Examination of Partisan Politics in the French Dailies: As Regarding the Role of France in Genocide

An Examination of partisan Politics in the French Quality Dailies: As Regarding the Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide

Tosin Omiyale

January 2011

Declaration

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of MA in International Journalism is entirely my own work and has not been submitted for assessment for any academic purpose other than in partial fulfilment for that stated above.

Signed ……………………………

Date ………………………………

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Acknowledgement I am heartily thankful to my supervisor, Tom O’Connor, whose supervision, advice and support enabled me to develop an understanding of this subject.

Without his guidance, availability and patience, it would have been impossible to complete this thesis.

I am indebted to the members of my family for their support throughout the years and for the opportunity to pursue a Masters degree in International Journalism.

Lastly I would like to acknowledge my friends and exceptional colleagues in The Integration Centre for their support and understanding throughout the development of this thesis.

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Table of contents Declaration............................................................................................. i Acknowledgement................................................................................. ii Table of content.....................................................................................iii List of figures.........................................................................................iv List of tables.......................................................................................... iv Abstract...................................................................................................v 1. INTRODUCTION...………………………………………………...1 1.1 The French government accused in Rwandan genocide.............3 1.2 The role of France in Rwandan genocide....................................4 1.3 Structure of dissertation.............................................................. 7 2. LITERATURE REVIEW................................................................. 8 2.1 Introduction................................................................................. 8 2.2 Key terms and theory.................................................................10 2.3 The context of existing problem.................................................13 2.4 The scope of study......................................................................14 2.5 The press and political parties.....................................................15 2.6 The French press and politics......................................................16 2.6.1 The political orientation of Parisian newspapers................18 2.7 Summary...................................................................................... 20 3. METHODS........................................................................................ 21 3.1 Research hypotheses................................................................. 21 3.2 Methodology...............................................................................22 3.2.1 Data sample....................................................................... 23 3.2.2 Coding scheme...................................................................25

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4. FINDINGS............................................................................................28 4.1 Introduction.................................................................................. 28 4.2 Positioning of the press: Coverage of the intervention of France in Rwanda..................... 30 4.2.1 Positioning of the press: Coverage of accusation of France in Rwandan genocide....33 4.2.2 Positioning of the press: Coverage of the acceptance of French error in Rwanda...... 35 4.3 Positioning of political sources in Le Monde and Le Figaro........ 36 4.4 Discussion of findings...................................................................40 4.4.1 Political parallelism in the coverage of the role of France in genocide........................................................................... 40 4.4.2 Parisian newspapers and political partisanship.................... 43 4.5 Parallelism of political parties and Parisian newspapers on the Policy of France in Rwanda.................................................................45.

5. CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 47 Bibliography .........................................................................................50 Appendix A- Result for Critical Statement According to Criticism Categories in 1998, 2008 And 2010 .................................54 Appendix B - Names of the Political Sources Used in Le Monde and Le Figaro…………………………………………....55 Appendix C- Political Sources and Position Taken On the Policy and Strategy of France in Rwanda...................................56 Appendix D - Content Analysis Coding Sheet for Articles...................57 Appendix E- Sample of the Rwandan Government Report on the On the Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide..............58 Appendix F- Sample of Le Monde Articles in 1998, 2008 and 2010......60

Appendix G- Sample of Le Figaro Articles in 1998, 2008 and 2010.....73

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.1

Frequency of critical statements in Le Figaro and Le Monde according to targets in 1998..................................................... 32

Figure 4.2

Frequency of critical statements in Le Figaro and Le Monde according to targets in 2008..................................................... 34

Figure 4.3

Frequency of critical statements in Le Figaro and Le Monde according to targets in 2010.......................................................35

Figure 4.4

Portrayal of the distribution of political sources in Le Monde and Le Figaro in 1998, 2008 and 2010......................................39

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1

Distribution of articles per publication in 1998, 2008 and 2010.................................................................................... 25

Table 4.1

Background features of articles analysed in Le Monde and Le Figaro.............................................................................29

Table 4.2

Distribution of articles per words on the role of French in genocide................................................................................30

Table 4.3

Distribution of critical statements in Le Monde per Target........31

Table 4.3.1 Distribution of critical statements in Le Figaro per Target.........31 Table 4.4

Portrayal political sources and their position regarding the role of France in Rwandan genocide in Le Monde and Le Figaro in 1998, 2008 and 2010.....................................37

Table 4.5

Critical statements per 100 words by target in 1998 2008 and 2010 in the coverage of French role in Rwandan genocide..................................................................41

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Abstract In the French press, a prerequisite for an objective and nonpartisan press is expressed in the liberal model of a press that is free from government control.

Subsequently in the past years, the French press has been characterised by the commercialisation of the press. Despite commercialisation, the French press shows a tendency of partisan politics and unbalanced criticism, in reporting political issues.

The political partisanship of the press is communicated in the concept of political parallelism. It refers to the extent to which a media system reflects the major political orientations in the society as presented in news contents. To critically assess partisan politics in the French press, this study completed a quantitative content analysis on the news and editorials of Le Monde and Le Figaro, using the concept of political parallelism as analytical framework.

The articles that were analysed involved a major political debate in 1998, 2008 and 2010, on the participation of France in the Rwandan genocide. Accordingly the study analysed the degree of critical statements in Le Monde and Le Figaro, according to the ruling parties in France i.e. the right-wing government and the left-wing government. The analysis revealed that Le Figaro was less critical of the right-wing government and a clear partisan to the goals of the conservative political party. On the other hand, Le Monde was less critical of the left-wing government, and has a tendency to support the goals of the socialist political party.

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CHAPTER 1

1.0 Introduction In western liberal democracies, there are circumstances were newspapers and political institutions are closely related. Ellinas (2010) noted the relationship that exists between journalist and political sources, where politicians often emerge as primary definers. Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) sited another situation when the press is linked to political bodies through ownership, financial contribution and the traditional support of newspapers for political party goals or policies.

In such cases, there is a tendency that newspapers will produce one-sided political content and reflect an ideological and partisan positioning, emanating from this relationship (Seymour 1974; Hallin and Mancini 2004).The argument as presented by media scholars is that press-political partisanship clashes with the normative and professional roles of the press in a democratic society, which emphasizes the need for press freedom, objectivity, impartiality and holding political leaders accountable (Davis 2010; Harcup 2009).

Past research on French news coverage showed that the French press displays a degree of political partisanship (Benson 2005 in Benson and Neveu (eds).

However, the extent of partisan politics in the French press is yet to be established because of the minimal amount of research available in this field.

BBC news (2006) noted that in France, Many rich industrialists evidently see having a stake in a leading daily as a way of promoting their interests, and exercising greater influence on government policy... media outlets are owned by companies with close ties to prominent politicians and the defence establishment, leading some to question potential conflicts of interest.

Furthermore, (Berkel 2006; Benson 2010) claimed that popular Paris based dailies such as Le Monde, La Libération and Le Figaro, displayed a strong element of a left-right wing political and ideological division in their coverage of a national debate on immigration and a political European debate on the ‘Haider conflict’.

Accordingly, to critically assess partisan politics in the French press, this current research seeks to examine Paris based newspapers and how a controversial event, i.e. ‘the accusation on the alleged role of France in the Rwandan genocide’ that killed over 800,000 Rwandans, was reported.

1.1 The French Government Accused in Rwandan Genocide In 2008 and 2010, the conservative party was the ruling government in France.

Nicolas Sarkozy was the French president and Franรงois Charles Amand Fillon was the Prime Minister. In 2008, during the right-wing government, France was accused of complicity in the Rwandan genocide.

In August 2008, Rwanda's Ministry of Justice released a detailed report that was compiled by an independent national commission in Rwanda, after an 18 month investigation to prove that France was involved, in the planning of the genocide of the Tutsis in April 1994 (see Appendix E for sample of report). The report accused 33 French officials, including former French president Franรงois Mitterrand, for helping prepare perpetrators that carried out the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and further stated that French soldiers committed some of the killings. Despite these accusations, the French government maintained that its intervention in Rwanda was to help in the reconciliation of Rwandans (see Rwanda Ministry of Justice 2008; BBC 2008).

In the years since the genocide, the leaders of the United Nations, the United States of America, and Belgium, have all apologized for their failure to stop the genocide. But France did not acknowledge its responsibilities in the genocide until 15 years after. In February 2010, President Nicolas Sarkozy finally admitted that French errors had contributed to the Rwandan genocide.

The accusation of the French government in the Rwandan genocide provides an important and interesting context to examine the extent of partisan politics in the French press. This is because some writers and international governmental agencies have previously established that France was to an extent linked to the genocide, before the Rwandan government formally accused the French government in 2008 (see Kroslak 2007). One would therefore anticipate that in a democratic society, where the press is often commercialised, the French press should produce objective and balance news coverage of the event.

Moreover as the watchdog role of journalism emphasizes, one would anticipate that the French press would take up a critical role, holding the government to account, and probably investigate the event to uncover the truth. Against this background, it is thus interesting to examine the news content of the French newspapers, for any sign of one-sided criticism of the French government that may suggest political partisanship.

1.2 The Role of France in Rwandan Genocide France was involved in Rwanda from 1990, prior to the genocide that started in April to July in 1994. The French government during this period was a coalition between the socialist party and the conservative party. François Mitterrand, from the socialist party was the president of France and Edouard Balladur, a conservative, was the Prime Minister. The involvement of France in Rwanda can be linked to the close ties between the government of François Mitterrand (former President of France) and JuvÊnal Habyariamana, the president of Rwanda during this period.

As a result of the relationship between the two governments, Habyariamana relied on the government of François Mitterrand for support during crisis (Kroslak 2007). Moreover, as part of the ‘la francophonie’, Rwanda was an important ally in the pursuit of French interest in central Africa and as a result of the military cooperation between the two countries, François Mitterrand did not hesitate to assist the Rwandan government against the invasion of the Rwandan rival party, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (see Kroslak 2007).

In the analysis of Linda Melvern (an investigative journalist and author), she noted that the presence of France in Rwanda was to avoid the RPF political rivals (supported by the Ugandan government) to gain military victory in Rwanda. She further revealed that according to a document found in the Paris archive, the administration of François Mitterrand considered the RPF invasion of Habyariamana’s government, to be part of an Anglophone plot to establish an English-speaking land in Rwanda, thereby strengthening the Anglophone influence at the expense of the French policy in Rwanda (Melvern 2006).

Therefore in October 1990, François Mitterrand responded to Habyariamana’s call to provide French troops for military support during an attempt by Tutsi leaders (General Fred Rwigyema and Colonel Paul Kagame), to invade Habyariamana’s government. Henceforth the French government extended a formerly limited military assistance agreement to the training and support of the Rwandan army.

In the process of the military support (1990-1993), the French military advisors present in Rwanda were attached to the Presidential Guard. In this manner, the French government became involved in organising, training and arming the Presidential Guard that was responsible for the massive killings and the arming of the interahamwe militias in Rwanda (African Rights 1994). In the long run, the French government and its military troops, carried out three major operations in Rwanda from 1990-1994, namely Operation NoroĂŽt, Operation Amaryllis and Operation Turqouise.

First, during Operation NoroĂŽt, which was aimed at supporting the government of Habyarimana in countering the aggression of the RPF (political rivals) in October 1990, the French government was criticised for shipping weapons into Rwanda.

Second, in Operation Amaryllis, which was aimed at evacuating French dignitaries, nationals and other foreign entrepreneurs at the beginning of the genocide in April 8 1994, the French government was criticised for also evacuating the families of Habyariamana, dignitaries from the Habyarimana’s regime and some members of the Hutu extremist involved in the planning of the genocide.

Third, when France obtained a mandate from the United Nations to intervene under Humanitarian Intervention goals to protect the dying and threatened Rwandan population (Operation Turquoise, June 16), the French troops were criticised for giving the Tutsi population a false sense of security, and for allowing the militias, government and military leaders responsible for the genocide, to escape to the protection zone provided by the French troops (African Rights 1994; Thompson 2007; Wallis 2007; Kroslak 2007).

