Criminal Procedure Ebook

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE RULE RULE RULE RULE

GUIDE: 126 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 113 ARREST 114 BAIL 112 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

PIATRICE MARIE DE LA CRUZ JR RIETA PALATTAO VLADIMIR PATI COLEN RAZON CARL RYAN DAVID SIMANGAN RONA LULU TALAUE

CASES: YEAR 2017-2020

RULE 126

(SEARCH AND SEIZURE)

RULE 113 (ARREST)

1

MARTIN VILLAMOR AND VICTOR BONAOBRA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 200396 MARCH 22, 2017

2

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RENANTE COMPRADO FBRONOLA G.R. NO. 213225 APRIL 04, 2018

3

MARCELO G. SALUDAY VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 215305 APRIL 3, 2018

4

LARRY SABUCO MANIBOG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 211214 MARCH 20, 2019

5

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JERRY SAPLA A.K.A. ERIC MALLARI SALIBAD G.R. NO. 244045 JUNE 16, 2020

6

7 8

RULE 114 (BAIL)

9 10 11

RULE 112

(PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION)

12 13 14 15

LACASTE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR NO 199018 SEPTEMBER 27,2017 SAPI V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR NO 200370 JUNE 07, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FBRONOLA GR NO 213225 APRIL 4,2018 AGPAD V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR NO 227366 AUGUST 1,2018 MAHIPUS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR NO 210731 FEBRUARY 13, 2019 PEOPLE VS ESCOBAR G.R. NO. 214300' JULY 26, 2017 GENUINO V DE LIMA G.R. NO. 197930 APRIL 17, 2018

TEJANO V MARIGOMEN A.M. NO. RTJ-17-2492 SEPTEMBER 26, 2017 PEOPLE V NOVO TANES Y BELMONTE G.R. NO. 240596 APRIL 3, 2019 RECTO V PEOPLE G.R. NO. 236461 DECEMBER 5, 2018 STEVEN R. PAVLOW VS. CHERRY L. MENDENILLA GR NO. 181489 APRIL 19,2017

EDWIN GRANADA REYES VS. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GR NO. 208243 JUNES 5, 2017

PRESCILLA Z. ORBE VS. LEONORA O. MIARAL GR NO. 217777 AUGUST 16, 2017

GIRLIE M. QUISAY V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. R. NO. 216920 JANUARY 13, 2016 ABS CBN V. GOZON GR. NO 195956 MARCH 11, 2015

RULE 126 (SEARCH AND SEIZURE) CASE DOCTRINE MARTIN VILLAMOR AND VICTOR BONAOBRA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 200396 MARCH 22, 2017 The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the authority to barge into private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant.

FACTS On June 17, 2005, PD Peñaflor received a call from an informant regarding an ongoing illegal numbers game at the residence of Bonaobra. A team composed of PD Peñaflor, Saraspi, PO1 Rolando Ami, a driver, and a civilian asset proceeded to Bonaobra's residence to confirm the report.Upon arrival at the target area, the team parked their service vehicle outside the compound fenced by bamboo slats installed two inches apart which allowed them to see the goings on inside. According to the police officers, they saw petitioners in the act of counting bets, described by the Bicol term "revisar," which means collating and examining numbers placed in "papelitos," which are slips of paper containing bet numbers, and counting money bets. When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced themselves as police officers and confiscated the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting to P1,500.00 in different denominations, the "papelitos," a calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen. Petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco Camacho where they were investigated for illegal gambling.

Subsequently, a case was filed against the petitioners before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The RTC rendered its Judgment finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing illegal numbers game locally known as ''lotteng” a variant of the game Last Two, respectively as a collector or agent under Section 3(c), and as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287. The CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION BE UPHELD?

ISSUE AND RULING

01

No. The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said right.

Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a criminal activity was ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental to a warrantless arrest thereafter. It appears that the police officers acted based solely on the information received from PD Peñaflor's informant and not on personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed, was actually being committed, or was about to be committed in their presence. The Court finds it doubtful that the police officers witnessed any overt act before entering the private home of Bonaobra immediately preceding the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted that from his position outside the compound, he could not read the contents of the so-called "papelitos;" yet, upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers and money on the table, he readily concluded the same to be gambling paraphernalias.

