歷史家Timothy Synder在《論暴政》一書中 帶出了「必然性歷史觀(politics of inevitability)」的概念。一言概括之，即是歷史必然 按照某個軌跡前進。資本主義者認為自然產 生市場，而市場帶來民主，最終令眾生幸福； 共產主義者則認為自然推進科技發展，令社 會進步，從而推動社會變革，最終建構烏托 邦。 冷戰過後，共產主義的倒台，印證其軌跡的失 敗；至於資本主義的軌跡亦不斷被挑戰。近幾 年，世界各地都捲起社會運動的風潮。我們不 禁想：社會運動會否也有同樣的軌跡跟隨。目 光轉回二零一九年勇敢舉起抗爭旗幟的香港 人，現在的軌跡看似是身處於低谷與迷茫。當 歷史已經不斷驗證軌跡可被顛覆, 香港人又 該如何從歷史學習，打破既有規限？ According to the theory of politics of inevitability, history is thought to be move solely in one direction regardless of the past. For the inevitable capitalists, capitalism would make the world a better place by bringing liberal democracy. On the flip side, the inevitable Marxist put their faith in a class revolution as the ultimate means to achieve a better world. The conflict of the two ideologies came to a watershed moment along with the end of the Cold War. The failure of the communist campaign had shown the cruel reality of the trajectory in the idea while someone thinks the triumph of Capitalism can be the end of history. The world is believed to be advancing in a fixed way. However, the adoration of capitalism has been challenged by many social movements in different Western countries. These efforts might be shifting history into another direction again. This brings us to think: is there always a predetermined future? The situation of Hong Kong has been frustrating for those Hong Kongers who showed their strong wills to reverse the course of inevitability . Many people anticipate that Hong Kong is going to gradually declined and some have decided to leave. Yet, the examples above have shown that the so-called politics of inevitability is indeed not an inevitable fate. Hence, what sorts of inspiration can HongKongers learn from the history that brought radical change to the world?
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現已被政權以國安法拘押的何桂藍在入獄前曾寫下： 「 現在的香港，已踏入反抗政治的時代。」
Preface 序 by UTHKPASS 2020-2021
國家機器的步步進逼，民主陣營的樹倒猢猻散，逼使反 抗者難以再於公共空間用振臂一呼，換來千聲和應。不過，面 對公共空間的紅線已成「紅海」，反抗行動依然體現於個體意 念的集合，例如六四三十二週年遍地開花的紀念活動，爆買「 阿布泰」，蘋果日報等等。有感於此，本會執委作為關心香港 時政的領頭者，決定出版《溯念》一刊，緊貼最新社政潮流，把 立於極權寒風下的個體意念呈現於讀者眼前。
中文論述的重磅主打，是《時代曲的公共意義》，著重刻劃流 行曲中聽眾與詞人兩種個體共同塑造的公共關係；另外， 《是 時候捨棄黃藍二分鬥爭思維》則向公眾拷問個體不再需要「鬥 黃」，而應以有否弘揚港式文化為主軸； 《當反抗成為義務》則 以哲學概念分析強權不應是不參與公共事務的理由，而應抓 緊每個可能的機會吹起反抗的號角。至於英文專題文章方面， 則會聚焦於疫情如何揭示外傭群體廣受歧視， 乃至於形成一種 「現代奴役」 ；同時，第二篇文章會從宏觀角度統整後國安法 時代香港人為何遇上精神健康的困境。同時，第三及第四篇 文章會分別反思雨傘運動的起因，及抗爭與生育權的關係。 承接以上文章以個體為中心，本會亦希望涉 足於每個香港人在去留之間的撕裂與掙扎。 《海外 香港人的身份矛盾》為論壇中文文本，希望為讀者 梳理新一波移民潮下的各種觀點，及縮窄身土不 二與身處海外的分歧；另外，本會亦有幸訪問青年 歷史系學者鄭雋言先生，為香港人描繪離散群體 的脈絡，同時重塑殖民地時代華人群體的形象。訪 問全文亦以英文記於刊中。 本會之所以採用「溯念」一詞，有兩大意思： 一，回溯昔日的歷史與初心，為迷失的香港人重構 前進的方向；二，上接年刊《葦航》的「生如逆旅，一 葦以航」，在逆行之間堅守信念，堅持思考。 香港人要走的路漫長且顛簸。 《詩·秦風·蒹葭》一詩有 云： 「溯洄從之，道阻且長。」本會《葦航》及《溯念》兩刊已把「 本土派」、 「在加港人」、 「去留」、 「港史」、 「反抗」、 「信仰」等香 港人熟悉的名詞以不同文章闡釋。回應著過去，立足於現在， 前瞻向未來，本會寄望香港人不論身處何地，都要讓公共討 論永不止熄。
【註：所有文章不代表本會立場，而本會亦感謝各文章的匿名提供者。】 All essays only reflect the opinions from anonymous writers, but not the UTHKPASS.
Pictures from HKFP 圖片由HKFP網上報道提供
T H E L A S T O F A P P L E D A I L Y 蘋 果 日 報 ， 後 會 有 期
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(1995-2021)
Part 1: F a i t h
電影《V劍客》中就曾指： 「信念是刀槍不入的。」首部分得名「信念」，便 是希望叩問讀者，日常生活的交流能成為信念的對話嗎？甚至到了海 外，信念也能不滅嗎？ “Beneath this mask , there is more than flesh. Beneath this mask , there is an idea, Mr. Creedy, and ideas are bulletproof.” - Quote from V for Vendetta. Whenever humans are living collectively, the exchange of ideas is constantly happening. Can we, Hongkongers, keep the torch shining even miles away from our home? 8
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時代曲的
「時代被顛覆」－麥浚龍《酷兒》
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公 共意義
歌曲與社會，素來都有著不可分割的關係。社會學家R . Serge Denisoff便曾於 “Protest Songs: Those on the Top Forty and Those of the Streets” 一文中指出：「歌曲的 公共用途常被用作對外政治宣傳 （ Both practitioners and critics have, despite this fact, tended to see music as an effective external weapon.）。」放之於香港的民主 運動，由八九六四支聯會的「民主歌聲獻中華」，到二零一四雨傘運動中的「撐起雨 傘」，再到二零一九年反送中運動的「願榮光歸香港」，這些歌曲都被看待為社會運 動的圖騰，不但能承載運動參與者的共同訴求及精神，更能把政治理念簡化，輔以旋 律讓公眾更易接收。
“換言之，隨著政治理念的更動，歌曲的內容亦會隨之流變。”
不過，不止以上這些本質已是政治宣傳的歌曲，筆者認為香港整個流行曲生態亦逐漸 與大時代背景吻合，以回應時代為主題，甚至不自覺反映了社會運動中的特徵。因 此，筆者在下文將會以歌詞內容及歌壇生態兩方面論證它們與時代的關連，指出流行 曲不只停留於個人聆聽的層面，而是承載把想法放至公共空間作交流的意義。 11
隨著市民對港府的不滿不斷上升，不少歌者以 歌直接表達對社會的控訴。香港作為經歷九七過 渡、國民教育風波等多次跌盪的浮城，芸芸流行 曲中並不缺乏對大政治氣候的描述。然而，比起 《願榮光歸香港》中直接以「黎明來到要光復這 香港」來主動呼籲抗爭者堅持抗爭，一般流行曲 都是以被動的角色回應社會議題。 當中的俵俵者，莫過於2011年10月謝安琪發 表的《你們的幸福》。當時的香港人，剛打開 2010年代的大門，便已迎來數之不盡的社會問 題，例如6月土瓜灣三級火引發的劏房問題、8月 的外傭居港權爭議及雙非孕婦產子等等。然而， 即使問題遍及法律權限、住屋安全，甚至中港關 係，大部分升斗巿民均抱持漠不關心的態度，而 只執著於個人瑣事。在這樣的前設下，填詞人林 夕便以此曲向公眾拷問「究竟要做痛苦的人，還 是幸福的豬」。翻查歌詞，字裏行間不乏對所謂 「港豬」的諷刺及批判。左一句「飲飽吃醉是容 易極的快樂」，右一句「人間多少瘡疤見報 若 太深奧懶得知道」，已把「港豬」只愛吃喝玩 樂，而不過問蒼生的特徵躍然紙上。
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/ 你 失 去 耐 性 失 落 飲 飽 吃 醉 是 容 易 極 的 快 樂
牽 手 看 偶 像 連 續 劇 哭 哭 笑 笑
輕 輕 鬆 鬆 將 恩 怨 情 慾 變 娛 樂 /
同時，「填密這一生一秒 還自覺有幸繁忙是一種祝福抵抗孤獨」便指出都市人愛把生 活的時間表填得密密麻麻，根本沒有時間花腦力心思為社會上的矛盾找出答案。 到了一零年代中，「港豬」的話題從輿論重心退下來， 取而代之的是覺醒後對民主的渴望。受雨傘運動的 啟蒙，香港人逐漸對抗爭有了想像，亦從政權及警 察手中親身體驗了如何被制度打壓。更加重要的是 ，隨著831 框架的空降，民主的落實在香港人心目 中彷彿成為永遠不會在這片土地上綻放的彼岸花。 在社運情緒尚高漲下，謝安琪所唱的《雞蛋與羔羊》 及《家明》便用了兩種角度敘述社會上追求民主的 決心。《雞蛋與羔羊》中，儘管創作人周博賢指創 作靈感來自奧斯卡得獎電影《被奪走的十二年》， 香港人卻視之為描繪反抗壓迫的過程。
/A餐雞蛋撞石牆 不怕壯烈下場，決不退讓 B餐俯首做白羊 一世困在牧場 餐券這兩張，怎麼取向/
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歌詞中「A餐雞蛋撞石牆，不怕壯烈下場，決不退讓」，及「B餐俯首做白羊，一世困 在牧場，餐券這兩張，怎麼取向」，對當時坐在街頭上的香港人而言，
