All against Barça

All against Barça. A history of conflicts between FCB, the State and its institutions.

Written by Víctor Garrido Teomiro

Introduction: The disagreements between Futbol Club Barcelona (FCB), the Professional Football League (LFP) and the Royal Spanish Football Federation (RFEF) at the end of December 2024 and the first days of January 2025, regarding the interpretation of the Financial Fairplay regulations and the registration of players Pau Víctor and Dani Olmo, are the latest chapter in a history of direct confrontations between the Blaugrana entity and state bodies and institutions, or even against the state itself. The aim of this article is to analyze some of the most significant episodes that throughout history have pitted FCB against institutions that represent the state, or national organizations related to the world of football.

Closure of FCB activity due to the whistle blowing during the anthem, 1925

On June 14, 1925, a match in tribute to the Orfeó Català was played between FCB and Júpiter, winners of the Spanish Championship and Group B respectively. In a political context marked by the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera, who had declared a state of war just a month earlier.

The event had previously been denied by the authorities, 1and the FCB had also not included in the program delivered to the civil governor the tribute that was given in honor of the choral society. These two facts would later be used as an aggravating factor in the report that would be drawn up on the festive day. The main incident is well known, the booing of the Spanish anthem that was performed by an English band, from a ship that at that time was moored in the port of Barcelona. The fact that the previous interpretation of the English anthem was widely respected by the attendees, in contrast to the loud booing that was uttered during the Spanish Royal March, scandalized the authorities present there, who, fueled by the complaints of some attendees on the field, filed a case against the club.

The public's reaction cannot be understood without contextualizing the political and social situation of the country. Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, which initially had the support of the Catalan bourgeoisie, quickly promoted a unitary policy that did not contemplate any type of regionalism or nationalism beyond Spanish.

Persecution against Catalan national identity became a common occurrence, and the use of Catalan in official acts, the use of the Senyera, or censoring educational content that could be considered "separatist" was prohibited. The political persecution against Catalonia has its maximum exponent in the dissolution of the Mancomunitat, and the creation of Unión Patriótica (UP) as the sole party of the regime reinforces the idea of ending any political institution of a Catalanist nature.2

1

Ramon BARNILS FOLGUERA : Critical History of Barcelona Football Club , 1st ed . Barcelona, Empúries, 1999, p. 59.

2 To learn more about Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, consult Alejandro QUIROGA: Miguel Primo de Rivera: Dictatura, populism and nation, Ed. Crítica, 2022.

The file instructed by Commander Justo Conde and Martin Corral, of the Barcelona Security Corps , collected a series of statements to police officers and spectators who attended the tribute. “Acts of disaffection to the Fatherland” or pointing out that within the club instead of referring to the Campeonato de España as such, it was called Campeonato Peninsular, are some of the observations that can be found in the investigation. Finally, the Civil Governor of the city of Barcelona, Joaquim Milans del Bosch, would decree the closure of the entity's operations for six months, from the issuance of said measure, on June 24. The sanction went beyond the sporting sphere, prohibiting the football team from playing any type of official match, meetings of the Board of Directors and the club's administrative activities were also prohibited. Within the package of sanctions was the disqualification of Joan Gamper as President of FCB, who could not hold any position within the club in the future. Forced into exile, he returned after a few weeks, but never held a position at the club again.

Cover of the file that closed the club's activity

Page where the closure of the entity's operations for six months is decreed

The measure proved quite unpopular among Catalan sports institutions, and through the Catalan Football Federation (FCF) they requested a suspension of the sanction against FCB. The request was denied by the Civil Governor, who stated that he could not lift the sanction because “on this matter there has always been a lack of a phrase or a concept that would moderately destroy an affirmation of love for the Fatherland, the concept of disaffection towards it in which the aforementioned Futbol Club Barcelona is found”. Not only did Catalan football clubs take a position in favor of FCB, we also find the Barcelona Journalists' Union, and recently we found a telegram from Celta de Vigo requesting the lifting of the sanction by FCB. Thanks to the solidarity shown by the various teams and entities in the world of sports, the ban on carrying out any administrative activity within the club was eased, and a few meetings were held to manage the club's expenses and collection obligations. The sentence did not mean the disappearance of the entity thanks to the effort made by its members and players, who, as Xavier G. Luque points out, continued to pay membership fees and some contributed money on a non-refundable basis. The players remained loyal to the club, only playing friendly matches with other clubs during the period in which the sanction was in force.3

3

Xavier G. LUQUE: "When players and partners saved Barça after six months without football due to a political decision", La Vanguardia, March 27, 2020, retrieved from the internet, https://www.lavanguardia.com/deportes/fc-barcelona/20200327/48109956708/barcelona-jugadoreshistoria-crisis-economica-les-corts.html

The Di Stefano case, 1953

The first major clash between FCB and Real Madrid (RM) was not played on the pitch, nor on Spanish soil. The dispute between the two clubs over the signing of Alfredo Di Stéfano in the summer of 1953 would mark the beginning of a historic rivalry, and the capacity of Francoist institutions to influence sporting matters. As we have said, we are in the midst of the Franco dictatorship, 4 years before the entry of the Opus Dei technocrats into government.