Thus, the evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound is inadmissible in evidence since it was obtained in violation of Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court acquits petitioners.

CASE DOCTRINE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RENANTE COMPRADO FBRONOLA G.R. NO. 213225 APRIL 04, 2018

Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains an item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.

FACT

ISSUE AND RULING 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS VALID? No. The search in this case could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person. Further, in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally was used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so happened that the alleged drug courier was a bus passenger. To extend to such breadth the scope of searches on moving vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target person. The search in the instant case cannot be considered as search of a moving vehicle and is therefore invalid.

2. WHETHER THE SEIZED ITEMS ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE? Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

Without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict accused-appellant. Thus, an acquittal is warranted.

02

CASE DOCTRINE MARCELO G. SALUDAY VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 215305 APRIL 3, 2018 The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. Other factors such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity may diminish this expectation. To emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a warrantless search, on the other, are mutually exclusive. While both State intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the underlying reasons for the absence of a warrant are different. A reasonable search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application. Examples include searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar public ·places. In contrast, a warrantless search is presumably an "unreasonable search," but for reasons of practicality, a search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view, consented search, and extensive search of a private moving vehicle.

FACTS On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. A member of the Task Force, requested all male passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its small size.

SCAA Buco then looked at the male passengers lined outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later identified as petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards the direction of the bag. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco. Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the Office of the City Prosecutor for Davao City.

ISSUE AND RULING WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH WAS VALID? Yes. The bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. In this case, the authorities merely conducted a “visual and minimally intrusive inspection” of the accused’s bag by simply lifting the bag that noticeably appeared to have contained firearms. Also, the authorities relied on their own senses that a firearm was inside, as well as having seen the very suspicious looks being given by the accused therein. Further, the Court laid down the following conditions in allowing a reasonable search of bus while in transit: (1) the manner of the search must be least intrusive; (2) the search must not be discriminatory; (3) as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety; and (4) the courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused. Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant.

03

CASE DOCTRINE LARRY SABUCO MANIBOG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 211214 MARCH 20, 2019 For a "stop and frisk" search to be valid, the totality of suspicious circumstances, as personally observed by the arresting officer, must lead to a genuine reason to suspect that a person is committing an illicit act.

Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based on this constitutes an infringement of a person's basic right to privacy.

FACTS In the morning of March 17, 2010, Chief Inspector Beniat received information from a police asset that Manibog was standing outside the Municipal Tourism Office of Dingras, Ilocos Norte with a gun tucked in his waistband. To verify this information, Chief Inspector Beniat immediately organized a team.

Together, they proceeded to the Municipal Tourism Office located around 20 meters from the police station. About five to eight meters away from the Municipal Tourism Office, Chief Inspector Beniat saw Manibog standing outside the building. The team slowly approached him for fear that he might fight back. As he moved closer, Beniat saw a bulge on Manibog's waist, which the police officer deduced to be a gun due to its distinct contour. Chief Inspector Beniat went up to Manibog, patted the bulging object on his waist, and confirmed that there was a gun tucked in Manibog's waistband. He disarmed Manibog of the .45 caliber handgun inside a holster, after which he arrested him for violating the election gun ban and brought him to the police station for an inquest proceeding. Regional Trial Court found Manibog guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the election offense with which he was charged. It ruled that the warrantless search on Manibog was incidental to a lawful arrest because there was probable cause for the police officers to frisk and arrest him accused LARRY MANIBOG y SABUCO is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the election offense of violation of Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 in relation to Comelec Resolution No. 8714 The CA Affirmed RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE AND RULING WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH WAS VALID? Yes. In the present case, the policemen searched the accused not only because of a tip - a very specific one - that he was at that moment standing in front of the nearby Municipal Tourism Office with a gun on his waist. More importantly, PCI Beniat testified that at a distance of about two to three meters from the accused, he saw the latter's bulging waistline indicating the "distinct peculiar contour" of a firearm tucked on his waist. Citing his experience as a police officer, PCI Beniat testified that he could distinguish a firearm from any other object tucked on the waist of a person.The tip on petitioner, coupled with the police officers' visual confirmation that petitioner had a gun-shaped object tucked in his waistband, led to a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun ban.

