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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Adduru, Junett C. Culminas, Roland T. Daquioag, Khimmy Joy F. Decena-Mallari, Fe T. Tumbali, Gy Anne L.

Table of Contents VALDERRAMA VS. PEOPLE GR 220054 MARCH 27, 2017

DE LIMA V. GUERRERO GR. NO. 229781 OCTOBER 10, 2017

PEOPLE V. DELECTOR GR 200026 OCTOBER 4, 2017

MICHAEL LABRADOR ABELLANA V. HON. MEINRADO P. PAREDES G.R. NO. 232006 JULY 10, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JOSHUA QUE Y UTUANIS G.R. NO. 212994 JANUARY 31, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JIMBOY SUICO Y ACOPE G.R. NO. 229940 SEPTEMBER 10, 2018

DEMOSTHENES ARBILON vs. SOFRONIO MANLANGIT GR. NO. 197920 JANUARY 22, 2018

MAYOR CORPUS V. JUDGE PAMULAR GR 186403 SEPTEMBER 5, 2018

QUIMVEL V. PEOPLE GR 214497 APRIL 18, 2017 GUELOS V. PEOPLEGR 177000

JUNE 19, 2017

PEOPLE V. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GR 240621 JULY 24, 2019

CASANAS V. PEOPLE GR 223833 DECEMBER 11, 2017

CABRAL V BRACAMONTE GR 233174 JANUARY 23, 2019

SUPREME TRANSPORTATION LINER V. SAN ANDRES GR 200444 AUGUST 15, 2018

EVANGELISTA V. SCREENEX INC GR 211564 NOVEMBER 20, 2017

LARA’S GIFT AND DECORS, INC., vs. PNB GENERAL INSURERS CO., INC. GR. NO. 230429 JANUARY 24, 2018

SPS. TAPAYAN vs. PONCEDA MARTINEZ GR. NO. 207786 JANUARY 30, 2017 07

PEOPLE V. ANTIDO GR 208651 MARCH 14, 2018

RURAL BANK OF MABITAC, LAGUNA, INC V. CANICON ESPELETA G.R. NO. 196015 JUNE 27, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BASHER TOMAWIS Y ALI G.R. NO. 228890 APRIL 18, 2018

SPS. PASCUAL vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS GR. NO. 202597 FEBRUARY 08, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPNES VS. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO and JULIUS LACANILAO G.R. NO. 240053 OCTOBER 9 2019

CECILIA RIVAC, PETITIONER VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT .G.R. NO. 224673 JANUARY 22, 2018

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, G. R. NO. 220598 JULY 19, 2016

ROSEMARIE ERIBAL BOWDEN V. DONALD WILLIAM ALFRED BOWDEN G.R. NO. 228739 JULY 17, 2019

Table of Contents BDO UNIBANK, INC., PETITIONER V. ANTONIO CHOA, RESPONDENT. G.R. NO. 237553 JULY 10, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. EDWIN DAGSA Y BANTAS, G.R. NO. 219889 JANUARY 29, 2018

CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR,VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 223477, FEBRUARY 14, 2018

LOIDA M. JAVIER VS. PEPITO GONZALES G.R. NO. 193150 JANUARY 23, 2017

IN RE: WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR MICHAEL LABRADOR ABELLANA V. MEINRADO P. PAREDES +DECISION G.R. NO. 232006, JULY 10, 2019

PO1 CELSO TABOBO III Y EBID VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 220977 JUNE 19, 2017

NESTOR GUELOS, et. al.VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 177000 JUNE 19, 2017

SHIRLEY T. LIM, ET. AL., VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 226590 APRIL 23, 2018

BEN MANANGANVS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 218570 NOVEMBER 22, 2017

SECURITY BANK CORPORATION VS. GREAT 27 WALL COMMERCIAL PRESS COMPANY, INC., ALFREDO BURIEL ATIENZA, FREDINO CHENG ATIENZA AND SPS. FREDERICK CHENG ATIENZA AND MONICA CU ATIENZA G.R. NO. 219345 JANUARY 30, 2017

28 EVY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. VALIANT ROLL FORMING SALES CORPORATION G.R. NO. 207938 OCTOBER 11, 2017

VALDERRAMA VS. PEOPLE GR 220054 MARCH 27, 2017 Doctrines The required conformity of the public prosecutor was not a mere superfluity and was necessary to pursue a criminal action. A private party does not have the legal personality to prosecute the criminal aspect of a case, as it is the People of the Philippines who are the real party in interest. The criminal case must be under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, when the public prosecutor does not give his or her conformity to the pleading of a party, the party does not have a legal personality to pursue the case.

Facts Josephine ABL Vigden filed a complaint against Deogracia Valderrama for grave oral defamation. When the prosecution failed to present its evidence, Vigden filed a Motion for Reconsideration explaining that the private prosecutor failed to appear because of health concerns. Valderrama filed an opposition arguing that the public prosecutor did not give his conformity to Vigden’s motion. Both RTC and CA granted the motion. SC reversed.

RULE 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

PEOPLE V. DELECTOR GR 200026 OCTOBER 4, 2017 Doctrines The sufficiency of the information is to be judged by the rule under which the information against the accused was filed.· The facts alleged in the body of the information, not the technical name given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, determine the character of the crime.

Facts Armando Delector was charged with murder through the following information:That on or about the 8th day of August, 1997, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at Barangay Diaz, Municipality of Gandara, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one VICENTE DELECTOR alias TINGTING with the use of a firearm (revolver), which the accused had conveniently provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused the untimely death of said Vicente Delector. Armando’s defense was that it was an accident. Both RTC and CA found Armando guilty of murder. SC modified the decision to homicide.

Held The allegation of the information did not sufficiently aver acts constituting either or both treachery and evident premeditation. The usage of the terms treachery and evident premeditation, without anything more, did not suffice considering that such terms were in the nature of conclusions of law, not factual averments. As a consequence, the accused could not be properly convicted of murder, but only of homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

MAYOR CORPUS V. JUDGE PAMULAR GR 186403 SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 Doctrines Before an accused enters his or her plea, either formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After an entry of plea, only a formal amendment can be made provided it is with leave of court and it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, there can be no substantial amendment except if it is beneficial to the accused. An allegation of conspiracy to add a new accused without changing the prosecution's theory that the accused willfully shot the victim is merely a formal amendment.

Facts Carlito Samonte was charged with murder for killing Angelito Espinosa. He admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense. Based on the affidavit of one of the prosecution’s witnesses, it was Mayor “Jong” Amando Corpus who instructed Samonte to kill Espinosa. Hence, Public Prosecutor Floro Florendo directed the filing of an amended information adding Corpus as a new accused who conspired and confederated together with Samonte. Corpus and Samonte questioned the inclusion of Corpus and the insertion of the phrase “conspiring and confederating together” in the amended information invoking Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibiting substantial amendment of information that is prejudicial to the rights of the accused after arraignment.

Held Since only Samonte has been arraigned, only he can invoke Rule 110, Section 14. Corpus cannot invoke this because he has not yet been arraigned. On the other hand, the amendment is merely formal because the allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic theory of the prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Espinosa. However, allowing such amendment after Samonte’s plea would prejudice him.

