small fixed wing aircraft and a full complement helicopter fleet comprising attack, utility and light helicopters.

• Fixed wing aircraft are needed by AAC for communications duties, as airborne command posts, for reconnaissance and surveillance, for casualty evacuation and similar other tasks.

• The helicopter fleet should consist of attack helicopters; armed helicopters (gun, ships); heavy, medium and light lift utility helicopters; observation helicopters; and helicopters for communications, electronic warfare and as aerial command posts.

• One or more composite squadrons specially dedicated for functioning with the Special Forces are essential.

• Headquarters Commands and Corps need to have aviation brigades and divisions should have aviation squadrons. Armoured divisions need to have attack helicopter squadrons in addition.

• UAV’s need to be integrated with the AAC for optimum results.

• All logistics functions need to be integrated within the AAC and the present system of control of logistics manpower by different corps needs to be dispensed with.

• Besides hardware, manpower upgrade, to include a separate aviation cadre, increased intake of aviators; recruitment and training of technical as well as nontechnical manpower; revision of war and peace establishments; and introduction of new trades needed.

• Other changes include modernisation of aviation bases, raising of aviation brigades and logistics units; restructuring of training establishments; enhancement of air field support services; dedicated communication systems; and the upgrade of the Army Aviation Directorate, which is now manned by an additional director general level officer.

Conclusion The strength of army aviation is in its ability to deploy quickly, conduct reconnaissance and surveillance,

manoeuvre rapidly, and apply tremendous combat power for the land forces commander.

Army aviation’s mobility and firepower make it a dominant force, as it gives the commander a force that can rapidly build devastating firepower at any point on the battlefield. Army aviation’s strength is its versatility to deploy quickly, see the battlefield, manoeuvre rapidly, and focus maximum combat power at decisive points.

Army aviation needs to develop organisations that enhance capabilities to support the concepts of operations of field commanders. The force structure should be tailored to meet evolving operational requirements. In addition, aviation organisations should include appropriate maintenance and logistical support elements required to sustain the force. Aviation leadership development should be expanded to prepare aviation leaders for the diverse challenges that this DSI versatile force requires.

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ARMY AVIATION

FEBRUARY 2013

The operational diversities of the Indian Army, coupled with the variety of terrain; extensive deployment in mountainous and high altitude areas; need for over the crest line observation for reconnaissance by field commanders.

Tasks include detection by sensors, raids by armed helicopters, quick positioning of infantry to seal escape routes, aerial assault where feasible, and movement of reinforcements speedily by utility and medium-lift helicopters.

Boeing AH-64 Apache Longbow AFP

Suggested Areas of Growth Reconnaissance, attack, utility, and medium lift helicopters; medical evacuation platforms; and air traffic control units are all required to support the army.

The Special Forces (SF) need dedicated aviation assets for the successful conduct of operations. Army aviation must also provide aerial platforms for command, control and communications, as well as for electronic warfare. In addition, intuitive and versatile leaders, staff officers and welltrained soldiers are also essential for future operations.

In the Indian Army, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) are presently grouped with the artillery. This needs to be changed.

UAV’s are best grouped with aviation units, especially as UAV’s and manned attack helicopters have successfully conducted hunter-killer joint operations in the US and other armies. It is a logical and a costeffective option, which is likely to give better pay-offs.

The operational diversities of the Indian Army, coupled with the variety of terrain; extensive deployment in mountainous and high altitude areas; need for over the crest line observation for reconnaissance by field commanders; direction of artillery fire; casualty evacuation from inaccessible areas; and speedy move of commanders to the forward posts which are difficult to access; make the need for a dedicated aviation unit for every infantry and mountain division and in some cases to independent brigade group levels too a necessity.

In plains and deserts, the integration of the third dimension with mechanised forces by way of attack and scout helicopters is essential.

All armoured divisions need a dedicated attack helicopter squadron, in addition to a reconnaissance and observation squadron.

The following recommendations are made to enhance the combat potential of Army Aviation:

TABLE 1

Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV’s) and Aircraft COUNTRY

STRENGTH

TANKS

AFV’S

AIRCRAFT

AVIATION

INDIA

1,325,000

3,215

1,810

632

(<) 250

CHINA

2,285,000

7,550 (+)

5,150 (+)

2,554

522

619,000

2,640 (+)

I,266

376

550

USA

1,477,896

9,573

26,653

4,269

5,263

RUSSIA

I,200,000

23,000 (+)

27,190 (+)

2,080

1,700

UK

2,24,500

420

4,347

1,300

350

FRANCE

3,62,485

406

8,468

1,300

424

GERMANY

1,48,496

408

1,794

780

568

PAKISTAN

18

Army Aviation2ndtime.indd 18-19

DSI

• AAC must have a mix of small fixed wing aircraft and a full complement helicopter fleet comprising attack, utility and light helicopters.

• Fixed wing aircraft are needed by AAC for communications duties, as airborne command posts, for reconnaissance and surveillance, for casualty evacuation and similar other tasks.

• The helicopter fleet should consist of attack helicopters; armed helicopters (gun, ships); heavy, medium and light lift utility helicopters; observation helicopters; and helicopters for communications, electronic warfare and as aerial command posts.

• One or more composite squadrons specially dedicated for functioning with the Special Forces are essential.

• Headquarters Commands and Corps need to have aviation brigades and divisions should have aviation squadrons. Armoured divisions need to have attack helicopter squadrons in addition.

• UAV’s need to be integrated with the AAC for optimum results.

• All logistics functions need to be integrated within the AAC and the present system of control of logistics manpower by different corps needs to be dispensed with.

• Besides hardware, manpower upgrade, to include a separate aviation cadre, increased intake of aviators; recruitment and training of technical as well as nontechnical manpower; revision of war and peace establishments; and introduction of new trades needed.

• Other changes include modernisation of aviation bases, raising of aviation brigades and logistics units; restructuring of training establishments; enhancement of air field support services; dedicated communication systems; and the upgrade of the Army Aviation Directorate, which is now manned by an additional director general level officer.

Conclusion The strength of army aviation is in its ability to deploy quickly, conduct reconnaissance and surveillance,

manoeuvre rapidly, and apply tremendous combat power for the land forces commander.

Army aviation’s mobility and firepower make it a dominant force, as it gives the commander a force that can rapidly build devastating firepower at any point on the battlefield. Army aviation’s strength is its versatility to deploy quickly, see the battlefield, manoeuvre rapidly, and focus maximum combat power at decisive points.

Army aviation needs to develop organisations that enhance capabilities to support the concepts of operations of field commanders. The force structure should be tailored to meet evolving operational requirements. In addition, aviation organisations should include appropriate maintenance and logistical support elements required to sustain the force. Aviation leadership development should be expanded to prepare aviation leaders for the diverse challenges that this DSI versatile force requires.

19

30/01/13 5:07 PM

ARMY DOLDRUMS

FEBRUARY 2013

IN DEEP WATERS: MODERNISING THE ARMY

Rahul Bedi

In this era of modernising the armed forces, Indian Army has proved to be the laggard. While it withstands shortages in all the arms, the infantry and the artillery are the worst hit. The procurement process that require multi-level clearances are caught in a maze of bureaucratic regulations in the defence ministry - the administering body for all the three services. But clearly the danger of eroding an army that is a conventional deterrent in an unstable security environment, threatens the country severely.

KEY POINTS

The Soviet era legacy weaponry needs to be replaced urgently with the cutting edge materiel While the army's 12th five year plan is ambitious, there are very few takers at least in the community of retired army officials The ‘military transformation’ that the previous chief of army staff, General Vijay Kumar Singh had thought of, remained still-born with he being embroiled in controversies with the government on the one side, and on the other, a faction of serving officers and recently retired officers

T

AFP

Multi barrel rocket launcher SMERCH at Republic Day parade

20

Rahul_bedi2ndtime.indd 20-21

he war fighting capability of India’s 1.2 million-strong army, its evolving doctrine and overall competence in confronting emerging security challenges in a turbulent neighbourhood and beyond, stands compromised by its continuallypostponed modernisation.

Its proficiency is constricted by the vacillation in decision making by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), solely responsible for the army’s overall modernisation and evolvement as it grapples with acute equipment shortages, obsolete hardware and restricted nightfighting capacity to execute the entire spectrum of conflict from nuclear engagement to low-intensity warfare.

“Ambitious plans to transform the army from threat-based to capability-based

force by 2022 proficient in conducting hybrid missions, countering asymmetric threats and even possibly fighting a war against China and Pakistan, have been thwarted by the MoD’s hidebound bureaucracy”, said retired Lt Gen Naresh Chand.

An equally indecisive Army headquarters was equally complicit, he declared tardy in drawing up qualitative requirements for varied materiel while routinely dispatching tenders, withdrawing and re-issuing them with tedious regularity but ultimately without closure.

“Such inept doings deprive the army of sustaining its combat edge in a proliferating technological milieu not only in conventional operations but also in handling nontraditional and sub-conventional threats”, Gen Chand declared.

But this goal was circumscribed further by the recent Rs 100 billion ($ 1.8 billion) cut in the Services capital or acquisition allocation for modernisation for the current financial year ending in March.

Consequently, military planners cautioned that the army’s overall upgrade to replace its voluminous Soviet and Russian-era equipment - much of it having reached collective obsolescence - and its concomitant doctrinal implementation, could be postponed beyond the 14th Five-Year Plan (2022-2027). There is concurrence in Indian military circles that the army’s modernisation is the most sluggish of the three Services.

It’s axiomatic that the army’s desired capacity transformation is pegged fundamentally to modernisation with well-accoutred fighting units trained and equipped to perform varied and often interchangeable operational roles. “Till equipment deficiencies are vindicated the army’s structure and operational ethos will continue largely to pursue a linear direction” warned retired Lieutenant General Vijay Kapoor.

The feeble riposte the army proposed as a punitive response against Pakistan for ‘sponsoring’ the November 2008 terror strike on Mumbai in which 165 people died, he stressed, merely highlighted the inadequacies of its conventional deterrence.

DSI

More importantly these gaps will limit the army’s capacity to effectively operationalise its newly enunciated ‘Cold Start’ doctrine or ‘Pro-active Strategy’ of launching a pre-emptive conventional offensive against Pakistan in a limited war scenario to achieve negotiable military gains in a nuclear weapons environment.

Predicated to deploying more efficient networked platforms in greater numbers than currently in service, this strategy envisages converting static formations deployed in defensive roles along the Pakistani frontier into ‘integrated battle groups’ capable of undertaking swift, punitive strikes with minimum re-organisation.

These inadequacies will also affect the army’s supplementary tasks which include deploying intermittently on UN Peace Keeping missions and domestically on humanitarian missions.

The materiel shortfalls highlighted by former army chief General V K Singh in a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh leaked to the DNA newspaper last March - include badly - needed light observation, attack and heavy lift helicopters, howitzers and all-weather, night-fighting capable main battle tanks (MBTs) and infantry combat vehicles (ICVs). Rocket artillery, air defence platforms, assorted small arms, varied missiles and ordnance and communication equipment comprise the army’s burgeoning deficiencies.

It presently requires clearance from 18 MoD and associated departments and agencies to clear acquisitions either domestically, through imports or both.

Consequently, purchases mandated to take 36-48 months according to successive DPP editions took 7-8 years if not longer while critical Fast Track Procurements (FTPs) - directed to be cleared in 12-18 months - were equally delayed.

Analysts concede that the MoD needed to acquire significant stakes in its development, rather than abandoning the process to the respective Service headquarters, forever squabbling over their ‘Me-first’ approach and hustling for allocations to operationalise their changing doctrines.

21

30/01/13 5:11 PM

ARMY DOLDRUMS

FEBRUARY 2013

IN DEEP WATERS: MODERNISING THE ARMY

Rahul Bedi

In this era of modernising the armed forces, Indian Army has proved to be the laggard. While it withstands shortages in all the arms, the infantry and the artillery are the worst hit. The procurement process that require multi-level clearances are caught in a maze of bureaucratic regulations in the defence ministry - the administering body for all the three services. But clearly the danger of eroding an army that is a conventional deterrent in an unstable security environment, threatens the country severely.

KEY POINTS

The Soviet era legacy weaponry needs to be replaced urgently with the cutting edge materiel While the army's 12th five year plan is ambitious, there are very few takers at least in the community of retired army officials The ‘military transformation’ that the previous chief of army staff, General Vijay Kumar Singh had thought of, remained still-born with he being embroiled in controversies with the government on the one side, and on the other, a faction of serving officers and recently retired officers

T

AFP

Multi barrel rocket launcher SMERCH at Republic Day parade

20

Rahul_bedi2ndtime.indd 20-21

he war fighting capability of India’s 1.2 million-strong army, its evolving doctrine and overall competence in confronting emerging security challenges in a turbulent neighbourhood and beyond, stands compromised by its continuallypostponed modernisation.

Its proficiency is constricted by the vacillation in decision making by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), solely responsible for the army’s overall modernisation and evolvement as it grapples with acute equipment shortages, obsolete hardware and restricted nightfighting capacity to execute the entire spectrum of conflict from nuclear engagement to low-intensity warfare.

“Ambitious plans to transform the army from threat-based to capability-based

force by 2022 proficient in conducting hybrid missions, countering asymmetric threats and even possibly fighting a war against China and Pakistan, have been thwarted by the MoD’s hidebound bureaucracy”, said retired Lt Gen Naresh Chand.

An equally indecisive Army headquarters was equally complicit, he declared tardy in drawing up qualitative requirements for varied materiel while routinely dispatching tenders, withdrawing and re-issuing them with tedious regularity but ultimately without closure.

“Such inept doings deprive the army of sustaining its combat edge in a proliferating technological milieu not only in conventional operations but also in handling nontraditional and sub-conventional threats”, Gen Chand declared.

But this goal was circumscribed further by the recent Rs 100 billion ($ 1.8 billion) cut in the Services capital or acquisition allocation for modernisation for the current financial year ending in March.

Consequently, military planners cautioned that the army’s overall upgrade to replace its voluminous Soviet and Russian-era equipment - much of it having reached collective obsolescence - and its concomitant doctrinal implementation, could be postponed beyond the 14th Five-Year Plan (2022-2027). There is concurrence in Indian military circles that the army’s modernisation is the most sluggish of the three Services.

It’s axiomatic that the army’s desired capacity transformation is pegged fundamentally to modernisation with well-accoutred fighting units trained and equipped to perform varied and often interchangeable operational roles. “Till equipment deficiencies are vindicated the army’s structure and operational ethos will continue largely to pursue a linear direction” warned retired Lieutenant General Vijay Kapoor.

The feeble riposte the army proposed as a punitive response against Pakistan for ‘sponsoring’ the November 2008 terror strike on Mumbai in which 165 people died, he stressed, merely highlighted the inadequacies of its conventional deterrence.

DSI

More importantly these gaps will limit the army’s capacity to effectively operationalise its newly enunciated ‘Cold Start’ doctrine or ‘Pro-active Strategy’ of launching a pre-emptive conventional offensive against Pakistan in a limited war scenario to achieve negotiable military gains in a nuclear weapons environment.

Predicated to deploying more efficient networked platforms in greater numbers than currently in service, this strategy envisages converting static formations deployed in defensive roles along the Pakistani frontier into ‘integrated battle groups’ capable of undertaking swift, punitive strikes with minimum re-organisation.

These inadequacies will also affect the army’s supplementary tasks which include deploying intermittently on UN Peace Keeping missions and domestically on humanitarian missions.

The materiel shortfalls highlighted by former army chief General V K Singh in a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh leaked to the DNA newspaper last March - include badly - needed light observation, attack and heavy lift helicopters, howitzers and all-weather, night-fighting capable main battle tanks (MBTs) and infantry combat vehicles (ICVs). Rocket artillery, air defence platforms, assorted small arms, varied missiles and ordnance and communication equipment comprise the army’s burgeoning deficiencies.

It presently requires clearance from 18 MoD and associated departments and agencies to clear acquisitions either domestically, through imports or both.

Consequently, purchases mandated to take 36-48 months according to successive DPP editions took 7-8 years if not longer while critical Fast Track Procurements (FTPs) - directed to be cleared in 12-18 months - were equally delayed.

Analysts concede that the MoD needed to acquire significant stakes in its development, rather than abandoning the process to the respective Service headquarters, forever squabbling over their ‘Me-first’ approach and hustling for allocations to operationalise their changing doctrines.

21

30/01/13 5:11 PM

ARMY DOLDRUMS Gen Singhʼs disclosure was no secret having been corroborated over decades by successive parliamentary defence committees, the Comptroller and Auditor General and Public Accounts Committee reports.

These watchdog organisations had collectively reiterated that Indiaʼs materiel acquisition procedures were tardy.

T-90 Tank at Republic Day Parade

and 66 associated counter- insurgency Rashtriya Rifles (RR) units is making incremental progress. Over 305,000 infantry troops and around 56,000 RR personnel lack basic weapons, ballistic helmets, lightweight bullet proof jackets and night vision devices (NVDs), assorted ordnance and mine protected vehicles (MPVs). The infantry directorate recently projected a Rs 340 billion shortfall of equipment which it had been persistently demanding for years but not received as the MoD had either cancelled tenders, deferred urgent requirement proposals or was still mulling their feasibility.

This deficit includes some 200,000 close quarter battle (CQB) carbines to replace the outdated 9mm carbines currently in use, an equal number of assault rifles to succeed the locally developed INSAS 5.56mm assault rifle (AR) - which both the army and MoD recently discarded -15,000 general purpose machine guns, 1100 light-weight antimateriel es, 225 MPVs andwith 64 snow Chineserifl President, Hu Jintao scooters employment at heights above Prime for MInister.

Dr Manmoihan Singh 21,000 feet in Siachen.

22

Rahul_bedi2ndtime.indd 22-23

Alongside, the over Rs 250 billion ambitious Future Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS) programme to modernise infantry and RR battalions 2020 onwards to become a fully networked, all-terrain, all-weather personal equipment platform force with enhanced firepower and mobility for the digitised battlefield of the future, also stands deferred.

Official sources said the F-INSAS prototype that was to be completed by 2012-13 through a combination of imports and locally designed equipment, has been delayed by at least five years if not more with the eventual overall upgrade postponed to well beyond its projected date of 2025-27.