Since the genocide in 1994, The United States Intelligence, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Non-governmental agencies and the media, have established to a degree, the involvement and responsibility of the French government in the genocide.

1.3 Structure of Dissertation The remainder of this study is divided into four chapters. The chapter after the introduction is chapter two. It further elaborates on the French press and politics, the context of the problem and the scope of study of the dissertation. It also introduces the theoretical framework for the analysis of the problem examined.

Chapter three proposes the hypotheses, and to further test the hypotheses, the content analysis method was chosen. Chapter three also discusses the procedure for testing the hypotheses, the sampling of the materials used for analysis, and how the data for the analysis was gathered.

The outcome from the data analysis is discussed in detail in chapter four and the findings in this study are also presented according to the hypothesis that was proposed. The final chapter discusses the main conclusions gathered from the data findings and its implication on professional practice of journalism.

CHAPTER 2

2.0 Literature Review 2.1 Introduction From the arrays of media literatures, media theorists have critically examined the role of mass media in a democratic society. Media theorists and scholars have come to identify certain roles of the media in a democratic society, despite the different press systems seen in different democratic countries (Hallin and Mancini 2004). McQuail (cited in Kuhn 1995, p. 2) noted that identifying the roles of journalism in a democratic society does not mean that the media in different countries should be confined to certain roles in the society. McQuail (cited in Kuhn 1995) argued that ‘there is no agreed version of what functions the media perform, since this would require an agreed version of society’.

But examining the functions of journalism in a democratic society is important in media theories, ‘in a response to the intellectual challenge posed by scholars who are concerned with professional ethics, with a more responsible performance of media institutions’ (Christians et al 2009, p.vii). As a result, Christians et al (2004) identified some examined roles of journalism in a democratic society. They indicated five overlapping roles: the monitorial role, facilitative role, radical role and collaborative role. Journalism as a Fourth Estate of the realm and its role in Public Sphere was also communicated in the works of Harcup (2009).

Although scholars continue to critically examine the functions of journalism in the democratic society, there is however, an established notion that it is imperative that the media in a democratic society be a ‘free press’ without constraints, government control and influence, to fulfil its normative functions in the society (Fleming et al 2006). But as seen in most democratic societies, the press is actually not an independent actor (Herman and Chomsky 2002). The press can be subject to influences ‘from the complex systems of social and political interdependencies’ (Kuhn and Neveu 2002, p. 2). This is largely possible because, according to McQuail, journalism is not produced in a vacuum. Journalists work in a range of constraints, influences and structural factors that affect their output (McQuail 2000).

In the field of political communication, media scholars noted for example, an existing relationship between the press and political actors, which impacts the news content to sometimes favour political actors (Davis 2009 ; Blumler and Gurevitch 2007 in Negrine and Stanyer (eds) , thereby becoming agents of those who exercise political power (McQuail:1987). A further exploration in political communication that examines the relationship between the media and political actors reveals an existing link between politics, political parties, and the press (Swanson 2007 in Negrine and Stanyer (eds); Hallin and Mancini 2004).

2.2 Key Terms and Theory To understand the context of this chapter, the key terms and theories related to the field of this study is stated and defined below.

Press: In this study, the term is used to refer to newspaper publications, including their online versions, except where specifically mentioned as print editions only.

Political Communication: Due to the broad field, this study applies its definition as the communication that involves three sets of actors (media institutions, political institutions and citizen publics) in a bounded political theory, usually a liberal democracy, but further conceals complex and evolving interrelationships and dynamics ( Negrine and Stanyer 2007 in Negrine and Stanyer (eds ).

Party-Press Parallelism Theory: The concept of Party-Press Parallelism was introduced by Seymour-Ure in 1974, into mass media studies in The Political Impact of Mass Media. This concept describes the degree to which news media organizations are intrinsically and extrinsically proximate to political parties (Seungahn, Poong and Youngchul 2009, p.4). The concept argues that the connection between individual parties and newspapers can be measured through three indicators, which are: organisation, goals (programmes and tactics) and members or supporters (partisanship of readers) (Kuhn 1995, p. 71). According to Seymour-Ure, Party-Press Parallelism exists when a newspaper is owned by a political party and when a newspaper supports a party. In other situations general bonds exist between papers and parties or ideologies of parties, which reflect in the strong partisan slant in the newspaper content (Kempem 2007, p. 303).

Political Parallelism Theory: This concept is a broader interpretation of Party-Press Parallelism and was developed by Hallin and Mancini, arguing that in many Western European countries, the strict sense of one-to-one connection of newspapers and political parties is not common today, and in some countries, Party-Press Parallelism is more distinct than in others (Hallin and Mancini 2004).

Therefore Political Parallelism concept would refer more broadly to the degree and nature of the links between the media and political parties. ‘It is the extent to which a media system reflects the major political divisions or orientations in the society as presented in news content and current affairs reporting’ (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p.25).

Historically, such media must have had connections with organisations, such as political parties and trade unions.

As noted in the history of western European countries, newspapers were established or published on the initiative of political parties or other political actors. From the beginning of the print era...political advocacy was a central function of the media (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p.26).

Hallin and Mancini further argued that the past organisational connections with political parties can still influence the media toward partisan news contents that can reflect the political ideologies of political parties.

Another indicator of political parallelism is the tendency for media personnel to be active in political life; often serving in party or public offices, or has seen in other media systems, journalists may work for media organisations whose politics coincide with their own (Hallin and Mancini 2004). The concept of political parallelism argues on the relationship between politics and media owners. The last indicator of political parallelism is partisanship of media audiences.

In observing the Party-Press concept, difficulties have been encountered by researchers. Berkel (2004), Kempen (2007) noted the difficulty in associating the ownership of a form of mass media to a particular political party.

Also, Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 28) suggested reconceptualising party-press parallelism to political parallelism, because ‘the strict sense of one-to-one connection of newspapers and political parties is increasingly unusual today’.

However these researchers did not deny the existence of party-press parallelism in democratic countries, which was traditionally dominant in some European countries (Kuhn 1995), and also exists in Asian journalism and other parts of the world (Seungahn, Poong and Youngchul 2009; Nyamnjor 2005).

2.3 The Context of Existing Problem The press system in Western Europe has remained ideologically and structurally aligned and assimilated with the political system (Hallin and Mancini 2004; Kempen 2007; Ellinas 2010), even though partisan and ‘press-party parallelism’ has been on decline since the beginning of media commercialization (Kuhn 1995; Berkel 2006).

After Seymour Ure (cited in Seungahn, Poong and Youngchul, 2009) examined the manner in which the press system in the United Kingdom is parallel to the party systems, particularly in terms of political ideology, subsequent studies in the political communication have examined the concept, in different political contexts, news media environments and in a broader comparative context; as related to different countries and observations. For example, Bennette (1990), Blumer and Gerevitch (1995), Kuhn (1995) Berkel (2006), and Kempen (2007) have contributed to the party-press parallelism or political parallelism theory.

Although these past researches in media studies have contributed extensively to the concept of party or political parallelism and its effect on political behaviour, there is however a need for further examination of this concept in a different context.

First, Berkel (2006) presented a comparative analysis on how a European ‘Haider debate’ was characterised by political parallelism in the press of four European countries namely, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Austria. She noted that the argument, as presented in the editorials of the press, showed a biased newspaper positioning in their right-wing and left- wing political orientation.

However, she suggested the need for future research looking at other issues.

Second, the content analyses from past research, which focused on different national issues in both national and international comparative research, noted the existence of political parallelism in the French press (see Berkel 2006; Benson 2009). Although researches have examined the media in France and its political orientation in reporting national-political and European issues, an issue that relates to the policy of France in Africa is yet to be covered.

2.4 The Scope of Study Therefore, this research study aims to critically assess the extent of the existing relationship between the French press and the coverage of domestic politics, by examining an event relates to the policy of the French government in Africa.

The scope of this study is not intended to cover a comparative analysis of the press in numerous countries.

Furthermore, it is outside the scope of this study to

examine the readership culture of the French press, although political parallelism theory suggests the partisanship of newspaper readers.

In the remainder of this study, Party-Press Parallelism or Political Parallelism theory will be used in an analytical framework. This study does not consider the two concepts to be different, but that the latter is a development of the former. In examining the relationship that exist between the press and party systems, partypress parallelism theory is considered to be the strongest form , while political parallelism is taken as a broader form.

As Hallin and Mancini (2004, p.27) noted: Distinct political tendencies expressed in the concept of Party-press parallelism still persist, but the concept exist in its strongest form, when each news organisation is aligned with a particular party... but where the media are still differentiated politically, they are often not associated to a particular party, but with a general political tendencies, which is expressed in a broader concept of political parallelism.

Thus, this chapter will focus on the surrounding literature regarding the relationship between media and political parties in Europe, the political structure of the French press, party-press parallelism and political parallelism concepts. It questions the belief that media contents reveal political orientation or political parallelism, there by supporting a political view or ideology (Berkel 2006; Kuhn 1995).

2.5 The Press and Political Parties The press plays a key role in the process of political communication and sometimes operates as a passive conduit for the transmission of political information, which actually questions the freedom and objectivity of the press in a democratic society (Kuhn 1995). According to Seymour (1975) the strong political advocacy of the press is rooted in party ownership of different newspapers, where newspaper contents are often parallel to ideological goals of political parties.

Today one can argue that newspapers in some countries such as France, South Korea and Nigeria, are owned and published by political parties (Kuhn 1995; Seungahn, Poong and Youngchul 2009; Nyamnjoh 2005).

But in Western Europe, this kind of one-to-one connection between the press and political parties, has been traced to the history of print and is rather uncommon today (Hallin and Mancini 2004). In the period of commercialisation and professionalization of the press, party control is rather rare (Davis 2010; Kuhn 1995). Notwithstanding, western European newspapers may still be linked with political parties and their ideologies (Berkel 2006; Marchetti 2009).

2.6 The French Press and Politics In France, the press is not only an artery of political communication, but it is also a major actor within the system, sometimes positioned as political advocates, with the capacity to mobilise public opinion in support of a particular point of view, as presented in the news agenda ( Kuhn 1995). Scholars and researchers alike noted that French papers can be politically positioned and aligned to the political structure in the country, i.e. left-right wing distinction (Benson 2010; Berkel 2006; Hallin and Mancini 2005).

In the history of France, the press participated in the ideological polarisation of party-systems and inter-party rivalries. The State also had a major control of the press through ownership, media policies, media finance and as a main primary definer in political issues (Kuhn 1995). But Kuhn argued that such party loyalties in the French press, are very weak today due to commercialisation of the press, and the minimal identification of French voters to a political party (Kuhn 1995).

According to Kuhn, the ‘commercial desire to maintain circulation figures and widen market appeal’ has encouraged newspapers to ‘eschew’ party partisan commitments (Kuhn 1995, p.70).

Regardless, the commercialisation of the press may not always guarantee freedom from partisan politics. Hallin and Mancini (2004, p.25) argued that, ’commercial and non-commercial media can be politically partisan’, and that a media supported by political parties can adopt norms of political balance.

Furthermore, Benson (2010) claimed that in the French press, advertisingsupported newspapers can be politically partisan and therefore commercialisation of newspapers may not be a guarantee for objective and balanced criticism in news reporting (see Benson 2010). Instead, Hallin and Mancini (2004) argued that the French press is likely to be politically partisan because of its polarised system, which increases the tendency to be politically aligned. According to Hallin and Mancini (2004), “polarised pluralist societies are characterised with a high degree of political parallelism, and newspapers can be identified with ideological tendencies...and commentary-oriented journalism is very strong” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p. 61).

Second, in their thesis of political parallelism, Hallin and Mancini (2004) argued that in a society that was traditionally linked with political parties such as France, there is a tendency that even after the decline of party-parallelism, newspapers can still be influenced through its organisational link, to back the ideology of a political party ( Hallin and Mancini 2004).

One of the consequences of Political parallelism is that newspapers reflect political division and unbalanced criticism of the government or party in power.

This means that the political orientation of a newspaper may be a factor that determines the degree of political criticism published in a newspaper (Berkel 2006; Benson 2010). However, in the professional norms of journalism, it is essential for a ‘free press’, “while acting as a forum, to limit their activity to objective news selection’ (McQuail 1992, p. 197), to avoid news bias.