QUIMVEL V. PEOPLE GR 214497 APRIL 18, 2017

GUELOS V. PEOPLEGR 177000 JUNE 19, 2017

Doctrines

An investigating prosecutor is not required to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the law. What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the Information or Complaint, not the caption or preamble thereof nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, being conclusions of law. The rule is satisfied when the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient.

Facts Edward/Eduardo Quimvel was charged with Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610 through the following amended information:That on or about 8 o'clock in the evening of July 18, 2007 at Palapas, Ligao City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, through force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, insert his hand inside the panty of AAA, a minor of 7 years old and mash her vagina, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information ... it is not the technical name given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the Information. When the law or rules specify certain circumstances that can aggravate an offense or that would attach to such offense a greater penalty than that ordinarily prescribed, such circumstances must be both alleged and proven in order to justify the imposition of the increased penalty.

Facts Petitioners were charged with Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the Revised Penal Code. In the course of the trial, the evidence presented sufficiently established the fact that the petitioners came to know that the victims were agents of a person in authority, as the latter introduced themselves to be members of the PNP.

Both RTC and CA found Quimvel guilty of the crime hence, the issue that he be convicted only for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC due to the failure to allege all the elements necessary in committing Acts of Lasciviousness under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.

Based on the evidence presented, both RTC and CA found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the said crime. On appeal by the petitioners, the Supreme Court however, found that the information in the case failed to allege all the elements which constitute the crime of Direct Assault upon an Agent in Authority.

Held

The elements of the offense penalized under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 were sufficiently alleged in the Information, to wit: the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and that child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. It is not necessary that the description of the crime, as worded in the penal provision allegedly violated, be reproduced verbatim in the accusatory portion of the Information before the accused can be convicted thereunder.

The establishment of the fact that the petitioners came to know that the victims were agents of a person in authority cannot cure the lack of allegation in the information that such fact was known to the accused which renders the same defective. Therefore, the petitioners can only be convicted of the crime of Homicide instead of the complex crime of Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide due to the simple reason that the Informations do not sufficiently charge the latter.

PEOPLE V. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GR 240621 JULY 24, 2019 Doctrines The prosecution is given the right to amend the information, regardless of its nature, so long as the amendment is sought before the accused enters his plea. However, once the accused enters his plea during arraignment, the prosecution is already prohibited from seeking a substantial amendment, particularly citing those that may prejudice the rights of the accused. Substantial amendments consist of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. Formal amendments which can be made at any time do not alter the nature of the crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation.

Facts This stemmed from an information filed before the SB charging Jaime Kison Recio with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, entitled the "AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act." During trial and before the prosecution presented its last witness, it filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Amended Information seeking to amend the amount stated in the Information from ₱7,843,54.33 to ₱7,842,941.60. In opposition thereto, Recio argued that the amendment is not merely formal but substantial, which would be prejudicial to his right to be informed of the charges against him.

Held The Court finds that the amendment of the Information sought by the prosecution is one of form, and not of substance, as it adds nothing essential for Recio's conviction of the crime charged nor does it seek to amend the Information's recital of facts constituting the offense charged. The amendment simply sought to correct the total amount of the disbursement vouchers reflected in the Information to make it conform to the evidence on record.

CASANAS V. PEOPLE GR 223833 DECEMBER 11, 2017 Doctrines The venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases shall be placed either where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place.

Facts An information was filed before RTC Valenzuela against Joshua Casanas y Cabantac a.k.a. Joshua Geronimo y Lopez for carnapping. Christopher Calderon reported to the police authorities that Casanas did not return his tricycle when he (Casanas) volunteered to drive it for a passenger since Calderon was about to go inside the public market in Marilao, Bulacan. A few days later, Valenzuela Police Station received a report that a suspected stolen motorcycle was sold in Karuhatan, Valenzuela City.

Held The carnapping incident happened in Marilao, Bulacan including all essential elements of the crime such as, there is an actual taking, the motorcycle does not belong to the offender, lack of consent by the owner or presence of violence, intimidation, or force during the taking which is tantamount to unlawful taking, and intent of the offender to gain from the taking. Hence, it is proper that the complaint be filed in the courts of Marilao, Bulacan, not in Valenzuela. It cannot be said that because the suspected motorcycle was found in Valenzuela that it was one of the essential elements of the crime. Besides, the crime together with its essential elements had long been consummated in Marilao, Bulacan five (5) days before the motorcycle was discovered at Valenzuela.

CABRAL V BRACAMONTE GR 233174 JANUARY 23, 2019 Doctrines In criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements of the crime or offense was committed must be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere allegation is not proof and could not justify sentencing a man to jail or holding him criminally liable.

Facts An information was filed before RTC Paranaque City against Chris Bracamonte for estafa. It was alleged that Bracamonte and Ruel Francis Cabral had a negotiation conducted in a warehouse in Paranaque City where Cabral was convinced to sell his shares of stock. They executed a MOA in Makati City and Bracamonte issued and delivered a post-dated check to Cabral in Makati simultaneous to the signing of the agreement. However, said check was later on dishonored in Makati. Bracamonte moved to quash the Information contending that the venue was improperly laid in Parañaque City, because the postdated check was delivered and dishonored in Makati City.

Held The Court does not see why Cabral did not file the complaint before the Makati City trial court. Not only were the MOA and subject check executed, delivered, and dishonored in Makati City, it was even expressly stipulated in their agreement that the parties chose Makati City as venue for any action arising from the MOA because that was where it was executed. It is, therefore, clear that the element of deceit took place in Makati City where the worthless check was issued and delivered, while the damage was inflicted also in Makati City where the check was dishonored by the drawee bank. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Parañaque City, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.

SUPREME TRANSPORTATION LINER V. SAN ANDRES GR 200444 AUGUST 15, 2018 Doctrines The requirement for the reservation of the civil action does not apply to the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code. Such actions may be filed anytime, provided the plaintiff does not recover twice upon the same actor omission.

Facts A complaint for damages arising from criminal negligence was filed before the court a quo (RTC) by Antonio San Andres against Supreme Transportation Liner (STL) and Felix Ruz. Subsequently, STL and Ruz filed their Answers with counterclaim. The counterclaim against the respondent was based on Article 2184 in relation to Article 2180 and Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

Held Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures states that all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority shall cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court. aSTL and Ruz’ counterclaims, being in the nature of an independent civil action, required no prior reservation. Under Section 1, Rule 111 what is “deemed instituted” with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer “deemed instituted”, and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without reservation in the criminal action. However, Article 2177 of the Civil Code kin relation to Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibit double recovery of damages arising from the same act or omission. There was no conformity from the public prosecutor and this was not denied by Vigden. Since the Motion for Reconsideration pertains to the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, it involves the criminal aspect of the case and thus, cannot be considered without conformity from the public prosecutor.

RULE 111 PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

EVANGELISTA V. SCREENEX INC GR 211564 NOVEMBER 20, 2017 Doctrines The criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed. A check is discharged by any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money.

Facts Benjamin Evangelista obtained a loan from Screenex, Inc. wherein he issued two checks as security. He gave 2 open-dated checks. Subsequently, he was charged with violation of BP 22 with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. The court acquitted him of the criminal charge but declared liable for the corresponding civil obligation.