F-INSAS is divided into five categories: modular weapons, body armour, hand-held target acquisition devices and communication equipment to enable soldiers to transmit and receive voice, data and video systems. Portable computers in the shape of “wrist displays” for soldiers and “planning boards” for commanders would complete the programme.

DSI

Over the past few months, however, the MoD has incrementally launched the process to import (44,618) 5.56mm CQB carbines featuring four competing models and 33.6 million rounds of ammunition by conducting field trials at Mhow, Pokhran and at high altitudes in the northeast.

Facing off for the tender are Israel Weapon Industries (IWI) fielding its Galil Ace carbine, Italy’s Baretta with its ARX160 and USA’s Colt and Sig Sauer’s offering the M4 and 516 rifle models respectively.

The selected CQB carbine vendor will be required to transfer technology to the OFB to licence build some 380,000400,000 carbines for use by the army, the paramilitaries and eventually state police forces.

Meanwhile, the mission reliability of a significant proportion of the army’s mechanised forces-around 2500 Russian and locally built T-72 and T-72M1s ‘Ajeya’ MBTs that form the backbone of its 59-odd armour regiments and some 2,200 Sovietdesigned ‘Sarath’ BMP-II ICVs was low

EAGLE: Common Platform for a Family of Multirole Vehicles

Defense Solutions for the Future 23

gdels.com

AFP

Blacklisting of foreign vendors too had reduced the army’s procurement options.

So much so that the 14-member Naresh Chandra committee appointed last year to re-examine military reforms is believed to have argued against the frequent and somewhat arbitrary proscribing of foreign vendors.

It reportedly recommended that this blacklisting needlessly delayed India’s military modernisation, dependent largely on imports. India imports over 74 per cent of its materiel needs - a proportion that is steadily rising.

“The gross equipment shortfall that emerged during the 1999 Kargil conflict has over years, disastrously multiplied to reach alarming proportions presently” said retired Major General Sheru Thapliyal. It will take the army decades of decisive action and steadfastness to good this vital deficit, he declared.

The Army’s 12th Plan (2012-17) details impressive plans to bolster its combat capability against China and Pakistan and upgrade military infrastructure along its borders. During this period it also plans on overcoming “slippages” which handicapped it during the previous, 11th Five-Year plan, but a cross-section of senior, serving and retired officers were sceptical if these limitations could be resolved soon.

“Over 85 per cent of the equipment is decades-old, but due to a number of systemic impediments the pace of modernisation has been lagging by more than 10 years” said retired Major General Mrinal Suman, India’s foremost expert on acquisitions and offsets.

He said India is poised to spend at least $120 billion over the next 10-15 years on defence buys and estimates that efficient procurement procedures could save it up to 15 per cent or $18 billion in initial purchase price and associated life-cycle costs in addition to acquiring modern equipment on time. “But what we need to achieve this is a thorough overhaul of the acquisition process” Gen Suman declared.

An audit of the army’s equipment profile is illuminating.

Upgrade of its 359 infantry battalions

FEBRUARY 2013

30/01/13 5:13 PM

ARMY DOLDRUMS Gen Singhʼs disclosure was no secret having been corroborated over decades by successive parliamentary defence committees, the Comptroller and Auditor General and Public Accounts Committee reports.

These watchdog organisations had collectively reiterated that Indiaʼs materiel acquisition procedures were tardy.

T-90 Tank at Republic Day Parade

and 66 associated counter- insurgency Rashtriya Rifles (RR) units is making incremental progress. Over 305,000 infantry troops and around 56,000 RR personnel lack basic weapons, ballistic helmets, lightweight bullet proof jackets and night vision devices (NVDs), assorted ordnance and mine protected vehicles (MPVs). The infantry directorate recently projected a Rs 340 billion shortfall of equipment which it had been persistently demanding for years but not received as the MoD had either cancelled tenders, deferred urgent requirement proposals or was still mulling their feasibility.

This deficit includes some 200,000 close quarter battle (CQB) carbines to replace the outdated 9mm carbines currently in use, an equal number of assault rifles to succeed the locally developed INSAS 5.56mm assault rifle (AR) - which both the army and MoD recently discarded -15,000 general purpose machine guns, 1100 light-weight antimateriel es, 225 MPVs andwith 64 snow Chineserifl President, Hu Jintao scooters employment at heights above Prime for MInister.

Dr Manmoihan Singh 21,000 feet in Siachen.

22

Rahul_bedi2ndtime.indd 22-23

Alongside, the over Rs 250 billion ambitious Future Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS) programme to modernise infantry and RR battalions 2020 onwards to become a fully networked, all-terrain, all-weather personal equipment platform force with enhanced firepower and mobility for the digitised battlefield of the future, also stands deferred.

Official sources said the F-INSAS prototype that was to be completed by 2012-13 through a combination of imports and locally designed equipment, has been delayed by at least five years if not more with the eventual overall upgrade postponed to well beyond its projected date of 2025-27.

F-INSAS is divided into five categories: modular weapons, body armour, hand-held target acquisition devices and communication equipment to enable soldiers to transmit and receive voice, data and video systems. Portable computers in the shape of “wrist displays” for soldiers and “planning boards” for commanders would complete the programme.

DSI

Over the past few months, however, the MoD has incrementally launched the process to import (44,618) 5.56mm CQB carbines featuring four competing models and 33.6 million rounds of ammunition by conducting field trials at Mhow, Pokhran and at high altitudes in the northeast.

Facing off for the tender are Israel Weapon Industries (IWI) fielding its Galil Ace carbine, Italy’s Baretta with its ARX160 and USA’s Colt and Sig Sauer’s offering the M4 and 516 rifle models respectively.

The selected CQB carbine vendor will be required to transfer technology to the OFB to licence build some 380,000400,000 carbines for use by the army, the paramilitaries and eventually state police forces.

Meanwhile, the mission reliability of a significant proportion of the army’s mechanised forces-around 2500 Russian and locally built T-72 and T-72M1s ‘Ajeya’ MBTs that form the backbone of its 59-odd armour regiments and some 2,200 Sovietdesigned ‘Sarath’ BMP-II ICVs was low

EAGLE: Common Platform for a Family of Multirole Vehicles

Defense Solutions for the Future 23

gdels.com

AFP

Blacklisting of foreign vendors too had reduced the army’s procurement options.

So much so that the 14-member Naresh Chandra committee appointed last year to re-examine military reforms is believed to have argued against the frequent and somewhat arbitrary proscribing of foreign vendors.

It reportedly recommended that this blacklisting needlessly delayed India’s military modernisation, dependent largely on imports. India imports over 74 per cent of its materiel needs - a proportion that is steadily rising.

“The gross equipment shortfall that emerged during the 1999 Kargil conflict has over years, disastrously multiplied to reach alarming proportions presently” said retired Major General Sheru Thapliyal. It will take the army decades of decisive action and steadfastness to good this vital deficit, he declared.

The Army’s 12th Plan (2012-17) details impressive plans to bolster its combat capability against China and Pakistan and upgrade military infrastructure along its borders. During this period it also plans on overcoming “slippages” which handicapped it during the previous, 11th Five-Year plan, but a cross-section of senior, serving and retired officers were sceptical if these limitations could be resolved soon.

“Over 85 per cent of the equipment is decades-old, but due to a number of systemic impediments the pace of modernisation has been lagging by more than 10 years” said retired Major General Mrinal Suman, India’s foremost expert on acquisitions and offsets.

He said India is poised to spend at least $120 billion over the next 10-15 years on defence buys and estimates that efficient procurement procedures could save it up to 15 per cent or $18 billion in initial purchase price and associated life-cycle costs in addition to acquiring modern equipment on time. “But what we need to achieve this is a thorough overhaul of the acquisition process” Gen Suman declared.

An audit of the army’s equipment profile is illuminating.

Upgrade of its 359 infantry battalions

FEBRUARY 2013

30/01/13 5:13 PM

ARMY DOLDRUMS (APFSDS) rounds from Russia on grounds of ‘operational necessity’ as its War Wastage Reserves (WWR) had dropped below ‘critical levels’. Official sources said the ‘distress’ procurement reportedly at ‘inflated prices’ also obliged the MoD to waive the offset obligation of 30 per cent mandated for all Indian military purchases over Rs 3 billion.

The 657 imported Russian T-90S MBT’s with an additional 1000 to be built locally under licence and 124 indigenously designed Arjun MKI tanks inducted recently into service were capable of operating in the dark, but were too few to make any significant difference in a conflict situation.

Plans to locally construct 1000 T-90S MBTs at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) at Avadi near Chennai were restricted by piecemeal orders from the army and partial full technology transfer by the Russians with regard to the platforms gun and turret armour. A warehouse in Avadi full of manuals in Russian that awaited translation further hampered their local manufacture.

Initially, the T-90S’s fired Russianmade AMK-338 and AMK-339 rounds.

But these had more or less been exhausted in training and the MBTs 125mm smoothbore guns have yet to be configured to fire locally manufactured AMK 340 rounds, in effect leaving them virtually ammunition-less.

Production of 9M119 Refleks (NATO designation AT-11 ‘Sniper’) missiles by the state-owned Bharat Dynamics at Hyderabad scheduled to begin in early 2006 is also behind schedule as several test firings have been unsuccessful.

Russian technicians are being consulted to resolve the problem.

To modernise its armour fleet, the army recently placed an order for 124 additional Arjun’s to be built at HVF by 201516 and is expected to acquire another 250 of its upgraded Arjun Mk-II model equipped with missile-firing capability, indigenously designed ‘Kanchan’ explosive reactive armour to protect it from APFSDS and high explosive anti-tank rounds and rocket-propelled grenades. The Mk-II

24

Rahul_bedi2ndtime.indd 24-25

Eventually, the efficacy of the Indian army to manage possible future conflicts will depend on the speed with which it moves, concentrates and regroups rapidly over varied terrain, employs precision weaponry and integrated Command Control Communication Computers Intelligence Interoperability (C4I2) systems to operate under a nuclear overhang.

BAE systems M777 155mm/39 calibre Light weight Howitzer

AFP

with an inordinately large number lacking night fighting capability.

The majority of T-72’s await upgrades to enhance mobility, firepower and provide them with either full solution thermal imaging fire control systems or third generation partial solution thermal imaging stand alone systems (TISAS) to enable them to operate in darkness.

Merely 310 partial solution TISAS had been acquired from Israel’s El Op and installed on the T-72M1s, while an equal number were under acquisition.

Defence planners, however questioned the financial and operational sagacity in upgrading the ageing T-72’s with explosive reactive armour, fibre-optic gyro-based navigation and laser warning systems, frequency hopping radio sets and advanced nuclear, biological and chemical equipment to keep them in service till 2020 and even beyond. Stabilising its gun control system by attaching a new thermal shroud on its 125mm 2A46 smooth bore gun ensuring greater accuracy and equipping the MBT with a new and integrated fire detection and suppression system would complete the staggered retrofit package.

The T-72M1 fleet also faces a depletion of OFB-produced 125 mm AMK 340 shells with not enough rounds for the army to even carry out mandatory, bi-annual basic firing exercises. Armoured corps sources said some 150,000-200,000 AMK 340 rounds had since 2003 been destroyed due to a combination of defective manufacturing and negligence in storing.

Faulty barrels and questionable ammunition were also responsible for demoralising T-72M1 tank crews after a series of AMK 340 rounds burst inside tank barrels causing collateral damage.

Armoured corps officers said nervous tank crews were even refusing to fire the AMK 340 ordnance and when forced to do so and at times even resorted to elaborate ‘jugaad’ or innovative stratagems to detonate the shells from outside the MBT. This, in turn forced the MoD in late 2011 to initiate emergency measures to import some (66,000) 125mm Armour Piercing Fin-Stabilised Discarding Sabot

FEBRUARY 2013

model will cost an astronomical Rs 370 million or $ 6.72 million once completed with 93 improvements over the previous version.

The army’s artillery profile, however, is possibly the direst with 180-odd field artillery regiments employing at least six calibres that were either obsolete or fast approaching that state. Around 32 artillery regiments were equipped with 410 FH-77B 155 mm Bofors guns imported in the late 1980s-presently reduced to half this number following cannibalisation due to the non-availability of spares - and 180 Soviet 130mm M-46 field guns reportedly upgraded somewhat unsatisfactorily to 155 mm/45 calibre status jointly by Soltam of Israel and the OFB. The remaining 148 or so regiments still operate Soviet D-30 122 mm guns, the locally-designed and OFB-built 105mm Indian Field Guns, its Light Field Gun derivative and imported 130 mm M46 towed field guns dating back to the 1960’s.

The proposal under the Artillery

Rationalisation Plan to acquire by 202025 a mix of around 3000-3600 155mm/39 calibre light weight and 155mm/52 calibre towed, mounted, self-propelled-tracked and wheeled-and ultra light weight 155mm/39 calibre howitzers through imports and local, licensed manufacture for an estimated $ 7-8 billion, has been continually postponed for nearly a decade.

Tenders for almost all these guns have been dispatched, withdrawn and reissued and several rounds of inconclusive trials conducted. Matters were further complicated by the MoD blacklisting at least four top overseas howitzer manufacturers - Denel (South Africa), Rheinmettal (Germany and Switzerland) and Singapore Technologies Kinetics on alleged corruption charges which all three deny.

But last November, the MoD, after dispatching a letter of request to the US government to procure 145 BAE Systems M777 towed 155mm/39 calibre light weight howitzers and Laser Inertial

Artillery Pointing Systems for $ 647 million. These guns - whose numbers are expected to increase - will eventually equip the divisions raised recently in the northeast to counter China, but the contract for their procurement is yet to be inked.

Even the army’s eight-odd elite Special Forces battalions - or around 6,000 personnel - have not been spared.

They continued not only to function without a specified operational mandate, organisational support or “dedicated budget” but also faced incomplete weapon and equipment packages many of which had been in the pipeline for over a decade.

This latter shortfall rudely surfaced in the fierce fighting between SF personnel and Pakistani terrorists in Mumbai’s November 2008 siege that took nearly three days to be cleared up.

The deadline to import 1000-odd sniper rifles for the SF, for instance under the FTP route expired in December 2010 following extended trials featuring with

DSI

Finland’s bolt-action SAKO TRG-22/24, IWIs semi-automatic Galil 7.62x54mm model and Sig Sauer SSG 3000 boltaction, magazine-fed rifle. Similarly, the procurement of 900 single barrel, pump action 12-gauge shotguns for the SF and (1,300) 9mm submachine guns for select “Ghatak” infantry commando platoons and 1.3 million rounds of accompanying ammunition initiated three years ago under FTP procedures, too awaits closure.

The former acquisition was cancelled after trials following a comical clerical error in the MoDs initial tender which has since been re-issued.

The list of the army’s equipment inadequacies seems endless. The bulk of its air defence guns- Bofors L 70’s and the Soviet Zu-23-2’s and ZUS-23-4’s and missiles like the Russian OSA-AK and Kradvat’s date back 30-40 years and need replacing. The Defence Acquisition Council meeting chaired by Defence Minister A K Antony summoned last October specially to approve the longpending LOH purchase - including 64 for the air force - their acquisition reportedly by passed the acquisition, an issue which is dealt with elsewhere in this journal.

Army officers fear that equipping the army’s two recently raised mountain divisions of around 40,000 personnel at Lekhapani and Missamari in Assam, the proposed 40,000-strong corps in addition to two independent infantry and two armoured brigades under the 12th Finance Plan to counter China’s massive military buildup in Tibet, too poses a financial and procedural challenge.

Eventually, the efficacy of the Indian army to manage possible future conflicts will depend on the speed with which it moves, concentrates and regroups rapidly over varied terrain, employs precision weaponry and integrated Command Control Communication Computers Intelligence Interoperability (C4I2) systems to operate under a nuclear overhang. And, that ultimately depends on its equipment profile and modernisation efforts in order to augment its doctrinal shift from attrition DSI to manoeuvre warfare.

25

30/01/13 5:14 PM

ARMY DOLDRUMS (APFSDS) rounds from Russia on grounds of ‘operational necessity’ as its War Wastage Reserves (WWR) had dropped below ‘critical levels’. Official sources said the ‘distress’ procurement reportedly at ‘inflated prices’ also obliged the MoD to waive the offset obligation of 30 per cent mandated for all Indian military purchases over Rs 3 billion.

The 657 imported Russian T-90S MBT’s with an additional 1000 to be built locally under licence and 124 indigenously designed Arjun MKI tanks inducted recently into service were capable of operating in the dark, but were too few to make any significant difference in a conflict situation.

Plans to locally construct 1000 T-90S MBTs at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) at Avadi near Chennai were restricted by piecemeal orders from the army and partial full technology transfer by the Russians with regard to the platforms gun and turret armour. A warehouse in Avadi full of manuals in Russian that awaited translation further hampered their local manufacture.

Initially, the T-90S’s fired Russianmade AMK-338 and AMK-339 rounds.

But these had more or less been exhausted in training and the MBTs 125mm smoothbore guns have yet to be configured to fire locally manufactured AMK 340 rounds, in effect leaving them virtually ammunition-less.

Production of 9M119 Refleks (NATO designation AT-11 ‘Sniper’) missiles by the state-owned Bharat Dynamics at Hyderabad scheduled to begin in early 2006 is also behind schedule as several test firings have been unsuccessful.

Russian technicians are being consulted to resolve the problem.

To modernise its armour fleet, the army recently placed an order for 124 additional Arjun’s to be built at HVF by 201516 and is expected to acquire another 250 of its upgraded Arjun Mk-II model equipped with missile-firing capability, indigenously designed ‘Kanchan’ explosive reactive armour to protect it from APFSDS and high explosive anti-tank rounds and rocket-propelled grenades. The Mk-II

24

Rahul_bedi2ndtime.indd 24-25

Eventually, the efficacy of the Indian army to manage possible future conflicts will depend on the speed with which it moves, concentrates and regroups rapidly over varied terrain, employs precision weaponry and integrated Command Control Communication Computers Intelligence Interoperability (C4I2) systems to operate under a nuclear overhang.

BAE systems M777 155mm/39 calibre Light weight Howitzer

AFP

with an inordinately large number lacking night fighting capability.

The majority of T-72’s await upgrades to enhance mobility, firepower and provide them with either full solution thermal imaging fire control systems or third generation partial solution thermal imaging stand alone systems (TISAS) to enable them to operate in darkness.