這兩張「餐券」的對比反映了是否值得去付出個人代價來 追求改革體制的掙扎。 不過，正如上文所說，歌曲並沒有明確指出哪一種價值觀是正確出路，或是否有越大 犧牲的覺悟就必然是好，而是把選擇的空間交回給聽眾；至於《家明》，按填詞人黃 偉文所指，歌詞是對六四的懷緬。「他出發找最愛 今天也未回來」，這兩句所述的， 是前往天安門後慘死在坦克下的中國大陸抗爭者，而找的「最愛」，正正是政治制度 的民主化。與雨傘運動一樣，參與者雖不致於犧牲生命，但依舊放棄了課堂或工作走 到了登打士街及金鐘佔領區尋找「民主」的最愛。這種犧牲的精神令兩者存在了某種 異曲同工之妙。與此同時，「留低哪種意義就看世間怎記載」一句亦向大眾表達這些 社會運動將會載入史冊，而被定性為「佔中暴亂」還是「雨傘運動」則看公民社會有 多堅持民主的價值。由此可見，即使是一般派台歌，歌詞亦往往連結至當刻的社會議 題，令聽眾能與之有所共鳴，成為時代的紀錄。
填詞人固然能在新派台的歌曲寫下在時代下最新鮮的感受，但時代的連結卻能跨越時 間的限制，把一些已有相當歷史的歌曲重新「激活」。雨傘運動中，Beyond 的《光 輝歲月》及《海闊天空》便不斷在集會時被主持及歌手唱出。以《光輝歲月》為例， 儘管創作的時空下並沒有任何與政權周旋的元素，不過「今天只有殘留的軀殼 迎接 光輝歲月 風雨中抱緊自由」此數句中對自由的引頸以盼便成為當時運動參與者的座右 銘，甚至成為遊行中所展示的標語，可算是鞏固了公共空間中追逐自由的心態。 到了近年，1997年紅透半邊天的《傾城》亦屢次再被翻唱。最典型的例子莫過於上 年九月發佈的《霓虹黯色》微電影採用了重新翻唱的《傾城》為插曲，而此翻唱版的 觀看次數更是多達七十多萬次。筆者略略看了一下影片的留言版，不難發現獲大量讚 好的留言都是指出歌曲出得及時，例如「現在出就是對香港最好的告別」，「現在聽 感到香港的憂傷」等等。由此可見，經歷了反送中運動一路到現在，市民大眾一直需 要一個能反映無力阻止既有秩序崩塌的窗口，而《傾城》正正補上了這個位置。於不 滿中共及港府施政的市民而言，香港早已不再是心目中熟悉的模樣。即使反抗了大半 年，換來的只有對數以百計抗爭者的清算，以及對民主力量的肅清。
/浮華盛世 作分手佈景/
正因如此，「浮華盛世 作分手佈景」一句便響 應香港人心中對新香港的陌生。更甚者，公共政 策學者如張炳良，葉健民均形容後國安法時代的 香港如同「二次回歸」，北京急欲透過法制改革 為先聲，全面改造香港社會，促使大量有能力移 民的中產直視留下共存亡或到外找尋新生活的兩 難。當移民者抱著對舊香港的南柯一夢離境時， 此句亦把他們在香港 的旅途劃上句號。句子如 是，《傾城》中的用字也能準確地回應現在香港 不再能堅守以往引以為傲的核心價值。「煙花」 ，「瓊樓」，「笙歌」等通通具有繁華的意思， 象徵政制崩塌前穩定的假象。隨著它們停下來， 「倒了陣形」，香港的繁榮亦因而告一段落。
不止於描述假象的破滅，《傾城》更寫下集體意志的渺小（collective will)。踏入千 禧年代，公民社會中集體意志的成效被大量學者吹捧，而其中的俵俵者為華盛頓大學 的Paul Burstein 及April Linton。他們在 “The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Polic y : Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns” 一文中便認為政黨，壓力團體，及社會運動是對 影響政府施政的重要因素。 對尚在經歷太平盛世的上一代來說：他們便經常強調一種論述：只要人心不死，公民 社會能延續的話，香港依然尚有希望。他們經常拿著的例子便是零三年百萬人上街後 阻止廿三條通過來證明集體意志的強大。但時移世易，雨傘運動的慘淡收場，反送中 運動中雷厲風行的打壓均一次又一次地推翻以上的定律。即使人數眾多，有共同希望 到達的應許之地，亦未能遏止由少數有權力者所掌控的暴政。正如《傾城》中所寫， 當全城為香港花光狠勁，卻只換來「如同苦笑 擠出的高興」。
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與無力感相輔相承的，還有希望。二零一九年的反送中運動史無前例地團 結了民主力量，亦加深了不同陣營的連結。由社運高潮時和理非及勇武抗 爭者之間的不割蓆（即和理非理解勇武對於武力衝擊背後的理念，而勇武 相反亦體諒和理非未必能完全捨棄包袱的苦衷），到國安法不斷打壓下如 本土派劉穎匡所言般促使本土泛民的大和解，民主陣營再沒有過往常出現 的黨同伐異。這與梁繼平所說的：「連結香港人的，是痛苦」的道理不謀 而合。讀者可會問：這些通通與希望又有甚麼關係？正正是因為就算香 港變得陌生，就算集體意志不再被尊重，就算尚未找到所謂「破局」的可 能，已經被痛苦連結在一起的香港人開始相信彼此，令每個個體依然存有 對於改革體制的希望，甚至只是單純令居住地變得更美好的夙願。在這些 種種前設下，這亦難怪Rubberband 在二零一八年發佈的《未來見》再次 獲得捧紅。以上所述的情感連結與歌中「約定未知那遠路裡 同看著時代飛 舞」的精神遙相呼應，相約在達成願望後的香港再次相見。由於這種期許 未知何時何日才完結，香港人需要的是「棲於低壓 像呼吸都不對」的精神 支柱，才能堅持至實現「未來見」。
/ 約定未知
那遠路裡 同看著時代飛舞/
時代構建的不單單的是歌詞與之的連結，更是一個嶄新的歌壇生態，而嶄 新的模式恰恰就是反送中運動中建立出來的「無大台」形式。「無大台」 代表的是不再百分百相信權威，同時個體主宰自己命運的精神。當發號施 令的「大台」不再存在，就只剩下每個個體為自己的行動負責。台灣佛光 大學社會學暨社會工作學系副教授鄭祖光教授就於《從「反送中」到「光 復香港時代革命」：「無大台」的社會運動意味著什麼？》一文中指：「 在網路上「人人是大台」，任何人提出方案只要有人認同就可以形成集體 行動。」方案提不提出，方向如何，認不認同，到行不行動都全憑個人意 志。此精神本身源自2014年時抗爭者不滿以「佔中九子」，學民思潮及學 聯等為首的組織主導整場雨傘運動，甚至在爭議聲中走入政府總部談判。 儘管政治上「無大台」模式應否延續尚可爭論，現實就是「無大台」已經 拓展至其他生活範疇，例如文藝上，一拳，序言等小品書店在大量抗爭者 自願杯葛「三中商」下比以往累積了更多知名度。
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當然，要在社會運動的浪潮下打倒既有連鎖書店在商業市場的壟斷是不可 能，但至少已經帶來改變；放之於歌壇上，過往的歌手要一舉成名就需要 各大唱片公司或如T V B般的大型電視台的支持。但與書店市場不約而同的 是，社會運動揭示了既有秩序充斥大量中共在幕後操盤的紅色資本（TVB 就多次被戲稱為CCT V B，商務印書館亦被揭發由中聯辦全資擁有)，而在 反抗政府的呼聲越高下，與中共關係越見密切的商業巨頭亦連帶被視為政 權的附庸，從而被杯葛。與此同時，即使不是每間娛樂公司均如TVB 和 星夢般「紅底」，亦不代表旗下的歌手都能倖免於杯葛潮。以寰亞娛樂（ 香港）為例，旗下藝人如楊千嬅，陳小春早就因為他們在微博上表態成為 「護旗手」而成為杯葛的對象，但同一公司的陳健安，黃淑蔓等則沒有表 態而不受影響。由此可見，觀眾選擇是否關注一名歌手不是因為他或她所 屬於哪間唱片公司而被綑綁式對待，而是個體對於大政治氣候的表態。
「無大台」的形式把個體意志崇尚至更高位後，亦順帶提升了大眾對獨立 音樂的關注。比起與大型唱片公司簽約的歌手，獨立音樂人及樂隊不會被 合約限制，因而能有較大空間去表達至所思所想。這亦在以表態為先的時 代中越趨被重視。以今年極速走紅的Serrini為例，她亦曾就著限聚令， 國安法等影響全港的政策在社交媒體上評論，甚至敢於在國安法實施前於 Instagram「出帖」，這種做法在普遍較「謹言慎行」的娛樂圈上較為罕 見；無獨有偶，數之不盡的獨立音樂人便曾把社會運動的元素加入歌曲之 中，如LMF 的《二零一九》向濫用警權的控訴，My Little Airport在《今 夜到干諾道中一起瞓》表達無悔投入抗爭的堅決（「但我也是為這下一代 人 我也無愧於心」），以及《K同學》中對抗爭者被告暴動罪的唏噓（「 願這街坊裝可免被暴動罪追究」）。
更何況，成為一個音樂人不再如以往般艱難，只要有相關設備便能發佈至 Youtube，Soundcloud等各大網絡平台。觀眾在選擇大量增加下，捨棄所 謂「主流」的歌手亦不致「無歌聽」。相比之下，當所謂的主流繼續避談 政治，所創作的歌曲根本難以與聽眾有所共鳴。此外，個體的積極表態其 實是一種賭博：一方面就政治表態將無可避免招致中國大陸的封殺，失去 大量商業機會；但另一方面能藉表態換取不再依賴既有秩序的抗爭者的支 持。對於本身較以「地下」形式活躍的獨立音樂人而言，商業及演出機會 本身已較少，在代價較低的前設下將有更大誘因不平則鳴。當然，筆者不 是希望在此指出歌手的表態是充滿利益計算，只是「無大台」的突破令音 樂人了解到即使不加入大公司依然得以生存，個體能量本身也能用以積聚 支持者。
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筆者認為，歌詞與歌壇兩方面的流變均 是值得留意的，皆因它們共同構建了一 種雙向的公共交流(social interaction) 。正如著名社會學家Floyd N.House 於 1926年的 “Social Relations and Social Interaction” 一文所指，「一段公共關 係必然產生自個體在公共空間交流下後 的反應。」正如上文所述，不論是填詞 人新填的歌曲，還是早已存在於時代洪 流的舊歌，能否在當刻的香港再度掀起 熱潮的關鍵是要回應外在環境。因此， 歌詞打進了聽眾的心坎裏，連結了聽眾 與填詞人對時代的感悟，形成了公共交 流的首部分； 源於這種對共鳴的渴求，以及既有娛樂 巨頭對政治的緘默，聽眾不再依賴娛樂 巨頭推送的歌星作日常消遣。這可見個 體的政治取態逐漸取代娛樂巨頭的「品 牌效應」， 甚至音樂的品質，成為了 決定一個音樂單位能否受到大眾青睞的 因素。當「無大台」的模式延續至娛樂 界，聽眾對政治表態的好惡則重新塑造 了歌手圈，構建了整個公共交流的第二 部分。整體而言，兩部分的公共交流便 建立了一段獨特的公共關係。
“歌詞與歌壇兩方面的流變均是值得留意的， 皆因它們共同構建了一種雙向的公共交流”
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Bibliography Burstein, P., and A. Linton. 2002. “The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns.” Social Forces 81 (2): 380–408. https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2003.0004. Denisoff, R. Serge. 1970. “Protest Songs: Those on the Top Forty and Those of the Streets.” American Quarterly 22 (4): 807. https://doi.org/10.2307/2711871. House, Floyd N. 1926. “Social Relations and Social Interaction.” American Journal of Sociology 31 (5): 617–33. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2764352.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A8bfd49d53aeb13f b3776273500609f57. 何桂藍. 2019. 【 “ 專訪】屬於每一人的共同體 梁繼平：真正連結香港人的，是痛苦 | 立場人語 | 立 場新聞.” 立場新聞 Stand News. 立場新聞 Stand News. October 18, 2019. https:// thestandnews.page.link/nro9MaysAE6VewJH7. 巷仔口社會學. 2019. “從「反送中」到「光復香港時代革命」 ： 「無大台」的社會運動意味著什麼？.” The News Lens 關鍵評論網. August 31, 2019. https://www.thenewslens.com/article/124131.
