Labor Law Review - case Digest | Designed by Hannah Tome

LABOR LAW

REVIEW 2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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SOCIAL JUSTICE

ARLENE A. CUARTOCRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. ACTIVE WORKS, INC. G.R. NO. 209072 JULY 24, 2019 PANASONIC MANUFACTURING PHILIPPINES CORPORATION VS. JOHN PECKSON G.R.NO. 206316 MARCH 20, 2019

MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE

TELEPHILIPPINES, INC. VS.FERRANDO H.JACOLBE, G.R. NO. 233999 FEBRUARY 18, 2019

ISABELA-I ELECTRIC COOP., INC., VS. VICENTE B. DEL ROSARIO, JR., G.R. NO. 226369 JULY 17, 2019

TEST EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP ARNULFO M. FERNANDEZ G.R. NO. 225075 JUNE 19, 2019

VS. KALOOKAN SLAUGHTERHOUSE

ARNULFO M. FERNANDEZ G.R. NO. 225075 JUNE 19, 2019

VS. KALOOKAN SLAUGHTERHOUSE

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND ENTITLED TO HIS MONEY CLAIMS

TWIN REQUISITE OF VALID DISMISSAL

INOCENTES, ET. AL, VS.R. SYJUCO CONSTRUCTION, INC. (RSCI) / ARCH. RYAN I. SYJUCO, G.R. NO. 237020, JULY 29, 2019 EREN VILLANUEVA, VS. GANCO RESORT AND RECREATION, INC., G.R. NO. 227175, JANUARY 8, 2020

LOSS OF CONFIDENCE AS GROUND FOR VALID DISMISSAL

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY VS. MAXIMO C. MAMARIL ET AL. G.R. NO. 225725 JANUARY 16, 2019 RAMIRO LIM & SONS AGRICULTURAL CO, VS. ARMANDO GUILARAN ET AL G.R. NO. 221967 FEBRUARY 06, 2019

VALID EMPLOYER POLICY 1. TELEPHILIPPINES, INC., V. JACOLBE, G.R. NO. 233999, FEBRUARY 18, 2019

2. DE LEON VS PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC. (PTC) G.R. NO. 232194 JUNE 19, 2019 3. THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA VS LILIAN SIO G.R. NO. 217896 JUNE 26, 2019

LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS

JAIME MONTEALEGRE AND CHAMON’TÉ INC. VS SPOUSES ABRAHAM AND REMEDIOS DE VERA GR 208920 JULY 10, 2019

QUITCLAIMS AND WAIVERS

CAROLINA’S LACE SHOPPE, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MAQUILAN, ET AL., G.R. 219419, 4/10, 2019

COMMISSION AS PART OF WAGE

EDITHA SALINDONG AGAYAN VS. KITAL PHILIPPINES CORP., ET AL. G. R. NO. 229703.

DECEMBER 4, 2019

BURDEN OF PROOF; PAYMENT OF STATUTORY ENTITLEMENTS PACIFIC METALS CO., LTD. VS. EDGAR ALLAN TAMAYO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 226920.

DECEMBER 5, 2019

NON- DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS

AUTOMATIC APPLIANCES, INC., SAMSON F. LIM, ET AL. VS. FRANCIA B. DEGUIDOY G.R. NO. 228088.

DECEMBER 4, 2019

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SOCIAL JUSTICE ARLENE A. CUARTOCRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. ACTIVE WORKS, INC. G.R. NO. 209072 JULY 24, 2019

DOCTRINE: We reiterate that any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy espoused by the Constitution. Moreover, the proviso in Section 10, Republic Act No. (RA) 8042 which prescribes the award of "salaries for the unexpired portion of [the] employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" to illegally-dismissed overseas workers has been declared unconstitutional by the Court as early as 2009, and thus should no longer be a source of confusion by litigants and the courts.

FACTS:

ISSUES:

Arlene A. Cuartocruz and Cheng Chi Ho, a Hong Kong national, entered into a contract of employment whereby petitioner shall work as the latter's domestic helper for a period of two years. Petitioner was tasked to do household chores and baby-sitting, among others, for a monthly salary of HK$3,400.00 and other emoluments and benefits provided under the contract. Respondent Active Works, Inc. (AWI), a Philippine corporation engaged in the recruitment of domestic helpers in Hong Kong, is petitioner's agency. Petitioner received a warning letter from her employer, stating that she is required to improve her attentiveness in performing her work within one month, failing which the letter shall serve as a written notice of the termination of her employment contract effective. On the same day, petitioner wrote a reply, apologizing for giving false information by stating in her bio-data that she is single when in fact she is a single parent. She also asked for a chance to improve so she can continue with her work.8 However, 7 days after the warning letter, Cheng Chi Ho informed the Immigration Department of Wangchai, Hong Kong that he is terminating the contract with petitioner effective immediately for the following reasons: "disobey order, unmatch the contract which she submit before and refuse to care my baby. Petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) for illegal dismissal, payment of unpaid salaries and salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract of employment, reimbursement of placement fee and other fees incident to petitioner's deployment to Hong Kong, and moral and exemplary damages. The Executive LA (ELA) rendered a decision finding the termination of petitioner's employment contract without notice as valid and legal. Upon appeal the NLRC issued a Resolution nullifying and setting aside the ELA Decision. The CA rendered its Decision affirming with modification the NLRC Resolution

Whether petitioner was dismissed without a just and valid cause.

RULING: Under Philippine law, workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before the termination of their employment. They may not be removed from employment without a valid or just cause as determined by law, and without going through the proper procedure. In this case, respondents failed to prove by substantial evidence that there was just or authorized cause for the termination of petitioner's employment. There was no showing of particular instances when petitioner supposedly disobeyed her employer and refused to take care of his baby. With respect to petitioner's alleged misrepresentation that she was single when in fact she was a single parent, there is also no showing how this affected her work as a domestic helper. In fact, being a mother herself puts petitioner in a better position to care for her employer's child. Where there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. Petitioner was likewise not afforded procedural due process. The termination letter expressed concerns that petitioner claimed she had never been confronted with. She was left in the dark as regards the real reason for the termination of her employment, and was not given sufficient opportunity to rectify her shortcomings or explainherside. Equally repulsive is the fact that petitioner's employer did not furnish her a copy of the termination letter which was submitted to the Immigration Department of Wanchai, Hong Kong. The provisions in the employment contract and the employer's conduct are patently inconsistent with the right of security of tenure guaranteed to local or overseas Filipino workers under the Constitution and the Labor Code.

