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Fall 2026 Journal

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Virginia Journal of International Affairs Fall 2026


This edition of the Virginia Journal of International Affairs was funded in partnership with the Honor Committee at the University of Virginia. The Honor Committee aims to create a Community of Trust where honesty and mutual respect support all interactions and academic endeavors. We thank Honor for their generous support in the printing of this Journal.


Contents Staff

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Information

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From the Editor

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Drone Proliferation and the Non-State Actor Problem: Can International Humanitarian Law and Deterrence Theory Survive the Rise of the Quasi-State Militant?

Brianna Gutierrez

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United Kingdom and the European Union: The Consequences of Brexit

Samuel Ittelson

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Replicating USAID in Cambodia: China’s Sectoral Gains and Gaps

Riley Sucato

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Do State Capacity and Farmer Support Matter to Democratic Nation-Building? A Hypothesis Test in the Case of Japan

Ruichong (Richard) Xu

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Staff

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Editor-in-Chief

Anna Douglas Piper

Co-Managing Editor

Charlotte Sparling

Co-Managing Editor

Priya Buddhavarapu

Production Chair

Saira Uttamchandani

Media Manager

Luke Crafton

Events Chair

Junno Farah

Staff Editors

Sophia Abrahams

Anthony Chandler

James Derrick

Anjali Finch

Andrew Gardner

Ella Gilmore

Aimen Leja

Ingrid Schaefer

Wilson Pace

Philip White


Information About the Virginia Journal The Virginia Journal of International Affairs is the University of Virginia’s preeminent publication for undergraduate research in international relations. The Virginia Journal is developed and distributed by the student-run International Relations Organization of the University of Virginia. The Virginia Journal is one of the only undergraduate research journals for international relations in the country, and aims both to showcase the impressive research conducted by the students at the University of Virginia and to spark productive conversation within the University community. The Virginia Journal seeks to foster interest in international issues and promote high quality undergraduate research in foreign affairs. The Journal is available online at vajournalia.org Submissions Interested in submitting to the Virginia Journal? The Journal seeks research papers on current topics in international affairs that are about ten pages in length. Only undergraduates or recent graduates are eligible to submit. The submission form opens every semester. Contact Please direct all comments to vajournal.editor-in-chief@iroatuva.org.

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From the Editor Dear Reader, As we near the end of the fall of 2026, calls of today’s world as one of unprecedented crises ring on. Much of what we are seeing is certainly unexpected. Wars continue in Ukraine, Iran, Gaza, and Sudan, among others. The United States is withdrawing from much of the global system, and Europe is rushing to fill the gap in many areas of defense and alliance commitments. Drone warfare is changing how conflicts are understood, artificial intelligence continues to evolve at an increasing rate, populist ideologies grow worldwide, and humanitarian crises persist. However, be it naïveté or optimism, I find despair impractical. Some experts see the beginning of a new world order; others see the same system, reshaped by technology, warfare, and ideology. Whatever the case, engaging with international relations matters as much as ever. And for readers who find themselves feeling adrift in this change, I encourage turning towards what we can do. Fortunately, UVA is rich in intellectual rigor, and the pieces featured here help us grapple with this change. The papers included in the Fall 2026 Edition of the Journal include retrospective topics on democratic nation-building in postwar Japan and the consequences of Brexit in an attempt to evaluate how historical changes impact our current outlook. We then turn to more recent developments, examining both how USAID’s 2025 withdrawal from Cambodia fueled Chinese investment in the area and how the rise of drone warfare complicates previous understandings of international humanitarian law and deterrence theory. Our goal is to show how historical developments can illuminate modern changes in development, technology, and multilateral alliances. I hope our readers are able to engage with these topics beyond these pages, since many of their models help us make sense of a changing international system. 6


We sincerely thank everyone who submitted their work to this edition. The engagement we saw this semester inspires and encourages me for the future of problem-solving in IR. The creation of this edition of the Journal would not have been possible without our production team, including the incredible Fall 2026 Virginia Journal Executive Board and our hard working staff editors. I also sincerely thank each of our authors for the trust they gave our staff and the time they spent collaborating with us to strengthen their papers. Furthermore, the Virginia Journal extends our gratitude to the International Relations Organization at UVA for providing their continued support to the Journal, as well as UVA’s Honor Committee for funding production this fall. Lastly, thank you to our readers for taking the time to read the pieces presented in this Journal. Whatever we call the events of this moment, they are vast and can feel overwhelming. I hope each of you learns from our authors and feels a little steadier in this changing world. Most importantly, thank you for supporting undergraduate research, which reminds us that a response to uncertainty is not despair but asking better questions. With that, I am honored to present the Fall 2026 Edition of the Virginia Journal of International Affairs. Sincerely,

Anna Douglas Piper Editor-in-Chief of the Virginia Journal of International Affairs, Fall ’26

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Drone Proliferation and the Non-State Actor Problem: Can International Humanitarian Law and Deterrence Theory Survive the Rise of the Quasi-State Militant? By: Brianna Gutierrez

About the Author: Brianna Gutierrez is a fourth-year student from Manassas, Virginia, studying Foreign Affairs with a minor in Computer Science at the University of Virginia. Her policy interests focus on the intersection of emerging technology, international security, and law, particularly AI innovation and regulation, international humanitarian law, and the proliferation and use of drones by nonstate actors. She is especially interested in how existing legal and policy frameworks can adapt to rapidly advancing technologies and evolving security challenges.

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Abstract: International humanitarian law and deterrence theory, both built around a stable divide between states and non-state actors, struggle to make sense of organizations that fly precision-strike drones one year and staff a cabinet the next. This paper argues they largely cannot. It examines four comparative cases: Hezbollah, the Houthi movement, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Boko Haram, included as a contrast case in which sponsorship and territorial permanence were largely absent. Each case is analyzed through a four-part lens: baseline capability, technological evolution, organizational change, and legal or strategic strain. The erosion of the state/non-state divide in drone warfare and in governance is one phenomenon, not two; Boko Haram’s failure to erode either confirms this by contrast. The war in Ukraine has accelerated the global diffusion of drone doctrine to non-state actors far beyond that conflict. State sponsorship and territorial permanence, not hardware cost alone, best explain why some non-state actors acquire advanced drone capability while others do not. The paper closes with eight policy recommendations.

“State sponsorship and territorial permanence, not hardware cost alone, best explain why some non-state actors acquire advanced drone capability while others do not”

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Introduction For most of the drone age, from the early 2000s to roughly 2010, only a handful of governments could locate and strike a target from the air without risking a pilot. Both International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and deterrence theory assumed non-state armed groups would remain the weaker party in any exchange of fire, confined to ambushes and hit-and-run tactics. That assumption no longer holds. By the mid-2020s, several non-state actors fielded strike-capable unmanned aerial systems (UAS), assembled from components costing a few hundred dollars and requiring little more technical sophistication than a hobbyist drone kit.1 Cheap hardware alone does not guarantee this outcome; Boko Haram has used commercial drones longer than Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has existed as an organization; yet, they have never developed a comparable capability or governing role. This divergence is the paper’s central puzzle. Both frameworks were built around an implicit state/non-state asymmetry that affordable drone technology is eroding. The organizational and technological tracks examined below are related but not always synchronous. HTS shows the clearest divergence, since its drone program predates its capture of the Syrian state by years; Hezbollah and the Houthis show closer synchrony between the two tracks.

1 Kerry Chávez and Ori Swed, “The Proliferation of Drones to Violent Nonstate Actors,” Defence Studies 21, no. 1 (2021): 1–24.

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This paper’s four-case design is bounded rather than exhaustive. The Taliban’s August 2021 capture of US-supplied drones, followed within weeks by its assumption of Afghanistan’s government, resembles HTS’s trajectory outline on the surface.2 However, because both the capability and the governing role arrived at once, in a single event, there is no acquisition process to test against the paper’s explanatory variables and no way to determine whether one track shaped the other. It is excluded not because the hardware was captured rather than self-built, but because that origin collapses the very process the paper’s variables are designed to explain. Hamas in Gaza and Sahelian groups such as JNIM and ISWAP raise comparable questions and represent natural extensions of this framework. The analysis proceeds in six parts. Section Two establishes the technological baseline, the accelerating Ukraine effect, and the variables explaining capability acquisition. Section Three traces the organizational evolution of non-state actors from insurgency/ terrorism toward quasi-administration. Section Four presents the four case studies. Section Five examines where IHL and deterrence theory each strain and how the two strains connect. Section Six concludes with policy recommendations. Proliferation, the Ukraine Effect, and the Determinants of

2 Philip Caldwell, Taliban Captures Million-Dollar US Drones, August 18, 2021.

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Capability Drone proliferation to non-state actors followed two paths. First, military-grade proliferation involves a state sponsor transferring or licensing purpose-built strike drones to allied groups. Second, civilian-grade proliferation, which involves non-state actors buying, modifying, or 3D-printing commercially available drone components. While military-grade platforms remain largely inaccessible to most non-state actors, the civilian pathway has effectively erased the cost barrier that once separated state and non-state precision-strike capability.3 A modified commercial quadcopter can be built for a few hundred to a few thousand dollars, against tens of millions of dollars for a stateoperated drone program.4 The dissemination of tactics has proven as consequential as the diffusion of hardware. The Islamic State pioneered the modern non-state drone playbook, modifying commercial quadcopters to drop small munitions and later developing suicide drones and coordinated drone swarms.5 Its tactics were disseminated globally after its territorial defeat, adopted by HTS and by Boko Haram, 3 Kerry Chávez and Ori Swed, 1–24. 4 Jake Dulligan, Laura Freeman, Austin Phoenix, and Davis Bradley, “The Rising Threat of Non-State Actor Commercial Drone Use: Emerging Capabilities and Threats,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, March 28, 2025. 5 Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, “On the Horizon: The Ukraine War and the Evolving Threat of Drone Terrorism,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 18, no. 3 (2025).

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which began using drones for surveillance in 2018 following the same broad playbook.6 This 2018–2024 period has been described as a technological “plateau” for non-state drone use.7 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine disrupted that plateau. Ukraine is the first large-scale conflict in which both hostiles have deployed military and commercial drones at massive scale, ushering in a “second drone age” of global diffusion to state and non-state actors alike.8 Foreign drone powers have used the war as a live testing ground that further accelerates proliferation elsewhere, and the broader unmanned-systems ecosystem it has fed has already empowered both state and non-state actors well beyond Ukraine’s borders.9 Ukrainian drones now generate most frontline casualties in that conflict, with prominent use of fiber-optic-guided drones that resist jamming.10 Clear evidence includes Hezbollah’s 2025–2026 campaign against Israel, in which the group adopted fiber-optic-tethered FPV drones explicitly to defeat the Trophy active protection system on Israeli armor, the same anti-jamming 6 Anna Cara, “Islamic Extremists Are Now Using Drones in Nigeria, Leader Says,” Air Force Times, November 30, 2018; Don Rassler and Yannick VeilleuxLepage, “On the Horizon.” 7 Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, “On the Horizon.” 8 Dominika Kunertova, “The War in Ukraine Shows the Game-Changing Effect of Drones Depends on the Game,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 2 (2023): 95–102. 9 Federico Borsari and Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr., “An Urgent Matter of Drones,” CEPA, September 27, 2023. 10 Michael C. Horowitz, Erin D. Dumbacher, and Lauren Kahn, “How Ukraine’s Drone Innovation Reversed Russia’s Momentum,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 12, 2026.

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logic Ukrainian forces developed against Russian electronic warfare.11 Ukraine functions less as a direct patron of non-state actors than as an accelerant. Why Some Actors Succeed and Others Do Not The comparative evidence points to three variables to explain why some non-state actors build sophisticated complexes while others do not. The first and most consistent variable is state sponsorship. Hezbollah, the Houthis, and HTS each received support, material, or technical transfer from Iran at some stage, whether directly (Hezbollah), through shared supply networks (the Houthis), or through reverse-engineered captured Iranian-supplied equipment (HTS).12 A sponsor state can transfer engineering knowledge and guidance systems that exceed what commercial components alone allow, shortening years of trial and error. Boko Haram, by contrast, has relied almost entirely on commercial platforms smuggled through the Lake Chad basin.13 The second is territorial control paired with a manufacturing base. HTS in Idlib and the Houthis in Sanaa established semi-permanent production facilities.14 Boko Haram’s 11 Mohammad Mansour, “How Hezbollah’s Fibre Optic Drones Test Israel’s Sophisticated Radar System,” Al Jazeera. 12 The Times of Israel, “Hezbollah’s Iranian-Made Drones Emerge as a Fierce and Evasive Foe for Israel,” October 14, 2024. 13 Africa Defense Forum, “Nigerian Terrorists Increase COTS Armed Drone Use,” Africa Defense Forum, March 10, 2026. 14 Lamar Arkandi, “HTS Manufactures Drones in Local Factories in Northwest Syria,” North Press Agency, February 12, 2024.