2.6.1 The Political Orientation of Parisian Newspapers According to Kuhn (1995, p. 32): The Paris dailies are in many respects the dominant players in the French press system, since they reflect the concerns of national elites.

In particular, the quality Parisian dailies such as Le Monde, Le Figaro and La Libération exercise a strong influence among few economic and political decision makers...

However these three ‘quality newspapers’ like other Parisian dailies have a tradition of political and ideological orientation (Benson 2010). Media scholars claimed that Le Figaro is clearly partisan in its coverage of domestic politics, with an ideological support of conservative goals, and Le Figaro is likely to be more critical of the left-wing government than the right-wing government (Kuhn 1995; Albert 2010; Berkel 2006; Benson 2010).

In another manner, Kuhn (1995) claimed that La Libération supported the leftwing political line when it was first published in the 1970s, but its editorials later became more critically balanced in the 1980s , and today the paper claims to be committed to a radical-independent goal, meaning it publishes a balanced criticisms (Albert 2010 ). But Benson (2010) argued that La Libération can still be more critical of the right-wing government that the left-wing government.

Differently, (Kuhn 1995; Berkel 2206; Benson 2010) argued that despite claims that Le Monde is committed to a political left-of-centre goal, with a more independent and balanced news coverage, the paper does not operate in an ideological vacuum, but still has a tendency to be aligned in a left-wing political manner. Although, Benson (2010) claimed that among these three major Parisian newspapers, Le Monde is likely to be critically balanced in political news coverage.

Considering this current study, the three quality Parisian newspapers mentioned above are interestingly the same newspapers that reported more on the alleged role of France in the Rwandan genocide. In the coverage of the accusation of the French government in the genocide which, was first published on 25th February 2010, this current study observed that it was reported differently. Le Monde and La LibĂŠration appeared to have a similar coverage that was more critical of the government and the content of Le Figaro seemed to be less critical of the government.

Therefore considering the difference that was observed on how the three Parisian dailies covered the accusation of the French government in the genocide, and in light of argument made by media scholars (that the three dominant Parisian newspapers can be politically oriented in their news coverage), this study suggests that the observable is how the three Parisian dailies report on the accusation of the French government in the genocide. This means that there is likelihood that the content of Le Monde and Le Figaro may demonstrate different degrees of criticism on the alleged role of France in the genocide, based on their traditional support for a political line or ideology.

Due to time constraints, this research will attempt to analyse the contents of Le Monde and Le Figaro, and examine how the two dailies may have positioned themselves in reporting on the role of France in the Rwandan genocide, and whether the news contents is politically parallel to the political orientation or structure of these French dailies.

2.7 Summary In summary, newspapers and political parties in France relate.

Media scholars and researchers alike argued that the relationship between the two institutions results in a partisan approach of the coverage of political news or debated issues, which reflects in the news content.

Benson (2010) established that commercialisation does not determine whether a press is partisan or not, because despite commercialisation, the French press still exhibits a varied degree of partisan politics. Hallin and Mancini (2004) thus suggested that because the French press is politically oriented, there is a tendency of the French press to exhibit political parallelism, which is shaped by its multiparty parliamentary system and its historical tradition of a politicized press.

By drawing upon the ‘political parallelism’ framework, this study proposes that the observable difference between Le Monde and Le Figaro in their coverage of France’s alleged involvement in the Rwandan genocide should depict a political partisan and ideological division between the left and right wing - the pillars of the French political structure.

CHAPTER 3

3.0 Methods

3.1 Research Hypotheses Against the background of the argument noted in chapter two, this research will focus on France and two Parisian dailies claimed to have different political orientation i.e. Le Monde and Le Figaro. The study examines the alleged role that France played in the Rwandan genocide, with an objective to test if it was reported along a partisan political line, usually in a left-right wing division.

Therefore the questions in this study are: Hypothesis 1: That the political partisan newspapers, Le Monde and Le Figaro, will report the French involvement in the Rwandan Genocide from different perspectives, as anticipated by political parallelism theory.

Hypothesis 2: That Le Monde will be more critical of right-wing governments over the period under review and Le Figaro more supportive of them

Hypothesis 3: That Le Monde and Le Figaro will identify with the position of a supported party, on the policy of France in Rwanda.

3.2 Methodology The methodological framework presented in this chapter explains and justifies the use of the approach chosen in this study. It also indicates some limitations to this research approach.

Content Analysis This research was conducted based on quantitative measures and the use of content analysis method to analyse the content of Le Monde and Le Figaro. The content analysis approach was adopted to facilitate the critical examination, description and comparison of the contents of the published articles in focus.

The approach was also chosen under the assumption that by noting the frequency with which certain words appeared in the text, it would be possible to arrive at the aim of analysing the articles. Importantly, the political parallelism theory suggests the use of content analysis as one of the indicators to assess the extent of political parallelism in the media (see Hallin and Mancini 2004).

In analysing the text, the investigation takes the form of semantic content analysis, to enable the classification of the meaning of selected texts, in the development of an objective and quantitative information. According to Krippendorff (2004), content analysis allows for the explanation and correlation of the differences in the news content over an issue, in terms newspaper characteristics, such as geographical location, ownership and political orientation.

Furthermore content analysis method has been employed in previous media research to determine the traces of political parallelism in the European press, by analysing the content of newspaper reports, commentaries and editorials (see Berkel 2006 ; Benson 2010). It is worth recognising that content analysis does not allow for inferences of causality and impact on people, and the result of the content analysis stated in this study may not be generally applied to other research studies that use different categories or units for analysis (Reinard 1998).

3.2.1 Data Sample The content analysis involved the coverage of the role of France in the Rwandan genocide, as reported in two Parisian daily newspapers namely, Le Monde and Le Figaro. The two newspapers under review were selected based on the claim that they form part of the leading news dailies in France. Furthermore, for effective comparison, the newspapers were selected to represent the different political orientation of newspapers claimed to exist in France (commonly categorized as left of centre or ‘leftist’ and right of centre or ‘conservative’).

The articles analysed were gathered annually to cover three major timeframes (1998, 2008 and 2010) that are relevant to the debated event. The timeframes represent the debate on the intervention of the French government (i.e. period of the coalition government) in Rwandan genocide (1998), when the Rwandan government officially (in a report) accused the French government of participation in the genocide (2008) and when President Sarkozy admitted to the errors of the French government (2010). The timeframe (2008 and 2010) depicts the peak period of media coverage of the debate, but in order to facilitate a holistic analysis, while benefiting from a broad snapshot of how the coverage progressed; the articles

were selected to cover three years, which are 1998, 2008 and 2010.

In the search of articles published by the two newspapers regarding the alleged role of France in the Rwandan genocide, the key words such as ‘Le génocide Rwandais’ and ‘Le génocide Rwanda’ were used to search the online archives of Le Monde and Le Figaro, for the period of the three years specified above. During the online search, the articles chosen were precisely in the form of text, to enable same material for comparison.

The relevant material gathered from the online search was news and editorials referring to the topic of, ‘L’intervention ou L’opération de la France au Rwanda’( The French intervention or operation in Rwanda), ‘Le rapport Rwandais publié contre la France’ (A report published by Rwanda against France), ‘Le rôle de la France dans le génocide au Rwanda’ (The role of France in the Rwandan genocide), ‘Sarkozy admet les erreurs de la France au Rwanda’(Sarkozy admits the errors of France in Rwanda), ‘Le Rwanda accuse la France de participation au génocide’(Rwanda accused France of participating in the genocide) and ‘La France dénonce rôle au génocide’(France denies role in Rwanda genocide). These key topics enabled the study to identify available articles regarding the alleged role of France in Rwanda genocide for the period of 2008 and 2010. As a result, a sum of 35 news reports and editorials were collected for 2008 and 2010.

In 1998, the selected articles that focused on the intervention of the French government in Rwanda, excluded the articles on the hearing of the French officials in the parliament, which was aimed to investigate the role of French officials in Rwanda. The articles were excluded because they were basic reports on the proceedings of the parliament. As a result, a sum of 30 news reports and editorials were gathered. (see Table 3.1 for more detailed information).

Table 3.1 indicates that during 1998 the articles published were more (n=30) than the articles published in 2008 (n=20) and 2010 (n=15). In 1998, governmental agencies and journalists were at the centre of debating the role of France in the genocide, which caused a major controversy within the French government during that period.

Table 3.1: Total Distribution of Articles per Publication in 1998, 2008 and 2010 Publication Le Monde Le Figaro

Coverage Periods 1998 2008 16 (53 %) 11 (0. 55 %) 14 (46 %) 9 (0. 45%)

2010 8 (53 %) 7 (46 %)

Total nos of Articles 35 (53 %) 30 (46 %)

Total

30 (46 %)

15 (23 %)

65 (100%)

20 (30 %)

3.2.2 Coding Scheme A coding procedure was adopted in analysing the texts (The coding sheet can be viewed in Appendix C), and the entire text of each article used was coded to include the headlines and quotes attributed to sources.

First, the texts were classified according to the major actors or targets referred to in the articles, which in this case are the French right-wing government, the leftwing government, government (referring to government as a whole) and others (referring to other governments and governmental agencies). In the analysing the texts, the study focused on the analysis of critical statements only. In practice, critical statements only, were identified in the articles.

To measure criticism, the frequency of critical statements in the articles was then recorded in each year, according to whether they referred to the ‘French rightwing government, the left-wing government, government and others’. In classifying the critical statements, which is the analysis unit, this study adopted six classifications of criticism proposed by Benson (2010), which are administrative, strategy, ideology, truth, policy and character.

An administrative criticism refers to the improper execution of administrative obligations or procedures, maybe through incompetence or mismanagement.

Strategy criticisms refer to negative evaluation of the effectiveness of an idea or action and could reflect a political partisan end. Ideology criticisms refer to the criticism of ideological concepts such as conservatism, socialism, neo-colonialism and democracy. Truth criticism refers to providing proof to establish the truth about or to show the falsity of a statement, action or claim. Policy criticism would mean an improper execution of a policy or the failure to achieve the objectives of a policy. Lastly, a character criticism refers to attacks on the personal characteristics of elites, such as pretentious and insensitive (Benson 2010).

Second, in order to test the hypothesis which suggests that Le Monde and Le Figaro maybe positioned along the ideological political spectrum of France, a qualitative analysis of interviews or the discourse of political officials may have been ideal to determine the position of the political officials in relation to the policy of France in Rwanda.

However, due to time constraints, this study sampled the political sources that were quoted in the articles of Le Monde and Le Figaro, in 1998, 2008 and 2010, as a substitute to determine the position of political officials, in relation to the policy of France in Rwanda. The names of the political sources gathered were entered into Google search to determine the political party of these political sources, which was categorised as conservative and socialist parties.

In the articles published by the newspapers, attention was drawn to the statements attributed to the political sources that referred to the ‘policy and strategy’ of France in the Rwandan genocide. The statements gathered on the strategic role and policy of France in Rwanda were then analysed as positive or negative (unit analysis). The findings were finally compared to the findings on the position of the newspapers as regarding the criticism of the left-wing and right-wing government in the role of France in the genocide.

CHAPTER FOUR 4.0 Findings

4.1 Introduction In this chapter, the findings on the quantitative content analysis documented in the methodology chapter, are reviewed according to the time frame of, and the themes debated on the role of the French government in the Rwandan genocide. The first section of this chapter is a review of the results from the findings of the texts that were analysed. This section also includes findings on the official sources that appeared in Le Monde and Le Figaro. The second section discusses the results in relation to the aforementioned hypothesis and empirical arguments of past research noted in the literature review.

The timeframe is a keynote aspect of this study. It surrounds the major themes on the role of France in the genocide that was published in Le Monde and Le Figaro.

The time frame also represents the political background that is used in a further analysis and comparison of the results viewed in this chapter.