PANASONIC MANUFACTURING PHILIPPINES CORPORATION VS. JOHN PECKSON G.R.NO. 206316 MARCH 20, 2019

DOCTRINE:

2

While the rights of the workers, as with all human rights, must be protected, the law does not authorize the oppression or selfdestruction of the employer. The constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice cannot be understood to mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor especially when the antecedent facts indicate the lack of malfeasance on the part of the management.

RULING: The petition is meritorious. Peckson's resignation was voluntary and, thus, Panasonic is not guilty of constructive dismissal. It is a fundamental rule that when an employer interposes the defense of resignation, on him necessarily rests the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned. The very contents of the letters show not only any lack of reluctance or tension on the part of Peckson, but in fact express gratitude and well wishes, without qualification, nor do they show any sign of aggression, bitterness, or hostility towards his former employer. In Bilbao v. Saudi Arabian Airlines. the Court found as voluntary the resignation of the complainant, whose clear use of words of appreciation and gratitude negated the notion that she was forced and coerced to resign. Likewise, the Court held in Rodriguez v. Park N Ride Inc., that the petitioner-employee voluntarily resigned as evidenced in part by her submission of two resignation letters containing words of gratitude. While the rights of the workers, as with all human rights, must be protected, the law does not authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer.

The constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice cannot be understood to mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor especially when the antecedent facts indicate the lack of malfeasance on the part of the management. In this case, Peckson was not able to overcome this burden to prove that his resignation was involuntary. Nor was he able to properly assail with his own evidence Panasonic's proof that he left of his own accord.

FACTS: Peckson was formerly employed as a Sales Supervisor for the Battery Department of petitioner Panasonic Manufacturing Philippines Corporation. The legal controversy started Peckson expressed his intention to resign effective on October 30, 2003.In a subsequent letter dated September 25, 2003, Peckson informed Panasonic that he wished to change the effectivity of his resignation instead to October 15, 2003. Then Peckson filed a complaint for constructive dismissal with the NLRC, with claims for payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement with full backwages, non-payment of 13th month pay and other benefits, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against Panasonic and Jose De Jesus (De Jesus) in the latter's personal capacity as Manager of Peckson's former Battery Sales Department. In the complaint, Peckson alleged that he was forced to resign by De Jesus after the latter accused him of falsifying De Jesus' signature in an "Authority to Travel" form. LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, ruling that Peckson's resignation was a voluntary act.

ISSUE: Whether or not Peckson's resignation was voluntary, and if so, whether or not Panasonic and De Jesus are guilty of constructive dismissal.

MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE TELEPHILIPPINES, INC. VS. FERRANDO H.JACOLBE, G.R. NO. 233999 FEBRUARY 18, 2019 DOCTRINE: While security of tenure is indeed constitutionally guaranteed, this should not be indiscriminately invoked to deprive an employer of its management prerogatives and right to shield itself from incompetence, inefficiency, and disobedience displayed by its employees, as the Court finds in this case.

FACTS TP hired Jacolbe as a CSR tasked to resolve customer's questions and issues promptly and efficiently, among others, in accordance with set performance standards and protocol. For TP to properly assess his work performance, Jacolbe was required to meet the key performance metric targets of, among others, an Average Handle Time (AHT) of 7.0 minutes or below.

Jacolbe's supervisor, Mr. Philip Charles Go, issued an Incident Report for failure of Jacolbe to hit the 7-minute AHT goal agreed upon for the 3rd week of January while he was under TP's Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). Subsequently, TP's Human Resources Department sent Jacolbe a letter informing him of its receipt of the Incident Report and further stating that his "work performance for the last 6 months is unsatisfactory due to his consistent failure to meet the AHT Goal in spite of being enrolled in its PIP which, if proven true, would constitute as an offense against its code of conduct warranting the termination of his employment. Jacolbe submitted letter explanation.

Unsatisfied with his explanations, TP issued Jacolbe a Letter dismissing him from work for failure to meet account specific performance metrics or certification requirements under Section V.B.4 of its Code of Conduct and Zero Tolerance Policy.

Aggrieved, Jacolbe filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims against TP. The LA found Jacolbe to have been illegally dismissed and held that Jacolbe's failure to meet the 7minute AHT mark in two (2) instances could hardly be considered as habitual and gross neglect of duties that would warrant his dismissal, especially since Jacolbe was awarded as Top Agent in December 2012. The NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling and held Jacolbe's dismissal valid. The CA set aside the NLRC ruling and ordered TP to reinstate Jacolbe or pay him separation pay in lieu thereof, as well as full backwages, inclusive of allowances, 13th month pay, salary differentials, holiday and rest day premium pays, as well as service incentive leaves.

ISSUE: Whether or not Peckson's resignation was voluntary, and if so, whether or not Panasonic and De Jesus are guilty of constructive dismissal.

RULING:

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Yes. A valid dismissal necessitates compliance with both substantive and procedural due process requirements.

