UTHKPASS: ENAVIGO - 葦航

UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

得名由來 「凡心所向，素履所往，生如逆旅，一葦以航。」 本刊得名葦航二字，取自七堇年的《塵曲》。七堇年認為，生命本質上就是一 段與逆境為伴的旅程。凡夫俗子或不懂應對，但能者卻應視之為無物，並只立 於一片蘆葦便毅然起航。這與本會執委的想法不謀而合：的確，現在社會瀰漫 著絕望和無力感，但既然一個個體的生命必然伴隨著低潮和逆境，不斷在絕望 的輪迴中打圈並無意義。 放之於一個共同體上依然如是。命運有高有低，當打壓的巨浪洶湧而至，前行 者更需要以知識抱緊心中信念。本會希望，此刊能以思想作蘆葦，使讀者在迷 茫之時能閱讀更多、思考更多。力量即使微小，依然能在打壓中踏浪而行，不 致被絕望吞噬。 共勉之。

Origin of The Name Enavigo, a direct translation from Latin and means to sail forth, put out to sea, sail clear of obstacles and strive forward as the journey proceeds.

‘Abhor victimhood. Denounce entitlement. Neither are gifts, rather cages to damn the soul. Everyone who has walked this earth is a victim of injustice. Everyone.’ -Richard Paul Evans, A Winter Dream.

Life marches on no matter the journey until it reaches the end. As we embark on our journey, we face obstacles, the difficult road you are called to walk may, in fact, be your only path to success.

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UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021 致讀者：

余達志 (二零二零至二零二一年度 （學術) 副主席)

多倫多大學香港公共事務學會（下稱本會）是由十位幹事組成，而五名核心執委皆為一年 級學生。作為全北美唯二的香港公共事務學會，本會執委認為更有必要以此身位帶動關注香 港，因而催生了《葦航》（英文名字Enavigo)。 的確，製作一份學生刊物從來都不容易，尤其是遠在多倫多。不過，本會執委更明白把香港 的話題帶入海外公共空間之必要，並願意迎難而上，以刊物作平台，向各位讀者拋磚引玉。 在禮崩樂壞的年代，歷經多次社會動盪的香港和香港人的命運彷彿與未知劃上等號，而思索 前路的聲音不絕於耳。所謂「光影記錄故事，文字刻劃生命」，本會希望以文字為主，相片 為輔，並設置三大篇章探討香港人的過去、現在和未來。 精選投稿的內容，圍繞近幾年香港人關注的話題：香港人口中的本土派是甚麼？政治寒冬下 應如何刻劃香港的政治生態？香港歷史應專科專教嗎？防疫政策真的以政治考量為主導？在 後國安法時代，每個家庭或多或少都在思考移民。本會希望以過往的移民為借鏡，解答以下 一系列的疑惑：香港文化到了海外如何得以保存？香港與加拿大如何連接？慫恿香港人離開 的原因又在哪裏？海外的校園抗爭有成效嗎？當世人需要面對一個趨向瘋狂的世界，本會執 委希望讀者能一邊閱讀一邊就住以上的疑惑不斷拷問自己，重構理性思考的堡壘。 關於香港的話題能說的實在太多，本刊所包含的都只是相關討論的表象，讀者若希望作深度 了解，能自行參閱各文章所列的參考資料。若能刺激一下讀者的思考，這本年刊已經完成它 的使命。在此感謝各投稿者的踴躍參與。 （註：所有投稿者文章的立場與本會無關） 多倫多大學香港公共事務學會

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UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

Dear readers, Wesley Cheung (2020-2021(Admin)Vice President)

It is with great honour for UTHKPASS to present to you our very first journal publication Enavigo. Being the first HKPASS to initiate this journal publication in North America, UTHKPASS is proud and thankful for everyone who had contributed and participated in the work on the journal. Envigo, same as UTHKPASS, is mostly directed by a group of first-year students from Hong Kong who are passionate and determined to bring Hong Kong’s affair public into the civic discourse in Canada.

As we all know, these two years have not been easy for the world and Hong Kong. Many places were not only affected by pandemics but also by different political turbulence. Whereas in Hong Kong, society is constantly being entangled in different suppressive political challenges. Under such social contexts, we believed it is vital to provide a platform for overseas Hong Kong people to keep engaging with a critical conversation about Hong Kong. We hope to initiate the exploration of Hong Kong’s public affairs over the course of different times. We hope this publication would more or less bring a new thought for you and hope you will enjoy it.

2020-2021 UTHKPASS (University of Toronto Hong Kong Public Affairs and Social Service Society)

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UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

香港人還能走多遠？

容祉蓓(二零二零至二零二一年度主席)

很記得，這是學會《年刊前瞻》系列首篇帖子中的一句說話。 誠然，走往哪裏都不是任何一個香港人能決定，但不論如何，只有走下去才能看見𥌓光。 走下去的方法，並沒有固定的。正如沒有人知道，作為一個大學一年級的學生，能夠以主席 的身份與大家分享自己的感受，亦能有這個機會與關心香港的各位在橫跨了一整個太平洋的 多倫多大學中合力運作這個學會。也許我們沒有最流暢的文筆，也許在運作上依然有不足之 處，但對於香港的熱愛足以令我們以筆代步，用文字刻下走下去的足印。不但希望能凝聚多 大香港人之餘，亦能引起其他學生對香港事務的關注，使香港話題在加拿大的討論度更高。 遠在楓葉之國，出版一份有關香港的學生刊物 是一個一腳踢的概念， 而從構思、徵集投稿、 設計，到出版都是一個個難關。不過就算腳步再蹣跚，堅持走下去才不致埋沒了學會的信 念 。所謂「文以載道」，文字是論述和想法的載體。運作本會的道理就如同在漆黑的行人路 上擦亮了火柴，一根也許作用不大，但有了第一根，才能有萬家燈火，使我們足以行到水窮 處，坐看雲起時。 最後，特意在此感謝各位繁忙學業中抽空參與本刊製作的幹事，也希望各位讀者喜歡本刊的 內容。

PRESIDENT ’S NOTE

Elva Yung (2020-2021 UTHKPASS President)

“ How far can HongKongers go?”

This is the first sentence of the first post in the introduction series of Enviago.

To be frank, how far we can go cannot be decided by a single HongKonger, but no matter what, we have to continue to see the light.

The road ahead is entirely flexible and spontaneous. Much like how I am so privileged as a firstyear student to be able to share my thoughts with you all as president of the club and have this opportunity to work with those that share the love of Hong Kong at the University of Toronto.

Our writing may not be perfect and there may still be hiccups in our operation, but our love for Hong Kong is enough for us to pave our journey with words. Not only do we wish to unite HongKongers, but also to help students to understand the public affairs of our home, allowing for further fruitful discussions in Canada.

Being in the Great White North, publishing a journal about Hong Kong is not easy. From brainstorming, drafting, designing to publishing is one hurdle over the next. However, no matter how hard the journey might seem, persevering to the end is crucial for maintaining the true meaning of the club.

They say writings are for conveying the truth; words are vehicles for discourse and ideas. The essence of the club is like lighting a single matchstick In a dark road. One will not be of much use, but it acts as a catalyst for the millions of those that will ignite the road ahead. We will not lose faith even in the most desperate situations. The end of one hope is just the beginning of another.

Lastly, I would like to thank every single member of the executive team, who, despite leading busy academic lives, took time to compile this publication. Without further ado, please enjoy the contents of our publication.

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UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

Annual Review Fall 2020 February 4: Begin of Hong Kong News Rewind Series November 25: Re-activiation of UTHKPASS February 7: 2nd Annual General Meeting December 4: Application of UTHKPASS

Executives starts March 9: Begin of HongKonger Business Series December 20: Call for submissions on Hong March 13: Current Affairs Column

Kong Parliamentary Politics

March 26: 2020-2021 Annual Publication is out December 27-29: Interview period of

Executive applicants

Winter 2021 January 11: Call for submissions on Hong

Kong Cultural Identification January 16: 1st Annual General Meeting January 29: Interview with Dr. Amardeep Kaur January 31: UTHKPASS x KCLPASS x UTCDS Debate Competition February 1: Call for submissions on Hong

Kong-Canada Relations: Remigration

and Cultural Exchanges February 3: Interview with Utantielab

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| 專 題

| 文 章

THEME #1: HONG KONG CULTURAL IDENTIFICATION

專 題 一 ： 所 謂 香 港 人 : 香 港 人 的 身 份 認 同

近年，「香港人」丶「本土」等概念屢次出現在媒體的報道上。政治版塊上，越來越 多政治人物歸類自己為本土派；娛樂上，香港人開始支持擁抱相同價值的藝人；文化 上，社區上出現鼓勵本土文創的風氣。有論者認為，這些現象都是香港人族群身份的 體現。 香港人的身份認同，不是一朝一夕的事。九七回歸後，中港關係較融洽，香港人亦較 能接受與中國大陸的磨合。以2008北京奧運會為例，香港人不但支持香港隊選手， 亦為中國隊的成績而高興。然而，隨著兩者在政制及社會議題上出現根本性的分歧， 兩地的矛盾呈螺旋式的增長。人大常委會頒佈了831白皮書，香港人便發起了雨傘運 動；國民教育的推行及逃犯條例的修訂，便掀起了反國教運動及反送中運動。 這些運動的本質，都是香港人希望能捍衛自身的制度及核心價值。正因為中國大陸在 維護民主丶人權等做法上備受爭議，亦作出了一國兩制「五十年不變」的承諾，香港 人才擁有「香港社會有別於中國大陸社會」等概念。與此同時，隨著漸趨白熱化的抗 爭運動，香港人不知不覺建立了主體意識，亦催生了各種探討身份認同的論述，例如 《香港民族論》。 「香港人」的概念代表甚麼？到底是如《香港民族論》所說，是以共同價值為標準 的「公民民族主義」，還是以反抗中共干預而齊集的共同體，甚至返璞歸真以血統定 民族？時至今日依然尚未𨤳清。與此同時，二零一九年十二月香港民意研究所的調查 中，有百分之七十八的受訪者認為自己是「廣義香港人」，而只有百分之二十一認為 自己是「廣義中國人」。這又帶來了甚麼啟示？ In recent years, the ideology of localism has been frequently mentioned in public discourse. The proposition that claims Hong Konger as a distinctive identity is widely upheld by many politicians or social influencers. These advocates of localists are also widely supported by many Hong Kong people. Hence, the assertion of the identity “Hong Konger” is now embedded in a part of Hong Kong society.

The transformation of Hong Kong people’s identity has undergone a drastic change. Right after the handover in 1997, many Hong Kong people were opened to associated themselves with the Chinese identity. In the 2008 Beijing Olympics, such a sense of identity was brought to the peak. Hong Kong people were not only chanting for their own representatives but also the Chinese athletes. This cultural phenomenon came to its decline after many political disputes between Hong Kong and China.

The resistance in Hong Kong towards the Chinese government such as the Umbrella Movement or Be Water Movement shows the crucial disagreement between Hong Kong people and mainland China. The Chinese government failed to gain confidence and trust from Hong Kong people due to their polarized views on human rights issues. The “One Country Two Systems” also drew a clear line between Hong Kong and other cities in China in terms of its political structure. All of these factors provide a solid foundation for the formation of the identity “Hong Konger.”

However, the debate on “What’s exactly is Hong Konger?” is still ongoing. Some might use the standard of civic nationalism to outline the spectrum of Hong Konger. Some argue that common social objectives created the imagined community, as Benedict Anderson said. As more and more people in Hong Kong see themselves as “Hong Kongers”, the question is yet to be solved.

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UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

圖片描述：二零一九年反送中運動的中學生集會

UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

本專題以海外香港人為目標受眾， 渴望讓港人在社會運動沉寂時期重新反思自己 的身份。 正如議題引導所指，本土派是甚麼？社會運動時不斷高喊的口號又代表甚 麼？ 如何從各方面傳承香港人的身份？ 本會希望，讀者能先暫時蓋上本刊，先以數 分鐘思考這些問題，而再 閱讀 本專題一系列的文章，希望能 為 以上的困惑 帶來答 案 。 首篇<本土派定位的思考>，顧名思義，希望能為後國安法時代的本土派帶來一 個清晰的定義; 第二篇<地厚天高對香港政治生態的解讀>，則希望敘述現今香港政治 人物的處境，及本土派的重要性; 第三篇<身份認同的象徵-港史科>，則希望帶出為 甚麼香港人要爭奪歷史話語權; 第四篇< 香港人身份的延續 >，則願重新提醒香港人 即使流散於世界各地，依然要不忘本。 香港人，請別氣餒 。

UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

本土派定位的思考

(圖片取自本土民主前線fb 專頁)

本土派，在近幾年裡，似乎不斷進入香港的視線，亦有更多政治人物歸類自己為「本 土派」。 但「本土」這概念如此虛無縹緲，難以用片言隻語下定論。中文大學新聞與 傳播學院教授李立 峯便曾指出，「本土派的代表人物多年來也不停轉變，所以一些市 民可能不太明白本土代表甚 麼。」有鑑於本土派正逐漸成為主流，筆者認為本土派需 要被清楚定義。

“若要替本土派定位 ，就必先拋棄故有以黨派分政治版塊的思維。”

本土派的淵源 正本清源，本土派這個類別，其實早在二零一九年前已出現。當然，顧名思義，本土 是以香港 利益為本位。然而，如何本土，本土抵抗的對象等等，亦隨時間而改變。一 九二五年的省港大 罷工中，香港工人發動罷工聲援上海工人，而當時反對罷工的華人 會以各種行動保衞香港經濟 免受罷工衝擊，例如華籍商人便在全港華商大會中一致支 持港英政府維持治安。同樣為香港人 ，這批華商團結一致以保護自身利益為目標，因 而支持港英政府施政來維持經商環境安定；一 九六六年的九龍暴動亦可謂香港人不滿 港英政府殖民，希望重奪管治權而發起的本土運動。當 時的運動發起人蘇守忠便是以 天星小輪加價為推廣反殖民主義的觸發點。正如樹仁大學社會學 系教授張少強便認為 這種反對殖民的心態便是香港人「自覺與這片土地相連」，是民族主義的 雛型。

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UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

到了現在，本土派的定調則成了否定大中華主義，以最小化與中國的聯繫來最大化港 人的利 益。被譽為本土派代表人物的梁天琦，在二零一六年（時為本土民主前線發言 人）接受端傳媒 訪問時便指「透過港中區隔，可以建立我者與他者的區隔，從而強化 香港人的主體意識」。 他這一句，可算是概括了近幾年本土派的發展路向。隨著社會 運動的爆發，不少政治人物及素 人均以本土的名義作政治宣傳。倘若把這種百花齊放 只以本土一詞歸納，則未免過於籠統。7 月舉行的立法會初選，人人均呼籲「有本土 就投」，但今時今日究竟誰是本土，其實從來沒有 任何一個確實的答案。舉個簡單的 例子，劉穎匡是否本土派？黃之鋒是否本土派？相信大部分 的香港人也說不個所然 來。而要回答這個問題，則要先清思緒，明白到本土派是一個尖端 ，也是一個光譜 。