In the three periods of 1998, 2008 and 2010 (see Table 4.1), the right-wing parties were ruling in France. Ideally, to analyse the extent of partisan politics in the French press, there is a need to examine the content of the newspapers in the context of the left-wing and right-wing governments. But 1998 was selected because it was the peak period of debate on the Intervention of the French government (the coalition government in 1994) in the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

For clarification, the articles reviewed in this chapter were selected and analysed according to the major targets observed in the articles, which in this case is the left-wing government in 1998 and the right-wing government in 2008 and 2010 (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: Background Features of Articles Analysed in Le Monde and Le Figaro Periods

Publication Targets

Publication Themes

1998

left-wing government(coalition of left-wing and right-wing parties)

The Intervention of France in the Rwandan genocide in 1994

2008

Right-wing government

The accusation and denial of France in the Rwandan genocide

2010

Right-wing government

Nicolas Sarkozy admits French errors in Rwanda

In general, in the report on the role of France in the Rwandan genocide during the periods of 1998, 2008 and 2010, the two newspapers featured more editorials than news reports. Le Monde published a greater number of articles than Le Figaro.

However Table 4.2 shows that despite publishing more articles than Le Figaro, Le Figaro in 1998 had lengthier articles in words (total word count of 16344) than Le Monde (total word count of 13436).

Accordingly, the publication with the higher total of words in a year, showed more critical statements. Furthermore Table 4.2 indicates a diminishing difference in the total number of articles published in the two newspapers. In 1998, (30) articles were published, in 2008 (20) articles were published and in 2010 (15) articles

Table 4.2:

Distribution of articles per words on the Role of France in Rwandan Genocide Year Publication Total no.

Total Mean of articles no. of no. of per year words words per article per article 1998

2008

2010

Monde

16

13436

840

Le Figaro

14

16344

1167

Le Monde

11

5302

482

Le Figaro

9

3605

401

Le Monde

8

5577

697

Le Figaro

7

2166

309

4.2 Positioning of the Press: Coverage of the Intervention of France in Rwanda Overall in 1998, the reportage on the intervention of France in the Rwandan genocide shows a higher number of critical statements in total, more than the succeeding periods of 2008 and 2010 (see Tables 4.3 and 4.3.1). As previously mentioned in the methodology chapter, the high level of articles published in 1998, is probably due to the peak period of the debate on the intervention of the French government in the Rwandan genocide.

Table 4.3: Distribution of Critical Statements in Le Monde per Target

Le Monde

year

Critical statement by Target

1998

2008 Year

2010

Left-wing government ( coalition government during the Rwandan genocide)

55

10

11

Right-wing government

22

30

19

Government (refers to France as a whole)

3

4

2

Others (refer to other govt(s) and governmental agencies)

8

2

6

68

46

38

Total no. of words per critical article

Mean of total no. of words per critical article = 4.25 4.18 4.75 Note: Data analysed to determine the position of Le Monde are highlighted in red

Table 4.3.1: Distribution of critical Statement in Le Figaro per Target

Le Figaro Critical statement by Target

Year 1998

2008

2010

Left-wing government (coalition government during the Rwandan genocide)

145

Right-wing government

52

1

1

Government (refers to France as a whole)

5

1

1

Others (refer to other govt(s) and governmental agencies)

1

2

3

155

15

7

Mean of total no. of words per critical article = 11.07

1.67

1.0

Total no. of words per critical article

11

2

Note: Data analysed to determine the position of Le Figaro are highlighted in red

During the right-wing government in 2008 and 2010, Tables 4.3 and 4.3.1, show that criticism was recorded under the left-wing government. For clarification, the left-wing government here, referred to period of the genocide in 1994. In 2008 and 2010, newspaper articles still criticised the government that was in power during the genocide of 1994. Furthermore, Tables 4.3 and 4.3.1 show that in 1998 Le Figaro (11.07) offered more than twice the number of critical statements in average than Le Monde (4.25). Additionally, in the analysis of the critical statements according to targets, Le Figaro offered more critical statements against the left-wing government (145) than Le Monde (55).

In the frequency of criticism by targets in 1998, Le Figaro was more critical of the actions of the left-wing government in the intervention of France in the Rwandan genocide than Le Monde. Le Figaro also offered a minimal criticism of the rightwing government. Furthermore, in 1998, Le Monde was critical of the intervention of the left-wing government in Rwanda. Table 4.3 shows that in a total frequency of 68 critical statements per target, 80 percent of the critical statements were offered against the left-wing government. Figure 4.1 shows the difference in the amount of critical statements offered in Le Monde and Le Figaro in the criticism of the left-wing government in 1998 (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Frequency of Critical statement in Le Figaro and Le Monde according to Targets in 1998 Frequency of Critical statements

160 140 120 100 80 Le Figaro

60

Le Monde

40 20 0 Left-wing Right-wing Government government government Targets

Others

In summary, in the coverage of the debate on the intervention of France in the Rwandan genocide in 1998, the findings show that Le Figaro was more critical of the left-wing government than Le Monde. But, Le Monde was also critical of the left-wing government. The two journals recorded more critical statements on the strategy and the policy of the left-wing government in Rwanda during the genocide (see Appendix A).

4.2.1 Positioning of the Press: Coverage of the Accusation of France in Rwandan Genocide In reference to Tables 4.3 and 4.3.1, in the period of 2008, the total frequency of critical statements offered by Le Monde (45) is three times more than the frequency of critical statements in Le Figaro (15). On average, Table 4.3 reveals critical statement at 4.18 and 1.67 for Le Monde and Le Figaro respectively. In the coverage of the accusation of France in the genocide, Le Monde offered more criticism of the right-wing government (30) than the left-wing government (10).

Le Monde shows more criticism of the policy of the right-wing government in Rwanda (see Appendix A) for rejecting the claims that the French government had participated in the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

In contrast, Le Figaro was less critical of the right-wing government. Table 4.3.1 shows that in a total frequency of 15 critical statements per target (100%), six percent of the critical statements were offered to the right-wing government and 73 percent of the critical statements were offered to the left-wing government. For the comparison of the frequency of critical statements in Le Monde and Le Figaro in 2008 (see figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2: Frequency of Critical Statement in Le Figaro and Le Monde according to Targets in 2008

Frequency of Critical Statements

35 30 25 20 15

Le Figaro

10

Le Monde

5 0 Left-wing Right-wing Government government government

Other

Targets

In summary, in the coverage of the accusation and denial of the participation of France in the Rwandan genocide, Le Monde was more critical of right-wing ruling party in 2008 than Le Figaro. Le Monde criticised the policy, administration and the ideology of the right-wing government in 2008. Le Figaro rather focuses criticism on the left-wing government in power during the genocide.

4.2.2 Positioning of the Press: Coverage of the Acceptance of French Mistakes in Rwanda In 2010, the right-wing party was the ruling government in France. During this period, Le Monde published eight articles and Le Figaro published seven articles on the acceptance of French errors in Rwanda. In relation to the amount of articles published, Le Monde was more critical of the right-wing government than Le Figaro. Le Monde offered a frequency of (19) critical statements against the rightwing government, and Le Figaro recorded a frequency of (1) critical statement.

Also in 2010, Le Monde criticised the left-wing government for committing grave errors in Rwanda. Le Monde offered 28 percent of critical statements to the leftwing government, but 50 percent of critical statement are accorded to the rightwing government. (see Table 4.3).

Figure 4.3: Frequency of Critical Statement in Le Figaro and Le Monde according to Targets in 2010

Frequency of Critical Statement

20 18 16 14 12 10 8

Le Figaro

6

Le Monde

4 2 0 Left-wing Right-wing Government government government Targets

Other

The articles published by Le Monde during this period were lengthier in words than the articles published by Le Figaro. The number of articles published by Le Figaro (7) is one article less than the amount of articles published by Le Monde (8). Similarly as noticed in 2008, the total frequency of critical statements published by Le Figaro was rather minimal (see Figure 4.3). Criticism on the policy, ideology and strategy of the right-wing government in Rwanda was published in Le Monde.

4.3 The Positioning of Political Sources in Le Figaro and Le Monde In the debate on the role of France in the Rwandan genocide (see Table 4.5), Le Figaro (10) and Le Monde (13) recorded a total amount of 23 political sources in the period of 1998, 2008 and 2010. Table 4.5 describes the sources, their political parties, and position in relation to the policy and strategic role of France in the Rwandan genocide.

The conservative politicians recorded in Le Monde (9) and Le Figaro (6) supported the policy of France in Rwanda during the three years under review.

However in Le Monde, seven out of the nine conservative politicians that is recorded, accepted that France had committed strategic errors in Rwanda (see Table 4.4). The last two conservative politicians supported the policy and strategy of France in Rwanda. These last two conservative politicians that supported the policy and strategy of France in Rwanda, were part of the coalition government of Franรงois Mitterrand (left-wing government) during the Rwandan genocide.

Table 4.4: Portrayal of Political Sources and their position regarding the role of France in Rwandan genocide in Le Monde and Le Figaro in 1998, 2008 and 2010 Le Monde Le Figaro

Number of conservative

9

Number of Conservative 6

Number of Socialist

4

Number of Socialist

4

Total of political sources 13

Total of political sources 10

Conservative Source Policy – positive (9) negative (0) Strategy – positive (2) negative (7)

Conservative Source Policy – positive (6) negative (0) Strategy – positive (2) negative (4)

Socialist Source Policypositive (1) negative (3) Strategy- positive (0) negative (4)

Socialist Source Policypositive (3) negative (1) Strategy- positive (3) negative (1)

NOTE: Policy: refers to diplomatic dealings, support for government, bilateral relationship, political influence Strategy: refers to the plans taken in intervention, military operations during the genocide and actions taken during the support of Habyarimana’s regime.

Similarly in Le Figaro, four out of the six conservative politicians that is recorded, accepted the strategic error of France in Rwanda. The two exclusions shown in Table 4.4, were the same politicians that were recorded in Le Monde, as part of the coalition government of François Mitterrand during the Rwandan genocide (refer to Table 4.4). The two conservative politicians maintained a positive position on the policy and strategy of France in Rwanda.

Furthermore, Le Monde and Le Figaro recorded a sum of eight socialist political sources (four each). Table 4.4 shows an interesting contrast in the position of the socialist politicians. Le Monde records three socialist sources that were critical of the policy of France in Rwanda (Pierre Brana, Bernard Cazeneuve and Paul Quiles). In contrast Le Figaro also shows three socialist sources that agreed to the policy of France in Rwanda, although the sources are not the same individuals (Alain Richard, Charles Josselin and Hubert Vedrine).

In Le Figaro the (3) socialist sources that are recorded, agreed to the policy and strategy of France in Rwanda (see Table 4.4). The only socialist source recorded in disagreement with the policy and strategy of France (Paul Quiles), was also recorded in Le Monde as one of the four socialist that was critical, of the strategy and policy of France in Rwanda (see Appendix C for the position of politicians on the policy and strategy). From the total amount of political sources in Le Monde and Le Figaro, five conservative politicians and one socialist politician appeared in both publications (See Figure 4.4 for an illustration of the same political sources that appeared in the articles of Le Monde and Le Figaro).

Figure 4.4: Distribution of Political Sources in Le Monde and Le Figaro in 1998, 2008 and 2010

Le Monde

1

Le Figaro

2 1 2

1 1

2

2 1 1

12 1

1 1

1

1

2

2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1

1 2 Key

Conservative 1 Socialist 2

1

In summary, a total amount 2 of 232political sources were quoted in Le Monde and Le Figaro. The political 2 sources reflected the two major political spectrums in France, which are Conservative (15) and Socialist (8) parties. The articles of the 1 the socialist and conservative parties. two newspapers show sources from both 1 1

1

According to Table 4.4, the political sources reflect a mixed view on the policy 1 1 and strategy of France in Rwanda. In all, four socialist politicians opposed the 2 policy of France in Rwanda and the remaining four socialists supported the policy.

Furthermore, five socialist politicians oppose the strategy of France in Rwanda, and the remaining three socialists were in favour of the strategy. Furthermore, Table 4.4 shows that all the conservative politicians (15) that are recorded, were in favour of the policy of France in Rwanda, but eleven (11) conservative politicians opposed the strategy of France in Rwanda (see Appendix C).