However, a reasonable suspicion is not synonymous with the personal knowledge required under Section 5(a) and (b) to effect a valid warrantless arrest. Nonetheless, the combination of the police asset's tip and the arresting officers' observation of a gun-shaped object under petitioner's shirt already suffices as a genuine reason for the arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk search on petitioner.

04

FACTS Sapla was a jeepney passenger who was arrested at a police checkpoint. The Regional Public Safety Battalion in Tabuk claimed it received an anonymous phone call that a certain male individual will be transporting marijuana from Kalinga to the province of Isabela. On that same afternoon, the RPSB hotline received a text message that a man wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap on board a passenger jeepney, with plate no. AYA 270 would be transporting marijuana in a blue sack bound for Roxas, Isabela. A joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command post. The police officers flagged down the said vehicle on a checkpoint and saw accused Sapla seated at the rear side of the vehicle. The police officers asked Sapla if he was the owner of the blue sack in front of him, which the latter affirmed. The police officers asked him to open the blue sack and saw 4 bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar. In his defense, Sapla denied that he carried any baggage when he boarded the jeepney to go to Roxas, Isabela. He said the police officers found the marijuana in a sack among the baggage of the passengers and chose to arrest him from among three male passengers who wore fatigue pants.The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the corpus delicti of the crime hence charged Sapla guilty for violating section 5 of RA 9165.The CA affirmed RTC’s ruling. The CA found that although the search and seizure conducted on Sapla was without serach warrant, the same was lawful as it was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle. The CA held that the essential requisite of a probable cause was present, justifying the warrantless search and seizure.

CASE DOCTRINE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JERRY SAPLA A.K.A. ERIC MALLARI SALIBAD G.R. NO. 244045 JUNE 16, 2020 “Does the mere reception of a text message from an anonymous person suffice to create probable cause that enables the authorities to conduct an extensive and intrusive search without a search warrant? The answer is a resounding no,” SC said, adding that a tip is considered hearsay “no matter how reliable it may be.”The supreme Court said that, while the court recognizes the necessity of adopting a decisive stance against the scourge of illegal drugs, the eradication of illegal drugs in our society cannot be achieved by subverting the people’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.“The Constitution does not allow the end to justify the means. Otherwise, in eradicating one societal disease, a deadlier and more sinister one is cultivated — the trampling of the people’s fundamental, inalienable rights,” it added.

ISSUE AND RULING WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH WAS VALID? No. In finding the warrantless search invalid, the Court held that the accused was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious. Surely, probable cause justifying an intrusive warrantless search and seizure cannot possible arise from double hearsay evidence and from an irregularlyreceived tipped information. A reasonably discreet and prudent man will surely not believe that an offense has been committed and that the item sought in connection with said offense are in the place to be searched based solely on the sayso of an unknown duty guard that a random, unverified text message was sent to an unofficial mobile phone by a complete stranger. Therefore, with the glaring absence of probable cause that justifies an intrusive warrantless search, considering that the police officers failed to rely on their personal knowledge and depended solely on an unverified and anonymous tip, the warrantless search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was an invalid and unlawful search of a moving vehicle.

05

RULE 113 (ARREST) CASE DOCTRINE LACASTE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR NO 199018 SEPTEMBER 27,2017 The warrantless arrest is lawful under the provisions of Section 5 (a) Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which provides that - a police officer may without a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or attempting to commit a crime. In the course of a lawful warrantless arrest, the person of the accused may be searched for dangerous or illegal objects. It follows that the prohibited object or item taken from him on the occasion is admissible in evidence

ISSUE AND RULING WHETHER OR NOT HE WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND SEARCHED?

FACTS Lacaste a tricycle driver was on samat street when he was flagged down by TFAV Unit and was searched for shabu along with his tricycle.

No. [Petitioner] was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs.

The arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe based on his own personal observation that the [petitioner] was holding on to a plastic sachet that he believed contained shabu, judging from the past record of [petitioner], and that his suspicions were heightened when [petitioner] ran away after seeing him.

CASE DOCTRINE SAPI V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR NO 200370 JUNE 07, 2017 For a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

ISSUE AND RULING

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST? No. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.