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是時候捨棄黃藍二分鬥爭思維？
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還記得二月初，超過二十萬訂閱的Youtube 頻道試當真被指為無綫電視的 《咁大件事冇人講》節目拍攝音樂影片。此事招來大量網民負評，惹起試當 真「染藍」的疑雲，而連登等網上討論區更掀起一股「罷試當真」的熱潮。
也許，經歷過反送中運動，香港人早已習慣 在日常生活建構「黃色生活圈」。筆者當然 不會否定「黃色生活圈」在凝聚士氣，籌集 資金等層面上對鞏固同路人陣營的功用，但 時空換轉至後國安法時代的香港，為政治問 題表態需要付出極大代價。下筆之際，店舖 擺設抗爭者人偶的Chickeeduck 荃灣店便被 大量警察調查，更聲稱此店與國安法案件有 關；同樣為政治表態，50歲前大學教授亦因 在反國安法遊行中高叫「五大訴求」被判監 三個月。以上的例子不禁讓筆者思考，既然 身為「同呼吸，共命運」的命運共同體，我 們是不是理應對同路人多一點體諒，不再不 斷苛求香港人公開表態？ 不得不否認的是，在社會運動之時，必須要 透過塑造敵人來加強民主陣營自身的向心 力，而其中一個方法就是製造黃藍對立。正 如本土民主前線前發言人梁天琦在2016年的 立場新聞專訪中就指：「要鼓動反抗力量， 同仇敵氣係最強大的武器，最能煽動一股民 粹出來。」 的確，大眾根本沒空作大量政治 理論的分析，而從政者就需要把政治理論簡 單化，從而快速動員一般市民在日常生活實 踐抗爭。於是，這便形成「黃色經濟圈」。 不過，社會運動冷卻後大眾隨即退場，加上 言論自由和表達自由被箝制，短期內公民社 會難以再度向政權展開如反送中般的大規模 反擊，並不必要繼續大量動員；更有甚者， 製造對立必然會加劇整個香港的內耗，令 尚希望參與公共討論的市民繼續沉醉於「鬥 黃」之中，不斷尋找證據來判斷哪些店舖、 藝人或公司是黃還是藍（不說試當真，即使 是公開支持民主陣營的杜汶澤亦曾被謾罵， 而原因是他替被視為「藍」的KFC賣廣告） 。 以上把黃藍二分的現況說明後，為了加強論 述，接著會為一些常見的攻擊作反駁，而這 些攻擊可以簡單分為「情緒勒索論」、「延 續抗爭論」及「偽黃論」。「情緒勒索論」 的論調主要是訴諸於敵我之間的區隔，或強 調同路人能凝聚在一起，即「你係咪同路 人嚟架，你對唔對得住手足啊」，「依家幾 多手足入面受緊苦，係咪表個態都難？」等 等。筆者認為，這些批評都是未能跟貼時代 的表現。 除了上文提及了今時不同往日，為 政治表態隨時要承擔法律後果，筆者更希望 強調每個個體也要滿足經濟及生活需要。
CHANNEL 需要S
以杜汶澤的KFC事件為例，他早已因被中國大陸封殺而失去大量商業機會，但同時他 亦要盡量擴闊收入渠道而維持「喱騷」頻道的營運。開支如此龐大，杜汶澤接受廣告 合作是無可厚非。當然，筆者不是說今天杜汶澤走回大灣區或歌頌警察也要無限量包 容，而是要諒解同路人需要在堅守立場大義與為生活妥協中作出平衡。 至於第二種攻擊是「延續抗爭論」。秉持這種立場的批評者認為正正是因為遊行和集 會的選項已被抹煞，才更需要在日常生活堅持「黃藍對立」來時刻提醒大眾抗爭尚未 停止。 筆者當然不反對 繼續支持黃店，但經過反送中一役及肺炎肆虐，香港人早已 習慣不信任政府。根據香港民意研究所在上年十二月尾的調查指出，香港人對於政府 的信任淨值跌至負百分之二十七。由此可見，在日常生活已積累這麼多民怨下，根本 不需要更多的提醒。只要稍有空間或爭議性極大的議題出台，大規模抗爭再次爆發並 不是不可能。最後一種是「偽黃論」。這種立場的支持者的論述是追求純淨的「黃」 ，即不能容忍民主陣營的產品、生產工序等有任何中國的成分。然而，筆者認為所謂 的「偽黃」也要承擔表態的代價，只要願意作任何形式的表態都應該珍惜。除非有任 何出賣抗爭者等極端情況出現，不斷貼上「偽黃」的標籤只會徒損同路人的士氣。 的 26
有讀者在此可能會問：那麼，香港人對於光顧甚麼娛樂、商品等還有甚麼底線？很簡 單，就是堅持以粵語，用正字，以香港人為其中較大的服務對象等相對較返璞歸真的 條件。看似虛無及難以介定，但這些條件正正建立了一個族群的特徵，而香港人對外 訴說自己是香港人時亦能用那些文化載體作例子。由於種族往往是由自己聲稱(claim) 開始，關鍵是在於如何給予證據證明自己與他者有所不同。正如人類學家Anthony P.Cohen 於 “Culture as identity” 一文中所指：「一個民族的主體性之所以能建立 出來，是源於一個個體的文化身份認同。 (Nationhood, is a claim about character and integrity of one’s cultural identity.) 」當香港人有更多例子用以證明自己的獨一無二時， 才能使文化身份得以延續。 姑勿論從現實角度考慮「黃店」的表態空間越來越少，製造對立經已毫無必要；更有 甚者，抽象點來說，與其浪費時間在同路人之間內耗，不如把公民社會凝聚，利用民 氣把符合以上條件（即講粵語，寫正字，以香港人為其中較大的服務對象）的文化載 體推高知名度。畢竟，表不表態只是當刻的問題，只有放長雙眼，在打壓下令香港人 的身份轉型及延續，才能使這個反抗的共同體「野火燒不盡，春風吹又生」，經得起 時間大河的歷煉。 27
Part 1 - Guests own stance 沈旭暉教授 主題：點喺海外貢獻香港，同埋以香港為主題嘅組織應唔應該繼續「圍爐」、抑或融 入當地社群，了解國際事務呢啲位置上面分享。 前提：想講嘅係對立定係合作，網絡世界好多矛盾，有唔同選項唔係binary嘅concept。學術訓練令我喺看似對立之前搵一個選擇。去留係咪一個必然對立嘅選擇，十 年前每年喺香港嘅時間唔過半年，但身份認同都係一個香港人。喺成長年代，97年 前移民潮，對移民概念係非黑紙白，移民之後唔會再見，可能得人生大事（結婚、喪 禮）。但當依家移民嘅時候可能距離仲近咗，唔受到移民嘅阻隔。 第二，依家呢個時勢，每一個人如果想貢獻香港先可以maximize呢個benefits。每一 個人都係個體，無可能有共同嘅概念。本身每一個人都好唔同，網絡言論話好多人要 走/留，好難有rules去apply比所有人，但係喺功能上面可以好概括咁劃分，依家留喺 香港價值大啲，其他人走嘅價值大啲。比較歷史上，冷戰時期波蘭捷克都要面對呢個 問題，悠久歷史嘅故鄉，generalize到某啲pattern，想傳承呢個論述會比較危險，唔 喺嗰度寫嘢會更加有用，但其他人要靠串連先可以發揮影響力。要喺Local area先發 揮到串連。當時有好多留守嘅人有號召力，但有其他代價同犧牲。每一個case都見過 好多案例。總有人會留，總有人會走。Base on社會大價值同個人選擇。 第三，學生同年輕人，好有趣嘅discussion。 “香港本土主義啱啱興起，一方面好強調身土不二， 但又唔喺香港，依家同以前最唔同嘅就係Internet點樣facilitate距離感。”
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盧斯達先生 主題：海外香港人移民外國之後點兼顧多元身份嘅問題，尤其係之前一路都有批判一 啲所謂嘅「極端移民」 好奇對於外國海外留學生究竟點睇移民，因為自己多數時間喺香港。極端移民派嘅論 述，因為喺網上討論區上面見到好多奇怪嘅論調，細個以為自己諗嘢已經好激進，但 原來又更加多激進嘅人。呢個問題會聯埋政治抗爭，因為討論移民潮嘅時候要討論歷 史背景，只不過兩年之前反送中，一路好多野發生之後令抗爭膠著甚至打壓，人係無 情緒出口，無辦法排解情緒。例如抗疫議題，唔係真係咁在乎討論焦點，只不過將不 滿情緒用其他topics宣洩。移民咁大件事，就係因為經過咁艱苦嘅抗爭，去到移民呢 個問題有人會講移民視為抗爭手段，值得一提。連登有論述話要集體移民，推倒中國 好麻煩。做嘅所有野都只是為了令外國加速反思佢嘅抗中政策，但呢套論述無考慮人 迷惘嘅情緒，令人覺得為香港抗爭係咪就要移民，網上論述變成抗共手段係一種唔人 道嘅決定。包圍中國先不論好定唔好，但嗰啲人如果比你說服咗...抗共呢個係一個想 像，同中國爆炸論同一道理，係一個漫長嘅過程，唔會有一個突然嘅過程。 激進移民來自於無辦法排解19年嘅創傷，可能兩年以來都係咁emotional，只不過無 人知道，最後到處發揮虛假嘅罪惡感。 排解嘅方法係做多啲嘢，例如諗吓移民。無事嘅人都會好唔開心，去到聽到極端移民 論，如果留喺香港就等於交稅比港共，呢種立場已經太harsh。想做多啲嘢嘅心情， 眼白白睇住自己唔鍾意嘢嘅發生，做多啲嘢係啱嘅，但其實大家要分清楚究竟想做多 啲嘢嘅慾望同能力係咪相對。好想做一樣嘢，但能力未到，最後導致自己失控。極端 移民係情緒失控嘅其中一個行為。移民之後做啲乜嘢？無人知，純粹覺得香港走得越 多人就 越好。所以覺得做多啲嘢嘅不甘心係好嘅，知恥近乎勇，當知恥嘅時候咗多啲 嘢係好事，但唔可以比自己嘅慾望掩蓋自己嘅能力。保持清醒係唯一忠告，比較關心 大家19年嘅精神狀態。見到網上言論會嬲嘅，但沈靜完之後又同情佢哋喺一個trauma 嘅心態，覺得大家要多啲諗吓呢個問題。
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Part 2 - Moderated Discussion 問: 當人去了外國以後, 言論空 間大了, 可以有更多自由去討論 政治論述 。 那這算不算是一種 移民可以發揮到的政治功能呢? 雖然人不能被當作一種政治工具 但從功能性來看, 會不會在 做多 啲嘢 上面幫到香港呢? 盧: 當然有用 。 在香港很多東西 都不能說的很盡。但是近來的612, 很多海外的人會舉辦活動。 在香 港看見這些資訊或圖片,會覺得很感 觸 同時也覺得羨慕. 。 不論是在香 港或海外. 政治或權力一向都會將 人拆開, 但是當看見很遠的地方的 人跟你想法一樣, 真的可以減少孤 獨感 。 2016年的時候, 我很痛苦, 因為我 覺得政治已經沒希望, 但69之後我 發現其實大家並不是那麼孤獨 。 所以我覺得當你在外面仲講到野嘅 時候 雖然好似為自己而講咁, 但是 可在十萬八千里之外的人聽完你說 話之後會很感動, 令他覺得可以繼 續走下去. 我覺得這比具體的東西 更為重要. 能衝破這種虛假的孤獨 對於政治議程或身分認同也是很重 要的力量.
沈: 海外香港人可以講多啲野係咪可以幫到香港呢一樣嘢, 我想重申多次移民不是一樣 binary的concept. 例如很多二代三代的香港人不是很會廣東話, 或很少到香港, 突然 buildup一個身分認同也是靠互聯網的串連 ; 相反在本土的香港人也可以很離地地過 活. 所以地理位置不是唯一的因素. 今天的主題, 應該留或走, 我覺得應該是 你覺得自 己可以做些什麼, 下一步是什麼 。 要不然我們就會變得很概括, 無法討論 。 可是在這 個網絡的世界, 很多都是簡化討論, 是沒有意思的, 有意義的討論是如何找到中間位 。 香港人的身分認同是什麼呢? 不少香港留學生到外國之後卻更加強化了身土不二的想 法 。 這是在於香港的identity, 是排他性的認同, 還是一種建基於價值觀的認同還是 其他呢? 我想再問下去的時候就是一個更加核心的問題, 什麼是香港人呢? 所以下一個 離開香港的朋友, 究竟是embrace香港的identity, 還是strategically想做某些東西呢? 如果你離開香港是想成為一個manipulative的tool, 那這跟香港是沒有關係的 。 我以 前在讀identity的時候 我覺得香港的identity是開放, 外向型的 。 中國的identity, 很強調血源, 即便身處異鄉你也是中國人 。 但說到香港的身分時, 不同族群有否認同 某些values, 其實我們都acknowledge到她是一個廣義的香港人 。 那所以即便在外地, 香港的identity也可以繼續延伸, 減少非黑即白的內訌 。 31
問: 假設移民不是一個二元對立的概念, 有沒有一些東西是一定要留下來/離開才能做 到的呢? 盧: 就要看你做些什麼了 。 有些朋友都仍然在做街頭宣傳活動 。 其實現在十分危險, 我也替他們擔心 。 但他們 的想法就是, 他們透過在本地踩界的行為去試香港具體上的空間有多大 。 你不知道哪 一隻字是他們不喜歡的, 也不知道紅線在哪. 他們以身犯險去測試香港公共社會的活動 空間有多大/小 。 這樣行為就要只能在香港才能做到 。 香港實際的狀態是如何呢, 是 要靠本土香港人不斷嘗試及踩界才能知道和體現出來 (例如被拘捕) 。 第二就是 士氣問題 。 如果我們世界不斷在說離開才是好, 對於無法離開的人是一種 士氣的打擊 。 這種話題很情緒化和個人化 。 所以就會有人說: 留下的人都是很重要 (例如蘋果). 海外的人的確有多些話語權, 很多有話語權的人都離開了香港 。 不過, 不 論外地的人怎麼幫助香港, 都要有些養份留在香港民間, 才可以改變現狀 。 64之後很多人流茫外國後, 都對中國的影響力減少 。 海外很大, 組織和意識很容易變 得很散亂 。 相反在香港如此密集的地方, 很多東西都可以發展得很快, 時間流動快, 信息傳達快. 這也是留在本土的優勢 。 團結本土香港人一定比團結海外香港人容易, 相對地令政治意識散播的比其他地方快 。 以歷史來說, 香港的政治意識是改變的超 快. 不知道我是否過度樂觀, 但我覺得這就是香港的優勢 。
問: 會不會是因為這份孤獨感, 對外國有一種期望呢? 在這個前設底下, 會不會有一個 合格線, 或者有什麼obliagtions去justify香港人的身分象徵或政治義務呢? 社交媒體 的運用是否一件好事呢, 或者當移民了的香港人用不用遵守一些obligations去令香港 人的identity不會分散/ 不去打擊更多人的士氣呢? 沈: 香港的identity是很fluid, be water. 怎麼才是有用呢? 留或不留, 都能夠找到絕對的 justification 。 因為每個人都有他的客觀情況去衡量他應不應該走, 所以我們又怎能有 一套客觀的基準去說如何做才叫有用呢? 以我們對網絡世界的認知, 以及他的演算法, 我們都知道他在faciliate一種二元對立 。 例如這個活動在連登出po, 並沒有用學術討 論包裝, hit rate一定會比較高 。 因為以為有花生食 。 任何一個題目, 一定要找到一 個對立, 才能go vital. 就算沒什麼好爭論, 都要找些東西拗 。 現在重點就是會有多少 人被這些網絡言論影響了 。 我們現在的責任就是 如何在能讓人們食到花生嘅同時, 不 會過分被這些資訊影響, retain critical thinking. 是否一定要用返以前的標準200萬人出返嚟先至會維持到熱度? 有200萬人固然好開心, 但係200萬人之外仲有好多嘢做 。 03年大遊行後大家就直接走, 但是現在我們有救傷 隊, 接車的人, 很多不同的人在做不同的東西 。 所以我覺得如果二百萬人被禁止出街 之後, 最重要嘅唔係話 「 我點樣去淨係諗點樣重現返大遊行 」 之外, 仲有好多人做好 多嘢, 唔一定要淨係用大遊行嘅方式去表達 。
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盧: 我唔覺得有checklist係做到 。 身份認同定義係好流動, set guidelines係冇乜用 。 我覺得海外嘅香港人係要有一種情緒上嘅考慮, 例如移民之後會變得香港嘅情況傾 向極度負面 佢要證明自己移民嘅決定係啱. 雖然這個對香港前景嘅政治判斷未必係啱 但係海外嘅人唔應該咁快判斷香港死, 歷史上有很多地方就算情況比香港差亦能夠撐 住, 例如緬甸 。 在乎香港這個群體, 你就不會說一些說話去傷害大家去傷害一些跟自 己處境不同的人. 由小時候關心政治開始都是由互聯網開始, 很多特別的言論都有網上去講 。 一開始我 以為網絡上的言論是真實的, 但是一當人多的時候, 很多東西就會變得manipulative. 我的第一目標是希望保存香港, 並不是犧牲香港去達到 中共毀滅的目標 。 雖然大家表 面上是在談論移民, 但是背後的agenda大家也要看清楚。 根據我個人經歷, 互聯網會 令一個人變壞, 會很難保持理性, 就例如美國總統選舉, 每種立場都有自己一定的道理 , 但是你永遠都不會找到真相 。 現實和網絡融為一體的時候, 我覺得要更加留意和懂 得去不要那麼認真去看待極端言論 。 不要變得資訊過載, 我們太依賴網絡, 亦都令我 們沒法將時間放在真正重要的議題上 。 如何運用網絡而又不被網絡吞噬. 雖然我們真 正感受到網絡對知識傳播的力量, 同時間網絡亦會反噬你 。 網絡現在有很多安全隱患, 所以盡量抽身出來與人面對面溝通, 這樣心理狀態才會平衡. 又要適當地在網下建立組 織和關係. 問: 是否有義務或責任去關心當地的政治 ? 沈: 做這些東西的時候你是為了什麼, 關鍵是你有沒有發自內心 。 要不然這是不能持 久的 。 我始終覺得應該要將香港議題帶進世界, 但是手法一定要是sustainable. 大家有這個責任去指出香港有多差, 但是當你接收了這些訊息之後是否真的會有一個 線性的conclusion, 覺得要離開了, 要逃避了。這其實不是一個線性的關係 。 面對如 此政權的時候, 如何去突破一個binary的思考是一個重要的議題 。 中國政府 是 一個 十分有經驗的控制式政權, 們亦十分擅長挑起矛盾 . 歷史上很多事件如果有心的話亦可 以簡單地將它變成一個二元對立, 這就是鬥爭思維 。
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盧: 我覺得這個不應該是一 個應不應該的問題, 每個人 都不能做到完全融入另一個 國家 。 例如 古巴裔的人會 一直支持共和黨, 因為他們 不喜歡共產主義, 所以會特 別喜歡反對共產主義的人 。 望返香港， 香港的生活和文 化歷史實在太distinctive, 我認為香港人都是會做番嗰 啲嘢, 睇返嗰啲嘢. 某程度 上都會留低香港人的身份在 裏面 。 香港人和英國的身 份如何調和現在不是一個很 迫切的問題。
其實都是看你有沒有這樣的 能力 。 如果有能力其實試 下無妨, 不同人不同分工, 想 做是一回事, 可不可以做也 是另一回事 。 融入多融入 少也是悉隨專便 。 做好自 己崗位便行。
再到是不是幫到該地方的人, 至少我不會去破壞他們的利 益或秩序 。 始終是在別人 政府之下, 我覺得不要做壞 香港人嘅名聲都很重要, 對 國際戰線又好什麼都好, 香 港人的世界聲譽也很重要。 不要以自己為中心去拿很多 利益 。 因為我們香港人都 很討厭不入鄉隨俗的人, 這 就是海外香港人的考驗之處, 如何平衡參與本地的東西和 留意香港的政治 。 問: 當我哋見到1997 和 2020年兩次移民潮的分別, 我哋都會有個問題：為何當 出現重大的政治事件時候, 香港人會選擇走? 香港人本 質十分計較自己的機會成本, 會否是這些性格而引致選擇 立刻逃避呢? 34