Held In BP 22 cases, the action for the corresponding civil obligation is deemed instituted with the criminal action. The criminal action for violation of BP 22 necessarily includes the corresponding civil action and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. This notwithstanding the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action is treated as an independent civil liability based on contract.

PEOPLE V. ANTIDO GR 208651 MARCH 14, 2018 Doctrines Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as his civil liability based solely thereon. The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts.

Facts Romeo Lantayan was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. However, it appears that before the promulgation of the Resolution, he has already died as evidenced by his Certificate of Death

Held Lantayan’s death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal case against him. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as his civil liability based solely thereon. Thus, upon Lantayan’s death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished in as much as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. However, where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore may be presumed but only by way of filing a separate civil action. This separate civil action may be enforce against either the executor or administrator on the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation.

MAYOR CORPUS, JR. AND SAMONTE V. HON. JUDGE RAMON D. PAMULAR OF BRANCH 33, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA, MRS. PRISCILLA ESPINOSA, AND NUEVA ECIJA PROVINCIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FLORO FLORENDO GR. NO. 186403 SEPTEMBER 05, 2018 Doctrines An allegation of conspiracy to add a new accused without changing the prosecution's theory that the accused willfully shot the victim is merely a formal amendment. However, the rule provides that only formal amendments not prejudicial to the rights of the accused are allowed after plea. The test of whether an accused is prejudiced by an amendment is to determine whether a defense under the original information will still be available even after the amendment is made and if any evidence that an accused might have would remain applicable even in the amended information. An arraignment held under the manner required by the rules, grants the accused an opportunity to know the precise charge against him or her for the first time. It is called for so that he or she is made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him or her. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Thereafter, the accused is no longer in the dark and can enter his or her plea knowing its consequences. It is at this stage that issues are joined, and without this, further proceedings cannot be held without being void.Thus, the expanded concept of double jeopardy presupposes that since an accused can be in danger of conviction after his or her plea, the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy should already apply.

Facts Angelito Espinosa was shot by Samonte causing his death. Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an Informationfor murder dated June 5, 2008 was filed against him. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense. Trial on the merits ensued.The wife of the deceased, Mrs. Priscilla AlcantaraEspinosa, filed a complaint-affidavit captioned as Reply-Affidavit.She also filed an unsworn but signed Reply to the Affidavit of Witnesses before First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge Floro F. Florendo. Based on the affidavit executed by Alexander LozanoCorpuz was the one who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito. RTC dismissed. Priscilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration,but opposed by Corpus Florendo and set aside. He also instructed Assistant Public Prosecutor Bonifacio to conduct the review.Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelito's murder. He directed the filing of an amended information before the Regional Trial Court.Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a Review Resolution where he reinstated the Regional Trial Court Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of the murder complaint against Corpus. Meanwhile, Florendo filed an undated Motion to Amend Information, praying for the admission of the amended information. Corpus and Samonte opposed this Motion by filing a Joint Urgent Manifestation/Opposition dated February 2, 2009.The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, Samonte and Corpus jointly filed a Petition for Review dated February 9, 2009 before the Department of Justice.However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija issued the assailed February 26, 2009 Order, which granted the motion to amend the information and to admit the attached amended information. The assailed Order also directed, among others, the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.Hence, a direct recourse before this Court, through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with a prayer for an immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order.

RULE 116 ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA Held 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertains to a suspension of an arraignment in case of a pending petition for review before the Department of Justice. It does not suspend the execution of a warrant of arrest for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of an accused. In the assailed February 26, 2009 Order, Judge Pamular denied Corpus' motion to defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings.Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in case of a pending petition for review of the prosecutor's resolution filed before the Department of Justice .Thus, respondent judge committed an error when he denied petitioners' motion to suspend the arraignment of Corpus because of the pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. Petitioners jointly filed their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on February 9, 2009. Thus, the 60-day period has already lapsed since April 10, 2009. Hence, respondent judge can now continue with the arraignment and further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.

RURAL BANK OF MABITAC, LAGUNA, INC V. CANICON ESPELETA G.R. NO. 196015 JUNE 27, 2018 Doctrines Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

Facts An information for estafa was filed against Aguilar, Canicon, and Espeleta. Subsequently, the RTC, through Judge Stella CabucoAndres issued a warrant for the arrest of all three accused. Only Espeleta and Canicon were arrested, while Aguilar remains at large. Espeleta filed an urgent motion for reinvestigation and claimed that the preliminary investigation was conducted hastily, thereby denying her the chance to present her evidence. Petitioner opposed the motion. Without resolving the urgent motion for reinvestigation, the RTC arraigned both Espeleta and Canicon. Both accused entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. Meanwhile, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Melchorito M. E. Lomarda conducted a reinvestigation.The amended information dropped Espeleta from the list of those originally charged, and recommended bail for all the remaining accused.

Held In this case, the amended information dropped Espeleta as an accused after arraignment. As she is no longer included therein, the proceeding for the charge for estafa against her was effectively terminated. As a rule, where the dismissal was granted upon motion of the accused, jeopardy will not attach. October 23, 2007 Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion because the RTC did not make an independent determination or assessment of the merits of the motion to amend information.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BASHER TOMAWIS Y ALI G.R. NO. 228890 APRIL 18, 2018 Doctrines In our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The role of the Court in the fight against the illegal drug menace is to ensure that the guilty is convicted and that the appropriate penalty is imposed. In the discharge of this task, the Court must be mindful that the rights of the individual must, at all times, be safeguarded.

Facts The above-named accused, without having been lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sold, traded and delivered to a PDEA agent a methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, with a net weight of 12.74 grams as evidenced by Chemistry Report Number DD-153-08 in violation of the aforecited law.Upon his arraignment, Tomawis pleaded not guilty. During the pre trial conference, the following facts were stipulated upon: (1) the identity of the accused and jurisdiction of the RTC over his person; (2) the qualification of the forensic chemist who conducted the drug test; (3) the sample examined by the forensic chemist tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride with a weight of 12.7402 grams; and (4) the sample was delivered by Intelligence Officer 1 (IO1) Mabel Alejandro (IO1 Alejandro).RTC also held that the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity of the seized drugs. CA affirmed.

Held For a successful prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of RA 9165, the following must be proven: (a) the identities of the buyer, seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of paramount importance that the prosecution prove that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs are preserved. Each link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs must be established. Prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining the record/s of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.

DE LIMA V. GUERRERO GR. NO. 229781 OCTOBER 10, 2017 Doctrines The Court, if it rules positively in favor of petitioner regarding the grounds of the Motion to Quash, will be pre-empting the respondent Judge from doing her duty to resolve the said motion and even prejudge the case.

Facts DOJ filed criminal complaints against senator delima after several inquiries made by the congress regarding the proliferation of drugs inside the bilibid prison. On the basis of the evidence presented by the DOJ and the complaint affidavits, Judge Guerrrero of Muntinlupa issued a warrant of arrest against Senator Delima. The senator then filed a motion to quash the warrant and pending such motion she also filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 alleging that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was with grave abuse of discretion.