Merely 310 partial solution TISAS had been acquired from Israel’s El Op and installed on the T-72M1s, while an equal number were under acquisition.

Defence planners, however questioned the financial and operational sagacity in upgrading the ageing T-72’s with explosive reactive armour, fibre-optic gyro-based navigation and laser warning systems, frequency hopping radio sets and advanced nuclear, biological and chemical equipment to keep them in service till 2020 and even beyond. Stabilising its gun control system by attaching a new thermal shroud on its 125mm 2A46 smooth bore gun ensuring greater accuracy and equipping the MBT with a new and integrated fire detection and suppression system would complete the staggered retrofit package.

The T-72M1 fleet also faces a depletion of OFB-produced 125 mm AMK 340 shells with not enough rounds for the army to even carry out mandatory, bi-annual basic firing exercises. Armoured corps sources said some 150,000-200,000 AMK 340 rounds had since 2003 been destroyed due to a combination of defective manufacturing and negligence in storing.

Faulty barrels and questionable ammunition were also responsible for demoralising T-72M1 tank crews after a series of AMK 340 rounds burst inside tank barrels causing collateral damage.

Armoured corps officers said nervous tank crews were even refusing to fire the AMK 340 ordnance and when forced to do so and at times even resorted to elaborate ‘jugaad’ or innovative stratagems to detonate the shells from outside the MBT. This, in turn forced the MoD in late 2011 to initiate emergency measures to import some (66,000) 125mm Armour Piercing Fin-Stabilised Discarding Sabot

FEBRUARY 2013

model will cost an astronomical Rs 370 million or $ 6.72 million once completed with 93 improvements over the previous version.

The army’s artillery profile, however, is possibly the direst with 180-odd field artillery regiments employing at least six calibres that were either obsolete or fast approaching that state. Around 32 artillery regiments were equipped with 410 FH-77B 155 mm Bofors guns imported in the late 1980s-presently reduced to half this number following cannibalisation due to the non-availability of spares - and 180 Soviet 130mm M-46 field guns reportedly upgraded somewhat unsatisfactorily to 155 mm/45 calibre status jointly by Soltam of Israel and the OFB. The remaining 148 or so regiments still operate Soviet D-30 122 mm guns, the locally-designed and OFB-built 105mm Indian Field Guns, its Light Field Gun derivative and imported 130 mm M46 towed field guns dating back to the 1960’s.

The proposal under the Artillery

Rationalisation Plan to acquire by 202025 a mix of around 3000-3600 155mm/39 calibre light weight and 155mm/52 calibre towed, mounted, self-propelled-tracked and wheeled-and ultra light weight 155mm/39 calibre howitzers through imports and local, licensed manufacture for an estimated $ 7-8 billion, has been continually postponed for nearly a decade.

Tenders for almost all these guns have been dispatched, withdrawn and reissued and several rounds of inconclusive trials conducted. Matters were further complicated by the MoD blacklisting at least four top overseas howitzer manufacturers - Denel (South Africa), Rheinmettal (Germany and Switzerland) and Singapore Technologies Kinetics on alleged corruption charges which all three deny.

But last November, the MoD, after dispatching a letter of request to the US government to procure 145 BAE Systems M777 towed 155mm/39 calibre light weight howitzers and Laser Inertial

Artillery Pointing Systems for $ 647 million. These guns - whose numbers are expected to increase - will eventually equip the divisions raised recently in the northeast to counter China, but the contract for their procurement is yet to be inked.

Even the army’s eight-odd elite Special Forces battalions - or around 6,000 personnel - have not been spared.

They continued not only to function without a specified operational mandate, organisational support or “dedicated budget” but also faced incomplete weapon and equipment packages many of which had been in the pipeline for over a decade.

This latter shortfall rudely surfaced in the fierce fighting between SF personnel and Pakistani terrorists in Mumbai’s November 2008 siege that took nearly three days to be cleared up.

The deadline to import 1000-odd sniper rifles for the SF, for instance under the FTP route expired in December 2010 following extended trials featuring with

DSI

Finland’s bolt-action SAKO TRG-22/24, IWIs semi-automatic Galil 7.62x54mm model and Sig Sauer SSG 3000 boltaction, magazine-fed rifle. Similarly, the procurement of 900 single barrel, pump action 12-gauge shotguns for the SF and (1,300) 9mm submachine guns for select “Ghatak” infantry commando platoons and 1.3 million rounds of accompanying ammunition initiated three years ago under FTP procedures, too awaits closure.

The former acquisition was cancelled after trials following a comical clerical error in the MoDs initial tender which has since been re-issued.

The list of the army’s equipment inadequacies seems endless. The bulk of its air defence guns- Bofors L 70’s and the Soviet Zu-23-2’s and ZUS-23-4’s and missiles like the Russian OSA-AK and Kradvat’s date back 30-40 years and need replacing. The Defence Acquisition Council meeting chaired by Defence Minister A K Antony summoned last October specially to approve the longpending LOH purchase - including 64 for the air force - their acquisition reportedly by passed the acquisition, an issue which is dealt with elsewhere in this journal.

Army officers fear that equipping the army’s two recently raised mountain divisions of around 40,000 personnel at Lekhapani and Missamari in Assam, the proposed 40,000-strong corps in addition to two independent infantry and two armoured brigades under the 12th Finance Plan to counter China’s massive military buildup in Tibet, too poses a financial and procedural challenge.

Eventually, the efficacy of the Indian army to manage possible future conflicts will depend on the speed with which it moves, concentrates and regroups rapidly over varied terrain, employs precision weaponry and integrated Command Control Communication Computers Intelligence Interoperability (C4I2) systems to operate under a nuclear overhang. And, that ultimately depends on its equipment profile and modernisation efforts in order to augment its doctrinal shift from attrition DSI to manoeuvre warfare.

25

30/01/13 5:14 PM

NETWORKED WARFARE

FEBRUARY 2013

ARMED FORCES AND NCW Arun Sahgal

KEY POINTS

The introduction of ICT is bringing in RMA in the realm of post-WW II warfighting methodology Developing NCW in India through a bottom-up approach as opposed to the evolutionary methods of the American armed forces and that of the Chinese is a possible game-changer in South Asia Satellite connections that lead to better targetting, besides producing wholesome images of the battlefield developments add value to Command and Control decisionmaking

Elbit Enhanced Tactical Computer’s

The armed forces of the country are fast approaching technology enriched environments for fighting both Third and Fourth Generation Wars. The sensor-shooter loop is getting shortened with advancement in hand-held data, voice and video receivers, which allow tactical usages. The technology sensitises and increases the appreciation of the battlefield for Command and Control in the rear.

26

Network-centric2ndtime.indd 26-27

AFP

N

etwork centric warfare or NCW is redefining the future battlespace. In the information age, power is increasingly derived from information sharing, information access and speed. The Indian armed forces are moving fast in this direction. The usage of information technology as a force multiplier in warfare stems from the belief that information advantage leads to information superiority eventually enhancing combat effectiveness of platforms.

This is achieved by “networking” of sensors, decision-makers, and shooting platforms, thereby creating shared awareness, speed of command, hightempo manoeuvre, close coordination and synchronisation during operations resulting in greater lethality, and enhanced combat capabilities. The primary objective of applying modern information technology is to enhance battle-space awareness between operational and command elements.

Within the above concept “Battlefield Management Systems (BMS)” act as force-enablers. It gives combat-advantage to Armed Forces, enabling a state-ofthe-art networked theatre in a spit-fire battlefield environment. The recognition of information dominance in future wars is based on the success of information dominated military command and control, in influencing outcome of the battle.

Since the 1980s, Indian defence scientists in general, and specialists at the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR) in particular, have been playing backroom role in enabling the transformation of Indian armed forces. “Third generation war focuses on using speed and surprise to bypass the enemy’s lines and collapse their forces. Essentially, this means the end of linear warfare at the tactical level, with units instead of seeking frontal contact attempt to out-manoeuvre each other to gain the greatest battlefield advantage. The impact of C2 capabilities have kept increasing with each generation of warfare and have become an essential ingredient of third generation warfare and beyond.

Integrated command and control (C2) capabilities are essential to meet the complexities of third generation warfare and spearheaded the digitisation of the battle space. Hence, the sensors and weapon interfaces, together with the communication infrastructure have migrated to digital technology. These developments have been driven by the adoption of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for supporting the C2 chains. The units enabling the above are collectively called Battle Management Systems (BMS) or C4I2SR (command, control, communication, computers, information, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems.

The C2 process has been characterized as a series of sequential and interactive steps by a US Air Force strategist Col John Boyd, who termed it the Observe-OrientDecide-Act (OODA) loop. The central tenet of modern BMS is the OODA loop. An entity that can process this cycle quickly, by observing and reacting to unfolding events more rapidly than an opponent, can thereby get inside the opponent’s decision cycle and

DSI

gain operational advantage. In the last two decades, armed forces have been investing in the design and development of various C2 systems.

Indian Army develops NCW Capability The Indian Army has launched an ambitious programme for transforming itself into a net centric force. It has over the period evolved a doctrine for integrating various components of C4I2 (command, control, communication, computers, information and intelligence) together with an Information Warfare (IW) doctrine, given the growing nature of threat in the neighbourhood. However since these two components on their own do not create NCW transformational thinking, particularly in the absence of integrated doctrines and inter-service synergy, it is now in the process of developing a comprehensive net centric warfare doctrine, that aims to close the loop between sensors that pick up information, decision-makers and shooting platform that aim to reduce what is generally called ‘sensor to shooter’ time in other words speedier engagements and enhancement of tempo of operations.

The fulcrum of net-centricity being developed by the Indian Army is actually what is generally referred to as the Tac C3I System (Tactical Command, Control, Communications and Information System).

Under the overall rubric of Tac C3I, sub-systems like the CIDSS (Command Information Decision Support System), ACCCS (Artillery Command, Control & Communication System), BSS (Battlefield Surveillance System), ADC&RS (Air Defence Control & Reporting System), BMS (Battlefield Management System) are in various stages of development, trials and fielding. In an exercise carried out last year somewhere in the desert sectors the efficacy of these systems was tested providing much needed assurance to the field formations.

An effective communication provides the backend of sensor connectivity to generate synergistic effect. Within this construct army is developing a Tactical Communication System, providing both the bandwidth for data sharing and seamless

27

30/01/13 5:19 PM

NETWORKED WARFARE

FEBRUARY 2013

ARMED FORCES AND NCW Arun Sahgal

KEY POINTS

The introduction of ICT is bringing in RMA in the realm of post-WW II warfighting methodology Developing NCW in India through a bottom-up approach as opposed to the evolutionary methods of the American armed forces and that of the Chinese is a possible game-changer in South Asia Satellite connections that lead to better targetting, besides producing wholesome images of the battlefield developments add value to Command and Control decisionmaking

Elbit Enhanced Tactical Computer’s

The armed forces of the country are fast approaching technology enriched environments for fighting both Third and Fourth Generation Wars. The sensor-shooter loop is getting shortened with advancement in hand-held data, voice and video receivers, which allow tactical usages. The technology sensitises and increases the appreciation of the battlefield for Command and Control in the rear.

26

Network-centric2ndtime.indd 26-27

AFP

N

etwork centric warfare or NCW is redefining the future battlespace. In the information age, power is increasingly derived from information sharing, information access and speed. The Indian armed forces are moving fast in this direction. The usage of information technology as a force multiplier in warfare stems from the belief that information advantage leads to information superiority eventually enhancing combat effectiveness of platforms.

This is achieved by “networking” of sensors, decision-makers, and shooting platforms, thereby creating shared awareness, speed of command, hightempo manoeuvre, close coordination and synchronisation during operations resulting in greater lethality, and enhanced combat capabilities. The primary objective of applying modern information technology is to enhance battle-space awareness between operational and command elements.

Within the above concept “Battlefield Management Systems (BMS)” act as force-enablers. It gives combat-advantage to Armed Forces, enabling a state-ofthe-art networked theatre in a spit-fire battlefield environment. The recognition of information dominance in future wars is based on the success of information dominated military command and control, in influencing outcome of the battle.

Since the 1980s, Indian defence scientists in general, and specialists at the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR) in particular, have been playing backroom role in enabling the transformation of Indian armed forces. “Third generation war focuses on using speed and surprise to bypass the enemy’s lines and collapse their forces. Essentially, this means the end of linear warfare at the tactical level, with units instead of seeking frontal contact attempt to out-manoeuvre each other to gain the greatest battlefield advantage. The impact of C2 capabilities have kept increasing with each generation of warfare and have become an essential ingredient of third generation warfare and beyond.

Integrated command and control (C2) capabilities are essential to meet the complexities of third generation warfare and spearheaded the digitisation of the battle space. Hence, the sensors and weapon interfaces, together with the communication infrastructure have migrated to digital technology. These developments have been driven by the adoption of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for supporting the C2 chains. The units enabling the above are collectively called Battle Management Systems (BMS) or C4I2SR (command, control, communication, computers, information, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems.

The C2 process has been characterized as a series of sequential and interactive steps by a US Air Force strategist Col John Boyd, who termed it the Observe-OrientDecide-Act (OODA) loop. The central tenet of modern BMS is the OODA loop. An entity that can process this cycle quickly, by observing and reacting to unfolding events more rapidly than an opponent, can thereby get inside the opponent’s decision cycle and

DSI

gain operational advantage. In the last two decades, armed forces have been investing in the design and development of various C2 systems.

Indian Army develops NCW Capability The Indian Army has launched an ambitious programme for transforming itself into a net centric force. It has over the period evolved a doctrine for integrating various components of C4I2 (command, control, communication, computers, information and intelligence) together with an Information Warfare (IW) doctrine, given the growing nature of threat in the neighbourhood. However since these two components on their own do not create NCW transformational thinking, particularly in the absence of integrated doctrines and inter-service synergy, it is now in the process of developing a comprehensive net centric warfare doctrine, that aims to close the loop between sensors that pick up information, decision-makers and shooting platform that aim to reduce what is generally called ‘sensor to shooter’ time in other words speedier engagements and enhancement of tempo of operations.

The fulcrum of net-centricity being developed by the Indian Army is actually what is generally referred to as the Tac C3I System (Tactical Command, Control, Communications and Information System).

Under the overall rubric of Tac C3I, sub-systems like the CIDSS (Command Information Decision Support System), ACCCS (Artillery Command, Control & Communication System), BSS (Battlefield Surveillance System), ADC&RS (Air Defence Control & Reporting System), BMS (Battlefield Management System) are in various stages of development, trials and fielding. In an exercise carried out last year somewhere in the desert sectors the efficacy of these systems was tested providing much needed assurance to the field formations.

An effective communication provides the backend of sensor connectivity to generate synergistic effect. Within this construct army is developing a Tactical Communication System, providing both the bandwidth for data sharing and seamless

27

30/01/13 5:19 PM

NETWORKED WARFARE country notorious for its “botnets”. The US military concerned by repeated Chinese hacking and venomous attacks is raising a Cyber Command, it may be prudent for India to expedite creation of such a command which has been recommended by the Naresh Chandra committee on Defence Reforms.

Air Force’s IACCCS (Integrated air Command, Control and Communications System) Like the Army the Indian Air Force is in the advance stages of developing an integrated network in terms of a layered, hardened and in-depth air defence command, control and communications network, called IACCCS. The complete system is being established under a twophase programme costing Rs 160 billion designed as a robust, survivable networkcentric C4I3 infrastructure that will receive direct real-time feeds from existing spacebased overhead reconnaissance satellites, ground-based and aerostat-mounted An Army officer on top of a Network System truck during the Republic Day parade, New Delhi

The 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan LTIPP (2012-27) was approved by the Defence Acquisition Council in April 2012 but the public version of the document is yet to be released.

28

Network-centric2ndtime.indd 28-29

ballistic missile early warning radars and high-altitude-long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, and manned airborne early warning & control (AEW & C) platforms.

The IACCCS will also coordinate the early warning and response aspects of a layered, ground-based, two-tier ballistic missile defence (BMD) network that is now at an advanced stage of development. The fibreoptic network-based AF Net, on the other hand, replaces the IAF’s troposcatter-based communications network. Developed at a cost of Rs 10.77 billion in collaboration with US-based Cisco Systems Inc, HCL Infosystems Ltd and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd (BSNL), the AF Net incorporates the latest traffic transportation technology in the form of internet protocol (IP) packets over the network using multi-protocol label switching (MPLS). A large voiceover-internet-protocol (VoIP) layer with stringent quality of service enforcement will facilitate robust, high quality voice, video and conferencing solutions. With these two critical elements now in place, the way

DSI

ahead is now clear for plugging into the IACCCS a large number of new-generation ground-based radars that are now in the process of being delivered, be it for airspace surveillance in search of airborne targets (like manned aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles), or coastal surveillance or ground surveillance.

BMD Integration The most challenging and contentious part of the IACCCS’ implementation roadmap, however, remains the two-tier BMD component. While the ground-based, airborne and space-based systems required for giving early warning of inbound hostile ballistic/cruise missiles are already being acquired from both indigenous sources and abroad (primarily Israel), acquisition of the active ‘hard-kill’ component—antiballistic missiles and their fire-control systems—looks set to be a long drawn-out affair due to the differing perceptions of BMD among the three armed services. The

AFP

connectivity. According to Army’s Signal Officer-in-Chief Lt General S P Kochhar, “The need for a state-of-the-art Tactical Communication System (TCS) has been long felt. The TCS being conceived for the force will bridge the gap between existing and contemporary technologies in the sphere of military communication”.

The Indian Army is following what can be termed as the bottom up approach for developing NCW capability, rather than an evolutionary model adopted by both the Americans and more recently the Chinese.

There are two important reasons for this.

In the absence of integrated and synergistic oversight that could only happen if there is a Chief of Defence Staff or Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee there is little tri-service integration with each service evolving their own path with a working perspective of their eventual integration.

A vital requirement in a networked system is not only interoperability of the system under development but also facilitation of information sharing among systems that were not originally designed to talk to each other. For inter-Services interoperability, there is requirement of a comprehensive and well documented tri-service model which forms the basis for reference at the conceptual and development stage.

