Comprehensive response to security challenges in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine Taking into account the gender approach: lessons for the future 1
Author: The Women's Information Consultative Center. Anastasiya Nenka, Director. Olena Suslova, Founder wicc.net.ua Project coordinator: ©Nacionalinė nevyriausybinių vystomojo bendradarbiavimo organizacijų platforma / Lithuanian NGDO Platform Contact: Olena Suslova, suslovaolena@gmail.com Cover photo: Tetiana Shyshkina / Unsplash.com This publication is part of the project Eurodad network capacity building funded by EC. The publication and its contents are the sole responsibility of Lithuanian NGDO Platform and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
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The country is as strong as each man, woman, boy, and girl living there. Today we are advocates of freedom. Today the whole world witnesses this and admires the heroism of Ukrainians. If everyone in the world would use their freedom to support and join our fight, we would all win peace.
Slava Ukraini! Even though Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not unexpected, and work on increasing Ukraine’s resilience has been ongoing since 2014, all those things that had been planned but not accomplished, worsened the situation for many people. The lessons that Ukraine has learned and is still learning are important not only for Ukraine, but also for all those who understand the urgent need to respond comprehensively to security challenges in the context of a destroyed global and regional security system. The study titled Conversations With Women About Security1, conducted by the WICC (The Women’s Information Consultative Center) in 2020, identified one of the most important human needs, which is the need for emotional security. Yet, although it is important for overall human security, this need is not included in the classification proposed by the UNDP2. Ukraine has extensive experience in analysing the impact on emotional security, both from the elements of the hybrid war and from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that occurred in 2014. It was then that the need to develop and implement a comprehensive approach to security issues was acutely recognised. Such preparation began in 2018 during the implementation of the first National Action Plan (NAP) 1325 (2016-2020) and was included in the second NAP 1325 (2020-2025). The plan’s strategic goal number 2, titled “Development of a gender-sensitive system for identifying security challenges, preventing and responding to them” NAP 1325 (2020-2025) from the Resilience to Security Challenges section identified tools for a comprehensive response to security challenges in the face of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, taking into account the gender approach. Achieving this goal is envisaged through the development of an effective mechanism of interaction between the government, nongovernmental actors and citizens, as well as ensuring the ability of the population of Ukraine to identify security challenges, to try to prevent them and to respond to them accordingly if and when they occur. Preparations for a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 were accompanied by a significant accumulation of weapons, equipment, fuel, manpower and more. This has had a negative impact on people’s emotional security, especially for women, who traditionally have the predominant responsibility for children, the elderly and people with disabilities. Therefore, the WICC decided to conduct their monitoring of the situation. 1 2
http://wicc.net.ua/post/rozmovy-zhinok-pro-bezpeku https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf
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The purpose of such monitoring is to learn about the presence in the communities of at least minimal components of a comprehensive response to security challenges in the context of Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine, taking into account the gender approach. The monitoring was carried out by the WICC with the participation of МОЖУ (ICAN) (Peacebuilding Association of Women of Ukraine) without any external or internal donor funding. During this process, a gender-sensitive checklist of security issues was developed3. In addition to general questions about the establishment of crisis headquarters, algorithms of action, etc., the checklist also included questions that reflected possible threats of military action, problems in the use of modern communications and other aspects that are not reflected in the so-called traditional security schemes: Is it possible to urgently notify residents using communication means other than the smartphone (such as loudspeakers, landlines, etc.)? Are relevant communication channels identified that take into account different target groups (different ages, disabilities, family responsibilities, etc.) and different levels of crisis (emergency) situations (both peacetime and wartime)? Are there any handouts for residents on how to respond to different crises and how are they disseminated among various target groups? How are NGOs involved in the process of informing residents about the crisis response? Where can a list of these organisations be found? How to contact NGOs for available resources? What is the algorithm of action in crisis (emergency) situations in the absence of protective structures of civil defence (i. e. shelters) in the village? Is relevant information available on the algorithms of action for people who find themselves in places from which it is difficult to evacuate them? Who organises civilian car-owners to be used for community needs in a crisis (emergency) situation? What to do if there is a blackout of mobile phone communications? Have parents with children that attend kindergartens / schools / out-of-school educational institutions been informed on how to act and where to pick up their children when an air alarm sounds or there is a need for emergency evacuation during parents’ working hours? There are 1,469 territorial communities in Ukraine. As of February 23 of the current year, 31 communities were in the temporarily occupied territories. In the period 14-23 of February, 951 requests to reply to the questions laid out above were sent to local communities. As of 24 February, such requests were no longer being sent out. All in all, 338 responses were received. 3
http://wicc.net.ua/post/kontrol-nyy-spysok-pytan-do-derzhavy-pro-bezpeku