沈: 做一個比較政治學的角度, 最怕就是比較兩樣不可比的東西 。 以其他國家來說很 難會有一個case是可以完全跟香港比較, 例如一個每日都經歷槍林彈雨的人, 可能已經 安於常態; 但是當香港人過著比較安逸的生活, 自然就會覺得是危機 。 這是一個relative concept, 去比較是不公平的 。 自古以來香港都是一個很portal的identity, 習慣了跟各地的人打交道 。 香港人習慣 欣賞global嘅視野, 呢個就係香港人身份嘅其中一部分 。 很多新一代的人離開香港的 成本比我們的是低了 。 有些在海外出生的香港人從細到大都是在外國生活, 是什麼令 到他們突然embrace香港人的身份, 特意搭飛機到香港學廣東話, 參加香港政治活動? 要解釋道這樣東西才能比較完善解釋香港的identity, 不是話出事的時候走咗老就沒有 家的感覺就不是香港人。 盧:出事就逃避可能是人的共通點 。改朝換代在人類歷史裏面不是很多人真的是經歷 過 。衛奕信接受訪問的時候說過, 香港人有很多重性格, 快啲走喺香港人嘅意識裏面係 好深入 。 觸發90年代的移民潮是未知, 但現在的人是因為已知才觸發現在的移民潮 。 以前和現在的移民潮核心的原因是有所不同的 ; 廣泛氛圍也是不同 , 當時的人計 劃走的時候是一個遙距看見北京的事件, 但現在的人走是因為親眼目擊到香港本地大 街小巷發生的事而離開 。 香港人很複雜, 我也看過人有選擇地不走, 堅持留守和坐監 。 我不會去批判香港人是 否冇得救, 香港實在有太多不同的人 。 移民不一定代表忘記, 但是我覺得只要有人記 得或做到自己想做啲嘢已經很好 。
“革命情緒很浪漫, 但是總不會所有人一起到終點 。”
【文案暫且告一段落。 論壇錄影可到本會面書專頁瀏覽】
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上圖：旺角
社會運動的高潮過後，大眾失去了關注的著力點。然而，在國安 法及疫情夾擊的年代，新問題不斷衍生。本會既以論述為本，更 不能抽空現況，於是嘗試用以下文章勾劃香港社會的面貌，並為 其中的問題向讀者提供答案。 Amid the pandemic and the diminishing freedom, the social movement is now experiencing stagnation under the current circumstances. Considering the uncertainty in the future, there is no time for us to stop thinking of the current social predicament.
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P a r t 2: Social Dynamics
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The Mistreatment of Hong Kon M y entire life, I have grown up with a domestic helper. In Hong Kong, this is not
uncommon, as there are over 390,000 domestic foreign workers currently working in Hong Kong. They clean up our houses, do our laundry, and cook for the family. For the first couple years that I lived in Hong Kong, I had not known much about my helper Sharon. For me, she was another parent, but she would let me watch TV past my bedtime. I knew that she came from Cebu, but had not known at what cost. It was only until I got involved with local NGO Enrich HK - a charity who offers financial literacy and empowerment education to the domestic helpers- that I began to ask some crucial questions. Who were these women? Why are they working as domestic helpers? What is life for them like in Hong Kong? Hong Kong, as mentioned above, has over 390,000 foreign domestic workers, making up a whopping 5% of Hong Kong’s population. These women come from the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, all in search of a better life for themselves and their families back home. Some hopefuls come to Hong Kong’s shores with little financial or legal education, and fall right into the clutches of shady loan sharks, unsuitable employers, and are left helpless by Hong Kong’s government. 38
ng’s Migrant Domestic Workers This debt cycle begins within seconds upon arrival to Hong Kong. Agencies charge soon-to-be domestic helpers with 15,000 Hong Kong dollars in illegal training and placement fees, which logistically takes up to 3-6 months of their contract to pay back. Because of this, helpers are forced to turn to short term money lenders, some who collude with these agencies to extract as much money as possible, and who charge rates that defy money lender laws, upward of 48 or 60%. They promise cash, and when they aren’t paid back in due time - they turn to vicious and frightening tactics. They relentlessly call the helper, show up to the helper’s house, harass their employers which can lead to termination of the helper’s contract. At this point, she is vulnerable, jobless and has no money to support herself, pay back her debt and provide for her family. She could work for thirty years or more, and she would have nothing to show for it. In some cases, she calls upon a daughter, or a sister to come and help her pay back this debt, which just feeds back into the cycle. In some testimonials given by Enrich HK students, this harrasment can continue on for years, and can even follow these helpers back home to their respective countries. 39
This cycle is called debt bondage, a form of modern day slavery, and not enough is being done about it. Helpers received a minimum allowable wage of $4,630 HKD per month. From this, 50-60% is sent back home. This leaves her with $2,278 of her own, and if you divide that by days in the month - that is 73 dollars a day. In Hong Kong’s expensive, modern, cosmopolitan city - that will buy you practically nothing and get you virtually nowhere.
About 90% of the domestic helper population struggle with debt, and despite the overwhelming amount of cases of money exploitation brought forth by NGOs working for Migrant Rights in Hong Kong, the police and the government have not prosecuted a single case. This asserts an unspoken idea that in Hong Kong, domestic helpers are nothing more but second class, unprotected, abusable background workers. This is ironic, as most Hong Kong households depend on domestic helpers, and in truth, domestic helpers are the backbone of Hong Kong’s highly functional society. While this may be a pressing issue, domestic workers face much, much more.
Abuse: An Unfit Household goes unlooked
In Hong Kong, it doesn’t take much to qualify to hire a domestic helper. You must make 15,000 Hong Kong dollars per month (US $1,920), you must be able to pay the minimum allowable wage, and have enough room in your house to host a helper and allow for her to have “reasonable privacy”. By law, domestic helpers are required to live-in with their employers, which may allow for the helper to be susceptible to abuse of all kinds: physical, emotional, verbal, sexual, etc.
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Through my work back in Hong Kong with Enrich HK and Mission for Migrant Workers, I have heard stories of women being forced to sleep on kitchen floors, on top of refrigerators, in bathrooms, outside in sheds, in cabinets, and in closet-like rooms. This is inhumane, yet affects almost 30,000 helpers in Hong Kong. Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor reported that a substantial percentage of workers are mistreated by their employers; of 2,500 workers interviewed, at least 25 percent said they had experienced violations of their contract (including being paid less then the minimum wage requirement and being denied their mandatory weekly day of rest and statutory holidays). More than 25 percent had also experienced physical and verbal abuse, including a “significant incidence” of sexual abuse. Because of this live-rule, helpers can also be forced to work long hours, with most helpers working anywhere between 16-18 hours a day. What hurts most, is that the government isn’t making any strides into regulating this. If a helper attempts to file any suit against her employer, it is most likely to never be heard. In one case in 2014, one helper’s story reached international audiences. Erwiana Sulistyaningsih, an Indonesian helper, fled the country in fear of her employer. For 8 months, Erwiana was routinely abused by her employer, Law Wan-Tung. Erwiana was made to sleep on the floor, work 21 hours per day, and denied her rightful rest day. If she did not complete her duties, or was too late to answer the phone, she was beaten. 41
After 8 months, she couldn’t walk as her wounds had become infected, and her employer had denied her medical attention. In order to cover her tracks, her employer sent her back to Indonesia and threatened her family if she was ever to speak about her abuse. At the airport, Erwiana was abandoned, and left in the kind hands of other helpers returning back to Indonesia. It was because of the other helpers at the airport, was Erwiana’s story shared. What followed was months of protests seeking justice for Erwiana, and various helper’s rights groups going in to condemn the police and the government for their neglect. Law Wan-Tung was arrested, sentenced to six years, and was released 3 and half years into her sentence. The government called Erwiana’s case an isolated one. Justice? I think not.