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one attempt at sustained governance collapsed within months, detailed in Section Three, well short of the time the other two groups had to build infrastructure.15 The third is technical human capital, often flowing through veteran or foreign-fighter networks. HTS’s Shaheen Brigade drew on personnel with prior experience in more advanced groups’ drone programs.16 Where this pipeline is absent, groups tend to plateau at the modified-hobbyist-drone stage, exactly where Boko Haram’s program has remained. Availability of cheap hardware is necessary but not sufficient. The decisive factor is whether a group has a sponsor, a secure base, or a trained pipeline to convert hardware into an integrated strike capability. This bears directly on Section Six: restricting commercial drone sales is unlikely to be effective against the most capable actors, since they have alternative pathways, though such restrictions could matter more for actors resembling Boko Haram. The Organizational Evolution of Non-State Actors A parallel evolution has occurred alongside the technological one: the same actors acquiring drone capability 15 J. Tochukwu Omenma and Ifeanyichukwu M. Abada, “Boko Haram Insurgency: A Decade of Dynamic Evolution and Struggle for a Caliphate,” Security Journal, February 17, 2020, vol. 33, 376–400. 16 Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, “On the Horizon.”

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have also moved from insurgent/terrorism groups with no governing responsibility toward quasi-administrative or fully governing authorities. IHL’s classification framework assumes a rough correspondence between an actor’s territorial status and its organizational sophistication, an assumption these cases complicate, and one Boko Haram’s failed attempt at the same trajectory helps isolate. Hezbollah illustrates “shadow governance” most clearly. Since 1992 it has held cabinet seats in every Lebanese government formed since 2005 and currently holds 13 of 128 parliamentary seats, while operating outside formal state accountability.17 It runs a parallel-state apparatus including a financial institution, health and education networks, and religious courts.18 The May 2025 municipal elections confirmed this base remains intact despite battlefield setbacks.19 HTS represents the far end of this spectrum. Before December 2024, it administered Idlib through its “Syrian Salvation Government.”20 Following Assad’s collapse, in December 2024, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa was declared transitional president 17 Thomas Clayton and Jim Zanotti, “Lebanese Hezbollah,” Library of Congress, December 4, 2024. 18 “Hezbollah Maintains Influence through Social Services the State Cannot Provide,” The Arab Weekly, August 12, 2025. 19 “Hezbollah Maintains Influence through Social Services the State Cannot Provide.” 20 Philip Loft, “Syria One Year after Assad: Forming an Interim Government (CBP-10430),” House of Commons Library, September 2, 2026.

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within weeks, and a 23-member cabinet was sworn in by March 2025.21 The Houthi movement portrays a middle position. Since seizing Sanaa in 2014, it has operated a parallel state across northern Yemen, including tax collection, courts, and security, without international recognition.22 Boko Haram attempted the same trajectory earliest and failed fastest, detailed in the case study below. This divergence, detailed further in the case studies below, creates a genuine comparative test for IHL, addressed in Section Five. Territorial boundaries in these regions remain contested and fluid; where territorial control is discussed here, it refers to areas of governance responsibility described in the cited sources, not a claim about international boundaries. Case Studies Each case follows the same four-part structure so the cases can be compared systematically. Hezbollah, the Houthis, and HTS succeed along both technological and organizational tracks. Boko Haram is a comparison case: a longer operational history than HTS but a shallower drone program and a failed rather than sustained 21 Ibid. 22 Cole Black, “The Houthi Model – Non-State Actors and Multi-Drone Capabilities,” Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University, December 30, 2025.

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attempt at governance. Hezbollah Baseline Capability. In the early 2020s, Hezbollah’s drone use was primarily Iranian supplied platforms for reconnaissance, with the group’s military identity still centered on rockets.23 Technological Evolution. By the 2025–2026 campaign against Israel, drones accounted for the majority of Hezbollah’s recorded attacks.24 The group adopted fiber-optic-tethered FPV drones explicitly to defeat Israel’s Trophy Active-Protection System; because these drones are wire-guided, jamming is ineffective,25 and the hardware is assembled largely from cheap components.26 Organizational Change. Hezbollah has established training pipelines and logistical infrastructure to sustain a larger drone force than five years earlier,27 while May 2025 elections confirmed continued dominance in its southern strongholds despite military losses.28 This sequencing runs roughly concurrently across both 23 The Times of Israel. 24 Alma Research and Education Center, “Hezbollah’s Ongoing Effort to Build up its Drone Force: Training Drone Operators and Establishing Logistical Infrastructure,” Alma Research and Education Center, 2026. 25 Mohammad Mansour, “How Hezbollah’s Fibre Optic Drones.” 26 David Daoud, “Israeli Forces Face Challenges as Hezbollah Ramps up Use of FPV Drones,” FDD’s Long War Journal, May 6, 2026. 27 Alma Research and Education Center, “Hezbollah’s Ongoing Effort.” 28 “Hezbollah Maintains Influence through Social Services the State Cannot Provide.”

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tracks, unlike HTS below. Legal and Strategic Strain. Hezbollah’s dual status as both a represented political actor and an independent military force complicates proportionality analysis and deterrent credibility, as discussed further in Section Five. The Houthi Movement Baseline Capability. The Houthi program began with shortrange weapons directed within Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia.29 Technological Evolution. Over roughly a decade this expanded into a globally consequential capability: a 2019 swarm attack on Saudi Aramco’s Shaybah facility demonstrated masseffect capability once exclusive to state air power, later extending to Red Sea shipping, US naval assets, and targets inside Israel.30 Organizational Change. The Houthis have built a parallel administrative structure across northern Yemen since 2014, including taxation, courts, and security,31 likely supporting dronemanufacturing capacity as territorial control did for HTS.32 Legal and Strategic Strain. The group has traded a 29 Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, “On the Horizon.” 30 “Six Houthi Drone Warfare Strategies: How Innovation Is Shifting the Regional Balance of Power | ACLED,” December 11, 2025. 31 Cole Black, “The Houthi Model.” 32 Suat Cubukcu and Evan Jordan, “The Houthi Drone Supply Chain,” Orion Policy Institute, July 26, 2025.

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comparatively primitive drone for the destruction of an expensive US Reaper, explicitly for propaganda value rather than net military gain, challenging the rational cost-benefit assumption of classical deterrence.33 A punitive threat calibrated to costs the group is assumed to avoid may miss its actual utility function. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Baseline Capability. HTS’s drone program, the Shaheen Brigade, began by modifying commercial drones to drop munitions, mirroring earlier Islamic State practice.34 Technological Evolution. The group established production facilities in Idlib using 3D printing,35 and its drones were reportedly used for targeted strikes against senior regime commanders.36 Some capability claims are self-reported by HTS commanders and should be treated as claims rather than verified figures.37 Organizational Change. The organization that built clandestine drone workshops in Idlib, detailed in Section Three, found itself administering the Syrian state within weeks of Assad’s 33 Leonardo Jacopo and Maria Mazzucco, “How the Houthis’ Strikes on US MQ-9 Reaper Drones Serve a Wider Regional Agenda,” Atlantic Council, February 26, 2025. 34 Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, “On the Horizon.” 35 Lamar Arkandi, “HTS Manufactures Drones.” 36 Rueben Dass, “Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham’s Drone Force,” Lawfare, December 13, 2024. 37 Harun al-Aswad, “What Are Shaheen Drones, the New Rebel Weapon in Syria’s Skies?” Middle East Eye, December 10, 2024.

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collapse. This infrastructure predates the organizational transition by years, making the technological track a precondition here rather than a parallel development. Legal and Strategic Strain. HTS’s drone program did not disappear with this transition. This is the sharpest strain of the four cases: a drone strike conducted by the Shaheen Brigade in November 2024 and a nominally identical strike by the same personnel in spring 2025 would likely be classified under different bodies of law, despite no change in the actor’s actual capability. Boko Haram (Comparison Case) Baseline Capability. Boko Haram’s engagement with drones began later and more modestly than the other three cases, used initially only for surveillance, a development Nigerian President Buhari announced in 2018.38 Technological Evolution. By 2019 the group reportedly operated drones more sophisticated than the Nigerian military’s at the time.39 Yet, its arsenal remains built from commercial platforms sourced through Lake Chad basin smuggling rather than a state supply chain.40 Sustained armed drone attacks against Nigerian bases only became common around 2023–2026, roughly five years 38 Anna Cara, “Islamic Extremists.” 39 Ibid. 40 Africa Defense Forum, “Nigerian Terrorists Increase COTS Armed Drone Use.”

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after first ISR-only use.41 Organizational Change. Boko Haram’s one attempt at territorial administration, seizing Gwoza in August 2014, collapsed within seven months.42 The group has not held comparable territory since, fragmenting into smaller factions conducting a more classical insurgency.43 Legal and Strategic Strain. Because Boko Haram never achieved a state sponsor or sustained territorial permanence, its drone program plateaued at the improvised level Section Two identifies as the default outcome absent those advantages. It poses none of HTS’s classification strain, since its territorial control never outlasted a single campaign season. Nigeria’s campaign against the group, degrading equipment and contesting supply routes, illustrates deterrence by denial operating much as classical theory predicts, in sharp contrast to the Houthi case. Where Governance Frameworks Strain: IHL, Deterrence, and Their Interconnection IHL’s Categories Strain IHL rests on a distinction between international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict, the latter triggered 41 Africa Defense Forum, “Nigeria Debuts Domestically Produced Attack Drone,” Africa Defense Forum, November 5, 2025. 42 Omenma and Abada, “Boko Haram Insurgency,” 376–400. 43 International Crisis Group, “Boko Haram on the Back Foot?” May 4, 2016.

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once violence crosses organization and intensity thresholds under Common Article 3.44 These thresholds assume non-state parties lack the reach and precision of state militaries. Three strains follow. First, the organizational-sophistication threshold is difficult to apply consistently: a group with a dedicated production facility, a specialized strike unit, and a training pipeline, as HTS possessed before December 2024, exceeds what the threshold contemplated, with no mechanism for recognizing this short of full statehood. Second, distinction and proportionality analysis is harder to apply when a non-state actor conducts precision strikes rather than merely receiving them. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has acknowledged current IHL does not fully address autonomous or remotely piloted systems.45 Third, an accountability gap persists: command-responsibility doctrine in principle applies to nonstate leaders, but state practice for pursuing drone-operating commanders remains thin, particularly once a group transitions into a recognized government, as HTS did.46 The HTS case collapses the state/non-state distinction on 44 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Ensuring the Use of Drones in Accordance with International Law,” September 22, 2014. 45 “Frequently Asked Questions: International Humanitarian Law and the Use of Drones in Armed Conflict | International Committee of the Red Cross,” December 10, 2025. 46 International Bar Association, “International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute Council Resolution on the Use of Drones for the Delivery of Lethal Weapons,” May 25, 2017.

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which IHL classification depends, sharpening all three strains simultaneously. Boko Haram demonstrates the opposite because its territorial control did not outlast a single campaign season, it never posed a comparable classification puzzle, evidence that sustained administrative permanence, not drone capability alone, generates this strain. An intermediate classification category, defined by governance function rather than technological capability, would better capture this gap. The existing rebel-governance scholarship already treats sustained taxation, courts, and security provision as measurable indicators of state-like function independent of a group’s military wing.47 International relations scholarship on contested sovereignty offers a complementary frame, placing armed actors on a spectrum of “relative statism,” with groups like the Houthis approaching full state capture at one end.48 Legal scholarship on armed groups’ civilian institutions makes a parallel point: IHL’s organization criterion looks almost exclusively at military capacity and has little vocabulary for a parallel judiciary or tax authority.49 47 Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly, Rebel Governance in Civil War, Cambridge University Press, 2015. 48 Murat Yeşiltaş, Tuncay Kardaş, and Tim Jacoby, “Rethinking Non-State Armed Actors and Sovereignty,” International Politics, December 21, 2022, s41311-022-00423–27. 49 Katharine Fortin and Ezequiel Heffes, eds, “Assessing the Civilian and Political Institutions of Armed Non-State Actors under International Law,” In Armed Groups and International Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2023; Katharine Fortin, “Exploring the Civilian and Political Institutions of Armed

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Deterrence Theory: Foundations and Strain Classical deterrence theory developed primarily to explain nuclear-era great-power behavior. Schelling (1966) distinguishes deterrence from compellence, and deterrence by punishment from deterrence by denial. It generally assumes a rational unitary actor with an identifiable “return address” and a cost-benefit calculus sensitive to credible threats. These assumptions travel poorly to non-state actors. Bowen (2004) argues classical deterrence does not transfer cleanly to actors lacking fixed, valuable territorial assets a punitive strike can threaten. Wilner (2014) traces persistent difficulty establishing credible commitment against insurgency and terrorism. Grieco and Hutto (2023) find remote aerial coercion generally weaker than traditional airpower, a finding this paper’s evidence suggests may run in reverse when non-state actors deploy drones against superior states.

“classical deterrence does not transfer cleanly to actors lacking fixed, valuable territorial assets a punitive strike can threaten” The Houthi case most clearly shows the credibility and Non-State Actors under IHL in an Age of Rebel Governance,” Elgaronline, 140–66.