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The monitoring results contain conclusions based on general trends from the responses received. The conclusions based on the answers were supplemented by the “monitoring of life experience” accumulated after February 24, which showed both what worked and what was planned but not implemented, as well as revealed new problems that had not been covered at all. The history of civil defence in Ukraine dates back to the First World War; it was in place during the Soviet era and then again after the country’s independence in 1991. During extended peaceful periods or in the absence of war, there is a less apparent need and thus less motivation to develop defence systems. Unfortunately, even Russia’s aggression in 2014 in the Crimea and some districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions did not result in the rebuilding of modern protection systems. Therefore, the main part of the answers to the questionnaire also reflects a formal approach to ensuring an integrated approach to human security and that of the community. The replies to the questionnaires included such formulations as “it will be resolved as needed”, “it has been implemented”, “you need to look on the site”, yet they were provided with no evidence and not even hyperlinks to reliable websites where such claims could be verified; therefore, they do not give adequate grounds to monitor the real situation on the ground, and people living in these communities do not have the opportunity to use security facilities – if they exist – nor any other available measures. The data that was collected during this review reflects both general approaches that have different impacts on women and men, boys and girls, and individual aspects of an integrated approach to security. They also address accessibility for different categories of people. The alert systems mentioned in the responses leave out many categories of people. Created after a large-scale invasion, mobile messaging systems are much more efficient and widely covered and more inclusive, but they are designed to reach the full range of modern gadgets and a high level of digital literacy. The IT literacy rate has increased significantly as a result of the Covid pandemic, but it is still insufficient to fully reach the public through such channels. The part of women among those who lack digital literacy and do not have modern gadgets remains higher than men – in particular, among the elderly. Communities should pay close attention to fully cover the population through digital communication channels. Security plans and algorithms of action must take into account the fact that traditional gender roles place an incomparably greater burden on women, in particular during evacuation. At the same time, both in 2014 and in 2022 during an evacuation there were repeated cases (in particular, in the village of Schastya in the Luhansk region) of preference to be evacuated being given to women with children and denied to single fathers with children. Official documents that govern evacuation processes must indicate the priority of evacuation for persons with family responsibilities, be they men or women. Informing and educating different categories of the population on the principles of action in emergencies needs to be radically revised as a whole. Particular emphasis should be placed on informing and educating those referred to in the law as unemployed. This includes both those involved in care work and those who work freelance and other “outside the office” schemes, which usually does not relieve people of care work. Women make up the majority 5
in this category. Both the content of informational and educational texts and the channels of communication need to be reviewed. Training should include not only theoretical lessons but also practice of skills that may be useful in emergencies, with a special focus on people who may not have enough experience with it or none at all. It is important to keep in mind that as far as a comprehensive approach to security is concerned, we are talking primarily about the analysis of existing problems and people’s needs; it is also important to take into account their place of residence. Risks may be nature-based (such as an increased risk of fires, floods, avalanches, etc.); or due to geographical position, such as being located near chemical production facilities, military depots, or borders. A community’s location and the compilation of a comprehensive list of possible threats allows the community to prepare appropriate security algorithms and bring them to the attention of the whole population. Another negative factor of the current information policy in terms of ensuring a comprehensive approach to security is the appeal by politicians or instructional material transmitted to the population in the form of “do not panic and believe in us”. Neither of these formulations has a constructive effect on the audience. Firstly, the imperative form that begins with negation has precisely the opposite meaning to that embedded in the message. The call to simply and blindly “believe”, instead of explaining specific steps that need to be taken in case of an emergency, calls for passivity which in turn leads to panic. Therefore, such appeals have a negative impact on emotional security in general. Reports of inspections of protective structures of civil defence (shelters) should be revised to include provisions on access and use by different categories of the population, in particular the less mobile persons. Provisions concerning the use of shelters by people with family responsibilities should also be added. Many shelters have the so-called dual use. In the absence of emergencies (crises), they house a variety of facilities, among them sports, entertainment, and others. As practice has shown in 2022, the policy of dual-use premises should be revised; dual-use should be such that, if necessary, the use of premises in peacetime could be quickly transformed into conditions necessary in emergencies. Particular attention should be paid to the organisation of shelters in rural areas. In the vast majority of communities, proper shelters are completely absent. Hiding in unsuitable places such as basements or garages can only increase the risk of blockages in the event of bombing and create an illusory sense of security. The actions of people with family responsibilities in the case of an emergency have a wide range of gender issues that are still far from being addressed. Full implementation of item 6, titled “Development conditions for employees that facilitate the combination of functions and responsibilities in professional and private life, in particular in the security and defence sector” of the NAP 1325 (2020-2025) is needed. This provision should also take into account emergencies.
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As a result of it not being taken into account, after Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, women were left with a very limited range of solutions; they were forced to either terminate their work contracts in order to be able to look after their children, or try to arrange some other form of child care which in many cases proved to be almost impossible, given the circumstances. At the same time, the documents adopted in the development of martial law were gender-blind, and only as a result of appeals from NGOs and individual media outlets were changes and additions made, which only balanced the situation out to a very limited extent.
AFTERWORD The monitoring conducted by the WICC and the МОЖУ (ICAN) network before the invasion of Ukraine covered only some of the issues raised by Ukrainian society, both in general and through the gender approach. The operational revision of the NAP 1325 (2020-2025) with changes and additions that reflect the current needs and, to some extent, the strategic interests of its target audiences, is an urgent need and an important stimulus for public authorities, civil society, and everyone in Ukraine today. There is already a political decision to update the plan, and NGOs are working to identify all the related issues and priorities. We continue our work to increase the resilience of the country’s population.
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