4.4 Discussion of Findings

4.4.1 Political Parallelism in the Coverage of the Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide In relation to the findings, the Parisian newspapers show a degree of unbalanced criticism of the French government, in the coverage of the role of France in the genocide. The positioning of Le Monde and Le Figaro in criticising the governments, suggests the traditional political orientation of the French press, which is argued by previous researchers. Traditionally, Le Figaro is said to be committed to the goals of the conservative party. On the other hand Le Monde is traditionally said to be committed to the goals of the socialist party (Kuhn 1995; Berkel 2006).

The frequency in the amount of critical statements offered in Le Monde and Le Figaro during the three periods under review, shows a distinctive difference along the political spectrum of France. In 1998, during the peak of the debate on the intervention of the left-wing government in the Rwandan genocide, Le Figaro was more critical of the left-wing government than Le Monde. Moreover, Le Figaro in 1998 published more critical articles than 2008 and 2010, when the right-wing government was in power (see Table 4.5). In the following years (2008 and 2010) during the rule of right-wing party, Le Monde was rather more critical of the rightwing government than Le Figaro.

Thus, in the criticism of the role of France in the Rwandan genocide, the findings here show that the degree of criticism in the French press is related to the position of the political spectrum in France. These findings agree with previous research arguments that the coverage of national politics in the French press can reflect the right-left wing political division.

Table 4.5: Critical Statement per 1000 Words by Target in 1998, 2008 and 2010 in the Coverage of the French Role in Rwandan Genocide Year

1998

2008

2010

Publication

Critical Statement per 1,000 words by Target Left-wing Right-wing Government government government

Others

Le Monde

52 (24 %)

2 (1 %)

3 (1 %)

8(4 %)

Le Figaro

142 (65 %)

4 (2 %)

5 (2 %)

1(0.4%)

Le Monde

10 (17 %)

30 (51 %)

4 (5 %)

2(3 %)

Le Figaro

9 (15 %)

1 (2 %)

1 (2 %)

2(3 %)

Le Monde

10 (24 %)

18 (43 %)

2 (5 %)

5(12 %)

Le Figaro 2 (5 %) 1 ( 2 %) 1 (2 %) 3(7 %) Note: Percentage of Critical Statement is measured in the frequency of the total number of Critical statements offered the two publications per year

Therefore as suggested in Hypothesis 1, and in the theory of political parallelism proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004), the findings agree with the prediction that given the traditional political orientation of the French press, the coverage of the role of France in the Rwanda will reveal a partisan left-right wing dimension.

However, as demonstrated in the result of this study (see Table 4.5), partisan politics in the French press should not be exaggerated. Even though Le Figaro was more critical of the left-wing government in 1998, Le Monde did not show an advocacy support for the role of the left-wing government in Rwanda.

Rather, Le Monde was critical of the policy and the strategy of the left-wing government in Rwanda (see Appendix A). Although the articles published by Le Monde were less critical in tone than the articles published by Le Figaro.

In this manner, the findings presented here, question the claims of Hallin and Mancini (2004, p, 73) that because ‘France is a polarized pluralist society, political parallelism tends to be very high, and newspapers are marked by a strong focus on political life and journalism advocacy’. Although this may be true, it is also vital that in referring to the traditional political orientation of the French press, a reasonable consideration should be given to the claims made by media scholars, that political partisanship in the French press has shown a decline in past years. In an instance, Benson (2010) and Albert (2010) noted that Le Monde is likely to be even in criticism against the government, regardless of ideological orientation.

In summary of the first-step analysis of political parallelism in the Parisian news dailies, according to results stated in this chapter, Le Monde and Le Figaro in the coverage of the role of France in the Rwandan genocide show a varying degree of political parallelism. The news content of Le Monde and Le Figaro reflect a leftwing and right-wing political orientation that exists in the French society. Le Monde was more critical of the right-wing government than the left-wing government and Le Figaro was more critical of the left-wing government than the right-wing government.

However the political orientation of the French press should not be overstated, because as reviewed in the results of this chapter, despite the claims that Le Monde is traditionally committed to the left-wing political goals, Le Monde was still critical of the intervention and the role of the left-wing government in the Rwandan genocide.

4.4.2 Parisian Newspapers and Political Partisanship Drawing from the findings recorded in figure 4.5, Le Figaro turns out to be a partisan to the goals of the conservative government in the coverage of the role of France in the genocide. Comparing the percentage of criticism per 1000 words in the three years shown in figure 4.5, Le Monde was actually more critical of the governments during these years than Le Figaro. In 1998 Le Monde still offered approximately 24 percent critical statements of the left-wing government, despite the claims that the newspaper used to be, and can still be a partisan to the goals of left-wing government.

In contrast, Le Figaro in 1998 established in its series of investigative reports that the French left-wing government, i.e.-the coalition government of François Mitterrand, failed in its policy in Rwanda and also participated in the genocide.

In spite of Le Figaro’s published claims, the findings in this study show that Le Figaro didn’t criticise the right-wing government in 2008 for denying that France participated in the genocide. Moreover in 2010 when Nicolas Sarkozy finally admitted to the errors of France in Rwanda, Le Figaro didn’t show to criticise the right-wing government for the years of denying the truth. On the other hand, the criticism of the policy and the ideology of the conservative government were rather made by Le Monde.

Also in relation to the findings in this chapter, Le Monde did not show to be a clear partisan to the goals of the left-wing government because Le Monde was critical of the left-wing government, but at the same time offered more criticism of the right-wing government than the left-wing government (see Table 4.5).

Correspondingly, the findings in this chapter agrees to the prediction stated in Hypothesis 2, that Le Figaro will demonstrate a partisan politics in the coverage of the role of France in the Rwandan genocide, due to its traditional support for the goals of the right-wing government. Furthermore it can be justified drawing from the findings that Le Figaro shows a one-sided political support of the right-wing government, with less than two percent criticisms of the right-wing government in 2008 and 2010. In this case the findings here disagrees with the argument made

by Benson (2010) that even though there are partisan distinctions in the French press, it does not extend to the point of a one-sided coverage in favour of the party in power.

In summary of the second-step analysis of the Parisian dailies and political partisanship (in the coverage of the role of France in the Rwandan genocide), Le Figaro shows a clear partisan to the goals of the right-wing government, considering that Le Figaro did not show criticism of the right-wing ruling government in 2008 and 2010, and was more critical of the left-wing government than the right-wing government.

On other hand, Le Monde shows a distinction along the political division of the left-wing government, considering that Le Monde was more critical of the rightwing government than the left-wing government. However Le Monde did not show to be a partisan to the goals of the left-wing government in the coverage of the role of France in the Rwandan genocide, because Le Monde was critical of the left-wing government and reported the errors committed by the left-wing government in the Rwandan genocide.

4.5 Parallelism of Political Parties and Parisian Newspapers on the Policy of France in Rwanda The aim of this analysis is to determine whether the position of Le Monde and Le Figaro is parallel to the position of the political parties on the policy and strategic goals that France played in Rwanda. In order to attain this aim, the result on the position of Le Monde and Le Figaro is compared to the result (Table 4.4) on the position of the political sources according to their parties (i.e. conservative and socialist parties). In 1998, this study shows that even though Le Monde was less critical than Le Figaro (on the role of the left-wing government in Rwanda); Le Monde still shows approximately 24 percent of criticism.

In relation to political sources, the three socialist-politicians that opposed to the policy and strategy of France in Rwanda appeared in the articles of Le Monde as sources. Le Monde criticised the only socialist politician that was positive of the policy of France in Rwanda. The findings here interestingly shows that Le Monde was critical of the role of the left-wing government in Rwanda, and the criticism of Le Monde agrees with the position of the socialist party-members, that may be opposed to the policy and the strategy of France in Rwanda.

However, the parallelism of Le Monde with the position of the socialist party, should not be overstated. Table 4.4 shows that the articles of Le Monde also featured conservative political sources. Firstly, two of the conservative politicians that appeared in Le Monde were criticised in 1998, 2008 and 2010 for their support on the policy and strategy of France in Rwanda. Secondly, the seven conservative sources that appeared in Le Monde support the policy of France in Rwanda, but oppose to the strategy of the left-wing government in Rwanda.

Nevertheless, Le Monde focused on the strategic opposition of the left-wing government offered by the conservative politicians.

In Le Figaro, two conservative sources out of the total of six conservative sources, supported the strategy and the policy of the left-wing government in Rwanda.

However Le Figaro criticised the two sources (Alain JuppÊ and Édouard Balladur) that were part of the coalition government of François Mitterrand during the genocide. The four remaining conservative political sources that appeared in Le Figaro in 2008 and 2010 supported the policy of France in Rwanda but opposed the strategy of the left-wing government in Rwanda.

According to Table 4.4, Le Figaro also featured four socialist political sources in 1998. Three of the socialist political sources supported the policy and the strategy of the left-wing government in Rwanda and were criticised accordingly in Le Figaro. The only socialist in 1998 that opposed the policy and strategy of the leftwing government in Rwanda, appeared as a source in Le Figaro to support the criticism of the left-wing government.

Therefore the findings here agree with Hypothesis 3 that in relation to the political parallelism theory, Le Monde and Le Figaro is identified along the ideological position of the left-right wing government, on the policy and strategy of France in Rwanda. However, the parallelism of Le Monde and Le Figaro, should not to be considered in a strict sense, to reflect the position of a particular party. For instance as shown in the results (Table 4.4), not all the socialist political sources opposed the strategy and policy of the left-wing government in Rwanda. A socialist politician can also support the policy and strategy of the left-wing government in Rwanda, as actually noticed with the socialist sources that appeared in Le Figaro. In essence the findings show a mixed representation in the conservative and socialist parties, on the policy and strategy of France in Rwanda.

This means that within the socialist party, there are politicians that agree and disagree with the policy and strategy of France in Rwanda, and the same can be said of the conservative party. Thus, Le Monde and Le Figaro feature sources (whether socialist or conservative) that agreed with their position.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 Conclusion

In conclusion, the observable difference between Le Monde and Le Figaro in their coverage of France’s alleged involvement in the Rwandan genocide, depicts a political partisan division between the left-right wing government, in a manner Hallin and Mancini (2004) describes as political parallelism. A pattern in which the press reflects the major political orientations in the society as presented in news content.

In the coverage of France’s alleged involvement in the Rwandan genocide, Le Figaro was more critical of the left-wing government than Le Monde, and Le Monde was more critical of the right-wing government than Le Figaro.

Despite the claim made by media scholars (Albert 2010; Kuhn 1995) that partisan politics in the French press is on decline due to commercialisation, Le Figaro still appears to be a partisan to the goals of the conservative party. As reviewed in this study, Le Figaro on the role of France in Rwanda, criticised the coalition government during the genocide. Le Figaro criticised the intervention of the leftwing government in Rwanda. Having established a fact that the coalition government lead by François Mitterrand in 1994, participated in the genocide, Le Figaro made no criticism against the right-wing government in 2004, for denying that France participated in the Rwandan genocide.

Significantly, even though Le Figaro was more critical of the left-wing government in 1998 than Le Monde, Le Monde still criticised the left-wing government coalition government)in its involvement in the Rwandan genocide.

While this study focused on Le Monde and Le Figaro, it is important to acknowledge the possible similarities between the two dailies, and their coverage on the role of France in Rwanda. The two Parisian newspapers published more editorials than news reports during the three years under review (1998, 2008 and 2010). The opinion of journalists was common in the editorials of the two dailies, and the criticism made against the governments, were centred on strategy, policy and truth (see Appendix A). Taking these similarities into account, it is important to highlight the relationship that exists between the Le Monde, Le Figaro, and the political parties in France. Drawing from the analysis in this study, the support of the French policy in Rwanda appears to be divided along the political spectrum of France. In detail, the conservative politicians were more supportive of the policy of France in Rwanda, than the socialist politicians. However, the support and the opposition of the policy came from both political parties.

Remarkably, the French press in the centre of such political divisions on national policies, is likely to be divided to reflect the positions of the political parties. As actually demonstrated in the findings of the study, Le Figaro and Le Monde in their editorials, featured selected politicians that agreed with their own criticisms accordingly. Le Monde’s position in the criticism of the policy and strategy of the left-wing government, is parallel to the position of the socialist politicians used as sources in Le Monde. Similarly, the position of Le Figaro in the support of the policy of the right-wing government is parallel the position of the conservative politicians that appeared as sources in Le Figaro.