06

FACTS Sapi was flagged down by the police officers on a checkpoint after they received an information that he was on his way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.

They confiscated a teabag to what appears to be marijuana.

FACTS The police received a text message from a CI about an alleged courier of marijuana who was sighted at bukidnon. The police stationed a checkpoint to where they stopped the bus and ordered the passengers for baggage inspection. They found a transparent cellophane bag containing mj leaves in the bag of Renante.

ISSUE AND RULING WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST WAS VALID? No. There was no overt act in the presence or within the view of the police officers which would indicate that he was commiting the crime of illegal possesion of drugs.

CASE DOCTRINE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FBRONOLA GR NO 213225 APRIL 4,2018 For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (]) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.The tip provided by the informant does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

FACTS PO1 Falolo who was not on duty at the time boarded on a bus. Since the bus was already full, he sat on top of the bus. The petitioner then threw his carton baggage to PO1 Falolo. When he caught the box, he already suspected that it was marijuana due to it’s distinct smell and irregular shaped leaves. He then decided to follow the petitioner. Since he was off duty and doesn’t have load. He followed the petitioner until he reached SPO2 Suagen who was on duty at that time and caught the petitioner.

CASE DOCTRINE AGPAD V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR NO 227366 AUGUST 1,2018

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.

07

ISSUE AND RULING WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST? Yes. At that moment, PO1 Falolo acquired probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest on petitioner. There were numerous circumstances and overt acts which show that PO1 Falolo had probable cause to effect the said warrantless arrest: (1) the smell of marijuana emanating from the carton baggage; (2) the irregular shape of the baggage; (3) the hardness of the baggage; (4) the assent of petitioner in the inspection of his baggage but running away at the sight of SPO2 Suagen; and (5) leaving behind his baggage to avoid the police officers.

FACTS The police officers conducted a stake out where they saw the petitioner having pot session with Sacare and Lim. The police officers arrested them when they tried to escape.

CASE DOCTRINE MAHIPUS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR NO 210731 FEBRUARY 13, 2019

Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment

ISSUE AND RULING WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST AS VALID? Yes. It became valid when the petitioner admits that he failed to question the validity of the arrest before arraignment. He actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not raising the objection before his arraignment.

08

RULE 114 (BAIL) CASE DOCTRINE PEOPLE VS ESCOBAR G.R. NO. 214300' JULY 26, 2017

GENUINO V DE LIMA G.R. NO. 197930 APRIL 17, 2018

Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in criminal proceedings. An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does not give rise to res judicata.

The power of courts to restrict the travel of persons out on bail is an incident of its power to grant or deny bail.

1. WHETHER MANUEL ESCOBAR’S SECOND PETITION FOR BAIL IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA

WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS EMPOWERED BY A SPECIFIC LAW TO RESTRICT THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL OF PERSONS UNDER CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION.

ISSUE AND RULING

Escobar’s Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in criminal proceedings. Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute between the parties or their successors-in-interest. Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman declares that res judicata as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and has no bearing on criminal proceedings.

2. WHETHER ESCOBAR SHOULD BE GRANTED BAIL A grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits. No part of this Decision should prejudice the submission of additional evidence for the prosecution to prove Escobar’s guilt in the main case.

The Department of Justice is neither empowered by s specific law nor does it possess the inherent power to restrict the right to travel of persons under criminal investigation through the issuance of hold departure orders, watch list orders and allow departure orders. Its mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987 to “investigate the commission of crimes and prosecute offenders” cannot be interpreted so broadly as to include the power to curtail a person’s right to travel.

Furthermore, D.O. No. 41, Series of 2010 cannot be likened to the power of the courts to restrict the travel of persons on bail as the latter presupposes that the accused was arrested by virtue of a valid warrant and placed under the court’s jurisdiction. For these reasons, Department of Justice Circular No. 41, Series of 2010, is unconstitutional.

FACTS Manuel Escobar filed a petition for bail which was denied by the RTC and CA. He then filed a second petition for bail and was also denied on the ground of res judicata. CA overturned the Decision of the RTC arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the second bail petition and granted the petition for certiorari and order RTC to determine the appropriate bail for Escobar’s provisional liberty.