Legally Unprotected and Neglected: The Harsh Reality Domestic Workers Face Helpers, despite financial debt and physical abuse, are also left defenseless by Hong Kong’s legal system. For most residents in Hong Kong, after seven years, you can become a permanent resident - which allows for that individual the right of abode. This law, however, specifically excludes those who reside in Hong Kong under the title of domestic helper. This bars them from applying for public housing and social-welfare benefits. Still, to this day, helpers remain to be seen as temporary residents, despite some having lived in Hong Kong for upward of twenty to thirty years. While this issue has been widely debated in court, and remains to be unchanged, helpers have another legal rule working against them. This rule is called the two week rule. Within two weeks of a helper’s termination, if they haven’t found new employment they are to be deported. This discriminatory rule only applies to foreign domestic workers, and to not other foreign workers. It is to be said that this applies pressure to the domestic workers to stay with abusive employers, as it is nearly impossible to find work that fast. This two-week rule also puts pressure on the domestic workers to not report incidents in which their contract has been breached or they have experienced abuse.
If a helper chooses to file a suit against their employer, one can assume that their contract will be or has been terminated. While legal proceedings take place, a helper is not allowed to take up any work, which then violates the two-week rule. That being said, at this point the helper is jobless, homeless, living in poverty and a fugitive of the two-week rule. By this standard, most helpers are deported before their case ever sees the light of day. How is that justice? While some NGOs like Mission for Migrant Workers - offer legal help and shelters in which at-risk helpers can stay, that is not enough. In three crucial sectors, the Hong Kong government and legal system has failed these women, and have in turn made Hong Kong an unsafe space to work and live.
Covid-19 and the Plight of Domestic Workers In the midst of the pandemic, the Hong Kong government is dubbed discriminatory as it forces domestic helpers to get vaccinated or face losing their jobs. They have made vaccinations amongst this community mandatory; especially for helpers who wish to have their contact renewed or incoming helpers who are looking for work. While some praise the free vaccinations the Hong Kong government is providing the migrant domestic workers, others believe that by tying the mandatory vaccinations to their contracts is extremely discrimination and social exclusion at its worst. Eman Villenueva, a spokesperson for the Asian Migrants Coordinating Body, accuses the government of blackmailing the migrant workers by enforcing this rule.
Domestic workers who tend to work over 108 hours a week don’t have time to schedule mandatory vaccine appointments ahead of the deadline set for them by the government. If not tested by the May 9th deadline, helpers could face a 5,000 HKD fine. This exceeds a helper’s monthly minimum wage by 370 HKD. Betty Yung Ma Shan-yee, chairwoman of the Hong Kong Overseas Domestic Helper’s Association, argues that employers should shoulder some of the financial burden if they do not do their duty in helping their domestic workers arrange a testing slot before the deadline. There is more need for flexibility for both domestic helpers and their employers. Some employers don’t have the time to take off of work on the weekdays to allow for their domestic helpers to get tested. There should also be a law in place to ensure that helpers have adequate time to rest after receiving both doses of the vaccine. In other words, Johannie Tong Hiu-yan, from the group Mission for Migrant Workers, says that the government departments have done little to spread the word about the compulsory testing order to the domestic helpers themselves. At a time like this, the urgency of the pandemic may cloud all ethical judgements on how to handle the current crisis. Although there are talks of the government repealing this rule, it is hard to say if the Hong Kong government handled this well.
I do believe that this issue is combattable. Through empowerment and financial education offered by Enrich HK, helpers can learn how to manage their finances, avoid loan sharks and pay back any legal debt that they need. However, this education should be mandatory upon arrival, so we can stop the cycle before it’s even allowed to start. Through work done by the NGO, Fair Employment Agency, foreign domestic workers can be recruited through safe and vetted agencies, and employers know which agencies treat their workers well. Through work done by the Mission for Migrant Workers, legal change can happen, but only with the support and lienance of the Hong Kong government. That being said, this work has been continuously done by NGOs in Hong Kong, yet nothing has seriously been achieved in the hopes of change. In order to ensure that foreign domestic workers are treated well and are protected, the Hong Kong government needs to do more.
當反抗成為義務 香港人陷入了一種絕望的輪迴。 如果要貼切地形容的話，那就是每天早上起床，睡眼惺忪地看著電話，然後又從新聞 中看到了新一輪的打壓。不過，自己除了情緒上的起伏外，根本沒有其他東西可做， 或者能做，最後這種輪迴成為了例行公事。 以上的處境不是虛構的，而是實際上當國家機器用盡一切手段無間斷地試圖置香港人 於死地時，人微言輕的香港人在絕望中萌生了放棄的念頭是十分正常的。然而，這種 念頭倘若不被導正，將會於病毒般一傳十、十傳百，繼而瀰漫於整個都市中。因而筆 者希望，先由人生存的意義入手，再正立反抗的必要，從而避免反抗的力量被自身的 絕望消耗殆盡。 很記得社會運動如火如荼的八月，港鐵封站阻止抗爭者聚集的措施惹起了公憤。這不 但令港鐵被標籤為「黨鐵」，亦令抵制港鐵的聲音一度主導了香港人的抗爭日程。當 中抵制的行動不外乎三種：阻礙車門關上的不合作運動、跳閘及罷搭。這些抵制行動 的本質，都是以製造自己和別人的不方便為代價，向港鐵表達不滿，以及宣示政治理 念。那時，網絡上瘋傳了一張有線電視記者採訪的截圖，而被訪者留下了一句說話： 「我的訴求就是返工。」這驟眼一看，好像沒有甚麼問題，但現實就是他們生存的意 義已被扭曲。
“我的訴求就是返工?”
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哲學家鄂蘭曾在《人的條件》一書中為人類的行為作一個簡單的區分：勞動(labour) 、工作(work)和行動 (action)。篇幅所限，本文只會集中討論勞動和行動。勞動的意 思，是指維持人類生命的必要活動。舉個簡單的例子：人類需要食物來延續生命，因 而每天都需要煮食或買外賣，然後吸取所需的營養，日復日，年復年，周而復始。同 樣地，套用回上段上班的例子，倘若上班的目的只是純粹的溫飽維生，而人生的目標 就只是上班的話，這些人本質上都與動物沒有分別，而原因是兩者都只為了生存，即 「食訓痾」，並沒有其他更高尚的目標。鄂蘭甚至把這些專事勞動的人冠上了「勞動 動物」(animal laborans) 的稱號。相反，按照鄂蘭的解讀，行動的意思是人彼此通過 言行展現其獨特之處，而獨特之處合起來就體現了全人類的複雜性( plurality)。以上 的學術語言艱澀難懂，但大概意思就是人類必須透過在公共空間的互動來留下自己在 時代的印記，從而證明自己曾經存在過。 讀者在此可能會有疑惑：敘述了一大堆學術理論，那又與「我的訴求就是返工。」有 甚麼關係？筆者認為，最容易或最能體現「行動」的行為是參與公共事務，例如踴躍 為時政發表意見，甚至辯論。當人類就著時局表達自己的看法時，其獨特性已經被體 現，而時代亦記錄了這一把聲音。返回不合作運動的討論，筆者認為要擺脫淪為「勞 動動物」的尷尬處境，被訪者就理應就住不合作運動表達其立場及原因，哪管是支持 （我支持因為港鐵不對）或反對（我反對因為這阻礙了城市中的交通運作），而不是 以「我不理而我的訴求就是返工。」這種模稜兩可卻又充滿奴性的答案來回應。
/最 容 易 或 最 能 體 現 「 行 動 」 的 行 為
是 參 與 公 共 事 務/
證明了人參與公共事務的必要後，就能討論為何在今天的香港參與公共事務是 與反抗掛勾。兩者本來並不一定劃上等號，但在荒謬的時勢下，不反抗就只能 退縮。今天國安法連一個表態也容不下，明天公開表達愛國愛黨就成為普羅大 眾參與公共事務的先決條件 ， 逼迫大眾退回animal laborans 的層次。 現實 殘酷還殘酷，市民能做的似乎不多。不滿港府施政的市民心底裏大概也曾有過 疑問：民主派人士在106大搜捕後紛紛被國安法控告，升斗巿民能做甚麼？政府 借疫情推行安心出行應用程式、甚至突發封區，難道市民應螳臂擋車、以身阻 礙不成？這樣的不斷反躬自省只會導致一種結果－－「算了吧，還能怎麼樣？ 」的感慨，最後失去了反抗的意志，在國安法的打壓中提心吊膽地過活。要避 免這種態度成為人生的主軸，就理應奮而起身反抗。
反抗的第一步，是意志上的反抗。以後的每天，即使世事依然荒謬，每天睡醒 依然是誰被捕誰入獄的消息，也要向自己說這些事情本不應出現，而不應因為 恐懼而自斷參與公共事務的途徑。這與哲學家卡繆對於反抗的理解可謂不謀而 合。他認為，直到反抗行動開始的一刻，反抗者才是真正意義上的拒絕他所認 為不義之事。拒絕向打壓者低頭，是最基本的反抗。 /直到反抗行動開始的一刻，反抗者才是真正意義上的拒絕他所認為不義之事。/ 48
第二步是行動上的反抗。猶記得二零一九年仲夏對抗逃犯條例一役，沒有四五 月民主派的議會抗爭及各大專院校組織的「吹雞」，哪有數以百萬計的市民冒 著高溫前往集會、遊行的畫面？這正正反映了個體反抗的價值在於能誘發其他 人一起反抗，反抗的意識一傳十、十傳百，便能形成摧枯拉朽的力量。即使現 時這些畫面短期內已難再現，香港人依然能找到方法實踐反抗的意志，例如建 立區報與親建制報章爭奪輿論話語權丶 創立各式各樣的關注組丶組織社區互助 網絡、杯葛「安心出行」等等。 「行動上的反抗」 / 這一步的重點不在於甚麼行動， 而是在於行動本身。/ 無可置疑，身處於現在的香港，投入反抗後並不代表有甚麼實質上的利處，甚 至隨時成為政權打壓的對象。不過，我們要撫心自問的是，作為香港人，真的 甘於被政權逼迫致屈膝跪地嗎？乃至於作為人，應該甘於被一個沒有民意授權 的政權不斷限制自由嗎？要成為一頭被政權圈養的豬，還是一個真正意義上的 香港人，就交由讀者自己選擇。
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A Brief Analysis On Current HongKonger’s WellBeing
A s its citizens and residents know, Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of China established after the British handover in 1997. Its unique history with the British and the Chinese gives rise to diverse cultures and a distinctive lifestyle. However, there is no doubt that this complicated history has led to tremendous political conflict that has, and will continue to, change the lives of its citizens and residents.
What makes Hong Kong unique is that the region has been operating under the ‘one country, two systems’ policy after the 1997 handover. Although Hong Kong is geographically part of China, the policy states that its government and political system are separate from communist China. The policy ensures that Hong Kong would be ruled by the people of Hong Kong, with the freedom of establishing their government, allowing them to enjoy the autonomy that will last for 50 years. Yet there have been multiple instances, increasing in recent years, threatening to strip away the freedom Hong Kongers were promised. Significant events such as the implementation of Article 23 of the Basic Law in 2002, the Moral and National Education proposal in 2012, the Umbrella Revolution in 2014 and the Extradition Bill of 2019 have led to outrage and uproar in the community. These events, representing the increasing pressure of the Chinese government to take back control, have led to sudden and rapid change in the community, inflicting consequences on civilian and everyday life. These sudden and rapid changes hold severe implications for Hong Kongers. As the fear of sovereignty ceasing looms over Hong Kongers, they have found ways to express their distaste and anger through protests. However, as the Chinese continue to tighten their grip on control, peaceful protests that happen occasionally have escalated into prolonged movements that end in tear gas and violence.
In addition to exposure to violence, families and friend groups have disintegrated due to a clash in political views. Although this does not directly relate to the protests, these shrunken social networks lead to a decrease in support systems where people can turn to for assistance during stressful times. This, accompanied by the stigma surrounding seeking psychological help, which is deeply rooted in the city, has put tremendous pressure on those who lack adequate support systems. This leaves many without the opportunity to address their thoughts and feelings openly. Bottling up and keeping negative feelings and emotions to oneself can ultimately cause someone to tip over the edge, leading to severe issues such as PTSD or suicidal thoughts.