Substantive due process mandates that an employee may be dismissed based only on just or authorized causes under Articles 297, 298, and 299 of the Labor Code. On the other hand, procedural due process requires the employer to comply with the requirements of notice and hearing before effecting the dismissal. In all cases involving termination of employment, the burden of proving the existence of the above valid causes rests upon the employer. In this relation, jurisprudence instructs that gross inefficiency is analogous to gross and habitual neglect of duty under Article 297 (e) in relation to Article 297 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, for both involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the employer or to his business, andconstituting, therefore, just cause to dismiss an employee. In this case, records reveal that Jacolbe's AHT scores for 62 consecutive weeks, or from January 2012 up to his dismissal in March 2013, were well above the 7 minutes or lower AHT mark. As he had been having difficulty meeting the same, TP allowed him to continue in its employ and even enrolled him in its SMART Action and Performance Improvement Plans twice – in July to August 2012 and again in January 2013 – to help him improve his AHT scores. This notwithstanding, Jacolbe's AHT scores remained well above the 7-minute AHT mark. Undoubtedly, Jacolbe's repeated and consistent failure to meet the prescribed AHT mark over a prolonged period of time falls squarely under the concept of gross inefficiency and is analogous to gross and habitual neglect of duty under Article 297 of the Labor Code which justified his dismissal. The Court finds ample evidence to support the findings of the NLRC that Jacolbe's dismissal was valid. Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in substituting its own judgment with that of the NLRC. While security of tenure is indeed constitutionally guaranteed, this should not be indiscriminately invoked to deprive an employer of its management prerogatives and right to shield itself from incompetence, inefficiency, and disobedience displayed by its employees, as the Court finds in this case.

ISABELA-I ELECTRIC COOP., INC., VS. VICENTE B. DEL ROSARIO, JR., G.R. NO. 226369 JULY 17, 2019

ISSUE:

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Whether the respondent was constructively dismissed when he got appointed to the new position of Area Operations Management Department Manager in lieu of his former position as Management Internal Auditor?

DOCTRINE:

RULING:

We have always recognized and respected certain rights and privileges of employers and would not, when law and judgment dictate, interfere with its business decisions. Management rights and prerogatives, however, are not absolute. On numerous occasions, We have come forward to temper the unbridled exercise of these rights and prerogatives.

YES. In Philippine Industrial Security Agency Corporation vs.

Percival Aguinaldo, We held that the "Court is fully aware of the right of management to transfer its employees as part of management prerogative. But like all rights, the same cannot be exercised with unbridled discretion. The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic element of justice and fair play. The Court then emphasized: While it is true that an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, layoff of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers (San Miguel Brewery Sales vs. Ople, G.R. No. 53515, February 8, 1989), and this right to transfer employees forms part of management prerogatives, the employee's transfer should not be unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to him. It should not involve a demotion in rank or diminution of his salaries, benefits and other privileges, as to constitute constructive dismissal. Here, the NLRC and Court of Appeals correctly ruled that respondent was demoted without sufficient cause. Demotion involves a situation in which an employee is relegated to a subordinate or less important position constituting a reduction to a lower grade or rank, with a corresponding decrease in duties and responsibilities, and usually accompanied by a decrease in salary.39 This was exactly what happened to respondent.

FACTS: Isabela-I Electric Cooperative, Inc. hired respondent Vicente B. Del Rosario, Jr. as Financial Assistant. The latter quickly rose from the ranks. After just three (3) months, on April 26, 1996, he got promoted as Acting Management Internal Auditor and on October 26, 1996, as Management Internal Auditor at petitioner's main office.5In January 2011, petitioner approved a reorganization plan declaring all positions in the company vacant. Respondent, along with other employees signed a Manifesto to oppose the reorganization. Despite this opposition, petitioner proceeded to implement the reorganization in June 2011.While on vacation leave in October 2012, respondent received two (2) letters from petitioner. The first referred to his appointment as probationary Area Operations Manager. The second contained four (4) office memoranda which (a) indicated his area of assignment; (b) ordered him to cease acting as petitioner's management internal auditor; (c) directed him to turn over his current post and pertinent documents to his successor; and (d) appointed his subordinate Arlene B. Boy as officer-in-charge of the Auditing Department.11 Although respondent had issues about this new appointment, including the fact that his successor was not even a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) as he was the only CPA among petitioner's employees, he begrudgingly accepted his appointment.Three (3) months later, respondent sent a letter to petitioner voicing out his concern that the new position given him was a demotion. In the same letter he requested to be reinstated to his former position, especially since he was the only CPA among petitioner's employees. Petitioner, however, did not act on his letter.Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages. He claimed he was unlawfully demoted and was therefore constructively dismissed. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision It held that petitioner did not present any justifiable reason for not reappointing respondent to his former position, nor did it deny that respondent was the only licensed CPA among its employees. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s decision.

TEST EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYEREMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP ARNULFO M. FERNANDEZ VS. KALOOKAN SLAUGHTERHOUSE G.R. NO. 225075 JUNE 19, 2019 FACTS: According to petitioner, he was hired in 1994 as a butcher by Kalookan Slaughterhouse, Inc. He claimed that he worked from Monday to Sunday, from 6:30P.M. to 7:30A.M., with a daily wage of P700.00, which was later reduced to P500.00. He further claimed that he met an accident while driving Kalookan Slaughterhouse's truck in December 2013 and that deductions were made from his wages. He questioned these deductions in July 2014, and thereafter he was treated unreasonably. The next day, however, he was shocked when he only received P200.00 due to his previous undertime and was informed that he could no longer report for work due to hisoldage.Kalookan Slaughterhouse, on the other hand, asserted that petitioner is an independent butcher working under its Operation Supervisor, Cirilo Tablit. Kalookan Slaughterhouse alleged that it imposed policies on the entry to the premises, which applied to employees, dealers, independent butchers, hog and meat dealers and trainees. According to Kalookan Slaughterhouse, petitioner violated the policies and he misconstrued the disallowance to enter the slaughterhouse as an act of dismissal. Petitioner filed the complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA. The LA ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed. The NLRC ruled that although there was a semblance of employer-employee relationship as the work of a butcher is necessary and desirable in the usual trade and business of a slaughterhouse, the facts and circumstances in this case showed that there was no employer-employee relationship. The CA ruled that petitioner's claim of the existence of an employer employee relationship is not supported by substantial evidence as he failed to submit salary vouchers, pay slips, daily work schedule and even a certificate of withholding tax on compensation income.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an employer -employee relationship between petitioner and respondent.