本土派？激進？溫和？ 尖端，猶如刀鋒，位於利器的最前方，而本土派就是一群思想上願意在某一議題上以 香港人利 益為優先的先驅者。以往曾有論者為本土派下定義。時事評論員盧斯達在二 零二零年四月於立 場新聞撰文指，「本土派是一個進進出出的政治空間，是香港動盪 而一日千里的政治發展最前 沿的化身，一切因而良莠不齊而永遠發展中 」 。正因為 香港問題依然尚在「現在進行式」， 甚至在社會運動及疫情下不斷發酵而沒有得到解 決，因而本土派將會不斷受到新議題的挑戰。 倘若以本土派自居的政治人物在應對上 並不是以香港人利益為優先，就已從尖端中退下來。 有論者在此便會質疑，本土派的標準是否過於寬鬆及模糊，亦令香港人誤以為激進民 主派丶城 邦派等等亦是本土派的一種。筆者認為，激進民主派並不一定以「否定大中 華」為主軸，而更 重要的是他們的成立是因為傳統泛民的不作為，而本身從根本上缺 乏論述支撐，例如人民力量 二零一一的成立就是希望在區議會追擊民主黨。在定位上 而言，激進民主派只是手段上激進， 而不符合本土派的條件；

下圖： 中西區區議員 、 本土派梁晃 維 在立法會初選拉票 (梁晃 維fb)

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UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

同時，城邦派的確也曾披上本土派的外衣。二零一三年，陳雲在香港 城邦論中就以重 建本土文化榮譽、建立香港本土意識丶鼓吹公民參政奪回話事權等為出發點， 實踐「 政策要以民主過程商議和制定」等憲制改革，最終願景為達成香港和中國大陸地位相 等 的中華邦聯。不過，隨著時間的推移，城邦派的論述基礎不斷被打擊，而主要倡導 者亦逐漸 不再以香港人利益優先。同樣是陳雲，他今年便在自己的社交媒體上多番出 文指「不要去反送 中」丶「保持中立及自主，大家安居樂業」。 在面臨新一輪惡法下，筆者實難相信「不要去反 送中」就最能抵禦對香港法治的干預，反 而是懦弱不敢反抗的表現。 退一步從結果論來看，送 中條例的撤回亦是源於香港人多次抗爭的成果。正因如此， 政治論述的改變令現今的城邦派不 再是本土派。

即使同為本土派，光譜上也可以存在極大差異，而當中的差異點便是政治人物想像的 出路。范 國威領導的新民主同盟在政治理念上高舉本土旗幟，例如反對雙非及爭取新 移民審批權，主張 港人優先，但所想像的未來則與泛民主派如出一轍，只是高喊雙普 選的口號。比起張崑陽丶梁 頌恆等以先破後立為主軸，以「攬炒議會」，甚至呼籲 國際制裁香港等觸犯國安法紅線的方法 來延續對香港的想像，何者較溫和丶何者較激 進，顯而易見。

UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

本土與泛民 在國安法降臨下，政治人物所高舉的理念會成為政權的眼中釘。在言論空間壓縮下， 今時今日 的本土派的想像隨時會成為禁忌，亦令市民比以往更難區分誰是本土派。筆 者在此斗膽下一註 腳， “在否定大中華的先決條件下，現今的本土派是以想像為根基， 願意自我製造政治議程的一 群人，而在這些議程中，他們以香港人為優先。” 當他們開始失去香港人本位的想像，便逐漸從 本土派這個尖端中滑落，同時亦會有新 血填補。 與泛民主派不同的地方在於，泛民也可以有抗 爭意志，也可以行動上激進，但他們卻 只是奉行「兵來將擋丶水來土淹」的策略，即是政治議 程只是不斷抵抗接踵而來的惡 法（如林卓廷便以重奪立法會民主派過半抵擋惡法為參選宣言） ，而缺乏想像。 此區分可以從二零二零年七月立法會初選中略見端倪。以本土派自居的張可森便以「 重塑我城 未來」為口號，提出對未來議會的想像——全民議政平台。這不但能統合各 區事務，更能在 傳統兩級議會外，開拓出新的途徑來讓不同聲音發聲。同樣是本土派 的鄒家成，在接受立場新 聞專訪時便多次強調「立新」。初選之時，他發現舊有黨派 並不一定否決財政預算案，於是透 過訂立「墨落無悔」承諾書製造出新的政治版塊— 抗爭派。這令當時的選民能看清哪些政治 人物願意一定否決財政預算案，並用承諾書 「夾實」。儘管最後政府延後選舉令計劃胎死腹中 ，承諾書亦統整了較激進的民主派 政治人物的力量。凡此種種，皆是想像。 下圖： 2020年7月15日，15名初選勝出者見記者，當中包含本土派候選人 （圖片來源：端傳媒）

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本土派的想像，也不僅僅限制於政治層面。即使放之於社區， “本土派的政治人物亦能自我製造 政治議程，為當區帶來新的想像。” 北區區議會主席，本土派羅庭德便是一例。在立場新聞的專 訪中，他認為本土議題 應包含社區經濟，因而在當區推行「民宿文創」，翻新皇后山等項目， 令北區的資 源能更被善用，亦避免被大財團趕絕香港人的文化。羅氏這些社區規劃於一年多 前 是願景，而於當下卻已逐漸實踐。更加重要的是，這正好能滿足時代的需求。在大政 治環境 越趨高壓下，民主陣營的政治人物將無可避免地失去更多在建制裏為民請命 的機會，而改為返 回社區把本土意識植根於民。由此可見，本土派的想像甚至能成 為面對打壓的子彈，而支撐這 些想像的，是「以香港人利益為本位」的信念。

結語 本土派從來都是香港的特色。在世上其他國家，不論是左翼右翼，都必然是以本土利 益為優 先。

“正因為香港以往存在親英政府的政客， 而現在存在親北京的政黨， 它們的決定會以其他持份者的利益為先， 才需要本土派的出現。”

的確，在這個時間點，畢竟只要符合否定大中華丶願 意想像等特定條件，誰也可以 披上及脫下本土派的標籤，因而難以用個別人物或政黨劃分。不 過，這一個不斷滾 動的齒輪於香港政壇絕對佔一席位。即使論述或會因人而異，即使面臨打壓 時會首 當其衝，他們的想像卻無可避免地改變著香港社會。

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參考資料

李立峯. (2020, July 25). 港人對政治派別認同的持續轉變: 本土派的抬頭 黃熙麗 . (2016, April 16). 通識導賞：六六乍現 本土論述五十年後仍存困局 陳倩兒, 黃銘浩. (2016, February 19). 從「暴動」到選舉，本土新生代梁天琦說：我不 想失敗，我想贏。

https://theinitium.com/article/20160301-hongkong-leungtinkei/

盧斯達. (2020, April 1). 甚麼是本土主義？誰人是本土派？

https://www.thestandnews.com/politics/%E7%94%9A%E9%BA%BC%E6%98%AF%

E6%9C%AC%E5%9C%9F%E4%B8%BB%E7%BE%A9-%E8%AA%B0%E4%BA%B A%E6%98%AF%E6%9C%AC

%E5%9C%9F%E6%B4%BE/

盧斯達. (2020, July 27). 專訪：由「無人識你喎」到新東初選出線 鄒家成：證明本土 理念有得贏 盧斯達. (2020. February 25).【專訪】首名本土派區議會主席：25歲羅庭德的北區新 想像 梁俊彥. (2021, January 6). 香港反對派與公民社會，2021要末路還是轉型？

https://theinitium.com/article/20210106-opinion-hk-civil-society-pro-democracy-party needs-reform/

陳雲. (2011). 香港城邦論

https://sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/proletarian-library/books/df00fa07c7bce1bccaae ae6a33eaca09.pdf

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地厚天高對香港政治生態的解讀

圖片描述：二零一六年的本土民主前線，持大聲公者為梁天琦，後方為黃台仰 （圖片來源：端傳媒）

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地厚天高，是由本地新晉導演林子穎於二零一七年所編導的紀錄片，而紀錄的對象， 是現今抗 爭者廣為傳頌的名字—梁天琦。此片獲第二十四屆香港電影評論學會大獎選 為年度推薦電影， 亦於2018年台灣國際紀錄片影展，獲得華人紀綠片獎的評審團優 等獎。由本地導演拍攝，再 由本地公司影意志出品，而拍攝的對象更是本土派的代表 人物，這套電影可算是反映香港本土 精神的極致。筆者在觀影後，比起從文化角度分 析，更希望從香港政治人物的壽命、從政者年 輕化、本土派的需要性三點分析香港的 政治生態：

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上圖： 前立法會議員 、青年新政游蕙禎及梁頌恆 （圖片來源：BBC)

片中所出現的政治人物，今日的遭遇已是南轅北轍：游蕙禎已經不在政治圈的鎂光燈 下，唯一 剩下的就只是她被律政司追討欠薪的官司；梁頌恆，李東昇及黃台仰已到 外地流亡；而主角梁 天琦亦已身陷監牢。的確，大量原因能把抗爭者陣營的政治人物 淘汰，而當中 政權的打壓 絕對 是其中一環。前嶺南大學文化研究系副教授羅永生就 曾指出，

“香港的政制架構是一個虛擬的多元體制， 而這種多元並不會對體制造成甚麼威脅。” 因而在一個「虛擬民主」的地方，從政者 參與的選舉都只是「選舉遊戲」。那是因為 他們的政治主張是有限制的。不乎統治者心意的， 政權的國家機器能隨意用不同法例 打壓。由限制人身自由的國安法（大肆拘捕民主派人士）， 到以社團條例取締政黨（ 二零一八年取締香港民族黨），再到以選舉主任取消參選資格（電影 中便有梁天琦因 其港獨論述而成為首位被港府取消選舉資格的一幕），凡此種種都為香港政圈 帶來了 寒蟬效應。政圈中人要不一直為捉不透的紅線而不斷躲避，要不寸步不退，但卻隨時 因 為一句說話，一句口號，甚至一項政綱而付出數以年計失去自由的成本。 坊間流傳著一種說法：政治人物被打壓能令其社運成績表更添亮麗。但不可不否認的 是，每一 種打壓都是會縮少政治人物在公共空間的影響力。舉個簡單的例子：許智峯 及羅冠聰先後流亡 後，他們將越來越失去在香港的公共空間話語權。這是因為他們已 經沒有任何公職人員的身份 ，而只能淪為網絡上的意見領袖。 韓國政治系教授 22

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香港政治人物的壽命 如果要以一句說話概括香港政治人物的壽命，就必然是 電影中前立法會議員梁頌恆在立法會辦 公室受訪的一段 說話：

「其實個情況就好似鋪條路過維港 咁， 每個政治人物都只係鋪得幾格既啫， 鋪完之後就要跳落海 因為哩條係不歸路。 無錯我係犧牲咗， 但後人就可以沿著條路一路行落去 而佢哋距離目標一定會越嚟越近。」

--梁頌恆 2017 <地厚天高>

Chong Lim Kim在 “Toward a Theor y of Individual and systemic effects of Political Status Loss” 一文中就指出，政治領袖在失去政治 身份後，都會在收入、政治前途、 社經地位等方面付出高昂的代價。即使是梁天琦，在二零 一八年被重判入獄後，他對 公共空間的影響力近乎零。就算現時抗爭者高呼他二零一六年的競 選口號，梁天琦只 是成為了抗爭者的象徵，而不是影響力的體現。倘若香港是一個真正的民主 社會，以 上提及的政治人物及其所屬政黨都能在議會甚至建制中為香港作出貢獻，而他們的政 治壽命都能延續。 第二個不能忽略的原因，是香港民主陣營的派系鬥爭。在反抗北京干預的過程中，香 港民主陣 營屢次出現鬥爭路線的分歧。正如時事評論員梁俊彥便曾於端傳媒撰文指： 「泛民主陣營這種 分散多元的狀態，一來是長年有意識推動的結果，出發點是為了在 主流民主運動外維持公民社 會的活力和多元」.......「同時亦基於選舉制度「比例代 表制」鼓勵分裂的特性，民主派內部互 相競爭，山頭林立」。 這並不僅僅限於溫和 與激進路線的拉扯，而鬥爭往往損耗政治人物的 壽命。縱觀時間軸，二零一一年發生 社民連與人民力量的分裂，而黃毓民，陳偉業兩人帶領支 持者另組人民力量追擊民主 黨；二零一六年城邦派與本土派的互相聲討，熱普城自喻為「唯一 本土派」，並推動 「永續基本法，全民制憲」，與青年新政等爭奪選票； 電影中本土民主前線 在民政

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上圖：前立場新聞記者何桂藍及荃灣區議員岑敖暉 （圖片：端傳媒）

事務處向民主黨叫罵，指「民主黨，賣香港」（諷刺民主黨在民主路上的不作為）。 以 上種種都是派系鬥爭的例子。政見之爭尤自可，但各派系的支持者甚至加上了如同 人格謀殺的 指控（例如青年新政就不斷被抹黑為共諜）。多少政治人物就在鬥爭的過 程中或失去人民信任 ，或損耗信任基礎。的確，政治路線分分合合本是兵家常事，但 香港市民及從政者需要認清的 是香港從來都不是一個真正的民主社會，因而民主派不 應以制度裏的黨派利益為先，而是以最 有效的方法推動香港民主。 至於最後一個原因，是 香港公民社會的覺醒 。隨著中國大陸的干預越發增強，香 港人逐漸感受 到「覆巢之下，豈有完卵」的存亡號召，故對政治人物的要求亦更加嚴 謹。不同於以往，新一 代積極參與公共空間的政治討論，而從政者的一言一行亦被監 察。政客的失言，就會成為眾矢 之的。二零一六年前立法會議員楊岳橋的一句「法治 已死？O ver my dead body」，不但引起 公眾嘩然，更在後來的反修例運動中淪為抗 爭者恥笑的對象。當時的發言片段更在高登，連登 各網路討論區俯拾皆見。在今日的 香港，政權，司法制度的正當性已備受質疑，而楊岳橋則因 為以上的言行被冠上過時 的形象，抗爭者亦漸漸否定他的路線。

“民心盡失，已是政治壽命將盡 之時。”

有論者或會認為，這不是正常政治人物更替的過程嗎？的確，誠如邱吉爾所言：「對 政治人物 無情，是偉大國家人民的象徵。」筆者並不打算判斷這樣的政治生態是好是 壞，而是希望正立 不論是甚麼派別也好，香港從政者的政治壽命極為脆弱，需要在多 個因素夾擊下找尋一線生 機。的確，政治人物是需要被監察。然而，香港已逐漸邁入 一個後極權社會，與當權者對抗的 異見分子面臨的風險比以往更大。致力於爭取民主 自由的香港人，對前路的分歧是否應暫且放 下？又是否應對同路的政治人物多一點寬 容，多一點大局為重，而不是在一次犯錯後便要即時 消滅其政治壽命？這是一個值得 深思熟慮的問題。 24

