Defence and Security of India - February 2014

INDIAN SHIPYARD

deveLOPMeNT, GROWTH & PROSPeCTS The shipbuilding capacity of the country is marred by time overruns and low quality product I HARSiMRAN MALHi MODERN WARFARE

SPeCiAL OPS iN MOdeRN WARFARe The smaller powers with less developed capabilities indulge in ‘asymmetric warfare’ February 2014

deFence and SecurIty of IndIa

DSI

www.defencesecurityindia.com

ARMY’S

ARMOUR dRiveS

Looking ahead to the induction and modernisation of the ambitious main battLe tank (mbt) programme, the indian army is chaLLenged by some grave issues Like night bLindness of the tanks, ordnance shortage and fatigue of t-90s incLuding many others I RAHUL Bedi

volume 6

ISSue 2

` 250

FEBRUARY 2014

LETTER FROM THE

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editor

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n 2012, when the Defexpo’12 was organised, a well-known military commentator had talked about India’s arms bazaar was a lucrative proposition. The Indian business was considered to be of the order of $ 100 billion, to be spent over then and 2022.

The medium, multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA) deal was yet to be finalised. And, the navy had 40-odd vessels in the shipyards. India was paying up a Russian demand for $ 2.1 billion bill on an aircraft carrier that initially was supposed to cost a little over one billion dollars, including the cost of a score of MiG29 Ks/KUBs. There was corruption in the deals, but their investigations were not yet choking off the decision-making process, either at the service headquarters or at the ministry of defence. So the mood was naturally upbeat. But two years later, at Defexpo’14, the mood will not be so positive. The country’s economy has slowed to a level that is barely moving at five per cent, beyond the standard eight per cent of the last few years. The MMRCA contract negotiation is moving at a snail’s pace, and the deal will surely not be signed in the present financial year, so the observers say. And Defence Minister, AK Antony’s corruption watch has failed to stop the tide of smelly deals that have manifested in serious damages to the defence preparedness. Of course, Admiral Gorshkov/INS Vikramaditya has been delivered; another supply of twenty of MiG-29 Ks is on anvil. Having said that, the Defexpo’14 will still have its positives; the arms industries will still display their wares; and hope for India to get on to the fast tracks of economic growth of recent past. The military modernisation of the country is yet an unfinished task. With the general elections just a few months away, while no big ticket deal is expected to go through, a quick return to stellar capital budgets for the armed forces is the desire for both the services and the vendors, post-poll. And in that scheme of things, the army needs a higher priority. For its own languorous decision-making coupled with the MoD’s indecision has left it bereft of crucial ammunitions and arms, both in the short and medium term.

This Defexpo’14 will show whether the special needs of the army and the navy can be catered.

Pinaki Bhattacharya

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The country’s economy has slowed to a level that is barely five per cent, beyond the standard eight per cent of the last few years. The MMRCA contract negotiation is moving at a snail’s pace, and the deal will surely not be signed in the present financial year.

CONTENTS

ARMOUR

8

Army’s Armour

Drives

Looking ahead to the induction and mordernisation of the ambitious Main Battle Tank (MBT) programme, the Indian Army is challenged by some grave issues like night blindness of the tanks , ordnance shortage and the fatigue of T-90s including many others 4

FEBRUARY 2014

ARMY AIR DEFENCE SPECIAL FORCES

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Three DecaDes of sTaTus Quo

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Smaller powers with less developed capabilities indulged in ‘asymmetric warfare,’ but current indications are that even countries have indulged in strategic rethink.

Air defence involves detection, identification, handing the target over to the AD weapons and finally deterrence or destruction of the target.

INDIAN SHIPYARDS

CHOPPERING AROUND

operaTions in MoDern Warfare

32

DeVeLopMenT, GroWTh anD fuTure prospecTs

COMMUNICATIONS

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46

an inDian c4isr sysTeM by 2020

inDian heLicopTer proGraMMe

Despite unique advantages such as long coastline ship building capacity is marred.

The technology rich combat environment requires command, control, communication, computers, intel, surveillance work seamlessly.

The choppers have become integral in a country where the area spread require and a lack of paved airstrips create possibilities of a chopper insertion.

NAVAL ARMAMENTS

SIMULATORS

DEFENCE RELATIONS

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58

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naVaL coMbaT sysTeMs

eMbeDDeD siMuLaTion

russia anD inDia, in a cLose eMbrace

Though Indian Navy prides itself for sourcing its indigenous platforms, all or most of its combat systems are sourced through imports.

A cost effective Live, Virtual and Creative (LVC) training environment is not a substitute for live training.

The USSR had been in a firm clinch with India, the successor state picked up the threads after a few hiccups.

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CONTRIBUTORS

RAHUL BEDI

NARESH CHAND

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London and the Irish Times.

Na resh Chand is a Former Director General of Army Air and Former Member Secretary National Radar.

He is also an ex officio member of Apex Board for monitoring the 'Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme' and served with DRDO (Electronics and Radar Development Establishment). He also worked as a consultant with Bharat Electronics Limited.

AIR MARSHAL (RETD) SUMIT MUKERJI

DR. S. KULSHRESTHA

Muk erji was commissioned in 1972. A Qualified Flying Instructor (Cat ‘A’), a Fighter Combat Leader, he first commanded a MiG-29 Squadron, the second a MiG-25 Squadron and the third, the Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment of which he was the Commodore Commandant for 5 yrs. He was awarded the Shaurya Chakra for Gallantry (peace time) in 1981 and the VSM in 1997. He was appointed the Air Officer Commanding-inChief, Southern Air Command in 2009.

RAdm. S. Kulshrestha , Indian Navy in the year 1975 and served as Director General of Naval Armament Ministry of Defence (Navy) where he was directly responsible for availability of reliable and safe naval armament. He has superannuated from Indian Navy in 2011 and is currently unaffiliated. He has been writing in defence journals on issues related to matters Navy, Armament technology and indigenisation.

FEBRUARY 2014

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defence and security of india FEBRUARY 2014 VICE ADMIRAL (RETD) HARSIMRAN MALHI

LT GENERAL (RETD) DAVINDER KUMAR

Vice Admiral H.S. Malhi was commissioned into the Indian Navy on 1 July, 1972 after completion of training at national Defence Academy , Khadkvasla and completed Basic Engineering Course and Marine Engineering Specialization. He has also done a Post-Graduate in Advance Marine Engineering Course at Institute of Armament Technology, Pune, Naval Higher Command Course at College of Naval Warfare, Mumbai and National Defence College, Delhi. He became Chairman & Managing Director of Mazagon Dock Ltd. Mumbai from 20 Oct 2008 and retired on 31st January 2012

Dav inder Kuma r superannuated in September 2011 as the CEO & Managing Director of Tata Advanced Systems Ltd. He has been on the Board of Directors of a number of Private and Public sector companies. Earlier, he was the Signal Officer-in-Chief of the Indian Army responsible for conception, planning and execution of communication networks, electronic warfare and information security projects.

VOLUME 6, ISSUE 2

EDITOR Pinaki Bhattacharya CREATIVE DIRECTOR Bipin Kumar DESIGNER Sachin Jain (Dep. Art Director), Mukesh Kumar, Ajay Kumar (Asst. Art Director), Sujit Singh (Sr. Visualiser) JR. FEATURESWRITER Anandita Bhardwaj SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING Vishal Mehta (E-Mail: vishalmehta@mtil.biz) MANAGER MARKETING Jakhongir Djalmetov (E-Mail: joha@mtil.biz) Prateek Singh (E-Mail: prateeksingh@mtil.biz) Pulkit Rawal (E-Mail: pulkit@mtil.biz) SALES & MARKETING COORDINATOR Atul Bali (E-Mail: atul@mtil.biz) CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION Vipul Jain PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MTC PUBLISHING LIMITED 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMAN J. S. Uberoi PRESIDENT Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER Puneet Nanda GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Benelux Cornelius W. Bontje Tel: (41) 79 635 2621 Email: cbontje@ymail.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: rem-media@sfr.fr Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Latd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com Scandinavia/South Africa Emanuela Castagnetti-Gillberg Tel: +46 31 799 9028 E-Mail:egillberg@glocalnet.net South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr East-Central Europe/Greece/Turkey Zena Coupé Tel: (44) 1923 852537 Email: zena@expomedia.biz USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, BLESSALL Media LLC. Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmediainc@icloud.com Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited.

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AIR VICE MARSHAL (RETD) AMIT ANEJA Aneja was commissioned in the Indian Air Force as a Fighter Pilot in Dec 1976. An alumnus of the National Defence Academy, the Air Officer has flown over 3000 hours which includes operational flying in various front line fighter squadrons.

His flying experience includes flying on Kiran, Hunter, Gnat, MiG-21 and Mirage-2000. He is a Qualified Flying Instructor. The Air Officer is a post Graduate in Defence and Strategic Studies, did the Higher Command Course and is presently pursuing M Phil. He is a Graduate of Air Command and Staff College in USA, National Institute of Defence Studies in Japan and attended the Air Battle Management and Planning Course at CASPOA in France.

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ARMOUR

Army’s Armour

Drives Looking ahead to the induction and mordernisation of the ambitious Main Battle Tank (MBT) programme, the Indian Army is challenged by some grave issues like night blindness of the tanks , ordnance shortage and the fatigue of T-90s including many others

RAHUL BEDI

Key Points l The army is in the mode of processing the procurement of 300 light weight, 200 wheeled and 100 tracked tanks l The ‘Project Rhino’ ,supposed to be the backbone of army’s armour has suffered recurring setbacks l The T72M1 fleet has faced depletion of AMK340 shells to the extent of not being enough to carry basic firing exercises.

T

he Indian army’s ambitious main battle tank (MBT) induction and modernisation programmes are in a state of flux, afflicted by delays and an overarching lack of planning and resource management.

Its continually postponed plans to equip 61 armoured regiments that remain hobbled by the army’s vacillation and inefficiency in formulating realistic

qualitative requirements (QRs) for its MBT fleet. Interminable bureaucratic delays by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in approving badly-needed imports and upgrade contracts merely exacerbate the problem.

“Defence planners remain helpless in augmenting the army’s armour capabilities which are ageing and years behind schedule” defence analyst Lieutenant General Vijay Kapoor, a retired armoured corps officer said.

All those involved in the planning processes-the user, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and the MoD-seem collectively incapable of cooperating to effectively boost the army’s crucial armour profile, he added.

India’s former Army chief, General Deepak Kapoor had added to the gravity of this shortcoming.

In a candid, but worrying admittance, he had declared in January 2010, that around 80 per cent of the Indian Army’s MBTs, projected to operate in an essentially volatile and unfriendly neighbourhood, were ‘night blind’. The armoured columns of neighbouring nuclear rivals Pakistan and China, on the other hand, he had stated, were 80 and 100 per cent night-fighting capable.

“One of the major areas of my concerns is to remove the night blindness of the tanks, so

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that we are able to effectively fight at night as we are able to do in the day,” Gen Kapoor had declared, revealing one of the army’s enduring but worst kept secret, which remains unresolved.

“There are projects in the pipeline for ensuring the kind of night vision capability that some of our adversaries have, but these take three to four years to fructify” the army chief had stated, helplessly reiterating what some of his predecessors had similarly conceded privately, but failed to rectify.

The Indian Army operates a mix of some 2400 imported and licence built ‘Ajeya’

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AFP

An Indian Army T-90 battle tank kicks up dust during the Shoor Veer military exercise near Hanumangarh, located near the India-Pakistan border

T72M1s MBTs, 657 ‘Bhishma’ T90s platforms and 124 indigenously designed by Avadi-based, Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) and OFB-built Arjun Mk I tanks.

India imported 310 T90s in 2001-124 in completed form and the remaining 186 in kit form for assembly by the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) at Avadi, near Chennai - for Rs 36.25 billion. Thereafter, in 2007 it inked another Rs 49 billion deal for 347 additional T 90 MBTs. The latter import followed delays by the HVF in building 1000 T 90s under the 2001

purchase agreement due to problems in translating a warehouse full of Russian technical manuals and Moscow’s reluctance in transferring technology to locally construct the MBT, especially with regard to metallurgy in forging its 125 mm barrels.

By 2022, the Indian Army aims on operating around 1650 T90s, which along with Arjun MK I and its upgraded Mk II model will, in due course, replace the T 72M1s that are presently undergoing incremental upgradation. But this proposed switch stands largely postponed for now as the HVFs capacity to licence build the

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superior MBTs and Arjun’s remains limited.

The army has already inducted its first batch of 124 DRDO-developed and the OFB-run HVF-built Arjun MK Is, it ordered in 2000. Deliveries of an equal number it signed up for in August 2010 - which together,are enough to equip four regiments and scheduled for completion by 2016. For the follow-on order, the HVF plans on building 24 Arjun MK Is in the first batch till December 2014 and 50 units each year thereafter, till the total order of 124 is completed.

Alongside, the army is considering

ARMOUR

ordering some 250 Arjun Mk IIs, which incorporate 93 improvements-including 19 major ones-over Arjun Mk I. The upgraded platform, in which Israel Military Industries and Elbit Systems of Israel are collaborating closely with the DRDO’s CVRDE centre at Avadi, is presently undergoing the final round of user trials in Rajasthan.

CVRDE head P Shiv Kumar said improvements in Arjun Mk II, implemented in tandem with the Indian Army, include equipping the MBT with advanced thermal imaging sights for night fighting and the capability to fire Israel Aerospace Industry (IAI)-designed semi-active laser guided LAHAT missiles from its 120mm rifled gun to neutralise enemy tanks.

Weighing seven tons more than the 60ton Arjun Mk I, the Arjun Mk II will also be fitted with indigenously developed explosive reactive armour (ERA) to counter armor piercing fin stabilised discarding

AFP

An Indian MBT Arjun MK-1 tank rolls down Rajpath during Republic Day parade in New Delhi

In a candid, but worrying admittance India’s former Army chief, General Deepak Kapoor in 2010 had termed around 80 per cent of the Indian Army’s MBTs, projected to operate in an essentially volatile and unfriendly neighbourhood are ‘night blind’.

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sabot (APFSDS), high explosive anti-tank rounds and rocket-propelled grenade attacks and advanced land navigation and communication systems.

Additionally, it has a mine plough and an improved suspension and tracks to bear the additional load. An auxiliary power unit with an 8.5 kw capacity - up from Arjun Mk Is 4.5 kw-containerisation of its ammunition and modifications to its hull and turret to give it a lower and less vulnerable silhouette, constituting part of the improvement package. Panoramic sights, an upgraded gun barrel with an equivalent firing charge of 500 rounds, an automatic target tracking system, tank commanders’ panoramic sight and digital control harness complete the MBTs upgrade.

CVRDE is also collaborating with a local private sector manufacturer to develop a Mobile Camouflaging System to mitigate the threat of interference from enemy sensors and smart munitions for fitment

ARMOUR onto the MBT at a later stage.

But efforts to indigenously upgrade the MBTs power-pack to 1500 cc to endure the supplementary weight have been shelved and Arjun Mk II will continue with Mk Is 1400cc German MTU 838Ka-501 diesel engine and semi-automatic RENK RK304A transmission.

However, the Arjun Mk II fitted with a large proportion of imported systems, is expected to cost an exorbitant Rs 370 million ($5.96 million) each, once completed, defence minister A K Antony told Parliament in August 2011. In comparison, Arjun MK I with over 60 per cent imported components is priced at around Rs 170 million per tank, less than half the price of its upgraded model. The proven T 90S, on the other hand, were procured for $2.2-2.5 million per unit or nearly three platforms for the price of one Arjun Mk II. In a significant development, the anticipated success of Arjun Mk II has more or less put paid to the army’s plans to develop a 50-ton future main battle tank (FMBT) to replace the upgraded T 72M1s, 2020 onwards.

In December 2010 Defence Minister A K Antony had informed Parliament that the FMBT would be developed within a decade.

He said the army had conceptualised its requirements and the DRDO was carrying out a feasibility study.

The DRDO, for its part, had seconded a team of academics, technicians and army officers to develop the FMBTs transmission and engine called the Bharat Power Pack.

“We are confident that we will be ready with the FMBT prototype in five to seven years,” S Sundaresh, DRDOs chief controller of armaments and combat engineering division had said in Chennai in late 2010.

Working with a foreign consultant, in all probability from Israel, he said the DRDO was looking to develop a modular design FMBT capable of being upgraded whenever new technology emerged.

But the Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF), which after several years has failed to effectively formulate the proposed FMBTs preliminary specification qualitative requirements (PSQR), recently proposed the project’s abandonment. Instead, it is believed to have indicated its preference for gradually upgrading Arjun’s operational capability and agility, by reducing its excessive weight

An Indian soldier gives instructions atop T-72 Ajeya tank

without compromising on fire power, for eventual deployment in mountainous terrain.

The DGMF reasoned that building a third MBT production line alongside the T90s and Arjun presented neither economic nor logistic or even operational logic.

Besides, it argued that there had been no major breakthroughs in armoured vehicle technology in recent decades and consequently was of the view that the future of indigenous tank building needed to flow from MBT Arjun. This proposal, however, is still under review.

Meanwhile, Project Rhino under which 1900-2200 T 72M1MBTs that form the

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backbone of the army’s armour formations that were being upgraded, has suffered recurring setbacks.

The retrofit envisages fitting the T 72M1fleet with either partial or full solution thermal imaging fire control systems in addition to equipping them with ERA panels, fibre-optic gyro-based navigation and laser warning systems, frequency hopping radio sets and advanced nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) equipment.

Stabilising the tanks gun control system by attaching a new thermal shroud on the MBT’s 125mm 2A46 smooth bore gun for greater accuracy and equipping the tank with new integrated fire detection and

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AFP

The DRDO, for its part, had seconded a team of academics, technicians and army officers to develop the FMBTs transmission and engine called the Bharat Power Pack. “We are confident that we will be ready with the FMBT prototype in five to seven years,” S Sundaresh, DRDO chief controller of armaments and combat engineering division had said in Chennai in late 2010.

suppression systems would have completed the staggered retrofit package to keep the T72M1s in service till 2015-2020 and possibly, even beyond.

“The T72M1s lack of night fighting capability is due largely to the army’s incompetence and the MoDs lack of equipment awareness” retired Brigadier Arun Sahgal of the Forum for Strategic Initiative in New Delhi said. Both seem incapable of working together to enhance the military’s mechanised force capability, the former armoured corps officer added.

The crucial acquisition of around 950 full solution thermal imaging fire control systems (TIFCS) - 250 of them

replacements for the Drawa-T FCS from PCO-Cenzin of Poland, the $ 72.73 million contract for which was terminated in 2005and around 750-800 third generation, thermal imaging stand alone systems (TISAS) for fitment onto around 1700-1800 T72M1s, still awaits closure.

Over the past five years the army has acquired and installed merely 300 TISAS from Israel’s Elbit Systems Electro-optics or El Op for the T72M1s for around $120,000 each. But army sources said many of these were reportedly malfunctioning because of overheating in the Rajasthan desert.

And it was only in April 2013 that the MoDs Defence Acquisition Council approved

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the procurement of some 4780 thermal imaging (TI) sights for the army’s mechanised fleet including Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICVs) from the state-run Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) over the next few years.

Military analysts, however, believe these TI systems will be produced in collaboration with El Op with whom BEL has a close, albeit classified working relationship.

Of these, the T-72 and T 90s fleets will receive 2000 and 1200 TI sights respectively; the remaining 1580 imagers will be fitted onto the army’s Russian BMP1 and BMP-2 ICVs which too suffer from night blindness.

Efforts at replacing the T 72M1s 780hp V12 air cooled multi-fuel injection engine with the T90s 1000hp V92S2 four-stroke V12 diesel power pack fitted with a turbosupercharger too remains under development, contributing to the overall upgrade setback.