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rational-actor assumptions failing outright, since the group’s utility function prices in propaganda value, which a punishment-based model cannot accommodate. Hezbollah’s case strains the “return address” assumption structurally, since actor and state cannot be cleanly separated. HTS presents the most acute case, removing the non-state-actor category mid-conflict: a posture calibrated against an insurgent group becomes obsolete once that group controls a recognized government.50 Boko Haram is the exception that clarifies the rule: lacking a sponsor, a stable base, or a propagandadriven utility function, it has remained deterrable in something closer to the classical, denial-based sense.

“Boko Haram is the exception that clarifies the rule: lacking a sponsor, a stable base, or a propaganda-driven utility function, it has remained deterrable in something closer to the classical, denial-based sense” The Interconnection of the Legal and Strategic Tracks IHL concerns the legality of conduct during conflict; deterrence concerns preventing or limiting conflict. The two tracks are tightly interconnected here, because classification status shapes the deterrence options legally available to a state, while deterrence posture shapes how classification disputes play out. 50 Philip Loft, “Syria One Year.”

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Israel’s position toward Hezbollah illustrates this: because Hezbollah is simultaneously part of Lebanon’s formal apparatus and an independently operating armed group, any strike against its drone infrastructure implicates Lebanese sovereignty, constraining which deterrence options are diplomatically available.51 HTS demonstrates the same link from the opposite direction. Its sudden shift from armed group to recognized government immediately altered the deterrence calculus other states face, since retaliatory action against a government carries different legal thresholds than action against an insurgency.52 Boko Haram’s classification and Nigeria’s deterrence posture have remained stable precisely because the group’s status was never ambiguous the way HTS’s became, underscoring that the interconnection problem is a symptom of organizational transition, not drone use itself. Proposals addressing only deterrence posture or only IHL classification are likely incomplete. Policy Recommendations and Conclusion Below is a total of eight policy adjustments that follow from the analysis above. These recommendations are provisional.

51 Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah Shadow Governance in Lebanon | The Washington Institute,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 6, 2024. 52 Philip Loft, “Syria One Year.”

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National Level Shift deterrence posture from punishment toward denial. This requires no new treaty and no change in legal classification; states can implement it unilaterally through procurement and doctrine. The Houthi case makes this urgent: an actor that treats equipment loss as a propaganda win is not reliably deterred by threatening more losses. Nigeria’s campaign against Boko Haram is a working template. Treat classification and deterrence decisions as coupled, not sequential. This is achievable through internal institutional coordination rather than new legislation. Acting on one track without the other, as arguably happened during Syria’s transitional recognition, risks strategic surprise. Establish domestic counter-drone task forces and crossborder knowledge-sharing. Domestic extremist drone plots have risen sharply, including thwarted US plots and a seven-person arrest in Australia tied to an explosive-laden drone.53 This is feasible but less urgent. International Level Target specific supply-chain chokepoints. The clearest chokepoint is China’s 2024–2025 export controls on flight 53 James Paterson and Lydia Khalil, “The Ungoverned Sky: Drones and the Domestic Extremist Threat,” The Lowy Institute, March 22, 2026.

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controllers, motors, and radio modules. Russian networks have continued sourcing these parts through intermediaries, showing both the leverage and limits of a single-country regime.54 A second, case-specific chokepoint: HTS’s Idlib production relied heavily on components smuggled through Turkish border crossings such as Bab al-Hawa, a route already documented for fuel and goods trafficking that funded the group’s wartime economy.55 A narrower target is components exceeding hobbyist specifications, extended endurance, autonomous navigation, encrypted telemetry, already licensed separately in some jurisdictions.56 This would not have prevented Hezbollah, the Houthi, or HTS cases, since all three supplemented commercial components with state sponsorship or captured equipment. It would matter more for Boko Haram-type actors; interdicting the Lake Chad basin corridor specifically is more feasible than a generic global ban. Adopt safety-by-design regulation and a shared database of prohibited component schematics. Geofencing and tamper-resistant identification would primarily constrain Boko Haram-type or domestic-extremist actors; groups like Hezbollah, the Houthis, or HTS already rely on custom production and would circumvent factory safeguards.57 54 TS2 Tech, “China’s 2025 Drone Export Crackdown: DJI Grounded in the West While Russia Still Flies,” July 24, 2025. 55 Jon Gemayel, “The Hidden Network That Fueled Terror in Northern Syria,” Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University, May 29, 2026. 56 European Commission. (n.d.). Sanctions: Dual-use goods and services. 57 Jonathan Lewis, “Droning On: The Response to Use of Drones by Domestic

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Reform IHL thresholds to recognize intermediate organizational sophistication. A formal category between “organized armed group” and “state.” Defined by governance function as detailed in Section Five and would require multilateral consensus among states with sharply different interests. Support treaty negotiation on fully autonomous weapons. The UN Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems is working toward the November 2026 CCW Review Conference, with over forty states already supporting formal negotiations.58 This addresses the accountability gap in Section Five before autonomous targeting becomes standard. Fund international and regional accountability mechanisms. The command-responsibility gap identified in Section Five persists partly because enforcement relies on voluntary state cooperation. Sustained funding for the International Criminal Court and for regional bodies capable of prosecuting IHL violations would give the accountability doctrine some practical teeth. Also, addresses a general enforcement deficit rather than one this paper’s four cases demonstrate directly. The empirical record, particularly the 2025–2026 Violent Extremists,” GNET, January 27, 2025. 58 Kirthi Jayakumar, “GGE on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Dig Watch, Digital Watch Observatory, 2026.

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Hezbollah-Israel campaign and Syria’s ongoing transition, remains unsettled and may refine specific claims without disturbing the paper’s central argument. The pattern across all four cases is the paper’s real evidentiary base: sponsorship and territorial permanence, not drone technology itself, determine whether a nonstate actor crosses from insurgency/terrorism into something IHL and deterrence theory no longer have a category for. Hezbollah, the Houthis, and HTS crossed it; Boko Haram did not and remains governable under the frameworks this paper argues are otherwise failing. That contrast is the clearest evidence available that the erosion these frameworks face is conditional, not universal, and the policy recommendations above follow directly from knowing which conditions to watch for in the next case.

“sponsorship and territorial permanence, not drone technology itself, determine whether a non-state actor crosses from insurgency/ terrorism into something IHL and deterrence theory no longer have a category for”

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2024. https://gnet-research.org/2024/12/20/the-drones-of-hayattahrir-al-sham-the-development-and-use-of-uas-in-syria/. Omenma, J. Tochukwu, and Ifeanyichukwu M. Abada. “Boko Haram Insurgency: A Decade of Dynamic Evolution and Struggle for a Caliphate.” Security Journal, vol. 33 (2020): 376–400, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00233-7. Paterson, James, and Lydia Khalil. “The Ungoverned Sky: Drones and the Domestic Extremist Threat.” The Lowy Institute, March 22, 2026. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/theungoverned-sky-drones-and-the-domestic-extremist-threat. Punch Editorial Board. “Drone Warfare: Boko Haram’s Dangerous Evolution.” Punch Newspapers, November 12, 2025. https:// punchng.com/drone-warfare-boko-harams-dangerousevolution/. Rassler, Don, and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage. “On the Horizon: The Ukraine War and the Evolving Threat of Drone Terrorism.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 18, no. 3 (2025). https://ctc.westpoint.edu/on-the-horizon-the-ukraine-war-andthe-evolving-threat-of-drone-terrorism/. “Sanctions on Dual-Use Goods – European Commission.” April 23, 2026. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarityukraine/eu-sanctions-against-russia-following-invasion-ukraine/ sanctions-dual-use-goods_en. Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, 1966. https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300186703. 41


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United Kingdom and the European Union: The Consequences of Brexit By: Samuel Ittelson

About the Author: Samuel Ittelson is a 3rd Year at the University of Virginia, from Alexandria, Virginia as well as Bratislava, Slovakia. He is majoring in Foreign Affairs as well as Economics, through this he has developed a passion for international trade relations, as well as interactions between states. The majority of his work and academic research is closely related to intra-European affairs, as well as the interaction between European States and the United States of America. Abstract: Brexit is usually described as a mistake, the current Mayor of London Sadiq Khan also described it that way. This paper argues that the wrong word is being used. Hysteresis or a shock that keeps producing new damage rather than one that can simply be corrected once its costs are understood, is the better term. This paper traces the UK’s relationship with European integration from 45


its reluctant monetary policy, the 1992 ERM crisis and the 2008 financial crisis, into the years following the referendum in 2016. Using recent data on the economic impact of Brexit, (Bloom et al. 2025), it shows that GDP, investment, and productivity losses have not leveled off, but continued to grow. The paper closes by weighing this against the UK’s post-Brexit trade deals with Australia and New Zealand, which have done little to offset the losses. The United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, a landmark event commonly referred to as “Brexit,” has left lasting impacts not only on the United Kingdom, but also on Europe as a whole. The current Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, expressed his own view on Brexit by asserting that “Brexit was a mistake and continues to have a negative impact not just on my city and country, but on the European community as a whole.”1

“Brexit was a mistake and continues to have a negative impact not just on my city and country, but on the European community as a whole” Khan’s words break down the effects of Brexit across three main levels: the city level, the national level, and the broader European level. Though Khan’s words are powerful, calling Brexit a “mistake” is not the best way to describe its effects. 1 Sadiq Khan, “Speech to EU Heads of Mission and Ambassadors,” The Independent, February 19, 2025.

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Rather, Brexit can be best explained by the concept of hysteresis, a term which explains a shock that leaves permanent continuing issues rather than short term ones within a political or economic system. Hysteresis is a term often used within the context of unemployment, but can also be used to describe matters of trade and investment. Using the notion of hysteresis as a thematic anchor, this analysis of Brexit and its economic consequences will begin by explaining how the United Kingdom’s membership in the European Union was never a deep, long-term investment—partly due to historical reasons. This study will then examine the two financial crises that tested European economic integration directly: the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of 1990–92 and the Financial and Eurozone Crises of 2007–2018. It will then cover the impacts of these transnational economic crises on the United Kingdom and the European Union, including those consequences suffered by everyday British citizens. Finally, this study will analyze Sadiq Khan’s view and quote as an academic lens through which to observe the economic and political ramifications of Brexit and the crises surrounding it. The European Economic Community (EEC) was founded in 1957 by six member states: France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Given the geographic proximity and historical precedent of interstate trade between 47


these Western European states, economic integration through the EEC was seen as a natural culmination of the regional integration efforts that followed the Second World War. The United Kingdom, by contrast, had historically traded within the Commonwealth, a group of states consisting mostly of its current and former colonies. As decolonization accelerated through the 1950s and 1960s, beginning with the independence of the British Raj in 1947, the Commonwealth’s economic weight shrank, and the United Kingdom found itself with fewer preferential trade relationships throughout its former empire. Following two vetoes by the French government, the United Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973, driven less by preference and more so by the necessity of finding an alternative economic partner among Western European nations. The inclusion of the United Kingdom in the EEC meant that London had to switch its economic orientation away from the Commonwealth and towards a Western European, EECbased relationship. This shifting of economic trade from the Commonwealth to the EEC proved to be pivotal in determining the UK’s economic trajectory since according to Viner’s Principles on international economic policy, the gains of moving trade are only clear if trade creation outweighs trade diversion.2 In other words, the shift to a lower cost producer within an economic alliance has to outweigh the shift to a higher cost producer that is only cheaper 2 Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950), 41–55.

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because it sits behind the economic system’s wall of tariffs. For the United Kingdom, this trade-off was less favorable than it was for the other members of the EEC. An example of this less-favorable trade-off can be seen through Britain’s pivot away from cheaper Commonwealth products such as lamb and dairy produced in the Commonwealth nation of New Zealand and towards higher-cost European producers protected by the EEC’s Common External Tariff. This left Britain with a weaker trade creation case than the original six EEC members had, especially due to the fundamental mismatch of trade that occurred. The structural weaknesses of the UK-EEC partnership were compounded by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which in 1984 accounted for 71 percent of the entire EEC budget.3 In the early 1980s, Great Britain’s participation in the CAP was one-sided, with Britain being the largest net contributor to the CAP relative to the negligible economic benefits it received in return. The farming sector in Britain was a relatively small part of the economy when the UK joined the EEC, meaning that the United Kingdom had to pay into a system that was meant to benefit states with larger agricultural economies like France. This economic asymmetry led to discontent among the British public and politicians, famously leading Margaret Thatcher to demand her “money back.” Thatcher initially asked for a one 3 Janusz Lewandowski, quoted in “EU Budget Commissioner Calls for UK Rebate to End,” BBC News, October 6, 2010.