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從政者年輕化 地厚天高的首四分一，都是紀錄了梁天琦以往在港大舍堂的生活，而梁天琦亦在鏡頭 下訴說舍 堂領導的經驗如何塑造他成為一個政治人物。此時觀眾才突然醒覺，這個突 然冒起的政治新星 才剛剛大學畢業。到了今天，中西區區議員彭家浩、本土派鄒家成 等甚至連大學也尚未畢業。 這不禁令更多人有一個香港從政者趨向年輕化的想法。回 顧世界各地的社會運動，都不難發現 學生或年輕人都是反抗的推動者，而香港亦同樣 適用。 在與香港相鄰的台灣，國立台灣大學 歷史系專任助理教授羅士傑在《學生運 動和社會變革間的關係，是我們必需持續思考的重要問 題》一文中回顧太陽花學運時 就指，學生運動已經不一定與民族主義及政治抗議行動掛勾，而 是學生會對社會上發 生的哪些問題產生了基於良知的熱情，從而願意投入去讓運動發生，達成 創造社會的 目的。的確，隨著中國大陸對香港的干預越發加劇，而新一代對舊有從政者的不 斷妥 協有所不滿下，比起繼續相信代議士，學生們寧願自己投身入政治抗爭，甚至擔當領 導角 色。最最明顯的例子莫過於2012年的反國教運動中，其中一名領導者是尚在就讀 高中的黃之 鋒。當時他領導的學民思潮只是就著單一議題成立的學生組織，但他這份 「對社會發生的特定 ， 問題所產生的良知」逐漸建立了他對香港前途的看法，啟發 了他在就讀大學時便創立現在已解 散的香港眾志。 大政治環境固然重要，但高等教育在孕育政治領袖上亦功不可沒。前哈佛大學講師 Philip G. Altbach 在”Perspectives Students Political Activism” 一文中就論證了當 社會制度並不完全民 主，而言論自由亦不能完全受保障時，學生是最具組織性的社會 群體，而他們往往啟發至容許 較多社會討論的校園組織。早在英殖時期，西方教育已 在香港植根，加上香港問題由簽訂 《中英聯合聲明》時已不斷醞釀，故大專學界已從 良久以前便針鋒相對地論政。時至今日，各 大學學生依然能藉住學校刊物、校園媒 體、辯論比賽等平台發聲，甚至為公共空間的討論奠基 ，例如香港大學的

下圖：公開大學護理系學生鄒家成以本土派牌頭出選新界東 (圖片：端傳媒）

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上圖：香港大學於今年二月舉辦的地厚天高放映會 (圖片來源：眾新聞）

《學苑》及中文大學學生報。透過這些平台，不但編者能在撰文時釐清邏輯 思緒，而 且能啟發讀者以更多角度了解社會問題，甚至鼓勵他們採取行動（地厚天高中梁天琦 直言自己被《學苑》出版的《香港民族論》啟發）。當學生能有大量機會作思想上的 交流，便 能藉此建立對社會的一套看法，為自己的想像而努力。

今時今日還需要本土派？ 正如上文所指，地厚天高紀錄的，是一個本土派政黨成長的故事。當天新界東補選結 果出爐時 ，梁天琦曾激動地說：「由今天開始，本土、建制、泛民三分天下。」但時 間軸回到二零二一 的今天，即使是最傳統、最溫和的民主黨及公民黨，亦被政權以取 消議員資格及國安法拘捕時 ，本土不本土，又有甚麼分別？在跨黨派合組的抗爭派成 立後 其中的一分子 以本土派自居的 屯門區議員張可森就曾指出：「不用再去分本土 派，而是為民主出發的人都以香港作為最終極 的理念。」。但筆者恕不同意。在此就 先要回顧「抗爭派」的成立。初選之時，鄒家成等人 發現舊有黨派並不一定否決財政 預算案，於是透過訂立「墨落無悔」承諾書製造新的政治版 塊—抗爭派。這令當時的 選民能看清哪些政治人物願意一定否決財政預算案，並用承諾書 「夾實」。儘管最後 政府延後選舉令計劃胎死腹中，承諾書亦統整了較激進的民主派政治人物 的力量。由 此可見，抗爭派只是一個臨時協調而成的政治聯盟，當中包含本土派、香港眾志出 身 的從政者、前立法會議員朱凱迪、及難以被歸類的政治素人，而聯盟中的政治人物連 彼此對 香港前途的看法都不盡相同，更遑論大相逕庭的政治理念。因而筆者認為，

一個就住選舉而誕生的政治協商，並不能取代一整個政治派別。 解決了抗爭派能否取代本土派的問題，就去到了下一步：香港人還需要本土派嗎？無

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從不知天高與地厚 漸學會很多困憂 也試過制度和自由 也許不再沒有 又或者不想再追究 我發覺這地球原來很大 但靈魂已經敗壞 如用這歌 可以代表我 幫我為你加一點附和 假使可以全沒隔阻 可以代表我 可以伴你不管福或禍 這樣已是很足夠 容置疑， 答案是需要的。正如張可森所言，本土派最重要的意義是堅持香港人是自己 的主人，而把「本土派」綑綁一起的，是本土的理念和意志。 筆者在此反問：怎會有 一個地方的人民不會希望 有願意規劃自己的家的代議士為自己發聲呢？只有本土理念 能綑綁更多香港人，保護本土文化 的意識才得以承傳。如是者，

香港不會不再需要本土派，而是人人都成為了本土派。

結語 英國十七世紀詩人多恩曾說：「不要問喪鐘為誰而敲，喪鐘是為你我而敲。」 歸根究 底，以上三問都是建基於一群有志之士渴望回應時代給予香港人的問題。沒有他們， 就 不可能有這篇分析讓大家閱讀。

“諷刺的是，香港本以「一國兩制」獨特的制度而自豪， 但時代 的巨輪偏偏把以往那種穩定的幻象撕毀， 一再挑戰香港所謂「司法獨立」、「三權分立」等等 的核心價值。” 這不禁令一部分人醒覺，香港人其實一直陶醉於糖衣毒藥而不自知。於是，他們 領導 反抗，令越來越多的香港人對香港建立了身土不二的歸屬感，亦令敢於向高牆衝擊的 力量 越來越大。

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比起大部分香港人在二零一九年才被喪鐘驚醒，梁天琦早在三年前的新界東補選中已 經思考 「主權在民」等概念。不過， 更加重要的是，在反抗極權的過程中，誰先走誰慢慢跟上並不是 重點， 而是不論遲來早到，同路人都會分享對時代的感受。 也許，未必每個香港人都會認同未 來還需要本土派，亦未必每個香港人都分析到香港 政治人物曇花一現的政治壽命，但對於電影 中梁天琦「甚麼也沒得到」的無奈，以及 對未來失去預算的不確定性，

每個曾為我城奮鬥的香港人都會有所共鳴。

在極權生活是痛苦而提心吊膽的，筆者明白亦深表認同。梁天琦口中的「黎明前嘅黑 暗係至x 黑暗」也許尚未到來，香港也許依然能繼續惡化，但願每位同行者能在心灰 之時，在《地厚天 高》中尋到堅持下去的理由。

參考資料

公共影視平台：地厚天高

https://viewpoint.pts.org.tw/ptsdoc_video/%E5%9C%B0%E5%8E%9A%E5%A4%A9 %E9%AB%98/

梁俊彥. (2021, January 6). 香港反對派與公民社會，2021要末路還是轉型？

https://theinitium.com/article/20210106-opinion-hk-civil-society-pro-democracy-party needs-reform/

盧斯達. (2020, July 27). 專訪：由「無人識你喎」到新東初選出線 鄒家成：證明本土 理念有得贏

羅士傑. (2018 May 22). 學生運動和社會變革間的關係，是我們必需持續思考的重要問 題

https://www.thenewslens.com/article/95484

Altbach, Philip G. 1989. “Perspectives on Student Political Activism.” Comparative Education 25 (1): 97–110.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3099006.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7aea1fefc3c11ec 27084595f5eeccd0f Alvin. (2020, July 25). 「見字飲水」的意志—張可森

https://www.thenewslens.com/article/138302 Kim, Chong Lim. 1971. “Toward a Theory of Individual and Systemic Effects of Political Status Loss.” The Journal

of Developing Areas 5 (2): 193–206.

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身份認同的象徵-港史科 上圖：攝於香港歷史博物館翻新前，市民到場觀看「香港故事」(HK01)

近幾年,我們常聽到建制派的一種言論:中國歷史理應必修。背後的原因, 就是加強身份 認同,以及所謂的「愛國情操」。然而,在抗爭者陣營, 港史科的討論卻往往未能進入主 流論述圈。 詩人雨果就曾說 : 「歷史是什麼:是過去傳到將來的迴聲,是將來對過去的反映。」 歷史作為一種文宣工具, 把怎樣訴說過去的權力交給了史家。宏觀現時的課程結構, 中 國歷史中牽涉香港的部分極少, 而主軸只圍繞中華大地的博弈;至於歷史科, 關於香港 的討論亦只有香港一個單元, 主要教導學生關於英治及回歸的史實。這顯然是不足夠 的。要令莘莘學子從小建立以本土出發的思維,則更應以歷史的教導為文宣, 設港史科 為必修。 以往的批評者通常抱持一種觀念: 就是港史科的課程與中西史重疊, 或過於單薄。筆者 看卻不然。世界歷史科部分只記述上世紀一百年,明顯不足以構建學生的歷史觀。與此 同時, 此科並沒有特定的主軸,而只以「百科全書」形式記載過去一百年的大事;而中國 歷史的論調及主軸, 是大一統思想。明明中華大地的歷史的本質都是分分合合, 那些中 國歷史的支持者卻不斷僭建「王朝的興替過程不重要, 只要統一就是好」的觀念。這 種觀念, 早在第一課關於周代封建已現, 而昭然若揭於秦漢的描述。以秦代為例, 不論 是初中還是高中,各教科書描述秦代最具代表性的影響必然是第一個所謂「統一全國」 的皇朝。不可思議的是,所謂「中國」的主權觀念, 是在中華民國出現後才成形,而以往 的朝代只是基於「君權神授」、武力征服等較封建的因素而得到管治權。當香港的年 青學生在種種不了解下不斷被灌輸「自己是中華五千年的子民」的傳承使命時, 這並 不利於本土意識的建立。何況,誰說香港歷史的起源必然是跟隨中國歷史呢?

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把史事整理一下，便不難發現古代香港有一些事件從未被現今教科書提及。秦始皇統 一六國後， 中國歷史書中曾提及「王翦率四十萬部隊南平百越」，其後便略略帶過。 百越看似不重要，但其 實當中的一些部族，便曾佔領廣東，當中包括香港。除了在史 書一閃即逝的百越，東甌人在漢代 建立的南海郡，便曾駐於香港及東江流域，帶動香 港的發展。及後漢代時趙佗建立的南越國，便 亦包含香港及番禺一帶。他們在中國歷 史書本中，只淪為四邊的外族蠻夷，是大一統事業的附 庸。有論者可能會問：這些半 土著半部族的歷史過客對歷史的貢獻又有多大？的確，在歷史長河 中，他們也許微不 足道，但他們的事蹟真的確確實實發生在香港，要是連香港的史書也不記載， 就只能 任由被遺忘。 古代的事件看似遙不可及，但亦解釋了現今香港亂局助長者的源頭。抗爭者常常在口 中鄙視的新界鄉黑，最原始的版本是五大世族。當中錦田鄧氏等人已在宋帝昺丶張世 傑被追殺至香港時已可考。他們一直在新界盤踞勢力，令新界一直成為原住民的庇護 所。及後即使邁入英治時期，英軍 希望進入新界時亦遭到原住民的頑抗，史書記之 曰：「七日戰爭」。這些歷史，往往靠歷史愛好 者自行翻閱歷史文獻來知曉，但普遍 不為香港學生所知。既然我們以本土主義掛帥，本身學習的中國歷史又遠至西周，那 麼追本溯源以解釋現況，弄清史實又似乎並不過分。 當今香港的困局亦能被港史所說明。當今選修的歷史科，雖然著力描寫香港的政治走 勢，但選修 的人數漸少。以近年的數據為例，2020文憑試報考的考生數目已跌出頭 十。這令年輕抗爭者根本不明白混沌亂象之始，亦難以吸收前人的失敗經驗。九十年 代盛行的民主回歸一說，頗受老派泛民歡迎，亦盛產了一整代高舉「建設民主中國」 口號的知識份子。可惜的是，正因為當時他們天 真地相信共產黨遵守承諾，以及盲目 地擁抱回歸中華大地的浪漫情懷，才導致本土主義晚了十多 年才能與主流抗衡。引入

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必修的港史科，正正能避免下一代跌入前人所中的圈套。

回溯歷史、承認錯誤固然重要，但史實另一個不能忽略的重要性是能令抗爭者仔細思 考香港的前路及進程，甚至作為日後不受制肘時施政的參考。取殖民地時期的史實為 例，1992年彭定康憲制 改革中，以「單議席單票制」進行立法會選舉、在功能組別新 增個人票、成立選區劃定委員會等元素更被譽為香港民主化的指標，甚至惹來當時北 京政府的抨擊。當然，功能組別如何偏袒商界及既得利益者是衆人皆知的事實，但消 除這種不義的過程從來都不是一步到位，而是探討不同可能性然後得出最符合各方利 益的結論。即使以往的政策未必能趕上時局的變遷，但只要能給予一 點啟示，已值得 紀錄及及宣揚開去。 正如小說《1984》所言：

「誰控制了過去，就控制了未來； 誰控制了未來，就控制了現在。」 歷 史是沉悶的，但亦是教育中受重視的文 宣一戰。這是源於統治者希望如何正名自 己的形象，就決 定了歷史的書寫。 香港人 要打破極權營造的畫皮，則應重新投入文 史和教育的世界－－與其令下 一代繼續埋 頭研究大一統思想，不如更切實地教導他 們香港的前世今生。筆者認為，

“歷史的觀點 與角度， 便是大一統與本土角力的戰場。 即使不如街頭般硝煙滿佈， 也絕不能拱手相讓。” 左圖：六十年代徙置區, 志願團體向徙置區小 童派發免費牛奶 (圖片來源：明報) 下圖：2020年數名香港市民在維港海旁稍事休 息

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香港人身份的延續 上圖：二零一九年反送中運動

反送中運動完結之後，中共聯同港共一齊以包括國安法在內的各種手法打壓港人。在 2019年至 2020年中共有20900人其他香港居民淨移出，足以顯示香港內不少人均對香 港前途無希望。在民 主陣營裏，不少政界KOL認為移民可以保留實力，待日後再次 支援抗爭。可惜，這些KOL往往忽略 不少事實，令大眾誤會移民只需要移民留得青 山在，就不需要再考慮其他問題。 不少KOL或連登仔經常以猶太人及波蘭人復國作為例子，卻時常忽略他們流亡海外的 苦難經歷。 這兩個民族得以傳承的原因，某程度上歸功於有屬於自己的社區及社區中 心。猶太人不僅自己的 社區，更加有自己的學校及教堂。這些教堂及學校成為猶太人 的文化中心，令到猶太裔後代得以 繼續傳承下去。儘管如此，有些猶太後代亦難免地 失去自己的文化，令到其失去猶太人的民族意 識。後來猶太人成功復國只是偶然，是 在19世紀末屈里弗斯冤案之後令到錫安主義興起，及在二 戰之後，在英國及聯合國的 允許下才成功成立以色列。 相似地，波蘭人亦是透過成立文化中心，才得以在列強及納粹德軍佔領波蘭時仍然得 以保存文 化。這些所謂的文化中心便是透過自己的天主教堂及地下教育系統，令到波 蘭裔後代可以學習波 蘭傳統及文化。最後，波蘭在蘇聯解放之後才成功獨立建國，不 過淪為衛星國，作為蘇聯及西方 國家在歐洲開戰時的緩衝地區。後來波蘭成功脫離蘇 聯的掌控是歸功於團結工會努力不懈地帶領 反共主義社會運動，而不是靠民族意識。 香港人到海外落地生根，就需要面對一個現實的問題：如何確保自己的後代傳承份， 願意在 將來為抗爭出一分力？筆者在海外認識不少上一代在海外落地生根，而他們的 後代均不能夠流 利地講廣東話、不認識大部份香港本土才有的文化及對香港少有身份 認同。因此，在海外的港人 後代亦已經開始遺失我們引以為榮的文化及身份。以筆者 觀察，僅僅以父母的教育來傳承香港文 化並不足夠，因為若果想完完全全地令到後代 接受及吸納香港文化及思考香港的前路，他們必須在日常 生活中體會到香港文化。現 時，這批海外港人後代正是欠缺一個可供日常使用的文化中心，才導 致這批人士不再 32