Past researchers such as Berkel (2006) noted that in a debate of a European issue, the editorials of Le Monde and Le Figaro, favourably gave voice to the political speakers that support their own positions in the debate.

In essence political parallelism in the Parisian dailies is likely to determine the extent of balanced and objective criticism of the government and the ruling party.

It therefore questions the professionalism of the French press and the normative social responsibilities linked with the free press in western democracies.

According to Blumler and Gurevitch (1995), the existence of a free press in western liberal democracies, enshrines the democratic concept of the political accountability of power holders to ordinary citizens. But with the traces of political parallelism in the French press, the tendency to generate balanced political news content appears minimal.

To further analyse the extent of political parallelism in the French press, there is a need for future research to analyse a more variation of the French newspapers on reporting national debates. Furthermore there is a need for future research to analyse the effect of the active participation of journalists in political parties, on news content.

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Appendix A: Result for Critical Statement According to Criticism Categories in 1998, 2008 And 2010 Categories of Criticism Periods

1998

2008

Strategy

Ideology

Truth

Character

Policy

Le Monde 4

26

8

7

4

19

Le Figaro

48

15

27

1

54

Le Monde 6

10

4

8

3

15

Le Figaro

6

0

1

0

7

Le Monde 3

11

6

6

3

9

Le Figaro

2

0

1

1

3

Papers

Administrative

10

1

2010 0

Appendix B: Names of the Political Sources Used in Le Monde and Le Figaro Le Monde in 1998, 2008 and 2010 Names of political Sources Parties Edouard Balladur Conservative Nicolas Sarkozy Conservative Bernard Kouchner Conservative Jacques Myard Conservative Jacques Chirac Conservative Alain Juppé Conservative Bernard Debre Conservative René Galy-Dejean Conservative Paul Quiles Socialist François Leotard Conservative Bernard Cazeneuve Socialist Pierre Brana Socialist Lionel Jospin Socialist Le Figaro in 1998, 2008 and 2010 Names of political Sources Parties Alain Juppé Conservative Bernard Kouchner Conservative Edouard Balladur Conservative Nicolas Sarkozy Conservative Bernard Debre Conservative Micheal Rousin Conservative Hubert Vedrine Socialist Paul Quiles Socialist Alain Richard Socialist Charles Josselin Socialist

Appendix C: Political Sources and Position Taken on the Policy and Strategy of France in Rwanda Le Monde in 1998, 2008 and 2010 Names Party Policy EdouardBalladur Conservative positive Nicolas Sarkozy Conservative positive Bernard Kouchner Conservative positive Jacques Myard Conservative positive Jacques Chirac Conservative positive Alain Juppé Conservative positive Bernard Debre Conservative positive René Galy-Dejean Conservative positive Paul Quiles Socialist negative François Leotard Conservative positive Bernard Cazeneuve Socialist negative Pierre Brana Socialist negative Lionel Jospin Socialist positive

Strategy positive negative negative negative negative positive negative negative negative negative negative negative negative

Le Figaro in 1998, 2008 and 2010 Names Party Policy Alain Juppé Conservative positive Bernard Kouchner Conservative positive Edouard Balladur Conservative positive Nicolas Sarkozy Conservative positive Bernard Debre Conservative positive Micheal Rousin Conservative positive Hubert Vedrine Socialist positive Paul Quiles Socialist negative Alain Richard Socialist positive Charles Josselin Socialist positive

Strategy positive negative positive negative negative negative positive negative positive positive

Appendix D: Content Analysis Coding Sheet for Articles 1. Newspapers: 1b. Key words for online Archive Search: 2. Year: 3. Articles #: 4. Headline: 5. Word length: 6. Key topics for news and editorials selected: 7. Categories of article targets: left-wing, right-wing, government and others 8. Unit analysis for measuring critical statement: Categories

Administration

Strategy

Ideology

Truth

Policy

Character

Unit

101

102

103

104

105

106

Content Analysis Coding Sheet for Sources 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Newspapers: Article: Year: Names of political sources: Analysis for political sources: Categories of statements Coding unit

Policy, Strategy Positive, Negative

Appendix E: Sample of the Rwandan Government Report on the On the Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide

Appendix F: Sample Copies of Le Monde Articles in 1998, 2008 and 2010

Rwanda : la France doit corriger son discours officiel sur le génocide Article paru dans l'édition du 24.02.10 Que notre diplomatie cesse de renvoyer victimes et bourreaux dos à dos

onsieur le Président de la République, le 25 février, vous serez le premier président français à vous rendre au Rwanda depuis François Mitterrand en 1984. Cette visite prendra d'autant plus de relief qu'elle suit de quelques semaines la reprise des relations diplomatiques entre la France et le Rwanda après trois ans de rupture.

Nul doute, à cet égard, que le succès diplomatique de votre déplacement ne soit assuré. Mais la diplomatie n'est pas tout et l'histoire tragique du Rwanda exige plus de la France que le froid réalisme qui, à Paris et à Kigali, n'est pas entré pour une faible part dans le fait que soient enfin renoués ces liens consulaires.

Autrement dit, la vérité historique ne saurait être reléguée au second plan.

Rappelons les excuses officielles présentées à Kigali par le président américain Bill Clinton en 1998 et par le premier ministre belge Guy Verhofstadt en 2000.

Les pouvoirs publics français, quant à eux, s'entêtèrent, jusqu'au début de votre quinquennat, à adopter une attitude stupéfiante de la part d'une démocratie puisqu'elle se résuma en quelque sorte à éluder ses propres responsabilités et, pour mieux ce faire, à voir certains de ses serviteurs relayer, quand ils ne le susurraient pas, un discours négationniste. Discours qui, pour ne pas être pris pour ce qu'il était, se présenta sous la forme de la théorie du « double génocide » et de la responsabilité du Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) dans le déclenchement du crime contre l'humanité dont furent victimes les Tutsi.

Autrement dit, le génocide perpétré par le « Hutu Power » doit non seulement être relativisé par le génocide prétendument commis par le FPR, mais, en outre, celui-ci est le responsable premier du sort des Tutsi. Formidable et abject renversement du rôle des bourreaux et des victimes !

Ces « diversions » sont-elles le fruit d'une adhésion idéologique à cette vision fantasmée de l'Histoire ou le résultat du calcul bien compris de ceux qui pensent que leur aveuglement ou leurs méfaits potentiels dans la préparation et le déroulement du génocide seront masqués par la fange qu'ils répandent à grandes giclées ? Quoi qu'il en soit, elles ne doivent pas plus longtemps nous éloigner de faits décidément têtus et abondamment documentés par quantité de livres, documentaires, enquêtes, recherches universitaires et reportages.

Tout d'abord, la France a aidé financièrement et militairement le Rwanda, notamment dans les années 1990 et officiellement jusqu'en 1993. C'est la France qui a grandement participé à la formation de la gendarmerie et des Forces armées rwandaises, deux des fers de lance du génocide.

C'est la France qui a exfiltré Agathe Habyarimana, veuve du président rwandais tout juste assassiné mais surtout dirigeante notoire de l'« Akazu », officine du pouvoir où les groupes racistes les plus extrémistes planifiaient le génocide. Lui aussi exfiltré par la France : Ferdinand Nahimana, fondateur et directeur de la sinistre Radio des Mille Collines, surnommée « Radio La Mort » pour son rôle fondamental dans l'alimentation de la haine envers les Tutsi et dans la mise en acte de leur extermination. Quel donneur d'ordre pouvait ignorer qui la France protégeait ainsi, au moment même où elle abandonnait les employés tutsi de son ambassade à leurs massacreurs ?

Ce que l'on sait également, c'est que la France, pendant le génocide, était le seul pays occidental à maintenir des relations diplomatiques avec le Rwanda et à recevoir plusieurs hauts représentants du pouvoir génocidaire. Il faut dire que, vraisemblablement, trop nombreux étaient les officiels français considérant une victoire du FPR de Kagamé comme la garantie du basculement du Rwanda dans l'aire d'influence anglo-saxonne, et donc de l'amputation du pré carré français en Afrique.

Ce qui apparaît fort comme une collusion d'une partie de l'appareil d'Etat avec les institutions du génocide n'explique-t-elle d'ailleurs pas pourquoi les soldats français de l'opération humanitaro-militaire « Turquoise » ont été accueillis par les Hutu comme des amis, par des applaudissements, des chants, des danses, des drapeaux français, des portraits de Mitterrand mélangés à ceux d'Habyarimana, des cris « Vive la France ! » ? La plupart des officiels rwandais qui accueillaient alors les soldats français, en ces mois de juin et juillet 1994, avaient participé activement à la perpétration du génocide.

Ces quelques éléments parmi d'autres doivent pousser les autorités françaises à contribuer à dire une vérité dont la recherche a été trop longtemps différée ou qui a été trop longtemps tue. Et pour ce faire, de nombreuses questions réclament des réponses.

Des militaires français ont-ils été présents sur les lieux de l'attentat contre l'avion d'Habyarimana quelques minutes après son crash ? Ont-ils contribué à cacher ou à détruire les éléments prouvant qu'il était le fait du « Hutu Power » ? Le Gouvernement intérimaire rwandais - celui qui devait perpétrer le génocide - a-t-il été formé le 7 avril 1994 à l'ambassade de France à Kigali sous la houlette active de l'ambassadeur Jean-Michel Marlaud ? Comment qualifier la signature par Paul Barril, ancienne gloire du GIGN dont on a du mal à penser que ses agissements de mercenaire étaient inconnus de très hautes autorités de l'Etat, d'un « contrat d'assistance » au gouvernement génocidaire ?

Cela se passe le 28 mai, soit en plein génocide et onze jours après le vote à l'Organisation des Nations unies de l'embargo sur les armes. Teneur du contrat : vingt hommes et une vente d'armes pour 3 millions de dollars. Peu après le génocide, Paul Barril a été élevé au grade de commandant de réserve. Malgré ou grâce à ce qu'il a commis au Rwanda ?

La liste des questions pourrait s'allonger à l'infini. Elle montre l'urgence pour les autorités françaises à faire toute la lumière sur des faits qu'elles sont parfois les seules à connaître, et de poser une parole politique forte sur la part que prirent des ressortissants français dans le drame génocidaire et dans la diffusion d'une parole négationniste.

Je parle bien ici de ressortissants français et non de la France car les choses doivent être claires : certains responsables de l'époque prennent lâchement « la France » comme bouclier rhétorique, comme si dire leurs responsabilités reviendrait à salir la France. C'est à cette poignée d'individus, qui compte certains hauts responsables de l'Etat, et non à la France, d'assumer les actions qu'ils ont entreprises sans jamais en référer au peuple, à ses représentants, voire au gouvernement, pour agir secrètement, selon une logique qui en fait, sur le plan de la morale sinon sur celui de la justice, les complices du génocide.

En raison de l'honnêteté intellectuelle qui doit sans cesse nous pousser vers le souci de la vérité, du respect dû aux victimes et aux rescapés du génocide perpétré par le « Hutu Power » en 1994 et du caractère édifiant pour les générations futures de l'exposition des mécanismes et des responsabilités, votre visite au Rwanda, Monsieur le Président, est une fantastique occasion de poser les jalons d'un discours officiel revisité à l'aune de ces principes.

Dominique Sopo

Le Rwanda publie son réquisitoire contre la France LEMONDE.FR : Article publié le 06.08.08

on seulement la France de 1994 savait que le génocide des Tutsis se préparait au Rwanda, non seulement elle a aidé et armé ceux qui allaient le commettre, mais elle a "participé à la mise en exécution" d'un massacre qui a coûté la vie à 800 000 personnes. Les 331 pages du rapport rendu public mardi 5 août à Kigali assènent de graves accusations contre les responsables civils et militaires français de cette époque de cohabitation où François Mitterrand avait pour premier ministre Edouard Balladur.