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billion pound refund from CAP and rejected a counter-offer of 350 million pounds, before the dispute eventually settled after the Fontainebleau Summit in June 1984, which stipulated a monetary rebate from CAP that covered roughly two-thirds of Britain’s net contribution every year.4 Another economic development that coincided with UKEEC tensions was Britain’s discovery and initial extraction of offshore North Sea oil in the 1970s. Around the 1980s, the United Kingdom had become self-sufficient in oil. This development coincided with the OPEC I and OPEC II crises of the 1970s and 1980s, these shocks hit the oil-dependent economies of the world but specifically those of continental Europe. Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s new oil discoveries put a great degree of stress on British monetary policy.5 As heightened investment into the North Sea oil industry drove up the value of the British Pound, a phenomenon known as Dutch Disease began to take effect. Dutch Disease describes how a resource boom in one part of a country’s economy, in this case the North Sea oil industry, can drive up the value of that nation’s currency and make the nation’s other exports less competitive on the world market. As a result of this, British manufacturing, which relied heavily on the EEC market, became less price-competitive in the Western European market it had just 4 John Elsom, “Rebate Revisited: The Accident of History That Drove a Wedge Between Britain and Europe,” The New World, August 10, 2021. 5 P. J. Forsyth and J. A. Kay, “The Economic Implications of North Sea Oil Revenues,” Fiscal Studies 1, no. 3 (1980): 1–28.

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joined.6 However, the clearest illustration of Britain’s uneasy fit within European economic integration did not come through trade or the budget, but through money itself. In October of 1990 the United Kingdom joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) at a rate of one Pound to 2.95 Deutsche Marks (DM), a rate which greatly overvalued the Sterling against the Deutsche Mark. This commitment to a fixed exchange rate undermined British financial policy sovereignty. The United Kingdom was tied to whatever the German Bundesbank thought was right for Germany, not for the British people. Optimal Currency Area criteria become a useful lens by which to observe this phenomenon. These criteria are a set of conditions that economists use to judge if countries will be successful in sharing a single monetary policy or not.7 It mainly focuses on synchronized business cycles, concerted responses to economic shocks, and the implementation of flexible wages and prices. Great Britain and Germany failed this test. Germany, which at the time was trying to cover the mounting costs of reintegrating East Germany with the West, pushed the Bundesbank to raise interest rates to help control domestic inflation, while the 6 W. Max Corden and J. Peter Neary, “Booming Sector and De-Industrialisation in a Small Open Economy,” Economic Journal 92, no. 368 (1982): 825–48. 7 Robert A. Mundell, “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas,” American Economic Review 51, no. 4 (1961): 657–65.

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British economy, which was in a recession, needed lower interest rates to stimulate the economy. A fixed exchange rate forced the United Kingdom to adopt Germany’s monetary policy, which was designed to improve only the conditions in Germany.8 This led to an asymmetric shock, which the United Kingdom did not have the flexibility to absorb. This all came to fruition on September 16, 1992, now known as Black Wednesday, when the British Pound came under a speculative attack by short-selling foreign investors that the Bank of England could not defend against. Despite the Bank of England’s decision to raise interest rates twice in a single day, eventually to 15 percent (a hike later rescinded once the ERM exit was confirmed), by the end of the day, Britain had been forced out of the Germany’s ERM, at an estimated cost of over three billion pounds (after spending, by early estimates, as much as £27 billion of foreign exchange reserves in the defense).9 Through this crisis, Great Britain learned that a fixed exchange rate commitment was a source of instability, rather than one of stability. This incident shaped British monetary policy and explains London’s later refusal to join the Eurozone common currency area in the early 2000s.10 8 Bank of England, “Operation of Monetary Policy,” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 32, no. 4 (1992); Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz, “The Unstable EMS,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1 (1993): 51–143. 9 “What Was Black Wednesday? Causes, Explanation, Consequences,” IG, accessed October 20, 2026; “Cost of UK’s Fight to Stay in ERM,” Central Banking, February 9, 2005. 10 National Institute of Economic and Social Research, “Six Lessons from Black Wednesday for Today’s Central Bankers,” NIESR Blog, September 16,

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This lesson held true through the 2008 financial crisis and the 2010 Eurozone Crisis that immediately followed it, both of which showed the same underlying issue: asymmetric economic shocks with no flexibility are near catastrophic for governments and economies. In 2008, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain were locked into an ECB (European Central Bank) monetary policy that did not fit their own economic conditions, the same situation that Britain had found itself in a few decades prior. However, the key difference between the two situations was that Britain was allowed to leave under the ERM, while the European nations hit hard in 2008 did not have the option of exiting monetary agreements at a fixed rate, since they had all abandoned their own currencies in favor of the Euro. Conversely, Britain already understood that European monetary integration could create instability when economic crises gripped the global economy. Inside the United Kingdom, the economic crisis gripping Europe precipitated deep political controversy. David Cameron’s government pushed a program of austerity in the early 2010s that coincided with continued support of EU rules on aid and budgetary conduct, a policy that increased public sentiment that membership in the European Union created limitations and constraints on the British economy, rather than substantive benefits. This only exacerbated a pivot towards Euroscepticism that had permeated 2023.

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the United Kingdom for decades, a trend seen most clearly when observing changing views on immigration in the United Kingdom before and after 2008.11 While more generous immigration policies were first pitched as a policy that would benefit British labor markets. The idea of open immigration became a key grievance in the eyes of Eurosceptics once British economic growth stalled and public services grappled with a slow recovery from the economic downturns of 2008. By 2016, these grievances had produced enough political pressure to allow for a referendum on the United Kingdom’s continued membership in the European Union. The 2016 referendum asked a simple, yet incredibly openended question to voters: to remain in the European Union or to leave it. It did not, however, include a model for what leaving the European Union would look like. This unclear path forward led to a multi-year period of political confusion after the vote concerning which “form” of Brexit should be taken, whether that be a clean break or a model aligned with the single European market and customs union. This period of negotiations was of great economic importance, with uncertainty surrounding the future of British EU membership becoming a serious economic cost to British firms and consumers. Uncertain of when or how certain EU trade 11 Thiemo Fetzer, “Did Austerity Cause Brexit?,” American Economic Review 109, no. 11 (2019): 3849–86.

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and customs policies would be impacted by Brexit, British firms were forced to delay investment and hiring decisions amidst such an ambiguous economic backdrop.12 This uncertainty lasted from 2016 to the 2020 Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, resulting in substantive impediments on the British economy. The clearest evidence of the scale of economic impact comes from a 2025 study by Bloom et al., which combines macroeconomic data with firm-level surveys to estimate the cumulative effect of Brexit on the British economy. The study concluded that by 2025, Brexit had negatively impacted the United Kingdom GDP by between six and eight percent. They also found that investment in businesses dropped by twelve to eighteen percent. Employment also fell by three to four percent, the same percentage that overall economic productivity had fallen by. While these figures alone represent a substantial economic downturn within the United Kingdom during the Brexit period, the more important takeaway from the study centers around its timing. Bloom et al. found that these figures were in line with government estimates of the damage that Brexit made in 2016. However, the losses were not visible in 2017 and 2018.13 The real 12 Nicholas Bloom, Philip Bunn, Scarlet Chen, Paul Mizen, Pawel Smietanka, and Gregory Thwaites, “The Impact of Brexit on UK Firms,” NBER Working Paper No. 26218 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2019). 13 Nicholas Bloom, Philip Bunn, Paul Mizen, Pawel Smietanka, and Gregory

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damage occurred in the years following with a compounded effect. The single bounded shock (the vote) produced an economic cost that kept growing long after the shock. This is a prime example of hysteresis: in essence, Brexit’s indecisive implementation was a bad outcome that kept compounding upon itself.

“Brexit’s indecisive implementation was a bad outcome that kept compounding upon itself” Independent evidence using a completely different method points to the same conclusion. The Centre for European Reform built a statistical “doppelgänger” of the United Kingdom, a synthetic economy assembled from other advanced economies that closely tracked the real United Kingdom before 2020, and compared its performance to the real country afterward. This analysis finds that UK GDP is around 5.2 percent smaller, investment 13.7 percent lower, and goods trade 13.6 percent lower than the doppelgänger’s, figures that sit close to the range Bloom et al. found using entirely different data.14 Breaking this down by sector shows the mechanism directly: imports of chemicals and pharmaceuticals from the EU have fallen by about 24 percent Thwaites, “The Economic Impact of Brexit,” NBER Working Paper No. 34459 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2025). 14 John Springford, “Cost of Brexit,” Centre for European Reform, updated 2026; “The Cost of Brexit, Ten Years On: The Impact of Leaving the Customs Union and Single Market on UK Trade,” Centre for European Reform, 2026.

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and machinery by about 26 percent, precisely the kind of trade destruction that Viner’s model would predict. The financial services sector, which had long been the United Kingdom’s leading comparative strength within the larger European market, lost the right to automatically sell services across the European Union. This forced some firms to relocate parts of their operations to mainland Europe. According to one widely-cited industry tracker, more than 7,500 financial services jobs and roughly £1.2 trillion in assets had moved from London to hubs such as Dublin, Paris, Frankfurt, and Luxembourg following Brexit.15 This resulted in a far larger decline in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the United Kingdom following the referendum, with the uncertainty surrounding Brexit ultimately making Britain a less attractive destination for FDI. While all of these are issues on the national scale, they still had an impact on the everyday British citizen. During and after Brexit, the average British citizen faced a weaker labor market and slower overall wage growth than expected, coupled with higher prices for imported goods like food.16 15 EY, “EY Financial Services Brexit Tracker: Financial Services Firms Continue Moving Staff Ahead of Brexit Deadline,” October 1, 2020; reported in “More Than 7,500 Financial Services Jobs Move to Europe from London: EY Brexit Tracker,” Insurance Journal, October 1, 2020, https://www. insurancejournal.com/news/international/2020/10/01/584789.htm. 16 Bloom et al., “The Economic Impact of Brexit”; Rui Costa, Swati Dhingra, and Stephen Machin, “New Dawn Fades: Trade, Labour and the Brexit Exchange Rate Depreciation,” Journal of International Economics 152 (2024); Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, and Josh De Lyon, “Non-Tariff Barriers and

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Research from the London School of Economics’ Centre for Economic Performance found that new non-tariff barriers on trade with the EU added roughly 250 pounds to the average household’s food bill between December 2019 and March 2023— around 7 billion pounds in total—and accounted for close to a third of all food price inflation over that period.17 This was a result of new trade barriers and reduced competition to consumers. The argument that Brexit was a short-term adjustment with an endpoint is not backed by the data. In fact, the impact seems to be one of continually compounding nature. The effect on the European Union’s twenty-seven members has been real, but far more concentrated. The disintegration of trade between the European Union and Britain has reduced trade flows in both directions, though the effect on the EU side has been smaller in proportion because the European Union’s economy is several times larger than that of the United Kingdom; the same trade loss registers as a much larger share of British GDP. This aggregate figure conceals significant variation across member states. Ireland, the Netherlands, and Belgium, the economies with the deepest trade and logistical ties to the United Kingdom, have Consumer Prices: Evidence from Brexit,” Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper No. 1888 (London: London School of Economics, 2022), updated May 2023. 17 Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, and Josh De Lyon, “Non-Tariff Barriers and Consumer Prices: Evidence from Brexit,” Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper No. 1888 (London: London School of Economics, 2022), updated May 2023.

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been among the most exposed to the costs of Brexit within the European Union.18 Against these losses, the new policy of a Global Britain, which bolstered trade with Australia and New Zealand, has offered only a partial offset of the combined economic loss that followed Britain’s departure from the European Union. The British government’s own impact assessment estimates that a new trade agreement with Australia would raise their own GDP by just 0.08 percentage points by 2035, worth around 2.3 billion pounds a year, with a concurrent New Zealand trade agreement adding a further 0.03 percent.19 These metrics are negligible next to the 6 to 8 percentage points of GDP loss estimated by Bloom et al. Furthermore, Heron et al. argue that the real purpose of these agreements was less economic than symbolic, a way for the government to feign a sense of sovereignty and independence from the European Union rather than to replace the trade that had been lost.20 Each stage of this argument reinforces the same fundamental pattern: British membership in the EEC and then 18 International Monetary Fund, “Long-Term Impact of Brexit on the EU,” in Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 18/224 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, July 2018), 3–21. 19 UK Department for International Trade, “UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Impact Assessment,” 2021, discussed in “UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement, “ House of Commons Library, briefing CBP-9484. 20 Tony Heron, et al., “Performing Trade: ‘Global Britain’ and the UK’s PostBrexit Free Trade Agreements with Australia and New Zealand,” Review of International Political Economy (2025).

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the EU was, from 1973 onward, a weaker and more conditional commitment than any other country that joined before and after them, undercut further by independent sources of energy wealth from North Sea oil. Monetary integration failed its first real test in 1992 during the ERM crisis and failed a much larger one during the 2008 Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Crisis that followed. The 2016 vote and negotiations that surrounded and followed it locked in an exit under conditions of maximum uncertainty, and the measurable economic damage that has followed has not been resolved but compounded. The key word in Sadiq Khan’s quote is “mistake.” This implies a bounded and identifiable error—the kind of decision that could in principle be corrected once its consequences are understood. However, the evidence and data support a different and more precise conclusion. Hysteresis implies an open-ended cost that continues to accumulate regardless of whether the original decision is reversed or even regretted, and this is the exact pattern that occurs in Bloom et al., in which the forecasts were correct in identifying the size of the damage done to Britain’s economy, but wrong about whether these costs would ever stop compounding. Weighed against this pattern, the countervailing evidence is minor. New trade agreements and any modest gains in currency competitiveness are second-order to the effects of uncertainty and the limitation of investment and trade into the United Kingdom. 60


Khan’s claim about London must also be highlighted due to the concentration of financial services that occur within the city; it is also a sector that was directly and disproportionately affected by the United Kingdom leaving the European Union. Brexit is better explained and understood as a case of hysteresis rather than as a simple mistake. The United Kingdom’s relationship with European economic integration was shallow and conditional from the beginning in 1973. Then it was tested in 1992 during the ERM crisis and even more severely in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis, before being severed in 2016 under conditions that maximized economic disruption rather than minimizing it. Almost a decade on, the British economy has faced measurable costs that have not been resolved, and costs to the European Union have fallen heavily on the states that are geographically closest to Britain. Sadiq Khan is right that Brexit continues to have a negative impact, but he was wrong that it was simply a mistake, it was something far more concerning: hysteresis.