FCB had set out to sign one of the best players on the American continent, to form a tandem with Kubala and consolidate a team that was already dominant, both in the domestic championship and in Europe. The contractual situation of the Argentine star was quite complex. He would make his professional debut with River Plate, but a players' strike would force his departure to Colombian football.

The situation of football in Colombia was not the best either, since a split was taking place between DIMAYOR, the Colombian professional league, and the Colombian Federation . The situation was resolved thanks to the mediation of FIFA, through what is known as the Lima Pact, which recognized Colombian clubs as owners of the South American players that they had acquired from all over the continent during those years until October 1954, from then on they would return to being owned by their clubs of origin. In the case of Di Stefano, he was owned by Millonarios de Bogotá until October 1954, after which he would return to the ownership of River Plate.

The chronology of events, focusing on all the variables, problems and resources that were carried out by FCB to try to sign Di Stéfano are included in the book by Jordi Finestres and Xavier G. Luque on the case, 4while an article in the newspaper As published on the day of La Saeta Rubia 's death gives us a view of the events from the RM's side. 5The fact is that FCB went to negotiate the

4

Jordi FINESTRES, Xavier G. LUQUE: The Di Stefano case, the whole truth about the case that changed our history, Edicions 62, 2006.

5 Without author, "Así fue el fichaje de Stéfano", As, July 7, 2014, consulted on the web, https://as.com/futbol/2014/07/07/primera/1404744601_618211.html

signing with River Plate, while RM began negotiations with Millonarios. The negotiations with the Argentine club were fruitful and an agreement was reached, but once it had to negotiate with the Colombian club to acquire his rights, it refused to pay the high amount, 40,000 dollars. 6FCB encountered several difficulties during the process, such as the suspicion of a possible investigation into the process of exchanging currencies to complete the payment, or the decision of the National Sports Delegation (DND) to divide the player's rights between FCB and RM, which meant that Di Stefano would play the 1953-54 and 56-57 seasons with RM, and the 1954-55 57-58 seasons with FCB.

Over the last decade, additional documentation has been compiled on the case, such as that exposed by the newspaper El País regarding the payment of the full two million Argentine pesos by FCB. 7The documents found by Finestres and Luque, with the collaboration of Sid Lowe, which show that the General Secretariat of Falange is in a hurry to prohibit the signing of foreign players during the period in which negotiations are being held for Di Stéfano, or a letter from the President of the FEF, Sancho Dávila, in which he assures that the RM contract with Millonarios is “wet paper” have helped to shed light on the matter.8 The reasons for not signing the Argentine player of the moment for FCB still leave many doubts, but we can establish that poor negotiation and management of the matter by the President of FCB, Enric Martí Carreto, the complexity of Di Stéfano's contractual situation, and the impediments and difficulties that Falange and the DND developed throughout the process are the main bases on which this entire chapter is based.

6

Jordi FINESTRES, Xavier G. LUQUE: The Di Stefano Case, p. 51 Andrés BURGO: "This is how Madrid took Di Stéfano to Barcelona", El País, August 7, 2017, consulted on the web, https://elpais.com/deportes/2017/08/06/actualidad/1502042406_757005.html 8 Xavier G. LUQUE: "The papers of the Di Stéfano case", La Vanguardia, February 25, 2013, p.42 7

La Vanguardia page where a copy of the DND and FEF documentation regarding the Di Stéfano case appears

The case of the “oriundos”, 1972-1973

Popularly known as “the case of the Paraguayans” or “the oriundos”, this has a certain relationship with the Di Stéfano affair. We have seen that during the attempt to sign the Argentine player, the Franco regime declared a ban on signing any foreign player to teams within the Spanish state. This measure was applied intermittently during the years of the dictatorship, but after the poor image of the Spanish team in the 1962 World Cup, in which it had had 4 international players with other national teams, it decided to apply a measure that a decade later was still in force.

The change from a system that allowed clubs to incorporate foreign players without limitations to not being able to have any gave rise to a scheme that spread to different countries in South America, which consisted of documenting, either officially or fictitiously, Spanish ancestors to players from the American continent, known as natives. This procedure was used because Spanish law recognized the nationality of people born in other countries, but whose father or even grandfather was Spanish. The chronology of the events is detailed by Carles Santacana in the book El Barça i el Francoisme, where he assures that it was a common practice to falsify an alleged ancestry with Spanish nationality, alleging that the municipal or parish archive had been destroyed during the civil war.