RULING:

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YES, It is settled that to determine the existence of an employer -employee relationship, four elements generally need to be considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct. These elements or indicators comprise the so-called 'four-fold' test of the employment relationship. The Court finds that the NLRC and the CA committed a grave error and agrees with the LA. The totality of petitioner's evidence and the admissions of Kalookan Slaughterhouse convince the Court that petitioner was indeed an employee of Kalookan Slaughterhouse.

Petitioner was able to present an ID., gate passes, log sheets, and a trip ticket.

Kalookan Slaughterhouse even admitted through De Guzman that uniforms were given to all personnel, including [etitioner. While Tablit claimed to be petitioner's employer, he also admitted that he did not exercise any control over the means and methods of petitioner in rendering butchering services. If he was indeed the petitioner's employer, he should have control over the petitioner's means and methods for doing his job. It, however, appears on record that De Guzman, who is also an employee of Kalookan Slaughterhouse, was the one who exercised control over petitioner's means and methods as he reprimanded petitioner for his failure to properly store his butchering knives, coming to Kalookan Slaughterhouse with dirty clothes, reporting for work drunk, and not having an I.D. before going to the slaughterhouse.All the foregoing show that Kalookan Slaughterhouse through Tablit, was the one who engaged petitioner, paid for his salaries and in effect had the power to dismiss him. Further, Kalookan Slaughterhouse exercised control over petitioner's conduct through De Guzman. To the mind of the Court, Kalookan Slaughterhouse was petitioner's employer and it exercised its rights as an employer through Tablit and De Guzman, who were its employees.

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND ENTITLED TO HIS MONEY CLAIMS

ARNULFO M. FERNANDEZ VS. KALOOKAN SLAUGHTERHOUSE G.R. NO. 225075 JUNE 19, 2019 FACTS: Petitioner claims that on July 22, 2014, he was callously informed that he could no longer report for work because of his old age.53 Kalookan Slaughterhouse, however, claims that the petitioner was not dismissed but was only barred from entering as he failed to comply with the "No I.D., No Entry" Policy and the "No Uniform, No Entry" Policy.54The LA ruled that the petitioner's allegation of dismissal was unrebutted as De Guzman only attested to several instances where the petitioner was reprimanded for his failure to comply with the slaughterhouse's policy.55 For the LA, De Guzman did not state that on July 22, 2014, he had barred the petitioner from entering for his failure to comply with the policies.56The NLRC believed Kalookan Slaughterhouse that petitioner was not allowed to enter since he failed to comply with the slaughterhouse's policy.57 The CA did not discuss the issue of dismissal as it ruled that the petitioner was not an employee of Kalookan Slaughterhouse.58 The Court finds that the LA was correct in ruling that the petitioner was illegally dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed and entitled for his money claims?

RULING: Yes. The LA thus found that the petitioner was illegally dismissed when he was told on July 22, 2014, that he could no longer work due to his old age. For the LA, this was not a just or valid cause to terminate petitioner's employment and it was an arbitrary and whimsical act of Kalookan Slaughterhouse.23 Given the foregoing, petitioner was entitled to back wages and separation pay. Petitioner was also entitled to service incentive leave pay, 13th-month pay, and night shift differential pay as Kalookan Slaughterhouse failed to prove that petitioner was paid the foregoing.24

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TWIN REQUISITE OF VALID DISMISSAL INOCENTES, ET. AL, VS.R. SYJUCO CONSTRUCTION, INC. (RSCI) / ARCH. RYAN I. SYJUCO, G.R. NO. 237020, JULY 29, 2019

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EREN VILLANUEVA, VS. GANCO RESORT AND RECREATION, INC., G.R. NO. 227175, 01/08/2020 DOCTRINE:

Valid termination presupposes observance of substantive and procedural due process. There is compliance with substantive due process when employees are dismissed based on just causes, while procedural due process presumes notice and hearing.

The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee.

The offenses committed by petitioner should not be taken singly and separately. A valid dismissal necessitates compliance with both substantive and procedural due process requirements.

FACTS:

FACTS:

DOCTRINE:

Petitioners alleged that on separate dates in September 2015, Reymark (September 9), Jeffrey (September 19), Joseph and Dominic (September 24) went to work but they were denied entry at the Jobsite. The security guard instead informed them that they were already terminated. Petitioners insisted that they asked for reconsideration but only to be told to leave the premises. Hence, they filed a case for constructive dismissal and money claims against respondents. Respondents contended RSCI was just a construction company generally engaged in repair or renovation. They added that a few days or months after a repair or renovation project, they would inform the employees that they would be just called upon when a new project commences but for the time being, they could work or offer their services to other companies. They maintained that on the dates that petitioners were allegedly dismissed, petitioners were waiting for new project assignments. Respondents stressed that petitioners were not terminated but that they (petitioners) were the ones who declared their own dismissal

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid dismissal

RULING: The employees were illegally dismissed. Considering that respondents failed to discharge their burden to prove that petitioners were project employees, the NLRC properly found them to be regular employees. It thus follows that as regular employees, petitioners may only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause and upon the observance of due process of law.

As these requirements were not observed, the Court also sustains the finding of the NLRC that petitioners were illegally dismissed. Even if we rely on the averment of respondents that petitioners ceased to work at the end of their purported project contract, this assertion will not hold water since it is not a valid cause to terminate regular employees. This is in addition to the fact that there was no showing that petitioners were given notice of their termination, an evident violation of their right to due process.

The records of the case show that petitioner was charged with two infractions, i.e., (1) insubordination for her failure to sign the Notice to Transfer and (2) habitual neglect for her absences without leave from March 22 to March 26, 2014, as shown by the two memoranda served on her.The petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims. LA and NLRC ruled the dismissal invalid, while CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee

RULING: Insubordination or willful disobedience requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude"; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Both requirements are not present in this case.Anent the charge of habitual neglect for petitioner's absences without leave, jurisprudence provides that in order to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, the neglect of duties must be both gross and habitual. Petitioner's four-day absence without leave is not gross nor habitual. The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by petitioner should not be taken singly and separately. While it may be true that petitioner was penalized for his previous infractions, this does not and should not mean that his employment record would be wiped clean of his infractions. After all, the record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted out since an employee's past misconduct and present behavior must be taken together in determining the proper imposable penalty. Thus, the dismissal of petitioner, on the basis of the principle of totality of infractions, is justified.