“The United Kingdom’s relationship with European economic integration was shallow and conditional from the beginning in 1973”

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Bibliography Bakker, Jan David, Nikhil Datta, and Josh De Lyon. “Non-Tariff Barriers and Consumer Prices: Evidence from Brexit.” Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper No. 1888. London: London School of Economics, 2022. Updated May 2023. https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit18.pdf. Bank of England. “Operation of Monetary Policy.” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 32, no. 4 (1992). https://www. bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly-bulletin/1992/q4/operation-ofmonetary-policy. Bloom, Nicholas, Philip Bunn, Scarlet Chen, Paul Mizen, Pawel Smietanka, and Gregory Thwaites. “The Impact of Brexit on UK Firms.” NBER Working Paper No. 26218. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w26218. Bloom, Nicholas, Philip Bunn, Paul Mizen, Pawel Smietanka, and Gregory Thwaites. “The Economic Impact of Brexit.” NBER Working Paper No. 34459. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2025. https://www.nber.org/ papers/w34459. Corden, W. Max, and J. Peter Neary. “Booming Sector and DeIndustrialisation in a Small Open Economy.” Economic Journal 92, no. 368 (1982): 825–48. “Cost of UK’s Fight to Stay in ERM.” Central Banking, February 63


9, 2005. https://www.centralbanking.com/node/1423239. Costa, Rui, Swati Dhingra, and Stephen Machin. “New Dawn Fades: Trade, Labour and the Brexit Exchange Rate Depreciation.” Journal of International Economics 152 (2024). Eichengreen, Barry, and Charles Wyplosz. “The Unstable EMS.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1 (1993): 51–143. Elsom, John. “Rebate Revisited: The Accident of History That Drove a Wedge Between Britain and Europe.” The New World, August 10, 2021. https://www.thenewworld.co.uk/brexit-newsbritains-former-rebate-explained-6887858/. EY. “EY Financial Services Brexit Tracker: Financial Services Firms Continue Moving Staff Ahead of Brexit Deadline.” Press release. London: EY, October 1, 2020. https://www.ey.com/en_ uk/news/2020/09/ey-financial-services-brexit-tracker-fs-firmscontinue-moving-staff-ahead-of-brexit-deadline. Fetzer, Thiemo. “Did Austerity Cause Brexit?” American Economic Review 109, no. 11 (2019): 3849–86. https://doi. org/10.1257/aer.20181164. Forsyth, P. J., and J. A. Kay. “The Economic Implications of North Sea Oil Revenues.” Fiscal Studies 1, no. 3 (1980): 1–28. Heron, Tony, et al. “Performing Trade: ‘Global Britain’ and the UK’s Post-Brexit Free Trade Agreements with Australia and New Zealand.” Review of International Political Economy (2025). https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2025.2489078. House of Commons Library. “UK-Australia Free Trade 64


Agreement.” Research Briefing CBP-9484. https:// commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9484/. IG. “What Was Black Wednesday? Causes, Explanation, Consequences.” Accessed October 20, 2026. https:// www.ig.com/uk/trading-strategies/black-wednesdayexplained-230712. International Monetary Fund. “Long-Term Impact of Brexit on the EU.” In Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues, 3–21. IMF Country Report No. 18/224. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, July 2018. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/ Issues/2018/07/18/Euro-Area-Policies-Selected-Issues-46097. Khan, Sadiq. “Speech to EU Heads of Mission and Ambassadors.” Speech, London, February 18, 2025. Quoted in The Independent, February 19, 2025. https://www.independent. co.uk/news/uk/home-news/sadiq-khan-mayor-governmenttrump-brexit-b2699891.html. Lewandowski, Janusz. Quoted in “EU Budget Commissioner Calls for UK Rebate to End.” BBC News, October 6, 2010. https:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11198960. “More Than 7,500 Financial Services Jobs Move to Europe from London: EY Brexit Tracker.” Insurance Journal, October 1, 2020. https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ international/2020/10/01/584789.htm. Mundell, Robert A. “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas.” American Economic Review 51, no. 4 (1961): 657–65. 65


National Institute of Economic and Social Research. “Six Lessons from Black Wednesday for Today’s Central Bankers.” NIESR Blog, September 16, 2023. https://niesr.ac.uk/blog/six-lessonsblack-wednesday-todays-central-bankers. Springford, John. “Cost of Brexit.” Centre for European Reform. Updated 2026. https://www.cer.eu/research/cost-of-brexit. Springford, John. “The Cost of Brexit, Ten Years On: The Impact of Leaving the Customs Union and Single Market on UK Trade.” Centre for European Reform, 2026. https://www.cer.eu/ insights/cost-brexit-ten-years-impact-leaving-customs-unionand-single-market-uk-trade. UK Department for International Trade. UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Impact Assessment. London: Department for International Trade, 2021. Viner, Jacob. The Customs Union Issue. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950.

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Replicating USAID in Cambodia: China’s Sectoral Gains and Gaps By: Riley Sucato

About the Author: Riley Sucato is a fourth-year undergraduate at the University of Virginia, where she is pursuing a B.A. in Foreign Affairs and Economics with a minor in Chinese Language and Literature. Originally from Northern Virginia, she previously studied at University College, University of Oxford through UVA’s summer program and served as a National Security Research Intern at the Institute of World Politics, where she researched Chinese Belt and Road investments in Southeast Asia. At UVA, she is president of the National Security, Intelligence, and Defense Club and a member of the Club Running team. Outside the classroom, she enjoys reading fantasy novels and running marathons with her family. Abstract: The abrupt withdrawal of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from Cambodia in early 2025 created 69


immediate gaps across health, environmental, and governance programs that had relied on long-standing nongovernmental organization (NGO) networks. China moved quickly to expand its role, drawing on an existing footprint in infrastructure, medical outreach, and state-to-state cooperation. This paper evaluates where Chinese assistance was able to replace U.S. development sectors and where substitution proved structurally limited, drawing on sectoral analysis of health, environment, and governance programs as well as reporting from Cambodian NGOs and Chinese project announcements. The findings identify a clear pattern: China effectively filled the tangible, state-delivered components of development, particularly clinical services, hospital support, and large-scale infrastructure, where visible outputs aligned with its own development model. However, Beijing struggled to replicate the governance, civil society, and accountability mechanisms that previously anchored U.S. influence in Cambodia. The result is a development landscape defined by rising Chinese investment alongside a weakened civic space and reduced monitoring capacity. These gaps highlight the sectors where future NGO engagement remains both necessary and strategically consequential. Introduction USAID’s withdrawal from Cambodia in early 2025 created an unusual opportunity to examine how development influence shifts when a major donor exits abruptly. For more than two decades, USAID had supported health, environmental, and governance programs through a wide network of Cambodian and international NGOs. When those programs collapsed almost 70


overnight, they left clear gaps in service delivery, monitoring, and civil engagement. Cambodia is a useful test case for understanding what followed the dismantling of USAID worldwide. It is a small, aid-dependent state with long exposure to both U.S. and Chinese development models. Joseph Nye describes soft power as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment.”1 Applied to development assistance in Cambodia, this concept provides a framework for examining how donor-funded programs may build influence through relationships with civil society, public trust, and institutional engagement. After the withdrawal, China expanded its activities in health and parts of the environmental sector, where tangible and visible outputs aligned with its approach. However, Beijing could not replicate the governance, civil society, and accountability functions that had anchored U.S. soft power in Cambodia. A clear pattern emerged in the months that followed. China’s expansion concentrated in sectors that aligned with its own development model and fell short of those that did not. This paper addresses a central question: Which USAID development sectors in Cambodia did China expand into after 2025, and why were some sectors more replicable than others?

1 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 95.

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Background USAID occupied a disproportionately large role in Cambodia’s development landscape relative to the size of its budget. In 2024, the United States dispersed $122.3 million in total foreign assistance to Cambodia, of which $99.5 million came from USAID.2 USAID concentrated its funding to Cambodia in three main areas: basic health ($22.45 million), government and civil society ($27.45 million), and environmental protection ($8.22 million).3 USAID worked almost entirely through NGOs rather than Cambodian ministries. This NGO-centric approach created long-term ecosystems in health, governance, and environmental work that depended on sustained U.S. support. China’s pre-2025 presence in Cambodia followed a very different pattern. Chinese investment was larger in scale and centered on state-to-state infrastructure, construction, and capital projects. In 2024, Chinese investors committed $5.42 billion, accounting for approximately 54 percent of Cambodia’s total investment capital.4 Major Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Cambodia included the Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville Expressway, the Siem Reap Angkor International Airport, and

2 U.S. Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov – Cambodia, accessed June 2026. 3 Ibid. 4 Sum Manet, “China Accounts for 54% of Cambodia’s Total Investment,” Khmer Times, January 8, 2026.

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the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone.5 China also financed the $1.7 billion Funan Techo Canal and supported additional infrastructure projects, such as the Dang Kambet Reservoir and multiple Lancang-Mekong Cooperation projects.6 Chinese investment was especially visible in Sihanoukville, where rapid construction between 2016 and 2019 transformed this coastal city into a hub of Chinese-owned casinos, hotels, and highrise developments.7 Along with these investments, China funded social-sector projects, including renovating Preah Kossamak Hospital in Phnom Penh, deploying Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) medical teams and mobile clinics, and creating educationfocused initiatives aimed at improving school environments and facilities.8 USAID’s NGO-based, governance-oriented model and China’s state-centric, infrastructure-focused strategy shaped the 5 State Council Information Office of China, “China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative promotes Cambodia’s development, regional connectivity,” May 19, 2025. 6 CNN, “Cambodia Breaks Ground on Controversial $1.7 Billion Canal Funded By China,” August 5, 2024; CIDCA, “Cambodia Starts to Construct Reservoir with Chinese Assistance,” February 5, 2024; Khmer Times, “Cambodia, China to Ink Agreement on Cooperation Projects of MLC Special Fund 2024 This Week,” September 4, 2024. 7 King’s College London, “The Implications of Chinese Capital in Cambodia,” June 29, 2023. 8 China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), “Chinaaided hospital opens in Cambodia,” March 24, 2022; China Buses, “Free Mobile Clinic Vehicles in Aid of Cambodia Handed Over in Phnom Penh,” June 13, 2018; National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), “China-aid School Improvement Project Inaugurated in Cambodia,” November 1, 2024.

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context in which the 2025 withdrawal unfolded. Flashpoint: USAID Withdrawal USAID’s exit in early 2025 was abrupt and unfolded rapidly. On January 20, 2025, the incoming Trump administration marked its first day in office by freezing all U.S. foreign aid and initiating a ninety-day review, immediately suspending the flow of development assistance worldwide.9 Four days later, the State Department issued stop-work orders for U.S.-funded projects, forcing implementing partners in Cambodia to halt activities.10 By February 1, the administration took the USAID website offline.11 As the six-week review of USAID concluded, the administration terminated roughly 5,200 contracts worldwide. This included thirty USAID initiatives in Cambodia, totaling $260 million in funding for health, education, child protection, independent media, civil society, human rights, and anti-trafficking initiatives.12 By mid2025, Washington had largely dismantled USAID’s operational presence in Cambodia and was delivering the remaining U.S. assistance through State Department channels.13 9 Mark Robins, “Defunding USAID: A Timeline of Events?” Aprio, February 21, 2025. 10 Sonny Inbaraj Krishnan, “Trump Freezes USAID Funding, Cambodian Programs in Limbo,” Cambodianess, January 24, 2025. 11 Charlie Estes, “USAID Freeze Timeline,” Roots of Development – Development Without Dependency, March 17, 2025. 12 Seoung Nimol, “Thirty USAID Contracts Cease in Cambodia; Civil Society Find Ways to Survive, Gov’t Unfazed,” CamboJA News, March 13, 2025. 13 Ibid.