09

The case is a consolidated case of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against former DOJ Secretary De Lima for her issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41, Series of 2010, known as the Consolidated Rules and Orders and Allow Departure Orders. The petitioners question the constitutionality of this DOJ circular on the ground that it infringes the constitutional right to travel. The petitioners in these case are former President Arroyo and her husband, and Efraim Genuino. De Lima issued HDO and WLO against petitioners on the ground that criminal charges pf plunder, qualified theft and violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Spouses Arroyo filed a temporary restraining order against issued HDO and WLO of DOJ seeking relief and grant from court to allow them to travel so that President Arroyo may seek medical treatment abroad. The court granted relief sought on a condition that petitioner will file a bond of Php 2 million, an undertaking the petitioners shall report to Philippine Consulate in the countries they are to visit and shall appoint a representative to receive on their behalf subpoena, orders and other legal processes. Petitioners complied all the conditions instead of following the order of the court, DOJ caused for the refusal to process the petitioners travel documents.

ISSUE AND RULING

CASE DOCTRINE

Whether Judge Marigomen is guilty of ignorance of the law and respondent Camay, for violating of ARTA for being a fixer The charge of gross ignorance of the law against Judge Marigomen merits a more serious sanction.

TEJANO V MARIGOMEN A.M. NO. RTJ-17-2492 SEPTEMBER 26, 2017

The accused must be in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his/her liberty to be able to post bail.

Bail, as defined in Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, is "the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him [or her] or a bondsman, to guarantee his [or her] appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified." Based on this definition, the accused must be in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his or her liberty to be able to post bail.

Generally, bail is filed before the court where the case is pending.

However, if bail cannot be filed before the court where the case is pending as when the judge handling the case is absent or unavailable, or if the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending-Rule 114, Section 17(a) of the Rules of Court provides: Section 17. Bail, Where Filed. - (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available. with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein. (Emphasis supplied)The text of Rule 114, Section 17(a) of the Rules of Court shows that there is an order of preference with respect to where bail may be filed. In the absence or unavailability of the judge where the case is pending, the accused must first go to a judge in the province, city, or municipality where the case is pending. Furthermore, a judge of another province, city, or municipality may grant bail only if the accused has been arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending. A judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where the case is pending but approves an application for bail filed by an accused not arrested is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The last sentence of Rule 114, Section 17(a) is clear that for purposes of determining whether or not the accused is in custody of the law, the mode required is arrest, not voluntary surrender, before a judge of another province, city, or municipality may grant a bail application. In the same vein, it is gross ignorance of the law if a judge grants an application for bail in a criminal case outside of his or her jurisdiction without ascertaining the absence or unavailability of the judge of the court where the criminal case is pending.

A Judge Marigomen was not a judge in the province, city, or municipality where the case was pending. Neither was Andrino arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case was pending precisely because no warrant of arrest had yet been issued when he posted bail on May 9, 2013. Judge Marigomen violated Rule 114, Section 17(a) and is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Moreover, Judge Marigomen did not ascertain the absence or unavailability of Judge Saniel. This duty to ascertain is a consequence of Judge Marigomen not being the judge of the place where the criminal case was pending and could have been satisfied by inquiring and coordinating with the court personnel belonging to Branch 20, where the criminal case was pending. Had Judge Marigomen done his duty, Judge Saniel would have already been informed of the grant of bail on May 9, 2013, and therefore, would not have superfluously issued a Warrant of Arrest 21 days later. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be appreciated in favor of Judge Marigomen.

FACTS Tejano contented that Judge Marigomen refused to transfer the civil case to Judge Trinidad, the newly designated Assisting Judge, in violation of Administrative Order No. 137-2012. Alleging that Judge Marigomen issued the Order of Release with no standing warrant of arrest against Andrino, in violation of Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. On Judge Marigomen, granted Andrino’s motion to try the civil case because the circumstances that it had not been conducting hearings since 2012. Furthermore, he had not anticipated thar a new Assisting Judge would be assigned to the said court. Therefore, he continued hearing the civil case. As to Andrino’s bail bond, he approved it in the exercise of his sound discretion, alleging that in applications for bail, the stringent application of Andrino in posting bail but only because he was a public employee obliged to do so and denied that he was a fixer and claimed that he had no personal interest in the outcome of the civil. Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Marigomen guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars.