Finalisation and adoption of standards and protocols, mutually compatible database structures, development/deployment of interfaces between systems using disparate platforms and commonality of hardware are challenges which need to be overcome.

Harmonising standards and protocols for the three Services is a gigantic task.

Despite the above systemic problems, the Army is closely looking at various software components of the system which are vital to its functional efficacy which include; policy on data handling and data storage, policy and responsibly for cyber security together with plans to set up Army Information Assurance Agency under the Director General Systems.

Areas where the Army has yet to draft credible policy perspectives include; policy on simulation and war-gaming, enunciation of bandwidth requirements in synch with increasing net-centricity. Understandably these shortcomings and at times turf

FEBRUARY 2013

battles have resulted in inordinate delay in developing the Tactical Communications System (TCS).

Another important component of the Indian Army’s transformational perspective is developing capacities for “cyber warfare”.

It is a potent instrument of war with means to weaken enemy capabilities even before battle is joined. Security of information and assets is vital to a military where networked infrastructure involves country-wide WANs and numerous smaller networks in a network of networks concept. The endeavour to prevent an attack or contain it and affect swift recovery is important aspects of cyber warfare. Malware penetrating the systems or embedded at manufacturing stage can be disastrous in military networks. Hence there is a requirement of fool-proof mechanisms to check our system for malware, particularly so as all computer parts and some software are imported including mostly from a

29

30/01/13 5:19 PM

NETWORKED WARFARE country notorious for its “botnets”. The US military concerned by repeated Chinese hacking and venomous attacks is raising a Cyber Command, it may be prudent for India to expedite creation of such a command which has been recommended by the Naresh Chandra committee on Defence Reforms.

Air Force’s IACCCS (Integrated air Command, Control and Communications System) Like the Army the Indian Air Force is in the advance stages of developing an integrated network in terms of a layered, hardened and in-depth air defence command, control and communications network, called IACCCS. The complete system is being established under a twophase programme costing Rs 160 billion designed as a robust, survivable networkcentric C4I3 infrastructure that will receive direct real-time feeds from existing spacebased overhead reconnaissance satellites, ground-based and aerostat-mounted An Army officer on top of a Network System truck during the Republic Day parade, New Delhi

The 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan LTIPP (2012-27) was approved by the Defence Acquisition Council in April 2012 but the public version of the document is yet to be released.

28

Network-centric2ndtime.indd 28-29

ballistic missile early warning radars and high-altitude-long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, and manned airborne early warning & control (AEW & C) platforms.

The IACCCS will also coordinate the early warning and response aspects of a layered, ground-based, two-tier ballistic missile defence (BMD) network that is now at an advanced stage of development. The fibreoptic network-based AF Net, on the other hand, replaces the IAF’s troposcatter-based communications network. Developed at a cost of Rs 10.77 billion in collaboration with US-based Cisco Systems Inc, HCL Infosystems Ltd and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd (BSNL), the AF Net incorporates the latest traffic transportation technology in the form of internet protocol (IP) packets over the network using multi-protocol label switching (MPLS). A large voiceover-internet-protocol (VoIP) layer with stringent quality of service enforcement will facilitate robust, high quality voice, video and conferencing solutions. With these two critical elements now in place, the way

DSI

ahead is now clear for plugging into the IACCCS a large number of new-generation ground-based radars that are now in the process of being delivered, be it for airspace surveillance in search of airborne targets (like manned aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles), or coastal surveillance or ground surveillance.

BMD Integration The most challenging and contentious part of the IACCCS’ implementation roadmap, however, remains the two-tier BMD component. While the ground-based, airborne and space-based systems required for giving early warning of inbound hostile ballistic/cruise missiles are already being acquired from both indigenous sources and abroad (primarily Israel), acquisition of the active ‘hard-kill’ component—antiballistic missiles and their fire-control systems—looks set to be a long drawn-out affair due to the differing perceptions of BMD among the three armed services. The

AFP

connectivity. According to Army’s Signal Officer-in-Chief Lt General S P Kochhar, “The need for a state-of-the-art Tactical Communication System (TCS) has been long felt. The TCS being conceived for the force will bridge the gap between existing and contemporary technologies in the sphere of military communication”.

The Indian Army is following what can be termed as the bottom up approach for developing NCW capability, rather than an evolutionary model adopted by both the Americans and more recently the Chinese.

There are two important reasons for this.

In the absence of integrated and synergistic oversight that could only happen if there is a Chief of Defence Staff or Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee there is little tri-service integration with each service evolving their own path with a working perspective of their eventual integration.

A vital requirement in a networked system is not only interoperability of the system under development but also facilitation of information sharing among systems that were not originally designed to talk to each other. For inter-Services interoperability, there is requirement of a comprehensive and well documented tri-service model which forms the basis for reference at the conceptual and development stage.

Finalisation and adoption of standards and protocols, mutually compatible database structures, development/deployment of interfaces between systems using disparate platforms and commonality of hardware are challenges which need to be overcome.

Harmonising standards and protocols for the three Services is a gigantic task.

Despite the above systemic problems, the Army is closely looking at various software components of the system which are vital to its functional efficacy which include; policy on data handling and data storage, policy and responsibly for cyber security together with plans to set up Army Information Assurance Agency under the Director General Systems.

Areas where the Army has yet to draft credible policy perspectives include; policy on simulation and war-gaming, enunciation of bandwidth requirements in synch with increasing net-centricity. Understandably these shortcomings and at times turf

FEBRUARY 2013

battles have resulted in inordinate delay in developing the Tactical Communications System (TCS).

Another important component of the Indian Army’s transformational perspective is developing capacities for “cyber warfare”.

It is a potent instrument of war with means to weaken enemy capabilities even before battle is joined. Security of information and assets is vital to a military where networked infrastructure involves country-wide WANs and numerous smaller networks in a network of networks concept. The endeavour to prevent an attack or contain it and affect swift recovery is important aspects of cyber warfare. Malware penetrating the systems or embedded at manufacturing stage can be disastrous in military networks. Hence there is a requirement of fool-proof mechanisms to check our system for malware, particularly so as all computer parts and some software are imported including mostly from a

29

30/01/13 5:19 PM

Battlefield Surveillance System

initial components of such a two-tier BMD network, comprising both endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric missile interceptors, are not likely to be commissioned until 2015. For fire-control purposes the BMD system uses ELTA Systems-built EL/M2080 ‘Green Pine’ ground-based active phased-array L-band long-range tracking radar (LRTR), an initial two of which were supplied in late 2001 under the US$50 million ‘Project Sword Fish’ to the DRDO by the ELTA Systems Group subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries.

It is of significance that nearly three million lines of software code were written in India for the Battle Management/ Command, Control, and Communications & Intelligence (BM/C³I) centre, the hub of software and hardware systems.

Transmission links to the interceptor missile are based on jam-proof CDMA technology and multiple data transmission links have been set up so that if one is jammed the others could function. Israeli inputs were sought and received for designing and fabricating the BM/C³I centre, which not only acts as the DRDO’s primary BMD engagement simulator, but is also being used for evolving BM/C³I concepts, for defining BMD goals and developing BMD

doctrine, for evaluating candidate systems architectures, for serving as the principal prototyping-cum-validation tool for the BMD’s BM/C³I algorithms, and for defining the human role in the BMD battle. The BMD’s endo-atmospheric element makes use of the THALES Raytheon-supplied S-band Master-A engagement radar.

Enhancing Space based Domain Awareness: IRNSS The Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System (IRNSS) is an autonmous regional GPS based satellite navigation system being developed by the ISRO. The project was approved in May 2006 at a total project outlay of Rs 16 billion. The project was due for completion by the end of last year. The IRNSS will comprise a constellation of seven GPS navigational satellites placed in a geo-stationery orbit that will provide an absolute accuracy of around 10 metres or better throughput India and region extending upto 2000 kilometres around India. This system is likley to be operational by 2015 -16.

Geographical Information Systems (GIS) GIS plays a crucial role in operational

AFP

NETWORKED WARFARE planning, execution and monitoring progress of operations by showing all entities of interest in the context of a map. The GIS provides spatial information platform such as digital maps, digital elevation maps and satellite images to visualise the operational scenario. This enable the disposition of enemy deployments and better planning of own forces’ deployment.

Most of the GIS applications used

by Indian armed forces are based on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software.

These COTS GIS come with strict licensing policy and are prone to technology denial.

Their interoperability with other GIS systems for exchange of spatial information is limited.

To overcome these challenges and pitfalls of COTS GIS, the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR) has developed a home-grown GIS software for military applications, christened as INDIGIS. The INDIGIS is a suite of GIS components which are customisable, scalable and data centric to meet the specific GIS requirements of a collaborative defence environment. It offers a common platform for display, analysis and decision support involving spatio-temporal data for Net Centric Operation (NCO) systems.

Indigenous GIS kernel has been developed as a library of software components to cover the following major function. They are: a) processing of geo-spatial data in various formats of interest to Indian military; b) creation and management of a portable military symbol library; c) geo-spatial data exchange, analysis and visualisation with various Tactical Command Control Communication and Intelligence (TacC3I) systems; d) analysis and visualization of data from military sensors like GPS, digital compass, Battlefield Surveillance Radar, echo-sounder and unmanned aerial vehicles; e) support for all the usual features of COTS GIS including analysis and visualization of geo-spatial data in 2D and 3D. Naval Plans for Net Centric Operations Indian navy plans to create and sustain a three dimensional, technology enabled network centric system to transform itself

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216X276.indd 1

6/13/11 4:00:36 PM

AFP

NETWORKED WARFARE

Ship’s weapons coordinator communicates with the air defense ship, the USS Princeton

into a formidable sea power. Navy is aware that the key to harnessing the full potentials of such an advanced technology driven system lies in enhanced maritime domain awareness based on availability of “satellite resources” on an uninterrupted basis. Indian navy’s radical shift in its strategic outlook is clearly exemplified by the fact that it is aiming for a global reach from being a regional sea power focussed only on the threats from China and Pakistan.

To boost its strike capability, Indian navy is quite keen to link up its long range missiles, radars and air defence systems on all the sea bed assets to a centralised and a dedicated satellite network. Unlike the US Navy that is in a position to dominate a large part of oceanic waters through its “sustained and creative” reliance on a variety of advanced space based platforms including satellites meant for communications and navigation as well as reconnaissance and surveillance. The Indian navy in the immediate future is not looking at the kind of a sophisticated spacecraft system capable of penetrating oceanic thermal layers to monitor the movement of undersea objects.

The Indian navy’s immediate requirement is essentially to acquire a dedicated, conventional satellite system to ensure a smoother, faster and a secure communications link for a better coordination of its assets. However, Navy is fully well aware that ocean watch satellites snooping on the naval movements, electronic ferret satellites gathering data on radio frequencies, meteorological satellites predicting weather to facilitate an effective use of the weapons systems, navigation satellites guiding lethal weapons to designated locations with unfailing accuracy, reconnaissance satellites providing vital data on the strength of the potential adversaries and communications satellites ensuring a real time link up for the effective use of the resources are all essential elements in creation off an effective maritime domain awareness system.

As a long term vision, Indian navy is keen to operate an exclusive satellite supported by a constellation of spacecraft to meet the challenges lying ahead. Of course, for well over five years now, media reports have been suggesting Indian navy’s plan for a dedicated satellite system. And everything going as planned, the Indian navy, the youngest of

the Indian defence services, will get its first exclusive satellite system for a “secure and reliable” communications sometime during this year. The multi band communications satellite dubbed Gsat-7, will be designed, developed and launched by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).

Conclusion Above write up highlights the steps being taken to develop service specific net centric capabilities. These are both extensive and elaborate. Once operational this will provide credible system integration for both enhanced domain awareness and enhanced combat capability.

Unfortunately all these are being developed on specific service requirement basis with little attempt at inter-service integration. Given the prevailing higher defence management system and poor strategic direction at the strategic and political levels this is the best that can be achieved. There is no doubt all three services will initiate steps for system integration at great costs. Alas this is the price a poor country like India is doomed to pay for poor strategic mindset and attempts by service for respective empire building. DSI

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Il-76MD-90 A

IL-76MD-90A: THE LEGEND CONTINUES October 2012 saw one of the most significant events in Russian aircraft industry – the IL76MD-90A heavy military transport aircraft, assembled in Russia at Aviastar Plant, Ulyanovsk, got off the ground for the first time. With this aircraft, Rosoboronexport hopes to win a significant share of the global aircraft market, including in India and other countries in the Asia-Pacific Region.

ing package and aircraft automatic control system, and an all glass cockpit with multifunctional color LCD displays and intelligent control panels.

A comprehensive upgrade has increased the maximum payload of the aircraft up to 52 tons. 12% better fuel efficiency of engines, which now comply with ICAO noise and emission requirements, has extended a range at maximum load from 4000 km to 5000 km.

Increased engine thrust has also improved take-off and landing performance: the takeoff run at maximum takeoff weight is now 1540 m instead of 1750 m.

By the way, Rosoboronexport also offers the IL-78MK-90 convertible tanker based on the new IL-76MD-90A. The aircraft can fill simultaneously up to three various aircraft with two kinds of fuel in the air and up to four aircraft on the ground. It’s also interesting that the IL78MK-90 is not a highly specialized plane. After conversion it can be used in the transport, medical and fire-fighting roles.

With the start of large-scale production of the IL-76MD-90A and its specialized versions, Rosoboronexport intends to win a significant share in this segment of the world market.

By all factors and capabilities, these planes should certainly magnify interest among the Asia-Pacific countries, too. After all, IL-76MD90A aircraft are a continuation of the legend.

As is known, the IL-76-series planes were previously built at the Tashkent Aircraft Plant – more than 950 aircraft had been produced.

However, serial production there has been troubled in recent years by many technical and organizational reasons. Therefore it was decided to set up production of the aircraft in Russia.

Moreover, a big order from the Russian Ministry of Defense, signed in October 2012, suggests Il-76MD-90 A

Il-76MD-90 A a readiness of the new production site to run a large-scale production of the upgraded airlifter.

What distinguishes the IL-76MD-90A from its predecessors? If you look at the number of innovations, it is really possible to talk about a huge step in the development of this lineup – the plane has been retrofitted for almost 70%.

Among the key differences are a new modified wing using long box panels, a reinforced landing gear, new fuel-efficient PS-90A-76 engines, an upgraded fuel system and a FADEC-type digital engine control system, modern digital sighting, navigation and pilot-

Il-76MD-90 A

DSI Marketing Promotion

ROE_2ndtime.indd 1

31/01/13 12:07 PM

WARSHIP BUILDING

FEBRUARY 2013

WARSHIP DESIGN AND WEAPONISATION

DSI

S Kulshrestha

KEY POINTS

“We Shall Build Good Ships Here; At A Profit If We Can, At A Loss If We Must, But Always Good Ships.”

- Collis Potter Huntington.

AFP

A Russian Navy officer looks towards the Admiral Sergey Gorshkov frigate

Warship design is a complex exercise of fitting in disparate pieces together, thus requiring more efforts. Major shipyards like Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Mazagon Docks are setting up new yards where ʻmodularʼ shipbuilding will be undertaken.

34

warship_design2ndtime.indd 34-35

In 1886 Collis Potter Huntington decided to build a shipyard which would be known in the world for the quality of its ships. He founded the largest privately owned shipyard in the world, the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry dock Company (now Northrop Grumman) in Virginia. Warship design and construction is an iterative and tedious process involving various interconnected and overlapping agencies. Designing for maximum survivability and constructing it in a cost effective manner puts constraints which are not easily surmountable. It is imperative that ‘quality’ be embedded at every stage of design, construction, trials and training for a warship to carry out its tasks far away from its home port, in a hostile sea environment and against an unforgiving enemy. It is against this background that Huntington had stated ‘But always good ships’.

Warships today have to be designed such that they operate at high speeds, with low fuel consumption, manoeuvre & remain stable

A naval officer walks on a deck of the Indian Navy’s newlycommisioned warship INS Shivalik in Mumbai

in extreme weather at sea, and keep firing weapons till their last moment. Survivability requires that a ship’s infra red, acoustic and radar cross section be minimised to avoid detection by the enemy. The primary offensive weapon suit is decided by the role of the warship, say anti submarine, anti surface or strategic. For its defence it would have anti aircraft, anti submarine and anti surface weapons along with dispensers for decoys and electronic warfare packages against the anticipated threats. Larger warships also carry a secondary weapon outfit for a support role if required. The warship has to navigate, communicate and also detect the adversary, this requires placement of large radar, sonar and communication antennae above as well as below the water line, and all these increase the complexities of war ship design.

A warship is generally built to last three to four decades if not more, so the weapon and

AFP

Indian Navy is the only service in the country that sources its ship platforms from indigenous sources.

However, the public sector shipyards are often found wanting in terms of overshooting cost and time limits.

Only now are the PSU shipyards like Mazagon Docks Ltd and Garden Reach Shipbuilders setting up yards for modular ship-building processes.

equipment packages (propulsion, power, sensors, communication etc) have to be so placed that there removal for upgradation is easy, to match the rapid pace of technology.

A warship today does not operate independently, in a network centric environment it has to form part of a designated group of ships, which in turn form part of a bigger system of war effort.

Thus design of a warship has to take into account the fact that it is capable of operating with other warships and that its protocols are compatible with the other group ships.

Keeping all the above complexities in forefront and to ensure ‘building good ships’ new design approaches need to be studied.

“You are not going to find the ideal boat.

You are not even going to have it if you design it from scratch.”

- Carl Lane

35

30/01/13 5:30 PM

WARSHIP BUILDING

FEBRUARY 2013

WARSHIP DESIGN AND WEAPONISATION

DSI

S Kulshrestha

KEY POINTS

“We Shall Build Good Ships Here; At A Profit If We Can, At A Loss If We Must, But Always Good Ships.”

- Collis Potter Huntington.

AFP

A Russian Navy officer looks towards the Admiral Sergey Gorshkov frigate

Warship design is a complex exercise of fitting in disparate pieces together, thus requiring more efforts. Major shipyards like Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Mazagon Docks are setting up new yards where ʻmodularʼ shipbuilding will be undertaken.