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Cambodian civil society absorbed the sharpest impact. USAID had been a major funder of rights monitoring, legal aid, and land-rights advocacy, and its sudden withdrawal left organizations scrambling to replace lost support.14 The broader donor pullback also affected groups such as the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), Cambodia’s oldest human rights NGO, and the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), which document abuses and provide legal assistance.15 Environmental development faced similar disruption. Before the freeze, USAID had funded community forestry groups and civil society monitors through programs like USAID Conserve and the Cambodia Green Future Activity.16 With the 2025 stopwork orders and contract terminations, these initiatives lost the U.S. development support they had previously relied on, limiting resources for community-level monitoring. This contraction came as Chinese-financed dams, roads, and energy projects continued to expand in Cambodia, often with minimal consultation or

14 Kate Flower, “‘What’s Your Plan B?’: Cambodian Civil Society Is Fighting for Sustainability amid a Donor Exodus,” Australian International Development Network, June 20, 2025. 15 Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), “Who We Are,” ADHOC Cambodia. Accessed October 20, 2026; Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), “Accountability,” Accessed October 20, 2026. 16 Phal Sophanith, “USAID Announces New Environment Project to Preserve and Protect Biodiversity and Natural Resources in Cambodia,” Ministry of Information, December 5, 2023.

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safeguards.17 Finally, USAID’s withdrawal disrupted public-health programs that depended on external funding to sustain outreach and service delivery. Cambodian NGOs reported pausing activities and laying off staff as the freeze created immediate gaps in program continuity, including in health initiatives supported by donor funding.18 Before the freeze, USAID had backed major health-system programs such as the Enhancing Quality of Healthcare Activity (EQHA), which worked to improve clinical standards, data systems, and facility-level supervision across public and private facilities.19 What remained of U.S. engagement was narrow: demining through the State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, limited cooperation on drug trafficking, and a regional stability package that supported anti-scam coordination between Thailand and Cambodia.20

17 Terry Friel, “Phnom Penh NGOs Call for Stricter Controls on Major Chinese Projects,” AsiaNews, June 1, 2026; Phon Sothyroth, “Study: Three Chinese Projects Allegedly Caused Environmental, Social Impacts,” CamboJA News, July 26, 2026. 18 Seoung Nimol, “U.S. Aid Freeze Forces Cambodian Government to Seek New Funding Partners amid NGO Layoffs,” CamboJA News, February 3, 2025. 19 FHI 360, “USAID Enhancing Quality of Health Care Activity (EQHA),” Accessed June 23, 2026. 20 Associated Press, “US Will Provide $45 Million in Aid to Thailand and Cambodia in a Bid to Ensure Regional Stability,” Courthouse News Service, January 9, 2026.

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Sectoral Assessment: Public Health Public health was one of the sectors most affected by USAID’s withdrawal and one of the few areas where China could help fill the gap. Before 2025, USAID supported health system strengthening, HIV and tuberculosis prevention, maternal and child health programs, and healthcare outreach through a network of international and Cambodian NGOs, including the Khmer HIV/ AIDS NGO Alliance and the EQHA. Because USAID’s health programs ran through NGO networks rather than Cambodian ministries, they were difficult to replace when funding halted. Many organizations reported layoffs, reduced outreach activities, and uncertainty about future service delivery. China’s response to USAID’s withdrawal built upon a pre-existing healthcare presence in Cambodia. Chinese medical teams expanded clinical services and TCM programs, while Chinese-funded hospital projects continued at facilities such as Preah Kossamak Hospital in Phnom Penh and the Preah Sihanouk Provincial Referral Hospital.21 Chinese organizations also increased equipment donations and medical exchanges with Cambodian institutions.22 Within weeks of USAID’s withdrawal, 21 Ben Sokhean, “Chinese Medical Team Expands TCM Services in Cambodia,” Khmer Times, April 4, 2025; Cambodianess, “China to Aid Preah Sihanouk Provincial Referral Hospital.” Cambodian Media Broadcasting Corporation, March 7, 2026. 22 Ben Sokhean, “China Expands Medical Support in Cambodia,” Khmer Times, April 7, 2025.

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Chinese officials announced new assistance programs focused on vulnerable children and newborn health and renewed cooperation on malaria-related projects, signaling an attempt to move into areas where US programs had abruptly halted.23 Health proved particularly conducive to Chinese substitution because it aligned with Beijing’s broader model of development assistance. Hospitals, medical equipment, and physician exchanges produce visible and measurable outcomes that are directly associated with Chinese support.24 These projects are also politically safe. Unlike governance or civil society programs, they do not require partnerships with advocacy organizations or independent watchdog groups. As a result, healthcare allows China to generate public goodwill while avoiding the politically sensitive dimensions of development assistance. At the same time, China’s assistance did not fully replicate the functions previously performed by USAID. American health programs frequently incorporated community outreach, partnerships with local NGOs, and services targeted toward vulnerable populations. China primarily channels its assistance through state institutions, so it lacks many of the civil society connections that characterized U.S. engagement. This distinction 23 Zhang Kaiwei and Zhong Wenxing, eds., “Chinese-Backed Charitable Organizations Contribute to Improving Cambodia’s Healthcare Sector,” People’s Daily Online, February 13, 2025. 24 Faye Ng Yu Ci and Yanzhong Huang, “Public Health as Diplomacy: China’s Southeast Asia Strategy,” Think Global Health, May 8, 2026.

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is particularly important in Cambodia, where concerns about corruption and political influence have historically led Western donors to bypass government ministries and work directly with nongovernmental organizations. The health sector, therefore, demonstrates both the strengths and limits of Chinese replacement. China was able to provide visible services, infrastructure, and medical assistance that helped replace and mitigate the most immediate effects of the U.S. withdrawal. However, China has not been able to recreate the NGO-based networks that gave USAID influence beyond the Cambodian state. In this sense, China successfully substituted for direct health service delivery, but failed to fully match the soft power that U.S. development assistance had previously generated. Sectoral Assessment: Environment The environment sector is the strongest example of China successfully replacing the material side of development assistance in Cambodia but falling short on the governance side. By 2025, China already dominated Cambodia’s major energy and infrastructure projects, including hydropower dams, expressways, special economic zones, and massive land and energy initiatives. Human Rights Watch has linked the Lower Sesan 2 hydropower dam, built with Chinese financing and contractors, to displacement, collapse of fisheries, and biodiversity loss, highlighting how 79


Chinese infrastructure often moves forward with limited consultation or safeguards.25 The Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville Expressway, another major Chinese project, demonstrates Beijing’s ability to deliver large and visible infrastructure quickly. The Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone, a flagship BRI project, is another clear example of Chinese industrial growth reshaping local environments and governance, as its rapid expansion brought manufacturing and investment, along with pollution, land-use pressure, and weak oversight.26 This shows a pattern of China working government-to-government, rather than consulting with local populations or conducting environmental checks. After USAID’s withdrawal, China expanded its environmental footprint by leaning into a green development narrative. Cambodian officials praised Chinese support for renewable energy, industrial modernization, and participation in regional environmental programs, framing these initiatives as contributions to the country’s Circular Strategy on Environment 2023–2028.27 Chinese firms also continued to invest in hydropower, solar, and battery-storage projects, aligning with China’s broader commercial interests in Southeast Asia’s energy 25 Human Rights Watch, “Underwater: Human Rights Impacts of a China Belt and Road Project in Cambodia,” August 10, 202. 26 Sovinda Po and Kimkong Heng. “Assessing the Impacts of Chinese Investments in Cambodia: The Case of Preah Sihanoukville Province.” Issues & Insights 19, WP4. Honolulu: Pacific Forum, May 2019. 27 Zhang Kaiwei and Liang Jun, “Asia-Pacific Community: Environmental Cooperation with China Benefits Cambodia, Minister Says,” People’s Daily Online, March 20, 2026.

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transition.28 China’s approach helps explain why the environment sector was only partially replicable. Beijing can build infrastructure at scale, move energy projects quickly, and provide technical training to Cambodian ministries. These are visible outputs that generate political goodwill and reinforce China’s position as Cambodia’s main development partner. They also allow China to present itself as a leader in renewable energy, where its industrial strengths align with Cambodia’s needs. However, China cannot replicate the governance functions that defined U.S. environmental soft power. USAID’s environmental work centered on communitybased natural resource management, youth climate activism, civil society monitoring, and environmental safeguards, all functions that depend on transparency, participation, and independent oversight.29 Chinese assistance does not operate in these spaces. This structural mismatch explains why China could only partially substitute for U.S. influence in this sector. China successfully filled the infrastructure and energy components of environmental assistance, and, in some cases, expanded them. However, Beijing was unable to replace the governance ecosystem that had supported 28 Lauren Mai and Andreyka Natalegawa, “Chinese Energy Investments in Southeast Asia,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 17, 2025. 29 Celia Zeilberger, “Member Spotlight: ECODIT—Empowering Cambodia’s Youth as Change Agents for the Environment,” Pacific Strategies & Assessments Council, 2022; Prak Chan Thul, “US Ends Cambodia Aid Programme over Deforestation, Targeting of Activists,” The Jakarta Post, June 17, 2021.

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environmental accountability in Cambodia. In practice, Chinese expansion has placed development ahead of environmental protection, giving Cambodia new infrastructure but fewer tools to protect communities and ecosystems. The environment sector makes the limits of China’s soft power clear. Beijing can deliver large projects and technical cooperation, but it cannot reproduce the participatory, rights-aware model that shaped U.S. environmental influence. Ultimately, what has emerged is an unbalanced landscape in which development has accelerated, but the mechanisms that safeguard communities and ecosystems have weakened. Sectoral Assessment: Human Rights and Governance The human rights and governance sector is the clearest example of a space China could not replicate. USAID’s withdrawal removed long-standing support for organizations such as ADHOC and CCHR, which monitored abuses, provided legal aid, and documented land disputes. These organizations operated independently of the Cambodian government and depended on the ability to hold the state to account. When USAID left, that ecosystem shrank, and China was neither willing nor able to fill that gap. China’s engagement in Cambodia moved in the opposite direction. Rather than supporting independent monitors, Beijing 82


deepened cooperation with the Cambodian state through joint anti-crime operations, intelligence sharing, and the provision of surveillance and forensic equipment.30 These efforts aimed to protect Chinese nationals and tackle cross-border crime, rather than strengthening Cambodia’s rights institutions. At the same time, Chinese investment often worsened existing governance problems that USAID-backed groups had attempted to solve. Large land concessions, hydropower projects, and the construction boom in Sihanoukville brought displacement, land disputes, and labor abuses, as reporting on the Lower Sesan 2 dam shows. Additionally, trafficking networks and criminal activity tied to Chinese investors expanded in areas where oversight was already weak.31 The limits of substitution are clearest here, since USAID’s networks created political leverage rather than simply documenting abuses. These networks brought land disputes into public view, provided legal support to communities facing displacement, and compelled officials to respond to claims they might otherwise ignore. The same networks tracked the governance risks that accompanied rapid Chinese investment, including trafficking, 30 H. S. George Tan, S. Inderjit, Jessica Ong Hai Liaw, and Kwong Fook Wen, “Relations Between Cambodia and China: The Impact Towards Cambodia’s Sovereignty,” International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), March 27, 2025. 31 Lindsey Kennedy and Nathan Paul Southern, “Modern Slavery in the Mekong’s Casinos,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, July 25, 2022.

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criminal activity, and land conflicts in Sihanoukville. These were political functions rather than technical ones, and they depended on independence from the state. Once that independence weakened, the space for contesting official decisions narrowed, and the checks that had constrained local power holders largely disappeared. What has emerged is a widening gap. Chinese material influence has grown through investment, security cooperation, and state-to-state engagement, but the institutions that protect rights and hold power to account have weakened. The loss of those institutions also affects the political durability of China’s own projects. Without trusted channels for consultation, grievance resolution, or community oversight, local populations often interpret foreign investment as extraction rather than development. That perception makes projects more politically fragile, reduces public support, and increases resistance to largescale infrastructure. This sector marks the boundary of China’s soft power. Beijing can deliver services and build infrastructure, but it cannot reproduce the governance norms that shaped U.S. influence. Participation, transparency, and independent oversight do not transfer through China’s development model, and their absence carries long-term consequences for accountability, civic space, and the balance of influence between state and non-state actors in Cambodia. China extends its economic reach but does not build the legitimacy that once anchored U.S. influence in Cambodia. 84


Conclusion The evidence demonstrates a clear causal dynamic: China can replace visible, state-delivered services but not the governance and civil-society functions that anchored U.S. influence. In health, China filled immediate gaps with clinics, equipment, and medical teams. In the environmental sector, China expanded infrastructure and technical work but could not replace the community engagement that had supported USAID’s influence. The governance and human rights sector proved least transferable because the networks and oversight behind them did not fit China’s state-centered model. These differences matter for U.S. soft power. The withdrawal shifted Cambodia’s development landscape toward China’s strengths, yet it also revealed the limits of what Beijing can replicate. Substitution does not equal parity. Chinese projects met short-term needs but did not rebuild the institutional depth or civic partnerships that had anchored U.S. influence. Attribution is imperfect, and data gaps remain, but the overall pattern suggests that China’s ability to substitute for U.S. assistance was shaped primarily by its own development model. Beijing was best positioned to expand in sectors where state-led, tangible projects and visible service delivery aligned with its existing approach, but less able to replicate NGO-based governance, civil society engagement, and independent accountability mechanisms that fell 85


outside that model. These gaps also create space for a future NGO model. The functions China cannot replicate include community engagement, rights-based monitoring, participatory environmental oversight, and independent channels for grievance resolution. An organization designed to operate in these areas could rebuild the connective tissue between communities and institutions, restore accountability mechanisms weakened by USAID’s withdrawal, and provide a durable civil sector presence in an environment shaped by great power competition. Looking ahead, Cambodia’s development landscape will likely continue to reflect this divide. China will remain strongest in sectors where delivery is concrete and easy to publicize, while governance and civil society functions will stay underresourced and politically limited. This imbalance brings risks for accountability and long-term resilience, but it also provides space for new actors. The areas China cannot fill, including community engagement and rights-based oversight, remain open for organizations that can rebuild links between communities, local institutions, and external partners. Strengthening those functions will shape the next phase of soft power competition and development influence in Southeast Asia.