However, it dismissed the complait for violation of the Anti- Red Tape Act against Camay. Tejano led an Affidavit before this Court, stating the her filing of the Complaint is “only a product of miscommunication”. Thus, in order to move on, she declared that she was withdrawing the Complaint she had led against Judge Marigomen.

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ISSUE AND RULING WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE RTC WHICH GRANTED TANES’ APPLICATION FOR BAIL. The petition is totally without merit.

In this case, Tanes was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 which carries the penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes' bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion if the evidence of his guilt is not strong. To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the conduct of bail hearings is required where the prosecution has the burden of proof, subject to the right of the defense to cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence in rebuttal. The court is to conduct only a summary hearing, consistent with the purpose of merely determining the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court's grant or denial of the bail application must contain a summary of the prosecution's evidence. On this basis, the judge formulates his or her own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.

ISSUE AND RULING WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING RECTO'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. The denial of the Motion to Fix Bail by the RTC amounted to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The Order denying the Motion to Fix Bail was thus issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess or jurisdiction.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

The following Constitutional provision is implemented by the following provisions of the Rules of Court: SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. In the present case, Recto was charged with Murder an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the RTC was acting within its powers or jurisdiction when it denied Recto's initial Petition for Bail. The RTC possesses sufficient discretion to determine, based on the evidence presented before it during the bail hearing, whether the evidence of guilt is strong.

However, after the prosecution had rested its case, Recto filed a Motion to Fix Bail on the ground that bail had become a matter of right as the evidence presented by the prosecution could only convict Recto of Homicide, not Murder. This Motion to Fix Bail was denied by the RTC, reiterating its earlier finding that, in its judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong. This is where the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, and the CA thus erred in upholding the RTC's Order denying the Motion to Fix Bail.

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RULE 112 (PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION) CASE DOCTRINE STEVEN R. PAVLOW VS. CHERRY L. MENDENILLA GR NO. 181489 APRIL 19,2017

Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at the level of the prosecutor, does not form part of trial. It is not a judicial proceeding that leads to the issuance of a protection order.

FACTS

Respondent’s daughter ( Maria Sheila) filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for slight physical injuries and maltreatment. But due to her failure to substantiate her allegations, the Assistant City Prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint. Ten (10) years later, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Maria Sheila’s benefit, prating for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or Permanent Protection Order (PPO) under the AntiVAWC Law (R.A. No. 9262). a temporary restraining order was issued by the RTC in favor of the respondent’s daughter. When service summons with the TPO attached was attempted on September 7, 2005, Pavlow was out of the country. Thus, summons was served instead through his employee, Tolentino, who also resided at PAvlow’s own residence.

ISSUE AND RULING 1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CHERRY L. MENDELILLA HAD PERSONALITY TO FILE A PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTION ORDER UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE ANTI-VAWC LAW FOR THE BENEFIT OF HER DAUGHTER. 2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT MENDENILLA ENGAGED IN FORUM SHOPPING BY FILING A PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTION ORDER AFTER A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT UNDER THE ANTI-VAWC LAW WAS DISMISSED BY THE PROSECUTOR; AND 3. WHETHER SUMMONS WAS PROPERLY SERVED ON PETITIONER STEVEN R. PAVLOW AND JURISDICTION OVER HIS PERSON WAS VALIDLY ACQUIRED. 1. YES. The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly given personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection orther by Section 9(b) of the Anti-VAWC Law. However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file such a petition is suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself. Nevertheless, in this case, respondent Mendenilla filed her petition after her daughter’s complaint-affidavit had already been dismissed. A petition for the issuance of protection order is not limited to the alleged victim herself. The victim’s mother - as is the case with respondent Mendenilla - is explicitly given the capacity to apply for a protection order for the benefit of her child. Hence, Mendenilla had the requisite personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order in favor of Maria Sheila.