Operational availability of the T 72M1s too is problematic. According to the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) imported T-72 tanks require their first overhaul after 12 years or 10,000km while the second one is

ARMOUR carried out after 22 years or 18,000 km. For HVF licence built T 72M1s, the first overhaul is after 10 years or 5,000 km and the second after 20 years or 9,000 km.

“The backlog of 1572 tanks to be overhauled as of 2005 had arisen primarily due to insufficient overhaul capacity created, failure of the factory (HVF) to make available the quality spares in time and inadequate supply of tanks due for overhaul by the Army,” the CAG stated in its report on combat vehicles tabled in Parliament in May, 2006.

Consequently by 2015, the CAG warned, there would be a further accumulation of another 1983 tanks for their first and second overhaul, a situation that would ‘adversely effect’ operational readiness.

The T 72M1 fleet also faces a depletion of 125 mm AMK340 shells produced by the state-run Ordnance Factory Board with not enough rounds for the army to even carry out mandatory, bi-annual basic firing exercises over the past five years. Former army chief Gen V K Singh referred to this paucity of 125 mm tank ammunition in his April 2012 letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, which was leaked to a Mumbai newspaper generating widespread controversy.

Earlier in late 2011, the MoD had initiated the emergency import of 66,000 125mm APFSDS rounds from Russia for the T 72M1s on grounds of ‘operational necessity’. This had followed intimation by the army that its war wastage reserves of 125mm rounds had dropped well below ‘critical levels’. The MoD sources said the emergency ordnance procurement, reportedly at inflated prices, also obliged it to waive the offset obligation of 30 per cent mandated for all Indian military purchases over Rs 3 billion.

This ordnance shortage was also triggered by the destruction 2003 onwards of 150,000200,000 T 72M1 AMK340 rounds worth around Rs 7 billion due to a combination of defective manufacturing and negligence in storing. The AMK-340s semi-combustible cartridge case that is filled with triple–base propellant, was found to have inadequate packing between the layers to prevent leakage in high storage temperatures, often under the open sun without even overhead protection, rendering it unsafe.

These defective rounds had also “demoralized” T 72M1crews after a series of AMK-340 rounds burst inside the MBTs barrels. In one such accident two soldiers are believed to have died some years ago at Babina. Armoured corps officers said

thereafter nervous tank crews had, in several instances, refused to fire the AMK340 rounds and when forced to do so resorted to elaborate ‘jugaad’ or innovative solutions to detonate the shells a safe distance from the tank.

T 90s ammunition too is posing a problem for the army.

Initially, the T 90s fired Russian-made AMK-338 and AMK-339 rounds. But these had more or less been exhausted in training and the MBTs 125 mm smoothbore guns

In August 2013 the MoD signed a Rs 30-billion ($461 million) contract with the state-owned Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) for an undisclosed number of Invar anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) for theT90 fleet for delivery by 2018. The T 90s also faced ‘fatigue’ problems and needed major overhauling as, over years they had been ‘over exposed’ in exercises by senior commanders.

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have yet to be configured to fire locally manufactured AMK-340 rounds, in effect leaving many platforms virtually ammunition-less.

In August 2013 the MoD signed a Rs 30billion ($461 million) contract with the state-owned Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) for an undisclosed number of Invar anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) for the T90s fleet for delivery by 2018.

But army sources said BDL, which has been making Invar ATGMs based on the Russian 9M119M Refleks missile

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under a collaborative agreement with Rosoboronexport since 2006-07, would only be able to meet a part of the Indian Army’s projected requirement for some 20,000 projectiles.

A substantial portion of the remaining ordnance would need to be supplemented by imports from Russia. However, many tank officers feared that the Army’s budgetary constraints and the sharp decline in the value of the rupee against the US dollar would preclude wholly fulfilling the critical Invar ATGM deficit, further imperiling operations.

The T 90s also faced ‘fatigue’ problems and needed major overhauling as, over years they had been ‘over exposed’ in exercises by senior commanders.

Each T 90s has a maximum life of 650 on the onboard rev-counter (static running equal’s one rev per hour whilst traversing a distance of 17.5 km is one rev). However, in less than four years after the tanks entered regimental service around 2002-03 most had completed 600 revs and were in need of major overhauls. Tank gun barrels-capable of firing 220 effective full charge (EFC) rounds- too were imperiled. The T 90s can undergo a maximum of three gun changes.

A paucity of training simulators of which there were only four – two driving and two for gunnery instruction -contributed to the MBT’s overuse. To compound matters, these simulators were divided between Babina, Patiala, Jhansi and Ahmednagar forcing tank crews to waste time racing to each location. The situation was further complicated by the simulator maintenance wing being headquartered at Jhansi, resulting in delays if problems occurred at any of the other three locations.

In conclusion, the army is in the mode of processing the procurement of 300 light tanks weighing 22 tons each - 200 wheeled and 100 tracked - to equip two proposed armoured formations under raising, alongside the new Mountain Strike corps, for deployment in precipitous terrain along the unresolved Chinese frontier.

Some of these proposed platforms are for employment in battlefield reconnaissance in the desert region, in urban and semiurban environments, in riverine terrain and marshy ground. The MoD had dispatched a request for information to overseas vendors in October 2009 for these light tanks, but so far has failed to follow up on this requirement.

SPECIAL FORCES

OperatiOns in

MOdern Warfare Earlier the smaller powers with less developed capabilities indulged in ‘asymmetric warfare,’ but current indications are that even developed countries have indulged in strategic rethinking DISTINGUISHED CONTRIBUTOR, DSI

Key Points l The US’ interests catered by its military has proved to be too expensive, thus making them take to ‘deniable’ subversions through SFs. l The irregular forces expanded the spectrum of warfare to areas like cyber, financial and even transport nodes. l As in all cases strategic, Indian security managers are yet to wake up to the efficacy of SF deployability Introduction

C

hange is a phenomenon that is applicable to anything and everything.

Warfare has changed over the years as well. But within the conflict spectrum, irregular forces have carved for themselves a far more prominent place than earlier. This in turn has provided increasing scope for employment of Special Forces.

Modern War The spectrum of conflict has four segments; nuclear, biological and chemical; conventional, sub-conventional, and cyberspace. The conventional wars are getting rare because of multiple reasons.

Costs of conventional wars have risen phenomenally. A report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, USA dated 14 January 2013 had brought out that the cost of US war in Afghanistan for period FY 2001-FY 2013 totalled up to $641.7 billion. Even a superpower like America, post the wars in Iraq and continuing engagement in Afghanistan, has felt the pinch and has changed its policy to ‘no boots on ground’.

The new US doctrine strategy is therefore

changing from military domination to more subtle manipulation, orchestrating regional events from the background as subterfuge.

Battlefield transparency has enabled conventional forces to be targetted better.

This is coupled with lethality, accuracy and range of weapon systems. Technology has ushered in stand-off and smart weapons and directed energy weapons that may be based on platforms on ground, sea, air and space. Then of course is cyber war with the potential of paralysing the adversary even before declaration of war. But with all this, the most significant development has been the advent of the non-state actors and irregular forces (including state supported ones), some of which are as potent as conventional forces.

The lethality of irregular forces lies in the fact that they operate in a battlefield that is without borders and these forces defy all rules and regulations.

The last war amongst two conventional militaries was fought in 2005 between Russia and Georgia and past decade we have witnessed even the US and NATO forces battling irregular forces. A quiet but significant change has occurred, in that, while earlier it was only conventionally weaker nations that waged asymmetric wars employed irregular forces against an adversary, now even powerful nations have turned to this form of warfare. There are plenty of reports in the US media that state the US has been supporting Al Qaeda and other terrorists in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Libya, Syria and Iran. In line with the US policy of ‘no boots on ground’, the US has not physically invaded Syria but in effect has ‘boots on ground by proxy’ according to

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reports – implying various terrorist organisations. Post 2014, the US is resigned to indirectly subletting Afghanistan to the Taliban – an organisation it created through Pakistan to oust the Soviets and who it has been fighting in Afghanistan for past decade in conjunction Al Qaeda. While these organisations strike through terrorism, Ted Gunderson, as FBI Station Chief, Los Angeles, USA had gone on record to say in

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A National Security Guard (NSG) commando adjust the belt of his MP5 gun

2012, “Most terror attacks are committed by our CIA and FBI.� The US-NATO linked terrorist groups are also allegedly facilitating terrorist outrages in Chechnya and through Pakistani Taliban trainers training rebel forces in Syria.

Warfare is no longer confined to the battlefield. Boundaries between war and no war are blurred by asymmetric wars that have no borders, no rules and no regulations.

Psychological warfare imposes the largest penalty but affords the highest payoffs.

Successful psychological warfare demands integrated themes and subjects, which need to be developed. In addition to causes of conflict like territory and power, resources (water, energy, minerals etc) can become major flash points. There is heightened need for intelligence and deniable covert capabilities that ensure deniability of action for achieving

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strategic aims, both of which require Special Forces employment.

Transnational nature of threats and involvement of state actors in using subconventional conflicts have increased the complexity and technology empowered terrorists to cause severe damage through cyber, financial, kinetic attacks. Their acquiring WMDs is a major concern.

Asymmetric wars (of which terrorism and

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SPECIAL FORCES

Every Special Forces operative must be able to observe and fire in the dark but scaling of NVDs in Army Special Forces is still one between three operatives. The requirement of night vision goggles (NVGs) is met through taking off the night sight of the Tavor Assault Rifle and using it as a monocular. The night vision binoculars too are at a premium, and currently not available at all; there is a provisioning of 20 night vision binoculars per unit, whereas at least one must be provisioned to every five-man Assault Squad, or 36 night vision binoculars per unit. The thermal imaging devices provided are bulky and not state-of-the-art.

The night vision philosophy for Special Forces needs review.

Enhanced NVGs that use digital imagery to improve mobility and situational awareness under all lighting conditions are required.

These should be helmet-mounted systems that digitally combine video imagery from a low-light-level visible sensor and an un-cooled long-wave IR sensor onto a single color display located in front of the soldier's eye.

Till such time these NVGs are procured to required scales, voids should be filled with Monocular NVGs that can also double up as night sight of individual weapon of ‘every’ soldier. Digital technology should provide improved image quality. Application of advanced technology should aim at using NVDs for shooting around corners, reading maps, and laser designation etc incorporating sensor technology used in thermal weapon sights. All weapons (individual and crew served) must have NVDs to enable functioning as if night can become day. Similarly, adequate NVDs are required for spot and area surveillance and for laser designation of targets in order to optimise use of smart ammunition.

Indian paramilitary soldiers patrol during "Operation Green Hunt" near the jungles of Lathehar insurgencies are manifestations) will continue to dominate the conflict spectrum in the Sub Continent albeit windows of conventional war under the NBC backdrop will remain.

Special Operations According to a recent media report, in wake of increased violence by banned terror outfit NDFB(S) in Assam, the MHA has asked the Sashastra Seema Bal to begin undertaking “special operations” by creating a Special Operations Group in its battalions.

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Concurrent to this is another report that says Bangladesh government is set to launch “special operation” targeting foreign nationals staying illegally and undertaking various unlawful activities in the country.

However, in both these cases the term “Special Operations” is used in rather generic fashion. However, special operations are typically performed independently or in conjunction with conventional military operations. Having said that, this description needs to be viewed in the backdrop of

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Night VisioN DeVices (NVDs)

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conventional conflicts becoming rare (as discussed above), within ‘special operations’ are the more focused special operations that are undertaken essentially by Special Forces.

Such special operations are becoming increasingly important because of the threat posed by irregular forces.

What India Faces The Indian Army has been talking of a twoand-half front war for some time and this half front getting with China-Pakistan surreptitiously fanning insurgencies in India.

China sponsored Nepalese Maoists are linked with our Maoists and China is pumping weapons through Kachin rebels in Myanmar to insurgents in Manipur and Indian Maoists.

China has been surreptitiously creating her deadliest proxy in the USWA (United State Wa Army) in Myanmar. The Wa Tribe is the brain and heart that controls the drug trade in the famed ‘Golden Triangle’, much like the Taliban did during their ten year rule in Afghanistan. In recent years China has supplied USWA with assault rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers, anti-tank weapons,

shoulder fired AD missiles, armoured troop carrying vehicles and last year even with Mi-17 ‘Hip’ medium transport helicopters armed with TY-90 air-to-air missiles, creating a proxy that will be even deadlier than the LTTE. The intrusion made by China 19 kms deep into Indian Territory in April 2013 year has been followed by more, including in January, 2013 despite signing the BDCA. Namesake democracy in Pakistan and increasing radicalisation with Chinese presence in Pakistan/POK heightens the threat. Chinese stance on Arunachal and other Indian Territories will likely harden.

Covert presence of Chinese Special Forces and intelligence agencies in Pakistan, POK, Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka as part of PLA construction companies is possible. The Chinese “String of Pearls” is being augmented with a “Ring of Islamic Radicalism” courtesy Pakistan’s LeT, latest target being Maldives.

Growing interdependence and interlinking of terrorist groups are serious concerns. Possibility exists of South and east Afghanistan going under Taliban control post-2014. Robert Kaplan

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wrote in his book ‘The Revenge of Geography’, “An Afghanistan that falls to Taliban sway threatens to create a succession of radicalised Islamic societies from the India-Pakistan border to Central Asia. This would, in effect, a greater Pakistan, giving Pakistan’s ISI the ability to create a clandestine empire ….. able to confront India in the manner that Hezbollah and Hamas confront Israel”.

Strategic Asymmetry Within the India-China-Pakistan conundrum, China already has full spectrum conflict capability. India and Pakistan are taking initial steps in cyberspace but what should be a matter of serious concern in India is that while both China and Pakistan possess advance subconventional capabilities, India is lagging way behind in this sphere. This is a strategic asymmetry considering that sub- conventional war is and will continue to be the order of the day, irregular forces having demonstrated greater strategic value over conventional and even nuclear forces in recent years. We have failed to create deterrence against irregular

SPECIAL FORCES forces relying only on diplomacy. We continue to suffer from strategic intelligence voids. The discovery of some 11,000 Chinese in Pakistan / POK was courtesy New York Times. If we had Special Forces operatives covertly deployed in areas of our strategic interest, we would not be blind to future threats. The US discovered inadequacy of technical intelligence when Pokhran II surprised them completely. That is the reason they have operatives inside Iran for past several years. Covert Special Forces deployment in areas of strategic interest will significantly enhance our capacity to deal with multiple contingencies. There is urgent

Warfare is no longer confined to the battlefield.

Boundaries between war and no war are blurred by asymmetric wars that have no borders, no rules and no regulations.

Psychological warfare imposes the largest penalty but affords the highest payoffs

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need to develop publicised overt capabilities and deniable covert capabilities as deterrence against irregular war thrust upon us plus the will to selectively demonstrate it to ensure its effectiveness. Our Special Forces potential must be optimised and exploited to develop such capability.

Irregular forces can hardly be deterred through conventional power but somehow India does not appear to acknowledge this.

Operation ‘Parakram’ post the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament should have driven this point home aside from televised rhetoric by Pakistani speakers post periodic terror acts in India orchestrated from within

Pakistan, including challenging that India is welcome to employ its Strike Corps in retaliation. Other than during conventional war and routine missions under the United Nations, the only time India has deployed its Special Forces was as part of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, where all the then three parachute (commando) battalions in conjunction marine commandos were used to good effect.

Employing Special Forces strategically is a different ball game from using them as super infantry in counter insurgency within India and that too with adequate other forces to do these tasks.

misnomer. They are actually infantry battalions that have been trained for being delivered by parachute. Once landed, they operate as infantry battalions, holding ground till linked up. Presently, our Special Forces have no centralised command structure. This, plus the lack of strategic culture and prolonged employment in counter-insurgency leaves little scope for specialisation.

Resultantly, Army Special Forces are more ’jack of all trades’, MARCOS have limited prowess on land, GARUD are sans specialised air transportation units and their tasking duplicates tasks of Army Special

Indian paramilitary soldiers under an IAF IL-76 aircraft

Requirement What could be be considered as Special Forces in India are the Army Special Forces, Marine Commandos (MARCOS) of Navy, Garuds of Air Force, Special Groups (SGs) of Special Frontier Force (SFF) and Special Action Groups of National Security Guards (NSG). These forces have hardly been strategically used for politico-military missions cross border. Aside from routine UN missions, the only time India used Special Forces abroad was three Special Forces units as part of Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka. The media often quotes Parachute units as Special Forces, which is a

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Forces. Integrated and adequate intelligence is not institutionalized. Language training and proficiency is grossly inadequate. Being under different chains of command, there is no commonality in equipment and no concept of ‘packaged equipping’, aside from Specialist / advanced training facilities being inadequate.

Packaged equipment is essential because if a sub-unit does not have the complete authorised equipment, its combat capability will obviously be less. The equipment that is lacking presently is in terms of light weight hand-held laser target designators, information system package to

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communicate with required entities to include voice, data, video streaming, light weight long range global communications to call multiple weapon strikes, state-of-theart listening and surveillance devices – from miniature devices hand-held to MAVs, helicopter transportable all terrain vehicles, corner shots, goggles / devices to see through walls, hand-held EW weapons, state-of-the-art explosive devices with longterm timers, all terrain light weight clothing and load carriage, latest survival equipment, to name a few.

There is no concept of integrated or dedicated air support, and ‘support units’

in some 200 odd countries but we have not developed and employed our Special Forces for creating deterrence despite battling asymmetric war over past two decades. The hesitation is perhaps because of the misconception that trans-border employment of Special Forces is limited to short distanced physical or direct type of actions. This misconception continues to hound India’s security mandarins and politico-military leadership coupled with lack of a strategic culture and military not fully integrated into strategic planning of matters military. Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary wrote in his article “Adrift Without

cyber operations are an integral part of Special Ops including civilians. The SAGs of NSG and SGs of SFF are not cohesive units since 33 percent of their manpower is turned over annually.

Amongst the various Special Forces there is little or no joint training. High level of sophisticated coordination and synergy necessary between various political, military, intelligence agencies and other departments to pull off Special Forces strategic missions is missing. There is urgent need to educate and create macro conditions for Special Forces through measures like creating a national vision, joint doctrine, joint organizations and integrated intelligence support. The US Special Forces are deployed

a Strategic Culture” (12 March 2013), “….What would explain our unwillingness to recognize the depth of these threats even today and take appropriate…….. Pakistan uses the instrument of terrorism against us but we think that we can bring this to an end through dialogue. We let Kashmiri separatists meet Pakistani leaders in Delhi and Islamabad ….. That we produced Chanakya almost 2400 years ago is not sufficient ground to claim that today’s India possesses a strategic culture.”

Special Forces should be central to asymmetric response. It must be understood application of Special Forces as response to

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asymmetric war does not automatically lend itself to physical actions. In fact, physical actions should be the least resort. Special Forces are ideally suited to control fault lines of the adversaries without any signatures or with ambiguous signatures. We must use our Special Forces for shaping the environment in India’s favour in areas of our strategic interests. Special Forces do not create resistance movements but advice, train and assist resistance movements already in existence. Our planning must be based on achieving strategic objectives through application of modest resources, focusing on the essential psychological element for political victories.

India needs ‘Special Forces’ for strategic tasks including deterrent against irregular and asymmetric warfare, ‘Commando Forces’ for cross border tactical tasks and within border tasks beyond capabilities of regular infantry, and ‘Airborne Forces’ for rapid reaction and force projection within and outside India. The Special Forces should be organised to start with as a small 200-300 strong force with highest regional specialisation, directly under the highest political authority since most politicomilitary missions would be without reference to the military because of the sensitive nature. Manpower should be drawn from existing Special Forces plus other all India avenues. They should be tasked with: surveillance and target designation in areas of strategic interest; shaping asymmetric and conventional battlefield to Indian advantage; deter opponents exploiting our fault lines; control fault lines of adversaries; undertake information/psychological operations and unconventional warfare; anti-hijack; build partner capabilities with friendly countries; and provide cutting edge for strategic force projection. The balance of what really are Commando Forces should be reorganised into an Integrated Commando Command directly under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)/Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), integrating the Army Special Forces, MARCOS, Garuds, SAGs of NSG and SGs of SFF.