Held The prematurity of the present petition cannot be over-emphasized considering that petitioner is actually asking the Court to rule on some of the grounds subject of her Motion to Quash. The Court, if it rules positively in favor of petitioner regarding the grounds of the Motion to Quash, will be pre-empting the respondent Judge from doing her duty to resolve the said motion and even prejudge the case. This is clearly outside of the ambit of orderly and expeditious rules of procedure. This, without a doubt, causes an inevitable delay in the proceedings in the trial court, as the latter abstains from resolving the incidents until this Court rules with finality on the instant petition. Without such order, the present petition cannot satisfy the requirements set before this Court can exercise its review powers. Section 5 (2) (C) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly requires the existence of “final judgments and orders of lower courts” before the Court can exercise its power to “review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari” in “all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. ”The presence of the first requisite is at once apparent. The petitioner is an accused in the criminal case below, while the respondents in this case, all represented by the Solicitor General, have substantial identity with the complainant in the criminal case still pending before the trial court. As for the second requisite, even a cursory reading of the petition and the Motion to Quash will reveal that the arguments and the reliefs prayed for are essentially the same. In both, petitioner advances the RTC’s supposed lack of jurisdiction over the offense, the alleged multiplicity of offenses included in the Information; the purported lack of the corpus delicti of the charge, and, basically, the non-existence of probable cause to indict her. And, removed of all non-essentials, she essentially prays for the same thing in both the present petition and the Motion to Quash: the nullification of the Information and her restoration to liberty and freedom. Thus, ruling in Ient v. Tullet Prebon (Philippines), Inc. does not apply in the present case as the petition at bar and the motion to quash pending before the court a quo involve similar if not the same reliefs. To restate for emphasis, the RTC has yet to rule on the Motion to Quash. Thus, the present petition and the motion to quash before the RTC are simultaneous actions that do not exempt petitions for certiorari from the rule against forum shopping.

RULE 117 MOTION TO QUASH

MICHAEL LABRADOR ABELLANA V. HON. MEINRADO P. PAREDES G.R. NO. 232006 JULY 10, 2019 Doctrines The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel's acts, including even mistakes in the realm of procedural technique. A recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, however, the gross negligence should not be accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice.Failing in this duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him.

Facts A search warrant was issued against the accused who is Michael Badajos also known as Michael Badayos with a search warrant issued for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. When the team led by P/Supt. Labra arrived, the accused was present. They identified themselves as police officers and informed the accused of the existence of the search warrant. PO2 Maglinte was designated as searcher while PO2 dela Victoria was designated recorder. The search was done in the presence of the accused and barangay tanods of Bgy. Suba. Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged in both Informations. He thereafter filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant, which was denied by the RTC . After the pre-trial, the trial for the case ensued. Honorable Court, ordered the accused to present his witness starting September 10, 2008. Unfortunately, he failed to testify or present witnesses because there was no proper guidance of his previous counsel which he observed as not being able to defend his case diligently as exemplified by: a) failure to quash the search warrant before arraignment; and b) failure to file the Demurrer to Evidence on time. RTC held Abellana GUILTY. Petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration. RTC ruled that there was no ground to quash the warrant and the demurrer was actually filed on time.

Held The Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that petitioner was not deprived of due process. After all, the Court has consistently held that the crux of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Verily, petitioner was able to file several pleadings, including the following: motion to quash the search warrant, motion for physical re-examination and re-weighing of the alleged shabu confiscated from him, petition for bail, and demurrer to evidence. Also, he was represented by counsel when all prosecution witnesses testified and his counsel was also able to cross-examine them. Lastly, he was able to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration of the RTC Decision convicting him. A party who was given the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of cannot claim denial of due process of law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JOSHUA QUE Y UTUANIS G.R. NO. 212994 JANUARY 31, 2018 Doctrines The chain of custody requirements in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act are cast in precise, mandatory language. They are not stringent for stringency's own sake. Rather, they are calibrated to preserve the even greater interest of due process and the constitutional rights of those who stand to suffer from the State's legitimate use of force, and therefore, stand to be deprived of liberty, property, and, should capital punishment be imposed, life. This calibration balances the need for effective prosecution of those involved in illegal drugs and the preservation of the most basic liberties that typify our democratic order.

Facts An informant reported that a person identified as "Joshua," later identified as Que, was selling shabu. Acting on this report, P/C Insp. Nickson Babul Muksan (P/C Insp. Muksan) organized a buy-bust operation with PO3 Lim as poseur-buyer. PO3 Lim and the informant then left for the area of Fort Pilar. There, the informant introduced PO3 Lim to Que. PO3 Lim then told Que that he intended to purchase ₱100.00 worth of shabu. Que then handed him shabu inside a plastic cellophane. In turn, PO3 Lim handed Que the marked ₱100.00 bill and gave the pre-arranged signal to have Que arrested. Que filed a Motion to Quash Information and Warrant of Arrest and Admission to Bail. He pleaded not guilty to both charges when he was arraigned on June 7, 2004. RTC found Que guilty.CA affirmed.

Held The consequences of the failure of the arresting lawmen to comply with the requirements of Section 21 (I), supra, were dire as far as the Prosecution was concerned. Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachets of shabu that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JIMBOY SUICO Y ACOPE G.R. NO. 229940 SEPTEMBER 10, 2018 Doctrines Appellant can no longer question the legality of his arrest which should have been raised in a motion to quash the Information filed prior to his arraignment. When he failed to file such motion, appellant was deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court which precluded him from questioning the legality of his arrest.

Facts The above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, hold and possess and transport marijuana leaves with fruiting tops with the use of a motorcycle - motor star color red with a combination of black and gray without plate number, with an aggregate weight of 2,400 grams, Chemistry Report No. D-101-2011BUK, without authority nor permit from the government to possess the same,thus, Appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. RTC held that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of appellant for illegal transportation of marijuana through the positive and credible testimonies of witnesses who were law enforcers. The RTC did not give credence to appellant's defense of frame-up, denial and alibi as they were inherently weak and could not prevail over 1he positive assertions of police witnesses. CA likewise ruled that the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution pointed to an unbroken chain of custody from the moment the four bundles of marijuana were seized from appellant up to the time these were presented in court.

Held In any event, the arrest of appellant and the incidental search and seizure of appellant's backpack and sack containing marijuana were both valid. As correctly ruled by both the lower courts, the police officers had probable cause to justify the belief that appellant was an offender of the law and that the contents of the backpack and sack he was carrying were instruments of an offense not only in light of the confidential tip they received from an informant but also because of appellant's peculiar acts of making a sudden uturn before reaching the checkpoint and attempting to run when the motorcycle he was driving crashed. Indeed, the arresting officers were impelled to effect the arrest and seizure because of a probable cause. Given that the search was valid, the arrest was likewise lawful because it was made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug in appellant's possession.The trial court ruled the CA' s finding that the requirements under RA 9165 have been sufficiently complied with. In light of the prosecution's evidence, both testimonial and documentary, the lower courts correctly concluded that the identity, integrity and probative value of the seized marijuana were adequately preserved. The prosecution has sufficiently established an unbroken chain of custody over the seized marijuana, from the time the apprehending officers seized the drugs to the time it was brought to the police station, then to the crime laboratory for testing until the same was offered in evidence before the court.