9A

considerable number of players from all over South America played for different Spanish League teams through this procedure between the 1960s and early 1970s. The players and clubs were aware of this practice, acting under a nonaggression pact between them, that is, no one denounced any signing of this type. On the other hand, the FEF and the DND accepted the registrations of the players in the League without any problem, even if the origin of the documentation was dubious.

A change of script occurred in the summer of 1969, when FCB signed the Paraguayan player Irala, but the FEF verified that the player had already been international with another team, violating registration regulations.

9

Carles SANTACANA: Barça and Francoism, chronicle of decisive years, Apóstrofe, 2006, p. 139.

News from El Mundo Deportivo reporting on the Irala affair and the registration of the oriundos.

FCB protested the decision, claiming that other players were also found to be irregular, but only the Paraguayan's signing for Barça was denied. The events were repeated in the summer of 1972, when the FEF did not admit the documentation presented for the signings of Heredia and Echecopa to FCB and Granada, respectively. 10The then President of FCB, Agustí Montal, was outraged because it was the second time that the FEF had prevented the signing of a player to Barça, when the rest of the clubs also used the same procedure and were never denied registration. Montal commissioned the lawyer Miquel Roca i Junyent to conduct an exhaustive investigation into the process of falsifying documents. His testimony, included in the TV3 documentary "El Fitxatge", narrates point by point the irregularities that occurred. For example, the loss of nationality when performing military service was one of the pieces of evidence

10

Without author: "Echecopar and Heredia unleashed the issue of natives", El País, July 1, 1976, retrieved from the internet, https://elpais.com/diario/1976/07/01/ultima/205020002_850215.html

collected by the lawyer. Roca came to the conclusion that it was the FEF that was voluntarily omitting certain parts of the documentation, which certified the loss of Spanish nationality. In Paraguay he discovered that the documentation was directly falsified through a network set up to carry out said process.

Miquel Roca's report presented irrefutable evidence of the invalidity of the documents, and the active participation of the FEF in that process. Montal used the report presented by the lawyer as a tool to pressure the institutions that governed state football, with the desire to end the ban on signing foreign players, and at the same time stand up to the institutions of the regime. Finally the FEF agreed to open the borders, and the signing of foreign players was allowed. That same summer of 1973, FCB would acquire the services of the Dutchman Johan Cruyff.

Press clipping from June 8, 1973, reporting the lifting of the ban on foreigners

The war for television rights, 1979-1989

With the death of Franco and the beginning of the Transition, elections for the presidency of the club were held in May 1978, the first democratic ones since the Civil War. The victory of businessman Josep Lluís Núñez brought about a change in the structure of the club, but he maintained the defense of the club's interests before the Spanish institutions. One of the first confrontations upon reaching the presidency was with Radio Televisión Española (RTVE) over the rights to broadcast football.

Historically, bilateral contracts had been worked between clubs and television.

Each club negotiated conditions, matches per season and income that it would receive, and in the event that a match was broadcast where a team without a contract was playing, there was a basic income established. This situation generated a considerable disparity between clubs, which had to settle for what TVE offered, who was also the one who decided which match would be broadcast live, causing some teams to appear 4 or 5 times per season, and others two or three. For the 1979-80 season, RTVE had reached an agreement with 4 Primera clubs, but the President of the FEF, Pablo Porta, agreed with the rest of the Presidents of the Primera clubs that there would be no televised football that season. The proposal, launched by Porta but initially elaborated by Núñez, was disguised as a measure to economically protect the clubs due to the reduction in spectators in the stadiums, which was not compensated by the economic remuneration they received for broadcasting the matches live. The background, however, was to stand against an authoritarian and unjust system, where the other party enjoyed a negotiating power that allowed them to reach the agreement they wanted, without much room for maneuver for the clubs and the Federation .

RTVE did not give in, and the season began without broadcasting the traditional weekend match. The 4 contracts already signed were respected, and the public television had to wait for them to play each other before being able to broadcast the matches live.