However, there was lapsed in the procedural process, notice and hearing was not properly observed. Thus, the petition is partly granted.

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LOSS OF CONFIDENCE AS GROUND FOR VALID DISMISSAL

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY VS. MAXIMO C. MAMARIL ET AL. G.R. NO. 225725 JANUARY 16, 2019

DOCTRINE: To be a valid ground for dismissal, the loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. Loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. The employer, thus, carries the burden of clearly and convincingly establishing the facts upon which loss of confidence in the employee may be made to rest.

RULING: Mamaril was dismissed without just and valid cause. In dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer to show that the employee was dismissed for a valid and just cause. Here, Lepanto dismissed Mamaril based on loss of trust and confidence. To be a valid ground for dismissal, the loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.

Loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. The employer, thus, carries the burden of clearly and convincingly establishing the facts upon which loss of confidence in the employee may be made to rest.Mamaril’s admission that he did not lock properly the man door before he went on his roving patrol does not also amount to a breach of trust and confidence. Such breach, to be a ground for termination, must be willful. That is, it must be done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.

FACTS: Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company hired Maximo Mamaril as a security guard. He was assigned to the Security Reaction Force (SRF), a group of security guards tasked to do special duties for the company. Lepanto Security Guard Intelligence Operatives apprehended Eliseo Sumibang, Jr., an employee of Lepanto, for stealing skinned copper wires. Mamaril, the guard on duty at that time, was also apprehended since he allegedly conspired with Sumibang. Mamaril claimed that he was on roving patrol when the theft occurred. Mamaril stated that his only fault, if any, was that he forgot to secure the man's door. Padlocking the man door is a standard operating procedure of the company if the man door is not in use. After the investigation, Lepanto dismissed Mamaril from employment for dishonesty and breach of trust and confidence. The Labor Arbiter of the NLRC RAB-CAR ruled in favor of Lepanto. The Labor Arbiter declared that as a security guard in charge of the handling, custody, care, and protection of company property, Mamaril occupied a position of trust and confidence.

Thus, he was terminated for a just cause. With regard to the money claims, the Labor Arbiter declared that Mamaril failed to discharge the burden of proving that they are entitled to such money claims. The NLRC partially granted the appeal and declared that the dismissal of Mamaril from the service was without any valid and just cause. The NLRC likewise ordered Lepanto to pay them overtime pay, holiday pay, and rest day pay.

Lepanto filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. In a Decision dated 21 October 2015, the CA decided in favor of Mamaril et. al.

ISSUES: Whether Mamaril was dismissed by Lepanto without a just and valid cause.

RAMIRO LIM & SONS AGRICULTURAL CO, VS. ARMANDO GUILARAN ET AL G.R. NO. 221967 FEBRUARY 06, 2019 DOCTRINE: To be a valid ground for dismissal, the loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. Loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. The employer, thus, carries the burden of clearly and convincingly establishing the facts upon which loss of confidence in the employee may be made to rest.

FACTS: Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal against petitioners. They alleged that they were agricultural workers of the petitioners, employed to work in all the agricultural stages of work on its 84-hectare hacienda. Respondents also alleged that they were paid on a mixed pakyaw and daily basis. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC dismissed the complaints. In the petition for certiorari filed before the CA, it ruled that since the respondents have been performing services necessary and desirable to the business which are badges of regular employment, even though they did not work throughout the year and the employment depended on a specific season, the CA granted the reinstatement and payment of full backwages based on the latest Wage Order.

In an Order dated 29 March 2010, the Labor Arbiter adopted the computation of the Fiscal Examiner who awarded to respondents their backwages. The award was based on the mandated rates provided by law for the period from 2000 until December 2009, and was limited to six months of work per year, considering that sugarcane farming is not continuous.Petitioners filed a Memorandum of Appeal to the NLRC. They claimed that respondents barely worked, and thus, are not entitled to the computation of six months pay per year.The NLRC annulled and set aside the Order of the Labor Arbiter finding that the computation used was erroneous. The NLRC upheld the validity of the payrolls submitted by petitioners, which showed that as pakyaw workers, respondents did not observe the regular eight hour work daily for the tasks given to them. Based on the voluminous records submitted by the petitioners, the NLRC found that not all of the respondents worked for at least six months in the last six years prior to their dismissal.The Motion for Reconsiderationfiled by respondents was denied by the NLRC. Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the NLRC and reinstated the Order of the Labor Arbiter. The CA disregarded the payrolls presented by petitioners as these payrolls were self-serving, unreliable, and unsubstantial evidence. The inconsistencies in the signatures of respondents were so questionable to the naked eye that the CA found that its genuineness is doubtful.

ISSUES: Whether the entries in the payrolls enjoy the presumption of regularity.

RULING:

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While it is true that entries in the payrolls enjoy the presumption of regularity, it is merely a disputable presumption that may be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Section 43 of Rule 143 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 43.

Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.A presumption is merely an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made based on another fact or group of facts. It is an inference as to the existence of a fact that is not actually known, but arises from its usual connection with another fact, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what the ordinary human affairs take. Moreover, prima facie evidence is defined as evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue it supports, but which may be contradicted by other evidence. Thus, prima facie evidence is not conclusive or absolute evidence to the contrary may be presented by the party disputing the assumption of fact made by inference of law and the court may validly consider such. In this case, we find that the CA did not err when it found that the inconsistencies in the signatures of respondents are so questionable to the naked eye that there exists doubt on their genuineness. After a painstaking scrutiny of the voluminous records, it found inconsistencies in the signatures.Thus, while the payrolls in question enjoyed the presumption of regularity as entries made in the course of business, this presumption of regularity was effectively overthrown by evidence to the contrary.