DEMOSTHENES ARBILON vs. SOFRONIO MANLANGIT GR. NO. 197920 JANUARY 22, 2018 Doctrines Pre-trial is primarily intended to insure that the parties properly raise all issues necessary to dispose of a case. The parties must disclose during pretrial all issues they intend to raise during the trial, except those involving privileged or impeaching matters. Although a pre-trial order is not meant to catalogue each issue that the parties may take up during the trial, issues not included in the pre-trial order may be considered only if they are impliedly included in the issues raised or inferable from the issues raised by necessary implication.

Facts Manlangit (respondent) in his complaint for recovery of possession with writ of replevin, alleged that he purchased on credit one (1) compressor and one (1) unit of Stainless Pump, 3 horsepower, single phase for P200,000 and P65,999, respectively, from Davao Diamond Industrial Supply ( Davao Diamond). respondent claimed that the compressor had been in the possession of petitioner from November 1997 up to the time of the filing of the complaint, that despite demand, petitioner failed to return the same to respondent.

Held The records of the case show that Leanillo paid the compressor in behalf of respondent.The answer of petitioner to the complaint of respondent stated that the former voluntarily assumed paying the compressor since the same was beneficial to the mining operations of Double A. further, the receipts issued by Davao Diamond to Leanillo state that the same is “in partial payment of the existing account incurred by respondent” and is “in partial payment of respondent’s account with Davao Diamond relative to one (1) unit compressor.”Having ruled that Leanillo paid the compressor in behalf of respondent, the latter has therefore complied with his obligation to fully pay the compressor. Ownership of the compressor can now legally pass to respondent. As such, the latter has the right to possess the compressor since possession is an attribute of ownership.

LARA’S GIFT AND DECORS, INC., vs. PNB GENERAL INSURERS CO., INC. GR. NO. 230429 JANUARY 24, 2018 Doctrines The requirements laid down in Sec. 2 of the JA Rule that the parties must file with the court and serve on the adverse party the Judicial Affidavits of their witnesses not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference. While the belated submission of evidence is not totally disallowed, it is still, to reiterate, subject to several conditions, which petitioner failed to comply with. Specifically, the records are bereft of any justification, or "good cause," for the filing of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit during trial instead of during the pre-trial.

Facts During the trial, petitioner's counsel produced the Questioned Documents in open court and asked Mr.Villafuerte to identify those documents, seeking to introduce and mark them as exhibits. Respondents immediately objected in open court to the introduction and presentation of the Questioned Documents on the grounds that they were neither touched upon nor covered by the witness' crossexamination, and that the same were being introduced for the first time at this late stage of proceeding, without giving the parties opportunity to verify their relevance and authenticity.

Held The JA Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the submission of additional evidence even after trial had already commenced.The trial court has the discretion to allow the introduction of additional evidence during trial other than those that had been previously marked and identified during the pre-trial, provided there are valid grounds.The trial court precisely exercised this discretion. It allowed the introduction of the Questioned Documents during the re-direct examination of Mr. Villafuerte upon petitioner's manifestation that the same are being presented in response to the questions propounded by PNB Gen's counsel, Atty. Mejia,during the cross-examination.

RULE 118 PRE- TRIAL

SPS. TAPAYAN vs. PONCEDA MARTINEZ GR. NO. 207786 JANUARY 30, 2017

SPS. PASCUAL vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS GR. NO. 202597 FEBRUARY 08, 2017

Doctrines

Grounds for objection not raised at the proper time shall be considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court may not consider any other ground for objection, except those that were raised at the proper time.

Facts The parties herein executed a Deed of Undertaking in reference to the DBP Mortgage. The DBP Loan was not paid when it fell due. Respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against petitioners before the RTC of Ozamis CIty.

Held The plain copy of the Deed of Undertaking was admissible for failure to raise a timely objection. The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section 3 of Rule 130. However, to set this rule in motion, a proper and timely objection is necessary.The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is (sic) the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.

It is only at pre-trial that the rules allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, as provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

Facts On February 14, 2011, the petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals (CA) in order to nullify and set aside the decision rendered in Special Proceedings Case No. 4577 by the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC) ordering the cancellation of their notice of lis pendens recorded in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-42190 of the Register of Deeds of Butuan City. On November 16, 2011, the CA promulgated the first assailed resolution dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment. Considering that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is an original action before the Court of Appeals, pre-trial is mandatory, per Section 6 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, whereby the failure of the plaintiff to appear would mean dismissal of the action with prejudice. The filing of a pre-trial brief has the same import. The Supreme Court has invariably ruled that while "litigation is not a game of technicalities," it is equally important that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Held Whether or not the court erred in its decision of dismissing the action with prejudice due to petitioner’s failure to appear during the Preliminary Conference. The petitioners received the assailed resolution of November 16, 2011 on November 24, 2011. The CA actually received the motion on December 12, 2011. Considering that Section 1 (d) of Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provided that motions sent through private messengerial services are deemed filed on the date of the CA's actual receipt of the same, the motion was already filed out of time by December 12, 2011. Needless to remind, the running of the period of appeal of the final resolution promulgated on November 16, 2011 was not stopped, rendering the assailed resolution final and executory by operation of law.14 To be clear, the rule only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment has earlier been filed the pre-trial may be the occasion in which the court considers the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. If no such motion was earlier filed, the pre-trial judge may then indicate to the proper party to initiate the rendition of such judgment by filing the necessary motion. Indeed, such motion is required by either Rule 34 (Judgment on the Pleadings) or Rule 35 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of Court. The pre-trial judge cannot motu proprio render the judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. In the case of the motion for summary judgment, the adverse party is entitled to counter the motion.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPNESVS.MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO and JULIUS LACANILAO G.R. NO. 240053 OCTOBER 9 2019 Doctrines Section 15 of Rule 119, which provides the examination of witnesses for the prosecution, states that “[w]hen it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date or returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending.

Facts Mary Jane Veloso, Maria Cristina P. Sergio and Julius L. Lacanilao were friends and neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation and susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to bring on her trip. She then asked Cristina why the luggage was heavy but the latter simply replied that because it was new. The luggage was the same bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained prohibited drugs.The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. They informed the Indonesian Government that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and her testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius.Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should be made before and not during the trial.Also, they argued that such method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution

Held Whether or not rule 119, section 15 rules of court is applicable in the instant case. Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is inapplicable in the instant case.Section 15, Rule 119 which applies to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, Mary Jane's deposition must be taken before the court where the case is pending. In other words, the appellate court opines that Mary Jane's testimony must be taken before the trial court, where the cases of respondents are being heard, and not in Indonesia.Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. - When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. Under the foregoing prov1s1on, in order for the testimony of the prosecution witness be taken before the court where the case is being heard, it must be shown that the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.