34

warship_design2ndtime.indd 34-35

In 1886 Collis Potter Huntington decided to build a shipyard which would be known in the world for the quality of its ships. He founded the largest privately owned shipyard in the world, the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry dock Company (now Northrop Grumman) in Virginia. Warship design and construction is an iterative and tedious process involving various interconnected and overlapping agencies. Designing for maximum survivability and constructing it in a cost effective manner puts constraints which are not easily surmountable. It is imperative that ‘quality’ be embedded at every stage of design, construction, trials and training for a warship to carry out its tasks far away from its home port, in a hostile sea environment and against an unforgiving enemy. It is against this background that Huntington had stated ‘But always good ships’.

Warships today have to be designed such that they operate at high speeds, with low fuel consumption, manoeuvre & remain stable

A naval officer walks on a deck of the Indian Navy’s newlycommisioned warship INS Shivalik in Mumbai

in extreme weather at sea, and keep firing weapons till their last moment. Survivability requires that a ship’s infra red, acoustic and radar cross section be minimised to avoid detection by the enemy. The primary offensive weapon suit is decided by the role of the warship, say anti submarine, anti surface or strategic. For its defence it would have anti aircraft, anti submarine and anti surface weapons along with dispensers for decoys and electronic warfare packages against the anticipated threats. Larger warships also carry a secondary weapon outfit for a support role if required. The warship has to navigate, communicate and also detect the adversary, this requires placement of large radar, sonar and communication antennae above as well as below the water line, and all these increase the complexities of war ship design.

A warship is generally built to last three to four decades if not more, so the weapon and

AFP

Indian Navy is the only service in the country that sources its ship platforms from indigenous sources.

However, the public sector shipyards are often found wanting in terms of overshooting cost and time limits.

Only now are the PSU shipyards like Mazagon Docks Ltd and Garden Reach Shipbuilders setting up yards for modular ship-building processes.

equipment packages (propulsion, power, sensors, communication etc) have to be so placed that there removal for upgradation is easy, to match the rapid pace of technology.

A warship today does not operate independently, in a network centric environment it has to form part of a designated group of ships, which in turn form part of a bigger system of war effort.

Thus design of a warship has to take into account the fact that it is capable of operating with other warships and that its protocols are compatible with the other group ships.

Keeping all the above complexities in forefront and to ensure ‘building good ships’ new design approaches need to be studied.

“You are not going to find the ideal boat.

You are not even going to have it if you design it from scratch.”

- Carl Lane

35

30/01/13 5:30 PM

WARSHIP BUILDING each domain and then specifying ’how’ these requirements are satisfied in the successive domain. This leads to a much better design definition at initial stage itself.

Indian Navy and Warship Design A major impetus to the Indian Naval Design organisation was given by the then prime minister Mrs Indira Gandhi after her return from the launch of INS Nilgiri at Mazagon Docks Ltd Mumbai in 1968.

She directed that the Naval Design Office should design frigates, submarines and other fast craft with futuristic propulsion options including nuclear propulsion. She emphasised the need for synergy between the ship designers and the ship builders and this led to prominence of self reliance in warship design and production in the 1969-74 Defence Plan. The result of this, were the indigenous Godavari Class Type 16 frigates, whose design was accepted in 1975 and the commissioning

AFP

INS Satpura is seen during sea trials

stage must assess the anticipated explosive damages, redundancy for systems and requirements of damage control etc. A warship based upon survivability in design, while enhancing firepower and reducing human component, may therefore result in a better option for the future.

Axiomatic design approach puts forth the argument that, currently the design process is an iterative process, in that, several individual attributes are first designed and then integrated, often leading to re-design

36

warship_design2ndtime.indd 36-37

Armour plating thickness reduction had taken place earlier as the war at high seas no longer involved close combat and had evolved in to a larger and larger standoff distance battles.

AFP

Systems engineering approach to warship design has shown a way ahead because it is fundamentally an interdisciplinary engineering management process covering all aspects of hardware, software and the human component. It caters for life cycle requirements, and economically beneficial integrated design. A NATO specialist team constituted for setting up systems engineering guidelines for cost effectiveness of new technology in warships has indicated the essential steps of stake holder requirement definition, requirement analysis, synthesis architectural design, verification and validation prior to finalising of design. DARPA is also researching in to novel methods for design and verification of complex systems in its META program.

Under this program attempt is being made to devise a model based system engineering framework which can then enable architectural analysis of complex systems during conceptual design itself, leading to a much more robust and reliable system.

Designing for survivability approach advocate warship design of relatively smaller ships with much higher survivability and better weapons suit. It caters for a more dangerous battle environment, while reducing manpower requirements. This approach brings out a flaw of the reduction of armour plating thickness in the current designs of warships, which has been resorted to for keeping the structural weight low.

Armour plating thickness reduction had taken place earlier as the war at high seas no longer involved close combat and had evolved in to a larger and larger standoff distance battles. However to accommodate more sensors and weapon suits the armour plating thickness is being further compromised, resulting in lesser survivability of the warship in case of a hit. Survivability in war at sea implies ability of a warship to continue carrying out its mission, which in turn implies preventing enemy from detecting and attacking it. Thus requiring reduction of all types of detectible signatures, (Radar, IR, acoustic, magnetic, electronic etc) at the early design stage itself.

Further measures of survivability include enhancing floatability after an attack by the enemy; therefore studies at early design

FEBRUARY 2013

and finally to a compromise solution. In order to design a warship with much less manpower, some functions would have to be transferred to automation and some functions to the remaining manpower. This needs to be accomplished in a scientific manner such that neither the man nor the machine is over tasked. Axiomatic design consists of four domains namely, the customer domain, the functional domain, the physical domain and the process domain. The axiomatic process requires determining ‘what’ is required in

of the first ship Godavari took place in 1983.

The Naval Design team has not looked back since. The latest indigenous ship to join the Indian Navy is the formidable Kolkata class destroyer (project 15A) commissioned in Sept 2012.

Stages of Warship Design in India The fundamental steps in warship building in India commence with the drafting of the Preliminary Staff Requirements (PSR).

This is the result of deliberations between the

Naval Staff and the naval designers, taking into account the needs of the Navy based on future threat perceptions and the availability of technologies and industrial capabilities.

The PSR includes role, armament, sensors, overall dimensions, speed and endurance etc. There after conceptual design work is undertaken; it includes sifting through various technical alternatives and selecting the most feasible one for the preliminary design.

This has detailed schematics and calculations to provide the best design option as per the PSR. It is presented to Naval Staff highlighting areas of give and take with respect to the PSR. A desired preliminary design is arrived at after detailed deliberations.

The detailed design work is undertaken thereafter. This involves detailed drawings, hydrodynamic modelling, modifications if required based on modelling studies, layout plans, detailing of specifications and commencement of dialogue with the building shipyard. The shipyard prepares for construction of the warship by making production drawings, procuring jigs, fixtures and equipment that may be required during production.

Modular Ship Construction “Ships are the nearest things to dreams that hands have ever made, for somewhere deep in their oaken hearts the soul of a song is laid.”

- Robert N. Rose On 2nd Nov 2009, the then Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Nirmal Verma said “We need to revisit the building strategies of the (Defence) shipyards. There is a need to do much more. Construction schedule is where our shipyards lag. The reason for delays is the basic method of construction (adopted by the shipyards),” With respect to modular ship construction being followed by foreign shipyards, he said “This is found to be the most efficient means of ship construction by which time taken for delivery of the platform is minimised and the work at the dry dock is optimised.”

Currently the Defence Shipyards build ships by launching the hull in water after welding it and there after the shipyard’s

DSI

craftsmen install machinery and equipment in highly cramped spaces. This has also contributed to inordinate delays in delivery of warships to the Navy as ships have taken nearly ten years to build. However the major shipyards like MDL and GRSE are already in process of modernising by moving to modular ship building wherein 300-tonne blocks are manufactured independently along with their equipment, electrical wiring, pipelines etc and then fitted to neighbouring blocks precisely, to finally form the warship. It is expected that MDL’s modular shipyard costing Rs. 824 crores would be commissioned by June 2013, there after it is expected that destroyers would be constructed in 72 months and frigates in 60 months.

One of the areas defence shipyards need to study is outsourcing while retaining essential technical manpower for critical defence related work. With the Indian industry maturing rapidly, many of the tasks like crew accommodation, painting, wiring, piping etc may be totally outsourced, however, with a mechanism to ensure that quality of work is ensured. Both, cost benefits and better quality, should form the basis of outsourcing in warship building endeavours. Shipyards would have to identify and involve major contractors from ship design stage itself and have the production designs ready prior to commencing construction. Fundamentally Indian shipyards should ‘Build good ships’.

Indian Naval Ships and Craft on Order on Indian Shipyards • MDL: 3 Project-15A Kolkata class destroyers, follow on four Project-15B destroyers, one Project-17 Shivalik class frigate and 6 Project-75 Scorpene submarines.

• GRSE: 4 ASW Corvettes of Project-28, 6 Inshore Patrol Vessel of the Rajshree class and 8 Landing Craft Utility.

• GSL: 4 Offshore Patrol Vessels, 6 of 105-metre Offshore Patrol Vessels and one 90-metre Offshore Patrol Vessel.

• HSL: 12 Inshore Patrol Vessels of two different classes, 3 of 50-ton Bollard Pull Tugs and one 25-ton Bollard Pull Tug. • CSL: Indigenous Aircraft Carrier IAC. • Pipav Shipyard: 5 NOPVs • ABG Shipyard: Cadet Training Ship.

37

30/01/13 5:30 PM

WARSHIP BUILDING each domain and then specifying ’how’ these requirements are satisfied in the successive domain. This leads to a much better design definition at initial stage itself.

Indian Navy and Warship Design A major impetus to the Indian Naval Design organisation was given by the then prime minister Mrs Indira Gandhi after her return from the launch of INS Nilgiri at Mazagon Docks Ltd Mumbai in 1968.

She directed that the Naval Design Office should design frigates, submarines and other fast craft with futuristic propulsion options including nuclear propulsion. She emphasised the need for synergy between the ship designers and the ship builders and this led to prominence of self reliance in warship design and production in the 1969-74 Defence Plan. The result of this, were the indigenous Godavari Class Type 16 frigates, whose design was accepted in 1975 and the commissioning

AFP

INS Satpura is seen during sea trials

stage must assess the anticipated explosive damages, redundancy for systems and requirements of damage control etc. A warship based upon survivability in design, while enhancing firepower and reducing human component, may therefore result in a better option for the future.

Axiomatic design approach puts forth the argument that, currently the design process is an iterative process, in that, several individual attributes are first designed and then integrated, often leading to re-design

36

warship_design2ndtime.indd 36-37

Armour plating thickness reduction had taken place earlier as the war at high seas no longer involved close combat and had evolved in to a larger and larger standoff distance battles.

AFP

Systems engineering approach to warship design has shown a way ahead because it is fundamentally an interdisciplinary engineering management process covering all aspects of hardware, software and the human component. It caters for life cycle requirements, and economically beneficial integrated design. A NATO specialist team constituted for setting up systems engineering guidelines for cost effectiveness of new technology in warships has indicated the essential steps of stake holder requirement definition, requirement analysis, synthesis architectural design, verification and validation prior to finalising of design. DARPA is also researching in to novel methods for design and verification of complex systems in its META program.

Under this program attempt is being made to devise a model based system engineering framework which can then enable architectural analysis of complex systems during conceptual design itself, leading to a much more robust and reliable system.

Designing for survivability approach advocate warship design of relatively smaller ships with much higher survivability and better weapons suit. It caters for a more dangerous battle environment, while reducing manpower requirements. This approach brings out a flaw of the reduction of armour plating thickness in the current designs of warships, which has been resorted to for keeping the structural weight low.

Armour plating thickness reduction had taken place earlier as the war at high seas no longer involved close combat and had evolved in to a larger and larger standoff distance battles. However to accommodate more sensors and weapon suits the armour plating thickness is being further compromised, resulting in lesser survivability of the warship in case of a hit. Survivability in war at sea implies ability of a warship to continue carrying out its mission, which in turn implies preventing enemy from detecting and attacking it. Thus requiring reduction of all types of detectible signatures, (Radar, IR, acoustic, magnetic, electronic etc) at the early design stage itself.

Further measures of survivability include enhancing floatability after an attack by the enemy; therefore studies at early design

FEBRUARY 2013

and finally to a compromise solution. In order to design a warship with much less manpower, some functions would have to be transferred to automation and some functions to the remaining manpower. This needs to be accomplished in a scientific manner such that neither the man nor the machine is over tasked. Axiomatic design consists of four domains namely, the customer domain, the functional domain, the physical domain and the process domain. The axiomatic process requires determining ‘what’ is required in

of the first ship Godavari took place in 1983.

The Naval Design team has not looked back since. The latest indigenous ship to join the Indian Navy is the formidable Kolkata class destroyer (project 15A) commissioned in Sept 2012.

Stages of Warship Design in India The fundamental steps in warship building in India commence with the drafting of the Preliminary Staff Requirements (PSR).

This is the result of deliberations between the

Naval Staff and the naval designers, taking into account the needs of the Navy based on future threat perceptions and the availability of technologies and industrial capabilities.

The PSR includes role, armament, sensors, overall dimensions, speed and endurance etc. There after conceptual design work is undertaken; it includes sifting through various technical alternatives and selecting the most feasible one for the preliminary design.

This has detailed schematics and calculations to provide the best design option as per the PSR. It is presented to Naval Staff highlighting areas of give and take with respect to the PSR. A desired preliminary design is arrived at after detailed deliberations.

The detailed design work is undertaken thereafter. This involves detailed drawings, hydrodynamic modelling, modifications if required based on modelling studies, layout plans, detailing of specifications and commencement of dialogue with the building shipyard. The shipyard prepares for construction of the warship by making production drawings, procuring jigs, fixtures and equipment that may be required during production.

Modular Ship Construction “Ships are the nearest things to dreams that hands have ever made, for somewhere deep in their oaken hearts the soul of a song is laid.”

- Robert N. Rose On 2nd Nov 2009, the then Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Nirmal Verma said “We need to revisit the building strategies of the (Defence) shipyards. There is a need to do much more. Construction schedule is where our shipyards lag. The reason for delays is the basic method of construction (adopted by the shipyards),” With respect to modular ship construction being followed by foreign shipyards, he said “This is found to be the most efficient means of ship construction by which time taken for delivery of the platform is minimised and the work at the dry dock is optimised.”

Currently the Defence Shipyards build ships by launching the hull in water after welding it and there after the shipyard’s

DSI

craftsmen install machinery and equipment in highly cramped spaces. This has also contributed to inordinate delays in delivery of warships to the Navy as ships have taken nearly ten years to build. However the major shipyards like MDL and GRSE are already in process of modernising by moving to modular ship building wherein 300-tonne blocks are manufactured independently along with their equipment, electrical wiring, pipelines etc and then fitted to neighbouring blocks precisely, to finally form the warship. It is expected that MDL’s modular shipyard costing Rs. 824 crores would be commissioned by June 2013, there after it is expected that destroyers would be constructed in 72 months and frigates in 60 months.

One of the areas defence shipyards need to study is outsourcing while retaining essential technical manpower for critical defence related work. With the Indian industry maturing rapidly, many of the tasks like crew accommodation, painting, wiring, piping etc may be totally outsourced, however, with a mechanism to ensure that quality of work is ensured. Both, cost benefits and better quality, should form the basis of outsourcing in warship building endeavours. Shipyards would have to identify and involve major contractors from ship design stage itself and have the production designs ready prior to commencing construction. Fundamentally Indian shipyards should ‘Build good ships’.

Indian Naval Ships and Craft on Order on Indian Shipyards • MDL: 3 Project-15A Kolkata class destroyers, follow on four Project-15B destroyers, one Project-17 Shivalik class frigate and 6 Project-75 Scorpene submarines.

• GRSE: 4 ASW Corvettes of Project-28, 6 Inshore Patrol Vessel of the Rajshree class and 8 Landing Craft Utility.

• GSL: 4 Offshore Patrol Vessels, 6 of 105-metre Offshore Patrol Vessels and one 90-metre Offshore Patrol Vessel.

• HSL: 12 Inshore Patrol Vessels of two different classes, 3 of 50-ton Bollard Pull Tugs and one 25-ton Bollard Pull Tug. • CSL: Indigenous Aircraft Carrier IAC. • Pipav Shipyard: 5 NOPVs • ABG Shipyard: Cadet Training Ship.

37

30/01/13 5:30 PM

WARSHIP BUILDING

AFP

AK Anthony on the deck of indian warship Weapon Systems Weapon systems on a warship depend upon its assigned role and mission in war.

Generally warships carry weapons to cater for threats emanating from the air, surface and underwater. For air threats like sea skimming missiles and air attacks, ships have surface to air missiles, guns in dual role, and close in weapon systems/point defence systems (multi barrel guns, short range missiles). For surface threats ships have surface to surface missiles and guns. For anti submarine warfare ships have torpedoes and ASW rockets. Warships carry decoys for deception of enemy torpedoes and oncoming missiles, these comprise of chaff dispensers, IR decoys, acoustic decoys etc.

The warships also have an extended weapon capability on the helicopters they house on board; this could be a light weight torpedo, rockets or small calibre guns. The advent of unmanned vehicles will introduce another facet of weaponisation.

Naval weapons are complex in design due to the corrosive sea environment in which they have to operate, severe space and weight restrictions, and problems of stabilisation as the ship rolls, pitches and yaws. Further, as with all weapons, they cannot be procured just by paying the currency required by the manufacturers. The pricing of weapons is based upon the need of the country, its relations with the producing country, its position in the world at large and other considerations like, foreign policy issues, type of technology, availability of similar systems for sale in other countries etc.

In case of India it has been the experience

that the weapon system it desires is not available for purchase, alternate offered is exorbitantly priced, and what is affordable is invariably not required by India. The ideal solution is local availability of weapon systems which will ensure maintainability, timely upgrades and modularity for warship design.

The indigenous effort has still not matured to provide viable weapon system or even subsystem solution within the time frame and the budgeted costs. Economic viability, arms export policy and non availability of technological prowess, appear to be the main reasons. Thus India is left with no alternative but to import and also prolong use of existing armament by process of life extension, constrained with improper/insufficient spares, inadequate documentation and testing methods. Weapons thus continue to be deployed well beyond their useful life without ascertaining if or at all, or to what extent they meet the designed parameters.