圖：勵德邨
左圖：油麻地廟街
All of this coexists with the socioeconomic downturn that has been caused by chaos from demonstrations. Businesses have experienced a decline in traffic and sales because of the protests. This significantly affects the service and tourist industries as people are increasingly hesitant to spend money and partake in leisure in Hong Kong. As a result, many who work have faced salary cuts and were forced into unemployment. An increased financial instability for many people in Hong Kong has led to damaging effects in housing, education, and social problems, which have induced increased stress and a decline in well-being. All factors mentioned above, and possibly many more, have influenced the deterioration of mental health in Hong Kong. Although the political conflict may be over in a short period, there will potentially be lasting effects on Hong Konger’s well-being that may last for decades. It is imperative that Hong Kong is equipped with the resources necessary to deal with this mental health crisis to help mitigate the severe effects of stress and pressure in the community. This should include and not be limited to direct psychological services such as psychiatry, therapy, and counselling to tackle deteriorating well-being directly. Other services such as financial and housing services can also indirectly help increase well-being. These can lessen the burden people have, which can lead to increased happiness and satisfaction. Programs and initiatives that allow people to recover from the effects of the protests and the dire political situation can help improve the mental health of Hong Kongers. Ultimately, a city can only reach its maximum efficiency and prosperity if its citizens are satisfied and happy with their homes. This should be a significant factor in policy and decision-making moving forward.
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Is Hong Kong’s fight for political freedom also a fight for reproductive justice?
I n an opinion published on the
Intersectionality: why reproductive freedom is political
Hong Kong Free Press media website, the commenter discussed the destructive and negative impacts Hong Kong Police’s abuse of power and protest crackdown weapons and strategies have on children’s wellbeing in the city and argued that Hong Kong’s fight for political freedom is indeed also a fight for reproductive justice. “The definitions of reproductive justice can be understood in three main ways: the right to have children; the right to not have any children; and the right to raise your children in a safe environment.” However, it is quite clear that Hong Kong is no longer a safe place to live in, given the current political instability. Other than the police brutality and use of chemical weapons that clearly endanger people’s lives in Hong Kong, the newly implemented National Security Law also restricts freedom of speech, press, assembly and other rights, meaning that basically anyone who dares to show oppositions against the government could be prosecuted arbitrarily. Which explains why more and more young couples are hesitant to give birth to the next generations.
The theory of intersectionality published by Kimberlé Crenshaw is a work that emerged from her 30 years of study of race and civil rights, and this theory stresses that oppressive forces could be “intersecting and multiplicative” and create discriminations and difficulties for people simultaneously and/or differently.
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A research on the connection between Black Lives Matter Movement and Reproductive Justice also emphasised on how political struggles are often intersectionality connected and complicated and hence could be related to reproductive justice even if it does not directly seem like it. Statistics of the use of chemical weapons and reports on the abuse of power by the Hong Kong Police Force collected and written by Amnesty International have accurately presented evidence that showcased the threats people in Hong Kong have to face, especially the risks and danger the more vulnerable children and pregnant women have to face living in the city. It was stated in the Amnesty International Year-end Human Rights Review that around 15,972 canisters of tear gas were fired in less than 6 months, alongside with other live ammunitions and other acts of police brutality such as arbitrary arrests, torture and sexual assault.
It is evident that with so much chemical weapons used and violations of human rights occuring in Hong Kong, it is definitely also affecting the reproductive freedom and rights of citizens in this city because children’s safety are at risk and that potential parents are unable to decide freely to have children or not. Because of the above reasons, fighting for political justice, is in a way, also fighting for reproductive justice. “ With so much chemical weapons used and violations of human rights occuring in Hong Kong, it is definitely also affecting the reproductive freedom and rights of citizens in this city because children’s safety are at risk and that potential parents are unable to decide freely to have children or not.” 55
上圖：中環碼頭
Healthcare policies as a tool of control It is clear that COVID-19 could be and had been used as an excuse for the Hong Kong government to further increase their control over citizens in Hong Kong. According to Michel Foucault, a French philosopher, bio-politics can cover a range of health topics such as sexuality and reproduction which are very much related to reproductive justice, and that governments from around the world could easily abuse bio-politics to discipline the population as well as marginalised different communities. Such scenarios are actually quite evident in Hong Kong, as COVID-19 was used as an excuse for the cancellation of the 2020 Legislative Council Election in Hong Kong, people’s right to vote for lawmakers who represent them is taken away, protests and even street stations or counters that comply with social distancing laws were still heavily cracked down or interrupted by the police force.
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Other than that, a government official in the Health Department also had hinted that ethnic minorities in Hong Kong are more associated with spreading COVID-19 because of their eating habits that are seemingly “different” than the locals. It was clear that a spatial delineation of race and degeneracy was portrayed by the government, in an attempt to reinforce the idea that ethnic minoritities are outsiders of Hong Kong, which again seems to be one of a “useful” tool for the government to justify their increasing discrimination and state control, particularly over the more marginalized groups. Given that reproductive justice is fundamentally about the autonomy and self-determination of one’s own body, state intervention in any health related policies would be also connected to reproductive justice even if it is not very obvious or direct. Hong Kong’s fight for political freedom is also largely about fighting for self-determination for the city’s own destiny, hence it is also very much both a fight for political justice and reproductive justice.
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P a r t 3 : Look
以史為鏡 可以知興替 。
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king Back in History
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Chinese Community; From Past to Present - Interview with Mr. Chun Yin Cheng
Brief Biography Justin Cheng is a MA graduate from the Department of History at UBC. His research focuses on Hong Kong. In particular, he is interested in the relationships between the colonial government and Chinese merchants in the early twentieth-century. Through examining the materials in connection to the 1906 typhoon in Hong Kong, his thesis shows how bureaucratic practices amongst the Governor, Colonial Office, and Legislative Council, and interactions with the European and Chinese mercantile elites demonstrated the delicate nature of Hong Kong’s colonial governance, serving as a case study on the workings of British colonialism at an everyday level. At UBC, Justin is also a Student Associate of Hong Kong Studies Initiative (HKSI). Justin received a bachelor of arts in History from the University of California, Berkeley. As an alumnus of Queen’s College, Hong Kong, he has been appointed Honorary Assistant Curator for its History Museum since the latter was established in 2013.
Photo provided from the interviewee.
(Interview conducted by Vice President (Academic) Thomas Yue and Vice President (Admin) Wesley Cheung)
W e have witnessed the perseverance shown by Hongkongers in various ways to
show their spirit of resisting the political suppression from the authoritarian Hong Kong government. Remaining silent is never an option for them as the desire for liberty has been deeply rooted in the Hongkongers’ identity along with a series of social movements. Other than the current political situation, Hong Kong had encountered another form of hardship just a few decades ago. The British colonial period presented us with a different experience of political suppression due to racial or socioeconomic reasons. We interviewed Mr. Justin Cheng, a Hong Kong scholar from the Department of History at the University of British Columbia, to talk about the past of Hong Kong residents during the colonial time. As our dialogue began from the early 19th century, we also discussed the immigration wave before the 1997 Handover and its similarity with the current one, considering both waves were driven by the concern toward the Chinese government’s influence in Hong Kong. 62
Whilst some people might credit the British colonialists for the material benefits they brought to Hong Kong, “Mr. Cheng pointed out that the Chinese populations were often marginalized or even disadvantaged systematically.” The racism against the Chinese must not be overlooked when assessing the colonial period in Hong Kong. Same as many British colonies, the locals were considered inferior by the British in terms of their moral character, intelligence and culture. This can be seen in many efforts that were made to establish a racial hierarchy. The Peak District Reservation Ordinance of 1904 was a noticeable example of an official policy to separate the Chinese from the high-end living district in Hong Kong Island. Chinese were forbidden to live on the Peak, except servants or drivers. As this exclusive area sitting at the top of the colony was highly developed for the Europeans, historian Anthony King suggests that the rule was created to maintain the superiority and social structure of the European community in Hong Kong. The implication of the white community dominating the social hierarchy of the colony is expressed by constructing a “social physical place” to serve the British. Racial segregation was a form of distinction that divided these Europeans among the others which were necessary to affirm their superiority over the colony. Other than the unfair zoning, discriminatory measures were as well imposed in other realms.
For the British colonialists, continually living in a foreign environment might possibly degrade their moral character due to the “contamination” from the indigenous culture. Avoiding any interaction with the local population is a way for them to ensure the pure whiteness of their “Britishness.” The fear of the British inhabitants having an intimate interface with the Chinese norms and values was apparent in terms of how racial segregation existed in the education system. Back in the late 18th century, there was no school set up specifically for the Europeans in Hong Kong. This raised many parents’ concern about allowing their children to share the same classrooms with the Chinese students. Hence, they began calling the government to open a school for Europeans. In the petition proposed by the head of all the major hongs, they explicitly stated that “the education of the European children suffers very much from the fact that Europeans and Asiatics are mixed” and that “constant contact with Chinese, both in classroom and playground must affect the formation of the character of the European boy.” Without any doubt, their proposal was supported by Governor Blake and the Kowloon School was built to fulfill the duty. Similar to drawing a territory limited to the Europeans, raising racial barricades in education was to eliminate any possibility of forming an association between the two groups. Moreover, it illustrates the British’s undue sense of arrogance toward their own culture. As a result, such white supremacy shaped their disdain against the Chinese population and enacted all these schemes to persist the racial differentiation.
Considering how one’s race would determine one’s socioeconomic status, as Mr. Cheng mentioned in the interview, the unique position of the Chinese bourgeoisie makes them an intriguing character throughout colonial history. Given the colonial setting in Hong Kong, it became the capitalistic center in East Asia since the 19th century which prompted the latter rise of the Chinese bourgeoisie. The influx of the European commercial firms provided opportunities for the well-to-do Chinese merchants to become the capitalists in the market. For this reason, the Hong Kong compradors and merchants often owned 60 to 80 percent of the share in different foreign companies. This consolidated the establishment of the Chinese bourgeoisie, and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was formed in 1896 as a union to represent themselves. Shortly after these Chinese merchants accumulated a substantial amount of wealth, a few local leading figures, including Kan Tongpo, the Li brothers, and Shouson Chow, co-founded the Bank of East Asia to offer financial service to the wealthy Chinese community. Mr. Cheng added that the whole Chinese merchants community were as well the taxpayers who paid the highest amount of tax in Hong Kong. The growth of their economic power laid a significant foundation for shaping this special class among the locals. As a result, their efforts on improving their financial power demonstrated the capability of the local elites to the colonial government.
The distinctiveness of the Chinese merchants’ community might be largely attributed to their capital; however, it was far more than money. Mr. Cheng believed it is their western education that fabricated the multi-layers within their identity. When Western culture began to exert its influence into Hong Kong amid the domestic political turmoils taking place in China, many Hong Kong social elites saw western knowledge as a valuable intellectual asset to advance their society. Consequently, they did receive western education in Hong Kong and some even went to study abroad. Unlike the present days, only a few portions of the Chinese population have such privilege. The prominent Chinese bourgeoisie, such as Ho Kai and Wei Yuk, all pursued a tertiary education overseas. The increasing number of the well-educated Chinese population was indeed recognized by the officials. In fact, when proposing to build a private school for these wealthy families, Governor Blake specifically claimed that it is necessary to preserve the “respectable” Chinese upper class of Hong Kong and “would probably form part of the official class of the future.” This indicated that the colonial government acknowledged the potentiality of the Chinese bourgeoisie as their consultants on Hong Kong affairs. “Such revelation not only ascertained the presence of this special class but also facilitated a cooperative relationship between this group of locals and the colonial government.”
Mr. Cheng asserted that the colonial government had seen them as the essential agents when handling matters regarding the Chinese community. The bourgeoisie earned relatively more respect than the ordinary Chinese which qualified them to be the political representative of the locals. Ho Kai and Wei Yuk were selected to be the unofficial members of the Legislative Council. Their presence in the Hong Kong political realm filled the gap between the government and the locals. The establishment of Tung Wah Hospital in 1872 was a noteworthy example in which the Chinese merchants came to revamp the government’s failure to provide sufficient medical facilities to the locals. These Chinese merchants paid from their own pocket to build a Chinese-run hospital to provide healthcare service to the locals. Tung Wah Hospital was founded owing to the inefficient official medical institution and the doubt toward Western medical treatment from the locals put public health in an insecure position. This effort was particularly vital to the colonial government at the time when more Chinese migrated to Hong Kong because of the political unrest in the Mainland. This sort of political mechanism was surely mutually beneficial to the government and the Chinese bourgeoisie. It reduced pressure and expenditures from the officials while increasing the notability of the merchants among their own ethnic group. “With their financial, cultural and political unusual position, the bourgeoisie became the remarkable and admirable group in this colonial society.”
group in this colonial society. The question of HongKonger’s identity has longed to be one of the contentions between different political theorists. When speaking about what constitutes a person as a Hongkonger, Mr. Cheng said the fluidity of identity often makes the answer to be obscured. “The identity of Hong Kong emerged after World War II, but people have multiple identities, and different identities are expressed according to different social circumstances.” Mr. Cheng said. As most of them came from various provinces of mainland China, they would form native place associations (同鄉會) to stay connected with their roots. For example, if a Hong Kong emigrant came from Fujian(福建) shortly in the 1950s, the identity of Fujianese would more or less build his self-perception, hence joining the Fujian native place association in Hong Kong is to remain himself closely tied with his origin. Following this cause, those first-generation migrants often prioritize their native place identity over their national identity. “While for now, a more predominant identity is formed, and we all call ourselves as Hongkongers.” He said. “And it is simple: After several generations, the younger ones do not have the strong sense of belonging to where their ancestors lived.” As they become the native part of the local community, the identities that their ancestors once identified with would be more likely to be detached from them. Consequently, these local-born generations of the family would no longer keep track of the affairs from these places.