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public-health-as-diplomacy-chinas-southeast-asia-strategy. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 94–109. https://doi. org/10.1177/0002716207311699. Phal, Sophanith. “USAID Announces New Environment Project to Preserve and Protect Biodiversity and Natural Resources in Cambodia.” Ministry of Information, December 5, 2023. https:// www.information.gov.kh/articles/119452. Po, Sovinda, and Kimkong Heng. “Assessing the Impacts of Chinese Investments in Cambodia: The Case of Preah Sihanoukville Province.” Issues & Insights 19, WP4. Honolulu: Pacific Forum, May 2019. https://urbandatabase.khmerstudies. org/get-data/Mjk1/view. Robins, Mark. “Defunding USAID: A Timeline of Events?” Aprio, February 21, 2025. https://www.aprio.com/insights-events/ defunding-usaid-a-timeline-of-events-ins-article-ne/. Seoung, Nimol. “Thirty USAID Contracts Cease in Cambodia; Civil Society Find Ways to Survive, Gov’t Unfazed.” CamboJA News, March 13, 2025. https://cambojanews.com/thirty-usaidcontracts-cease-in-cambodia-civil-society-find-ways-to-survivegovt-unfazed/. Seoung, Nimol. “U.S. Aid Freeze Forces Cambodian Government to Seek New Funding Partners amid NGO Layoffs.” CamboJA News, February 3, 2025. https://cambojanews.com/u-s-aid92


freeze-forces-cambodian-government-to-seek-new-fundingpartners-amid-ngo-layoffs/. Sokhean, Ben. “China Expands Medical Support in Cambodia.” Khmer Times, April 7, 2025. https://www.khmertimeskh. com/501665869/china-expands-medical-support-in-cambodia/. Sokhean, Ben. “Chinese Medical Team Expands TCM Services in Cambodia.” Khmer Times, April 4, 2025. https://www. khmertimeskh.com/501665148/chinese-medical-team-expandstcm-services-in-cambodia/. Sothyroth, Phon. “Study: Three Chinese Projects Allegedly Caused Environmental, Social Impacts.” CamboJA News, July 26, 2026. https://cambojanews.com/study-three-chinese-projectsallegedly-caused-environmental-social-impacts-2/. State Council Information Office of China. “China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative promotes Cambodia’s development, regional connectivity.” May 19, 2025. http://english.scio.gov. cn/m/beltandroad/2025-05/19/content_117882124.html. Sum, Manet. “China Accounts for 54% of Cambodia’s Total Investment.” Khmer Times, January 8, 2026. https://www. khmertimeskh.com/501823138/china-accounts-for-54-ofcambodias-total-investment. Tan, H.S. George, S. Inderjit, Jessica Ong Hai Liaw, and Kwong Fook Wen. “Relations Between Cambodia and China: The Impact Towards Cambodia’s Sovereignty.” International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), 93


March 27, 2025. https://rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/ articles/relations-between-cambodia-and-china-the-impacttowards-cambodias-sovereignty/. Thul, Prak Chan. “US Ends Cambodia Aid Programme over Deforestation, Targeting of Activists.” The Jakarta Post, June 17, 2021. https://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2021/06/17/ us-ends-cambodia-aid-programme-over-deforestation-targetingof-activists. U.S. Department of State. ForeignAssistance.gov – Cambodia, accessed June 2026. https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/ KHM/1/2024/disbursements. Zeilberger, Celia. “Member Spotlight: ECODIT—Empowering Cambodia’s Youth as Change Agents for the Environment.” Pacific Strategies & Assessments Council, 2022. https:// pscouncil.org/a/Member_Spotlight/2022/Member_Spotlight_ ECODIT_Empowering_Cambodias_Youth_as_Change_ Agents_for_the_Environment.aspx. Zhang, Kaiwei, and Liang Jun. “Asia-Pacific Community: Environmental Cooperation with China Benefits Cambodia, Minister Says.” People’s Daily Online, March 20, 2026. https:// en.people.cn/n3/2026/0320/c90000-20438205.html. Zhang, Kaiwei, and Zhong Wenxing, eds. “Chinese-Backed Charitable Organizations Contribute to Improving Cambodia’s Healthcare Sector.” People’s Daily Online, February 13, 2025. https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/0213/c90000-20276402.html. 94


Do State Capacity and Farmer Support Matter to Democratic NationBuilding? A Hypothesis Test in the Case of Japan By: Ruichong (Richard) Xu

About the Author: Richard (Ruichong) Xu is a fourth-year Echols Scholar at the University of Virginia from Ningbo, China. He majors in Political Philosophy, Policy, and Law and Foreign Affairs. His academic interests center on political philosophy, international relations, and law, and extend to psychology, psychoanalysis, and the philosophy of marriage. He is the author of two books: “A Brief Talk About the Law” and “Principles of a Normative Constitution.” His research on postwar Japan examines how inherited administrative institutions and land reform contributed to rural political incorporation and democratic nation-building. 97


Abstract: Why did democratic nation-building take root in postwar Japan despite the country’s prewar authoritarian trajectory? This article examines how inherited state capacity and rural political incorporation contributed to that outcome. Using within-case process tracing across prewar and occupied Japan, it evaluates two hypotheses: that existing administrative institutions enabled democratic reform and that farmers’ practical acceptance of the postwar order supported its consolidation. The analysis traces a sequence in which surviving Japanese institutions facilitated occupation-era land redistribution, which gave tenant farmers a material stake in the new order and encouraged their electoral and organizational incorporation. Prewar Japan demonstrates that strong state capacity alone was insufficient for democracy, while the postwar evidence supports a more conditional account linking administrative capacity, redistributive reform, and social incorporation. Although the case does not establish either factor as universally necessary or sufficient, it suggests that externally directed democratic reforms gain firmer foundations when effective implementation is coupled with tangible benefits for politically significant social groups. Following its defeat in World War II in 1945, Japan came under a U.S.-led Allied occupation. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) directed the occupation and worked through the Japanese government to implement political and social reforms. Japan subsequently developed a stable democratic political order and is widely regarded as a classic success case 98


of democratic nation-building. Its transition from a defeated imperial power to a durable postwar democracy raises an important question: what made this outcome possible? This paper aims to contribute to discussions of the reasons behind the success of Japan’s post–World War II democratic nation-building. Democratic nation-building requires more than constitutional design. A democratic order must be implemented through administrative institutions, and it must gain acceptance from groups large enough to stabilize or destabilize the new regime. This theory yields two testable hypotheses: (i)

H1, the state-capacity hypothesis: strong pre-existing state institutions are an important condition for successful democratic nation-building because they allow reformers to implement democratic reforms through inherited administrative structures rather than govern through direct substitution or chaos.

(ii) H2, the farmer-support hypothesis: farmers’ support is important for successful democratic nation-building because, in an agrarian society, a large rural population can either stabilize the new order through acceptance and incorporation or undermine it through resistance. This paper tests both hypotheses in Japan from the late prewar period through the occupation and early postwar 99


consolidation. Its central claim is cautious: Japan does not show that state capacity automatically generates democracy. It suggests that democratic nation-building became plausible when inherited state capacity was redirected toward land reform, and when that reform gave farmers a practical stake in the new political order.1 The test requires precise concepts and clear working definitions. In the context of this paper, strong state capacity means the state’s ability to formulate, transmit, and implement binding decisions through coherent administrative institutions. This paper measures it through four indicators: bureaucratic coherence, territorial reach, implementation capacity, and institutional continuity after rupture. Successful democratic nation-building is embodied not only in the proclamation of a constitution, but also in the establishment and sustained operation of representative institutions, repeated competitive elections, and democratic institutional continuity after the occupation. Farmers’ support does not necessarily mean ideological devotion to or endorsement of liberal democracy. It means practical acceptance and incorporation into the new order, as measured by the absence of sustained rural violence, acceptance of land reform, rural voting behavior, and the 1 Fukuyama, Francis. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Cornell University Press, 2004, pp. 1–14; Dobbins, James, et al. America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq. RAND Corporation, 2003, pp. xiii–xxvi; Monten, Jonathan. “Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 656, no. 1, 2014, pp. 173–91.

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presence of agricultural organizations.2 Table 1 summarizes these concepts and their indicators.

“Successful democratic nation-building is embodied not only in the proclamation of a constitution, but also in the establishment and sustained operation of representative institutions, repeated competitive elections, and democratic institutional continuity after the occupation” Table 1: Variables and Key Indicators in the Context of this Hypothesis Test Concept Strong state capacity (independent variable for H1)

Working Definition The ability to formulate, transmit, and implement binding decisions through coherent administrative institutions

Key Indicators The central bureaucracy’s ability to tax, implement policies, and maintain administrative reach across the country; institutional continuity after 1945

2 Fukuyama, Francis. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Cornell University Press, 2004, pp. 1–14; Kellstedt, Paul M., Guy D. Whitten. The Fundamentals of Political Science Research. 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 104–23; Pollock, Philip H. The Essentials of Political Analysis. Sage/CQ Press. Chapter 3, “Proposing Explanations, Framing Hypotheses, and Making Comparisons,” pp. 48–58.

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Concept Working Definition Key Indicators Farmers’ support Practical acceptance Acceptance of of and participation land reform; low (independent in the new political sustained rural variable for H2) order, without violence; electoral necessarily endorsing participation; democratic ideals political activity through agricultural organizations Successful Establishment Functioning democratic and sustained representative nation-building operation of a institutions; (dependent democratic political repeated competitive variable for H1, order following elections; democratic H2) intervention institutional continuity after the occupation Methodologically, the paper uses within-case process tracing. Collier defines process tracing as the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence in light of explicit hypotheses, with special attention to description and sequence.3 The paper, therefore, treats prewar/wartime Japan and postwar occupied Japan as two temporal cases inside one country. The first case asks whether strong state capacity existed before 1945 and whether it was sufficient to sustain democratic nation-building. The second asks whether inherited capacity survived defeat and enabled reform implementation. The test uses several forms of evidence. The initial state3 Collier, David. “Understanding Process Tracing.” PS: Political Science & Politics, vol. 44, no. 4, 2011, pp. 823–30.

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capacity test is a hoop test:4 if Japan lacked strong capacity before 1945, H1’s proposed mechanism would not be supported in this case. A stronger smoking-gun-style test5 for H1 would be evidence that occupation reforms were actually implemented through Japanese institutions because direct American administration was impractical. For H2, the key tests are whether farmers were politically significant, whether land reform benefited them materially, whether they mounted sustained anti-regime violence, and whether they were incorporated into postwar electoral and organizational politics. Table 2: Process-Tracing Tests Hypothesis

Test Type

H1: State capacity

Hoop

Expected Evidence Japan had a centralized bureaucracy, territorial reach, and policy implementation capacity before 1945

Result to Evaluate If absent, H1’s proposed mechanism is unsupported in this case; if present, H1 remains viable

4 Passing a hoop test is a necessary condition for a hypothesis to be valid or strongly plausible. That is, if the hypothesis fails a hoop test, the hypothesis is seriously weakened or eliminated. If it passes, the hypothesis survives, but it is not yet strongly supported. 5 A smoking-gun test provides evidence that is sufficient to strongly support a hypothesis, but not necessary. That is, if the hypothesis passes a smoking-gun test, the hypothesis receives strong support. If it fails, the hypothesis is not eliminated, because the “smoking gun” may simply be unavailable.