The defence procurement procedure (DPP) has been promulgated to enable the Armed forces to timely procure the desired equipment with least drain on national resources. The DPP has been regularly revised to cater for Indian conditions. It has been structured so that the Indian defence industrial base is progressively strengthened by offsets, Transfer of Technology (TOT) and JV regimes. However ‘The Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan’, LTIPP, of the armed forces, is an indicative acquisition plan for the next 15 years but without any commitment of funds or frozen requirements.

The weapon procurement procedure commences with drawing the staff requirements, which the DRDO and industry claim are unrealistic, the armed forces justify it, as weapons are used over decades and therefore once procured they should remain current and amenable to technological upgrades as long as possible. Perhaps the only way the Government of India can resolve this issue is through policy level intervention by firstly categorising external threats at two levels depending upon their severity & extent and thereafter specifying two types of procurement, one (say P1) to the staff requirements of the Armed Forces and the other to a level (say P2 through local sources only) which meets at least 75% of the staff requirement. Killability studies may be carried out to assess the numbers (with sufficient redundancies) of P1 and P2 types required to meet the threats in their entirety. Further it can incentivise the P2 procurement by increasing the defence budget proportionately and set up an accountability mechanism for timely delivery, maintainability and functionability of the same.

In conclusion, it suffices to state that warship design is undergoing a change today forced by factors like economic slowdown, emergence of littoral threats, reduction in blue water engagements, development of powerful sensors and weapons as well as advent of unmanned vehicles on the horizon. There is a need to look into newer design methods like systems engineering design approach, designing for survivability and axiomatic design principles etc. rather than adhering to the telescopic iterative methodology in use in India. The shipyards need to switch over to modular construction to ensure timely and cost effective deliveries. The shipyards also need to carry out a periodic review of outsourcing, leveraging upon the increasing technological capabilities of the Indian industry, this will help in reducing the long term costs and assure quality of equipment & fittings. Lastly there may be a need for policy level intervention into weapon procurement to ensure that the Defence Industrial Base in India is strengthened to levels where it can sustain the requirements of the Armed forces.

The shipyards, then, would be able to ‘Build better and better Ships’ for the DSI Indian Navy.

38

warship_design2ndtime.indd 38

30/01/13 5:30 PM

Subscription-Dec-2011:cover-feb3.qxd 30/01/13 4:52 PM Page 1

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POLICY

FEBRUARY 2013

Robert Gates and AK Anthony in New Delhi

Amit Cowshish

KEY POINTS

AFP

The defence procurement procedure, the defence production policy and other policy elements of the defence ministry geared towards better procurement management still lack vigour in implementation.

Some intelligent improvisations should be allowed within the basic premises of the various policies.

The 2012 defence offsets rejig may have created some anomalies in terms of items on the offsets investment list that are not classically defence technologies.

DEFENCE OFFSETS AND DPP For the first time, the defence ministry has created a policy framework that could guide the defence materiel procurement process into a more institutionalised structure than being ad hoc. The defence offsets guidelines, the latest ones of 2012, are geared towards creating an indigenous defence industrial base through tie-ups with foreign vendors.

40

offset_2ndtime.indd 40-41

I

ndia’s emergence as the largest importer of defence equipment almost coincides with relegation of China from that slot to the fourth slot. This is the result of a policy doggedly pursued by the Chinese leadership over a long period of time to encourage domestic defence industry. India, on the other hand, displayed inexplicable inconsistency in pursuing a similar policy and it is only now, especially since the Kargil conflict jolted the system, that there is a greater focus on strengthening the defence industrial base in India with a view to reducing the dependence on import.

Four important steps have been taken by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) since 2001 that have the potential of reversing the trend of procurement of defence equipment from the foreign sources. The first of these steps was creation of the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) which, among other

things, is responsible for defence planning. The long-term requirement of defence equipment gets identified through this process.

The second important step was the promulgation of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) in 2002 to regulate capital procurements. DPP was amended several times to add the fast track procedure; a customised procedure for indigenous warship shipbuilding; and, procedure for procurement under what are known as ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’ and ‘Make’ categories.

These categories were created to promote indigenous research, design, development and production of defence equipment.

The third important step was the promulgation of a Defence Production Policy (DPrP) in January 2011 with the objective of achieving substantive self-reliance in design, development and production of defence equipment, weapon systems and platforms.

This policy also aims at creating conditions conducive for the private industry to actively participate in this national endeavour, enhancing the potential of the small and medium enterprises and broadening the research and development base of the country.

The fourth, and the latest, step is the promulgation of a revamped defence offsets policy in August 2012, which is radically different from its first avatar introduced in 2005 and subsequently liberalised in 2008.

Search for a real policy framework: These measures have created the policy framework for identification of long-term requirement of defence equipment by the services, specified the objectives to be kept in view while deciding the mode of procurement, laid down procedure for capital procurement and enabled leveraging of the huge budgetary allocation to bring in investment and technologies through offsets to strengthen the defence industrial base in India. This framework is certainly not the best but it is good enough for making substantial progress in minimising the import of defence equipment through progressive increase in domestic production. Why, then, has the situation not changed perceptibly?

There are no simple answers but it is clear that the MoD has to take some more steps to execute its own policy prescriptions, plug

DSI

the loopholes, refine the policies based on feedback and go beyond the routine handling of issues related to strengthening of the defence industrial base.

To begin with, if the objective of increased indigenous production of defence equipment is to be achieved, there has to be a time-bound roadmap and a clearly defined strategy for achieving the goal. This is an area that has not received the attention it deserves. While it would take a long time to evolve a roadmap and a strategy for moving along that roadmap, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) could at least start taking the steps that are already mandated by the existing policies.

A case in point is the lack of urgency displayed in disclosing information about what the services would need in the next ten to fifteen years. The DPP recognises the need to share the future needs of the armed forces with the industry and mandates a public version of the perspective document to be brought out outlining the technology perspective and capability roadmap covering a period of fifteen years.

The 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan LTIPP (2012-27) was approved by the Defence Acquisition Council in April 2012 but the public version of the document is yet to be released. In fact, there is a need to bring out the public versions of the five-year and the annul plans also, which are sub-sets of the LTIPP. The industry cannot position itself to meet the current and futuristic requirements of the services unless it has an official word on the short-term and long-term requirements of the defence services. The ministry must also decide well in advance what requirements cannot be met indigenously within the expected timeframe and take advance action to bridge the gap through imports.

The DPrP requires an annual review of the progress made towards achieving self-reliance. It has been two years since the promulgation of the policy but no such review is known to have been carried out. Had this been done, it would have got highlighted that many measures prescribed in the policy have not been taken. For example, it is stated in the policy that the government would simplify the procedure under the ‘Make’ category in such a manner that it enables indigenous design and development of the required

41

30/01/13 5:33 PM

POLICY

FEBRUARY 2013

Robert Gates and AK Anthony in New Delhi

Amit Cowshish

KEY POINTS

AFP

The defence procurement procedure, the defence production policy and other policy elements of the defence ministry geared towards better procurement management still lack vigour in implementation.

Some intelligent improvisations should be allowed within the basic premises of the various policies.

The 2012 defence offsets rejig may have created some anomalies in terms of items on the offsets investment list that are not classically defence technologies.

DEFENCE OFFSETS AND DPP For the first time, the defence ministry has created a policy framework that could guide the defence materiel procurement process into a more institutionalised structure than being ad hoc. The defence offsets guidelines, the latest ones of 2012, are geared towards creating an indigenous defence industrial base through tie-ups with foreign vendors.

40

offset_2ndtime.indd 40-41

I

ndia’s emergence as the largest importer of defence equipment almost coincides with relegation of China from that slot to the fourth slot. This is the result of a policy doggedly pursued by the Chinese leadership over a long period of time to encourage domestic defence industry. India, on the other hand, displayed inexplicable inconsistency in pursuing a similar policy and it is only now, especially since the Kargil conflict jolted the system, that there is a greater focus on strengthening the defence industrial base in India with a view to reducing the dependence on import.

Four important steps have been taken by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) since 2001 that have the potential of reversing the trend of procurement of defence equipment from the foreign sources. The first of these steps was creation of the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) which, among other

things, is responsible for defence planning. The long-term requirement of defence equipment gets identified through this process.

The second important step was the promulgation of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) in 2002 to regulate capital procurements. DPP was amended several times to add the fast track procedure; a customised procedure for indigenous warship shipbuilding; and, procedure for procurement under what are known as ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’ and ‘Make’ categories.

These categories were created to promote indigenous research, design, development and production of defence equipment.

The third important step was the promulgation of a Defence Production Policy (DPrP) in January 2011 with the objective of achieving substantive self-reliance in design, development and production of defence equipment, weapon systems and platforms.

This policy also aims at creating conditions conducive for the private industry to actively participate in this national endeavour, enhancing the potential of the small and medium enterprises and broadening the research and development base of the country.

The fourth, and the latest, step is the promulgation of a revamped defence offsets policy in August 2012, which is radically different from its first avatar introduced in 2005 and subsequently liberalised in 2008.

Search for a real policy framework: These measures have created the policy framework for identification of long-term requirement of defence equipment by the services, specified the objectives to be kept in view while deciding the mode of procurement, laid down procedure for capital procurement and enabled leveraging of the huge budgetary allocation to bring in investment and technologies through offsets to strengthen the defence industrial base in India. This framework is certainly not the best but it is good enough for making substantial progress in minimising the import of defence equipment through progressive increase in domestic production. Why, then, has the situation not changed perceptibly?

There are no simple answers but it is clear that the MoD has to take some more steps to execute its own policy prescriptions, plug

DSI

the loopholes, refine the policies based on feedback and go beyond the routine handling of issues related to strengthening of the defence industrial base.

To begin with, if the objective of increased indigenous production of defence equipment is to be achieved, there has to be a time-bound roadmap and a clearly defined strategy for achieving the goal. This is an area that has not received the attention it deserves. While it would take a long time to evolve a roadmap and a strategy for moving along that roadmap, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) could at least start taking the steps that are already mandated by the existing policies.

A case in point is the lack of urgency displayed in disclosing information about what the services would need in the next ten to fifteen years. The DPP recognises the need to share the future needs of the armed forces with the industry and mandates a public version of the perspective document to be brought out outlining the technology perspective and capability roadmap covering a period of fifteen years.

The 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan LTIPP (2012-27) was approved by the Defence Acquisition Council in April 2012 but the public version of the document is yet to be released. In fact, there is a need to bring out the public versions of the five-year and the annul plans also, which are sub-sets of the LTIPP. The industry cannot position itself to meet the current and futuristic requirements of the services unless it has an official word on the short-term and long-term requirements of the defence services. The ministry must also decide well in advance what requirements cannot be met indigenously within the expected timeframe and take advance action to bridge the gap through imports.

The DPrP requires an annual review of the progress made towards achieving self-reliance. It has been two years since the promulgation of the policy but no such review is known to have been carried out. Had this been done, it would have got highlighted that many measures prescribed in the policy have not been taken. For example, it is stated in the policy that the government would simplify the procedure under the ‘Make’ category in such a manner that it enables indigenous design and development of the required

41

30/01/13 5:33 PM

POLICY

AFP

South Block; Defence Ministry HQ

equipment, weapon systems and platforms by both the public and the private industry in a faster time frame.

Apparently, no specific step has been taken by the ministry in this regard. It is not surprising, therefore, that not a single project has made any perceptible progress under the ‘Make’ category.

These are examples of, and not an exhaustive commentary on, what the MoD must do to ensure implementation of its own policies. In the absence of any clear strategy to implement the policies, the MoD is left with little choice than to resort to outright purchase of equipment under the ‘Buy’ category, mostly from abroad, or licensed production under the ‘Buy and Make’ category.

While outright purchase does not involve any transfer of technology, the technology transfer under the ‘Buy and Make’ category has its own limitations. In most of these cases, the defence public sector undertakings and the ordnance factories are the nominated agencies

for absorbing the technology. However, there have been problems both in ensuring full transfer of technology and in absorbing it.

More importantly, licensed production does not automatically imply transfer of intellectual property rights, thereby limiting advantages of technology transfer.

The defence procurement procedure provides for another two routes for procurement of defence equipment and weapon systems. These routes are ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’and ‘Make’. Under ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’ the request for proposal is issued to only the Indian companies, including joint ventures with the foreign companies. The products procured through this route must have a minimum of 50 per cent indigenous content on cost basis. The ‘Make’ category, on the other hand, covers procurement of high technology complex systems, to be designed, developed and produced indigenously. These two routes have the potential to create a robust indigenous defence industrial base but ironically very few

acquisition programmes could so far be taken up under these two categories.

One reason for this is the inadequacy of the requisite indigenous industrial capability to undertake projects under the ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’and ‘Make’ categories. To a large extent, this factor is also relevant in the context of the procurement programmes under the ‘Buy and Make with transfer of technology category. This problem manifested itself in the Avro-replacement programme of the Indian Air Force after it was decided that the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited would not be nominated as the production agency.

The proposal could not be categorised as ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’ as there were no Indian entities in the private sector that had the requisite experience to be given the request for proposal for manufacturing the transport aircraft. The same difficulty came in the way of categorising this programme as ‘Buy and Make’ as there was no Indian entity that could be nominated

42

offset_2ndtime.indd 42

30/01/13 5:33 PM

AF_An_LAAD_2013_21,6x27,6cm_INGLES_DSI.pdf 1 25/09/2012 11:55:51

POLICY

FEBRUARY 2013

by the ministry to absorb the technology and manufacture the transport aircraft indigenously.

Ultimately, it was decided to leave it to the foreign manufacturers to choose the Indian production partner. This was an innovative solution resulting from out-of-box thinking. Such measures need to be institutionalised.

AFP

Will the defence offsets help: It is this problem of a weak industrial base in India that was sought to be addressed through the Defence Offset Guidelines, first introduced in 2005. The guidelines were amended several times till a new set of guidelines was promulgated with effect from August 1, 2012.

The new guidelines are radically different from the guidelines introduced in 2005 and all the typical features of an offsets policy, with the possible exception of offset trading.

The key objectives of the new guidelines are to leverage capital acquisitions to develop the Indian defence industry by fostering development of internationally competitive enterprises; augmenting the capacity for research, design and development of defence products and services; and, encouraging development of synergetic sectors like civil aerospace and internal security.

These objectives are intended to be achieved by making it mandatory for the vendors to undertake offset obligation to the extent of a minimum of 30 per cent in all acquisition programmes where the estimated cost is INR 300 crore or more. To make it attractive for the vendors, the new guidelines provide for multipliers and offset banking. The offset obligation can now be discharged during a period that extends up to a maximum of two years beyond the period of the main contract.

The avenues for discharge of offset obligation have been clearly defined and a detailed list of eligible products and services has been included in the guidelines.

Re-phasing of offset obligations and change in the Indian Offset Partner or the offset component have been permitted. An overall cap on penalty for default has been prescribed.

These features of the new liberalized offset policy have the potential of ushering in an era of greater industrial activity. However, there are issues that need to be addressed to ensure that it serves the intended purpose.

To begin with, while the objectives of the new policy have been defined it does not cater to a

The 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan LTIPP (2012-27) was approved by the Defence Acquisition Council in April 2012 but the public version of the document is yet to be released.

44

offset_2ndtime.indd 44-45

The assessment of the impact of offsets on these parameters requires efforts that go beyond merely analysing the sixmonthly reports on implementation of the individual offset programmes, as required under the new guidelines. The entire task related to monitoring, review and analysis could be outsourced to a professional body, which should not be difficult

Dassaullt Rafale Fighter Jet , the chosen MMRCA with 50 per cent offset

clearly defined goal. The policy leaves it to the foreign entities to choose the area in which they would like to discharge the offset obligation. This unregulated flow of offsets might not serve the purpose of bringing in the technologies, products and services that are needed by the Indian industry to reach a stage from where it could take a leap on its own to join the big league of the arms manufacturers. It is, therefore, necessary that a provision is made in the existing policy to enable the MoD to demand and direct the offsets in the areas in which they are needed the most at a given point of time to bridge the gap in the existing industrial capability. This would also help in preventing flow of offsets in the areas in which these may not be required. This task can be undertaken by the Defence Offset Management Wing (DOMW), created under the new policy, with suitable restructuring.

Energising the DOMW is a challenge in itself. Its functions include monitoring the discharge of offset obligations, audit and

review of progress reports received from vendors, participation in technical and commercial evaluation of the offset proposals, implementation of the offset banking guidelines and administration of penalties.

These are routine activities which can be performed without having to go beyond the confines of the ministry of defence. However, DOMW is also responsible for formulation of the defence offset guidelines (and, by implication, amendment to the existing guidelines) and for assisting vendors in interfacing with the Indian industry.

These are responsibilities which require continuous interaction with the industry, continuity of the personnel manning the DOMW and acquiring expertise which the present system of manning the ministerial structures by officers on deputation does not permit. This is not a reflection on the individuals manning the DOMW but a pointer to the need for a systemic change.

There is another non-routine but extremely significant function that needs to be added to the charter of the DOMW. A number of issues concerning the implementation of the new guidelines have been raised in the seminars and discussions, as also in the print media, since the new guidelines were promulgated.

These range from doubts regarding licensing requirements to ownership of intellectual property rights. The DOMW must institute a mechanism to receive these inputs and provide immediate clarifications on a regular basis. These clarifications must be posted on the website for information of all the stakeholders. In fact, there is a need to empower the DOMW to give advance rulings or clarifications on issues that the prospective vendors, Indian Offset Partners and others may raise.

The DOMW is required to monitor the progress of the individual offset contracts

DSI

but a bigger challenge is to learn lessons from the overall offset programme and adjust the offset policy to suit the changing scenarios.

It is indisputable that there is a cost attached to implementation of offsets which the buyer has to bear. This additional cost can be justified only if the offsets result in transfer of technologies that do not get outdated soon after these are transferred, qualitative improvement in the indigenous industrial capabilities or creation of jobs which would not have been possible but for the offsets.

The assessment of the impact of offsets on these parameters requires efforts that go beyond merely analysing the six-monthly reports on implementation of the individual offset programmes, as required under the new guidelines. The entire task related to monitoring, review and analysis could be outsourced to a professional body, which should not be difficult as the new guidelines permit the DOMW to avail of the assistance of any appropriate entity for discharging its functions.