. Rather than inheriting the linkage
to their ancestral origin, the identity “Hongkongers” undergirds their character and roots. Mr. Cheng mentioned that the phenomenon of identity shift would as well occur in the 2020 Hong Kong migration wave in a similar manner. Some commentators hold the view that emigration is similar to other diaspora communities, such as the Jewish community. With this prerequisite, Mr.Cheng has raised a point that it is easier for the Jews to maintain cultural ties with their homeland and among themselves due to their common religious belief. As a member of overseas Hongkongers, we have a strong feeling that it is necessary to have a similar common goal, even though there is no such religious element in HongKonger’s history. Otherwise, it would be difficult to sustain their solidarity. For example, localist politicians like Cheung Ho-sum did also realize the problem of lacking a common belief. In this sense, Cheung pointed out that Hongkongers should ‘hold Hong Kong as a common faith (以香港作為 信仰)’, which is to believe Hong Kong would finally get liberated, though it may seem impossible currently in an objective way. Thus, the main point of a belief is to uphold our core values and vision, instead of whether the belief can be reached or not. As it creates spiritual connections among overseas Hongkongers, the problem of lacking a common goal no longer exists.
Yet, Mr.Cheng noted that current Hongkongers began to have a sense of preserving their own culture. “Preservations are always difficult, especially in the case that they are preserving Hong Kong culture outside Hong Kong.” He said. However, he added that having an awareness to preserve is absolutely beneficial. To illustrate, he compared the current emigration with the 1997 one again. “The previous generation does not have any sense of that, and they only cared more about assimilating into the host country”. However, he reminded the readers that a sense of preservation does not necessarily lead to strong connections to the homeland. Take Chinese diasporas as an example, after those Chinese families left China and settled down in countries like the US and Canada, their next generations have already merged into overseas communities, and they no longer have a strong sense of belonging to their homeland. As such, they are usually called “whitewashed”. He added, “When they have already become a member in those communities, they are not part of the diaspora anymore.” Similar phenomena can be seen from other diasporic communities. For example, the StandNews has reported an exiled Armenian family, which had left Armenia and moved to Britain after the early 20th-century Armenian genocide. Assadour, the grandfather of the Armenian family, had experienced the cruelty of genocides, so he was still willing to devote his time to persuade the international community for support until now, such as meeting with UK’s MPs; While for his
grandson Alex, he did not have the experience of genocide, and was totally merged into the British community. Even though he recognized what his grandparents had done was meaningful and justifiable, he admitted that he would not succeed in the work of international lobbying. He told the reporter that when time passes, there are more barriers for his later generations to hold the Armenian identity, thus he would be surprised if his daughter had inherited a bit of Armenian identity. From what we see in Chinese and Armenian diasporas, overseas Hongkongers can anticipate what challenges they may face when they try to maintain the Hongkonger identity in the future. Then, Mr.Cheng reviewed the pre-handover 1997 migration tide. The tide happened because of the public fear of the rule under the authoritarian Chinese government and believed it was “the end of a liberal Hong Kong” after the British had left. The people who had emigrated were usually “astronauts”, as the parents often travel between Hong Kong and overseas for work, whilst their children or other family members live overseas. Such attachment to Hong Kong from these “astronauts” might be due to their possessions or businesses that could not be liquified in a short time. Hence, those who did not prepare to leave Hong Kong at an earlier time would not be able to completely settle in foreign countries. Moreover, the establishment of the “One Country Two Systems” as the doctrine for the Hong Kong government to rule Hong Kong, allowed the capitalistic way of life to be preserved after the handover.
Many principles from the British colonial period favoured by Hong Kongers such as free markets or rule of laws became the original constituent of HKSAR. Under this circumstance, this seemingly bright future of Hong Kong revived the hope of these overseas Hong Kongers. It turned out some even came back to Hong Kong from other countries as “One Country Two Systems” were functioning as it promised to do. However, he stated that the second émigration tide since 2020 is not the same. The most identifiable characteristic is most, or at least some, of the émigrants, do not have the thought of coming back to Hong Kong anymore, even only a short stay. While the reason is simple: With the adoption of “National Security Law” and stronger oppression coming ahead, Hong Kong is no longer “an option of living” for them. As a professional historian, Mr.Cheng realized students had not had enough basic knowledge of Hong Kong history. He outlined a what-if curriculum if a discipline of “Hong Kong history” is taught in the local education system. He believed it would be nice to study Hong Kong history in three historical contexts: Colonialism, Chinese History and transnationalism. Rather than designing event-based, a themebased curriculum can ensure interested students have a basic but concrete understanding of what is happening back in time. He believed 1841 could be the beginning of Hong Kong history since this was the year when people had begun to recognize Hong Kong as an independent entity. A metropolitan where the “east meets west”, Hong Kong has undoubtedly influenced the historical developments of China and
even the world. In short, with more uncertainties ahead, it is anticipated that more Hongkongers are fleeing Hong Kong. Facing these challenges ahead, there is still a lot to be done for Hongkongers to maintain their unique but fragile identity, and to consolidate the community as a whole. The UTHKPASS hopes that the above interview can show the importance of “Hong Kong history” in shaping one’s identity, while simultaneously inspiring the public with the experience from past diasporas.
右圖：嘉頓山 Citations Carroll, John M. Edge of Empires Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong. Harvard University Press, 2005. Cheung Hoi Kit (張凱傑). 抗爭派尋泛民合作「同行是唯一選擇」張可森：初選剎那興 奮如梁游被DQ前 謹記教訓並肩作戰. 眾新聞. 2020. Fiona Chow. 【流離之後・1】打國際線矢志為民族平反的亞美尼亞人，和他的後代、後後代. 立場新聞. 2020.
Why Did The 2014 Umb
S ince the 1997 Sino-British Handover, Hong Kong has witnessed numerous protests in
support of complete political reform under the newly appointed Chinese government. Among these pivotal social movements was the 2014 Occupy Movement, known as the Umbrella Movement due to the yellow umbrellas protestors used to shield police attacks and advances. Proposed by pro-democracy organizers Benny Tai, Rev. Chu Yiu-Ming, and Chan Kin-Man in 2013, the Occupy Movement was a series of civil disobedience and public space reclamations in major business districts and transportation routes. Not only did the movement give rise to political radicalization, but it also challenged both the Chinese and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR ) governments. Over 500,000 demonstrators demanded the election of the Chief Executive through genuine universal suffrage. Pro-democracy political parties and student associations concurred that civil disobedience would be conducted in a nonviolent and lawful manner and protestors would own up to their charges if arrested by the police. Although the social movement was mostly led by political activists and students, it drew people from all walks of life and reflected collective participator y culture. 70
brella Movement Arise?
The Occupy Movement was pre-empted on 10 June 2014 by Beijing’s National People’s Congress white paper decision. Although the State Council of Beijing voiced their support for universal suffrage in the 2017 Chief Executive elections, its implementation would only occur under the following conditions: potential candidates would be cherry-picked by Beijing’s ”nominating committee” and must abide by the patriotic values of the Chinese government in the Basic Law of Hong Kong. Beijing’s proclamation drew over 510,000 Hong Kong citizens in the name of democracy on the 17th anniversary of the Sino-British Handover on July 1 2014. Interpreting NPC’s declaration as an infringement of political rights, various Occupy Central Movement (OCM) supporters shaved their heads on 9 September as a symbolic resistance to Beijing Standing Committee’s verdict. Class boycotts and sit-in protests staged by student organizations Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) followed from September 22 to 26.On September 26, some Scholarism members broke into the east wing forecourt of the Admiralty government headquarters and student activists Joshua Wong Chi-Fung, Alex Chou, and Lester Shum were arrested by the police. 71
The Occupy Movement was pre-empted on 10 June 2014 by Beijing’s National People’s Congress white paper decision. Although the State Council of Beijing voiced their support for universal suffrage in the 2017 Chief Executive elections, its implementation would only occur under the following conditions: potential candidates would be cherry-picked by Beijing’s ”nominating committee” and must abide by the patriotic values of the Chinese government in the Basic Law of Hong Kong. Beijing’s proclamation drew over 510,000 Hong Kong citizens in the name of democracy on the 17th anniversary of the Sino-British Handover on July 1 2014. Interpreting NPC’s declaration as an infringement of political rights, various Occupy Central Movement (OCM) supporters shaved their heads on 9 September as a symbolic resistance to Beijing Standing Committee’s verdict. Class boycotts and sit-in protests staged by student organizations Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) followed from September 22 to 26. On September 26, some Scholarism members broke into the east wing forecourt of the Admiralty government headquarters and student activists Joshua Wong Chi-Fung, Alex Chou, and Lester Shum were arrested by the police. OCM officially commenced on the afternoon of September 28 during Chief Executive Leung Chun-Ying’s afternoon press conference addressing the movement. Demonstrators were met with pepper spray and 87 canisters of tear gas as they charged at riot police blockades and defense lines. The police’s use of tactical weapons to disperse crowds of pro-democracy protestors was broadcasted on international media, drawing concerns of police brutality from international audiences. Chief Secretary and current Chief Executive Carrie Lam, fearing the obscure social and political atmosphere following OCM, consequently postponed the constitutional development consultation on September 29. HKFS addressed an open letter to the government on October 2, encouraging dialogue between the two parties. HKFS’s initiative prompted preparatory meetings with the government over constitutional reform on October 5-7; dialogue officially took place on October 21 between HKFS and three secretaries of the Constitutional Development Task Force. Failing to reach a compromise, the government assured HKFS they would forward public opinion reports to the State Council Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office. Pro-democracy supporters’ illegal occupation of major roads was met with condemnation from pro-Beijing groups and Chinese President Xi Jinping. In a meeting with Chief Executive C.Y. Leung on November 9, President Xi stressed that the Chinese government would undertake necessary measures to maintain “One Country, Two Systems”. Despite China’s draconian reminder, HKFS leaders addressed an open letter to Premier Li Keqiang expressing their intent to travel to Beijing and voice their demands. Nevertheless, their plan proved futile when the Hong Kong International Airport “denied” their travel documents on November 15. After violent clashes with the police, vandalism of the legislative building, and hunger strikes by Scholarism members, OCM initiators turned themselves in at the police station and advised protestors to disperse on December 3. The 79-day movement ended when police arrested 209 people and cleared illegally occupied roads on December 11 and December 15. The HKSAR government failed to actualize the movement’s demands and universal suffrage was unachieved. Why did the 2014 Umbrella Movement arise? Which factors contributed to the recruitment of pro-democracy protestors? The Umbrella Movement can be interpreted as an amalgamation of polarized political views with students’ anti-Chinese beliefs against the regime’s national education curriculum. 73
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The first interpretation focuses on the intersection of cultural identity, education, and social media participation among young Hongkongers. The emergence of the local Hong Kong (HK) identity originated in the 1970s and has drastically fluctuated since.16 According to preliminary surveys conducted during the 70s, local HK Chinese equally took pride in being Chinese as being Hongkongese. 17 This cultural identification with Chinese identity contrasted the strong sense of HK identity students felt predating the movement. According to a study conducted by political scientist Sonny Lo in 2014, 63% of 142 form five secondary school students identified as Hong Kong people, 16% as Chinese, and 39% as HK Chinese. Only 14% of respondents opposed the UM, 56% supported it, and the remaining 30% had no stance, depicting the overwhelming support for democratization among young people in HK. Lo argued young people born after the 1997 handover only have limited knowledge of Mainland Chinese culture and politics through mass media, their peers, and DSE liberal studies. The liberal studies curriculum requires secondary students to objectively evaluate media sources on Hong Kong-China events. Political awareness that comes with the curriculum has allowed students to anonymously engage in critical discourse and debate with those holding opposing views while challenging higher authorities, namely the education system and the government.19 Pro-China legislators Priscilla Leung and Fanny Law blamed the rise of the UM as a failure of
of the liberal studies program to instill patriotism and blamed teachers for overly politicizing students.20 Lo states that although liberal studies increase political awareness, they heavily rely on local media sources, which often have biased political orientations. He hypothesized the reliance on social media opened vulnerable youth to extremist ideologies and potential recruitment or influence by radical student organizations such as Scholarism during the movement. Sociologist Eyerman’s social movement theory states that “[a] social movement emerges when groups of disparate and ever-changing individuals sense they are united and moving in the same direction.”22 Social movements like OCM arose as its demands created a unification of political and cultural goals; protesters felt as if they held no individual power within society and turned to physical forms of protest with those with similar goals. The role of social identity can be further analyzed through in-group and out-group threat perceptions between pro-democracy and pro-establishment camps. According to Social Identity Theory, individuals develop their identity based on their social groups. Ingroups are social groups individuals identify with and tend to be biased towards. Outgroups are opposing groups with different ideologies that tend to be stereotyped by the ingroup. Due to their opposing political alignments, pro-democratic and pro-China supporters had strong stereotypes and hostile perceptions towards each other. Moreover, UM can be interpreted as a crossclass retaliation of liberal pan-democratic protesters against the National People’s Congress decision for the 2017 Chief Executive elections. Sonny Lo also argued that their political identity
originated from strong inclinations to Western-style democratization. On the contrary, those who politically identify with China’s authoritarian regime will interpret democratic values as Westernisation and the disruption of the state by foreign influences. Another perspective focuses on political dissatisfaction and frustration towards the central government. The lack of political rights and civil liberties, lack of democratic representation in the legislature, and lack of governmental accountability caused many people to protest on the streets. Some pro-democracy supporters believed that HK should be completely independent and autonomous under their interpretation of “One Country, Two Systems”. Public opinion polls revealed that satisfaction towards the PRC and HKSAR governments had reached a new low directly predating the movement at -35% and -20% respectively. Political scientist Charles Tilly stipulated that colonial HK possessed ample political and civic freedom, constitutional protections, and public consultation during the decades before the 1997 handover from the British colonial empire to the PRC. Hong Kong citizens exercised their limited political freedoms through protests, petitions, and the press under British governance. The only limitation to political freedom was the election of the governor by the British Queen. At present, the chief executive is elected by an election committee consisting of 1200 members in place of 7 million residents in Hong Kong. Candidates are selected through a screening process by the People’s Republic of China to ensure they follow the nationalistic requirements of the Basic Law of Hong Kong. They are also required to pledge allegiance to the Chinese National Security Law. On the contrary,
members of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong are elected through fair district elections by citizens. The late Chinese communist leader Deng Xiaoping once promised that Hong Kong’s economic prosperity and political stability as one of the Four Asian Tigers would be maintained and “deep-frozen” after colonial rule. Deng emphasized a non-intervention strategy under “One Country, Two Systems” with a distinct rule of law and legislation between HKSAR and the PRC. He stressed the only distinction between the old and new governance would be a change in the national flag. 29 Though his promise came into fruition a few years after the Sino-British Handover, it soon became clear that a healthy relationship between China and HK could not be sustained. Since the 2007 National People’s Congress Standing Committee decision on the Chief Executive elections, the general public raised concerns about how Beijing would implement electoral democracy. NPC’s consecutive delays of its universal suffrage plan vastly diminished the guarantee of universal suffrage, and pro-democracy supporters took it in their stride to salvage what was left of Beijing’s wilful proclamation. Despite the contrast between the colonial and postcolonial political systems, UM supporters saw a sliver of hope for democratization in Articles 45 and 68 from the Hong Kong Basic Law. These articles implied that universal suffrage for the Chief Executive elections could eventually be achieved under a democratic nominating committee by 2007, which was presumed to be 2017 and 2020 at the earliest. Therefore, “the UM can be construed as a culmination of sanguine and discontent towards the Hong Kong political system.”