VALID EMPLOYER POLICY

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prerogative. Jurisprudence instructs that gross inefficiency is analogous to gross and habitual neglect of duty under Article 297 (e) in relation to Article 297 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, for both involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the employer or to his business, and constituting, therefore, just cause to dismiss an employee.

"Gross inefficiency" is closely related to "gross neglect," for both involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the employer or to his business. Hence, the dismissal is valid.

1. TELEPHILIPPINES, INC., V. JACOLBE, G.R. NO. 233999, FEBRUARY 18, 2019

2. DE LEON VS PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC. (PTC) G.R. NO. 232194 JUNE 19, 2019

DOCTRINE:

DOCTRINE:

Management can impose necessary and relevant to the achievement of imposing objectives and a reasonable work standard in the exercise of its management prerogative. Gross inefficiency is closely related to gross neglect, for both involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the employer or to his business, thus a valid requirement for dismissal of employee.

Company’s management prerogatives are upheld so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements.

FACTS:

FACTS: In its petition, TP maintains that the CA erred in declaring Jacolbe's dismissal invalid, ratiocinating that the latter had consistently failed to meet the reasonable company-imposed performance targets, specifically the 7-minute AHT mark, for sixty-two (62) consecutive weeks despite the opportunities and assistance extended to him to improve his performance. It argues that Jacolbe's continued and persistent failure to meet the key performance metrics clearly illustrated gross inefficiency which is analogous to gross and habitual neglect of duties justifying his dismissal. For his part, Jacolbe simply maintains that there was no valid ground for his dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal was valid based on management prerogative.

RULING: The Court observes that the 7-minute AHT metric is not unique to Jacolbe as it is in fact a key performance metric, which measures the effectivity and efficiency of a CSR in handling customer's concerns in each call. It applies to all employees assigned to the Priceline account who, save for a few including Jacolbe, have all been able to meet the same. Along with the other key performance metrics, it was employed by TP to properly and reasonably assess the overall work performance of its employees. Notably, the AHT metric per se is also used by TP for all employees in its other accounts, and is in fact considered an established work performance evaluation metric within the business process outsourcing industry where TP belongs. All told, the 7-minute AHT metric does not appear to be arbitrary and unreasonable. On the contrary, the Court finds it necessary and relevant to the achievement of TP's objectives and a reasonable work standard imposed by TP in the exercise of its management

On January 31, 2005, de Leon began as a Hotel Personnel Planner for the Crewing Department of respondent Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC), a manning agency acting as agent for foreign principals and engaged in the business of send1ng Filipino seafarers on board ocean-going ships or vessels. At the start of his employment, de Leon was given PTC’s oldcompany handbook, De Leon’s first few years with PTC went well, and he was, in fact, promoted to Hotel Personnel Officer in 2008. In December 2010, he was seconded by PTC to First Maritime Shared Services, Inc. (FMSSI), PTC’s offshore processing unit, where he was given the position of “Scheduler.” In 2010, he was served with two written memoranda by the Human Resources Department of PTC regarding a supposed violation of PTC’ s Code of Discipline.In 2012, PTC revised its Code of Discipline, in which it indicated more clearly its prohibition against accepting gifts. On October 9, 2013, she together with another co-employee was caught on CCTV accepting a brown bag from a co-employee to which the next day she was confronted and confirmed that did accept a gift. On November 22, 2013, De Leon received a written resolution terminating her employment.

ISSUE: Whether the termination of Petitioner’s employment is valid and legal.

HELD: Yes. In light of the strict provisions of the POEA Rules, it was reasonable for PTC to protect itself by crafting its Code of Discipline. Thus, as it is recognized that company policies and regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with until finally revised or amended. The Court has, in the past, upheld a company’s management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements. In this case, the Court holds that PTC

was well within its management prerogative in terminating de Leon’s employment upon a finding of a violation of its company rules.By his own admission in the present petition, he instructed Adefuin to give the gift in question to Brillante in the far end of the office, as he knew that there was a CCTV camera in their work area. He thus knew that he was at risk of getting caught doing an act he should not do. Despite this, he still received the gift and did not return the same to Acar or even turned over the same to the Human Resources Department as instructed by the Code of Discipline. This, therefore, constitutes willful misconduct or disobedience of company rules that further justifies PTC’ s decision to terminate de Leon’s employment.

3. THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA VS LILIAN SIO G.R. NO. 217896 JUNE 26, 2019 DOCTRINE: An employer has a free reign and enjoys wide latitude of discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline in its employees and to impose penalties, including dismissal, upon erring employees.

FACTS: Petitioner, The Heritage Hotel Manila (Heritage) employed Lilian Sio (Sio) as a Service Agent on September 1, 1995. She was last assigned at the hotel’s restaurant, Le Cafe. Her tasks included assisting in the serving of food and beverages to Heritage’s guests. In two separate incidents, Sio allegedly exhibited behavior not inimical to the hotel’s image wherein she disrespected, showed discourtesy to guests. Complaints were formally filed before the human resource department of the hotel against Sio and she was heard, later on, penalized for suspension from work with the 2nd penalty indicating a warning that repetition of the same act would warrant dismissal.

Aggrieved by the decision, she filed a complaint before the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP), illegal suspension, and other monetary claims.

ISSUE: Whether Sio’s suspension is valid and legal.

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HELD: Yes. It is axiomatic that appropriate disciplinary sanction is within the purview of management imposition. What should not be overlooked is the prerogative of an employer company to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the proper conduct of its business and to provide certain disciplinary measures in order to implement said rules to assure that the same would be complied with. An employer has free reign and enjoys wide latitude of discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline in its employees and to impose penalties, including dismissal, upon erring employees. Sio’s suspensions were imposed by Heritage not solely on the basis of Bumatay’s report/complaint on the first incident or Mendoza’s complaint on the second incident.