Conclusion The need for us to bridge the subconventional conflict capability was never more. We need to optimise our Special Forces potential to acquire full conflict spectrum capabilities.

MODULAR TOR-M2KM IS THE LATEST DEVELOPMENT IN SHORT RANGE SAMS S urface-to-air missile systems (SAMSs) of short range are the last stand in Air Defense system of any country.

In our days defensive potential and external aggression resistance of country are evaluated by availability of modern AD system and primarily by availability of short range SAMS. SAMS Tor-M2KM with modular combat and technical facilities is the latest development of JSC Almaz- Antey Air Defense Concern and JSC Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol. It provides high reliability and effectiveness against active maneuvering air targets, gliding and

guided aerial bombs, cruise, guided and antiradar missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, aircrafts and helicopters. This system is equipped with computer facilities and modern radio stations that allow to detect and process up to 48 targets, simultaneously track up to 10 targets with the highest level of threat and provide simultaneous engagement of four targets.

Tor-M2KM is modular system, which provide mounting of independent combat module(ICM) and technical facilities on any motor chassis, semitrailers, trailers and other platforms of appropriate carrying capacity as well as in the stationary version. The ICM,

which is equipped with all special-purpose equipment, computer system, radar and optical facilities, missiles, operators compartment, system of independent and supplementary power supply with own fuel range, life support system, conditioning system, is installed on the motor chassis and another platforms by three special-proposed, quick-disconnect brackets. Special structure of the brackets allows quick remounting of the ICM from one platform to another.

Remounting of the ICM from one platform to another is performed by 25-tonnes crane and takes no more than 10 minutes. The only limitation - technical characteristics of

platform must comply with the following requirements: for ICM it's necessary to have a load-carrying capacity of any platform types of not less than 20 tonnes, width of not less than 2500 mm and length of not less than 7000 mm, for technical facilities like transporterloader, maintenance workshop, group SPTA set, battery command post it's enough to have a load-carrying capacity of 8,5 tonnes, width of 2500 mm and length of 6000 mm.

The ICM is not connected with the platform neither with mechanical drives or hydraulic drives nor with electric systems. It is equipped

with gas-turbine unit (GTU) as its own power supply source, which provides electric power generation of required parameters and power.

Time for starting operating mode of the GTU is not more than 60 sec. Total time for the ICM combat readiness is not more than 3 minutes.

Electrostatic transducer was implemented as supplementary power supply source for the first time ever. It transforms electric power of three-phase voltage 380 V and frequency 50 Hz supplied from external source to electric power of three-phase voltage 220 V and frequency 400 Hz. SAMS Tor-M2KM mounted on serially produced motor chassis of Indian company TATA Motors was shown on International aviation salon MAKS-2013. By this we shown to all world that Kupol has designed surface-to-air missile system, combat and technical facilities of which could be mounted on different motor chassis and on different platforms in accordance with customer's request.

Furthermore there is possibility to mount the ICM on roofs of buildings and constructions, on difficult to access areas, on trailers and semitrailers, on railway platforms and even on low-tonnage vessels, which can carry a load of more than 20 tonnes. It allows to expand functionality of the system significantly, to provide air defense for different Armed Forces, important state, military and industrial objects, big cities (megalopolises), to provide reliable protection of the large sport events like Olympic Games or Football World Cup from air terrorists.

If SAMS is placed within the city or within the territory of protected object, combat capabilities of the system will be limited because of a great amount of surface facilities, buildings, constructions, which are located in the operating area of radar facilities of the system and missile flight trajectories.

Fully equipped independent combat module of SAMS Tor-M2KM has a weight of no more than 15 tonnes, that provides its transportation on an external load of МИ-26Т helicopter with high lifting capacity or its foreign analogues. In such way the ICM can be delivered and installed in the most hard-toreach places: on highest elevation, on roofs of buildings and constructions, where the ICM will provide reliable defense of objects against all air threats, in range of 15 km killing zone.

The process of lock-on and tracking of the targets in SAMS Tor-M2KM is automated.

Any of targets offered by vehicle can be selected for fire. When target is in the launch zone and surface-to-air missile (SAM) is ready, commander presses the button ПУСК (Launch). SAM is guided towards the target DSI Marketing Promotion

automatically and its combat part is exploded in the missile-target meeting point that provides reliable engagement of the air target.

High accuracy and modern methods of calculation of guidance parameters in combination with special-proposed combat equipment of SAM provide high killing probability against all types of air targets.

SAM module provides transportation, storage and launch of four surface-to-air missiles.

There are two surface-to-air missile modules in each ICM. Transporting-loading module, facilities of maintenance and repair, group SPTA set and simulator, placed on unified containers-bodies, can be mounted on motor chassis, on analogous chassis of the ICM or on any motor chassis, semitrailers and trailers in accordance with customer's request.

SAMS Tor-M2KM is equipped with navigation system GLONASS/GPS developed by Russian company "Navis". It determines location of system with high accuracy, at the same time it provides measurement of angle parameters of the ICM (roll and difference) in different planes. Now it's not necessary for crew to have geodesic skills, which were required during the previous generation of equipment.

Tests of SAMS Tor-M2KM with modular version of combat and technical facilities mounted on motor chassis TATA of Indian production were undertaken at Kapustin Yar site of Ministry of Defence of Russian Federation in October-November 2013. All performance characteristics were confirmed during these tests, in particular, combat capabilities of target engagement on boundary of the killing zone of 15 km, targets with flight speed of 700 m/s and also targets with course parameter of no more than 6 km in range of 12 km. All-weather and day-and-night capability of the system and its running characteristics were confirmed. Besides, cooperative operation of group, consisting of ICM, transportloading module 9Т244К, Kasta-2E2 radar in stand-by mode and battery command post Ranzhir-MK were checked during these tests.

SAMS Tor-M2KM passed all tests honorably.

Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern, JSC 121471, Moscow, Vereyskaia st., 41 Tel.: (495) 276-29-65, Fax: (495) 276-29-69 E-mail: antey@almaz-antey.ru

Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol, JSC Russia, Udmurt Republic, Izhevsk, Pesochnaia st., 3 Tel.: (3412) 72-5125, Fax: (3412) 72-6819 E-mail: iemz@kupol.ru

ARMY AIR DEFENCE

Three DecaDes of

sTaTus Quo

Air defence involves detection, identification, handing the target over to the AD weapons and finally deterrence or destruction of the target, for which in the most countries Air Force is overall responsible for with land and naval systems having role in it

NARESH CHAND

Key Points l The complexities of an air threat is increasing exponentially that can only be countered by a parallel process of growth in AA and AD radars and weapons. l But India continues to function in AA and AD with 70s systems that are slowly being modernised. l The request for proposals for QR-SAMs were issued twice. The DRDO has been able to field only the Akash system.

Air Threat Air defence (AD) or Anti Aircraft (AA) Artillery as it was earlier called, originated with the threat of airborne platforms like airships and aeroplanes being used for supporting warfare. Air power developed through both the World Wars and subsequent conflicts. Some of the early efforts to explore their use in military role took place in Italy in April 1909, when Wilbur Wright was brought to Italy to demonstrate his Military Flyer. Airplanes and airships were used for the first time in warfare during the Italian–Turkish war of 1911–1912 when in March, 1912, Captain Piazza made the first photo-reconnaissance flight in history. Since then there has been no looking back for air

power. With the support of technology, it has been becoming increasingly more precise and lethal in an all weather environment.

Battle of Britain is a shining example of the use of airpower in the Second World War when the German Air Force made a sustained effort to gain air superiority over the Royal Air Force. The development in aeronautics, avionics and airborne armament has redefined airpower as seen in the two Gulf and Afghanistan Wars.

The role of reconnaissance has become virtually ‘see all’ by day and night. New platforms in the form of unmanned aerial vehicles – both for surveillance, reconnaissance and armed role; cruise missiles, and short range ballistic missiles have added a new dimension to the AD. The stealth platform of Lockheed Martin’s F22 Raptor and also its fifth generation F-35 Lightning II fighter has brought out new challenges to AD. The aerial platform is a complex target to engage as it flies simultaneously in three dimensions, at speeds normally exceeding supersonic, by day and night. The reaction times for the AD gunners is thus in terms of seconds.

Air Defence AD Guns. The battle between an offensive and a defensive weapon is as old as the history of warfare. As soon as the first military aircraft was seen on the horizon , AA guns soon followed to shoot down the aircraft. Between the WW1 and WW2 there was hardly any development in AA gun technology. In 1928, the US adopted the three-inch M3 gun as a standard AA gun which could not cope up with the

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A Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor in flight

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ARMY AIR DEFENCE

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Indian Air Force personnel display Russian-made Igla surface -to-air missiles

advancement in aviation. The Germans selected 88 mm, the British 3.7-inch (94 mm) and the US 90 mm. There was mix of gun calibres ranging from 3.7-inch, 3-inch, 37mm, 40 mm to two-pounder guns.

However 40 mm calibre was the clear winner which is still current along with 35mm and calibres around 20 mm.

Radars: Detection of an aircraft was a major problem till the British developed the radar which became a key component in the evolution of AA weapons. The gun laying radar came in service in October 1940.

Subsequently, developments brought a generation of surveillance radars like Reporter(Thales), Indra (DRDO) and Giraffe Plus (SAAB) ; and fire control radars like Superfledermaus (Contraves- now obsolete), Fly Catcher (Thales) etc. Some of the fire control radars also had limited surveillance capability which reduced the reaction time by electronically handing over the target from detection to fire control mode.

Surface to Air Missiles(SAMs):

Germany is the pioneer in the development of missiles and their V1 and V2 airships are well known. The development of SAMs has greatly improved the effectiveness of surface based AD weapons. Many countries are developing SAMs with US, Europe and Russia at the forefront. The earlier missiles were guided by a command system in which one radar unit acquired and tracked the target, a second tracked just the missile, and a computer calculated missile data for interception. Generally the SAMs fell in three categories: missiles with very long ranges like the Nike series, based on static launchers; mobile missiles systems like the Russian Kvadrat; and the shoulder fired missiles like Raytheon’s Stinger of USA and Igla of KBM - Russia. The first SAM to enter service in Britain was the Bloodhound in 1958. The French worked on the PARCA and the MATRA R422-B missiles. Soviets were also making progress with SAMs which were evolved from German World War II programmes. Russia has been in the fore

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front of SAM development with about 24 types in the ground version ranging from SA1Guild to AA-24 Grinch. In the US inventory two missile systems stand out that is MIM23Hawk (homing-all-the-way-killer) and its latest version Hawk XXI. The modern version is Patriot series of missiles, which is truly a modern SAM and became operational during the first Gulf war. Its variants are Raytheon’s Patriot, Patriot Advanced Capability(PAC-1) PAC-2 and Lockheed Martin’s PAC-3.

AD System AD is a system which involves detection, identification, handing the target over to the AD weapons and finally deterrence or destruction of the target. In most countries, the air force is overall responsible for the AD of a nation with land and ship based systems having a synergised role in it. It is obvious that the overall AD has to have a battle management system to ensure gap free and integrated AD of the aerospace of the nation.

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The battle between an offensive and a defensive weapon is as old as the history of warfare. As soon as the first military aircraft was seen on the horizon , AA guns soon followed to shoot down the aircraft. Between the WW1 andWW2 there was hardly any development in AA gun technology. In 1928, the US adopted the threeinch M3 gun as a standard AA gun which could not cope up with the advancement in aviation

Anti-aircraft missile with the Russian-made Igla ground-to-air launcher

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assets including those of civil areas and the defence forces. l AD of the Field Army, which includes the armour formations, staging areas, surface to surface missile areas, gun areas, choke points and logistic areas. l AD of the strategic assets of the Field Army.

Indian Perspective In India, the Indian Air Force is overall responsible for the AD of the country and is jointly executed on ground by the Air Force and the Army. The Army is responsible for the point defence of the strategic assets of the country like nuclear plants, key airbases, radar stations, oil refineries, shore based installations of the Indian Navy like ammunition depots, key choke points like rail cum road bridges and so on. Army is also

responsible for the AD of the Field Army and Army’s strategic logistic nodes. Naval ships have their own ship based AD systems which includes guns and missiles like Rafael’s Barak of Israel. The division of responsibility between the Indian Air Force and the Army at times gets blurred as Army holds only guns for the strategic assets and even point defence SAMs are held by the Air Force. Army Air Defence (AAD) is responsible for: l Point defence of the national strategic

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AAD The Army inherited the AD system from the British after independence. The complete weapon force consisted of Bofor’s 40mmL/60 guns of WWII vintage. At that time, air power in the region was still in its infancy and the Army did not know what to do with the AD guns but held on to them. As L/60 gun had become obsolete, thus it was replaced by Bofor’s 40mmL/70 gun, which were later on manufactured under licensed production by Ordnance Factory, Jabalpur.

The production line is now closed. The gun is radar controlled; earlier with Contraves’ Superfledermaus fire control radar (now obsolescent) and now with Thales’ Flycatcher fire control radar.

ARMY AIR DEFENCE SAMP/T missile system in operational situation.

SAMP/T is a Surfaceto-Air Medium Range missile system

Superfledermaus was manufactured by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and now Flycatcher is also being manufactured by them under licensed production. However, the conversion from L/60 to L/70 took more than two decades. In spite of this handicap, AAD fought 1965 and 1971 Wars most gallantly. Finally the Army got its act together post 1971 and an all out effort was made at modernisation.

The Golden Era: Post-1971 was the golden age for AAD modernisation when most of the current weapon systems held in the inventory were inducted, mainly from erstwhile USSR. The pace of induction of L70 gun system was accelerated. Fire control radar Superfledermaus was replaced by Thales’ Fly Catcher and later by an upgraded version. The ZU23 twin guns and Man portable AD system (MANPADS) Strella (later on replaced by Igla), were inducted for the infantry divisions. The armoured divisions got Schilka four barrelled all weather mobile system for point defence, OSA-AK mobile all weather system to counter the attack helicopter threat and 23 mm twin guns for semi-mobile assets. Strela 10M mobile fair weather system was

acquired for independent armoured brigades and Kvadrat all weather system for area AD of the strike corps. All the systems for the Field Army were of Russian origin.

More than a decade later Tangushka was acquired from Russia but for unknown reasons, only a few numbers were imported, barely equipping one unit. This was followed by the long standing void of a tactical control radar by acquiring Thales’ Reporter Tactical Control Radar, which is manufactured by BEL under licensed production.

Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP): IGMDP is India’s missile development programme of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) which was started in 1980 and closed in 2008.

Apart from strategic missile systems, it included AD and anti-tank missile systems.

The AD systems were Quick Reaction SAM (QR-SAM), Trishul and Medium Range SAM (MR-SAM) Akash, both meant to be mobile systems to be successor to OSA-AK and Kvadrat respectively. Trishul was not successful and foreclosed in 2002 and Akash was thrust upon the Indian Air Force in transportable role as it could not operate in

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mobile role as required by the Army. To be operational in mobile role was of paramount importance to the Army in order to provide AD to the armour formations. Since large amount of funds and time was spent upon Akash, thus Army agreed to accept it in a semi- mobile role. The problem of successor to Kvadrat still remains.

Current Status It appears that during the post-90s period, time has got frozen for AAD with not an iota of modernisation. The current state of modernisation of AAD System is given in succeeding paragraphs.

40 mmL/70 Gun System. This gun is the mainstay of AAD and has been in service since 1964 which means that it is 50 years old. Its fire control radar has been modernised three times i.e. from Superfledermaus to Flycatcher and currently upgraded Flycatcher. Its rate of fire has been marginally increased and a percent of ammunition has proximity fuse. This gun system is crying for a change but nothing seems to work. The DRDO has not been able to develop a gun and world over gun systems are getting outpaced by the air threat.

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Raytheon Patriot (PAC-3) Missile

Skyshield of Rheinmetall AD was a possible successor, having an effective range of 4km and rate of fire of 1000 rounds per minute.

Its AHEAD (Advance Hit Efficiency and Destruction technology) ammunition which contains 152 heavy tungsten metal, spin stabilised sub-projectiles and ejected by a time fuse seems very attractive. However, the company has come under shadow of the Ministry of Defence and there is no likelihood of the Skyshield entering AAD. The BEL, jointly with Ordnance Factory, Jabalpur has taken on to upgrade 40mmL/70 gun by replacing its hydraulic drive by an electric drive, an integrated fire control system, an optronic sights and BARCO AMLCD display system linked to the joystick. The electrooptic systems are from Controp of Israel. It is understood that the contract has already been signed last month with BEL and an upgrade will start shortly.

23mm Twin Barrel Gun. This gun was imported in the eighties for the Field Army. It is an excellent gun but purely mechanical with a range of two kms and rate of fire of 2000 rounds per minute. It is also being upgraded by providing it an electric drive, fire control system, optronic sights and Barco

To be operational in mobile role was of paramount importance to the Army in order to provide AD to the armour formations. Since large amount of funds and time was spent upon Akash, thus Army agreed to accept it. The problem of successor to Kvadrat still remains. It appears that during the post-90s period, time has got frozen for AAD with not an iota of modernisation.

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display along with a joystick. Electro-optic systems are also from Controp of Israel.

Some other Indian companies like L&T, Tata Power and Alpha Technologies are also carrying out the upgrade. Comparative trials are expected shortly.

Schilka System. It is a highly mobile system of Russian origin for supporting armour formations and has been in service, since the early 70’s. Its successor was Tanguska also of KBK Russia, one regiment of which was procured but there was no further acquisition due to some unknown reason.The later system is Pantsir-S1 is a gunmissile system of KBK Russia. At present there seems some lethargy to progress the case for a successor to Schilka, however, BEL along with Israel is working on its upgrade. The upgrade involves replacing the fire control radar from Israeli Aerospace Industries(IAI), optronic sights, airconditioned cabin and a new Hindustan Powerplus, Caterpillar diesel engine. The four barreled gun with a cyclic rate of fire of 3,400 rounds per minute is still current. At present BEL is jointly working with IAI to make the radar operational and trials are expected in March 2014.

ARMY AIR DEFENCE The Crotale Mk3 system family is a short range air defence weapon system

Quick Reaction SAM (QR-SAM) System. The current system is OSA-AK which is a highly mobile system for the AD of armour formations. This system is more than 20 years old and needs to be replaced. As brought out earlier, DRDO’s effort to develop Trishul system did not succeed. A RFP has been issued a couple of times and withdrawn for some reason or the other. Apart from Russia, no country produces self-propelled AD systems. Russia’s TOR M-1(12km range) was a suitable system but somehow Russia falls shy of responding to an open tender. The other option is to select a suitable system and ask the OEM to mount it on a matching mobile platform. Possible choices are Rafael’s Spyder missile system of Israel which has already been selected by the Indian Air Force; Raytheon’s HAWK XXI is a more advanced, and compact version of the earlier version with a swanky new 3D MPQ-64 Sentinel radar. The missiles are upgraded MIM-23K standard with an improved blastfragmentation warhead that creates a larger lethal zone. Raytheon’s other system is SLAMRAAM, which is the land version of air to air missile however for some reason it has not been selected by the US Army. The MBDA’s Aster-15, with a range of about 30 km which seem to fall in the category of overkill. There are reports that DRDO is

IGMDP is India’s missile development programme of the Defence Research and Development Organisation which was started in 1980 and closed in 2008. It included AD and anti-tank missile systems.The AD systems were Quick Reaction SAM,Trishul and Medium Range SAM Akash, both meant to be mobile systems to be successor to OSA-AK and Kvadrat respectively.