2. NO. Jurisprudence has long settled that preliminary investigation does not form part of trial. Investigation for the purpose of determining whether an actual charge shall subsequently be filed against the person subject of the investigation is a purely administrative, rather than a judicial or quasi-judicial, function. It is not an exercise in adjudication: no ruling is made on the rights and obligations of the parties, but merely evidentiary appraisal to determine if it is worth going into actual adjudication.In applying to the case at bar, Assistant City Prosecutor Odronia’s dismissal of the complaint-affidavit filed by Maria Sheila came as a result of preliminary investigation. This meant that, to begin with, there was not even a prior judicial proceeding which could lead to the issuance of a protection order. The criminal action in which Maria Sheila would have been deemed to have impliedly instituted her own petition for the issuance of a protection order did not even commenced.

3. YES. The non-use of the precise term “summons” in the Anti-VAWC Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and its procedural rules provided in A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC does not justify the equation of a temporary protection order with summons and the exclusion of the use of summons. Rule 12, Section 7 stipulates that substituted service may be resorted to “if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be personally served within a reasonable time.” The exigencies of this case reveal a backdrop of justifiable cases and how, by the convenience of petitioner Steven Pavlow’s absence, immediate personal service was rendered impossible. These exigencies justified substituted service of summons upon petitioner during his temporary absence through Monette Tolentino, a person of suitable age and discretion, who also resided at petitioner’s own residence. Hence, jurisdiction over petitioner’s person was then validly acquired.

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FACTS The Sangguniang Bayan of Bansalan, Davao del Sur passed Municipa Ordinance, prohibiting the “storing, displaying, selling, and blowing up (‘pagpabuto’) of those pyrotechnics products allowed by law, commonly called ‘firecrackers’ or ‘pabuto’ within the premises of buildings 1 and 2 of the Bansalan Public Market. On December 14, 2009, then Bansalana Mayor Reyes approved a permit allowing vendors to sell firecrackers at the Bansalan Public Market from December 21, 2009 to January 1 ,2010. on December 27, 2009, a rire befell the Bansalan Public Market. It caused etensive damage and destroyed fire hydrants of the Bansalan Water District.

Subsequently, private respondent Paul Jocson Arches (Arches) filed a complaint dated December 20, 2010 against Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao. Arches questioned the approval and issuance of a mayor’s permit agreeing to sell firecrackers, in violation of Municipal Ordinance. He claimed that this permit caused the fire the previous year. The Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution dated March 20, 2013 and found that probable cause existed to charge Reyes and his co-respondents a quo with violation of Section 3€ of Republic Act No. 3019. The Ombudsman held that Reyes and his co-respondents a quo were public officers during the questioned acts. Both the government and private stall owners suffered undue injury due to the fire at the Bansalan Public Market. While the mayor’s permit was not the proximate cause of the fire, it nonetheless, “gave unwarranted benefit and advantage to the fire cracker vendors. The issuance of the mayor’s permit was “patently tainted with bad faith and partially or, at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence.

CASE DOCTRINE EDWIN GRANADA REYES VS. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GR NO. 208243 JUNES 5, 2017 A preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause.Preliminary investigation is not part of trial and is conducted only to establish whether probable cause xist

ISSUE AND RULING WHETHER OR NOT THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PETITIONER EXISTS. NO. The rule on non-interference is based on the “respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman[.]” An independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people, and is the preserver of the integrity of the public service.” thus, it has the sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused. The function is executive in nature. The executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter. It requires probing into the “existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he [she] was prosecuted. “the Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman. Disagreement with the Ombudsman’s findings is not enough to constitute grave abuse of discretion. It is settled: An act of a court or tribunal may constitute grave abuse of discretion when the same is performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgement amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or personal hostility. The Ombudsman properly performed its duty to determine probable cause as to whether petitioner and his co-respondents a quo violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. section 3(e) provides: Section 3. corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charge with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

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CASE DOCTRINE PRESCILLA Z. ORBE VS. LEONORA O. MIARAL GR NO. 217777 AUGUST 16, 2017 As the representative of the State, the public prosecutor determines in a preliminary investigation whether there is probable cause that the accused committed a crime.The general rule is that in the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor is given a wide latitude of discretion to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause.