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對香港人這個身份有多大的認同。 海外港人不能夠依賴現時海外的華人組織，因為在過去的20年，華人社區已經逐漸以 中國移民為 主。過度接觸這些華人社區恐怕只會令自己及海外港人後代染紅。因此， 去到海外，香港人必須 設法成立自己的社區。在這個社區中，香港人必須有一個屬於 自己的文化中心，包括社區中心、 粵語教堂或學校，用來傳承香港文化及粵語。一個 完善的海外香港社區才能提高香港人這個主體生存的 概率。 建基於此建議上，筆者有一個更大膽的提議：由海外港人成立國際 性的香港文化教育 組織，為各地想成立港人學校的人士提供支援及認證，確保海外港人的教育不 被染 紅。此類組織類似港英時代的英基或德國瑞士在各地成立的德語校園，確保就算在海 外，這 些人士的孩子可以接受相應的教育，可以隨時返去原本居住的地方而不感到陌 生。一個中央的文 化教育組織能夠確保各國海外港人的文化不會被遺忘，以及不會因 為當地文化移植的影響下而令 到各地香港文化有太大差別。 中共瘋狂的行徑務求留島不留人，香港人感到不安在所難免。因此筆者懇請各位移民 之前請三思 如何傳承香港文化及身份下去，而不只是考慮自己的未來。既然想要移 民，又認為自己是一個香 港人，就自然有一個義務去確保我們能夠在煲底之下相見。

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香 港 人 還 能 走 多 遠 ？

香 港 人 還 能 走 多 遠 ？

Theme #2: Hong KongCanada Relations Remigration and Cultural Exchanges

專 題 二 ： 港 加 連 線 — 二 次 移 民 和 文 化 移 植

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經歷過一波又一波的民生及政治風暴蹂躪，香港人又想到了離開：由踴躍開設境外戶 口，到「移民」成為網絡熱搜及茶餘飯後話題，移民潮的規模可見一斑；而加拿大， 似乎是很多港人移民的聚腳地。 事實上，加拿大本來就很受港人歡迎。不論是港英時期的金山（泛指加拿大、美國及 澳洲）淘金熱，抑或是八九十年代的中港各大事，往往可以見到大量港人前往加國。 當中後者尤為空前龐大 —— 數以萬計港人舉家移民，是為史上第一波港加移民潮。 同時，目前亦有數以萬計加拿大公民長居香港，可見兩地人民流動普遍，融合程度相 當高。 所謂「人離鄉賤」，在今時今日，港人為何忍痛離開自己的成長地，也要選擇移民？ 單單以近一年的政治動盪作解釋又是否夠全面？更甚之，為何港人會熱衷於移民加拿 大呢？另一方面，背負着悠久的歷史和長期的交流，港加之間又產生了甚麼獨有的文 化或交匯點？

After being ravaged by a series of social problems and political unrest, Hongkongers start to ponder about emigration once again; from ambitiously opening overseas bank accounts, to frantic discussions about “immigration” during their downtime or on internet search sites, the scale of emigration waves are certainly copious. As one might expect, Canada has become a safe haven and popular immigration hotspot for a vast majority of Hong Kong emigrants.

Canada has always remained one of the most popular destinations for Hong Kong immigrants. The origin of this migration trend can be traced back to the “Gold Mountain” fantasy and ideology about North America during the early 19th century, similar to the “American dream” stemming from the 20th century. The pre-handover period of Hong Kong also acted as a vital push factor for Hong Kong people to immigrate. What’s more noteworthy is that there are tens of thousands of Canadian citizens currently living in Hong Kong. Therefore, it is quite evident that there is a migration connection between the two locations.

Considering many Hong Kong migrants are emotionally attached to their home, it is intriguing to examine the financial, political, cultural, and personal conditions and reasons behind the decision of leaving their homeland. We might also question, what kinds of cultural or social bonds are formed under such migration circulations and interactions over history?

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This theme targets both HongKongers and local Canadians as audiences, as it illusrates the cultural interaction between Hong Kong immigrants and Canadian cities. The first passage is “Suburban Chinatown: Markham”, which narrates the development of Markham over the past decades with the influence of HongKongers; The second one being “Influence of Transnationalism and Migration at the Development of Richmond’s Golden Village”, which shows HongKonger’s influence in shaping Goldern Village from a rural area to a city; While the last passage <Further scenarios of migration waves> has predicted how HongKongers would react in the post National Security Law era.

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Suburban Chinatown: Markham

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Photo: Unionville

UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

T he emergence of Chinese Immigrants in

Canada has been increasingly evident throughout the past century and their culture has broadly influenced Canada’s ethnic geography.

Chinatown is one of the main geographic elements that demonstrates Chinese culture in Canada. There were 25 Chinatowns across the country in the 1930s and 1940s; however, by 2006, less than half of these urban Old Chinatowns had survived (Peritz, 2006). David Chuenyan Lai, as a geographer, has developed a 4 stages-development model, sequentially bud, bloom, wither, and revive (Lai, 1998, p.5).

He defines an Old Chinatown as “a Chinese residential, institutional, and commercial inner-city neighborhood that is physically discernible by its land uses, commercial facades, demographic structures, and socioeconomic activities.” (p. 4) As the urbanization in Canada continued, it led to the emergence of suburban Chinatowns, such as the one in Markham.

In this essay, the development of Markham’s that the model’s application is not limited to urban Old Chinatowns but also applies to new suburban Chinatowns like that in Markham.

According to Lai, a Chinatown will only have a few Chinese residents in its budding stage (1998, p.5). In 1961, there were only a few Chinese immigrants who were located in Markham, Canada’s immigration policies and the concentration of Chinese immigrants living in urban Old Chinatowns were the main drivers of this phenomenon. “Official federal Government discrimination towards this visible minority was harsh” (Markham Diversity Action Plan [MADP], 2010). The Head Tax policy, later named the Chinese Exclusion Act, has been regulated by the Chinese Immigration Policy in Canada between 1885 and 1947. Unfair policies were made with the aim of excluding Chinese immigrants.

Their rights to vote were deprived, and a costly head tax was required for each Chinese entering Canada. The racism towards Chinese ethnic communities was severe and the unwelcoming atmosphere has discouraged a lot of Chinese families to immigrate to Canada.

Following the revocation of the Exclusion Act in 1947, redresses were made and less harsh immigration policies were legislated in Canada, leading to a positive population growth of Chinese immigrants. Chinatowns were built across the country, representing the vibrant cultures of Chinese-Canadian communities and strengthening the bonding between Chinese-Canadians from different provinces in Canada.

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However, this scenario did not remain for long.

“Chinatowns came under merciless pressure from urban development, and Chinese-Canadians became upwardly mobile and Chinese-Canadians became upwardly mobile and moved on” (Peritz, 2006).

Chinese communities started to move from the biggest cities in Canada into the suburbs, Markham as an example. To illustrate, Dr. Morley Lam, whose father was a Chinese immigrant in Canada, moved to Markham in 1963 to start his dentistry practice right after he graduated from the University of Toronto (MADP, 2010). One of the biggest incentives that attracted Morley to start his practice there was the promising economic development there.

Markham was designated to be a high-growth area in Ontario and it offered Morley a bright future for his career with a large source of clients. Many other Chinese immigrants with similar cases to Morley’s moved into Markham, slowly expanding the Chinese community in this suburb and forming an ‘ethnoburb’, and thus planting a seed for a Chinese commercial area in Markham.

Lai’s second stage is blooming, which he describes as the stage where “the Chinese population increases rapidly by immigration” and “the Chinatown’s economy is becoming more diversified and prosperous.” The political uncertainty in Hong Kong and the rise of neo-liberalism were the two main drivers for the blooming of Markham’s Chinatown. In the 1970s, Neoliberalism encouraged the conduction of free markets and free trades, giving a rise to transnationalism across the Pacific Rim, and states like Canada have worked towards policies to prioritize economic immigrants and homo economicus (Ley, 2010, p.6). In 1978, the Business Immigration Program of Canada, with the two subcategories of entrepreneurs and self-employment, was introduced by the federal government of Canada. The purpose was to recruit wealthy immigrants to advance Canada’s economic development through active entrepreneurship or passive investment. The investor category was later introduced in 1986. This category was targeted to Hongkongers in regards to the arisen uncertainty among the middle class of Hong Kong following the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. The new set of immigration policies under such circumstances has led to a huge immigration flow from Hong Kong to Canada.

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As mentioned earlier, former Chinese immigrants had already planted the seeds for the acquisition of Chinese ethnic commerce in Markham and along with the increased immigration flow of Chinese immigrants in the 1980s, Market Village was opened in Markham in 1990. Most stores and restaurants in Market Village were family businesses and had a significant link to Hong Kong and Chinese merchandise. (Lo, 2012). The handover of Hong Kong from the British to the Chinese in 1997 has further stimulated the population growth of Chinese Immigrants in Canada.

In the same year, Pacific Mall was opened in Markham, neighboring to Market Village. The opening of the Chinese themed mall has aided Markham to be a popular province for the new wave of Chinese immigrants to settle. Pacific Mall was partnered with Thomas Fung’s Fairchild Group, a Hong Kong developer. It signifies the suburbanization of the Hong Kong and Chinese Canadian population and is still a major tourist attraction for being the largest Chinese shopping mall in North America.

Unlike other mainstream shopping malls with huge shops in North America, Pacific Mall exemplifies the operating structure of a commercial condominium system.

Individual units are sold to different owners, the types of merchandise sold and business hours can be decided by the owners themselves (Ho and Lau, 2009, p.115), wherein North America, malls are usually sold to one large owner.

The ownership of small individual units and the business model has attracted large groups of Chinese entrepreneurs to move to Markham, deeming it an opportunity to develop a family business, while enjoying the convenience of purchasing different Asian goods. Ho has also analyzed Pacific Mall architecturally designed as a combination of Hong Kong, China and Canada’s culture. The expansion of the Chinese population in Markham has attracted more developers to create Chinese themed malls and restaurants, such as Cha-Chaan-Tengs, to serve the Chinese neighbors.

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However, the client base for these Asian-themed malls contracted over time and Markham’s Chinatown has entered its withering stage. Lai’s description of this stage involves the closure of Chinese businesses, a decrease in the Chinese population, and a decline in the economy. Although the population growth of Chinese in Markham remained steady, Market Village has still faced its closure on March 1, 2018, because of its diminishment in major tenants along with a shrinkage of clientele (Lo, 2012). The craze about Asian themed malls was decreasing as Chinese Immigrants in Markham started to prefer visiting Markville Shopping Centre, which is one of the mainstream malls owned by Cadillac Fairview, over Pacific Mall or Market Village.

“The younger generation of immigrants are attracted to the mainstream malls because of the selection, because of the price, because of the after-sale ser vices,»

says the geography professor, Shugang Wang (Bascaramurty, 2012). People were less interested in purchasing merchandise in Pacific Mall and Market Village, for they were alleged for selling fake goods and the Hong Kong-Canadians even labeled them as the “A-commodities malls”, “A as in the alphabet A” (Ho, 2009, p.121). Notably, there is less customer protection and the absence of warranties for merchandise, especially electronicgoods, and luxurious products has made people choose to visit mainstream malls instead. The scale of Chinese-themed businesses and malls in Markham was shrinking, and the commerce model that represented Chinese ethnic culture no longer had a great vogue, signifying a fall back of Chinese culture in Markham’s Chinatown and subsequently entering its withering stage.

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Prior to the closure of Market Village in 2018, the Remington Group has planned to reconstruct Market Village into a new mall with a mixed development of condominium residences and a commercial retail plaza, which signifies the revival stage of Markham’s Chinatown. As Lai illustrates, a revitalized Chinatown involves renovations of old buildings and new construction projects, as well as an attraction of new businesses and investments (1998, p.8). Albert Young, the director of sales and leasing for Remington Centre, describes the development of Remington Centre as a “crossover mainstream mall”, with a mix of a Canadian mainstream mall’s retailing operation structure and Chinese ethnic culture and commerce (Bascaramurty, 2012).

“The planning of construction has brought hopes of revival to this suburban Chinatown.”

Some may argue that David Chuenyan Lai’s 4 stages development model is targeted to analyze Old Chinatowns, and is less applicable to modernized, suburban Chinatowns like Markham, for it only has a brief histor y and lack one of the main characteristics of Lai’s definition of an Old Chinatown - a physically discernable Chinese residential, institutional and commercial neighborhood. However, parts that are crucial to the histor y of Chinese-Canadian developments such as immigration policies and racism, influenced Markham’s development towards being a Chinatown. Although Markham’s Chinatown is more spread out, unlike the Old Chinatowns that have a “linear pattern or a cross-shaped pattern formed by two intersecting streets” (Lai, 1998, p.5), it still has met Lai’s main descriptions of the four stages. To conclude, the diminishing of the Chinese themed malls resulted in the setting up of Remington Centre signified the weakening of the Chinese culture in Markham’s Chinatown, for it needs a mix of both Chinese and Canadian commercial structure in order to reinforce the revival of this suburban Chinatown.

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Bibliography Bascaramurty, D. (2012, June 15). The rise and fall of the ethnic mall. The Globe and Mail. https://www.

theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-ethnic-mall/articl e4277988/ Chinatowns: towns within cities in Canada. University of British Columbia Press.

Ley, D. (2010).

Leung, H and Lau, R. (2009). Making of Pacific Mall: Chinese Identity through Architecture in Canada. In

Imagining Globalization: Language, Identities, and Boundaries. Palgrave Macmillan.

Lai, D. C. (1988).

Markham Diversity Action Plan. (2010). Retrieved from

https://www.markham.ca/wps/portal/home/about/accessibility-diversity/02-diversity-actio n-plan Millionaire migrants: Trans-Pacific life lines. Oxford, United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell.

Lo, D. K. (2012, May 16).

Peritz, I. (2006, June 17). ‘Chinatown is gone, gone to heaven’. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/chinatown-is-gone-gone-to-heaven/articl e710503/ Time winding down for Market Village. Fresh Daily Inc. Retrieved November 15, 2020, from https://www.blogto.com/eat_drink/2012/05/time_winding_down_for_market_village/ Yip, C. L. (1990, January). The Public Historian 12 (1). University of California Press. Retrieved from

https://online.ucpress.edu/tph/article-abstract/12/1/100/88149/Review?redirectedFrom=PD F

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Chinatown in March 1979. Photo by Paul Yee (1979), City of Vancouver Archives AM1523-S6-F70-: 2008-01

Influence of Transnationalism and Migration on t

A cross modern history, Chinatown, or Tongyan Gai in Cantonese and Tangren Jie in

Mandarin, has continued to remain a cultural representation of the Chinese diaspora.