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having a joint venture with MBDA for Mica missile calling it Maitree (Friendship) under a short range SAM (SR-SAM) system programme for possibly replacing QR-SAM system. The MBDA will help DRDO to fill the technological gaps of Trishul by providing technology of active seeker, propulsion and control systems.

Medium Range SAM (MR-SAM) System. Kvadrat is the current system which is more than 35 years old and has the technology of early sixties thus a RFP was issued but later on withdrawn due to poor response. The DRDO’s Akash has not succeeded in mobile role, thus the Army has procured it in limited numbers for a sort of static role. Only Russia produces selfpropelled AD systems for which the possible contender could be Russia’s BUK-M1. Other systems like Aster30, Israel’s Barak ‘Next Generation’, MBDA’s MICA and Patriot Advance Capability -3 (PAC-3) have to be mounted on a suitable mobile platform.

Patriot is the obvious front runner as it is war proven; has hit to kill technology; can engage aircrafts, helicopters, UAV’s, cruise and tactical ballistic missiles and deployed with 10 nations including the US. The DRDO had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Israel to jointly develop a MR-SAM systems but there seems little progress on it.

This project was to be built on Barak next generation, and have a range of about 70 km.

The future thus seems uncertain.

MANPADS. The current system is Igla, which is also in service with the other two services. There is a successor to Igla called Igla-M. Media reported that during the summer of 2012, SAAB’s RBS70 Next Generation was tried out along with MBDA’s Mistral and a system from Russia (probably successor to Igla), but no decision has emerged so far. MANPADS is employed by all the three services and the combined order could be quite large amounting to over than $5 billion.

The above analysis clearly brings out that there is some degree of paralysis in the process of procurement. The large degree of obsolescence, voids of equipment and shortage of ammunition has made the task of field commanders very difficult. A well trained modern army acts as a deterrence during peace. A very strong and resolute leadership is required to steer the ship of defence modernization through the maze of rules, regulations and the quagmire of alleged corruption.

SMC DSI Jan13 Final:Layout 1 31/01/14 2:59 PM Page 3

BATTLE FIELD UNDER RELIABLE CONTROL

n Azret Y. Bekkiev, Professor, Director General (JSC Concern Sozvezdie)

t present automated systems of military force control in tactical unit (ASoMFC) making is the most dynamically developed component of modern army weapon systems. In future armed conflicts efficiency of the used automated systems of military force and weapon control will have decisive importance to gain advantage over enemy.

Nowadays ASoMFC is an integration of all corps, communication and navigation control systems in a single information space for constant information change. This allows constantly get enemy object coordinates and to estimate combat environment on battle field, to conduct fire attacks (by aviation, UAVs, artillery and by other means) from great distances in real time scale.

The use of ASoMFC allows to simultaneously distribute information to all command levels – up to tank, IFV, APC commanders and even up to single soldier on close to real time scale during warfare.

In the Russian Federation ASoMFC is developed and implemented in military forces.

The development of the given system has been carried out by JSC «Sozvezdie» Concern» – integrated structure that unites 20 electronics enterprises. High technological level of ASoMFC is achieved by (communication, intelligentinformation support, identification and targeting, topogeodesic and time support) functional systems realization. At present complex

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integration of intelligence means, control and fire damage in a single combat system that includes the following subsystems forming: command and staff; artillery; air defense; aviation; electronic warfare; hardware, logistics, engineer support.

ASoMFC typical staff includes combat control automated means complexes, corps and special service, communication control and jamming and other commanders.

Unified hardware and software complexes (fixed, mobile and portable) make ASoMFC system base. Hardware and software complexes (HSC) are built based on typical range of modern Russian computer aids, radio stations, datacommunication equipment, cryptographic, navigation equipment and may be located on a tote or in offloading soldier vest, including power and life support systems. HSC are used to make command and control vehicles, command and combat vehicles, special C2 vehicles.

ASoMFC functional components include: program and information support, automated digital communication system. Information access distribution and data security are provided. Automated digital communication system is built on digital radio station «Аkveduk» family communication facilities using modern telecommunication technologies of WI-FI and MESH-networks, high rate radio relay station, wirelines, radio means of broadband access.

During combat training measures of ground forces in the Russian Federation it has been established that ASoMFC equipment of squads, battalions and divisions allowed to reduce ammu-

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nition consumption for typical target destruction on 20-30%; tactical standards execution time 2-3 times and some standards ten times; military force losses on 15-30 %. At the same time information completeness and actuality degree on the own military forces has increased 2,5-3 times, on enemy military forces 4,5-5 times; damage caused to enemy increases 2-3 times.

Now when modern information and telecommunication technologies have been developed by Concern, ASoMFC are made, operations on new unique technologies of robot control production are conducted. New technical approaches (which allows to join heterogeneous information sources, control, communication, electronic warfare, artillery and robotics objects in a single system) are developed. During control decision making is carried out with the use of neural network models. Artificial intelligence elements and information body process technologies are realized.

Unique standard complex, developed by JSC «Sozvezdie» Concern», allowed to provide in the nearest 15-20 years system development and accumulation taking into account rapid development of robotics technologies.

Republic of India is strategic partner of the Russian Federation. Russian experts suppose that it would be reasonable to realize the project of mechanized infantry brigade (batallion) ACS collaboration as applied to organization and establishment, armaments and tactical employment ways of Indian ground forces with the use of Russian, Indian components as well as ACS components of other countries (personal computers, car chassis, conditioner, power-supply sets and other equipment).

As a result of the carried out collaboration it would be possible to developed automated control system of general military units or providing military units, hardware and software complexes, training aids, programs and methods of military specialist training. Indian party could get detailed engineering drawings and organize independent or joint production of hardware and software complexes, command, combat and command and control vehicles in India by one of the ways, suitable for both countries. This would allow the Indian party to independently re-equip Armed Forces tactical military units by automated control systems, taking their combat capabilities on a higher level in the near term.

JSC “Concern “Sozvezdie” Russia, Voronezh,14 Plekhanovskaya St. Phone: +7 (473) 252-12-59 Email: office@sozvezdie.su Web: www.sozvezdie.su

INDIAN SHIPYARDS

DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH Despite the unique advantages such as a long coastline, history of experience and expertise and availability of cheap labour, the ship building capacity of the country is marred by time overruns and low quality of product, owed to various deficiencies

HARSIMRAN MALHI

Key Points l The private shipbuilding industry in the country is in the doldrums with the world economic outlook bleak and the withdrawal of an export subsidy l The DPSUs are sitting pretty with the Navy ordering for 40-plus ships, under Maritime Capability Perspective Plan l Compared to international standards, our shipbuilding practices are also wasteful.

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hipping worldwide is in dire straits and is struggling to come out of recession.

The Baltic Dry Index (BDI), which measures the demand for shipping capacity versus supply of dry bulk carriers, is an efficient economic indicator of world trade and thus a useful tool to predict future economic growth and production.

To put the state of shipping in perspective, BDI peaked at 11,793 points in May 2008 and crashed to 663 points in December 2008, which marked the beginning of The Great Recession. In December 2013, it was 1922 points, indicating a slow recovery of world trade.

We know, of course, that shipping has a direct impact on shipbuilding industry.

A number of our Indian shipyards in private sector were brimful with commercial shipbuilding orders in 2008.

Some had grand plans for expansion through acquisition and modernization of

India naval guard keeps watch on the two guided missile warships ‘Mumbai’ and ‘Kirch’ constructed at the Mazagon Docks in Bombay

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AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

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their facilities through large doses of CapEx. Their world came crashing down in December 2008. There was large -scale cancellation of orders as the world trade shrank. Like the rest of our economy, most private shipyards are now beset with a dwindling order book, non-existent credit and acute problems with liquidity and cash flow. Yet, being National Assets, they cannot be allowed to go under. It is essential that the GOI formulate a viable national shipbuilding policy to revive shipbuilding in these difficult times. Shipbuilding industry, in addition to securing vital national security and economic interests, is critical in other sectors such as steel, manufacturing and ancillary industries.

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PRESENT STATUS Indian shipbuilding is primarily centered on 27 or so shipyards of various sizes, comprising 8 public sector and 19 private sector shipyards. The shipyards have 20 dry docks and 40 shipways between them with an estimated total capacity of over 280,000 DWT. Of the 8 shipyards in public sector, there are four shipyards operating under Ministry of Defence (Department of Defence Production), which cater primarily to the needs of the Indian Navy. These are Mazagon Dock Limited ( MDL), Mumbai, Garden Reach & Ship Engineers ( GRSE), Kolkata, Goa Shipyard Limited ( GSL) Goa , and Hindustan Shipyard Limited ( HSL), Vishakhapatnam, which came under the ambit of MOD only recently.

The other PSU shipyards are under Ministry of Shipping. Most notable among them being Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL) with a capacity of 110000 DWT. In the private sector, the largest shipyard is at Pipavav in Bhavnagar district of Gujarat, with shipbuilding capacity of 75000 DWT. The other prominent private sector shipyards are owned by ABG group at Dahej, L&T shipyards at Hazira (Gujarat) and Kuttupally in Tamil Nadu and Bharti Shipyard at Dhabol in Ratnagiri district of Maharashtra.

Most private sector shipyards are engaged in building of medium and small

COASTAL SECURITY vessels such as Offshore Supply Vessels (OSV) and Anchor Handling Tugs (AHT).

In large ship segment, public sector shipyards, CSL and HSL, virtually hold monopoly. Private players such as Pipavav and L&T have made huge investments for construction of large vessels. Indeed, Pipavav has of recent, delivered five Panamax bulk carriers and three more are under construction.

The DPSU shipyards are primarily engaged in building high value, niche segment warships and submarines of highly complex design, with MDL at the vanguard.

LACUNAE WITH SHIPYARDS Whilst benchmarking our shipyards against international standards, particularly of shipyards located in Japan, South Korea and China, some egregious deficiencies are observed in operation of our shipyards, both in the Public & Private sector. These shortcomings invariably result in cost and time overruns and low quality of the product. As a result, we are unable to compete internationally for shipbuilding orders. This is despite the unique advantages India has, such as a long coastline, history of experience and expertise in ship construction and ship repair, availability of cheap labour etc. The evidence of these shortcomings was made explicit, in 2007, when Shipping Corporation of India, the country’s largest state owned shipping line placed its largest shipbuilding order of about $ 400 mn for 6 Aframax vessels with an East Asian shipyard, instead of an Indian yard.

The remedy lies not only in serious rethinking of our government policies but also reworking the nitty-gritties of shipbuilding aspects and management issues such as planning, design, production technology, scheduling, supply chain management and modernisation of our shipyard facilities.

When analysing our shipbuilding operations against global best practices, some of the glaring shortcomings, which need to be fixed, are in the following areas: Lack of coordination between planning, design and production departments in implementation of project plan. Whilst hull related part of this process is more or less well coordinated, it is the ‘outfitting’ process, which, in most shipyards, is out of control. One reason for time overrun in outfitting stage is lack of skilled

subcontractors in India. Most East Asian shipyards invest in development and training of sub-contractors to upgrade their skills and expertise. Indeed, I have always advocated that public sector shipyards must facilitate formation of sub-contracting companies comprising recently retired shipyard employees, whose long years of

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expertise/skills otherwise goes waste.

Supply Chain Management. Timely supply of material for ship construction is the single most critical area, which needs urgent improvement as this has high impact on both cost and time. Although the guidelines suggest scientific procurement policies such as EOQ (Economic Order

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The remedy lies not only in serious rethinking of our government policies but also reworking such as planning, design, production technology, scheduling, supply chain management and modernisation of our shipyard facilities. In a telling disregard for the country’s shipbuilding industry, the Maritime Agenda 2010-2020 put out by our Ministry of Shipping has nothing pertinent to say on Indian shipbuilding.

It is essential that a comprehensive Maritime Sector Policy is prepared.

Indian workers build ships at the ABG Shipyard at Magdalla Port, Ahmedabad. The ABG Shipyard is India’s largest private sector shipyard

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Quantity) and JIT (Just Inventory Time) or even better methods, these are rarely followed. Often requirements of high volume, low value class ‘C’ items are over estimated resulting in pile up of inventory in warehouses. These are hidden inventory carrying costs incurred perpetually in some shipyards until material is used in some

other project or sold as scrap. More shockingly, Indian shipyards have to pay more for buying indigenous goods than imports. This is because the government provides 100% tax waiver on imported shipbuilding materials. It makes better financial sense to import than buy locally.

This is a government level issue that needs to

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be resolved. Import of material means longer lead times. JIT system becomes impractical when vendor is located abroad.

This policy also hampers growth of local ancillary industries such as steel, equipment and pipe manufacturers.

Construction Method. Integrated Hull Construction, Outfitting and Painting (IHOP) is the current ‘mantra’ for speeding up ship construction. In this method, vessel is designed system wise (HVAC, piping etc) but construction is done block-wise.

Integrated blocks consisting of hull, piping, machinery, outfitting etc are separately and simultaneously built and welded together in the erection dock. Most Indian shipyards follow IHOP method. All DPSU shipyards have been modernized at great cost to facilitate IHOP. In contrast with global best practices, wherein, 80% of blocks are ready by keel-laying date, only about 20% of

COASTAL SECURITY The DPSU shipyards are primarily engaged in building high value, niche segment warships and submarines of highly complex design, Most private sector shipyards are engaged in building of medium and small vessels such as Offshore SupplyVessels (OSV) and Anchor HandlingTugs (AHT)

A K Antony in Russia for commissioning of INS Vikramaditya

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Employees of Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Limited (GRSE)

blocks are completed in Indian shipyards.

More importantly, by launch date, the extent of pre-outfitting in Indian shipyards is only about 10% as compared to 80% in East Asian shipyards. This is an area that needs greatest attention in order to eliminate time overruns.

Most of the shortcomings in our

shipbuilding operations prevail across the board in private, PSU and DPSU shipyards.

The DPSU shipyards have, of recent, undertaken massive modernization programmes, being the first such initiative, since their nationalisation in the 1960s, to facilitate modern best practices in shipbuilding such as IHOP construction.

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MDL, for instance invested over Rs.1400 crores to modernise its infrastructure over the period 2008-2013. It is expected that concerted Action Plans to overcome the shortcomings enumerated above along with modernised facilities for construction, will go a long way in improving productivity of our shipyards. A sobering statistic, which should make us reflect, is our build time, which is nearly four times than the international standard. Roughly, a warship with displacement of 3500 tonnes (frigate size) in East Asian yards is built in 30 months with 2,50,000 man-hours as against 60 to 72 months and 1.2 million man-hours in Indian yards. Build time is a product of good and efficient shipbuilding practices, a modern infrastructure and then there is the ‘customer factor’, wherein a series of ships of identical design are ordered to improve build time. It has been seen that the ‘series effect’ can result in 10th ship of the series requiring 35% less work load than the first one with concomitant reduction in build time.

FUTURE OUTLOOK Commercial Shipbuiling During the 10th five-year plan (20022007), a subsidy scheme was introduced; wherein 30% subsidy in bid price was available to shipyards on export orders. This

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Larsen & Toubro’s Heavy Engineering and Shipbuilding businesses, Madhukar Vinayak Kotwal, Whole-time Director and President shares company plans.

Q: Can you give us an overview of their current activities at your shipyards in Hazira and Kattupalli?

Currently, we are building 54 fast interceptor boats for the Indian Coast Guard. This is completely a L&T design and manufacture contract. The boats have been designed to have aluminium hulls and twin water-jet propulsion. We have planned to build 42 to 48 boats in Hazira and the rest in Kattupalli. The deliveries are expected to be completed far ahead of the contractual date – Sept 2020.The Kattupalli yard is also building 10 ships for Halul Offshore of Qatar. These include Platform Supply Vessels (PSVs) and Anchor Handling Tug Support & Stand-by (AHTSS) vessels. In these boats, we are providing high-tech Dynamic Positioning Systems, which create automated thrust, thus stabilising the ship, when anchored in rough seas and handling cargo.

Q: Does L&T plan to bid for the construction of six follow on conventional submarines? If so, is it likely to be done through a joint venture or collaboration with a foreign partner?

As you well know, L&T played a significant role in building the first nuclear powered submarine. Though we did not carry out the basic design, we were involved in detailed engineering and manufacture. In close coordination with DRDO, & IN, we had to develop the processes for manufacture of the pressure hull, including the complex forward torpedo Section. All the required jigs and fixtures, proven through mock-ups, were designed and built in house. Hull sections were manufactured at our Hazira works and then taken to Vizag, where our teams carried out the assembly and outfitting.We are equipped with the latest 3-D modeling& simulation work-stations as well as with Virtual Reality facilities in our Mumbai centre. L&T is the only private sector shipyard with such capabilities. In addition, we have a track record of having indigenously designed and built a number of Weapon Systems for the Navy.

Q: It is learnt that the government has cleared formation of a JV with MDL for construction of submarines. What is the present status of this JV and how do you take it forward for construction of conventional submarines?

Based on MoD guidelines, there was an elaborate selection process for a JV partner

by MDL also, after which two joint ventures were conceptualised by them. One was for work related to submarines with L&T. We concluded a shareholders’ agreement with MDL covering this scope. It was much later that we were informed that the JV could get work assigned only through competitive bidding. If this is the process to be followed, why is a JV required and how does formation of a JV help? galvanised commercial shipbuilding by raising India’s share of global market from 0.2% in 2002 to 1.3% in 2007. The subsidy was withdrawn from 31 August 2007 and along with global recession; this double whammy resulted in India’s share dropping to almost a negligible figure of 0.01%. In a telling disregard for the country’s shipbuilding industry, the Maritime Agenda 2010-2020 put out by our Ministry of

Shipping has nothing pertinent to say on Indian shipbuilding.

“The Manufacturing Plan - Strategies for Accelerating Growth of Manufacturing in India in 10th Five year plan and Beyond”, authored by the Planning Commission, has, in its chapter on shipbuilding/ship repair merely stated a target of 5% share of global shipbuilding and 10% share in ship repair by 2020, however there is nothing concrete by

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way of policies required to achieve these targets other than granting infrastructure statues to shipbuilding and an offset scheme.

It is essential that a comprehensive Maritime Sector Policy is prepared encompassing ports, shipbuilding yards and hinterland connectivity with SEZs for ancillary industries development, polytechnics for skill development etc. This will provide a huge force multiplier for our economy given our 7500-kilometer coastline.

Warship Building In an otherwise bleak scenario of commercial shipbuilding, the DPSUs have been fairly well-off with Indian Navy ensuring substantial implementation of its Maritime Capability Perspective Plan. On the anvil is long delayed project compromising seven frigates (follow-on Shivalik class) likely to be built at MDL and GRSE and LPD (Landing Platform Dock) program, the RFP for which is understood to have been issued. The other big-ticket project will be the P-75I, involving construction of six more submarines. The RFP is long pending for this project, resulting in an avoidable gap in submarine construction after the Scorpene programme is completed at MDL. A way out could be construction of the additional Scorpenes at MDL, to bridge this gap.

WAY AHEAD Shipbuilding in India is tightly compartmentalised into Private Sector, PSUs, and DPSUS, all under administrative control of different ministries resulting in absence of an overarching Maritime Sector Policy, which can synergise the strengths of various shipyards and thus provide a fillip to the economy of our country, particularly in areas along the coastline.

Joint Ventures have been attempted between the DPSUs and Private Sector shipyards in order to synergise their strengths. However, these JV’s have not taken off despite the initial hoopla. This has been primarily due to the “crabs –in- abucket” mindset of our private sector and shortsightedness of our DPSUs, who are sitting content with sufficient orders. Also, the government refuses to acknowledge that the infrastructure created by the private sector is as much part of our ‘National Assets’ as the one created with public money and both must be optimally utilized to make India the future hub of world shipbuilding.