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Hypothesis

Test Type

H1: State capacity

Hoop

H1: State capacity

Smokinggun-style

H2: Farmer support

Hoop

H2: Farmer support

Auxiliary/ straw

H2: Farmer support

Smokinggun-style

Expected Evidence Significant administrative capacity survived after 1945 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) implemented reforms through Japanese ministries/local institutions Farmers were demographically and politically important Little sustained farmer violence against reform or the new regime Farmers became electorally and organizationally incorporated

Result to Evaluate If absent, the reform-throughinstitutions mechanism is substantially weakened Strongly supports H1’s mechanism

If farmers were marginal, H2 weakens Supports H2 only when paired with incorporation evidence Strong evidence that rural support stabilized democracy

1. Hypothesis Testing in Prewar and Wartime Japan Prewar and wartime Japan pass the first state-capacity hoop test. The Meiji state had created a centralized bureaucracy, 104


national education, conscription, taxation, and administrative chains linking center and locality. Gordon’s account of the modern Japanese state emphasizes political unification, central bureaucracy, compulsory education, and the conscript army as core features of state-building. By the 1930s and early 1940s, the Japanese state possessed sufficient capacity to mobilize society for total war, regulate economic life, police dissent, and coordinate national production. This was not a weak or fragmented state. The independent variable in H1—substantial pre-existing state capacity—was clearly present before 1945.6 Yet prewar Japan also demonstrates why state capacity must not be treated as a sufficient cause of democracy. It would be inaccurate to say that prewar Japan had no democratic elements. The Diet, elections, political parties, and periods of party cabinets all existed, especially during the era often described as Taishō or interwar democracy. But these institutions were embedded within an imperial constitutional order in which the military, bureaucracy, emperor-centered ideology, and elite veto points significantly limited democratic sovereignty. The 1920s were therefore not a total absence of democracy but a fragile and partial democratic phase. When economic and political crises deepened in the late 1920s and 1930s, strong state institutions were not reliably aligned 6 Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 62–70, pp. 91–93, pp. 209–15.

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with representative government. They could be redirected toward empire, repression, and military mobilization, as they did in history.7 The agrarian question provides the most useful diagnostic evidence for why state capacity did not produce democratic nation-building before 1945. Rural Japan was marked by tenancy, landlord influence, vulnerability to price shocks, and recurring tenant disputes. Gordon’s treatment of interwar rural life and the depression crisis shows that rural distress exposed the limits of party government.8 Yotsumoto similarly connects landlordtenant relations and rural hierarchy to the wider crisis from which Japanese fascism drew strength.9 The point is not that farmers uniformly embraced militarism, or that rural society alone caused democratic breakdown. The more limited inference is that strong state capacity operated within a rural order that did not give many middle-income and poor farmers a robust stake in parliamentary democracy. A state can reach villages, collect information, and mobilize people without incorporating them democratically. This finding is important for both hypotheses. For H1, prewar Japan shows that state capacity is not sufficient. The 7 Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 161–72. 8 Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 139–48, pp. 181–95. 9 Yotsumoto, Yukio. “Why Did Japan Fail to Achieve Full-Fledged Democracy before World War II? An Analysis of Class Relations and Forces Using Marxian Class Theories.” Japan Studies Review, vol. 13, 2009, pp. 91–110.

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problem was not administrative incapacity but the political and social uses or applications of capacity. For H2, prewar Japan suggests that farmers’ practical orientation toward the regime mattered. Many farmers did not need or embrace abstract democratic ideology. Instead, they needed land security, relief from tenancy burdens, and confidence that representative politics could protect their own livelihood and basic well-being. If parliamentary institutions did not deliver such benefits, their social foundation remained fragile. This is consistent with broader agrariandemocratization literature, from Moore’s classic emphasis on landed elites and peasants to Ziblatt’s argument that landholding inequality can obstruct democratization where rural elites retain social and institutional power.10 Prewar Japan therefore weakens any simple version of H1 but sets up the test of H2: democratic nation-building would require not only capacity but robust rural incorporation as well. 2. Hypothesis Testing in Postwar Japan Postwar Japan provides the second and more direct test. The defeat delegitimized the old order, but it did not produce an administrative vacuum. Gordon’s chapter on occupied Japan, titled “new departures and durable structures,” vividly captures 10 Moore, Barrington, Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Beacon Press, 1966; Ziblatt, Daniel. “Does Landholding Inequality Block Democratization? A Test of the ‘Bread and Democracy’ Thesis and the Case of Prussia.” World Politics, vol. 60, no. 4, 2008, pp. 610–41.

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the central point. The military and some repressive institutions were dismantled, but ministries, local administrative routines, legal procedures, and bureaucratic personnel remained sufficiently functional to be redirected.11 This matters because H1 predicts not merely that a state existed, but that inherited institutions would allow reformers to implement democratic reforms without direct foreign substitution. The occupation, therefore, offers a strong test: if SCAP had to replace Japanese administration wholesale, H1 would be weakened; if SCAP governed through it and reforms were implemented effectively, H1 would gain substantial support.12 The evidence supports the latter interpretation. Gordon states that SCAP ruled indirectly through the Japanese government.13 Monten likewise treats Japan as a case in which the United States could work through a functioning state apparatus rather than build one from scratch, and the legal reform literature similarly stresses that many reforms were enacted through domestic governmental machinery.14 This is the smoking-gun-style 11 Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 224–38. 12 Monten, Jonathan. “Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 656, no. 1, 2014, pp. 173–91; Takemae, Eiji. Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy. Translated and adapted by Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann, Continuum, 2002. 13 Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 229. 14 Monten, Jonathan. “Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 656, no. 1, 2014, pp. 178–83.

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evidence for H1. It does not prove that state capacity is universally necessary for all democratic nation-building, but it strongly matches the mechanism predicted by the hypothesis. Reform was not merely commanded; it was administratively transmitted and executed through Japan’s existing state institutions.15 Land reform is the best test of the mechanism because it links state capacity, farmer support, and democratic stabilization into a single causal sequence. The Second Agricultural Land Reform Law of 1946, drafted by Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry under occupation direction, initiated compulsory redistribution of land to tenants. Recent quantitative work by Chiang, Fan, and Hsu summarizes the background: as of April 1946, about 28.7 percent of farmers were landless tenants, another 38.4 percent were semi-tenants, and rents often consumed 50 to 60 percent of annual crop yields. The reform transferred a large share of cultivated land to tenants, reducing tenancy sharply.16 Gordon describes the result as a thoroughgoing transformation of the countryside, making owner-cultivators the dominant rural figure.17 15 Oppler, Alfred C. “The Reform of Japan’s Legal and Judicial System under Allied Occupation.” Washington Law Review, vol. 51, no. 4, 1976, pp. 997– 1023. 16 Chiang, Daniel Minghan, Elliott Fan, Dexter Hsu. “A Taste of Communists’ Own Medicine: The Political Consequences of Land Reforms in Japan and Taiwan.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 18095, 2025, pp. 7–9. 17 Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 232–34; Grad, Andrew J. “Land Reform in Japan.” Pacific Affairs, vol. 21, no. 2, 1948, pp. 115–35; Williamson, M. W. “Land Reform in Japan.” Journal of Farm Economics, vol. 33, no. 4, 1951, pp. 458–69.

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The crucial process-tracing question is whether this reform would have been much harder without inherited administrative capacity. The answer is almost certainly yes. Land redistribution required cadastral knowledge, local administrative chains, legal authority, rural commissions, records of ownership and tenancy, and compliance monitoring. Finn’s account of the reform notes that the government served as agent for land transfers, that rural land commissions administered the program nationally, and that the commissions handled numerous complicated issues. The reform reduced tenant-tilled land from 46 percent in 1941 to about 10 percent in 1949, turning more than three million tenants into owners of 5.5 million acres. These are not the results one would reasonably expect in a setting of total administrative collapse or replacement.18 The same evidence also tests H2. If farmer support mattered, then we should observe not only formal reform but practical rural acceptance or incorporation. Here, the evidence is stronger than a mere absence of protest, but the absence of sustained violent resistance is still important. Finn reports that a reform involving millions of farmers and vast amounts of land produced only about a hundred incidents of violence and no bloodshed. This observation is not by itself smoking-gun evidence 18 Finn, Richard B. Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan. University of California Press, 1992, pp. 130–32; Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 232–34.

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of farmer support; quiescence can have many causes. But when paired with the massive tenant-to-owner transition, it becomes an auxiliary outcome consistent with H2. Widespread rural rebellion against the reform would have weakened H2. Instead, the reform seemed to give many cultivators convincing reasons to accept the new order after the land reform.19 The positive incorporation evidence is even stronger. Bullock argues that rice agriculture and small retail became chief social bases of conservative rule after 1955, and that agriculture and retail together supplied about three-quarters of support for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the 1950s and nearly half by the late 1980s. He also emphasizes that agricultural organizations helped implement state policy and direct political action, standing in the grey zone between state and society.20 Chiang, Fan, and Hsu provide more recent quantitative evidence that sons of tenant farmers were significantly more likely to prefer the Liberal or Democratic parties in 1955 and less likely to prefer the Socialist or Communist parties. Their locality-level results also associate greater land-reform intensity with higher right-wing vote share in 1955, while controlling for 1947 vote shares.21 This is close to 19 Finn, Richard B. Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan. University of California Press, 1992, pp. 130–32. 20 Bullock, Robert. “Redefining the Conservative Coalition: Agriculture and Small Business in 1990s Japan.” The State of Civil Society in Japan, edited by Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 175–76, 179. 21 Chiang, Daniel Minghan, Elliott Fan, Dexter Hsu. “A Taste of Communists’ Own Medicine: The Political Consequences of Land Reforms in Japan and

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smoking-gun-style evidence for H2’s incorporation mechanism: beneficiaries of rural reform became linked to postwar electoral politics rather than organized against the democratic regime.22 The integrated result is stronger than either hypothesis alone. H1 explains implementation: strong inherited institutions made land reform feasible at national scale. H2 explains stabilization: the reform gave farmers a material stake in the new regime and incorporated them into democratic competition. The causal graph is therefore not simply “state capacity causes democracy.” It is: strong state capacity enabled land reform; land reform generated farmer stakeholding; farmer stakeholding contributed to low rural resistance and political incorporation; and rural incorporation helped stabilize democratic nation-building. The causal sequence in postwar Japanese democratic nationbuilding is presented as follows.

The findings are substantial but need to be qualified. H1 Taiwan.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 18095, 2025, pp. 12–15, 25–29; Dore, Ronald P. Land Reform in Japan. Oxford University Press, 1959. 22 Finn, Richard B. Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan. University of California Press, 1992, pp. 130–32.

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receives substantial support as an implementation mechanism. Japan had strong state capacity before 1945, and after the defeat, SCAP relied heavily on surviving institutions to carry out reforms. But H1 must be qualified because prewar Japan shows that strong capacity can serve non-democratic purposes and hence that it is insufficient for successful democratic nation-building. H2 also receives substantial support, though with appropriate caution. Farmers were politically important; land reform produced concrete benefits; major rural anti-regime violence appears absent; and farmers were later incorporated electorally and organizationally. But this does not show that farmers loved liberal democracy in an ideological sense, or that farmers’ support is universally crucial to successful democratic nation-building. It simply shows that many farmers had practical reasons to accept and participate in the new order, and this highly plausible inference is enough to support H2 as defined here: farmers’ practical incorporation mattered significantly when they constituted a major political force. Conclusion The results of the hypothesis tests conducted in this paper do not categorically show that inherited strong state institutions are sufficient to lead to successful democratic nationw-building, nor that farmer support alone can stabilize an imposed regime. Taken together, these findings suggest a narrower but more plausible pattern of successful nation-building: democratic nation-building 113


is most promising when implementation capacity and social incorporation reinforce each other. Strong state capacity made reform executable; land reform made the new order practically valuable to a major social group (i.e., farmers). The Japanese case thus supports a conditional theory: external actors may be better positioned to achieve successful democratic nation-building when inherited institutions can be redirected toward reforms that give strategically important citizens reasons to accept and actively participate in the new regime. As for whether external actors can nation-build from scratch, Japan’s case cannot provide a compelling answer, as the country never had a weak state capacity in either the prewar or postwar periods.

“democratic nation-building is most promising when implementation capacity and social incorporation reinforce each other”

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Political Science Research. 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2018. Monten, Jonathan. “Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 656, no. 1, 2014, pp. 173–91. Moore, Barrington, Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Beacon Press, 1966. Oppler, Alfred C. “The Reform of Japan’s Legal and Judicial System under Allied Occupation.” Washington Law Review, vol. 51, no. 4, 1976, pp. 997–1023. Pollock, Philip H. The Essentials of Political Analysis. Sage/ CQ Press. Chapter 3, “Proposing Explanations, Framing Hypotheses, and Making Comparisons,” pp. 48–58. Takemae, Eiji. Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy. Translated and adapted by Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann, Continuum, 2002. Williamson, M. W. “Land Reform in Japan.” Journal of Farm Economics, vol. 33, no. 4, 1951, pp. 458–69. Yotsumoto, Yukio. “Why Did Japan Fail to Achieve Full-Fledged Democracy before World War II? An Analysis of Class Relations and Forces Using Marxian Class Theories.” Japan Studies Review, vol. 13, 2009, pp. 91–110. Ziblatt, Daniel. “Does Landholding Inequality Block 118


Democratization? A Test of the ‘Bread and Democracy’ Thesis and the Case of Prussia.” World Politics, vol. 60, no. 4, 2008, pp. 610–41.

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Virginia Journal of International Affairs Fall 2026 University of Virginia Printed by Bailey Printing Inc., Charlottesville, Virginia Sponsored by the International Relations Organization, a contracted independent organization, and the Honor Committee, an agency organization. Cover featuring photograph by Antoine Schibler via Unsplash. Photographs by Sorasak, Alka Jha, Kim Eang Eng, Rap Dela Rea and The New York Public Library, via Unsplash.


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