This dynamic continued until the eleventh day of the League, when the Spanish government intervened directly in the dispute between the clubs and TVE, and through the Minister of Culture, Manuel Clavero Arévalo, was obliged by decree to broadcast the match. The ministry argued that this match was considered an event that aroused general interest, essential to benefit from the Decree of 4 June 1959, and to be able to decide unilaterally that that particular match should be televised . When the 1959 decree was ratified, sport fell within the political law of the regime, but in 1979 the clubs and federations were recognised as independent legal entities, separate from the administrative system. The decree established that the federations and entities were integrated into the DND of FET y JONS, which had been dissolved more than two years earlier.11 The 1980-81 season, due to RTVE's intransigence, was developed without live football, nor the Gran Estadio summary program of the day. At the beginning of January, an agreement was reached for the delayed program, which represented the first global contract between clubs and the RFEF with RTVE. 12Núñez had been the main person responsible for demanding higher financial remuneration from RTVE in the meetings at the RFEF, and he would become the main reference in all negotiations with public television once he became the Economic Vice-Presidency of the RFEF in 1981. The first global contract between clubs and television in Spain for sports rights was reached on 3 September 1981, just before the start of the 1981-82 season. The figures in the contract were as follows: a total of 16 matches would be broadcast on Saturday afternoon, divided into two categories. Category A, considered the most interesting matches, would be paid 15 million each, while category B would be paid 9 million. As for the summaries of the matches, the Deportivo program could broadcast up to an hour and a half of the best plays of the matches at a rate of 9 million per program. In total, 306 million pesetas would be received for the rights to the summary program, distributed 60% between the First Division clubs, 15% both second A and second B, and the remaining 10% to the Third Division clubs. 13In total, almost 500 million pesetas.

11

Domingo GARCÍA: "Unconstitutional, but it would solve the problem between Television and clubs", La Vanguardia, November 17, 1979, p.37 12 E. P: "Acuerdo para este año, a 4 milliones por programa", La Vanguardia, January 16, 1981, p.32 13 Ibid.

Interview by El Noticiero Universal with Alfonso Lapeña, from RTVE, in 1982. In the image, a caricature of Núñez preventing cameras from entering the stadiums.

The emergence of regional television channels confirmed the abuse of power that RTVE, which had previously enjoyed a monopoly, was exercising. Its president, José María Calviño, was the main defender of the “illegality” of Televisió de Catalunya (TVC) and ETB, the Basque television. On 19 October 1983, the first contract was signed between the Catalan entity and TVC, in which an agreement was reached for the following 4 years. Thanks to the Third Channel law, the legal framework was established that recognised the existence of regional channels such as TVC, but RTVE continued to deny the existence of “La Nostra”, and denied the network of national and foreign links to the channel. 14Núñez assured that " You have to be blind not to understand that Barça, for what it is and for what it represents, must align seamlessly with Televisión de Catalunya [...] For historical, cultural and rooted reasons, Barcelona must be with TV-3"15 The 1984-85 season marked a turning point in RTVE's negotiating power, as the regional clubs reached agreements with the Professional Football League (LFP) for the rights to broadcast live football. That season, RTVE did not accept the clubs' financial proposal, which was asking for 1 billion pesetas, double the previous season.16 In September 1987, there was a change in the way in which television contracts had been negotiated between clubs and television stations until then. For the first time, a joint agreement was reached between TVE and the regional channels, with the right to broadcast 32 matches per season, 16 on the state channel and 16 on the regional channels. 17The other new aspect of this agreement was the duration of the contract, signed for two seasons, with a total amount of 2,800 million pesetas in total, 1,400 per season. The 89-90 season saw the disappearance of Televisión Española from the contract for the live broadcast of League matches, which was sole owner of the regional channels, gathered in the Federación de Organismos de Radio y Televisión Autonómicos (FORTA).

14

Without author: "Autonomous television and the identity of Catalonia", El Mundo Deportivo, March 23, 1984, p.41 15 15 Tomás GUASCH: "La trasmission por TV, una novela por entregas", El Mundo Deportivo, March 22, 1984, p. 9 16 Jesús ALCAIDE: "There was no agreement in the TVE-professional soccer meeting", EL Mundo Deportivo, August 22, 1984, p.36 17 Jesús ALCAIDE: “ There will be live football!, El Mundo Deportivo, September 11, 1987, p.16

The impact of the FCB president meant ending unequal contracts between clubs, negotiating global contracts that distributed income more equitably and negotiating better economic conditions. It was also a blow against RM, which he accused of receiving preferential treatment from state public television, represented in the broadcast of the basketball section's Christmas tournament.

As for TV3, the alignment from the beginning with the network and the defense of its right to exist and report, was key to consolidating it in Catalan society.

Conclusions

The presentation of these four cases serves to consolidate the idea that not only during the Franco dictatorship did situations of arbitrariness and abuse of power by state institutions occur, which harmed the interests of FCB. Conflict situations between Barça and the institutions that manage state football or organizations such as RTVE, which depends directly on the government, have occurred during authoritarian regimes, periods of transition or in consolidated democracy. The success of FCB in defending its interests against situations of abuse of power or arbitrariness has been closely linked to the ability of the directors to demonstrate the facts with coherent facts and evidence. Without an exhaustive report on the case of the natives, or the comparison between the treatment of the Spanish public channel with the rest of the European channels in the domestic leagues, it would have been completely impossible to reverse the situations. The probability of success has increased when FCB has managed to convince the other clubs of the legitimacy of their fight. We can conclude by pointing out that the margin of error has always been very low for FCB, and that these have been taken advantage of by their adversaries when it comes to defending their own interests.