RULE 119 TRIAL

CECILIA RIVAC, PETITIONERVS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT .G.R. NO. 224673 JANUARY 22, 2018 Doctrines A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment and the only controlling guideline covering a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice. This remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice

Facts On August 4, 2007, Rivac went to the jewelry store owned by private complainant Asuncion C. Fariñas where she received from the latter several pieces of jewelry in the aggregate amount of P439,500.00, which were meant for her to sell on consignment basis,[6] as evidenced by a document called jewelry consignment agreement. Fariñas and Rivac agreed that after seven (7) days, Rivac was obligated to either remit the proceeds of the sold jewelry or return the unsold jewelry to Fariñas should she fail to sell the same. However, despite the lapse of the aforesaid period, Rivac failed to perform what was incumbent upon her, causing Fariñas to send her a demand letter

Held Section 24, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure governs the reopening of criminal cases for further trial. It states in verbatim: "At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice.Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, and in the furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appearsIn this light, the CA clearly erred in holding that: (a) it was improper for the RTC to reopen its proceedings because the latter court had already promulgated its judgment; and (b) assuming arguendo that what it did was a new trial, there were no grounds for its allowance. To reiterate, a motion to reopen may be filed even after the promulgation of a judgment and before the same lapses into finality, and the only guiding parameter is to "avoid the miscarriage of justice." As such, the RTC correctly allowed the reopening of proceedings to receive Fariñas's subsequent testimony in order to shed light on the true nature of her transaction with Rivac, and potentially, determine whether or not the latter is indeed criminally liable.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, G. R. NO. 220598 JULY 19, 2016 Doctrines The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

Facts Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo vs.People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016FACTS:On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria MacapagalArroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Auditwhose charges were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after theirrespective demurrers to evidence were granted, except for Uriarte andValdes who were at large) for conspiracy to commit plunder.After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed theirdemurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish acase for plunder against them.The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case againstthe accused within its jurisdiction, except for petitioners and Valencia. Itheld that there was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired tocommit plunder.Petitioners filed this case before the Supreme Court on certiorari before theSupreme Court to assail the denial of their demurrers to evidence, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

Held The petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the denial of her demurrer to evidence.The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law.Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

ROSEMARIE ERIBAL BOWDEN v. DONALD WILLIAM ALFRED BOWDEN G.R. NO. 228739 JULY 17, 2019 Doctrines The rule barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is not absolute. The following are the recognized exceptions thereto: (i) when the prosecution is denied due process of law; and (ii) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused'[s] demurrer to evidence

Facts Rosemarie Eribal Bowden (petitioner) was the registered owner of a 2004 Mitsubishi Pajero (subject vehicle) with Plate No. FFD 228.The subject vehicle was sold to Virgilio S. Ramos (Ramos) without petitioner's consent by her then husband Donald William Alfred Bowden (respondent), a British national residing in Iloilo City. The marriage of petitioner and respondent was dissolved by virtue of a Decree of Divorce dated June 12, 2006.Petitioner claimed that while she was in London, she entrusted the Original Receipt-Certificate of Registration (OR-CR) of the subject vehicle to her niece Juvelyn Enate. However, during petitioner's marriage with respondent, the latter executed an affidavit of loss of the OR-CR and submitted it to the Roxas City District, Office of the Land Transportation Office (LTO). This paved the way for the issuance of a new OR-CR to respondent which he used to execute a deed of sale of the subject vehicle in his favor. Respondent submitted the deed of sale to the LTO and a new CR was issued in his name. Both affidavit of loss and deed of sale bore forged signatures of petitioner, prompting her to file criminal complaints against respondent.

Held Under Section 23, paragraph 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, a criminal action may be dismissed on the ground of insufficiency of evidence in two ways: (1) on the court's initiative, after an opportunity to be heard is accorded the prosecution; and (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In both instances, the dismissal may be made only after the prosecution rests its case.When the accused files a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence, it is incumbent upon the trial court to review and examine the evidence presented by the prosecution and determine its sufficiency to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. If competent evidence exists, the court shall deny the demurrer and the accused may still adduce evidence on his behalf if the demurrer was filed with leave of court. If filed without leave, the accused submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the court finds the evidence insufficient to support a verdict of guilt, the court shall grant the demurrer and the criminal case shall be dismissed. Such dismissal is a resolution on the merits and tantamount to an acquittal. Any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal is a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.[26] Accordingly, an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence cannot be the subject of an appeal.It bears stressing, however, that the Court is not at all precluded from reviewing an order of denial if it is shown that grave abuse of discretion attended its issuance

BDO UNIBANK, INC., PETITIONER V. ANTONIO CHOA, RESPONDENT. G.R. NO. 237553 JULY 10, 2019 Doctrines When a demurrer is granted in a criminal case, the private complainant can file a Rule 65 petition on the civil aspect of the case, as long as he or she can show that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer.

Facts On February 28, 2008, an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City against Choa, then president and general manager of Camden Industries, Inc. (Camden). He was charged with violating Presidential Decree No. 115, or the Trust Receipts Law, to the prejudice of BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO), the private complainant.On August 20, 2014, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, which the trial court admitted in its September 12, 2014 Order. In the same Order, the trial court gave Choa 10 days to comment on the prosecution's evidence.On October 30, 2014, the prosecution filed its Opposition. Arguing that the Motion for Leave should be expunged from the records, it claimed that the pleading was pro-forma for being filed beyond the five (5)-day reglementary period under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Rules of CourtEven if the Motion was timely filed, the prosecution asserted that it should still be denied for lack of basis, maintaining that Choa's civil liabilities could not have been offset by the judgment award granted to Camden in the Pasig civil case. It points out that since Choa's civil liabilities stemmed from his criminal violations of the Trust Receipts Law, they could not be the subject of compensation

Held RULE 119,SECTION 23. Demurrer to Evidence. — After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a nonextendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period often (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,VS. EDWIN DAGSA Y BANTAS, G.R. NO. 219889 JANUARY 29, 2018 Doctrines · Under the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and affirmed by settled jurisprudence, even though the crime charged against the accused was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.

Facts The victim, AAA, a young girl who was then four (4) years old, was walking home with two of her classmates|||when accused-appellant blocked their path and told AAA's classmates to go ahead as he would be giving AAA a candy. AAA's classmates left her and, after walking a little farther, they looked back and saw accused-appellant remove AAA's panty and proceeded to fondle her vagina||| The following day, while BBB was giving AAA a bath, the latter refused that her vagina be washed claiming that it was painful. Upon her mother's inquiry, AAA replied that accused-appellant played with her vagina and inserted his penis in it. BBB immediately went to talk to AAA's classmates about the incident whereby the said classmates relayed to her what they saw. They then proceeded to the police station to report the incident. AAA's classmates gave their statements, but AAA was not able to give hers as she was too shy. A criminal complaint for rape was eventually filed against accused-appellant. RTC held that accused is guilty as charged, while the CA modified the conviction to Acts of Lasciviousness.

Held Under the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and affirmed by settled jurisprudence, even though the crime charged against the accused was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.||| The CA found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, which defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child|. The essential elements of this provision are: 1.The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. 2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. 3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age As to the first element, Records show that the prosecution duly established this element when the witnesses positively testified that accused-appellant fondled AAA's vagina sometime in October 2004.||| The second element requires that the lascivious conduct be committed on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.

RULE 120 JUDGEMENT

CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR,VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 223477, FEBRUARY 14, 2018 Doctrines · Taking into consideration the variance doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime charged — the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional element of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein.