Rather, Sio was allowed to explain in writing, and administrative hearings were conducted to afford her an opportunity to rebut the charges against her. Other witnesses attended the hearing as shown by the minutes of the conference meeting attached to the Petition. The evidence likewise shows that Sio, instead of refuting the charges, apologized to the complainants. In other words, other pieces of evidence were presented by Heritage to prove the validity of Sio’s suspension.

LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS

JAIME MONTEALEGRE AND CHAMON’TÉ INC. VS SPOUSES ABRAHAM AND REMEDIOS DE VERA GR 208920, JULY 10, 2019 DOCTRINE: Although Article 212(e) of the Labor Code defines an “employer” as including any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, the said article by itself does not make a corporate officer personally liable for the debts of the corporation. In the absence of gross negligence, bad faith or a specific provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities.

FACTS: An employee won a complaint for illegal dismissal against his employer-corporation. The labor arbiter (LA) rendered a decision adverse to the corporation, finding it guilty of illegal dismissal and holding it liable to the employee for back wages, separation pay and unpaid salary. When the decision became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued, directing the sheriff to satisfy the decision out of the properties of the corporation and respondent officers (“respondents”). Pursuant to this writ, a parcel of land registered in the name of the respondents was levied upon and sold at a public auction. It was only when petitioners filed a motion to consolidate the title in their names that respondents realized that only the corporation was impleaded in the labor case, hence, they countered that since the property sold at auction does not belong to the judgment debtor, the corporation, but to respondents, who were not impleaded as party-respondents in the case for illegal dismissal, then the execution is void and of no effect. The NLRC rejected the argument, claiming that although as a rule, the officers of a corporation are not personally liable for acts done in performance of their duties, an exceptional circumstance exists in this case, i.e., the corporation is no longer existing and is unable to satisfy the judgment in favor of the employee.

ISSUE: Whether or not the corporate officers are liable to the Corporation’s liability to the EE.

RULING:

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The SC set aside the execution for failure to conform with the terms of the decision. The execution cannot be justified on the ground that the corporation had ceased to exist because the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction is unwarranted in this case. Although Article 212(e) of the Labor Code defines an “employer” as including any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, the said article by itself does not make a corporate officer personally liable for the debts of the corporation. In general, corporations are treated as separate and distinct legal entities from the natural persons composing them.

In the absence of gross negligence, bad faith or a specific provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities.

QUITCLAIMS AND WAIVERS CAROLINA’S LACE SHOPPE, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MAQUILAN, ET AL., G.R. 219419, 4/10, 2019 DOCTRINE: In order to prevent disputes on the validity and enforceability of quitclaims and waivers of employees under the Philippine laws, said agreements should contain the following: 1. A fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement;2. The benefits of the employees if possible with the corresponding amounts, which the employees are giving up in consideration of the fixed compromise amount;3. A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the employee in English, Filipino, or in the dialect known to the employees—that by signing the waiver or quitclaim, they are forfeiting or relinquishing their right to receive the benefits which are due them under the law; and4. A statement that the employees signed and executed the document voluntarily, and had fully understood the contents of the document and that their consent was freely given without any threat, violence, duress, intimidation, or undue influence exerted on their person.

FACTS: 2005, respondent Gloria Maquilan (Gloria) was employed by petitioner Carolina’s Lace Shoppe (CLS) as sales clerk. In April 2008, the Department of Labor and Employment inspected CLS. Upon inspection, one of the latter’s employees, Santiago A. Espultero, told the labor inspector that he was receiving a daily wage of P250. Thereafter, Espultero was dismissed from the service. One month thereafter, Gloria was likewise dismissed for no reason given. Like Espultero, she was made to sign a quitclaim in order to claim her separation pay amounting to P15,000 despite her three years in service. Gloria filed a case for illegal dismissal with money claims and damages against CLS. In defense, CLS averred that Gloria voluntarily executed a quitclaim and that she offered no evidence which depicted that force or fraud was employed in the execution thereof.

ISSUE: Is there merit to this defense?

RULING: No. Admittedly, the quitclaim does not indicate that Gloria received the amount of P15,000 as full and final settlement.

Similarly, there was nothing which indicates that said amount constitutes said full and final settlement. The quitclaim was also couched in general terms and the tenor of the same does not show that Gloria understood the importance of the same considering that on the same day that she resigned; she immediately relieved respondents from their liabilities. There was also no indication that Gloria intends to give up her claimed benefits in consideration of a fixed compromise amount. It must be emphasized that Gloria was constrained to receive the amount of P15,000 as she was eight months pregnant at that time and lives with no other means aside from her employment with CLS.

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COMMISSION AS PART OF WAGE

EDITHA SALINDONG AGAYAN VS. KITAL PHILIPPINES CORP., ET AL. G. R. NO. 229703.

DECEMBER 4, 2019 FACTS: Petitioner was dismissed due to willful disobedience and breach of trust. Petitioner refused to follow Consunji's instruction to provide him with the list of names comprising the RMs (Relations Managers). Moreover, Petitioner had formulated a business concept/plan which appeared to be in conflict with the operations of Kital. Considering that Petitioner was the former Telecommunications Head of Kital, which is a managerial position. As a consequence of her unlawful dismissal, Petitioner alleged that she is entitled to reinstatement, backwages, and other monetary benefits such. as service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. Petitioner further claimed that she is also entitled to several commissions including a PLDT leasing commission that she earned, but had not received. Petitioner submits that she is entitled to the 5% commission on the PLDT leasing/installation that she had obtained on behalf of Kital.

According to her, upon Kital's recovery of expenses, such as cost of sales, and there is already a return of investment, she is entitled to the 5% commission regardless of whether or not there have actually been monthly collections.

ISSUE:

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WON Petitioner is not entitled to the unpaid PLDT Leasing Commission.

HELD: No. Stated in Annex A of petitioner's Employee Contract with Kital are the Employee Benefits. Item No. 6 thereof on Commission reads:

6. Commission P20,000 committed PLDT commission for total minimum monthly collection of PhP1.2Million. If less, the commission will be pro rated based on the amount of the collection.