COMMUNICATIONS

An IndIAn C4ISR SyStem by 2020: A StRAtegIC ImpeRAtIve The technology rich combat environment requires command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR) to work seamlessly, while India Armed Forces suffers from major deficiencies.

DAVINDER KUMAR

Key Points l The heightened velocity of the battlefield requires C4ISR to create an interconnectedness l China’s rising power and India’s capacity deficiency is widening the gap between the two l Since evolving ‘jointness’ in military operations is an endemic problem, the widening C4ISR net will push the services to that end.

Environment Scan Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and Media, through their extremely rapid progress and all pervasive nature have shrunk the globe in to a village with attendant

economic, social, cultural and security linkages and interdependence. Technology and Information have become the new denominations of power with consequent major transformation in the world as follows:• A very different security paradigm wherein Physical Security has been relegated by a few notches. Economic security, energy security, food security and information security have taken the top slots.

• An entirely different way to conduct business characterized by speed of transactions and money transfer, supply chains across the globe with inherent linkages and inter-dependence • A unique way of governance and conducting warfare both in the physical and virtual digitised domains at the speed of light, with significant battlefield transparency, in full glare of the media demanding total

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situational awareness, decentralised command and quick decision-making with attendant risks and information overload.

While the physical national borders have become irrelevant, concerted efforts are being made by the nations to develop viable capability in the fields of battle-field transparency, precision weapons, unmanned platforms, navigation, Information Warfare, Command and Control systems, Robotics and so on. Concurrently, the less developed nations are looking for means to exploit the technological, physical and economic asymmetry and vulnerabilities.

This environment has impacted the warfare of 21st century in the following manner • The battlefield has enhanced to cover the entire nation and will involve all

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Indian Air Force (IAF) officers and crew of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircrafts

organs of governance from day one and will demand application of comprehensive national power.

• The warfare will be characterised by long range, very lethal and precision strikes, carried out remotely and in the full glare of media.

• Developed nations are likely to have battlefield transparency greater than 90%.

• It will encompass full spectrum of warfare in all dimensions (land, air, sea, space and info sphere) and at all levels (tactical, operational and strategic).

• It will be waged throughout the continuum of peace-crisis-conflict-return to peace. Some intelligence and disruptive elements would get involved much earlier than the actual conflict and stay much longer after cessation of hostilities.

• It demands organisational transformation, an unified command, especially skilled work

force and very aware leadership.

• Increased velocity of warfare that would require very quick decision making and distinctive capabilities in the management, analysis and dissemination of information.

• It will operate at the physical and cognitive levels concurrently where the minds and hearts of the population will be targeted specifically.

• It is likely to be offence dominant with enhanced exploitation of asymmetry and will redefine national sovereignty.

• It would require application of comprehensive national power facilitated by an appropriate C4ISR system at the core.

Assessment of Indian Security Environment South Asia is perhaps one of the most volatile regions in the world today with both

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traditional and non-traditional threats and challenges weighing heavily. Uncertainties of post-2014 Afghanistan, continuing export of terrorism by an increasingly radical Pakistan, China’s enlarged territorial claims and actions, external forces heightening India’s internal strife, particularly the Maoist insurgency, dissident groups in various countries and power play-cum-posturing by external forces have a direct impact on India’s security environment. Unsettled boundary issues are likely to continue causing tensions in the region. Non-traditional threats have assumed huge proportions and would continue to be pervasive in character. China’s growing comprehensive national power, the doctrine of Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare and Information Confrontation for its external application; her increasing military prowess and strategic

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COMMUNICATIONS footprints in POK and northern Nepal, the widening PLA-Indian Military capability gap, marked differential in the development of infrastructure along the borders with India; her continuous efforts to open and control maximum multiple land routes to the Indian Ocean and collusion with Pakistan and so on will remain areas of concern for India’s security. These will get accentuated due to uncertain US involvement in the event of conflict in the region; US move for a Pacific pivot and India’s look East policy.

Consequently, there is a growing understanding within India’s security establishment that Indian strategic and military capacity building must focus on China.

There is an urgent need to convert this “Understanding” to “Urgency” as a strategic imperative and build comprehensive national

and intelligence agencies and other government and private organisations. It would provide situational awareness (SA) for integration and coordination of joint element maneuvers and sensor to shooter connectivity for weapons employment. The resultant information superiority fundamentally changes the way operations are conducted. Joint C4ISR enables ability to mass effects without massing forces; protects against asymmetric threats; and provides joint force flexibility, analysis, interpretation, and efficiency.

In essence, C4ISR is about co-evolution of Technology, Organisation (i.e.

Architecture and Processes) and People and about control and disruption of Information and quick decision making.

A typical C4ISR System would be fielded in accordance with the national doctrine and

analysis capability, • Information Assurance, Cryptography and Language expertise • System Integration and Large System Integration and • A viable Defence Industrial and R&D base.

In view of the likely overall regional security scenario and the fact that China’s military modernisation programme would culminate in 2020, it would be prudent to assume that the window of opportunity to build such a capability would be till 2020.

Indian Scenario - Where do we stand?

At the political and Service Headquarter levels, a viable Command and Control set-up exists by way of Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) headed by the Prime Minister, National Security Council along with the National Security Adviser comprising of the Strategic Policy Group, a

There is a growing understanding within India’s security establishment that Indian strategic and military capacity building must focus on China due to her growing comprehensive national power, her strategic footprints in POK and northern Nepal

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capability to negate any internal or external threat from China as also contain the collusive threat from China and Pakistan.

Central to such a capability would be a fully integrated, responsive, viable, efficient, robust and survivable Indian Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) System.

This is an inescapable requirement for binding the nation’s comprehensive combat power into a viable and coherent force that would include the armed forces, defense

Indian Navy received third Boeing P-8I from Boeing in Nov 2013 policy frame work and would remain a , ‘work in progress’ due to the rapid march of technology and consequent impact on conduct of warfare. It will consist of • A well defined Command and Control structure with supporting organization for joint planning and execution, • Technology, Systems, Human Resource and Organisation for Surveillance and Reconnaissance • Communication networks for secure, efficient and fail safe information flow, • Data storage, processing, management and

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National Security Advisory Board and a Secretariat whose nucleus is provided by the Joint Intelligence Committee. The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), in theory, is the highest authority on military matters in the country and is assisted by Headquarters Integrated Defense Staff (IDS). However, a major shortcoming of this body is that it exercises no real power. The Chairman COSC exercises command only over his own Service and the two tri-Service Commands. The three service Chiefs are assisted by their respective headquarters

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A Barak-8 Missile launcher comes from a IndoIsrael JV

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and are individually responsible to the Defence Minister.

A glaring anomaly in the security decision making structure is the absence of a military high command in decisions of war and peace.

The missing link is the lack of co-ordination between the three service chiefs, leading to inter-service rivalry between the Army, Navy and Air Force. The single point politicomilitary dialogue, which is required to establish a coherent national strategy and quick decision making is thus lacking in the present setup.

Joint Threat Assessment, planning and execution at the operational level within the Armed Forces as also with the Ministries is lacking in this organisation resulting in delayed decision making, lack of policy framework and synergy.

The field formations and units are still organized for ,�the last war� and require urgent organisation transformation, equipping and training to acquire the capability, skills and mindset to operate successfully in an information rich digitised battlefield. Mechanism for sharing information laterally and with sister services is lacking. We have islands of excellence in each service but their impact is limited due to lack of integration and synergy. Delays in procurement and near absence of indigenous capability defeat any transition management efforts with consequent adverse impact on the combat capability.

In the area of battlefield transparency, we have done well at the strategic and in some cases, at operational and tactical levels. There is, however, a need to improve this at the tactical level, particularly in the area of night vision. India has reasonable capability in Command & Control communication networks and requisite organisations. These are, however, not integrated and lack interoperability. Also, there are issues of integration of legacy networks and a comprehensive indigenous Network Management System. Seamless operational capability of our networks and related policy framework and procedures are operational imperatives for a C4ISR system.

With regard to battlefield transparency, we seem to be catching up. We have very strong, all weather capabilities by way of our Space-based assets (2.5 metre resolution), Aerostats, UAVs, AWACS, AEW aircrafts, naval assets like P-8I, ELINT and SIGINT assets and so on. We need to improve on integration, bring more synergy

COMMUNICATIONS in analysis, have secure data storage and mining infrastructure, and enhance image processing and information sharing capabilities. Digitisation of existing information and its co-relation is a major challenge.

With regard to Navigation and Target acquisition, India is developing its own IRNS System and the first of the seven satellites is already in orbit. IRNS is likely to be completed by 2015. It also has a strategic tieup with GLONASS , the Russian GPS and Navigation system facilitating half-a-metre CEP for our missiles, including those planned to be fired from nuclear submarine Chakra.

Also, a strategic tie-up has been done with the EU Navigation and Positioning System Galileo, which will become available by 2020.

Agni -V had the most modern navigation and target acquisition systems with full redundancy.

India has proven launch capability in the Polar and Elliptical orbits. India has launched 72 satellites since 1975 of all types including Nano and Pico satellites. Satellites have been launched from various vehicles including American, Russian, European satellite launch rockets. India has multiple launch capability like MARV. PSLV can launch up to 4 satellites. India has very recently demonstrated her strategic capability of launching satellite in the geosynchronous orbit successfully with an indigenous cryogenic engine.

Previous DRDO chief is on record to state that with the successful launch of Agni-V, India has all the components of a viable Ballistic Missile Defence capability as also to launch low-earth satellites in case of an emergency/urgency.

As far as a national C4ISR system is concerned, India has some strategic deficiencies which make it very vulnerable.

Some of these are the absence of a National Doctrine and associated Policy Frame work, FABs for semi-conductor devices, lack of data centers and data storage and retrieval standards; Indian Operating System, absence of Information Security Standards, Limited Crypto-analysis capability, a standard Geographical Information System (GIS), a viable Defense Industrial Base, critical deficiency of language, information analysis and management and cyber experts and so on.

Delay in decision making and consequent non-availability of these assets is having a direct impact on our national security.

There is an urgent need to expedite the fielding of communication networks which have been awaiting implementation.

The Defence Communication Network(DCN) and Network for Spectrum must integrate the operational and logistic components of the three

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DRDO built pilotless target aircraft ‘Lakshya’

India's first dedicated military satellite was launched successfully from French Guiana on 30 August

What We Need to Do? At the strategic level, we need to formulate and issue a Doctrine for National Security which will then dictate the enabling policy frame work, organisation and capability.

An integrated Indian C4ISR System, catering for both the internal and external security requirements will be central to this capability.

A mechanism for formal integration of Civil and Military High Command in decision-making and resultant organisational transformation is a national security imperative. Chief of Defence Staff or a permanent Chairman of COSC seems to be the most viable option. This will improve ‘jointness’, synergy and coordination between the three Services and Government Agencies. It shall also rationalise planning and optimise expenditure on defence, strengthen the higher defence management and expedite politico–military decision making.

We also need to establish at least two integrated Theatre Commands, to start with, on trial basis, one in the mountainous terrain (China-centric) and the other in the plains.

These theatre commands should be organised in a manner that they effectively negate the operational capabilities and strengths of our adversaries through powerful IW capabilities supported by a robust and state-of-the-art C4ISR System.

Concerted efforts in a mission mode are needed to build a viable Defense Industrial Base and overcome strategic deficiencies enumerated in this paper. Concurrently, we need to ensure availability of infrastructure and training to meet the requirement of human resource for a C4ISR rich environment.

Communication Networks and Information management systems are the nervous system of a C4ISR system requiring an integrated approach. Best catalyst for jointness and synergy would be the “Integration of Communication and Information Assets” of the three services under one head. To start with, Indian Army must rectify the anomaly immediately by combining the Directorate General of Signals and the Directorate General of Information Systems.

There is an urgent need to expedite the fielding of communication networks which have been awaiting approval/ implementation for unacceptably long periods. We must integrate the Networks of

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the three services at all levels. The Defense Communication Network (DCN) and the Network for Spectrum (NFS) must integrate the operational and logistics components of the three Services and other government agencies. Suitable integration must be ensured between the Intelligence and National Networks including the proposed National Broadband Network. There is an operational necessity for aerial communication relays at Corps and equivalent levels, configured on UAVs and Helicopters. Aerostat based surveillance and communication system are required to be fielded in much larger numbers.

A dedicated naval surveillance and communication satellite is a good beginning. We need to launch the Army and Air Force satellites at the earliest and evolve a scheme for sharing the transponders, integration of terrestrial facilities with clear understanding of providing redundancy and sharing of the assets particularly if one of the satellite or the ground facility is unavailable due to technical reasons or enemy action. We must ultimately plan for “In orbit” spare satellites for surveillance and communications and be in a position to launch Low Earth Orbit satellites at a short notice to meet emergency/ operational requirement of surveillance or communications. Also, we must have the capability to manoeuvre the satellites to meet particular surveillance requirement.

There is an immediate requirement of Data Centres and Information Management assets, policies and standards in the Government and the Services. NATGRID is a good example to study in this case.

Finally, it is absolutely essential that we involve the Private sector and Academia and create indigenous capabilities of research, design, development, manufacturing and system integration in the fields of communications, surveillance, image processing, sensors and information management. For this, we need a strong political will and enabling framework to include appropriate financial arrangements and incentives. This should include better offset management, and greater accountability of the DRDO. We have to exploit the strategic window available to us up to the year 2020 and create an Indian C4ISR system. It is a national security imperative.

CHOPPERING AROUND

INDIAN HELICOPTER PROGRAMME:

EXPANSION AHEAD The choppers have become integral in a country where the area spread require and a lack of paved airstrips create possibilities of a chopper insertion.

SUMIT MUKERJI

Key Points l India with its wide swathe of land territory requires rotary wing aircrafts to cover it l Indian forces have conducted peacekeeping operations with Chetak and Cheetahs which have been Alouttes in their original incarnations l The proliferation and growth of helicopters in India has become a source for the influx of aviation companies.

Historical Perspective Man’s fascination for the third dimension has existed from times immemorial.

The interest generated when early man perceived flying creatures and their relative freedom from “the surly bonds of earth” and versatility in reaching seemingly inaccessible places, probably increased their inquisitiveness. But it was not until Icarus (from Greek mythology) fateful flight with wings made of feathers and pasted with molten wax that attempts were made to venture into this domain. But this setback did not deter man’s curiosity with the “birds and the bees”. While the former flew from place to place, the latter’s ability to hover to suck honey from the flowers

(astonishingly replicated by the hummingbird) provided the impetus to achieve this feat. The great Leonardo da Vinci, artist / inventor, a man with great foresight, provided the fundamental idea of a helicopter (as we know it today).

Around the year 1480, he produced drawings / sketches of Windmill-like machines operating in the horizontal plane.

He called it an “Air-Screw” and also termed it the “Helix” (a Greek word meaning ‘Spiral’ or ‘Twist’). While apparently simplistic to look at, it proved a difficult machine to produce. So it became obvious, very early, that a hovering machine would provide greater complications and success rate would be low. This has passed the test of time and has proved true, even to the present day. While fixed wing aviation has moved in leaps and bounds, rotary flight remains limited to a certain degree.

In 1907 the Frenchman Breguet made a 1000 lb rectangular helicopter which rose to 15 ft and flew for one minute, in what is generally accepted as the first vertical flight.

Known then as a “Gyroplane”, the first manned helicopter was flown by another Frenchman, Etienne Oehmichen, in 1924 - a flight of 7min 40 secs. The first successful rotary wing aircraft made were the FockeWulf FW 61 in 1936 and the first American helicopter was the Sikorsky VS-300 in the late 1930s.

Helicopters first saw action in the Second World War and were used in Observation, Communication and Rescue work. “Vertical Envelopment” became an over-powering need to achieve objectives

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and Vertical Assault Techniques for Marines and Special Forces were developed.

Versatility and Usage of Helicopters The versatility of the helicopter was beyond doubt. Its ability, not only to cover distances, but also to hover and provide good observation and decision making, was a wonderful feather in the cap for aviation.

However, engine power to create adequate rotor speed for lifting heavy loads with a limiting aerodynamic factor of blade tip speed were challenges that came along the way and, in fact, still exist. By sheer design, a helicopter is an unstable platform and therefore needs superior competence to perform in flight. Arming the helicopter brought in a totally new dimension.

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AFP

An IAF medium lift helicopter Mi-17V5

Some of the uses helicopters are now put to use, include :• Observation • Reconnaissance • Communication • Anti-Tank Role • Troop Insertion • Special Forces Tasks • Radar Busting • Combat Search & Rescue (CSAR) • Casualty Evacuation • Policing / Traffic Control • Fire Fighting • Medical Evacuation • Air Assault Operations • Battlefield Interdiction • Mine Sweeping • Anti-Submarine Warfare

• Disaster Management • Logistical Tasks / Supply Dropping • Armed Escort to Utility / Troop Carrying Heptrs • Search and Rescue (SAR) • Sea Search and Rescue (SSR) Civil Helicopter Operations in India India is a helicopter country. A country stretching 3000 miles on each side, it has (relatively) only a smattering of airfields located at the major towns in each state.

India is a country which encounters every possible type of weather and boasts of every possible type of terrain. Because of low percapita incomes and poor economic status till the last decade and a half, the proliferation of helicopters and their usage

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has been low, to say the least (not considering the Defence Forces). While the country has an extensive railway network and an even more extensive surface transport (bus) network, there is virtually non-existent last mile connectivity by air, so important in a fast-paced economic and industrial environment. But maybe we will see this happen by the end of this decade.

In the last 60 years of helicopter operations in India (the first flight was in 1953) the growth of helicopter operations has been so modest that a recent economic analysis which conducted a study has shown that only in the last 10 years or so that a sudden surge due to the economic upturn has accounted for a significant rise in the number of helicopter operators in the

CHOPPERING AROUND

YEAR 1993 – 94 95 – 96 97 – 98 99 – 2000 01 – 02 03 – 04 05 –06 07 – 08 09 – 10 10 – 11

No of Heptrs Operating 60 70 83 116 118 126 149 230 250 277

While the market is growing at the rate of almost 15% and an additional induction of at least 250 helicopters is expected in the next few years, the numbers are woefully short in comparison to, say, the USA, in terms of helicopter : population ratio.

In its Strategic Plan 2010 – 2015 the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) has acknowledged that helicopters have a tremendous future in India and given the fact that the large infrastructure required for fixed wing aircraft can only be enhanced incrementally, it was but natural to concentrate on propping up and promoting helicopter operations. To achieve this they have decided : • To create the right infrastructure for the rapid growth of helicopter operations. For this they expect to set up heliports in four major regions, Delhi (North), Mumbai (West), Kolkata (East) and Chennai/ Bangalore (South), in the first phase.

• The heliports are to be set up by the public/private or the joint sector. While developing the heliports will be the responsibility of the Airports Authority of India (AAI), they could also be set up by Pawan Hans or the private sector.

• Greenfield airports policy should be suitably modified to adapt to helicopter operations.

• States will be encouraged to develop helipads and heliports.

• They will regularly review the need for helicopter corridors for safe operations. Air Space Management must cater to helicopter operations along with fixed wing operations.

• Tourism and Medical Evacuation are expected to be the major drivers for helicopter growth in India. It is also hoped that dedicated helicopter effort with the National Disaster Management

Agency (NDMA) and the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) will strengthen the agencies and ensure rapid response in contingency situations.

• A drive to equip every major Government and Private hospital with a Helipad.

• The newly designated Wing in DGCA to facilitate helicopter growth in the country must monitor and upgrade Helicopter Regulatory Regimes periodically.

There are more than 65 non-scheduled operators (including Pawan Hans), at least 20 Private category operators, 16 Govt and PSU helicopters and the Para-

VVIP Commitments, Disaster Relief, Search & Rescue and other utilitarian and logistics tasks. Supporting the Sikorsky S-55 was the light-weight Bell 47 G2, fifteen of which served the IAF with great effect from 1954 to 1978.