Facts In an Information, petitioner Celso Melgar (Melgar) was charged of economic abuse against AAA and her minor son, BBB, by depriving them of financial support, which caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son. After arraignment wherein Melgar DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 260 pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he and AAA entered into a compromise agreement on the civil aspect of the case. After the RTC's approval of the compromise agreement, the criminal aspect of the case was provisionally dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year later, the prosecution moved to set aside the compromise agreement and to revive the criminal action, on the ground that Melgar sold the property, which was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-inarrears of his son, BBB, pursuant to their compromise agreement. Consequently, the RTC revived the criminal aspect of the case and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence. The RTC found Melgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262, which the CA affirmed. The appellate court ruled that he committed economic abuse under Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 and that Melgar's acts "has clearly caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to AAA and her child, BBB." Undaunted, Melgar moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied; hence, this petition. Melgar argues, inter alia, that he was charged of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 as the Information alleged that the acts complained of "caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to AAA and her son, BBB." As such, he contends that he cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.

Held In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and BBB of support, no evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding and taking into consideration the variance doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime charged the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional element of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein

LOIDA M. JAVIER VS. PEPITO GONZALES G.R. NO. 193150 JANUARY 23, 2017 Doctrines · Judgment is for conviction and failure of the accused to appear was without a justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available under Rule 120 section 6 of the Rules of Court.

Facts A criminal case was filed against PEPITO GONZALES and was charged of Murder with Frustrated Murder and Multiple Attempted Murder. The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Baler, Aurora. The promulgation of decision was set on December 15, 2005 and notice was received by the sister of the accused Gonzales but refused to sign the Return.On the day of promulgation, the accused failed to appear but his counsel filed a Withdrawal as counsel with the conformity of the accused. The promulgation was reset to December 22, 2005. The decision was promulgated in absentia when the accused again failed to appear and counsel de officio was appointed to assist him. The accused was convicted of the charges against him and was sentenced to a death penalty. Issuance for the arrest was ordered for his nonappearance and forfeiture of his bail bond was ordered. The decision was entered in the docket book of the Court Judge Buted ordered the immediate transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals for automatic review. In less than a month, the accused filed an omnibus Motion thru counsel to reconsider the promulgated decision be reconsidered and set aside. Judge Soluren, new Judge gave due course on the Motion filed by the accusedGranting the said Motion and reinstated his bail. Gonzales was acquitted from all the charges against him. A petition for certiorari was filed by Carmen Macatiag against Judge Soluren to the Court of Appeals. Court of appeals dismissed the said Petition.

Held The Supreme Court ruled that the Petition for certiorari filed by Macatiag was with merit considering that she has sufficient interest and personality to file said Petition, under Rule 1 and 2, Rule, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Judge Soluren as an officer acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction.The promulgation of the decision rendered by Judge Buted was ruled to be valid. The accused and the offended parties were properly notified of the scheduled promulgation. Under Sec. 6, par 5, Rule 120, Rules on criminal procedure, Judgment is for conviction and he failure of the accused to appear was without a justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the Court shall order for his arrest.

IN RE: WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR MICHAEL LABRADOR ABELLANA V. MEINRADO P. PAREDES +DECISION G.R. NO. 232006, JULY 10, 2019

Doctrines Failure of the accused to appear was without a justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available under Rule 120 section 6 of the Rules of Court. Accused cannot shift the blame to his counsel when he deliberately did not appear at the promulgation.

Facts On July 29, 2009, the RTC promulgated its Decision dated May 11, 2009 rendering the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 11, Art. II, RA 9165, and for violation of Section 12, Art. 2, RA 9165, he is hereby sentenced to suffer SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY TO FOUR (4) YEARS of imprisonment and a fine in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00). On August 13, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration but it was denied on the basis of last paragraph of sec. 6 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court and likewise issued an arrest order against petitioner. The RTC stated that when the case was called for promulgation of judgment, petitioner failed to appear despite notice through the bond company. His counsel's knowledge of the scheduled promulgation was also admitted when he stated in the Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration that "the first notice was received accidentally when counsel visited the courts' office to follow up his notarial petition whereby a court's personnel casually served like an ordinary notice. Thus, petitioner's failure to appear for promulgation of judgment was without justifiable cause. Moreover, petitioner did not surrender within 15 days from date of promulgation and there was no manifestation that his absence was for a justifiable cause.

Held Clearly, petitioner lost the remedies available to him when he failed to appear at the promulgation of judgment despite being notified of the same. He cannot shift the blame to his counsel, for while Atty. Albura was out of line when he deliberately did not appear at the promulgation "as a sign of protest," it was still incumbent on petitioner to attend the same. Moreover, the rule provides that within 15 days from promulgation, the accused may still surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, after proving that his absence was for a justifiable cause. However, the Court notes that petitioner, who was out on bail, failed to surrender himself as he was then at large.He was only arrested on February 10, 2010.

PO1 CELSO TABOBO III Y EBID VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 220977 JUNE 19, 2017 Doctrines · Irregularities prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner that attended the trial, the case calls for a new trial.

Facts On May 15, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting the petitioner of the crime charged. In so ruling, the RTC held that the petitioner failed to prove that all the elements of justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger are present in this case. On July 1, 2013, the petitioner filed an appeal by accepting his justification and further allow him temporary liberty under his original bond and a motion for reconsideration and new trial for his counsel's gross mistake and negligence deprived him of his right to due process.The RTC issued an Order allowing the petitioner to post cash bail in the amount of P150, 000.00. However, the RTC deferred the resolution of the motion for new trial and informed the petitioner that should he choose to avail of the remedy of appeal, the entire records would be forwarded to the CA. Hence, the petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA reasoned that the prosecution need not prove the elements of homicide considering that the burden of proof in this case has shifted to the petitioner for interposing the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger. However, it concurred with the findings of the RTC that the defense failed to prove the existence of all the elements of defense of a stranger.

Held The rule provides that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the client. The only exception would be where the lawyer's gross negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law.Thus, the petitioner must establish with clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. However, the petitioner was deprived of such opportunity to effectively present his evidence and to defend himself due to the gross and palpable negligence and incompetence of his counsel. Such deprivation amounts to a denial of the petitioner's due process, vitiating the integrity of the proceedings before the trial court.

RULE 121 NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

NESTOR GUELOS, ET. AL.VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 177000 JUNE 19, 2017 Doctrines · A motion for new trial is not among the remedies which may be entertained together with a petition for appeal on certiorari.

Facts In Criminal Case No. P-204, the RTC finds accused NESTOR and GIL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the RPC, for killing SP02 Andaya.In Criminal Case No. P-205, the RTC finds accused NESTOR, RODRIGO and ALFREDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the RPC, for killing P/C Insp. Camacho. The petitioners appealed to the CA. On November 17, 2006, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC.

Held The petitioners, in the Reply, invite the Court's attention to the subsequent testimony of P02 Carandang in the latter case filed against Nestor. The petitioners assert that said testimony should be considered as new and material evidence which thereby makes the findings of the trial court in the instant case as manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible. Thus, the petitioners moved for a new trial on the ground of alleged newly discovered evidence without, however, necessarily withdrawing their petition. At the outset, the petitioners' motion for new trial is denied. Clearly, the Rules of Court proscribed the availment of the remedy of new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence at this stage of appeal.Section 1 of Rule 121 states: At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.Under Section 14 of Rule 124, a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be filed at any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the CA convicting the appellant becomes final.Further, Rule 45, Section 1 clearly provides that a motion for new trial is not among the remedies which may be entertained together with a petition for appeal on certiorari.More importantly, the alleged newly discovered evidence is not worthy of the Court's consideration. Thus, the Court finds no reason to give merit to the petitioners' contentions of alleged new evidence.