These Chinatowns were first developed by immigrants as a product of both involuntary and voluntary factors; voluntary factors being language barriers, financial security and personal safety, involuntary factors being racism, discrimination, and prejudice.

“Transnationalism” is defined as the circular movement of migrants possessing dual citizenship to and from their origin countr y and destination countr y for education, retirement, or career opportunities.

“Transmigrants”, those who participate in nation-building between two states, have subjective and hybrid cultural identities shaped by the transnational social field, hence their concept of “home” is flexible and ambiguous. This paper analyses the influence of transnationalism and migrant flows on the development of Golden Village (列治文市黃金村), a New Chinatown located in Richmond, BC, Canada. Using a historical, cultural, economic, and political lens, the manifestation of transnationalism in language and ethnicity demographics, food, and urban development will be examined.

Chinese immigrants landed in British Columbian port cities such as Victoria in the late 1700s to early 1800s to construct the Canadian Pacific Railway, mine minerals and work in primary industries under insufferable conditions. Some worked in salmon canneries on the Steveston pier, which are now part of the Gulf of Georgia Cannery National Historic Site and operating seafood markets in Richmond’s Steveston Village (Pfeiff, 2011).

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10.0450.

he Development of Richmond’s Golden Village

During the early 1980s, East Asian immigrants saw an opportunity to develop pieces of low-value land in Richmond, which consisted of barren farmland and car dealerships (Pfeiff, 2011). Hong Kong (HK) investor and merchant Thomas Fung, along with HK Canadian architect Bing Thom, oversaw the first business development of an Asianthemed mall in North America – Aberdeen Centre, now rebranded as Times Square. They were named after the fishing village of Aberdeen and the Times Square shopping mall in Causeway Bay. These amenities spurred immense development along No. 3 Road due to its proximity to nearby neighbourhoods with an 80% Chinese population (Todd, 2011); the first neighbourhood lies between No. 2 Road and Gilbert and the second lies west of Garden City Road and south of Westminster Highway. In addition, Chinese supermarkets, restaurants, real estate offices were established, creating an ethnoburb of Chinese immigrants and appealing to upper middle-class tastes from South Vancouver (Lai, 1988, p.164). The blooming process, as defined by David Lai’s model, continued with the building of Kuan Yin temples along the Steveston Highway, which encouraged a sense of community within the Chinese diaspora through organised religion (Lai, 1988).

A 20 minute SkyTrain ride away from Downtown Vancouver, Richmond is a combination of Hong Kong Canadian culture, known as “Hongcouver” and the “most Asian city outside of Asia” (Chiu, 2019). As a result of economic development, the city is now an affluent neighbourhood characterised by its proximity to Vancouver International Airport with daily flights to and from Asia that sustain transmigrant flows and astronaut families.

The “Golden Village” consists of upscale Chinese-themed shopping complexes – Aberdeen Centre, Yaohan complex, President’s Plaza, and more (Dolinsky, 2014).

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One of the most prominent and effective ways of measuring the rate of migration flows are government censuses conducted every 5 years. According to the 1941 Canadian Census on ethnicity, within the 35,000 Chinese inhabitants of Canada, Vancouver had the largest Chinese population, followed by Victoria. In Metropolitan Vancouver, 91% of Chinese lived in Vancouver and the remaining 9% resided in Richmond and Burnaby (Lai, 1988, p.63). According to the 2016 census, within the 76.3% of residents part of the visible minority, 107,080 residents were of Chinese ethnicity, including biracial individuals (Statistics Canada, 2019). This trumps the white population in the area, despite Caucasians being 72.9% of the total Canadian population (Statistics Canada, 2019). 74,120 people in Metro Vancouver were Hong Kong-born or from Hong Kong descent (Chiu, 2019).

This census did not account for Canadians residing in other countries, which excludes dual citizens or transmigrants; the actual figure may be exponentially higher than the data presented as around 350,000 Canadians reside in Hong Kong.

The effect of transnationalism and migration is also revealed from an examination of language. Compared to the 33.1% English-speaking residents in Richmond, 21.9% spoke Cantonese and 20% spoke Mandarin as their first language from 2016 census data (Statistics Canada, 2019). From 2011 to 2016, native English speakers decreased by 5.9%, Cantonese speakers increased by 43.5%, and Mandarin speakers immensely increased by 90.8% (Statistics Canada, 2019). An analysis of this data shows that Mandarin speakers have overtook the Cantonese-speaking population after 2016 due to an increase in Mainland Chinese migrants in the last few decades (Chiu, 2019). The Immigration Act in 1976, the Head Tax federal apology in 2006, and the period of selective imigration were the 50

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catalysts for the rise in immigration. There is a low conformity rate of Richmond residents to the more dominant colonial language of English in Canada, especially in the older generation, which strips away power regimes and biosemiotics (Bowman, 2010).

Additionally, Richmond emphasises cultural and language conservation with its Chinese storefront signs, which are affected by politics. In British Columbia, there is no explicit law that requires English signs to be present on the front of shops and businesses. Thus, businesses may post signs with only Chinese characters on them, unlike Quebec’s nationalistic provincial law which requires French to be displayed bigger than its English equivalent on its storefront which led to petitions and social movements (Todd, 2011).

Despite Richmond Chinatown being viewed as a haven for many new Chinese immigrants, some find the globurb lacking in diversity and limiting in social interactions.

While being interviewed by the Vancouver Sun, Jeremy Lau, who immigrated from HK in 1993, offers an unspoken perspective on the concerns of Chinese people in Richmond.

“I’d like a more typical North American city and lifestyle, with not so many Chinese people,” he added, “When you immigrate to a new country, you want a new adventure.”

(Todd, 2011). However, the appeal of Richmond’s ethnoburb and enclave are hard to resist. The language barrier of Lau’s wife and family are hard to overcome, and the sense of safety from living with a community that enriches and maintains a sense of belonging to their homeland are hard to find in a foreign country.

Transmigrant flows and dual citizenship also play an integral part in the economic and political influence of Richmond Golden Village. After the creation of the Business 51

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Investor Category [1986-2014], more Hongkongers could migrate to Canada under the notion of investing and starting businesses in Canada. Notable examples of migration due to political events include the Sino-British handover and the 2019 pro-democracy protests in HK. The first large-scale migration wave occurred as a consequence of the Sino-British handover in 1997 after 199 years of British colonial rule, in fear of incoming political unrest and communist ideologies (Chiu, 2019). The second migration wave was the product of last year’s pro-democracy protests and political unrest in HK that left Richmond business owners in fear, as well as the transnational sphere and astronaut families. Mass demonstrations protested enforcement of the extradition law to China, demanded Carrie Lam’s impeachment, universal suffrage, private task forces to investigate unnecessary police force, and the release of detained protesters. Weekly pro-democracy protests halted the city for months as police and protesters violently clashed. As a result, tourism to both nations was halted and transmigrants could not visit their families. During an interview with Ivy Ho, Ten Ren Tea store owner in Aberdeen Centre, projected “Usually, there’s a constant back-and-forth happening … during summer, usually a peak travel time … we can’t help wondering if the chaos in Hong Kong has something to do with it.” (Chiu, 2019). Shopkeeper Phoenix So believes if a small fraction of the 300,000 HK Canadians move back to Canada, they would revitalise the economy during this unprecedented time (Chiu, 2019).

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Lastly, we will take a look at the effect of migration on the fusion of Chinese and East Asian cuisine and culture on Richmond’s globurb. Restaurants include Chen’s Shanghai Kitchen, Jade Seafood, and Malaysia restaurant Cattle Cafe are all located on Wai Sek Kai, Eat Street, an interweb of 200 restaurants (Pfeiff, 2011). Sheltered in these strip malls are Hong Kong-style Cha Chan Tengs, selling warm and savoury pineapple buns, cha siu bao, har gao (shrimp dumplings). (Dolinsky, 2014). Community centres in Richmond build a strong sense of community through table tennis, knitting, feng shui, and tai chi (Pfeiff, 2019). For those who enjoy nature and spiritual experiences, Chinese gardens and the International Buddhist Temple are available. Hindu cultural centres serve free Sunday vegetarian lunches, the Islamic Centre, and the Thrangu Monastery cater to spiritual needs (Pfeiff, 2019). The Richmond Summer Night Market is the most prominent East Asian cultural influence in the city, attracting more than 1 million visitors each year. Quirky goods such and carnival booths are set up for the enjoyment of the whole family. East Asian style street food and desserts from okonomiyaki to ice cream egg waffles are sold.

In summary, the development of Richmond Golden Village is driven by transnationalism, transmigrant flows, and the exchange of cultures between Hong Kong and Canada. Transmigrants, through their exchange and making of dual identity, contribute to the cultural, economical, and political fields of both nations, which have in turn blossomed phenomenal achievements such as the election of Hong Kong Canadian representatives in politics and parliament.

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Bibliography Bowman, P. (2010). Rey Chow and Postcolonial Social Semiotics. Social Semiotics, 20(4), 329–341. https://doi.org/10.1080/10350330.2010.494386 Chiu, J., & Peng, J. (2019, Aug 14). How businesses in Richmond’s Golden Village are handling the unrest

in Hong Kong. https://www.thestar.com/vancouver/2019/08/14/the-heart-of-hongcouver-is-the-golden-village-in- richmond-bc-a-canadian-community-built-by-the-hong-kong-diaspora.html Dolinsky, S. (2014, Jun 15). Canada’s Hong Kong enclave: Most loved of

Chinese food is found in Richmond. Chicago Tribune. https://www.chicagotribune.com/travel/cttrav-0615-food-richmond-canada-chinese-20140612-sto ry.html

Exploring the Golden Village Richmond restaurants showcase the wide diversity of

Chinese food. (2006, May 04). The Review.

Lai, D. C. (1988). Chinatowns: towns within cities in Canada. University of British

Columbia Press.

Pfeiff, M. (2011, Sep 03). Green tea. Roast duck. Are we in Hong Kong? The Globe

and Mail Statistics Canada. (2019, July). Ethnicity Hot Facts. City of Richmond. https://www.richmond.ca/__shared/assets/2006_Ethnicity20987.pdf Statistics Canada. (2019, August). Language Hot Facts. City of Richmond.

https://www.richmond.ca/__shared/assets/Languages6251.pdf .

Todd, D. (2011, Oct 15). China comes to Richmond; More than 60 per cent of

the city’s mostly well-off residents are immigrants. The Vancouver Sun. https://vancouversun.com/ news/mapping-our-ethnicity-part-2-china-comes-to-richmond

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Further Scenarios of Migration Wave

A round the 1997 Hong Kong sovereignty handover period, there was a migration

wave among Hong Kongers and a lot of them moved to Canada. Today, the Hong Kong government established the National Security Law and a new migration wave is now brewing. This essay takes the previous migration patterns and urban development as a reference, and hypothesize the future scenario of migration wave from Hong Kong to Canada due to the political uncertainty.

In the late 20th century, a lot of Hong Kongers were fear about the sovereignty handover from Britain to China in 1997. In the meanwhile, the Canadian government established the Business Immigration Program in 1978 for the entrepreneurs and self-employed people in order to attract wealthy immigrants which benefits the development of Canada. In 1986, the Canadian government added a new category which is investor, and this particularly targeted Hong Konger. Due to the unpredictable situation in Hong Kong, a lot of the Hong Kong middle class migrated to Canada through this Business Immigration Program. Similarly, due to the Be Water Movement starting from 2019 in Hong Kong with the political compression from Hong Kong government and Beijing as well as the establishment of National Security Law, it was a lot of uncertainty about the future of Hong Kong and a lot of Hong Kongers are seeking ways to leave Hong Kong. Recently, the Canadian government introduced new immigration which is also particularly targeted to Hong Kongers, especially Hong Kong youths, since a lot of them are highly educated and can contribute to the development of Canada. Since this circumstance is quite similar to the one in the 1980s and 1990s, according to the previous migration wave, I hypothesize that many Hong Kongers will migrate to Canada through this new immigration policy after it is implemented.

Moreover, the migration wave in the 1980s and 1990s facilitated urban development in Canada. There were more Chinatown and Asian-themed malls built in suburban areas. Thus, the new geospatial terms “ethnoburb” which combined ethnic and suburb and meaning suburbs with significant ethnic concentration from one group, and “globurb” which combined global and suburb and meaning globalized suburb are introduced. These are the concepts carried out by Wei Li. With the new migration wave of Hong Konger in the future, it will possibly facilitate another urban development in Canada. For example, if Markham is the suburban region developed due to the increased population from the immigration program established in the last century, the coming migration wave will further develop the suburban areas outside of the Greater Toronto Area. Also, this new suburban development may lead to the introduction of more new concepts.

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Lastly, a lot of Hong Kong migrants who moved to Canada in the 1980s and 1990s returned to Hong Kong due to different reasons, for example, some of them realized that Hong Kong politics was not that bad after the handover, and some of them wanted to seek for job opportunities in Hong Kong due to the economic growth in Asia. Thus, the concept of “transnationalism”, “transmigrant”, and “transnational social field” which basically referring to a circular movement and migrants are not bounded to a single movement from one nation state to another nation state, are introduced. From my perspective of the future scenario that whether the Hong Kong migrants will stay in Canada or not depends on the future political circumstance of Hong Kong and the economy of Canada and Asia.

The new mobility or migration flows might also create some new concepts in the future.

In conclusion, according to the previous phenomenon of 1980s and 1990s migrations wave and urban development, I hypothesize that there will be a new wave of immigrations from Hong Kong to Canada, and the increasing population due to new migrants will facilitate a further suburban development in Canada. However, because of the uncertainty of both politics and economies in the future, those new migrants might not return to Hong Kong like the returned migrants or transmigrants in the last decade.

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Will Canada become the next refuge for HongKongers?