Rédigé par sept juristes et historiens choisis par le pouvoir rwandais, présidé par l'ancien ministre de la justice Jean de Dieu Mucyo, le rapport est alourdi de 166 feuillets de témoignages dont la lecture suscite à la fois accablement et gêne.

Accablement, tant s'accumulent les récits de la collaboration des soldats français au tri ethnique de la population, de l'aide apportée aux tueurs, et de leurs exactions, allant des viols aux assassinats. Gêne, tant peuvent être sujets à manipulation des témoignages invérifiables de génocidaires repentis, recueillis par leurs vainqueurs dans un pays traumatisé et autoritaire. L'intitulé officiel de la commission, "chargée de rassembler les preuves montrant l'implication de l'Etat français dans le génocide", montre la précision de l'objectif assigné et le peu de place laissé aux vérités complexes.

En présentant le rapport devant les caméras de la télévision nationale, le ministre rwandais de la justice, Tharcisse Karugarama, a évoqué la perspective de "poursuites judiciaires" contre "des personnalités pointées du doigt pour leur rôle dans le génocide". Une liste de 33 responsables français – 13 politiques et 20 militaires – a été diffusée. Outre M. Balladur, sont notamment visés Alain Juppé, ministre des affaires étrangères de l'époque, Dominique de Villepin, son directeur de cabinet, François Léotard (défense), Hubert Védrine, secrétaire général de l'Elysée, et Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, conseiller à l'Elysée.

Le document dresse un inventaire de toutes les charges que l'actuel régime rwandais du président Paul Kagamé, issu de la victoire militaire des Tutsis de l'extérieur contre les génocidaires, a accumulées contre le pays qui a soutenu militairement ses adversaires hutus et parfois ses bourreaux.

Etayé par de nombreuses notes, le document décrit l'engrenage du soutien français au régime "fondé sur une discrimination ethnique officielle" du président Habyarimana, menacé depuis 1990 par le Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) regroupant les Tutsis exilés en Ouganda. Le document évoque"une stratégie indirecte de confrontation entre l'armée française au Rwanda et le FPR".

Attribuant au président Mitterrand un "parti pris antitutsi", les auteurs expliquent son engagement croissant par sa volonté d'"endiguer l'influence du monde anglophone [les Tutsis du FPR sont anglophones]" et de montrer aux autres présidents africains amis de la France que Paris ne laisse pas tomber ses alliés.

Concrètement, le rapport Mucyo accuse la France "d'avoir formé les milices interahamwe qui ont été le fer de lance du génocide". Les Français"nous disaient que (…) l'ennemi était le Tutsi", affirme un ancien interahamwe (milice hutue), qui dit avoir été formé par des militaires français."Les Français (…) ont formé des gens qui ont été utilisés pour tuer", martèle un ancien militaire rwandais auditionné par la commission. Omniprésents, les Français auraient engagé dès 1992 des programmes de "défense civile" alliant "l'apprentissage de différentes méthodes d'assassinat" et "un endoctrinement des miliciens à la haine ethnique". De facto maîtres du service de renseignement, des gendarmes français "ont contribué en toute connaissance de cause au fichage informatisé des suspects politiques et ethniques qui devaient être massacrés durant le génocide", ajoute le document, alléguant la connaissance par Paris du mécanisme d'élimination en préparation et accusant les Français d'avoir ainsi"contribué à la radicalisation ethnique du conflit".

Avant même la perpétration du génocide, les militaires français ont déployé "une importante activité dans le contrôle des cartes d'identité"permettant de trier Hutus et Tutsis aux barrages routiers, selon la commission. Des actes d'intimidation, des disparitions voire des viols consécutifs à ces contrôles sont amplement décrits par des témoins.

Après l'attentat contre le président Habyarimana et le déclenchement du génocide, le 6 avril 1994, ces mécanismes se seraient exacerbés. Le rapport décrit l'ambassade de France, où se sont alors réfugiés les hauts responsables du régime, comme le centre de la résistance des extrémistes hutus. Il dénonce "le soutien accordé par l'ambassadeur Marlaud" au colonel Théoneste Bagosora, considéré comme le cerveau du génocide. En plein massacre, les Français se seraient abstenus de sauver des civils. Un témoignage décrit "une femme enceinte que l'on éventre" devant "deux soldats français qui

rigolaient". En outre, les militaires français auraient pratiqué des "évacuations sélectives", séparant des couples mixtes, abandonnant les personnels rwandais de leurs propres institutions.

Inédits, plusieurs témoignages font état de la poursuite de livraisons d'armes françaises – "des dizaines de tonnes" – avant et pendant le génocide et de leur utilisation. Présentée par les Français comme "humanitaire", l'opération "Turquoise" déclenchée fin juin 1994 est analysée sans nuance dans le rapport Mucyo comme la poursuite d'une "guerre de l'ombre" contre les Tutsis "en plein génocide".

Multipliant les témoignages sur des exactions et sur la passivité devant les massacres, le document les présente comme parties prenantes d'une"stratégie" française. A le croire, il en serait ainsi du drame de Bisesero, où les militaires français ont attendu trois jours avant de porter assistance à des victimes du génocide errant dans une forêt.

Contestée, cette vision mécanique d'une complicité française délibérée sur le terrain est appuyée par un déluge de dépositions faisant état de largages par hélicoptère de Tutsis. Certains auraient ainsi été assassinés, d'autres livrés vivants aux génocidaires. Des dizaines de récits de viols complètent ce tableau insupportable. "Les Français, assure un témoin, nous avaient chargés de leur chercher des filles ou des femmes tutsi (…) qui, disaient-ils, ne leur causeraient pas de problèmes".

Alors que l'opération "Turquoise", sous mandat des Nations unies, est censée permettre la protection des victimes, la commission Mucyo y "discerne"rien moins que "la prise en charge du projet génocidaire par les décideurs français".

Livrées quatorze ans après les faits, ces pesantes accusations synthétisent et amplifient des griefs souvent déjà connus. Depuis longtemps déjà, les accusations réciproques lancées devant les tribunaux de chaque pays ou devant le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda d'Arusha (Tanzanie) alimentent une vive tension diplomatique franco-rwandaise.

Les mandats d'arrêt délivrés par le juge Bruguière contre de hauts responsables du régime actuel mis en cause dans l'attentat de 1994 contre l'avion présidentiel qui a déclenché le génocide ont abouti, en 2006, à la rupture des relations diplomatiques par Kigali. Le rapport Mucyo peut d'ailleurs apparaître comme une riposte à ces mises en cause qui entravent la liberté de circuler de plusieurs dignitaires rwandais.

Le document, remis au président Kagamé en novembre 2007, est finalement publié au moment où la justice espagnole met à son tour en cause des responsables rwandais. Kigali menace aujourd'hui explicitement de déclencher une procédure symétrique ciblant des personnalités françaises.

Officiellement, le rapport Mucyo n'avait pas été transmis, mercredi 6 août au matin, aux autorités françaises. Dans les milieux diplomatiques, on estimait ses conclusions "pas très nouvelles et peu convaincantes" et l'on voulait croire que l'initiative de Kigali n'était pas de nature à contrarier le réchauffement des relations bilatérales, net depuis l'élection de Nicolas Sarkozy. Et d'insister sur le fait que les personnalités françaises visées appartiennent toutes "au passé".

Philippe Bernard

M. Balladur et ses ministres défendent leur politique au Rwanda

Un amalgame sur les opérations militaires Article paru dans l'édition du 23.04.98 « Turquoise » ne doit pas faire oublier les aspects troubles de « Noroît » et d'« Amaryllis »

FIERTÉ », « honneur », « dignité ». Edouard Balladur, Alain Juppé et François Léotard, comme de nombreux responsables politiques et militaires français, n'hésitent pas à employer des mots forts, émouvants et définitifs à propos de l'action de la France au Rwanda. Ils retracent les efforts

de Paris pour intervenir à la fin du génocide. Alain Juppé rappelle et il a raison de le préciser tant ce point est capital qu'il fut le premier sur la scène internationale, en mai 1994, à appeler les tueries du Rwanda par leur nom : un génocide.

Ils racontent le quotidien des soldats français dans cette Afrique des Grands Lacs à feu et à sang : les colonnes de réfugiés jetés sur les routes, les enfants protégés et sauvés, les milliers de cadavres ensevelis. « Je ne peux ni comprendre ni admettre que l'on mette en cause le bien-fondé de notre intervention humanitaire », ajoute M. Juppé, tandis que M. Balladur dénonce, à propos des interrogations et des accusations parues dans la presse française, « une campagne violente, partisane, souvent haineuse ».

Les responsables français contribuent ainsi, consciemment ou inconsciemment, à un amalgame qui sème la confusion dans le débat actuel sur le rôle de la France au Rwanda. Car il y a bien deux époques distinctes dans la présence française au « Pays des milles collines ».

Il y a, d'abord, la période « Noroît », du nom de l'opération déclenchée par le président François Mitterrand en 1990, pratiquement sans aucune concertation avec le gouvernement de l'époque, et qui durera jusqu'en 1993. C'est le temps où l'Elysée gère directement la crise rwandaise, où les soldats d'élite envoyés sur le terrain soutiennent à outrance les Forces armées rwandaises (FAR). Les soldats français font la guerre sans que les Français le sachent. Deux officiers, les lieutenants-colonels Chollet et Maurin, « conseillers » du président Habyarimana, commandent les opérations militaires sous la supervision, à Paris, des généraux Christian Quesnot et Jean-Pierre Huchon. ÉTABLIR LA VÉRITÉ Il y a, ensuite, la période qui va du retrait des hommes de « Noroît », à l'automne 1993, au premier mois du génocide et à l'opération « Amaryllis », en avril 1994, lancée à Kigali pour évacuer les ressortissants européens menacés par la guerre.

Après l'époque du soutien partiellement secret mais extrêmement ferme au pouvoir rwandais, c'est la période la plus trouble des relations francorwandaises, celle d'éventuelles livraisons d'armes qui ne figurent sur aucun bordereau officiel connu, celle de la préparation d'un génocide par les extrémistes hutus dont Paris affirme ne pas avoir été tenu informé. C'est « Amaryllis », l'exfiltration organisée des dignitaires du régime Habyarimana et l'abandon du personnel tutsi de l'ambassade de France. C'est la réception à Paris, trois semaines après le déclenchement des tueries, de hauts responsables du génocide Jérôme Bicamumpaka, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza par, entre autres, MM. Balladur et Juppé.

La troisième époque est celle de « Turquoise », une opération humanitaire qu'aucun pays n'avait le courage d'entreprendre. C'est à propos de cette époque que les responsables politiques expriment si volontiers leur « fierté ».

Cet amalgame est présent dans toutes les interventions publiques, tant il y a sans doute motif à s'enorgueillir de « Turquoise » et tant il y a sans doute des faits à dissimuler sur « Noroît » et « Amaryllis ». Il est vrai que « Turquoise » fut, pour les armées, à l'époque de l'opération catastrophique et interminable de la Forpronu en Bosnie-Herzégovine, un modèle d'intervention rapide, efficace, dotée d'un mandat et d'un objectif précis. « Turquoise » a-t-elle permis ou va-telle permettre à la France de faire oublier les années troubles de son action au Rwanda ? C'est à la mission d'information de l'Assemblée nationale de poser les vraies questions, pour établir la vérité et refuser cet amalgame.

REMY OURDAN

Appendix G: Sample Articles of Le Figaro in 1998, 2008 and 2010

LE FIGARO.fr

Sarkozy au Rwanda en février 22/01/2010 | Mise à jour La visite de Nicolas Sarkozy au Rwanda en février marquera une étape cruciale dans un processus complexe de réduction des tensions entre Paris et Kigali, exercice délicat dans un pays qui attend une explication sur le rôle de la France dans le génocide.

L'événement est d'abord symbolique: ce sera la première fois depuis le génocide rwandais de 1994, qui a fait plus de 800.000 morts selon l'ONU, essentiellement parmi la minorité tutsi, qu'un président français se rend dans ce petit pays d'Afrique centrale.

Cette visite marquera le point d'orgue d'une réconciliation menée tambour battant, depuis l'annonce le 29 novembre de la reprise des relations diplomatiques suspendues depuis fin 2006.