FACTS

Leonora O. Miaral agreed to engage in the garment exportation business with her sister, Priscilla Z. Orbe. They executed a partnership agreement where they agreed to contribute ₱ 250,000.00 each to Toppy Co., Inc. and Miaral Enterprises, and to equally divide the profits they may earn.Petitioner later discovered that there was no exportation of garments to the United States or any other transactions in the United States that took place. Petitioner filed a complaint for estafa against respondent and Anne Kristine before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City. The OCP of Quezon City issued a Resolution recommending filing of Information for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code against respondents Leonora O.Miaral and Anne Kristine O. Miaral. The City Prosecutor later filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Information. The RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Information,and directing the arraignment of respondent and Anne Kristine. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed Orders of the RTC. It further directed the RTC to issue an order for the withdrawal of the Information for estafa against respondent and Anne Kristine.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE RTC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.

ISSUE AND RULING

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NO. The general rule is that in the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor is given a wide latitude of discretion to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause. However, when the respondent establishes that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in determining whether there is probable cause, the courts may interfere. In this case, the OCP found that no probable cause existed against respondent and Anne Kristine for the commission of the crime of estafa. In its Resolution, relying mainly on the case of United States v. Clarin, the OCP found that there was a partnership agreement between the parties, thus resolving that the failure of a partner to account for partnership funds may only give rise to a civil obligation, not a criminal case for estafa. Furthermore, the RTC made its own independent assessment whether or not probable cause exists that the crime was committed by respondent and Anne Kristine. "Independent assessment" does not mean mere approval or disapproval of the prosecution's stand; it also means that the RTC must itself be convinced that indeed there is or there is no sufficient evidence against the accused. The question is not so much whether the RTC has the authority to grant or not to grant the OCP's Motion to Withdraw Information, because it has such authority,but whether, in the exercise of that authority, the RTC acted justly and fairly. This Court finds that it did.

FACTS

ISSUE AND RULING

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati issued a Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause against the petitioner for the violation of RA 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). Later on, a Pabatid Sakdal or Information was filed before the RTC charging the petitioner of the said crime.The petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. She claims that it is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured. OCP-Makati countered that SACPHirang was authorized to approve the Pasiya pursuant OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 and the prior approval from the City Prosecutor with regards to the information was shown in the Certification.

WON RTC AND CA GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO QUASH?

CASE DOCTRINE

YES. Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts. xxx Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same Rules. xxx In this relation, People v. Garfin, firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

GIRLIE M. QUISAY V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. R. NO. 216920 JANUARY 13, 2016 The filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent.

ISSUE AND RULING W/N THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO FIND RESPONDENTS TO BE HELD LIABLE CRIMINALLY FOR THE CASE OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (RA 8293, AS AMENDED)?

The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED ABS-CBN’s petition and ordered RTC Q.C. Branch 93 to continue with the criminal proceedings against Grace Dela PeñaReyes and John Oliver Manalastas due to copyright infringement. It held that ABS-CBN's video footage is copyrightable because it is under “audiovisual works and cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any process for making audiovisual recordings.” It also stated that news or the event itself is not copyrightable. The Court differentiated idea and expression – idea meant as “a form, the look or appearance of a thing” while expression is its reality or the “external, perceptible world of articulate sounds and visible written symbols that others can understand.” Thus, the Supreme Court stated that “only the expression of an idea is protected by copyright, not the idea itself”, citing the US Supreme Court's decision in Baker vs Selden (101 U.S. 99).

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FACTS On August 13, 2004, petitioner ABS-CBN filed a criminal complaint against respondent GMA for (alleged) act of copyright infringement under Sections 177 and 211 of the Intellectual Property Code (RA 8293, as amended), because the respondent aired footage of the arrival and homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from Iraq without the petitioner's consent. ABS-CBN stated that it has an agreement with Reuter's that the petitioner will contribute news and content that it owns and makes to Reuters in exchange of the latter's news and video material, and Reuters will ensure that ABS-CBN's materials cannot be aired in the country by other subscibers.No other Philippine subscriber of Reuters would be allowed to use ABSCBN footage without the latter's (ABS-CBN) consent

CASE DOCTRINE ABS CBN V. GOZON GR. NO 195956 MARCH 11, 2015 Fair use, which is an exception to copyright owner’s monopoly of the work's usage, was defined by the Supreme Court as privilege to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the copyright owner's consent or by copying the material's theme or idea rather than its expression.

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