人物誌

人物的互動，交織成城市的心跳。 本會希望，讀者在經歷兩大專題的論述洗禮 後，能暫時放下理性與邏輯，重新感受文字的溫度。

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楓葉國的校園抗爭— 訪多

多倫多大學逃犯條例關注組

（E丶J 和H是多倫多大學逃犯條例關注組的發起人及成員）

\ 訪談相約於星期四的早上，本身以為氣氛會較嚴肅，但最後卻夾雜了閒聊。

「如果你話我既政治啟蒙㗎話，我諗係雨傘運動。嗰陣我中六。」H肯定地答。J和

應:「我諗我都係，嗰陣我屋企人同我講。」E則說：「我就2019年叫投入件事多啲。

」

「你問我點解要入個關注組呀....冇㗎，一九年場運動如火如荼，我仲喺多倫多，冇咩

幫到手，咪唯有喺uoft哩邊加入個關注組。」J 略一遲疑地答。也許，本地也好，海

外也好，投身於社會運動都是源於一顆「希望幫到手」的初心。

翻查關注組坐擁近千追隨者的Instagram帳號（以正讀者視聽：關注組已於2020年10 月解散），不難發現多大的關注組可算是加拿大的抗爭組織中數一數二，甚至規模堪

比香港各大專院校的學生組織。所發佈的帖文中，除了呼籲關注的文宣外，更不乏行

動的相片。

實

過

其

你 地 搞 咩 ？

上圖：多大反送中集會(圖片取自關注組facebook網頁)

H的回答如數家珍：「簡單來講可以分成三個階段啦，第一個係2019年六月到八月。 其實活動都算係小型，都係去下Dollarama (多倫多的連鎖雜貨店）整banner…都用咗 四百幾蚊加紙㗎。」

回想起六至八月，只算是運動的初期。那時候，遑論國際戰線的理論基礎，根本沒有 人在意海外抗爭。人人著緊的，是政府何時實現五大訴求，以及每天要到不同地方聚 集及示威。在缺乏鎂光燈的支援下，在海外一直堅持抗爭可不是一件容易的事。

二零一九年的九月，可算是關注組成名的轉捩點。H略一思索地說：「九月開咗學啦， 開始多咗人返黎多倫多。咁活動就變得多元化。舉個例子， 每年都喺kings circle有個 club fair ，咁唔同學會都會擺檔俾新生加入，我地就把握機會去搞個聲援香港既集會。 」開學，更成為連繫各人的途徑。E此時插話：「我好似都係嗰陣先 加入你地，然後慢慢 活躍。」

九月到十二月，三人都說是最忙的日子。H繼續解說：「後尾Ontario成個省有個叫

大組既物體，簡單啲講即係一個連接唔同大學關注組既平台，有Ryerson（懷雅遜 大學)啦，mcgill啦，好多。」 多倫多的社運網絡就此而成。小編曾在訪問前搜尋過 關注組 所籌備的活動，可算是「雅俗兼顧」— 由學術型活動如研討會，到普通的 地厚天高放映會、連儂牆及集會，都包羅萬有。以研討會為例，關注組就曾舉辦以 「社會運動與 女性性暴力」為題的論壇 並邀請學者出席。這可算是回應了時代， 那是因為反送中運動香港警方就屢被抗爭者指控侵犯或騷擾女性。撇除警方，民間 亦曾爆發運動「由男性主導，女性成為次要」的爭議。當然這些指控是否成立仍有 待商榷，但關注組的行動正正代表它願意回應時代的呼喊，亦令海外抗爭運動的支 持者能藉此機會反思性別與社會運動的關係。

那麼，十二月後呢？H的回答略顯沮喪：「2020年頭肺炎就開始爆發啦，咁多咗人 返咗香港...再加埋大家又開始忙，所以活動少搞咗，就連開會嗰陣都開始無咩人講 嘢，開始有啲half-in half-out 嘅狀態。原本都諗住三月搞多幾次集會嗰啲，但最後 都因為唔夠人而無疾而終。」

有冇邊次活動比較深刻?

上圖：悼念周梓樂逝世的紀念壇 (圖片取自關注組facebook網頁)

三人回答時都略嫌尷尬。H：「咁我講啦，其實十一月搞過一次絕食嘅，但依家諗返 起其實都有啲魯莽。當時有位中大過嚟嘅同學，然後香港又發生咗中大理大事件，咁 佢就諗住絕食去幫手。」難道不覺得有點衝動？「覺㗎。但嗰位同學話點都會做，咁 我哋咪一齊做，廢事得佢自己一個。但亦都由嗰時開始，會有人捐錢俾我哋。」

加拿大人點睇？

E笑說：「咁要交俾J喇，佢負責派傳單。」H及J 的回答都不約而同：「香港人根本 無俾過方案佢哋應該點做。」編者再追問下，H更帶出一段被記者訪問的經歷：「我 唔記得係多倫多邊間電視台喇，個記者問我：你覺得我哋加拿大人，又或者外國人， 應該點做去幫手？我當堂俾佢問到口啞啞----係喎，應該點做呢，佢哋最多有聯署咪 去簽囉，咁簽完喇，跟住呢？其實就算去到今日，外國人依然喺點樣幫手哩個問題上 面無乜方向。」的確，外國人也好，加拿大人也好，與香港相隔千里遠。作為別國的 人民，他們支持香港的原因只是建基於人道理由，或者對於民主自由的追求，而從 來都沒有一種所謂的義務。更何況，追求民主的地方根本不止香港一個，要求外國人 優先關注香港根本是強人所難。但當這些問題都被跨越，他們已經開始關注運動的發 展，甚至願意走前一步為我城付出，香港人也沒有給予他們一個肯定的答案。 H亦作出了一點補充：「多倫多嘅當地人其實偏左膠。如果香港人係以歧視中國人嘅 目標去宣傳，咁我肯定會無乜人理你。但如果包裝成追求民主， target打壓人權嘅 regime㗎話，就唔會有人敢反對。」在海外說香港的重點，是如何包裝。 65

你哋自己呢？

「我會話，係一種心態上嘅轉變。」H笑說。「其實我會 話，對於實際嘅成果之後反而睇得冇咁重，而係開始睇大家 有冇成長到。」正如H所說，關注組本身亦是一個微型共同 體。在抗爭的過程中，成員之間能學到甚麼丶收穫到甚麼是 寶貴的，亦會影響到之後的人生。「所以我冇blame 到任何 人，有野帶得走就得。」也許，

“無論世界變得再壞、變得再光怪陸離，

都無阻一個個體成長，做一個更好的人。”

E帶出了另一種想法：「好睇信心囉。其實我地有諗過同市政府嗰啲接觸，但我地真係冇 信心。」他們三人，數次強調了「信心」二字。H的想法更進一步，以行動為本：「你對 加拿大政治認識幾多？每個黨派嘅政治取向同理念係咩？唔好話其他香港人，其實關注 組內部都唔太識。做哩啲要有把握，但我哋冇信心。」

如果有人想重啟關注組，又或者帶更多香港的討論去多倫多，你哋會有咩寄語？ H說：「我會話要學識一種平衡。好簡單你要搞一個活動，要顧及好多持份者，有咩要取 捨，喺啲咩位取捨，哩啲都要學，都係經驗嚟。舉個好practical嘅例子：你要做討論， 受眾之間知識層面都唔同，有knowledge gap issues，咁點？你點訂個討論範圍同深淺度？ 哩啲都要慢慢諗，邊做邊學。」 J則返到了知識和組織層面：「講真，我覺得肯去做已經好好。但要真係做得更有效，就 應該對加拿大嘅政治制度有翻多小小認識。或者最基本，

根本唔可以以香港嗰套黃藍二分法去區分海外政府同政治組織。」

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結語 在肺炎及打壓雙重夾擊下，遠在多倫多的關注組也難逃四散的命運。有人投入 香港抗爭組織的行列；有人選擇在多倫多鞏固香港人的社區；亦有人暫且告別 抗爭，專注學業。不過，可幸的是，當天如火如荼的抗爭足以在各人心中留下 不可磨滅的足跡，甚至在海外留學生群體中播下反抗的火苗。

今天的分別，總有一天再聚。

本會（學術）副主席余達志、（行政）副主席張皓鈞、行政 秘書鄧子駿為此訪問的訪者 。

UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

Immigration

From Hong Kong to Canada

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Interview

with Dr. Amardeep Kaur

DR. AMARDEEP KAUR Amardeep Kaur holds a PhD in Geography and a diploma in Asian Studies from York University. Deeply influenced by Asian religious thought - Sufi, Sikh, and Buddhist, Kaur is a cultural geographer and multidisciplinary scholar who mobilizes poetics as her primary query into place-making practices. Kaur’s research agenda works with decolonial theories in order to approach cultures’ collaborative energies from below, make space for anarchic politics, and challenge state-centric discourses of Canadian multiculturalism. At University of Toronto, she has taught courses on Introduction to Sikhism and Canada-Hong Kong Migration. Her doctoral research pursued a study of cosmopolitanisms and diaspora through Sikh world-making practices in Hong Kong, Vancouver, and Toronto.

Her present project concerns an exploration of how HongKong’s 2019 Be Water Movement adapted and harnessed principles from Eastern philosophies, including embodied martial arts, to an urban civil disobedience. She is further writing a series of Hong Kong-inspired poems. Kaur is an avid practitioner of Shaolin kungfu and Guangzhou-style wingchun and drinks many varieties of cha.

B: Brittany Cheng R: Rachel Ho E: Elva Yung AK: Dr. Amardeep Kaur

The interview took place on 29 January 2021 via Zoom.

B: I’d like you to give a brief introduction

of yourself and what you do.

AK: I’m a sessional lecturer at the University of Toronto. I teach the course Canada-Hong Kong Migration, and that course is situated in the Canadian Studies program, which is affiliated with University College. I am a cultural geographer by training. My research work looks into circulations of people and cultures and I’ve previously done that research work between HK, Vancouver, and Toronto.

B: I’d like to ask about your background; what connections or histor y does your family have with immigrating to Hong Kong? What was your experience growing up in Hong Kong?

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AK: I grew up in the 80s and 90s in Hong Kong, so this was still pre-1997 during the British colonial rule. I was born in HK, so my roots are very specifically in HK. My parents were born in Punjab, so they moved from Punjab to Hong Kong in the second half of the 20th century. I kind of fall into the previous migration wave between Hong Kong and Canada, but I was rather late, right at the turn of the century for me – I pursued higher education here in Canada and I’ve been in and out of Hong Kong. I feel like HK is still kind of like my home, it’s where my heart is and where my roots are. It’s been a few years since I’ve been back there [HK], so I’m looking forward to getting back.

B: So you would say you are very nostalgic of HK?

AK: Yeah, nostalgia – that’s the word, the feeling. There’s a longing, a yearning, and I say that both critically but also with an awareness that it is present in my affective state, as they call it.

In terms of that, the third wave of migration has been catalyzed. I would say that it’s concealed at the moment, as the new migration wave is less visible and perhaps less revealing at this particular moment due to the COVID pandemic. Because of the pandemic, there have been worldwide job losses, work from home conditions, then we have the travel and border restrictions which are limiting migration. So it’s not like an immediate exodus that we can really visibly see, but instead preparatory work happening in the background with residents planning their move to Canada, Australia, United States, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.

E: The second wave of immigration from Hong Kong to Canada happened in the late 90s. Given the political situation in Hong Kong, how would you predict the incoming migration flow in 2021? Or is HK already experiencing a third wave of immigration?

AK: The migration catalyst has certainly been set for the present third wave. If 2019 gave Hong Kongers and the world momentary hope for the dire pro-democracy movement, that possibility feels rather gloomy now, since last year, after China’s suffocation of Hong Kong’s civil disobedience and the pro-democracy tides.

I would say that in this third wave we won’t just see ordinary migrants move out of Hong Kong but also corporate players who are relocating to other markets in Southeast Asia, there was a recent article by the Financial Post which reported that international firms and the top notch financial sector are witnessing their higher executive members depart for places like Singapore, and on top of that many corporate entities themselves are planning an exit strategy or downsizing in Hong Kong in favour of relocation to other coastal Asian cities like Singapore or Kuala Lumpur for their Asian headquarters.

The national security law established in June 2020 is particularly concerning and vague, given that it is designed to crackdown on any counter positions to the pro-Beijing establishment, even moderate representatives in the legislative council were ousted in November.

“That is sending a ver y clear message to all Hongkongers that China has zero concern for the well-being of the city and its economy”

For residential flow we will see a similar situation play out definitely in the urban regions in Canada, particularly Toronto and Vancouver, we will see that in this new decade.

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E: Could you briefly describe the relationship between Hong Kong and Canada in terms of immigration flow throughout previous decades?

If we go back to Hong Kong we are labelled as not comprehensive participants in Canada. When we were accepted as Canadian, it’s kind of grounded in class attitudes where the model minority myth is reproduced...and at the same time, the class attitude of Canadian society simultaneously reveals the racial undertones of the discourse which we see when we look at terms like “monster home”, so whether we were in small homes or big homes, this relationship is full of racial undertones.

AK: Unlike the early labor migration which brought the gold rush and building of the Canadian Pacific Railway in the 19th century, the migration we saw in the last couple of decades is predominantly catalyzed by relatively affluent Hong Kong classes. In fact, David Ley, the professor at University of British Columbia, he wrote that book on this phenomena which is titled Millionaire Migrants: Trans-Pacific Life Lines, so Hong Kong’s and Canada’s relationship took on a particular constellation given the formation of the Pacific Rim economy in the last few decades, which was a economic geopolitical construction where the various states which encompassed the rim of Pacific Ocean sought transnational investment and economic capital from across.

E: Recently, Canada announced that once Hong Kong citizens have completed their studies in Canada they would have the chance to gain permanent residence. Would you like to comment on Canada’s recent immigration measures that provide new pathways for Hong Kong youth to gain permanent resident status in Canada?

AK: I approach such matters as a double power situation, with positive and negative. There is the positive gain but also the challenge that comes with it. On one hand, young people feeling alienated from Hong Kong’s government now have more options and choices to pursue their dreams especially in terms of education and jobs, which is important. There is a road laid out for international students from Hong Kong to acquire Canadian residency following their Canadian degrees.I think it’s also important to unmask the facade, the appearance of what something looks like. What Canada is targeting is how it is gonna pump back the Canadian economy, especially in the pandemic and the downward economic spiral is looking for where it wants capital from. In other words, this is kind of like a two part agenda: to boost back the Canadian economy while sending a political statement to China. So when we unmask the facade, we see the double-edged sword, what the migration regime, this particular migration regime is saying: give your money first, pay up the international tuition fees, inject your capital into the Canadian economy in real estate,

Of course, there is more to the story of Hong Kong and Canada’s relationship than just the physical migration and population flow. Hong Kong and Canada have the unique transnational social field. Even non-migrants, Hongkongers for example who have never travelled to Canada or Canadians who are born to Hong Kong migrants are part of the transnational social field by which they participate or learn or see themselves in the world. So then we have that relationship marked also by the astronaut family households where family members are separated for large chunk of time and that’s predominantly gendered and among the generation 1.5, there are circular flows, depending on life stages, with Canadians moving back to Hong Kong for work, even though they might hold Canadian citizenship. So I would characterize Hong Kong and Canada’s relationship as uneasy and complicated.

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UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

boost our restaurants and consumer market.

For undergraduate degrees carried out over a span of four years, international students could be upfronting about 250,000 CAD upwards when we factor in living and travel expenses on top of tuition in the urban metropolitan areas of Canada, so unless one has a scholarship, which is how I came into Canada, this route targets those in the upper middle classes, but this particular class of people have already been able to migrate, using existing migration channels, so the concern here is that the lower middle classes and below, they are once again overlooked and these are the workers who have been completely neglected by Hong Kong’s economic and political system as well as from international support.

R: Canada has always been a popular destination for Hong Kongers to immigrate to and needless to say, the culture in both Canada and Hong Kong has more or less influenced each other. Are there any cultural aspects that are brought in

by Hong Kongers that you think is the most prominent in Canada?

AK: Yes, cultural circulations and influences, and this is happening throughout various migrations. We explored art and creativity in the course that we did last term. We also looked into symbolisms in poetry, public art and how they contribute to cultural circulations. Chinatown as well, which is more of a romanticized image of what culture is in terms of the circulations between Hong Kong and Canada. Food culture is a big part of these circulations. Circulations of cultures and influences have been happening throughout history. I think what has significantly changed is the infrastructure footprint or the associated creative class culture, which has a different visibility in terms of culture and capital, that has a different kind of visibility.