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL)’s involvement in India’s helicopter program started early in 1962. In view of the requirement of a light helicopter put up by the IAF, the Govt of India signed a licence agreement with SUD-AVIATION (presently EUROCOPTER, France). The Alouette III re-christened “Chetak” came into An Indian Navy Seaking Helicopter

AFP

country. To tabulate the data and put it in perspective (upto 2011) :

military (BSF). A cross section of light communication, utility and medium lift / passenger helicopters comprise the inventory of Registered civil helicopters.

Some helicopters in regular operation are the EC 130 B4, EC 135 P2, R4 Raven II, Bell 407 / Bell 412 / Bell 206 / Bell 212 / Bell 230, Augusta A 1095, Sikorsky 576 C, AS 350 B2, Dhruv (ALH), Schweizer 300, Mi – 172, Ecuriel, Chetak, Ceetah, Dauphin, AW 139, AS 365 N, etc.

Indian Air Force (IAF) The American Sikorsky S-55 helicopter was inducted into the fledgling IAF in 1954. 104 Helicopter Flight, formed with the first five S-55 helicopters became an established unit four years later and was designated 104 Helicopter Unit in 1958. The S-55s acquitted themselves well, undertaking

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production and the Alouette II, the “Cheetah” was produced for the Indian Army. It took 8 years for HAL to set up its production line and the indigenously built (“Raw Material” series) Chetaks & Cheetahs started rolling out. Over the years the HAL helicopter Division has produced more than 330 Chetaks and more than 240 Cheetahs.

Russian (including erstwhile Soviet Union) helicopters, in the form of Mi-4, Mi8 (both phased out), Mi-17, Mi-17 1V and Mi-17 V5 have comprised the medium-lift element of the IAF’s helicopter fleet since 1962 and remain the mainstay even today.

One Squadron of Mi-26 heavy-lift helicopters were procured and notwithstanding maintenance problems, have credited themselves well in Disaster Management duties and for heavy logistics jobs. Saddled with virtually every task that

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the IAF or the Govt of India could think of, the Mi-8/Mi-17 have had an unprecedented role in the IAF’s activities. It would be an injustice to the platform, which has given such selfless service, if a few words are not written about their activities in various operations.

• UN Operations. Considering that Air Power is a powerful instrument of coercion and compellance, the IAF has been utilised by the UN in operations against proxy or non-state actors / rebels, especially in Africa. Operating under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter which involves a

mention the physiological and psychological aspects. The only motivation that the thousands of troops have, is the helicopter. To these soldiers their only lifeline to the world is the rotary winged machine, which is revered as a deity. Medium lift Mi-17s, Chetaks and Cheetahs are operating at the limits of their performance envelope - and all under fire or threat of fire from the enemy overlooking the glacier. It is to the credit of the designers of these helicopters and the technicians who maintain them that the machines have sustained the stress and strain of such operating conditions over

ALH Dhruv with Heliborne System calibrated show of force coupled with restrained use of air power, the IAF has done laudable tasks in Somalia (1993-94) with Chetak helicopters, in Sierra Leone (2000) with Mi-8, Chetak and Mi-35 Attack Heptrs in the Congo (DRC) from 2003-11 and with Mi-17 & Mi-25 Attack Heptrs in Sudan (2005-11).

•The Siachen Glacier . Thirty years (and continuing) of unrelenting hostility and active aggression on the highest battlefield in the world, is no mean record. Eclipsed only by the 100 yrs War (1337 – 1453) between England and France, the sheer altitude and weather conditions has actually never had a precedent or an equal. Altitudes in excess of 16,000 ft, temperatures dropping to -35 deg C and -50 deg C in windchill, the human body is subjected to extremes of climatic conditions, not to

sustained periods and they should feel proud of such achievement.

• Sri Lanka Operations (Op Pawan). The helicopters came to the fore with their immense contribution to the conflict effort in Sri Lanka in 1984. Displaying awesome versatility and effectiveness against low intensity guerrilla warfare in dense vegetative terrain, the Mi-8s flew well over 35,000 sorties, lifted more than 10,000 troops and 6,000 tonnes of load. The Mi-35 gunships employed to interdict the movement of militants proved highly effective in the conflict.

Indian Navy (IN) As a major enabler for a naval fleet at sea, helicopters have virtually become a necessity for any Navy. The Indian Navy (IN) was, to my mind, a little slow off the

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blocks. A decade into the inception of its Fleet Air Arm, the IN acquired its first helicopter, the Alouette III in 1964, in the SAR role. The versatility of the helicopter to undertake the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) role, the Electronic Warfare (EW) role, execute Search & Rescue (SAR) missions and provide Airborne Early Warning (AEW) to the fleet, has made it an integral part of the IN. The Navy inducted the Sea King in 1971, in the ASW role and they doubled up as the Commando insertion vehicle. Procurement of Guided Missile Destroyers from the Russians gave the Navy the already embarked Kamov KA25 helicopters. These were further supplemented by the KA-28 and followed up by the EW version, the KA-31 in 2004.

With the expansion of the IN, each of its new ships embarked with at least one helicopter, the helicopter fleet in the Navy is all set to grow. Multi-role helicopters are the need of the day. Notwithstanding the induction of the ALH (Dhruv), which will serve the need for Heliborne Operations, Advanced Search & Rescue and Armed Patrol (as envisioned by them), the Navy is on the lookout to equip itself with helicopters in the EW, Anti-Ship and ASW roles with inflight refuelling capability, no less.

Indian Army (IA) Starting from humble beginnings as Air Observation Post (AOP) flights attached with IAF bases, the Cheetah and Chetak helicopters operated by the Indian Army (IA) have provided invaluable service and have earned an enviable reputation for themselves.

They have provided Observation and Recce, Communications and stellar logistical support in the Siachen Glacier. The Army Aviation Corps, established in 1987, has gone into high gear to procure as many helicopters as possible to conform to the fast-paced dynamic battle that is expected to be fought and enhanced even more with the added support of helicopters in various roles. An ongoing turf battle between the IA and the IAF rages, debating the ownership of the Attack Heptrs (presently held by the IAF). The Govt of India has decided that any further procurement of Attack Heptrs will only go the Army.

The IA presently holds more than 150 helicopters in its inventory, with an array of Cheetahs, Chetaks and Dhruv (ALH). HAL has now started supplying the armed

CHOPPERING AROUND version of the Dhruv, called the Rudra or ALH-WSI (Weapon System Integrated). On the lookout to replace the Chetak and Cheetah, the IA is in the process of acquiring 197 Light Utility Helicopters (LUH).

Meanwhile, HAL has demonstrated a Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) and the Army has shown its keenness to acquire it.

Industry The proliferation and growth of helicopters in India has become a source for the influx of aviation companies, vying for a place in the market. Joint Ventures (JVs) provide just the springboard for such opportunities and the Govt of India has added an additional fillip by introducing the “Offset” clause in all major defence deals. Joint Ventures are an ideal channel to utilise “Offsets” offered.

Apart from HAL which has virtually captured the market for providing helicopters for the Indian Defence Forces, a few JVs have emerged to cater for the military as well as the civil market.

• Augusta Westland / Tata A joint venture company between Finmeccanica owned Italian helicopter company AugustaWestland and Tata, called Indian Rotorcraft has been set up to manufacture Augusta Westland’s AW 119. The JV is to be responsible AW 119 final assembly, completion and delivery. Augusta Westland will retain the responsibility of world-wide marketing.

• Eurocopter / Pawan Hans. Joint Ventures between Eurocopter and Pawan Hans to set up Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) facilities in Mumbai and Delhi are planned. The MRO is designed to have the facilities to maintain and service the huge number of Dauphin helicopters operating in India and other South / South-East Asian countries. A training centre with a state-ofthe-art simulator for the Dauphin AS-365 N3 is to be set up. Eurocopter is also looking for smaller JVs with companies for subassemblies, structural parts and component manufacture. Eurocopter feels certain that the private helicopter segment and the commercial sector is expected to grow rapidly, which they hope to capture.

• Sikorsky / Tata Advanced Systems Ltd. A JV between Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation and Tata Advanced Systems Ltd (TASL) to manufacture Sikorsky S-92 components and cabins has been set up and is already producing the products. They also hope to be able to manufacture components for

An Indian Navy KA-28 helicopter

Proliferation and growth of helicopters in India has become a source for the influx of aviation companies, vying for a place in the market. Joint Ventures (JVs) provide just the springboard for such opportunities and the Govt of India has added an additional fillip by introducing the “Offset” clause in all major defence deals.

”

other aerospace OEMs as well.

• Kaman Aerospace / Kineco Pvt Ltd. A JV set up in Goa between Kaman Aerospace Group Inc (USA) and Kineco Pvt Ltd, called Kineco Kaman Composites – India Pvt Ltd has been set up to manufacture advanced composite structures for aerospace and other markets. The output will include composite structural parts for helicopters, among other uses.

• Textron (Bell Helicopters). Textron, the

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parent company of Bell Helicopters, has opened a Global Technology Centre in Bangalore with more than 400 engineers.

They have also entered into a contract with Dynamatics Ltd to make the Bell 407 fuselage.

Conclusion There is no doubt that India provides a growth platform for helicopters like no other country in the world. With a changed economic status and outlook, there is a need for business ventures to proliferate and last mile connectivity by air be achieved to areas beyond the big cities. The number of operators is steadily growing and there is immense scope for those helicopter companies providing utility helicopters for various purposes. Because there is no thrust towards any particular manufacturer, the field is wide open for civilian helicopters.

The three services have most of their orders firmly in place; however, the ambitious expansion plan of the Army Aviation Corps necessitates a major order, which is on the cards. But what is to be noted is that there is immense scope for industry to market ancillary products to the three services.

These may be in the form of sensors, modifications (glass cockpit), Night Vision Goggles (NVGs), making cockpits NVGcompatible, incorporation of stealth technology, avionics suites, self protection systems and, of course, weapons and fire control systems.

In the uniformed arena the Coast Guard needs to be reinforced with more helicopter assets and the para-military needs to acquire helicopters.

NAVAL ARMAMENTS

Indian Navy has ordered the submarine version of MBDA Exocet Missile

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Naval Combat SyStemS S KULSHRESTHA

Key Points l BMD systems are becoming important in terms of providing cover to ships in battles guarding against anti-ship ballistic missiles l Offensive weapons like cruise missiles, guns and torpedoes make the arsenal of naval ships formidable l A network-centric environment for warfare compress the time taken between sensor acquiring a target, to shots fired

T

he ultimate aim of a combat weapon system is to destroy the target by transferring energy (through warhead explosion, directed energy etc.) to it, sufficient for its disintegration. A naval combat weapon system comprises of a large number of subsystems interwoven by data links and computers. The system’s capability of multitasking, enables engaging of multiple 3D threats simultaneously. Detection of a target involves search in an area of its presence, localising the target by finding its range, bearing, elevation or depth and finally its identification. For this purpose, radars, sonars, electro-optics, and magnetic sensors are used. Once target is identified, continuous updates are required regarding its velocity and position to enable engagement by the weapon system. Prediction of the target’s future position is essential for launch of a

Though Indian Navy prides itself for sourcing its indigenous platforms, all or most of its combat systems are sourced through imports thus creating uncertainties about uninterrupted supplies in situations of need. weapon to neutralise the target. The sensors are, in a way, required to follow the target.

Track while scan systems enable search radars to carry out the integrated function wherein the sensors input the positional information and the computers calculate and predict the future position. This eliminates the need of separate fire control radar; the fire control solution is available almost concurrently with the target’s detection.

Electronic scanning has drastically reduced the reaction times as compared to the mechanical scanning, which had involved physical positioning of the antenna. In the case of underwater targets, sonars are used instead of radars but the medium of water is not as amenable to detection of the target as air and introduces uncertainties, which continue to favor the target. Phased arrays and synthetic aperture technologies are being used in both radars and sonars.

Computers enable a weapon system to detect, track, and predict future position of a target for launch of a suitable weapon. A capable weapon system should also be able to scan for multiple threats and identify potential targets for engagement. Once the weapon is launched, its probability of hitting the target is highly increased if it has been designed for guidance during its flight.

Guidance in a weapon implies the ability of the weapon to be guided by external/internal means to the target there by increasing the terminal hit probability. Weapons

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incorporating guidance include missiles (surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, and airto-surface), torpedoes, and guided bombs.

However, the design of a weapon, which is amenable to guidance and fitted with a proximity fuse for detonation of the warhead near the target, is very complex and costly.

A torpedo or missile has some common components like sensor, propulsion, warhead & fuse, electronics (guidance & control, on board computers) etc. Its structure is designed to provide protection to these components against shock and vibration experienced during its launch and propagation to the target. The architecture of the weapon’s structure must support aero/hydro dynamic principals for efficient movement through air/ water. The storage and launch system also form part of the weapon system, the main purpose is to enable efficient replenishment as well as alignment so that the weapon can be placed in line with the estimated position of the target.

This is relevant in case of unguided projectiles as well as guided weapons as it enables a weapon to head to the target even if there is a fault in the guidance and weapon has to proceed in autonomous mode. Some of the noteworthy combat systems are described in succeeding paragraphs.

AEGIS Weapon System. This was first deployed on US Naval Ship, USS Ticonderoga. This system covers the complete range from detection of a target to its

NAVAL ARMAMENTS neutralisation. The Aegis radar, AN/SPY-1, has the capability to simultaneously search, track and attack (provide guidance to missiles) up to 100 targets. It is an advanced, automatic detect and track, multi-function phased-array radar. The Aegis has as its foundation an advanced computer based command and decision system which enables it to carry out operations against multi-mission threats arising from the beneath the sea, surface and air. Lockheed Martin is producing the Aegis weapon system. The US Navy has 72 ships with Aegis system. It has recommenced production of new DDG 51 Class destroyers which will have increased COTS components in its subsystems like the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP), Multi-Mission Signal Processor (MMSP), AN/SQQ-89(V) Anti-Submarine Warfare/Undersea Warfare Combat System (ASWCS/USWCS), and the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 5.0. It is understood that the BMD capability upgrades are being reintroduced after the development of Dong Feng 21 D carrier killer missile by China.

The ships are being provided BMD capability by modifications to Aegis software & computers and provisioning of the BMD interceptor missiles. The BMD missiles are the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and the Standard Missile-2 Block IV (SM-2 Block IV). The BMD system has achieved 25 successful exo-atmospheric hits out of 31 trials since 2002. Raytheon currently manufactures the missiles.

Cruise Missiles: Some of the naval cruise missiles worth mentioning are the Brahmos, the Tomahawk, the Klub, and the Exocet.

Tomahawk by Raytheon, is perhaps the most famous and widely used cruise missile. It consists of a family of subsonic missiles which can target different types of surface targets. The current version is network centric and can utilise data from a variety of inputs like UAVs, satellites and ground forces. Retargeting during its flight is possible due to its loitering feature. The Russian Klub is an anti ship subsonic missile with a supersonic terminal speed of 2.9 mach. It has a warhead of 200 kg and a range of 220 km.

Exocet missile produced by MBDA is a sea skimming turbojet missile with a range of +180km. It has a warhead of 165kg. Indian Navy has ordered the submarine fired version of this missile, namely the SM 39, for the Scorpene submarines under acquisition.

The two stage supersonic Brahmos cruise

missile is the product of BrahMos joint venture between India and Russia. The Indian Navy had contracted it for fitment on its surface ships after ten consecutive successes in trials. It has been inducted in to the Indian Navy and the Indian Army. Its ramjet ensures cruise speeds of ~three Mach up to its range of 290 km. It carries a conventional warhead of 200-300 kg.

Brahmos is capable of being launched from multi platforms like ships, submarines, and aircraft. It is understood that the Brahmos has recently been upgraded by addition of the Russian satellite navigation system, GPSGLONASS existing in the strategic cruise missiles of the Kh-101 and Kh-555 type. It is likely to be inducted in to the Indian Air force and the Indian Naval submarines once the ongoing trials are completed.

Naval Guns and Close in Weapon Systems: Some of the heavy guns in use are, OTO Melara 127/64, Advanced Gun System (AGS), American 5� Mark 45, OTO Melara 76 mm gun, and Bofors 57/70 mm. The Italian OTO MELARA 127/64 LW Light Weight Naval Gun is used on board the Italian FREMM and the German F125 frigates. This rapid-fire gun can be installed on large and medium size ships, for surface fire and naval gunfire support, with anti-aircraft fire as its secondary role. The compactness of the gun feeding system makes it possible to install it on narrow section crafts. The gun can fire all standard 127mm/5 inches ammunition including the VULCANO long range guided ammunition. VULCANO is a family of Extended Range (ER) unguided ammunition and Long Range (LR) guided ammunition for the 127mm naval guns and 155mm land artillery system. VULCANO is a new and emerging technology based upon a fin stabilized airframe with canard control for terminal guidance; mechanical interfaces are same as standard 127mm ammunition.

Various configurations for VULCANO projectiles available for 127mm naval gun are, unguided extended range multirole ammunition, guided long range ammunition with IR seeker and autonomous IMU/GPS guided ammunition.

Also of interest is the 155mm (6-inch) Advanced Gun System, manufactured by BAE Systems, it is intended to fill the gaps in Naval Gun Fire Support role of the US Navy in providing a heavy volume, precise and sustained gun fire support to forces ashore.

The LRLAP ammunition is being developed

by BAE and Lockheed Martin Missile and

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Brahmos Missile on display during DEFEXPO, a defence fair

Fire Control. The LRLAP is capable of hitting targets at a range of 137 km with rocket booster assisted launch.

A close-in weapon system is a last ditch measure to target incoming anti-ship missiles/aircraft. Some major CIWS are, Mk 15 Phalanx (USA), Goalkeeper (Netherlands), DARDO (Italy) and the AK630 (Russia). The US navy has over 250 of the Raytheon’s Mk 15 Mod 21-28 Phalanx CIWS autonomous combat systems mounted on the US Naval ships. It can be used also against small craft and for ant- air warfare.

The Phalanx System is designed as a standalone integrated system which encompasses search (KU band radar and electro-optic), detection, target declaration, tracking, threat elevation, engagement, fire control and damage assessment, this ensures a very quick reaction time that is required for a CIWS. The heart of the Phalanx system is the M61A1 20 mm Gatling gun, providing a

AFP

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Indian Navy has placed an RFP for 127 mm guns in Nov 2013. As far as CIWS is concerned, a RFI for 30 in number 40mm guns with EOFS has been issued in 2011 and the DAC has in addition cleared a proposal for 116 in number 30 mm guns for the warships in 2012

rate of fire between 3000-4500 rounds per minute, firing specially designed high kinetic energy rounds. Incidentally the under trial SeaRAM Mk 15 Mod 31 CIWS is also based upon the Block 1B Phalanx with the gun system being replaced by the RIM 116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM). It is designed as a companion system to target supersonic ASCMs. It utilises the exact deck dimensions of the Phalanx system and can be conveniently mounted on ships. It has an 11cell RAM launcher. The RAM is a Mach 2+ missile with a blast fragmentation warhead of 11.2 Kg. It has a range of 9 km. It can be guided in three modes namely; infrared dual mode enabled (radio frequency and infrared homing), infrared only or passive radio frequency/infrared homing.

Indian Naval ships have the following main guns; A-190(E) 100mm,100mm AK100 naval gun,AK-176-M 76mm gun,AK76/62 76mm gun, Twin mount gun (76mm),

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OTO Melara Otobreda 76 mm gun. The CIWS guns include; AK-630 six-barreled 30 mm Gatling gun, AK-230 twin 30 mm gun.

Indian Navy also uses Barack 1 point defense missile system from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. The missile is 2.1 m long, with a diameter of 170 mm and has a weight of 98 kg. It has a blast fragmentation warhead of 22 kg weight with a proximity fuse. It has a speed of 2.1 Mach and employs Command to line of sight (CLOS) guidance. Its radar system is known as C3I and it can target missiles as close as 500 meters from the ship.