SHIRLEY T. LIM, ET. AL., VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 226590 APRIL 23, 2018 Doctrines · As prescription of the crime is the loss by the State of the right to prosecute and punish the same, it is absolutely indisputable that from the moment the State has lost or waived such right, the defendant may, at any stage of the proceeding, demand and ask that the same be finally dismissed and he be acquitted from the complaint, and such petition is proper and effective even if the court taking cognizance of the case has already rendered judgment and said judgment is merely in suspense, pending the resolution of a motion for a reconsideration and new trial, and this is the mere so since in such a case, there is not yet any final and irrevocable judgment.

Facts The petitioners were charged with falsification of a public document. They are siblings whom are officers of Pentel Merchandising Co., (Pentel), established by their father Quintin C. Lim. Quintin died on September 6, 1996. One of the stockholders of Pentel, Lucy Lim, alleged that the petitioners falsified the Secretary’s Certificate dated February 29, 2000. This Board Resolution authorized Jimmy Lim, one of the petitioners, to dispose the parcel of land covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) registered under Pentel’s name. Jimmy was able to enter into a Deed of Absolute Sale on March 21, 2000, conveying the subject properties to Spouses Lee. According to Lucy, the Secretary’s Certificate, dated February 29, 2000, bearing the sais board resolution, was falsified because it was made to appear that Quintin signed it, despite having already died on September 16, 1996 -- or more than three years from the time of its execution. They were found guilty by the Regional Trial Court DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 72 and the Court of Appeals. However, for the first time on appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that despite finding their guilt, the crime with which they were charged already prescribed.

Held As a general rule, an action for the quashal of the information on the ground that the criminal liability has already been extinguished must be made before an accused enter his plea, otherwise, it is deemed waived. However, Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure carves out an exception, which includes prescription of the crime. Even prior to the promulgation of the present Rules, the Court in People v. Castro, ruled that the accused may raise the prescription of the crime at any stage of the proceeding.

BEN MANANGANVS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 218570 November 22, 2017 Doctrines · In order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as "newly discovered" for purposes of a grant of new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is, rather, that the offering party had exercised diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.

Facts One evening around 7:30 pm, the Denna family were about to sleep when somebody called for them outside, recognizing who it was Jolita Denna open the door and saw her nephew Ben Manangan together with six armed individuals wearing masks. The Ben Manangan went outside the house of the Denna, the other three went to another house while the remaining three persons remained and asked for their money. When they reply that they do not have money, the armed group threatened to kill them all if they do not give their money which prompted the Denna Family to part with their valuables. On trial, accused contend that he should not be liable for robbery by a band because the prosecution did not prove that conspiracy exist between himself and the other 6 armed men and therefore he cannot be held liable for the acts of his co-accused.Petitioner file a motion for new trial and sought to present his wife, Maria Manangan, and six other persons. The trial court judge denied the motion and convict petitioner of the crime of robbery by a band on the grounds that there is an implied conspiracy between the accused and his other co-accused. On appeal, The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court modifying the penalty imposed. Hence, this instant petition.

Held Petitioner's Motion for New Trial was correctly denied by the RTC because the statements sought to be presented by the six persons were already available before and during the trial. The statements merely corroborate petitioner's alibi and defense, which will not alter the result of the trial. Most importantly, the statements of these six persons could have been discovered, accessed, and produced during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence because all six persons were living in the same barangay as petitioner. The offering party, petitioner in this case, failed to secure the statements of the additional six persons not because petitioner had no means of knowing that the pieces of evidence existed, but because petitioner was not diligent from the beginning.

SECURITY BANK CORPORATION VS. GREAT WALL COMMERCIAL PRESS COMPANY, INC., ALFREDO BURIEL ATIENZA, FREDINO CHENG ATIENZA AND SPS. FREDERICK CHENG ATIENZA AND MONICA CU ATIENZAG.R. NO. 219345 JANUARY 30, 2017 Doctrines ·At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered. In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof. The applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud. It is settled that fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation.

Facts On May 15, 2013, Security Bank filed a Complaint for Sum of Money (with Application for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment) against respondents Great Wall Commercial Press Company, Inc. (Great Wall) and its sureties, Alfredo Buriel Atienza, Fredino Cheng Atienza, and Spouses Frederick Cheng Atienza and Monica Cu Atienza (respondents), before the RTC. The complaint sought to recover from respondents their unpaid obligations under a credit facility covered by several trust receipts and surety agreements, as well as interests, attorney's fees and costs. Security Bank argued that in spite of the lapse of the maturity date of the obligations from December 11, 2012 to May 7, 2013, respondents failed to pay their obligations. The total principal amount sought was ₱10,000,000.00.

RULE 127 PROVISIONAL REMEDIESATTACHMENT

Held The Court finds merit in the petition. A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon the order of the court where an action is pending. Through the writ, the property or properties of the defendant may be levied upon and held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured by the attaching creditor against the defendant. The provisional remedy of attachment is available in order that the defendant may not dispose of the property attached, and thus prevent the satisfaction of any judgment that may be secured by the plaintiff from the former. In this case, Security Bank relied on Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court as basis of its application for a writ of preliminary attachment.It is settled that fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. While fraud cannot be presumed, it need not be proved by direct evidence and can well be inferred from attendant circumstances. Fraud by its nature is not a thing susceptible of ocular observation or readily demonstrable physically; it must of necessity be proved in many cases by inferences from circumstances shown to have been involved in the transaction in question.

EVY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. VALIANT ROLL FORMING SALES CORPORATION G.R. NO. 207938 OCTOBER 11, 2017 Doctrines · An injunctive writ is granted only to applicants with "actual and existing substantial rights" or rights in esse. That the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The writ will not issue to applicants whose rights are merely contingent or to compel or restrain acts that do not give rise to a cause of action.

Facts On September 4, 2007, Evy Construction purchased a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 134890 in Lipa, Batangas from Linda N. Ang (Ang) and Senen T. Uyan (Uyan). They executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, which was notarized on September 11, 2007. At the time of the sale, no lien or encumbrance was annotated on the title, except for a notice of adverse claim filed by Ang. On September 18, 2007, the Register of Deeds annotated a Notice of Levy on Attachment on TCT No. 134890.5 This annotation was by virtue of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued by Branch 46, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Parnpanga in Civil Case No. 13442 entitled Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation v. Angeli Lumber and Hardware, Inc., and Linda Ngo Ang.6 Two (2) other encumbrances were also annotated on the title.Evy Construction registered the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds on November 20, 2007. TCT No. 168590 was issued in its name; however, it contained the annotation of the prior Notice of Levy on Attachment, as well as a Notice of Attachment/Levy upon Realty dated October 2, 2007 and a Notice of Levy on Preliminary Attachment dated November 8, 2007.

Held The court found the argument unmeritorious. A levy on attachment, duly registered, has preference over a prior unregistered sale and, even if the prior unregistered sale is subsequently registered before the sale on execution but after the levy is made, the validity of the execution sale should be upheld because it retroacts to the date of levy. The prior levy on attachment carries over to the new certificate of title, effectively placing the buyers in the position of their vendor under litigation.