So this particular stream of migration, this pathway that is offered by Canada right now specifically for Hong Kong migrants closely resembles the Canadian experience class, which is an immigration program that favour international students upon graduation.

I think nonetheless this particular Hong Kong stream does facilitate some more ease, and there is an opportunity for graduates of Hong Kong universities as well to follow this pathway. As for the double-edged sword metaphor,my major concern is that the immigration apparatus here says that if you are young and working age, then they want you to study and live and work in Canada, and it further communicates that Canada doesn’t want younger generations to bring their parents or grandparents who are deemed unfit to contribute to the Canadian economy. So it’s basically a revolving door. While you are in the revolving door - the door that revolves to get into the entrances - while you are inside the revolving door, you are expected to acquire Canadian values and taste, and it’s almost like a new dress or suit we’re expected wear while we are in the revolving door, which is shuffling in who is desirable and who is not desirable for the Canadian economy.

B: What do you think were the push factors for immigration from Hong Kong to Canada in the late 90s? What about the push factors today? Did they change and if so, how?

AK: In the 1990s, the major push factor was fear of uncertainty. Given the Tiananmen Square Massacre, and the runup to the 1997 Handover was met with anxiety. Residents pursued passport insurances and citizenship elsewhere from Hong Kong, and this was a type of economic safe haven. Hongkongers also moved their capital overseas. Now, the push factors have changed; we are no longer in that psychological fear, but actually living the reality of our 1990s sleepless nights.

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At least for me, my 1990s sleepless nights.

I feel like the question in my mind is like, how can we be in the 21st century Asian city without democracy, where fighting for democracy lands one in prison?

R: Why would Hong Kong citizens choose Canada as an immigration destination instead of other English-speaking countries such as the US, Australia and the UK? AK: That’s a great question. Yeah, you might remember I polled my students last fall on the discussion threads, I think the aspirations are linked with different life stages.

The immigrants are going to be influenced also by their kin and social networks right?

Where they migrate to might depend on the families and people they know. And for the younger ones this is gonna be dependent on their university dreams. So in terms of the different places mentioned in your question, BNO passport holders may likely pursue the UK just because it is the easier option for them. Young people who have dreams for Ivy league universities might pursue the United states. But Canadian landscape does offer much advantages as well. I think both Greater Vancouver and Greater Toronto in Canada may be popular destinations. And this time the greater Toronto is gonna exceed expectations. We are gonna see an even larger share than we saw in the previous decades, we will probably out do Vancouver this time.

In terms of the 21st century push factors, residents become alienated from the government, work and labour conditions remain long and harsh, decent housing is out of range for many people, and then the higher educational pursuit is extremely difficult in Hong Kong. These large scale social issues cannot be resolved unless the government attends to these underlying inequities. Hongkongers did everything they could in 2019, and the years preceding 2019 for a hopeful change, and they used all kinds of methods and tactics. So what is left? The push factors now feel less about passport insurance; maybe right now we may experience an actual exit strategy and resettlement.

Given China’s latest crackdown on dual nationals or dual citizens, that option of dual flexible citizenship is no longer foreseeable. A lot of that has changed in the present economic and political catalyst.

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I mean we don’t have mountains here in Toronto, but the University of Toronto is right at the heart of the city, it’s close to the Spadina Chinatown, a relatively well connected transit system in the city... Younger migrants from Hong Kong pursuing their pathway of education, they are going to be attracted by the city life. And there is more interest to pursue politically engaged spaces, that student and social justice organizations provide.

B: As the Chinese and Hong Konger population increases in Canada, would you say that the culture in the GTA of Toronto or the False Creek of Vancouver is becoming more and more Asianized? Is Canada becoming a countr y composed of more and more ethnoburbs?

AK: There is an academic idiom that speaks for how Vancouver is being Asianized, but also how Asia is becoming more Asianized. So here we can think of the very specific circuit: Hong Kong-Vancouver-Dubai. There’s some groundbreaking research over the last decade on rethinking cities and their worldmaking processes, and how cities compete for world image status. New research is considering these new cultural interactions and geographies beyond the 20th century cities which usually were referred to as New York, London, and Tokyo.

We’ve got Toronto and Vancouver here. Some of the public art in False Creek, Vancouver, for example “Welcome to the Land of Light” and “Maraya”, both by the artist Henry Tsang, speak to these intriguing questions.

In particular, we see how cities take inspiration from each other to experiment and model themselves into a certain image in the world and produce urban infrastructure and public culture. Glenn Loury, Eugene McCann, Alice Ming-Wai Jim – they’ve carried out some formidable analysis and reflections on these geographies, connections, and public art.

With regards to your question of becoming more Asianized, what I would clarify or highlight is that Asian circulations in Canada have been happening for a much longer time. That’s what we see in Henry Tsang’s deployment of the Pidgin language- Chinook jargon, which alludes to Chinese language elements within the trade language during the fur trade in the Pacific Northwest. So perhaps what is different about today’s Asianization in Canada is the capitalist infrastructure development, which is what we see in the waterfront and condominium blocks at False Creek. Also, the consumer culture that is tied up with Asian themed malls; but there has been Asian involvement in infrastructure back in the 19th century as well. The British Columbia connection of the Canadian Pacific Railway– that was largely completed by Chinese workers.

Other kinds of Asianization were also happening at Chinatowns, even at Indigenous reserves. For instance, Larry Grant– he’s an elder of the Musqueam First Nation, and he recounts Chinese vegetable gardens that grew everyday Chinese greens like bokchoi, suchoi, and gailan.

These Chinese gardeners rented this land from indigenous band members along Fraser river back in the early 20th century. I try not to think of Toronto or Vancouver becoming more Asianized now– I think there’s been ongoing circulations and interactions. What’s different today is the new urban intensive infrastructure.

I mentioned this in a previous question– this has a distinct visible spatial footprint and cultural capital.

R: Given the current events, do you think the distinction and divide between immigrants in Canada with roots from Hong Kong and with roots from the mainland will increase and polarize even more?

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UTHKPASS Annual Publication 2021

At the end of the day, I hope Hong Kongers and Mainland Chinese engage in more productive collaborations, creative and generative energies, that kind of work would always involve friction and difficult encounters, but it’s part of figuring things out, and navigating challenges together to do something better.

AK: Thank you for your question. Yes, there are going to be increased distinctions and divides. At the same time, we will see new alliances and solidarities potentially form. Now, Hongkongers are Cantonese speaking and they use traditional Chinese script. In contrast, Mainland Chinese outside of the Guangdong province speak Mandarin and use simplified Chinese script. While Hongkongers can understand and engage with Mandarin speakers, Manadarin speakers are not conversant in Cantonese. This creates a linguistic split and a power imbalance.

In the past, the mainland Chinese migrations to Canada were largely from Guangdong. So as the result of linguistic linkages and by extension, the cultural ties, there remained a strong bond between Hongkongers and Chinese since both groups are Cantonese speaking.

Today, in addition to the linguistic imbalance, there are cultural dissonances and even political friction. And there is a distinct cultural taste of Hong Kong– the popular culture in Hong Kong is keen on Japanese and Korean influences.

B: Definitely, I agree that given the political friction and cultural imbalances between HK and China, I really do hope that wider Canadian society and just university in general can give us an opportunity to talk about these issues and bond with each other.

AK: The work you are organizing here is amazing, this kind of platform of setting up spaces for dialogue and working together to make change.

I think that what we have to remember is that when people move across borders, they are also shape shifting. Some boundaries dissolve, other values and identities shape shift to different forms.

So given the political awakening, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Taiwanese, may find that their political interests align. So we can see more Hongkongers bond more to the minorities discriminated against in China. They will also forge solidarities with other racialized students from various parts of Asia.

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辯賽紀錄

【 辯論邀請賽 UTHKPASS x UTCDS x KCLPASS】 二零二一年一月，是肺炎大流行的一週年。回顧過去一年的防疫措施，到底是借防疫 為名打壓為實的威權手段，還是扼殺病毒於搖籃間的公共政策，在民間的爭議始終未 見分曉。既然同為香港人，即使現時身處於海外，亦願為當下的討論留下一個註腳。 儘管疫症使學子相遙萬里，依然未阻我們慎思明辯，在思辯的旅途中跌宕前行。 多倫多大學香港公共事務學會 倫敦國王學院香港公共事務學會 多倫多大學粵語辯論學社 共同舉辦 日期：二零二一年一月三十一日 時間：下午10時(HKT)/ 上午9時 (EST)/ 下午2時(UKT) 辯題：港府制定抗疫措施時，政治考量先於公共衛生考量? 站方： 正方：KCLPASS (倫敦國王學院香港公共事務學會) 反方：UTHKPASS(多倫多大學香港公共事務學會)

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以下為賽事文案，以供各位讀者思考雙方的論點和理據，亦能到本會面書專頁重溫 整場比賽: 正方主辯: 定義： 公共衛生考量可以參考世界衛生組織05年頒布的國際衛生條例：以保護人 民，不受疾病國際傳播之害 - 反映面對疫情，政府應以公共衛生角度出發，一視同仁，科學為本嘅抗疫衛生原則 現實: 未能貫徹落抗疫原則，反而因為政治因素帶來防疫破口 標準: 衡量今天的辯題，就要看當政治同抗疫因素有衝突的時候，港府有否因為政治考 量而違背恆之有效，科學為本的抗疫原則。贊成辯題原因有二： 1. 以中國主導為方針，罔顧科學為本 以中國利益為主 論據: - 興建臨時醫院沒有招標，中國直接為香港聘請承建商

- 普及病毒檢測亦無招標，行政機關直接聘請三間內地公司協助檢測

推論: 政府無視程序公義和科學為主的指標，中國利益為最大依歸 反方要反對辯題，必先論證科學指標無效控制疫情，以中國優先的方針有必須及必 然性 82

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2. 公共衛生為名，行止暴制亂之實 論據: 港大醫學院院長梁卓偉: 工作絕不能有科學以外嘅 考慮，尤其政治藉機箝制港人集會自由 限聚令： - 不論有否保持1.5米距離，抱有共同目的聚集即屬違法 - 港人難以進行大型集會，示威權被褫奪 - 婚禮，喪禮及拜山卻獲豁免，餐廳亦可分批入座 最後想問友方，電視台頒獎典禮和政府召開行政會議都有 傳染風險，為何這些聚會卻被容許？ 反主: 反駁: 正方對政治考量的定義理解得不夠清晰 - 近年政治風波引來市民對港府的不信任，本應是抗疫 為本的政策也會被市民揣測背後的政治打壓元素 標準： 正方必須提供一個客觀的比較平台， 比較政治因素有否明顯的凌駕性

1. 公共衛生和政治密不可分，難以切割及劃分先後 - 政府制定政策時，必須考量多方面的因素，而因素也會 互相影響及箝制。一個政策的提出，考量和實行都會被 不同因素影響 論據: 實行全民疫苗時，政府必須擁有管治權 2.不少政治影響只是公共衛生政策的延伸， 無法推斷政策動機 論據: 限聚令及家居隔離措施的確能阻止病毒傳播 - 按照實際衛生需要和國際慣例指定，任何政策有政治 因素是否代表政治考量大於公共衛生考量呢？ 歸根究底: 不是因為政治因素有凌駕性，而是香港市民對 港府的不信任 - 03年沙士香港政府都有抗疫，一樣有限制市民自由，為何 當年沒有那麼多揣測？如何為每個政策的因素劃清界線？

正一: 政府指定衛生政策時，一直用政治理由為藉口，打破衛生原則 - 政府需要一視同仁落實防疫政策，因為病毒不會選擇性攻擊人類，所以括免必須 符合衛生考慮 論據: 入境防疫政策：一方面預防境外入境，一方面允許中國入境居家隔離 只須14天 頒獎典禮沒有完全符合衛生考量 反而選舉的防疫措施比文憑試更嚴密 83

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反一: 雙方最大分歧在於衡量辯題的標準：我方承認有政治考量，今日辯題涉及對比 在加入政治考量後，有否令原本需要實行抗疫的政策遠離抗疫原意和標準

- 承認有政治打壓效果，但不代表政治凌駕公共衛生

論據: 牛津大學研究顯示，社交距離和限聚令有效降低三分之二的醫療負擔和二分之 一的死亡率 當世界各國都實行社交距離措施，是否也代表世界各地的衛生措施都是政治因素凌駕 公共衛生？

反駁: 友方今天用二元對立的方式，認為不是衛生因素就是政治因素。

- 每個政策都牽涉種種不同因素，例如民生和經濟方面 ， 難以比較因素之間誰

更重要 正二 : 歸納: 兩方衡量辯題的標準都是考量政治因素的凌駕性 ，而可以從預防，控制及治療 三個層面 去處理今天的辯題 預防: - 友方解釋不了為何中國入境就能夠被優待 控制: - 限聚令括免了商業活動，無線頒獎禮 ， 為何不打壓這些活動又有衛生理據呢 治療: - 友方未能論證為何興建中國臨時醫院有衛生理據和必要性 - 本土及海外輸入社區檢測都能夠做得好，未能論證為何一定要靠攏中國 反二 : 反駁: 有政治因素並不代表違反抗疫原則，即使有政治打壓的效果，抗疫措施依然有衛 生根據 類比: 無罪推定的法律概念 (一個人要先被假定無罪，除非被證實有罪: 港府的確有打 壓人權，但是不代表每樣政策都如此) 84

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防疫根據 押後選舉：國際民主和選舉協助研究所-有75個國家或地區都有押後國家性或區域性的 選舉，是否所有國家都有政治打壓的考量呢？ - 只是證明了有政治打壓的考量，卻沒有證明大於衛生考量 - 借防疫政策來作政治打壓也需要疫情推波助瀾。2019社會運動激烈，港府有否突然 制定防疫措施打壓示威？ 自由辯論 (發言節錄) 正：為何電視頒獎禮可以如常進行，符合什麼衛生理據呢？ 反：想問友方同學，限聚令是否完全沒有抗疫作用？ 正：同意限聚令有抗疫作用， 但是為何持有共同目的的聚集就不被允許呢？再問友方 同學，為何無線頒獎禮可以繼續呢？ 反：明白有政治打壓和不公的現況出現，可是重點在於你能不能夠因為有這些現象 而論證整個政策都有偏離公共衛生的主軸。我方就發現限聚令減低三分之二的醫療負 擔，你認不認同沒有偏離衛生意識的主軸呢？ 正：如果要一視同仁的話，電視台頒獎典禮應該進行嗎？友方同學請正面回答。 反：剛剛已經提到執行上有不公的情況出現，但友方同學已經承認咗限聚令有抗疫作 用。 正：即使有抗疫作用，但又強加藉口指執行上又不公，即友方同學無視了一視同仁的 原則。那我繼續問你，押後立法會選舉當初有什麼公共衛生的標準？ 反：75個國家和地區押後選舉，那他們是否全部都是政治打壓？ 正：外國不可以有政治考量的嗎？ 反：如果疫情不嚴重的話，75個國家或地區會押後選舉嗎？友方同學只是在舉單一的 例子。你提及到的婚禮和葬禮都有人數上限，室內只允許50個人聚集，一樣有抗疫指引 和措施去遵守。再次問友方同學，打疫苗有否抗疫作用？ 正：打疫苗有抗疫作用。婚禮的話，50個人一齊碰杯進食，是否比在選舉一個人在票 格投票安全呢？有請友方同學回答。 反：友方同學今天迴避回答打疫苗有防疫作用。既然你已經承認有作用，那請問友方 同學如何分辨哪些部分是政治因素和政治打壓，那一部分是公共衛生 正：我先簡單歸納友方同學立場：今天友方同學立法會選舉佢睇唔到。再說說疫苗。 疫苗是否應該公開招標，選擇最有安全性的疫苗？ 反：即是友方同學只是擔心在招標過程中不公平的情況。再次問友方同學，如何分辨 政治打壓和公共衛生的部分？請先交一個客觀的標準。 85