Le Rwanda avait coupé les ponts avec la France après l'émission par la justice française de mandats d'arrêt contre neuf proches du président rwandais Paul Kagame. Ces derniers sont soupçonnés d'être impliqués dans l'assassinat en avril 1994 de l'ex-président hutu rwandais Juvénal Habyarimana, considéré comme l'élément déclencheur du génocide.

Or le pouvoir rwandais actuel accuse la France d'avoir armé les génocidaires, ce que Paris a toujours catégoriquement nié.

LE FIGARO.fr

Le Rwanda accuse la France de participation au génocide 06/08/2008 | Mise à jour Pour la première fois, les autorités rwandaises évoquent la possibilité de poursuites judiciaires contre d'anciens responsables politiques et militaires français.

Le Rwanda a une nouvelle fois accusé mardi la France d'avoir activement «participé» à l'exécution du génocide de 1994. Le ministre de la Justice rwandais, Tharcisse Karugarama, présentait à la presse les conclusions d'un rapport de la commission d'enquête rwandaise sur le rôle supposé de la France dans le génocide qui a causé la mort de 800.000 personnes entre avril et juillet 1994. Une commission dont la France a rejeté toute légitimité.

Selon ce rapport, la France était «au courant des préparatifs» du génocide, a «participé aux principales initiatives» de sa mise en place et «à sa mise en exécution». Le communiqué du ministère de la Justice reprenant les principales conclusions du rapport évoque «la persistance, la détermination, le caractère massif du soutien français à la politique rwandaise des massacres (…)».

Au rang des 13 dirigeants français incriminés, figurent notamment le président de la République à l'époque des faits François Mitterrand (mort en janvier 1996), le premier ministre Edouard Balladur, le ministre des Affaires étrangères Alain Juppé, son directeur de cabinet Dominique de Villepin ou encore le secrétaire général de l'Élysée Hubert Védrine. La commission d'enquête porte également des accusations très lourdes contre des soldats français de l'opération militaro-humanitaire Turquoise (fin juin-fin août 1994).

«Des militaires français ont commis eux-mêmes directement des assassinats de Tutsis et de Hutus accusés de cacher des Tutsis (…) Des militaires français ont commis de nombreux viols sur des rescapées tutsies». Les militaires français «ont laissé en place les infrastructures du génocide, à savoir les barrières tenues par les Interahamwe (extrémistes hutus)», poursuit le communiqué.

Paris attend le rapport «Ce rapport n'est pas un dossier criminel (…) C'est une bonne base pour d'éventuelles procédures légales», a précisé le ministre de la Justice lors de la présentation de ce rapport, diffusée en direct par la télévision rwandaise. Des propos qui pourraient ouvrir la porte à d'éventuelles poursuites judiciaires contre ces anciens responsables politiques et militaires.

Le ministère des Affaires étrangères français a indiqué mardi attendre d'avoir le texte des conclusions pour y réagir. Le ministère de la Défense, interrogé mardi , sur les accusations rwandaises contre Paris quant au génocide de 1994, a de son côté renvoyé à sa position exprimée dès 2007, déniant «impartialité» et «légitimité» à la commission d'enquête. À l'époque, la France affirmait «assumer pleinement son action au Rwanda en 1994 et notamment celle de ses forces armées».

Le 18 juin, le Rwanda avait déjà fait savoir qu'il souhaitait poursuivre devant ses juridictions des non-Rwandais accusés d'être impliqués dans le génocide.

Début juillet, le président rwandais Paul Kagame a menacé de faire inculper des ressortissants français si les tribunaux européens n'annulaient pas les mandats d'arrêt émis contre des responsables rwandais. Kigali a rompu fin novembre 2006 ses relations diplomatiques avec Paris après que le juge français Jean-Louis Bruguière eut réclamé des poursuites contre Kagame pour sa « participation présumée » à l'attentat contre l'avion de l'ex-président rwandais Juvénal Habyarimana le 6 avril 1994, un des éléments déclencheurs du génocide.

LE FIGARO.fr

Les ambiguïtés de Turquoise Arnaud de LA GRANGE

02/04/1998 Opération humanitaire et secret militaire Les ambiguïtés de « Turquoise » Organisée en pleine période de cohabitation à Paris, cette intervention a sauvé des rescapés tutsis du génocide mais a aussi permis à de nombreux assassins de s’enfuir.

Fin juin 1994, c’est la cohabitation : François Mitterrand est toujours à l’Élysée, Édouard Balladur est à Matignon. Paris décide d’intervenir au Rwanda et lance, trois mois après le début du génocide, l’opération « Turquoise ». En tout, deux mille cinq cents hommes sont engagés.

Lancés en éclaireurs, les soldats d’élite de l’armée française COS, GIGN, paras... déploient un impressionnant arsenal. Derrière, les autres unités ne manquent pas non plus de moyens : mortiers lourds, lance-roquettes, munitions en abondance...

A priori, « Turquoise » est une opération humanitaire. Pourquoi donc déployer un tel arsenal ? La réponse tient en quelques mots extraits, d’un document officiel et confidentiel. C’est un officier français qui parle : « Nous avions le souci (NDLR : pendant l’opération « Turquoise ») de distinguer l’information concernant les opérations humanitaires des autres relevant du secret militaire. » Comme « Noroit », « Turquoise » est une opération à double-volet. L’’« humanitaire » est affiché officiellement, le « secret militaire » ne devrait pas avoir de raison d’être.

Il est là pourtant. « Dans les premiers jours de « Turquoise », raconte un officier qui tient à garder l’anonymat, nous avons eu l’ordre d’avancer sur Butare. A ce moment-là, nos instructions étaient très claires : il était envisagé d’aller jusqu’à Kigali (NDLR : à cette époque, la capitale rwandaise est en train de tomber aux mains de la rébellion). Ces ordres ont été annulés au tout dernier moment. » Cette déclaration d’un officier français est confirmée par un haut responsable politique de l’époque : « C’est vrai, dit-il, peu après le début de « Turquoise », nous avons été à un cheveu de nous engager. » « Turquoise », à l’origine, n’était donc pas neutre. Consulté par l’état-major lors du montage de l’opération, le chercheur Gérard Prunier se souvient d’avoir croisé, dans les couloirs du ministère de la Défense, quelques faucons anti-rébellion. En revanche, tient-il à préciser, le général Mercier alors chef d’état-major de l’armée de terre n’avait, lui, « aucune idée derrière la tête ».

Mal engagée, l’opération « Turquoise » restera marquée par l’ambiguïté.

Certains politiques et militaires vont agir, mûs par leur conscience. Mais d’autres manoeuvreront en sous-main.

Accusations « injustes » D’où la polémique. Qui fera terriblement mal à l’armée française. L’opération « Turquoise » a été lancée alors que la France venait de se réconcilier avec l’institution militaire.

Les opérations menées avec la bénédiction de l’ONU au Cambodge et en Somalie, le prix du sang payé en ex-Yougoslavie avaient renforcé le lien armée-nation. A Noël, des milliers de collégiennes adressaient des lettres ou des cadeaux aux soldats français cantonnés en Bosnie...

Or, avec « Turquoise », voilà que l’armée française est accusée d’avoir campé avec le diable sur les collines du Rwanda. Un officier qui a participé à l’opération juge ces accusations « injustes mais compréhensibles ». « Injustes », dit-il, car la plupart des hommes participant à « Turquoise » ont le sentiment d’avoir été « propres et utiles ». « Compréhensibles », car l’opération ne pouvait s’affranchir des précédentes interventions françaises au Rwanda, très contestées.

Les 2 500 soldats français n’ont pas tous vécu la même opération. Au Zaïre, à Bukavu et Goma, les soldats déployés en base-arrière ont dû se transformer en fossoyeurs quand l’épidémie de choléra a décimé les camps de réfugiés hutus. Lorsqu’ils quitteront le Zaïre, ces militaires auront enterré plus de 20 000 cadavres. Ceux-là n’ont pas accompli de hauts faits d’armes, mais tutoyé l’horreur. Simultanément, il y a « Turquoise-Rwanda ». C’est ce volet de l’opération qui nourrit la controverse. En créant une « zone humanitaire sûre » (ZHS) dans le sud-ouest du pays, la France est soupçonnée d’avoir couvert la fuite vers le Zaïre des assassins et de leurs commanditaires politiques.

A la fin de juin 1994, dans les avions qui les emportent vers l’Afrique des Grands Lacs, légionnaires et marsouins des troupes de marine sont persuadés qu’ils devront se battre contre les rebelles du FPR, « l’ennemi de quatre ans », diabolisé dans les synthèses de renseignement qu’ils ont pu lire. « On pensait que la rébellion allait nous attaquer, que nous allions devoir aller au feu », confie un jeune commandant. Pour cela, les hommes de « Turquoise » ont emporté un armement lourd qui a inquiété la guérilla, informée au comptegouttes des préparatifs français.

De fait, il y aura des accrochages, mais très peu : « C’est arrivé pendant la première quinzaine de juillet », reconnaît le même officier.

Au retour de sa mission, un autre ancien de « Turquoise », le lieutenantcolonel Jacques Hogard, faisait remarquer que l’essentiel de son activité avait été de « sécuriser » la « zone humanitaire sûre », c’est-à-dire stopper les milices de meurtriers hutus. « Ma mission était claire : faire cesser les massacres et les règlements de compte, par tous les moyens, y compris la force. » « Je pense que la meilleure preuve de notre neutralité, elle est là », lance un autre officier. Il sort deux coupures de presse. Dans la première, un envoyé spécial du Figaro raconte comment, au début de l’opération, les soldats français ont été chaudement accueillis par des miliciens. Ecoeuré, l’un des militaires déclare au reporter : « J’en ai marre d’être acclamé par des assassins. »

Dans la deuxième dépêche, rédigée un mois plus tard, un journaliste du Monde relate les propos d’un soldat rwandais en fuite : « Il y a un mois, on a accueilli les Français avec des fleurs. Maintenant, on le regrette, ils ne nous ont pas aidé contre la rébellion. » Les soldats français n’ont globalement pas porté assistance aux assassins, mais ils ne les ont pas non plus arrêtés. Certains font le procès à l’armée française de cette passivité. « Encore une fois, ce n’était pas notre mission », explique un officier.

Pour rétablir un semblant d’ordre, les militaires français ont dû commencer par s’appuyer sur les autorités en place. « Je suis allé voir le préfet de Cyangugu pour lui ordonner d’user de son influence afin de calmer les extrémistes, raconte un officier. Il m’a traité de néo-colonialiste. Je lui ai répondu : « Prenez-le comme vous voulez, mais arrêtez vos c... ! ». » Par la suite, les officiers français se sont attachés à promouvoir des personnalités locales modérées. « Quant à enquêter sérieusement pour réunir des preuves sur les massacres, nous n’en avions pas les moyens, remarque l’un de ces militaires, il aurait fallu une opération d’une bien plus grande envergure.

15 000 vies sauvées Comparé aux 800 000 morts du génocide, le bilan de Turquoise paraît maigre. Pourtant, lorsqu’ils se retirent fin août, les soldats ont sauvé au moins 15 000 vies : celles des Tutsis réfugiés dans les camps protégés par l’armée française. Soupir d’un colonel : Nous en aurions sauvé des dizaines de milliers d’autres, si nous étions restés après Amaryllis .

Amaryllis. Ce nom de code est toujours en travers de la gorge de nombreux militaires. Il désigne l’opération d’évacuation des ressortissants français menée trois jours après l’attentat du 6 avril 1994 contre l’avion du président Habyarimana. Entre le 9 et le 12 avril, de jeunes parachutistes ont été forcés d’assister, passifs, au massacre de Tutsis débarqués par les miliciens des convois escortés par les unités françaises. C’étaient les ordres et ils n’étaient pas beaux. Faire le tri, parmi le personnel de l’ambassade de France, entre Hutus et Tutsis, est-ce digne d’un pays comme le nôtre ? , s’insurge un officier indigné : Et dire que, dans le même temps, on exfiltrait des dignitaires extrémistes du régime.