Some other broader policy initiatives are also needed to encourage the defence industry in India. These initiatives relate to streamlining of the licensing regime, permitting higher foreign direct investment in the defence industry, liberalising the export policy related to defence products, rationalising the taxation structure, creating a level playing field for the industry both in the private and public sector and minimising the cost of setting up business in India, just to name a few.

These issues are undoubtedly beyond the remit of the MoD but as the nodal ministry for ensuring that the need of the defence services are met in a most costeffective manner through greater indigenous production, the ministry must play a larger role. This can be done by providing a forum to the industry, both foreign and Indian, including the public sector and the micro, small and medium enterprises, for airing their problems and intervening on their behalf to find solution to the problems faced by them. To put it candidly, the MoD has to assume a dynamic leadership role to walk the talk on strengthening of the indigenous industrial base for achieving self-reliance DSI in defence.

45

30/01/13 5:33 PM

POLICY

FEBRUARY 2013

by the ministry to absorb the technology and manufacture the transport aircraft indigenously.

Ultimately, it was decided to leave it to the foreign manufacturers to choose the Indian production partner. This was an innovative solution resulting from out-of-box thinking. Such measures need to be institutionalised.

AFP

Will the defence offsets help: It is this problem of a weak industrial base in India that was sought to be addressed through the Defence Offset Guidelines, first introduced in 2005. The guidelines were amended several times till a new set of guidelines was promulgated with effect from August 1, 2012.

The new guidelines are radically different from the guidelines introduced in 2005 and all the typical features of an offsets policy, with the possible exception of offset trading.

The key objectives of the new guidelines are to leverage capital acquisitions to develop the Indian defence industry by fostering development of internationally competitive enterprises; augmenting the capacity for research, design and development of defence products and services; and, encouraging development of synergetic sectors like civil aerospace and internal security.

These objectives are intended to be achieved by making it mandatory for the vendors to undertake offset obligation to the extent of a minimum of 30 per cent in all acquisition programmes where the estimated cost is INR 300 crore or more. To make it attractive for the vendors, the new guidelines provide for multipliers and offset banking. The offset obligation can now be discharged during a period that extends up to a maximum of two years beyond the period of the main contract.

The avenues for discharge of offset obligation have been clearly defined and a detailed list of eligible products and services has been included in the guidelines.

Re-phasing of offset obligations and change in the Indian Offset Partner or the offset component have been permitted. An overall cap on penalty for default has been prescribed.

These features of the new liberalized offset policy have the potential of ushering in an era of greater industrial activity. However, there are issues that need to be addressed to ensure that it serves the intended purpose.

To begin with, while the objectives of the new policy have been defined it does not cater to a

The 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan LTIPP (2012-27) was approved by the Defence Acquisition Council in April 2012 but the public version of the document is yet to be released.

44

offset_2ndtime.indd 44-45

The assessment of the impact of offsets on these parameters requires efforts that go beyond merely analysing the sixmonthly reports on implementation of the individual offset programmes, as required under the new guidelines. The entire task related to monitoring, review and analysis could be outsourced to a professional body, which should not be difficult

Dassaullt Rafale Fighter Jet , the chosen MMRCA with 50 per cent offset

clearly defined goal. The policy leaves it to the foreign entities to choose the area in which they would like to discharge the offset obligation. This unregulated flow of offsets might not serve the purpose of bringing in the technologies, products and services that are needed by the Indian industry to reach a stage from where it could take a leap on its own to join the big league of the arms manufacturers. It is, therefore, necessary that a provision is made in the existing policy to enable the MoD to demand and direct the offsets in the areas in which they are needed the most at a given point of time to bridge the gap in the existing industrial capability. This would also help in preventing flow of offsets in the areas in which these may not be required. This task can be undertaken by the Defence Offset Management Wing (DOMW), created under the new policy, with suitable restructuring.

Energising the DOMW is a challenge in itself. Its functions include monitoring the discharge of offset obligations, audit and

review of progress reports received from vendors, participation in technical and commercial evaluation of the offset proposals, implementation of the offset banking guidelines and administration of penalties.

These are routine activities which can be performed without having to go beyond the confines of the ministry of defence. However, DOMW is also responsible for formulation of the defence offset guidelines (and, by implication, amendment to the existing guidelines) and for assisting vendors in interfacing with the Indian industry.

These are responsibilities which require continuous interaction with the industry, continuity of the personnel manning the DOMW and acquiring expertise which the present system of manning the ministerial structures by officers on deputation does not permit. This is not a reflection on the individuals manning the DOMW but a pointer to the need for a systemic change.

There is another non-routine but extremely significant function that needs to be added to the charter of the DOMW. A number of issues concerning the implementation of the new guidelines have been raised in the seminars and discussions, as also in the print media, since the new guidelines were promulgated.

These range from doubts regarding licensing requirements to ownership of intellectual property rights. The DOMW must institute a mechanism to receive these inputs and provide immediate clarifications on a regular basis. These clarifications must be posted on the website for information of all the stakeholders. In fact, there is a need to empower the DOMW to give advance rulings or clarifications on issues that the prospective vendors, Indian Offset Partners and others may raise.

The DOMW is required to monitor the progress of the individual offset contracts

DSI

but a bigger challenge is to learn lessons from the overall offset programme and adjust the offset policy to suit the changing scenarios.

It is indisputable that there is a cost attached to implementation of offsets which the buyer has to bear. This additional cost can be justified only if the offsets result in transfer of technologies that do not get outdated soon after these are transferred, qualitative improvement in the indigenous industrial capabilities or creation of jobs which would not have been possible but for the offsets.

The assessment of the impact of offsets on these parameters requires efforts that go beyond merely analysing the six-monthly reports on implementation of the individual offset programmes, as required under the new guidelines. The entire task related to monitoring, review and analysis could be outsourced to a professional body, which should not be difficult as the new guidelines permit the DOMW to avail of the assistance of any appropriate entity for discharging its functions.

Some other broader policy initiatives are also needed to encourage the defence industry in India. These initiatives relate to streamlining of the licensing regime, permitting higher foreign direct investment in the defence industry, liberalising the export policy related to defence products, rationalising the taxation structure, creating a level playing field for the industry both in the private and public sector and minimising the cost of setting up business in India, just to name a few.

These issues are undoubtedly beyond the remit of the MoD but as the nodal ministry for ensuring that the need of the defence services are met in a most costeffective manner through greater indigenous production, the ministry must play a larger role. This can be done by providing a forum to the industry, both foreign and Indian, including the public sector and the micro, small and medium enterprises, for airing their problems and intervening on their behalf to find solution to the problems faced by them. To put it candidly, the MoD has to assume a dynamic leadership role to walk the talk on strengthening of the indigenous industrial base for achieving self-reliance DSI in defence.

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FEBRUARY 2013

Pinaki Bhattacharya

KEY POINTS

The love of the Clintons for India and its policy of strategic restraint in 1999 Kargil episode went far in de-hyphenating Indo-Pak policies of the US The strategic part of the relationship emerged with Bush Jr's premeditated thought of leveraging India vis-a-vis China While the defence relationship with the US does not have across-the-board support in India with the reticent Defence Minister, AK Antony, himself not being a believer in a closer embrace with the USA.

AFP

Indian PM Manmohan Singh with George W Bush at White House

INDO-US DEFENCE TIES, POST-COLD WAR In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the decision to engage then sole superpower, the USA, by New Delhi bore fruit eventually when a neoconservative Republican Party government came to power in Washington. George W Bush, the president elected at the beginning of the new millennium, gave a huge boost to relations with India. A major component of that relationship was defence, in its various manifestations.

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I

n 1993, Narasimha Rao government in New Delhi was in a diplomatic quandary. The Berlin Wall had been destroyed, as the East German regime had ceased to exist in 1989. A year later in 1990, the Soviet Union had begun withdrawing from Afghanistan. Mikhail Gorbachev, who had been talking about Glasnost and Perestroika, lost his shaky control over the Soviet state structure. The Soviet state was dissolved.

With that, New Delhi lost a long time strategic alliance that had seen it through the troubled decades of the Cold War, which ended with the demise of the USSR. So, in 1992 Rao government that had already begun the process of economic liberalisation soon after winning a general election, decided to open channels of communication with the surviving super-power. It wanted to stabilise its foreign policy that was closely linked to its new plan for economic development.

A strategy was prepared in the inner sanctums of the government in South Block between the ministry of external affairs and the prime minister’s office. The government decided to make an attempt to engage the emerging administration that won the presidential polls in the USA in November of 1992. It was to be done before the Democratic Party nominee, Bill Clinton, also the president-elect, took office following US political tradition stipulating 20th January of the new year.

A small team of officials, belonging to the PMO and the MEA, were thus sent to the USA to begin the process of wooing the American establishment. Interestingly, they did not go to Washington directly, but headed for a small town in south-eastern USA called Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, where Clinton was the governor till before his election as president.

On the flight to the little known Little Rock, there couldn’t have been too many Indians, but for the officials of the Indian government. So, they did catch the attention of the fellow travelers. One of them was a person called Vernon Jordan, a counselorfriend of the Clintons, Bill and Hilllary.

Jordan himself decided to talk to the Indians and learnt about their mission.

This entirely unexpected break, actually paved the way for the Indian team to get some access to the transition team of Clinton’s new Administration. One young member of that New Delhi team was Hardeep Puri, who is now expected to retire as the country’s permanent representative to the United Nations.

He had told this writer quite a few years ago, the lucky break of meeting Jordan had actually paved the path for the country to develop relationships with the post-Cold War American leadership.

The culmination of that process was Clinton’s de-hyphenation of the Indo-Pak matrix on which lay the US policies towards South Asia. A result of this change in the mindset was available in the US president’s much publicised intervention in the Kargil adventurism of Pakistan in 1999.

Though earlier, the 1998 Pokhran II tests and India’s and Pakistan’s declaration of themselves being nuclear weapon bearing

DSI

States had still greatly disturbed the calculations of the Clinton Administration.

The influential liberal section of the Administration and the Democratic Party wanted India to defer to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, or at least the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. For, they were sure that if India fell in line, Pakistan would follow.

But New Delhi was intransigent about not signing either of the treaties, because it had held that both were discriminatory. Thus began the longest bilateral engagement of both the countries ever. Strobe Talbott, then deputy secretary of state of the US initiated a series of dialogues with then Bharatiya Janata Party-led NDA government’s representative, Jaswant Singh. There were eventually nine rounds of talks between the two.

While very little is known about the contents of the talks that took place in various places besides Washington, the US government apparently was convinced that India shared many of its organising principles. This was irrespective of what the people really thought about America, though it would seem to a general onlooker that the influential Indian middle-class voted for that country with their feet: in other words, an US education was considered a touchstone of academic acme that an Indian youth could achieve.

India, a Republican Party favourite: Though India was seen in the US in 1960’s or ‘70s as a basket case with a ‘fake’ moralist foreign policy based on Non-Alignment, a liberal section in the US – most of whom belonged to the Democratic Party, at the political level - was influenced by Gandhi and Nehru.

But after George W Bush Administration took-over power in Washington in 2000, their immediate priority was to counter inimical forces of Islam, who had been targeting the country and its people. Those circumstances led to the Republican Partyled government of Bush take a strategic view of a relationship with India.

While this decision was also initially influenced by a desire to pose a challenge to China in its backyard, the developments

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DEFENCE TIES

FEBRUARY 2013

Pinaki Bhattacharya

KEY POINTS

The love of the Clintons for India and its policy of strategic restraint in 1999 Kargil episode went far in de-hyphenating Indo-Pak policies of the US The strategic part of the relationship emerged with Bush Jr's premeditated thought of leveraging India vis-a-vis China While the defence relationship with the US does not have across-the-board support in India with the reticent Defence Minister, AK Antony, himself not being a believer in a closer embrace with the USA.

AFP

Indian PM Manmohan Singh with George W Bush at White House

INDO-US DEFENCE TIES, POST-COLD WAR In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the decision to engage then sole superpower, the USA, by New Delhi bore fruit eventually when a neoconservative Republican Party government came to power in Washington. George W Bush, the president elected at the beginning of the new millennium, gave a huge boost to relations with India. A major component of that relationship was defence, in its various manifestations.

46

Indo-Us2ndtime.indd 46-47

I

n 1993, Narasimha Rao government in New Delhi was in a diplomatic quandary. The Berlin Wall had been destroyed, as the East German regime had ceased to exist in 1989. A year later in 1990, the Soviet Union had begun withdrawing from Afghanistan. Mikhail Gorbachev, who had been talking about Glasnost and Perestroika, lost his shaky control over the Soviet state structure. The Soviet state was dissolved.

With that, New Delhi lost a long time strategic alliance that had seen it through the troubled decades of the Cold War, which ended with the demise of the USSR. So, in 1992 Rao government that had already begun the process of economic liberalisation soon after winning a general election, decided to open channels of communication with the surviving super-power. It wanted to stabilise its foreign policy that was closely linked to its new plan for economic development.

A strategy was prepared in the inner sanctums of the government in South Block between the ministry of external affairs and the prime minister’s office. The government decided to make an attempt to engage the emerging administration that won the presidential polls in the USA in November of 1992. It was to be done before the Democratic Party nominee, Bill Clinton, also the president-elect, took office following US political tradition stipulating 20th January of the new year.

A small team of officials, belonging to the PMO and the MEA, were thus sent to the USA to begin the process of wooing the American establishment. Interestingly, they did not go to Washington directly, but headed for a small town in south-eastern USA called Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, where Clinton was the governor till before his election as president.

On the flight to the little known Little Rock, there couldn’t have been too many Indians, but for the officials of the Indian government. So, they did catch the attention of the fellow travelers. One of them was a person called Vernon Jordan, a counselorfriend of the Clintons, Bill and Hilllary.

Jordan himself decided to talk to the Indians and learnt about their mission.

This entirely unexpected break, actually paved the way for the Indian team to get some access to the transition team of Clinton’s new Administration. One young member of that New Delhi team was Hardeep Puri, who is now expected to retire as the country’s permanent representative to the United Nations.

He had told this writer quite a few years ago, the lucky break of meeting Jordan had actually paved the path for the country to develop relationships with the post-Cold War American leadership.

The culmination of that process was Clinton’s de-hyphenation of the Indo-Pak matrix on which lay the US policies towards South Asia. A result of this change in the mindset was available in the US president’s much publicised intervention in the Kargil adventurism of Pakistan in 1999.

Though earlier, the 1998 Pokhran II tests and India’s and Pakistan’s declaration of themselves being nuclear weapon bearing

DSI

States had still greatly disturbed the calculations of the Clinton Administration.

The influential liberal section of the Administration and the Democratic Party wanted India to defer to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, or at least the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. For, they were sure that if India fell in line, Pakistan would follow.

But New Delhi was intransigent about not signing either of the treaties, because it had held that both were discriminatory. Thus began the longest bilateral engagement of both the countries ever. Strobe Talbott, then deputy secretary of state of the US initiated a series of dialogues with then Bharatiya Janata Party-led NDA government’s representative, Jaswant Singh. There were eventually nine rounds of talks between the two.

While very little is known about the contents of the talks that took place in various places besides Washington, the US government apparently was convinced that India shared many of its organising principles. This was irrespective of what the people really thought about America, though it would seem to a general onlooker that the influential Indian middle-class voted for that country with their feet: in other words, an US education was considered a touchstone of academic acme that an Indian youth could achieve.

India, a Republican Party favourite: Though India was seen in the US in 1960’s or ‘70s as a basket case with a ‘fake’ moralist foreign policy based on Non-Alignment, a liberal section in the US – most of whom belonged to the Democratic Party, at the political level - was influenced by Gandhi and Nehru.

But after George W Bush Administration took-over power in Washington in 2000, their immediate priority was to counter inimical forces of Islam, who had been targeting the country and its people. Those circumstances led to the Republican Partyled government of Bush take a strategic view of a relationship with India.

While this decision was also initially influenced by a desire to pose a challenge to China in its backyard, the developments

47

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DEFENCE TIES

of 9/11 deepened this desire to see India as a fellow traveller in terms of terrorist victimhood.

The neo-realists of the Bush administration, on the one hand, declared a counter-terrorism war against the Islamists and on the other, sought friends internationally who would support them in their endeavour.

These were the times when the BJPled NDA was still in power in New Delhi.

And their enthusiasm in taking on Islamic forces was not particularly subtle or even hidden. The government they ran, thus almost decided to provide any help that the US government could want as it attacked Afghanistan.

The result was a declaration of a ‘strategic partnership’ between the two countries, the main elements of which were listed in a document called ‘Next Step in Strategic Partnership.’ While the document did not significantly include military aspects, it

AFP

AFP

Indian and US army officers shaking hands at a Indo-US Joint Exercise ‘YUDH ABHYAS 09’

laid the foundations of a possible military collaboration in the strategic sense.

The thread of this evolving military relationship was taken up by the succeeding government of the Congress-led UPA. In June, 2005, then defence minister of the country, Pranab Mukherjee and the US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld signed a document that has become the foundational document of Indo-US defence relationship.

It is advisable, at this stage to remember some of the provisions of that document.

The goals that were set for the bilateral defence pact were: “maintaining security and stability,” “defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism,” “preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated materials, data, and technologies,” and “protecting the free flow of commerce via land, air seawith lanes.”

Chinese President, Hu and Jintao To achieve theseDrgoals, the actionable Prime MInister.

Manmoihan Singh parts of the agreement were long:

(a) conduct joint and combined exercises and exchanges; (b) collaborate in multinational operations when it is in their common interest; (c) strengthen the capabilities of our militaries to promote security and defeat terrorism; (d) expand interaction with other nations in ways that promote regional and global peace and stability; (e) enhance capabilities to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (f) in the context of our strategic relationship, expand two-way defense trade between our countries. The United States and India will work to conclude defense transactions, not solely as ends in and of themselves, but as a means to strengthen our countries’ security, reinforce our strategic partnership, achieve greater interaction between our armed forces, and build greater understanding between our

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RE 13 FO 20 80 BE H â&#x201A;Ź8 EE C OK R O FRtails BO A T M P NDl de H U TE ful 4T E V AT or Y ite f SA AR s IT eb IL w M See

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Image: CAE

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DEFENCE TIES defense establishments; (g) in the context of defense trade and a framework of technology security safeguards, increase opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, coproduction, and research and development; (h) expand collaboration relating to missile defense; (i) strengthen the abilities of our militaries to respond quickly to disaster situations, including in combined operations; (j) assist in building worldwide capacity to conduct successful peacekeeping operations, with a focus on enabling other countries to field trained, capable forces for these operations; (k) conduct exchanges on defense strategy and defense transformation; (l) increase exchanges of intelligence; and (m) continue strategic-level discussions by senior leadership from the U.S. Department of Defence and India’s Ministry of Defence, in which the two sides exchange perspectives on international security issues of common interest, with the aim of increasing mutual understanding, promoting shared objectives, and developing common approaches.