India is also co-developing with Israel a new generation Barack 8 missile with a range of 70 km under a tripartite agreement between DRDO, Indian Navy, and IAI. Indian Navy has placed an RFP for 127 mm guns in Nov 2013.As far as CIWS (guns) is concerned, a RFI for 30 in number 40mm guns with EOFS has been issued in 2011 and the DAC has in addition cleared a proposal for 116 in number 30 mm guns for the warships in 2012.

Torpedoes. Heavy weight torpedoes are a weapon of choice against ships and submarines. Notable heavy weight torpedoes include the US Mk 48 ADCAP, the Russian 53-65 KE, the Italian Blackshark, and the German Seehect. Hughes Aircraft produce the US MK 48 ADCAP wire guided torpedo.

This thermal torpedo has a range of 30 kms at 65kts and 50 kms at 40kts. It has digital fusing systems, digital guidance-and-control systems, and a sophisticated sonar among other improvements over its previous version. It has reduced self-noise due to improvements in its propulsion system.

Whitehead Sistemi Subacquei has developed Blackshark also known as A184. It has advanced ECCM, motor design and battery, giving it a speed of +50Km at +50kts. Atlas Elecktronik manufactures Seehecht, DM2A4. It was the first torpedo to be fitted with a fibreoptic wire guidance system.

Indian Navy has the SUT-266 German torpedo, the Russian wake homer 53-65 KE, SET 65, and the Russian 71ME wire guided torpedoes. It has been contemplating procuring Blackshark torpedo for its Scorpene class submarines. Indian Navy has recently issued an RFI for heavy weight torpedoes for its submarines and warships in pipeline.

Light weight torpedoes (LWT) are launched form ships and fixed/rotary wing aircraft against submarines. One of the LWTs, which is claimed to be the most tested

NAVAL ARMAMENTS

Ageis Weapon System from lockheed Martin torpedo in the world is the US Mk 54 torpedo (Raytheon) and deserves a mention as it also traces its lineage from other Raytheon torpedoes like the MK 46, Mk 50, Mk 48, and ADCAP. It has proved itself against submarine targets in various exhaustive tests in the US. It will replace Mk 46 and MK 50 torpedoes by end of 2014. The Mk 54 torpedo is 271 cm to 287 cm, weighs between 276 Kgs to 293 Kgs, and has a diameter of 32 cm. As per Raytheon, Mk 54 Sonar has evolved from Mk 50 and can generate up to 62 independent beams that can be steered in both the horizontal and vertical planes.

The European torpedo of interest is the MU90/IMPACT (A 244/S Mod 3) Advanced Lightweight Torpedo produced by EUROTORP and jointly developed by WHITEHEAD ALENIA Sistemi Subacquei (Italy, a FINMECCANICA company), DCNS International, and THALES (France). As per the manufacturers, the MU-90 is a NATOstandard-calibre (323,7mm) fire-and-forget LWT of 304 Kgs and 285 cm length, designed to counter any type of nuclear or conventional submarine, acoustically coated, fast-evasive, deploying active or passive anti-torpedo effectors. The torpedo

The sheer complexity of the Naval combat system due to the variety of underlying technologies, the vast number of components covering a multitude of engineering disciplines, the large number of vendors located in different nations, and the high costs, lead to inevitable collaborations with foreign governments and manufacturers

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can be deployed from surface vessels, fixed/rotary wing aircraft, or missile.

Indian Navy uses A224S lightweight torpedo manufactured by WASS Italy. DRDO (NSTL Visakhapatnam) has developed Torpedo Advanced Light (TAL) a lightweight torpedo, 2.75 meters in length and weight of 220 kgs. It is produced and assembled by Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL). TAL is an anti-submarine torpedo, which can be launched from both, surface ships and helicopters. It can attack and cripple submarines at speeds of up to 33 knots and up to a depth of 540 meters. It uses sea water activated batteries and can travel up to a maximum distance of seven km; it has an explosive weight of 50 kgs. The Indian Navy has placed an order for 25 TALs and further orders are likely.

Need for Strategic Perspective: The sheer complexity of the Naval combat system due to, the variety of underlying technologies, the vast number of components covering a multitude of engineering disciplines, the large number of vendors located in different nations, and the high costs, lead to inevitable collaborations with foreign governments and manufacturers. This in turn raises the question of unhindered supply of components and sub-assemblies during contingencies in future that may or may not be ideologically favoured by the nation where the vendor is located. There is a need therefore of a comprehensive exercise, to correctly identify every source which is required for production and maintenance of a combat weapon system. Thereafter, a study should be carried out about the country’s relation with India, its policies & laws and other factors that may affect weapon component life cycle supplies. In case of slightest apprehension, second sources/alternative designs need to be developed indigenously to eliminate dependencies. In case that appears formidable or involves exorbitant costs then such items need to be sourced in advance as per projected life cycle requirements and local periodic maintenance facilities developed. Since weapon systems have, a life spanning up to three decades there is also a need to have a strategic perspective in to government to government procurements as well as offset clauses. These dependencies can only be insured through effective long duration foreign and domestic policies of the government pertaining to national security of India.

SIMULATORS A cost effective Live, Virtual and Creative (LVC) training environment is not a substitute for live training, but the technology enabled Embedded Training (ET) provides a massively enabling option.

AMIT ANEJA

Key Points • ET creates an intense and a near-live milieu for training with value addition to the trainee.

• The article case study, an ET enabled helicopter platform, provides various scenario specific training for the pilots.

• The ET in a chopper platform obviates the need for setting up expensive avionics and EW systems, thus saving cost.

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mbedded Training (ET) within the military environment, encompassing ground, naval and air forces, has over the decades become increasingly prevalent.

Embedded training’s objective is to maximise the benefits from the live training component of the training program.

Together with the pursuit of the optimal mix of virtual and live training, ET is today at the forefront of leading military training organisation’s agenda.

ET is the ability to create within the live platform a fully immersed and realistic training environment, through the use of

EMBEDDED SIMULAT simulation and computer generated or virtual forces. Examples of ET are: injecting a complete ground forces virtual scenario, including friendly and enemy forces, into a tank’s on-board systems, and providing the tank crew with an authentic operational battlefield; stimulating on-board a naval vessel the sonar and torpedo systems, and providing a complete anti-submarine warfare training exercise; simulating the entire avionics suite of a fighter aircraft within a trainer aircraft cockpit, and including a rich constructive environment.

The benefits from embedded training may

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be divided into the added value to the trainee and the cost savings. The ability to provide a trainee with a training experience that is closest to reality, i.e. the “train as you fight” paradigm, is ensured through the utilisation of ET, thereby ensuring an increased combat ready trainee. Cost savings are achieved via direct cost savings of real systems not being installed on-board the training platform; expendable items (e.g. missiles, torpedoes, chaff, flare) that are not fired/released; and lower running costs of trainer platform instead of operational platform; and indirect cost savings such as not having to position

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A. K. Antony piloted a 25-minute flight of MiG-29K on the state of the art simulator at INS Hansa

ION: ARMING FLIGHT TRAINING real troops, tanks, aircraft and ships in the field, and being able to replicate the red and blue forces with constructive forces.

Through the use of data link equipped platforms, interoperability between the live (and virtual if necessary) trainees is achieved, adding to the realism of a training exercise. A helicopter equipped with an ET system will identify on its virtual Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) an incoming virtual, and determine the hit/miss outcome. The helicopter pilot will then perform a counter attack on the ground threat using its simulated weapon systems.

The entire engagement is recorded for a very high quality post-flight debrief.

Elbit Systems Ltd is one of the leading companies that has delivered many ET systems, all of which can be defined as Military Off The Shelf (MOTS) ET systems, including: Embedded Virtual Avionics (EVA) – enabling virtual mission training on-board all aircraft types, both fixed and rotary wing; In- Flight Electronic Warfare Simulator (IFEWS)a complete, autonomous, on-board threat-environment training and safety suite, capable of simulating the EW suite and virtual threats

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range; Air Defence Instrumented Training system (ADITS)-enabling Air Defence units to perform controlled training exercises involving real and simulated targets and assets; and Naval Combat Manoeuvring Instrumentation (NCMI) – providing enhanced naval training capabilities in operational scenarios including Anti Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-Ship Warfare (ASW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASuW) and Asymmetric Warfare.

In this paper, a case study of an ET system installed on board a training helicopter platform is elaborated, describing

SIMULATORS the types of scenarios that can be flown.

Since there is total software flexibility to create custom made platforms and factors affecting a dynamic tactical environment, appropriate tactical training scenarios can be created with fighter aircraft or any other fighting platform.

Currently the ET system’s capabilities include the following: n Display of constructive air and ground threats on aircraft displays on MultiFunction Display (MFD), Heads Up Display n Virtual Radar ( only necessary in nonradar equipped aircraft) n Air-to-Air combat with radar and nonradar aircraft n Air-to-Air combat with a virtual aircraft n Virtual Air- to-Ground training including simulated weapon delivery and scoring n Self-Protection Suite operations n FLIR sensors (targeting and navigation pods AGM-65, etc.) n SAR simulation n Tactical Situation Displays n Embedded Autonomous Air Combat Manoeuvring Instrumentation (EACMI) n Real Time Kill Notification (RTKN) n No Drop Bomb Scoring (NDBS) n Safety and restrictions watch-dog including Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Warning and Mid-air collision warning n Exercise Mission Planning, Real- time Monitoring and Debriefing.

Embedded Training System (Air) Description The Embedded Training System brings to fixed and rotary wing aircraft capabilities previously only available in ground based simulators. It enables Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) missions and weapon system training on-board the aircraft in flight; and provides enhanced functionality to the aircraft avionics suite, providing a wide range of new and advanced capabilities for training pilots.

aircraft sensors (if present). Constructive targets are created using the computer generated forces (CGF) software package.

The simulated targets behave according to doctrines and tactics that were applied during the mission-planning phase, and which are easily created and modified by the users.

An integral data link may be provided as part of the system and is responsible for coordinating simulation among every member of the flight. In this manner, each flight member “sees” all the entities created by each individual aircraft. The data link provides a coherent simulation arena in which all participants operate. l Ground

Airborne Capability: The ET system (Air) is based on a hardware module that includes an embedded computer, graphic processor, mass storage, power supply and an integrated data link if required. The software engine is coupled to a comprehensive database that generates constructive ground and air threats in realtime that are interactive with the actual l

Station Capability: A unique capability of the ET system is the pre-Flight, In-Flight and Post-Flight ground station capabilities. The ET ground station component augments the autonomous capabilities by offering: l Pre –Flight features: n

Mission planning using the Exercise Planning (EP) tool

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The ability to provide a trainee with a training experience that is closest to reality, i.e. “train as you fight” paradigm, is ensured through the utilisation of ET, thereby ensuring an increased combat ready trainee. Cost savings are achieved via direct cost savings of real systems not being installed on-board the training platform

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l Post –Flight features:

Indian Air Force pilots march past a Pilatus PC-7 training aircraft

n

n

n

n

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Enhanced debriefing capabilities-high resolution 3D visual database Enhanced debriefing of virtual avionics operations Time Axis control, enabling movement forward and backward in time ‘What If’ capabilities, enabling the performance of corrective action during debriefing (e.g. launch a different weapon and assess the difference in results) Ongoing tracking of trainee’s performance.

AFP

Embedded Training System helicopter training scenarios The following contains a description of typical helicopter training scenarios that can be performed with the Embedded Training System (ETS) and Helmet Mounted Display (HMD) system. The scenarios presented are in no way limited to those described, and with the use of supplied editors and software applications, the level of training scenario complexity desired resides ultimately with the flight instructor.

n n

n

Mission rehearsal Constructive entities creation-Technical Knowledgebase Editor (TKE) Constructive entities doctrine planningDoctrine Editor (DE).

l In –Flight features: n

n

n

n

n

n

Real-time monitoring of data link network participants, including both real and virtual/constructive entities Real-time monitoring of aircrew virtual avionics operation Up-link capabilities enabling real-time changes of scenario data. This capability includes real-time alteration of the virtual environment and scenario data: virtual/constructive participant’s performance, weapons, doctrine, etc.

Instructor interaction with the flight crew, and real-time monitoring capability Introduction of third- party nonparticipants (i.e. nearby civil air traffic) where available through alternative information sources.

Data recording for all participants, providing extensive post-flight debrief capabilities.

l Land Strike Scenario: A convoy of virtual ground troops combined with multiple vehicles manoeuvres on the terrain.

The crew will have to search for the convoy using the virtual Electro-Optical (EO) sensor and HMD. When the convoy is detected the crew will identify the target using its virtual image on the HMD and the other virtual characteristics as being displayed by the ETS. The crew will then use the laser sensor to designate targets and fire virtual missile or virtual dumb rockets to destroy as many vehicles as possible. Taking into account the virtual threat’s line of sight to the helicopter, the ETS will determine if the helicopter is detected by the convoy at all times. If the helicopter is within line of sight, the convoy may launch virtual Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) or virtual Man Portable Air Defence (MANPAD) missiles at the helicopter. The helicopter crew will be alerted by the virtual Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) and/or Missile Warning System (MWS). The crew can avoid the virtual attack by breaking line of sight; performing evasive manoeuvres combined with virtual countermeasure release or by destroying the firing unit. The ETS will determine the effectiveness of the crew actions and will continue to simulate the hostile attack accordingly.

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l Special Forces Insertion Scenario: A transport helicopter is required to insert a Special Force team into a hostile environment, and is on route engaged by multiple SAM sites The crew will plan their mission based on up-to-date field intelligence, and complete their pre-flight preparation by rehearsing the mission on the mission planning ground station. During the flight all the known and unknown (“surprise”) SAM sites will be active and based on line of sight and range to target the SAM sites will enter Search, Lock and Missile fire modes. Depending on the capability of the Electronic Warfare (EW) self-protection suite that is being simulated, the SAM sites will be identified and displayed visually and aurally on the RWR. Similarly, the threat will be displayed on the crew’s HMD. In the event that the virtual SAM site fires a missile, the crew will receive appropriate warnings on the virtual RWR, will see the incoming missile on the HMD, and they will have to react accordingly releasing counter measures (Chaff/Flare) and performing appropriate counter manoeuvres. Should these actions not be successful, the crew will receive a hit/kill result. In case of a hit, the damage assessment algorithm will determine which virtual avionic/weapon systems were degraded or destroyed. l SAR (Search and Rescue) Scenario: Virtual human survivor entity in the environment (land/sea) The crew will have to search and approach a virtual human that is located in the land/sea environment. The crew will plan a search pattern using the Combat Management System (CMS) and use the virtual EO sensor to search for the survivor. The helicopter can search for the survivor’s transmitting beacon, if available. Furthermore, the crew can also use the HMD to search for the virtual survivor by looking around. The survivor will appear on the HMD when it is within visual range and line of sight. When the survivor is detected, the crew will approach the survivor by using the HMD. In close range, the Air crewman (back seat) will direct the pilot to the approaching point while maintaining line of sight with the virtual survivor displayed on the air crewman’s HMD. l Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Scenario: Computer Generated Forces (CGF) submarine navigating in a designated

SIMULATORS

Interior of cockpit of flight training simulator Reality H for Dauphin helicopter area at multiple depths.

The crew will plan the search area for the submarines, the dipping sonar dip location and the pattern to release the sonar buoys and dip the sonar according to the plan.

While the Sensor Operator (SENSO) operates the sonars, the Air Warfare Officer (AWO) will use the radar and electro-optical (EO) sensors to search for the virtual submarine periscopes. When the virtual submarine is detected and identified, the crew will plan the approaching pattern to the submarine and fire a virtual torpedo. The crew will continue to use the helicopter sensors to track the submarine and fire torpedoes until destroyed.

Note: Training may be achieved at increasing level of realism. At the first stage the sonar buoy may be fully simulated i.e. simulated sonar buoys and simulated threat environment. At a later stage the sonar buoy may be physically deployed, requiring the pilot and the operator to deal with actual sonar buoy in the water while the threat environment remains simulated.

An ASW scenario may also include the training helicopter coordinating with a buddy chopper.

Embedded Training Cost Savings The cost savings by installing an Embedded Training System on-board a flying training platform may be divided into the following: • One-off cost savings due to not installing the real Avionics/Weapons/EW systems on-

The integration of ET intrinsically into the operational training of a pilot in no way aims to suggest one as a substitute of the other.

Training in actual systems has its own irreplaceable value

”

board the training platform. n Per annum cost savings for downloading of training from high-cost operational platforms to the lower cost training platform. n Per annum maintenance cost savings by not having to maintain the real systems mentioned above. n Per annum cost savings for expendables, such as chaff/flare, that is not required to be dispensed. n Per annum cost savings for flight costs saved by not having to fly the training platform to specially equipped

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training ranges, including the range equipment costs.

• Per annum cost savings for associated training participants that are not required to be deployed due to the use of computer generated (virtual) forces (CGFs) Looking at the issue in perspective, one sees that technology has infused in today’s combat while maintaining agility, versatility to multi-task, role flexibility and an ability to deliver a variety of armament accurately both Air-to Ground and Air-to-Air. It also gives the pilot a choice to create a virtual environment around him suitable to the role for best situational awareness. It is an irony though, that the same tools of technology also make penetration into the threat zone equally dangerous. Under the circumstances, the only guarantee is an extremely capable and lethal battle-space. The other concern that naturally comes along with the situation is that these assets, so empowered, are extremely expensive to possess, deploy and employ.

Under the circumstances, it is becoming increasingly difficult to train the nucleus of this capability; the pilot. On the one hand is the difficulty to create an integrated and composite operational training environment, and on the other, is the ever increasing cost of the employment of these combat assets with the ease and frequency that is optimally essential.

With simulation technology having reached a significant maturity and flexibility; the logical answer therefore, is to train in a virtual and creative environment. It not only enables creation of a dynamic and realistic immersed battle-space; but also keeps down the cost of training while ensuring safety of such operations and preservation of the expensive combat platforms for use more effectively when actual challenges appear.

The integration of ET intrinsically into the operational training of a pilot in no way aims to suggest one as a substitute of the other.

Training in actual systems has its own irreplaceable value. However, a right balance between Live, Virtual and Creative (LVC) will not only ensure that the pilot skills are kept razor sharp but also that it is achieved at an affordable cost. The unanswered question the world over today is not about the viability of LVC training; it is more about what the right balance between them could be. It also opens up the field to consider the dynamic nature of this balance, so arrived, as the simulation technology further improves. That, however, is another topic by itself.

DEFENCE RELATIONS

Russia and india,i

The USSR had been in a firm clinch with India, the successor state picked up the threads after a few hiccups

PINAKI BHATTACHARYA

Key Points l Early on while the Russian offers

for arms were not so welcome, the US’s reticence in giving materiel changed that. l By the 1970s the USSR had emerged as the primary supplier for all the three services. l Soviet fall created an environment of uncertainty in terms of both spares and new armaments

A

t the beginning, in 1947, Indian armed forces had a large arsenal of legacy weapons from the British. As PR Chari had noted in an article for Asian Survey of March, 1979, the Russian platforms that India had were Il-14 transport aircrafts (26 in number), An-12 transporter type (16) and Mi-4 helicopters (26 again).

The armaments of Western sources were so dominant in the Indian armed forces, that on a visit to Moscow in 1955 by then prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, refused to entertain the thought of Russian supplies, offered quite forcefully by Nikita Khruschev, then head of government of the USSR. Chari had noted that the Soviet leader had offered 60-100 MiG fighter aircrafts.

But Nehru was not impressed.

But this was set to change as Pakistan’s membership to the SEATO and CENTO had

AK Antony being presented a guard of honour on his arrival in Moscow on 18 November 2013 made it a client state of the USA. While Washington supplied F-104 Starfighters to the country, the US Administration of Dwight Eisenhower refused to supply those aircrafts to New Delhi.