-New leasing/installation: 5% net profit (after recovering all expenses) x x x Note: Upon closing the deal, the first month commission will be given affront. Then the remaining commission will be after return of investment.

As shown in the above Employee Benefit, the commissions are due upon actual monthly collections. The contract of lease with PLDT is up to 2018. To pay her the 5% commission outright when there is no assurance that it would last until 2018 would not be in consonance with the terms of the Employee Benefit. It is a wrong business judgment to pay the commission outright at the time of sale. Either party may terminate the contract, which indeed happened. Complainant did not refute the respondent claim that the contract was subsequently terminated.There is a NOTE indicated therein that "Upon closing the deal, the first month commission will be given affront. Then the remaining commission will be after return of investment."It is therefore clear that the 5% commission is due monthly or upon payment of the lessee, not outright 5% commission. It is only the first month commission that is paid immediately.

BURDEN OF PROOF; PAYMENT OF STATUTORY ENTITLEMENTS PACIFIC METALS CO., LTD. VS. EDGAR ALLAN TAMAYO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 226920.

DECEMBER 5, 2019 FACTS: Petitioner PAMCO negotiated to enter into an exploration agreement with Eramen Minerals, Inc. (ERAMEN) for the development of a target area covered by the latter's Mineral Production and Sharing Agreement (MPSA). PAMCO engaged the services of respondent Edgar Allan Tamayo, a licensed and registered geologist. Tamayo signed up for a two-month employment contract, commencing on September 2010. In tum, PAMCO agreed to pay Tamayo P90,000.00 per month for his services.

According to PAMCO, Tamayo's two- month engagement was extended for another two (2) months, or until January 31, 2011. On January 17, 2011, PAMCO and ERAMEN entered into an Exploration Agreement wherein Tamayo was designated manager for the ERAMEN/PAMCO Exploration Project. Tamayo was informed that his services as exploration manager was terminated effective December 31, 2011 in view of the completion of the exploration aspect of the project. Tamayo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAMCO and ERAMEN. He prayed for backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

ISSUES: 1. Is Tamayo a regular or project employee?

2. If Tamayo be deemed a regular employee, which between PAMCO and ERAMEN shall be liable to pay his back wages, 13thmonth pay, damages, and attorney's fees?

HELD: 1. Regular employee. Under Article 295 of the Labor Code, one is deemed a regular employee if one: a) had been engaged to perform tasks which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, unless the employment is one for a specific project or undertaking or where the work is seasonal and for the duration of a season; or b) has rendered at least one (1) year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, with respect to the activity for which he is employed and his employment continues as long as such activity exists. In connection with Tamayo's subsequent engagement for the

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ERAMEN/PAMCO Exploration Project, he rendered services therefor from January 2011 until December 2011 when he got terminated due to alleged project completion. It bears stress that it is common practice for employers to set the duration of an employment contract to a period shorter than one year to prevent an employee from attaining regular employment status, conformably with Article 295 of the Labor Code. The termination of Tamayo's employment, therefore, just a few weeks short of his one-year anniversary as an employee is highly suspect. It is not remotely possible that the termination was done to prevent Tamayo from gaining the status of a regular employee.

2. PAMCO is the one liable. Since PAMCO’s business rely on the expertise of a geologist with knowledge of Philippine soil and its rich sources of minerals. The tasks ordinarily performed by a geologist, therefore, are necessary to the business which PAMCO was engaged in. It is, thus, undeniable that Tamayo is a regular employee of PAMCO, for he performs work that is usually necessary and desirable to PAMCO's business.

NON- DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS AUTOMATIC APPLIANCES, INC., SAMSON F. LIM, ET AL. VS. FRANCIA B. DEGUIDOY G.R. NO. 228088.

DECEMBER 4, 2019

DOCTRINE: The management enjoys the discretion to assign and transfer employees to other work stations. The transfer is valid inasmuch as it does not involve a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or benefits, and was carried out in good faith and justified by business exigencies.

FACTS: AAI hired Deguidoy as a regular Sales Coordinator in its Cubao Branch. AAI suffered a decline in its sales and experienced economic difficulties. Consequently, AAI issued a Memorandum informing its employees of their re-shuffling and re-assignment to AAI's various branches. As a result, Deguidoy was re-assigned from the Cubao branch to the Tutuban Branch. She accepted her re-assignment. AAI conducted a review of Deguidoy's records and sales outputs. This led to the discovery that Deguidoy incurred numerous absences and had a low sales output. Deguidoy was placed under one-month suspension. She accepted the suspension and apologized for her faults. Deguido reported back to work. On even date, AAI verbally informed her of an intended transfer to its Ortigas branch. Dismayed, Deguidoy left during her lunch break, and never returned. Hence, AAI sent Deguidoy a letter requiring her to explain her failure to report for work.

Deguidoy ignored the said letter. AAI sent another letter but still, the same was unheeded. Unknown to AAI, Deguidoy filed a case for illegal dismissal with money claims including 13th month pay.

ISSUE: Whether or not Deguidoy was constructively dismissed by AAI

HELD: NO. Jurisprudence holds that the management's decision to transfer an employee shall not be assailed as a form of constructive dismissal in the absence of proof that the reassignment involves a demotion in rank, diminution in pay, or was an act of discrimination or disdain. In the instant case, the intended transfer did not involve a demotion in rank or diminution in pay, salaries and benefits. Deguidoy was simply asked to transfer to a different location were she will be occupying the same position and performing the same functions.

Equally important, the decision to transfer Deguidoy came after a painstaking evaluation of her performance at the Tutuban branch. It becomes all too apparent that AAI's decision to transfer Deguidoy to the Ortigas branch was triggered by the need to streamline its operations. The Tutuban branch needed manpower, whose functions Deguidoy could not fulfill.

Meanwhile, the Ortigas branch was frequented by lesser customers, and was in need of additional personnel, for which Deguidoy could adequately respond. In fact, the re-assignment was viewed as a means to aid her increase her sales target.

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