The crucial element in the agreement was the point F. As the well-informed readers of DSI know that talk of two-way trade in defence is just that, talk. For, this country produces a negligible amount of defence equipments, which is consumed by its own armed forces. Plus, the government in India has a policy – a throwback from the Nehruvian idealist days – of not exporting too much of military supplies.

On the other hand, the USA virtually comprised 50 per cent of the global arms bazaar. So, it is not surprising that even before the ink was dry on the ‘framework agreement,’ Rumsfeld argued for India buying the C-130 transport planes, manufactured by the Lockheed Martin Corporation. The assembly line for the aircraft was on the verge of closure, without any siginificant orders, as the US armed forces had stepped on to the next generation of transport planes like C-17 that were larger and more well suited to its needs. But India complied with the Rumsfeld request and ordered six, which are now being delivered.

The problem was C-130Js (the variant

India desired) was that its lift capability was limited, carrying only about a platoonstrength of soldiers and their supplies. It is meant to fly special forces in quick insertion and extraction operations. Not particularly suitable for conventional army’s war-fighting capabilities, the aircraft was of little value to the armed forces which, till then, dealt with non-conventional enemies in a manner that required this kind of deployment.

For example, in the upper reaches of the Himalayas, where in summer, the Indian Army engaged Kashmiri terrorists, there was very little space for a fixed wing aircraft of the C-130J kind to be landed.

Framework Agreement in implementation: Though Pranab Mukherjee, as defence minister had signed on the dotted lines promising to undertake joint, third country operations, the chances were dim that the India would engage in such warfare along with the USA. The political class in the country was not yet amenable to use Indian troops as the shock troops of the American imperium.

There was the issue of interoperability that needed to be addressed, at the technical level. This meant the troops of both the countries needed to share similar equipments in terms of radios, small arms, carbines etc, so that in case of joint action, an American soldier could take the position of an Indian jawan. This interoperability aspect, which was oversold as a concept by the American side to their Indian counterparts, was also a method of deepening the market in India for US-made materiel.

However, the military exercises began in earnest. The Indian army undertook annual land exercises like Yudh Abhyas that was held alternatively in India and the USA. These are typically less than a battalion strength exercises where the two armies hone their skills in joint fighting capabilities.

The military engagement between the two countries decidedly cooled after AK Antony took-over charge of the defence ministry. Antony was a Congress Party-man from Kerala, a state that had a long tradition of hostility towards the USA, in the main. He was also blooded in politics at a time when

The military engagement between the two countries decidedly cooled after AK Antony took-over charge of the defence ministry. Antony was a Congress Partyman from Kerala, a state that had a long tradition of hostility towards the USA, in the main. He was also blooded in politics at a time when the pro-US stance of the government had not taken roots.

the pro-US stance of the government had not taken roots. He, fiercely independent in his international views, remained suspicious of US motives. So there were no efforts yet made towards joint peacekeeping and peacemaking operations with the USA, as enshrined in the ‘framework agreement’s’ point D. The Democratic Party’s Barack Obama Administration was also initially cool towards India. It wanted to focus on a solution to the Afghan problem, which it marked out as its main task. But this process led them to provide Pakistan huge arms supplies. India began the clamour that these arms that were sought by Pakistan to fight Islamist insurgencies within that country, were being diverted to Pakistan Army’s weapons deployment against it.

While this led to a higher US vigilance and stricter controls on arms transfers to Pakistan, it did not stop the tide till Washington realised that Rawalpindi was playing a game of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. In other

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DEFENCE TIES

AFP

US President Barack Obama (C) walks alongside Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh down Cross Hall in the White House in Washington

words, the Pakistan Army was giving shelter and providing staging posts to the Afghan Taliban forces, while providing various logistical and operational help to the US forces.

Apprently, to facilitate the process of US supplies of military equipment to India, the Americans had been demanding that India signs the three agreements, which they consider to be the ‘foundational agreements’ of defence trade with India.

They are the Logistics Supply Agreement (LSA); Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA); and, Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA).

The LSA entailed making Indian armed forces bases their supply depots, where they could dump their materiel and undertake join operations, to get re-supplied later.

The CISMOA was about communication protocols being exchanged between the two countries that would enhance capabilities of interoperability in the field. And, BECA was about sharing information – of geospatial nature, for example – that could create an informational ecology for cartographic,

Meanwhile, the US is not all that worse off in terms of the arms trade with India, as the country with a $ 200 billion shopping list to be spent in a decade, provides enough resources to the American companies.

Though the two American companies, Lockheed and Boeing have lost out on the prestigious medium, multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) deal.

hydrographic and hydrological kind.

Antony has remained the bulwark against signing any of these agreements, which could lead to more pressure building on the country to source, more and more of defence equipments from the USA and also a tighter embrace of the country on India.

It is worth noting that for decades when communist China had been the US’s ally of choice against the communist Soviet Union, they did not agree on terms of any military engagements. This did not happen either when Sino-US relationship transformed itself into one of trade and commerce.

Considering the fact that the US insistence on these agreements early in the relationship with India, the rationale for it could be found in the nine rounds of talks Jaswant Singh had with Strobe Talbott, also a scholar on the Soviet Union. These talks, Talbott had recorded in his book, Engaging India, had helped him to understand the Indian political dynamics better.

But an USA that is fast losing its only superpower status, and India wishing a world of a number of major powers, may not find much relevance for these parts of military diplomacy to be too relevant in the future. For the time being, India is willing to source major weapons platforms from the USA without the critical technologies. Or it could be in a situation where it could replace these key sub-systems that the US denies by buying off-the-shelf.

Meanwhile, the US is not all that worse off in terms of the arms trade with India, as the country with a $ 200 billion shopping list to be spent in a decade, provides enough resources to the American companies. Though the two American companies, Lockheed and Boeing have lost out on the prestigious medium, multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA) deal, the country has still become a key player in the area of transport and tanker aircrafts; transport and attack helicopters and now even howitzers.

So overall, ‘framework agreement’ of 2005 is still keeping the two countries involved with each other, especially when the USA and the rest of the Western world, with the only exception of Germany, reel DSI under economic downturn.

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DEFENCE BUZZ An Update on Defence News

Tension Mounts Along Indo-Pak LoC Tension continues to build-up along the India-Pakistan border after a Line of Control (LoC) firing was reported earlier last week.

Both sides have enhanced troop movement after an Indian soldier was beheaded last month, following which Pakistan refused to respond to requests from India and its army for a flag meeting at the brigade level to deescalate tension along the LoC. The Indian side has been bolstered with the presence of additional Border Action Task Force personnel. Surveillance has been heightened with both the Army and Air Force deploying unmanned aerial vehicles in areas over Poonch and Rajouri sectors.

Meanwhile, IAF chief Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne warned that India may have to look at “some other options for compliance” if Pakistan continues to violate ceasefire agreements.

First Success For Airbus Military In India The Indian Ministry of Defense has selected Airbus Military to supply its A330 MRTT Multi Role Tanker Transport to the Indian Air Force.

Airbus won the competition after a lengthy selection process during which the aircraft refueled multiple types of IAF fighters and operated from the high-altitude IAF base at Leh. The A330 MRTT is offered with a choice of proven air-to-air refueling systems including an advanced Airbus Military Aerial Refueling Boom System, and/or a pair of under-wing hose and drogue pods, and/or a Fuselage Refueling Unit.

The A330 MRTT can also be used as a pure transport aircraft able to carry 300 troops, or a payload of up to 45 tonnes/99,000 lb. It can also easily be converted to accommodate up to 130 stretchers for Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC).

India Successfully Flight Tests Astra Missile India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has successfully flight tested the Astra ‘Air to Air’ guided missile on Sunday.

The missile fired from the ground based launcher successfully intercepted the target in mid-air.

Lakshya, the indigenously developed Pilotless Target Aircraft was used as the target. Astra is a ‘Beyond Visual Range’ (BVR) air to air missile being developed for the air force.

The single stage, solid fuelled ‘Astra’ missile is capable of engaging and destroying highly manoeuvrable supersonic aerial targets.

The 3.8 meter long missile, having a diameter of 178 mm and weighing 160 kg, can carry a warhead weighing 15 kg. It can be fitted to any fighter aircraft.

India, Russia Begin MTA Development India and Russia have officially begun work on the project to develop a transport aircraft, called Medium Transport Aircraft (MTA).

A total of 205 aircraft will be manufactured with the Russian Air Force (RAF) ordering 100 and 45 for the Indian Air Force. The last 60 will be built for export abroad.

With the MTA, the IAF will be able to phase out the aging AN-32 aircraft. Production is expected to begin by end 2017 and HAL and UAC will respectively manufacture a specified set of parts and modules for all 205 MTAs.

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DEFENCE BUZZ India’s MiG-29 Upgrade Could Boost MiG Aircraft Sales The successful delivery of the first three upgraded MiG-29 aircraft to the Indian Air Force could open doors for JSC Russian Aircraft Corporation to upgrade similar aircraft in other countries.

The company has been facing losses as several nations such as Algeria, Malaysia, and Lebanon are retiring their MiG-29 aircraft in favor of other manufacturers citing reliability and durability problems.

Trouble first began in 2008 when Algeria cancelled its order for 34 MiG-29s worth $1.4 billion citing lower quality than expected and returned several planes back to Russia. Similarly, Malaysia decided to cancel further orders of its MiGs. Earlier in August, the company completed the upgrade of 8 MiG29 fighters for Peruvian air forces in a contract reported to be worth $10 million.

HAL, Rosoboronexport Sign $2.2 Billion Su-30MKI Aircraft Contract India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) recently signed a contract with Russian arms maker Rosoboronexport for 42 numbers of Su-30 MKI frontline Fighter Aircraft.

“HAL’s total responsibility for this supersonic multirole aircraft has now gone up to 222. This will further boost our confidence and operations as we have already delivered 119 Su-30 aircraft to the Air Force. We will continue to contribute to the country’s defence preparedness”, said Dr. R. K. Tyagi, Chairman, HAL. Su-30 MKI is a two-seater, supersonic, multirole aircraft for day and night operations in all weather conditions. The aircraft is fitted with two turbojet AL-31FP engines and is equipped with state-ofthe-art avionics from Russian, Western and indigenous sources, according to a HAL statement.

IAI, BEL Strengthen Ties With Latest MoU India’s Bharat Electronics Limited India (BEL) and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) have entered into a new partnership to jointly produce Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LRSAM) Ship-Defence Systems.

The latest partnership allows BEL to function as the Lead Integrator and producer of major sub-systems and IAI will continue in its capacity as the Design Authority, producing sub-systems as a main subcontractor of BEL, according to a statement.

The work involved system integration where the upgraded systems would feature a solid-state radar and computers, electro-optical fire control systems, a new engine and overhauling of all subsystems, the purpose being to extend the life of the air defence system by 15 years.

Indian Army Wants Apache Helicopters From Air Force The Indian Army will request for the transfer of the recently sanctioned Apache attack helicopters from the Air Force’s command.

According to reports, the proposal would include transfer of attack helicopters from the Air Force as also the soon-to-be-procured US-made Apache choppers.

The Army is seeking to deploy the helicopters at the earliest along the China and Pakistan border.

The case for 22 Apaches is being processed by the IAF which held field evaluation trials for them and now the Defence Ministry is in the final stages of procurement of these combat assets, according to a news agency.

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02/01/13 10:55 AM

DEFENCE BUZZ Indian Navy Takes Delivery Of First AW-101 Helicopter India’s political and military elite will now fly in comfort and style as AgustaWestland has started delivery of 13 AW-101 helicopters to the Indian Air Force this year.

AgustaWestland quietly delivered the first three helicopters to the air force earlier last month as the IAF replaces the ageing Russian Mi8s and Mi-17s that are used to ferry the President, Prime Minister and other VVIPs. The new choppers will be a major upgrade compared with their Russian predecessors. The AW-101 has a built-in self-defence systems like missile-approach warners, chaff and flare dispensers and directed infra-red electronic counter-measures to protect passengers.

Powered by three turboshaft engines, the cockpit of the AW- 101 is fitted with armoured seats for the crew, and can withstand an impact velocity of over 10 m/s.

India Successfully Flight Tests Upgraded Jaguar Aircraft India’s state-run defense manufacturer Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has successfully flight tested the avionics of the upgraded Jaguar aircraft “Darin III” in Bangalore.

The upgrade includes system requirement capture, specification preparation, software, hardware, electrical, mechanical design and development, all of which was indigenously done by HAL. The aircraft now also has modern navigation, EW and weapon delivery system with INGPS using primary and reversionary modes, state-of-the –art, man-machine interface (near glass cockpit) with two smart multi function display and head-up display.

India Relies On Russian GLONASS GPS For BrahMos Launch India’s latest test launch of the sea-based BrahMos supersonic cruise missile relied on the Russian GPS-GLONASS technology to guide it to its target.

The GLONASS technology was added to the existing Dopplerinertial platform, allowing the missile to be updated with advanced satellite navigation systems from Russia’s Kh-555 and Kh-101 strategic long-range cruise missiles.

This is perhaps the first international application of the Russian GPS-GLONASS precision navigation system for a missile launch and further underscores the close defence relationship between India and Russia.

In 2011, Russia offered India services for transmitting highprecision signals through GLONASS for the guidance of Indian ballistic missiles. Russia reportedly offered New Delhi the technology knowing that the U.S will most likely not offer its GPS codes for highprecision signal transmissions and that Indian scientists would take some time to develop such a system.

Dassault Systems Opens Subsidiary In India French aircraft-maker Dassault Systems has opened subsidiary companies in India where earlier this year it bagged a multi-million dollar contract to supply 126 Rafale aircraft to the Indian Air Force.

The company named Dassault Aircraft Services India Private Limited (DASIPL) was set up recently and it is 100% owned by its French parent company, officials said.

Headed by Richard Lavaud, who has worked in India earlier with defence firms, and ensure the deal is signed with India.

Dassault Rafale, won the Indian MMRCA contract after emerging as the lowest bidder and beat out competitor Eurofighter Typhoon, is currently negotiating terms with the MoD.

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Indian Navy Gets First P-8I Aircraft The Indian Navy on Wednesday took delivery of the first of eight P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft from Boeing.

India awarded the $2.1 billion deal to Boeing in 2009 for procuring the long-range surveillance aircraft, which are equipped with antisubmarine weaponry.

The first plane was handed over to Indian personnel by the company in Seattle. It will be used for training the crew there, according to Navy officials said.

P-8I is a derivative of Boeing 737-800 long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft and will replace the Russian Tupolev Tu-142M maritime surveillance turboprop.

The Navy’s contract with Boeing included an option for four additional aircraft along with warfare, intelligence and surveillance systems, as well as training and maintenance support.

AFP

AFP

DEFENCE BUZZ

Boeing’s India Helicopter Order Win Over Russia: Indian Audit Report Provides Clues The Indian Defense Ministry in November selected Boeing for a $1.6 billion heavy-lift and attack helicopter order, which also is the first time in nearly two decades that the ministry has said no to Russian Helicopters - a traditional supplier of the Indian Air Force and Navy helicopter fleet for attack, medium-lift and heavy lift requirements.

However, problems with the Russian helicopters’ fleet in terms of maintenance, spares availability, high down time and low utilization rate, as outlined in a 2011 Indian Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) Report may provide clues as to why the Indian MOD preferred the American choppers.

Repair agencies were unable to meet AOG (Aircraft off Ground) demands in reasonable time indicating serious deficiencies in provisioning and procurement of spares and rotables, it added.

L&T Delivers High Speed Interceptor Boat To Indian Coast Guard India based Larsen & Toubro (L&T), has delivered its first indigenously designed and constructed High Speed Interceptor Boat (IB) to Indian Coast Guard (ICG).

The IB can achieve maximum speed over 40 Knots, and is designed and constructed entirely through in-house efforts. This is the first of 36 such High Speed Interceptor Boats being constructed by L&T under a contract worth Rs. 977 Crores. from ICG. The IB has a full aluminum-alloy construction for reduced weight and is powered by twin water-jet propulsion systems to enable quick response which is vital for coastal surveillance activities. The interceptors have the ability to operate effectively in shallow water which will be critical for near- shore action.

ABG Shipyard To Build $89 Million Training Vessel For Indian Navy India’s largest private ship building company, ABG Shipyard Limited, has been awarded a repeat order from the Ministry of Defence for building an additional cadet training vessel for the Indian Navy in a contract worth about Rs. 485 crore ($89.4 million).

The vessel will be approximately 110 meters in length with the capacity to carry a light helicopter. Designed to achieve a maximum speed of 20 knots, the vessel will be used to provide basic training to the Naval Cadets and trainees in activities such as disaster relief, search and rescue operations, according to a company statement.

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DRDO

EXPLORING NEW FRONTIERS IN THE REALM OF CUTTING EDGE DEFENCE TECHNOLOGIES Making India Stronger with 55 Years of Innovation, Research & Development dedicated to the Nation DRDO has placed India among elite group of : - 4 countries to have multi-level Strategic Deterrence capabilities - 5 countries to have its own Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program - 6 countries to have developed a Nuclear â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Powered Submarine - 7 countries to have developed own th Main Battle Tank and 4 generation Combat Aircraft.

DRDO has established 52 laboratories with over 7500 scientists and around 20,000 support staff and exhaustive infrastructure for testing and comprehensive evaluation of weapon systems and military equipment.

DRDO continues in its march over path of excellence exploring new frontiers in the realm of cutting edge defence technologies.

DEFENCE RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India www.drdo.gov.in

Issued by Directorate of Public Interface

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29/01/13 12:14 PM

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