正：首先我方承認疫苗是有用的，但條件就是要先安全。我們看見中國疫苗在第三 階段未出結果，研究進度滯後，港府卻依然要採購。如果中國疫苗不安全，大可以 先買牛津的疫苗。友方同學，請問港府為何要堅持買中國疫苗？ 反：由此可見友方同學不敢說標準出來。友方同學分不清哪一部分是公共衛生和政 治打壓。 正：剛才問你限聚令電視台應否繼續進行，友方同學未能回答。問疫苗為何不是以 科學為本你也回答不到，純粹話袋住先啦。究竟今天跟隨中國的小區概念是否最有 效的抗疫方法呢？煩請友方同學論證。 反：今天的辯題是政治因素凌駕公共衛生，我方承認有政治打壓和不公，這是否代 表遠離了公共衛生的目標呢？友方同學能回答是否遠離了呢？ 正：友方同學今天沒有聽清楚我方說什麼。我方認為如果要公共衛生，制定了政策 後要一視同仁，不會有差別。不會因為你在婚宴就攻擊你，也不會因為你在投票就 攻擊你。友方同學從來都沒解釋過為何這些事情有括免。友方同學只看見只要有衛 生因素就代表所有因素密不可分。但我方同學今天看到的是政府衛生政策是有被政 治理由凌駕，友方同學見唔見到呢？ 反：其實友方同學已經承認政策沒有遠離到衛生的目標。今日港府制定政策有許多 不同因素，包括民生，經濟等等。為何友方同學要歸類一旦不是公共衛生就是政治 因素呢？ 正：我方一直都強調，只要不是一視同仁就有偏離衛生目的。所以我方從來都沒有 否認有偏離的情況。再跳入經濟民生的討論，友方同學認為只要和中國有來往就應 該通關，那為何香港政府不跟歐洲和美國等等的國家通關，只和中國通關？ 反：我方不明白為何不是一視同仁就是偏離了。全球那麼多個國家都不可能每一個 政策都完全一視同仁，那麼在友方同學的眼中是不是所有國家的政策都偏離了公共 衛生的目的呢？ 正：今天我跟你說一視同仁，但係你又比唔翻把尺我，究竟咩先叫平衡到喎。所以 繼續問返你頭先嘅問題，為何只和中國通關？ 反：友方同學今天是有責任論證何謂一視同仁和偏離。但是友方同學今天交不到。 所以想問友方同學是否全世界都沒有公共衛生考量？ 正: 第一，外國是不關香港事。外國同樣能以政治行先。再者我方今天說得好清 楚，政府要是根據科學的話就應該持之以恆的實施政策，因為病毒並不會有差別對 待。如果你提出一個藉口，就必須以衛生角度去論證這個藉口。如果論證不了就代表 政府用政治因素凌駕衛生因素。如果六點後不允許堂食就應該全日都不允許堂食。 友方同學從來都論證不了為何無線電視可以聚集，而投票就不可以聚集，請友方同 學再論證一下。 （正方時間用完）

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反：友方同學今天只是將政治考量和公共衛生考量擺在一個二元對立面 ， 即是一樣東西存在，另一樣必然沒有。但是一場辯論並不是那麼簡單。友方同學提出 的六點後不可堂食，警察飯堂堂食的例子。警察可以堂食就代表有政治打壓的考量， 但六點後有否堂食在原則上是能夠抗疫，就代表有公共衛生的考量。友方同學今天的 責任就是要比較哪一樣因素比較大，但今天全場都未能交出客觀公平的標準，亦都 係呢個位輸。當今天友方同學連交出一個比較標準都做不到的時候，又如何跟我們 論證政治考量大於公共衛生考量呢？今天我們要宏觀整個政策制訂的思維。友方同學 只是舉出單一的無線頒獎典禮的例子，又是不是能夠論證整個思維是以 政治考量為先？不能，所以辯題絕不成立。 反結 - 政府制定一個政策就好像我們要製造一個複雜的機器一樣，應該有幾百甚至幾千的 零件。零件有不同的作用，但友方同學今天只擺出其中兩件零件作出比較， 並不公平。 - 公共衛生和政治考量就像兩個齒輪，互相配合和影響，請問友方同學能否分辨清楚 政策是源自於哪樣考量呢？ - 政策都會帶來不同方面的影響，抗疫政策更無可避免的影響市民自由，指定政策是 要在社會各個持份者之間取得平衡 友方同學今日未能論證政治因素有凌駕性。

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正結 今天雙方最大的分歧在於對港府的信任或不信任。不妨將過去和現實作為一個對比： 03年沙士於淘大花園大型爆發：政府五日內向淘大發出隔離令，四個月之內將 感染數字稱零，控制疫情 - 可見政府抗疫方針逐步完善，有法可依 政治考量有否令科學措施偏離 - 友方同學今日未能回答為何電視台頒獎能獲括免，為何採購中國疫苗，讓中國通 關。 - 因為當我舉出打壓自由的例子時，友方只會回答還有很多其他因素要考慮；當我舉 出立法會延遲的例子，友方即回答是因為執法不公令偏離政策原意。友方不但架空現 實層面討論， 而且透過數例子來按照個人意願幫政策初步分類。當我自由辯論的時候 問你為何不和外國通關，友方同學也是未能回應的。 - 今日友方無視現況，縱容不負責任的政府，令超過一萬人染疫，一百八十一個人離 我們而去。

結語：身在多倫多的我們，應避免因身在外地而與香港脫節。是次辯論不是希望帶出 哪個站方必然正確，而是希望透過論點和實證宏觀現時港府防疫政策帶來的爭議。 若讀者能在看完文章後有一份得著， 已是足夠。

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EXTENDED READING

AN OBSERVATION ON FAITH AND RELIGIOSITY IN HONG KONG’S DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

BY OXFORD UNIVERSITY HONG KONG PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL SERVICE SOCIETY

T housands sang a hymn for the first time last June

on the streets of Hong Kong, a hymn that was to be the first anthem of the AntiELAB movement. It united Christians and non-Christians alike, providing a sense of solidarity and solace amidst distress for protesters.

As the media and news feeds get oversaturated with articles and images, and as Hongkongers get awestruck by the many unprecedented and bewildering events that unfolded, the rational part of ourselves subsides and non-rational motifs begin to occupy a more central place in the movement. The frustration simply cannot be adequately expressed with legal or political arguments against an unresponsive government and a social situation saturated with contradictions. This calls for more attention on the non-rational parts of our common experience. Faith and religiosity might be a good place to start.

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THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY AND THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

Faith has long occupied an important role in Hong Kong’s civil society and a central place in civil society. The first schools in Hong Kong were built by missionaries, for instance. Churches are important repositories of social capital, according to Robert Putnam, which explains why they are involved in many organic grassroots movements and communal action in general. Note that not all churches are sympathetic to the movement, but those that are provide an important bedrock for the movement during its initial stages. Churches in Hong Kong sheltered protesters when they had nowhere to go. They were one of the building blocks and units in which people organise themselves into, making them a potent threat to the government. The recent asset-freezing targeted at a community church for having provided support to arrested protesters may only be the beginning of the backlash against churches for having contributed qua civic organisations in the movement.

There is something more to churches’ role as civic organisations. Particular ideas in Christianity make Christianity particularly relevant to fights for justice 90

and against oppression. To act justly and to love mercy (Micah 6:8) have been one of the most alluded to segments in the Bible in Hong Kong politics. The original arguments for democracy are heavily rooted in Christianity, starting with Lockean natural rights and his justification for revolutions as an ‘appeal to God’, for there is no superior authority on earth. Despite a wave for secularising justifications of democracy, Christian motifs related to justice, equality, and liberty are still relevant.

Not to mention the idea and language of civil obedience: Aquinas provided explicit theological support for civil disobedience against unjust laws of tyrants that do not align with the common good or the divine good.

Martin Luther King, a pastor, naturally appealed to such justifications in the civil rights movement.

A TURN TO NON-THEISTIC FAITH Y et, the experience of faith and

religiosity in the movement is not exclusively Christian. The anthem that succeeded Sing Hallelujah to the Lord, Glory be to Hong Kong, adopts Christian language in a secular manner. Localist social media pages, such as GearUp_HongKong on Instagram, have called for ‘adopting Hong Kong as our faith’ （以香港作信仰）. It does not exclusively allude to a particular Faith, but rather a non-theistic

Hong Kong. Adopting such non-theistic yet religious language is an attempt to consolidate and strengthen the ties of Hongkongers to their identity, particularly when freedom is under threat in Hong Kong, the geographic entity.

I do not seek to discuss in this essay whether this is, as Critics like Chin Wan say, presumptuous and arrogant as it honours Hong Kong instead of God with glory. This is probably the closest substitute Hongkongers can have, since only 10% of the population is Christian, significantly different from predominantly Christian countries, such as Poland. Yet, such non-theistic faith is not a new idea among people who dislike the CCP. A prominent neo-Confucian scholar, Mou Zong-san (牟宗三), theorised about a humanistic religion based on Confucianism to counter the Christianisation of China. It would be crude and vulgar to compare with religion to ‘adopt’ as the ‘official faith’ of the movement by regarding them in purely instrumental terms. Equally, it would be dangerous to adopt an overzealous religious attitude as our sole/ overarching guide in political action.

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A CLOSER LOOK AT OUR IDENTITY AND OUR FAITH IN HONG KONG

Resorting to faith is part of our search for an antidote to tyranny and despotism, things that go against human nature and make the moral character of a nation degenerate. A greater reason to turn to faith is the tremendous shock Hongkongers have been subjected, with everything we had once believed in or relied on questioned, shaken, and nullified. The acute sense of loss fuels radicalism and hopelessness by equal measure. Faith, in turn, forms.

What is it about Hong Kong that we cherish? The overused ‘Lion Rock Spir-

it’ can no longer resonate with our generation as it is more of a relic of a bygone era, too often mobilised by older generations as an excuse to ignore Hong Kong’s problems and one that does not fit the stagnant economic future for young people.

Being diligent, having excellent work ethic, and espousing a can-do spirit? These admirable qualities by themselves do not suffice to be the building blocks of a people’s identity. If anything, the other side of an overzealous fetish for diligence is an embodiment of the twisted, high-pressure environment of Hong Kong that we would all rather change. Softening this to speak of an entrepreneurial spirit – a fighting spirit for things we believe in – in turn brings us back to the question of what we are actually fighting for. Religion might be part of that answer, but caution must be advised against arrogance and negligence for critical self-reflection, for it is dangerously unclear what it means by adopting Hong Kong as our faith. “ Without such reflection, the idea of religion is vacuous at best, and blinding at worst.”

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We should venture deeper into a bleaker and darker outlook on the future of our city to reflect and investigate what we should do. A bleaker and more realistic estimate of things would lead us to the conclusion that Hong Kong, the city we all loved, is in a terminal state of decline with little hope for resuscitation. The climate after the enactment of the National Security Law has changed so rapidly that we cannot even begin to react to it. Bit by bit, the autonomy of the last ‘enclaves’ Hongkongers once had high trust in, including education, justice, and medicine, will be chipped away and reduced to irrelevance. The potential mass exodus induced by the BN(O) visa scheme and the latest Canadian scheme for university graduates will only accelerate the erosion of our social fabric of and allow the hollowing out and replacement of Hong Kong’s civil society with much more obedient educated Mainlanders to proceed at a much higher pace. The financial sector in Hong Kong is already dominated by Mainland Chinese professionals.

The erosion of professionalism and our civil society presents a huge blow to Hongkongers because we formulated this virtual sense of cosmopolitanism and idea of civil liberties prior to establishing a solid foundation of identity. With no solid basis of identity, we skipped a step and went on to construct an illusive sense of progressive, cosmopolitan, and liberal society that is built on little other than the good will of our colonial masters. We pride ourselves in our economic achievements and professionalism and treated them as the core of our identity.

“ We pride ourselves in our economic achievements and

professionalism and treated them

as the core of our identity. ”

The movement itself provided a powerful motif that worked and could still work. Yet, with Hong Kong the actual city transformed so rapidly that we cannot even recognise it, the connection of the movement to the physical location is much weakened, thus weakening an important teleological component of our faith in Hong Kong. What about the people – our fellow compatriots? Even those who were devoted to the AntiElab movement can become disheartened and divided amongst themselves. Already in the peculiar and saturated community of Youtubers who focus on life in the UK can we observe potential deep divisions. Without an active project of constructions to engage ourselves in, the idea of a Hongkongers’ overseas community will quickly erode and even become a negative burden we would rather not be identified with.

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A WAY FORWARD

H ongkongers have frequently turned to the experiences of Jewish people for in-

spiration. Much of the metaphors we use, such as the ‘Promised Land’, are heavily influenced by the Jewish community. Many have pointed out the dangerous naïveté of such comparisons. We have nothing remotely close to Judaism that sustains our non-material identity or Synagogues to also act as community centres. Owing to the hybrid nature of our identity, any attempts to distinguish ourselves clearly from the mainstream Western countries would probably involve summoning a hollow and illusive cosmopolitan idea of Hong Kong, or push us to a stronger than before recognition of the Chinese identity, which is what happened to the previous generations of Hongkongers who moved overseas. We do not really have any viable and readily available bedrocks to build our community upon. What we have, however, is a responsibility to construct such bedrock. As hopeless as the situation seems, with no clear image of what we are actually fighting ‘for’, the responsibility to construct and sustain a more solid form of our identity lies with Hongkongers overseas. This starts with a conversation – not a call to arms nor an ad hoc construction of ‘faith’, but an excruciatingly candid conversation of who we are and where we are heading.

後記 本會編製年刊之時，極權的打壓已逐步逼近，波瀾壯闊的社運畫面或再 難遇上。本年刊不奢求 作公共空間的奠基者，只求在此禮崩樂壞的年 代，能令香港人的故事 更為人所知，及為身處於黑暗中的同路人燃起一 點亮光。 願 寄語各位香港人: 風雨中抱緊自由。

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Credits: We are grateful that the following photographers are willing to provide us photos: @jose_joker, @re_kanandngan, @sabrnloo, @anth.sun. While other photos are taken from internet.

Thank you to Dr. Amardeep Kaur and ex-members of the University of Toronto Anti-Extradtion Bill Awareness Group for willing to give up their time for our interview.

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UTHKPASS 2021:

President: Elva Yung Vice President (Academic): Thomas Yue Vice President (Admin): Wesley Cheung Vice President (Finance): Sabrina Lo Secretary: Rachel Ho Academic Executive: Sofia Singer Admin Executives: Mindy Fan, Ernest Tang Graphic Designer: Brittany Cheng, Audrey Tang 98

Instagram: @uthkpass Facebook: UT Hong Kong Public Affairs and Social Service Society- Hkpass Contact: uthkpass@gmail.com

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