Critique Although Sonny Lo attributed the main cause of student participation in the UM to the liberal studies education system, he failed to acknowledge other non-student demographics and their stances on the movement. Given that Hong Kong is a diverse and multicultural society, Lo’s neglect of other age groups, socioeconomic backgrounds, and ethnic minorities in Hong Kong overgeneralizes Hong Kong’s political climate. Public opinion surveys conducted by the University of Hong Kong (HKU) during the movement discovered 83% urged the UM to end and 66% pleaded authorities to clear obstructed sites. When asked if respondents agreed with the Umbrella Movement, results were heavily polarized; 52.2% opposed and 46.8% endorsed the rallies. In juxtaposition to Lo’s unrepresentative data that 14% of students opposed the UM, over half of the general public contested it. Wu argued pro-China legislators and supporters scapegoated the failure of liberal studies and national education as the cause of the UM. Younger generations were not solely influenced by liberal studies and social media, but preferred bottom-up anarchical governance over PRC’s top-down model of governance, believing that all citizens should have collective agency over the political regime.According to the co-founder of Scholarism Joshua Wong Chi-Fung, these ideals reflect younger generations’ hope of a distant future where universal suffrage is considered a basic human right. Socioeconomic inequality, expensive housing, lack of socio-economic welfare, and limited job prospects contributed to their 78
frustrations. On the contrary, older generations were predominantly Mainland Chinese immigrants; obtaining basic human needs such as safety, health, familial, and economic stability were enough to satisfy them. An advantage of the sociological survey conducted by Sonny Lo is that its findings were triangulated by many social scientists. Theologist Rose Wu triangulated Lo’s data, agreeing that higher educational attainment instilled political consciousness among younger generations. Wu found that most participants between 16 and 35 years old used Wikipedia pages on the UM as a social networking platform, illustrating the importance of social media to spread ideologies of the movement and recruit young protestors. Young age (76.8%) and high educational attainment (61.9%) were strongly correlated with UM support, while over 60% opposing beliefs occurred among China-born citizens, service workers, and ones with low educational background.
Furthermore, the arguments made by pro-establishment legislators Priscilla Leung and Fanny Law about liberal studies and the absence of national education in factoring into the rise of the Umbrella Movement were not an understatement. In addition to China’s overarching political and legal control, the country has also attempted to instil patriotism through the National Education Campaign in 2012. The HKSAR government announced that it would schedule its implementation of the educational campaign in all public primary and secondary schools in 2012, so Hongkongers could cultivate a relationship and identity as a Chinese citizen from a young age. Hong Kong educational materials and curriculum were to be modelled after the “Chinese model” and paint the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a superior, benevolent, and politically advanced political party. Pro-democracy supporters termed this attempt of infiltrating the local liberal education system as “brainwashing”, “propaganda”, and “Mainlandization”, protesting the modern-day colonisation in only education, but also the saturation of tourists and economic trade flowing in from Mainland China.41 The anti-national education campaign was met with overwhelming support and led the HKSAR government to amend the program, making it optional. Such a top-down oppressive effort prompted students to begin student organisations such as Scholarism and HKFS in 2012, which would later become the face of the UM two years later.42 From this perspective, the issue of identity politics and anti-Chinese sentiments are prominent in Hong Kong. Not only did public discontent of the national educational curriculums display the public’s hatred of China’s ethnonationalism, 79
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authoritarianism, and the one-party political system, it also revealed the importance of cultural identity to Hong Kong citizens. “In summary, localist cultural identifications and political disenfranchisement led to the rise of the Umbrella Movement.” It is difficult to argue which aforementioned factors contribute more to the rise and occurrence of the movement as both causes are highly controversial issues in the city. On one hand, those who politically align with the interests of the Chinese central government will defend its draconian policies and campaigns as instilling patriotism and order to society; on the other hand, pro-democracy and pro-independence followers condemn the HKSAR and PRC’s measures to silence political freedom and expression in Hong Kong. derlying social, political, and governmental problems. In February 2021, Hong Kong was ranked 87th in the world on the 2020 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index, falling 12 places compared to 75th place in 2019. 43 Compared to other East and South East Asian nations, Hong Kong has experienced the second largest downgrade in democracy. It is daunting to say the possible implications this may have for the increasing control over political freedom. But one fact is clear- the UM rose as a build up of increasing dissatisfaction of un derlying social, political, and governmental problems.
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Credits: All photos in this publication are taken from online or by our committees. We are grateful that Mr. Chun Yin Cheng, Professor Simon Shen, Mr. Lewis Loud, and all anonymous essay writers for their insights to make this publication more fruitful.
左圖：中環士丹尼利街
後 記： 從前香港人選擇餐廳只會在乎味道及 食物，但現在人在多倫多，總會對香港 人開辦的餐廳增添一份親切感。有感 於香港人的商店較為零散，本會決定 為各位留學生整理一份名單。首彈是 位於列治文山 (Richmond Hill)、主 打All day breakfast 的非連鎖小店 Scrumptious 。
港人 商店
Scrumptious 是由一對香港夫婦所開，店內裝潢即使不冠冕堂 皇，早餐種類的款式之多以及性價比都讓食客甚少失望。餐單方面，經 典的西式套餐也好、單點窩夫、西多士等甜品也好，甚至香港人常吃的 菜式都應有盡有（例如菠蘿咕嚕肉飯、蛋包飯）。不但價錢實惠（大部分 食物價格都不超過$12 加幣），而且店主亦堅持即叫即做。
屬於香港人的良心小店在加拿大並不是隨處可見，能親力親為 的店主更是買少見少。與其經常光顧北美大型連鎖餐廳，倒不如發掘及 支持由香港人創辦的「隱世小店」，讓自己不再局限於某幾種選擇的同 時，說不定還會收穫意想不到的驚喜。
SCRUMPTIOUS 700 Elgin Mills Rd E, Richmond Hill, ON L4C 0H8 Photos from Joe Tay’s Facebook and Yelp
HATCH
802 Cochrane Dr, Markham, ON L3R 8C9
Hatch是由在北美土生土長的菲律賓人所開創的一 個加拿大咖啡烘焙品牌，而品牌的營運主要由幾名香港人負 責，包括烘焙，營運和選豆。店裏的首席咖啡師大有來頭，曾 奪得香港Brewers Cup 冠軍和世界 Brewers Cup 第四名 的佳績。 本會曾親自和來自香港的首席烘焙師交流，而他指香 港及台灣精品咖啡文化比北美的較為跟貼潮流，因此將他在 港台咖啡行業的所見所所聞帶來加拿大，從而為這裡精品咖 啡行業帶來品質上佳的原材料。這就例如Hatch從哥倫比亞 引入的El Parasio廣受多倫多的不同咖啡店歡迎，而正正是 他們在港台精品咖啡市場留意的新產品。 Hatch 選購咖啡豆的篩選過程極為嚴格。從不同莊園 購買咖啡豆時，Hatch都會讓3位由Coffee Quality Institute 所認可的Licensed Q grader 來檢測它們的品質。正 正因為他們的烘焙格調是以北歐淺焙風格為主，購入的生豆 必定要有Q score 86分以上，務求烘焙到以輕分子香氣和酸 甜為主軸的出品。他們的出品包裝上也有QR code ,顧客可 以從那裏當中知道咖啡豆的出品地和農場，以及對於那個產 品的相關評價。 與其經常光顧一些連鎖的咖啡店，大家可以嘗試支持 一些精品咖啡的獨立品牌，必定能可以品嚐到更高質素的咖 啡。
CAFE ALICE 8333 Kennedy Road, Unit 32-33, Markham, ON L3R 4P8
位於萬錦朗豪坊的 Cafe Alice 是由數位香港年 輕人營運的生活咖啡廳。店內裝潢精美，不論是佈 滿櫻花的天花還是手繪的牆壁都絕對比普遍餐廳 的裝修更別出心裁。相比起一般咖啡館，定位年青 市場的Cafe Alice食物和飲料的選擇相當豐富， 除了咖啡和甜品外還提供了一系列的日、台以及 西式的輕主食。最近更緊貼潮流，推出了近日興起 的croffle（ croissant+waffle）系列以及「一蚊一串 燒」的推廣優惠。店內不但設有數部電子飛鏢靶及 酒水吧，隔壁更是店主開設的夾公仔店，可以說是 一應俱全，未嘗不是一個消磨時間的好地方。
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大家好是一間由港人營運，位於列治文山 (Richmond Hill) Jubilee Square的港式茶 餐廳。大家好售賣港式扒餐、碟頭飯、撈出前 一丁、好立克等等各式香港人熟悉的餐點和飲 料。筆者在試食後，特別喜歡他們的海南雞飯。 假如在大多區讀書的你希望吃上充滿香港情 懷的一餐，不妨支持一下這家在加港人經營的 港式茶餐廳— 大家好。
大家好餐廳 PEPPER WOK 280 West Beaver Creek Rd Unit 28, Richmond Hill, ON L4B 3Z1
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