Still, in the 1962 border war between China and India, the otherwise deficient Indian armed forces were supported on an emergency basis by American and British weaponry. The politics of the day dictated the development. Western powers had calculated that if India were to be humiliatingly defeated in the war, it could prove to be an increase of influence of Communism in Asia.

On the other hand, the Chinese were already sensing the fraying of their alliance with then Soviet Union. A result of this accrued to Indo-Russian relations in the aftermath of the war. New Delhi sought Russian MiGs and received 19 of them. But

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what was crucial for the time; the Russians sought to deepen the budding relationship by establishing an indigenous production facility on which the two countries partnered.

Interestingly, these were also the days of Nehru’s search for self-sufficiency for the country. But the Russians came on board for joint ventures with the leading developing country of the world, also a leader of the Non-aligned Movement.

Importantly, this ‘partnership’ concept is now being touted by the current defence minister, AK Antony. He is being Nehruvian in terms of seeking to leverage India’s ongoing arms buying spree by which another $ 150 billion will be spent in a decade or so. As a part of the modernisation process of the armed forces, Antony has made it clear that no longer the country will be just a buyer to a seller. Instead, the country looks for a ‘partnership’ with the

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n aClose embRaCe Rosoboronexport Headquarter in Russia

foreign suppliers, who will have to set up joint ventures that would require technology transfers.

In the 1960s, this was only a seminal thought. The short stint of the Janata Party government in that decade, showed some signs of moving away from the IndoRussian proximate defence relations, but it did not stay in power long enough to cause a major course change.

Crisis in the relation Although in the 1980s, after Gandhi returned to the prime minister’s office, a conscious attempt was made to source the defence weaponry from Western sources because the Indian decision-makers did no longer wish to remain too dependent on one supplier for all their requirements. So the Jaguar deal was struck with the British defence manufacturer, SEPECAT, in 1978.

Once Rajiv Gandhi became the prime minister, the defence ministry decided to source its new 155mm howitzers from the Swedish manufacturer, Bofors Rajiv was in favour of an aggressive security policy that included the beginning of the weaponisation process of the nuclear capacity. This naturally brought up the issue about delivery vehicles. While the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) was started during Indira Gandhi’s regime, a credible, nuclear warhead carrying long range missile was still some time away.

Hence, the armed forces wanted to have an alternative delivery platform ready in the form of an aircraft, configured for the delivery of nuclear bombs. Mirage-2000 was thus chosen to be procured from Dassault, the huge French conglomerate.

These expanding relations with the

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West, provided a sense of cooling-off in the Indo-Russian defence relations. One of the key reasons for that, was the problem that then USSR’s defence-industrial system created, in terms of providing spares at cheap, affordable rates.

On top of that, with the withdrawal of the Soviet occupying forces from Afghanistan; the eventual fall of the Soviet communists from power, and the countries fissiparous Union attendantly unwinding itself, the former Soviet defence-industrial system got distributed to the new nations that were born.

For example, Ukraine became the hub for shipbuilding and aeronautical spares; some of the Central Asian Republics not only remained metals and minerals rich, with their extraction plants located there, but they also had to meet Russian armaments manufacturers’ special material supply centre.

DEFENCE RELATIONS

Putin welcomes Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in Moscow's Kremlin A result of this multi-sourced industrialised ecology, time and financial resources moved in tandem to greater heights. Additionally, the Russians decided to break the Rupee-Rouble trade concert and demanded hard currencies for India’s imports. This remained the situation through the 1990s, till the advent of Vladimir Putin as a strongman backed by the KGB, who could hold on to power long enough to combine and consolidate the various atomised organisations into mega sized corporate structures. A good example of harnessing the inherent strengths of these corporate units is the mega-sized trading arm called Rosoboronexport (ROE) that became the one stop shop for all supply queries and transactions.

Renewal of the relations Under Putin’s drive towards making Russia’s main manufacturing activity to be in the defence industrial sector, besides of course, pumping out more oil for earning hard currency, small wonder, his early stop after becoming the President of the Russia was New Delhi in November, 2000. The meeting with the prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee was focussed on increasing trade and supporting mutual economic development.

While Moscow was picking up the remaining threads of the former Soviet State that included the ‘military-industrial complex,’ it initially had major problems.

Many of the production facilities closed

down on as orders dried up. Russia’s armed forces reduced the earlier voracious appetite for armaments of the so-called people’s army – the Red Army – and the former Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe turned away with vehemence, Putin needed India’s finances to run some of them.

Of the many agreements that were signed, two key were on the two countries agreeing to a ‘Strategic Partnership,’ and a comprehensive long-term programme for scientific and technical cooperation between the Russian side and India stretching for a period between 2001-2010.

A slew of defence agreements were also signed between the two countries specifically talking about New Delhi funding many of the technology developments. They included: l Agreement between the government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of India on the Transfer to the Indian Side of a License and Technical Documentation for the Manufacture of the Su-30 MKI Aircraft, its Onboard Equipment, and the AL-31FP Engine and on Rendering Technical Assistance in Organising their Production, dated October 3, 2000. l Agreement on the Heavy AircraftCarrying Cruiser Admiral Gorshkov. l Agreement of Understandings between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Defence Ministry of India Concerning the Purchases of T-90 Tanks.

With these as the foundational

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documents of the new Indo-Russian defence relationship, an IDSA researcher, Jyotsna Bakshi, writing in the think-tank’s flagship journal, Strategic Analyses, AprilJune, 2006 issue, had quoted then defence minister, Pranab Mukherjee stating in 2005, “…after 2010 the progress of IndoRussian defence co-operation will be reviewed and the two may go in for another 10-year programme.”

In 2010 when Putin arrived, he was faced with a barrage of complaints about the delays in the programmes like the huge time-overrun in refurbishing the Admiral Gorshkov, also the hiked cost of the project.

As the two sides reviewed the cooperation between the two countries, a total number of joint ventures were up at 200.

The key elements that included the Brahmos cruise missile, enabled to be fired from sea, air and land – considered the most successful totem for Indo-Russian cooperation. It also included technology transfer for the T-90 tanks. And, the procurement for Smerch multi-barrel rocket launcher.

The most important deal, however, was the joint development of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). Meant to be the top-end of the IAF’s fighter inventory, and meant then to be inducted into service by 2017-18, this was to be a joint technical venture with Hindustan Aeronautics and Sukhoi Design Bureau, where the Indian version would be different from Russian parent.

Future Bright The endemic problems of the Russian defence-industrial complex still remain, the propensity to put the costs of the materiel high – a sense of being overcharged – and the problems of getting maintenance services, including spares remain.

And though Indian ministry of defence – essentially the government itself – seek to explore competitive systems and lesser prices, the level of Indo-Russian cooperation remains still at a higher level.

In fact, the model of joint ventures between the two countries’ defenceindustries are a model on which the new concept of “partnership” as opposed to the “buyer-seller” relations, have evolved.

And the Indo-Russian partnership still remains as the standard measure against which all the other relations will continue to be tested.

DEFENCE BUZZ

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DSI

DEFENCE BUZZ An Update on Defence News

Navy’s First ALH Squadron commissioned The first ALH (Dhruv) Squadron was commissioned at Kochi by Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha, Flag Officer Commanding in Chief Western Naval Command. Dhruv is the first indigenously designed and manufactured helicopter at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and with its multi role capabilities has proven her mettle in all the three services of the Armed Forces, Indian Coast Guard , BSF. The squadron would have the name Indian Naval Air Squadron (INAS) 322. Addressing the commissioning ceremony parade, Vice Admiral Sinha said that in the Navy, Dhruv

Indian Navy’s largest ship INS Vikramaditya commissioned Marking a new high in India-Russia strategic cooperation, the Indian Navy commissioned the completely refurbished 44,500 tonne carrier Admiral Gorshkov as INS Vikramaditya at an impressive ceremony at sub zero temperature in the windswept Sevmash Shipyard in the beautiful city of Severodvinsk in Russia. Snow flakes kept falling as the ceremony was held.

Speaking at the event, Defence Minister A.K Antony said INS Vikramaditya would

significantly enhance the reach and capability of the Indian Navy. He said, the country has a rich maritime history and the Indian Ocean has guided our fate over the centuries.

“India’s economic development is dependent on the seas and safeguarding the nation’s maritime interests is central to our national policy.

The meaning of ‘Vikramaditya’, which literally translates into “Strong as the Sun” is complemented by the Ship’s motto –“Strike Far, Strike Sure”,he said.

Indian Navy receives third Boeing P-8I

helicopters has transformed into an advanced search and rescue (SAR) helicopter also used for missions like heliborne operations, and armed patrol with night vision devices. Such machines in the inventory have become imperative for the Navy given the scenario of low intensity maritime operations and coastal security construct.

With the commissioning of Vikramaditya, Navy’s reach and ability to respond in real time to situations in our area of responsibility would see a jump, he added. Aerial assets like UAVs, Mig 29 K fighters, P 8 I and Dhruv have added punch to our quiver he added.

Based on the company’s Next-Generation 737 commercial airplane,the P-8I is one of eight aircraft Boeing is building for the Indian Navy as part of a contract awarded in 2009. The P-8I is the Indian Navy variant of the P-8A Poseidon that Boeing has developed for the U.S. Navy which incorporates not only India-unique design features, but also subsystems that are tailored to the country’s maritime patrol requirements.

Indian Navy received third Boeing P-8I longrange maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft on schedule.

The aircraft departed Boeing Field in Seattle for Naval Station Rajali, where it joined two P-8Is currently undergoing flight trials and testing. The first P-8I arrived in India in May.

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DEFENCE BUZZ

FEBRUARY 2014

DSI

India successfully test fires Agni-IV

AGNI-IV, the 4000 kms range Nuclear Capable Ballistic Missile was successfully launched from the Wheeler Island off the coast of Odisha.

This was the third consecutively successful trial and the last one in the series of development launches. The missile took off majestically, rose to a height of over 850 km, covered the intended range in about 20 minutes, hit the target with two digit accuracy; meeting all mission objectives

and proving the capabilities of the missile. The AGNI-IV missile propelled by composite solid fuel rocket motor technology was launched from its road mobile launcher indigenously developed by DRDO. The long range Radars and Electro-Optical Tracking Systems (EOTS) located all along the coast have tracked and monitored all the parameters throughout the flight. Two ships located near the target point tracked the vehicle and witnessed the final event. The Defence Minister, AK Antony congratulated the DG, DRDO and Scientific Advisor to Defence Minister, Avinash Chander and his team on the success.

“The event is of greater significance since the system was tested in its deliverable configuration with the active participation of Strategic Forces Command (SFC) personnel. The missile is now ready for induction and its serial production will now begin” said Shri Avinash Chander, who commanded the launch sequence.

IAF bids adieu to Mig 21, type 77

DRDO develops Heavy Drop System Capability

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The Kalaikunda airbase witnessed three MiG-27 aircraft perform the Trishul Break Manoeuvre as a salute to the MiG-21 type 77 aircraft that was towed out and into the Hangar for the last time.

The Kalaikunda based Operational Conversion Unit (OCU) bid a final farewell to its oldest workhorse.

The induction of first batch of six MiG 21s way back in Mar-Apr 1963 heralded the arrival of IAF in the ‘Supersonic era’. Its unprecedented combat versatility afforded the IAF great amount of operational flexibility. Over the years, this delta wing marvel slowly evolved into the combat

backbone of the IAF and close to 1000 fighters (which include all variants) have served in the IAF till date. In 1980-90s the MiG-21s constituted nearly 60% of our combat fleet strength.

It is no wonder therefore that five generations of our combat pilots including myself, who have ‘cut teeth’ on this veritable fighter swear by its unmatched combat prowess.

The T-77 fleet has been flying on an average around 9000 hours per year. While we operate the Su 30s and are looking forward to Rafale MMRCA, MiG-21 fighters continue to contribute to the IAF’s strength.

A 16 ton capacity heavy drop system (HDS) consisting of a platform and a highly advanced system of parachutes to drop loads consisting of military stores such as vehicles (including BMP class), supplies and ammunition from IL76 heavy lift aircraft has been designed and developed and demonstrated.

Three prototypes of the system developed by the Aerial Delivery Research and Development Establishment (ADRDE), an Agra based laboratory of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) have been realized and two

successful drops meeting the performance parameters have been demonstrated. The system is an extension of technology developed by DRDO for ‘P-7 HDS’, the 7 ton capacity Heavy Drop System developed earlier .

P-7 heavy drop system (P-7 HDS), paradropped as a composite unit termed as “Load”, has been developed for paradropping military stores/equipments such as military vehicles and ammunition trolleys from IL-76 aircraft and comprises of two main sub-systems namely Platform sub-system and Parachute Sub-system.

DEFENCE BUZZ

FEBRUARY 2014

13th India-Japan coastguard exercise Sahayog-Kaijin held

13th India- Japan Coast Guard joint exercise was held off Kochi. JCG (Japan Coast Guard Ship) Mizuho and its integral helicopter, Indian Coast Guard Ship (ICGS) Samrat, Chetak helicopter, Dornier aircraft, and ICGS C-404 took part in the exercise tiltled Sahayog- Kaijin 2014, held approximately 20 nautical miles off Kochi. Admiral Yuji Sato, Commandant of Japan

Coast Guard, and Vice Admiral Anurag G Thapliyal, Director General of Indian Coast Guard who was embarked on board ICGS Samrat witnessed the exercise.

The exercises included cross deck landings, anti piracy drills, search and rescue demonstration and a fire fighting demonstration.

Addressing the media jointly on board ICGS Samrat, on

completion of the exercise, both the Admirals expressed satisfaction at the successful conduct of the exercise.

The joint exercise between Coast Guards of India and Japan held annually since 1999, focuses on anti piracy procedures, pollution control measures and other areas of common professional interest.

Senior officials of Japan Coast Guard were also present .

Indian Coast Guard commissions third fast patrol vessel, ICGS Abhinav ICGS (Indian Coast Guard Ship) Abhinav, the third Fast Patrol Vessel built by CSL (Cochin Shipyard, Limited) was commissioned. Vice Admiral Anurag G Thapliyal, Director General Indian Coast Guard was the Chief Guest on the occasion.

Before this, ICGS also commissioned, Fast Patrol Vessel ‘Adesh’ and ‘Abheek’.

Speaking on the occasion, Vice AdmiralThapliyal said commissioning three ships in a span of 33 days is a testimony to the professionalism, resolve and capabilities of Cochin Shipyard Limited. Dwelling on the responsibilities of Indian Coast Guard and it’s fast paced expansion, the Admiral said that 46 coastal radar stations along the coast are nearing completion and 38 more station

Kumar has a crew of 39 and will be based at Kochi.The water jet propelled vessel has a length of 50 meters and displaces 290 tonnes with a top speed of 33 Knots. Fast Patrol Vessels, undertake surveillance, interdiction, search and rescue.

are in the pipeline in the second phase. He also expressed his appreciation for the support extended by the State Government for all initiatives and programmes .

Abhinav commanded by Commandant (JG) Raman

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DSI

HAL Contributes to ISRO’s GSLV D5 Mission

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) congratulates Indian Space Reasearch Organisation (ISRO) for the successful launch of Geo-stationary Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) D5 from Sriharikota on January 5, 2013.

“HAL’s Aerospace Division contributed in a significant way for the launch by supplying 13 types of riveted structural assemblies, seven types of welded propellant tankages which include the cryogenic liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks and cryogenic stage structures of GSLV-D5”, said Dr. R.K. Tyagi, Chairman, HAL. HAL integrated and delivered all the four L40 booster rockets and provided the bare structure of the communication satellite (GSAT-14), an assembly of composite and metallic honeycomb sandwich panels with a composite cylinder.

The HAL-ISRO partnership has been growing over the years and is poised for more. HAL has been associated with India’s prestigious space programmes since the establishment of ISRO. This includes the recent successful launch of the Mars Orbiter Mission spacecraft for which HAL delivered seven types of riveted structural assemblies and four types of welded propellant tankages.

LAST PAGE INTERVIEW

FEBRUARY 2014

DSI

“ INDIAN NAVY eNsures NAtIoNAl securItY AND mArItIme INterests” In this interview with the DSI, the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Pradeep Chatterjee lays out the Indian Navy’s experiences and plans.

Q. In recent times the navy had continued to extend its reach in a more intense way. How did the force fare in all those blue water forays?

A. The recent induction of platforms with long legs and potent fire power has ensured that Indian Navy is able to accomplish committed goals in a tangible and effective manner. The Indian Navy has contributed effectively in making sea lanes and waters in the IOR safer. We have sustained blue water operations as planned. IN ships have been deployed for antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, for overseas deployments, and bilateral exercises. In Oct 13, 2013 IN participated in the International Fleet Review at Sydney, Australia in Oct 13. IN units also participated in ADMM plus exercises on HADR and Maritime Security, conducted in Brunei and Jervis Bay, Australia respectively. To sum up, I can say that IN has fared very well in the recent times and our efforts have been appreciated.

Q. Has the quality of ships, weapons improved, thus enhancing the performance of the service?

A. It is but obvious that the performance of the platforms is dependent on the performance of the associated sensors and weapons fitted on them. I can proudly say that the technology being inducted by the IN is the latest and comparable (if not better) to the technology being used by other Navies in the world. I would also like to reassure you that the IN is a very credible and a professional service and would ensure India’s national security and maritime interests.

Q. Has the quality of the human resources improved in the same vein?

A. To operate the sophisticated ships, submarines and aircraft of the Indian Navy with the degree of skill required, is no mean feat. The very fact that the Indian

enhance the Navy’s share of the defence budget on a long term basis.

Drawing up unambiguous staff requirements, thorough technical evaluation and foolproof contracts, are essential ingredients of the procurement procedure. Further, utmost prudence in management of funds through close monitoring can give us the required ‘Bang for the Buck’.

Navy is recognised globally as the principal regional maritime force in the Indian Ocean is indicative of the high standards of the men running it.

The Human Resources of the Indian Navy have certainly improved over time and we are indeed proud of the quality of discipline, hardiness, resilience, innovativeness, and leadership of our personnel. We are confident that this provides us with a definitive edge over many regional and extra-regional navies.

Q. How has the government policies driven the modernisation objectives of the navy?

A. Modernisation of the Indian Navy is an ongoing process dictated primarily by capabilities to be achieved, threat perceptions, prevailing external strategic security environment, emerging technologies and availability of funds. The modernisation programme of the Indian Navy is being pursued in accordance with the long term Maritime Capability Perspective Plan which is consonance with the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan and the 12th Defence plan.

Acquisition of ships and submarines because of their complexity and size, have long development periods (5 to 12 years) and hence requires long term commitment of funds. Accordingly, there is need to

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Q. How does the future of the Indian Navy seem, ten years hence?

A. There is a growing acceptance of the fact that the maritime domain will be the prime facilitator of India’s economic growth. The role and responsibility of the IN is therefore likely to grow with the requirement to safeguard our expanding economic interests while being a mature and responsible regional maritime power.

Our focus, therefore in the medium and long term would remain on induction of platforms to achieve a balanced ‘force mix’ for undertaking roles, missions and objectives in our primary and secondary areas of interest. Significant attention is already being paid to augment and build technical and support infrastructure for maintenance of new induction platforms and undertake repairs of state-of-the-art equipment being inducted in the service.

The IN is developing a capable and balanced force that should counter emerging maritime challenges across the entire operational spectrum, from low intensity operations to armed conflict with nuclear overtones. Countering these challenges require navies to work in close cooperation with each other. This has often been done in cooperation with other regional as well as extra-regional navies.

Indian Navy, in consonance with India’s policy of providing capacity-building and capability-enhancement for littorals of Indian Ocean Region (IOR), has been very active in this regard as well.