Issuu

CASES 2015-2020

Criminal Procedure

Piatrice Marie de la Cruz Jr Rieta Palattao Vladimir Pati Colen Razon Carl Ryan David Simangan Rona Lulu Talaue

TABLE OF CONTENT RULE 110 JOSHUA CASANAS Y CABANTAC A.K.A. JOSHUA GERONIMO Y LOPEZ VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 223833 DECEMBER 11, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JERSON DASMARINAS G.R. NO. 203986 OCTOBER 4, 2017

EILEEN P. DAVID VS GLENDA S. MARQUEZ G.R. NO. 209859 JUNE 5, 2017

DEOGRACIA VALDERRAMA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JOSEPHINE ABL VIGDEN G.R. NO. 220054 MARCH 27, 2017 MAYOR “JONG” AMAD CORPUS JR AND CARLITO SAMONTE VS HON JUDGE RAMON PAMULAR OF BRANCH 33, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIIJA, MRS PRISCILLA ESPINOSA AND NUEVA ECIJA PROVINCIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FLOR FLORENDO G.R. NO. 186403 SEPTEMBER 5, 2018

RULE 111 PEOPLE VS LIPATA GR 200302 APRIL 20, 2016

DY VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 189081, AUGUST 10, 2016

SUPREME TRANSPORTATION LINER INC V ANTONIO SAN ANDRES G. R. NO. 200444 AUGUST 15, 2018 RAMONES VS. SPOUSES GUIMOC GR. NO 226645 AUGUST 13, 2018 PEOPLE VS ARAMBULO GR 186597 JUNE 17, 2015

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RULE 116 PEOPLE VS. ADOLFO GOYALA G.R.NO. 224650 JULY 15, 2020

PEOPLE V BRENDO PAGAL G.R.NO. 241257 SEPTEMBER 29. 2020

MAYOR AMADO CORPUS V JUDGE RAMON PAMULAR G.R. NO. 186403 SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 ESTIPONA V LOBRIGO G.R. NO. 226679 AUGUST 15, 2017

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NURULLAJE SAYRE VS DAX GONZAGA G.R. NOS. 244413, 244415-16 FEBRUARY 8, 2020

RULE 117 PANGANIBAN VS VILLAPANDO G.R. NO. 214965, APRIL 26, 2017

CASTILLO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 216922, APRIL 18, 2018

CABRAL VS BRACAMONTE G.R. NO. 233174 JANUARY 23, 2019 SALCEDO VS SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 223869-960,FEBRUARY 13, 2019 CAGANG VS SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 206438 JULY 31, 2018

RULE 118 SPS. PASCUAL VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS GR. NO. 202597 FEBRUARY 08, 2017 SPS. TAPAYAN VS. PONCEDA MARTINEZ GR. NO. 207786 JANUARY 30, 2017

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LARA’S GIFT AND DECORS, INC., VS. PNB GENERAL INSURERS CO., INC. GR. NO. 230429 JANUARY 24, 2018 BENJAMIN VERGARA VS. ATTY. EUSEBIO OTADOYGR. NO. 192320 APRIL 4, 2016

DEMOSTHENES ARBILON VS. SOFRONIO MANLANGIT GR. NO. 197920 JANUARY 22, 2018

RULE 119 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPNES VS. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO & JULIUS LACANILAO G.R. NO. 240053 OCTOBER 9 2019 CECILIA RIVAC VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. NO. 224673 JANUARY 22, 2018 GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN G. R. NO. 220598, 19 JULY 2016 ROSEMARIE ERIBAL BOWDEN, VS. DONALD WILLIAM ALFRED BOWDEN G.R. NO. 228739 JULY 17, 2019 BDO UNIBANK, INC., PETITIONER V. ANTONIO CHOA, RESPONDENT., G.R. NO. 237553 JULY 10, 2019

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RULE 120 JAVIER VS GONZALES G.R. NO. 193150 JANUARY 23, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PIMENTEL G.R. NO. 223099 JANUARY 11, 2018 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ALAPAN G.R. NO. 199527 JANUARY 10, 2018

RULE 121 FELIMON MANANGAN V COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE G.R. NO. 82760 AUGUST 30, 1990

GUELOS V. PEOPLE GR NO. 177000 JUNE 19, 2017 PETRONILO NAPONE, JR. AND EDGAR NAPONE V PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 193085, NOVEMBER 29, 2017 MERCEDES GATMAYTAN VS. SPS. DOLOR GR. NO. 198120 FEBRUARY 20, 2017 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PANTOJA GR. NO. 223114 NOVEMBER 29,2017 RAMON REVILLA VS SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 218232 JULY 24, 2018

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RULE 110

JOSHUA CASANAS Y CABANTAC A.K.A. JOSHUA GERONIMO Y LOPEZ VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 223833. DECEMBER 11, 2017 CASE DOCTRINE Court Jurisdiction may be raised as an issue at any time in the proceedings; In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional in that a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. The venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE AND RULING 1.Whether the RTC Valenzuela had jurisdiction over the case? 2.Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Casanas’ conviction for the crime of carnapping? 1.NO. Under Rule 110 Sec 15, Place where action is to be instituted -subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional in that a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. As such, when it becomes apparent that the crime was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, the case must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Casanas primarily argues that RTC-Valenzuela had no jurisdiction over the case, as the alleged carnapping happened in Marilao Bulacan and not in Valenzuela City where he was arrested, charged and tried. 2. No. The RTC-Valenzuela ruling convicting Casanas of the crime charged as well as the CA ruling upholding the same is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. It is well setltled that “where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one and under which acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. It is not a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory. The criminal case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its re-filling in the proper court having territorial jurisdiction over the case.

FACTS An information was filed before the RTC of Valenzuela charging Casanas of the crime of carnapping, the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about August,2012 in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain, did there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away with him (1) Recal motorcycle with plate number 7539IJ without the consent of its owner Christopher Calderon y Dorigon, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant. The RTC-Valenzuela found Casanas guilty beyond reasonable doubt, holding that the prosecution had established all the elements of the crime charged, considering that: a. Calderon allowed petitioner to drive the subject motorcycle, which was attached to a sidecar b. Casanas did not return the subject motorcycle within the agreed period and c. Casanas continued to use the same for his personal use, thereby exhibiting his intent to gain In this regard, the RTC-Valenzuela ruled that while Casanas Possession of the subject motorcycle was lawful in the beginning, such possession became unlawful when he failed to return the same to Calderon in accordance with their agreement. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, Casanas moved for the reconsideration but the CA denied the same. Hence, this petition.

People of the Philippines vs Jerson Dasmarinas G.R. No. 203986 October 4, 2017 CASE DOCTRINE The sufficiency of the information is judged by the rule applicable at the time of its filing. That rule is in Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated but by the facts stated in the indictment, that is, the actual recital of the facts in the body of the information, and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. Indeed, the facts alleged in the body of the information, not the technical name given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, determine the character of the crime.

FACTS The accused Dasmarinas and Polo were charged with murder by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas for the killing of PO2 Marlon Anoya. According to the information filed by the prosecutor, the killing of the victim was qualified by the circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior stretch and evident premeditation. During the arraignment, polo pleaded not guilty while Dasmarinas also did the same. Both denied having killed the victim Anoya. During the trial of the case, accused Dasmarinas said he was not in the scene of the crime and that he was with his live-in partner in San Juan. The preliminary investigation of the case was already ongoing. The prosecutor sent subpoenas to the accused Dasmarinas requiring him to appear in the investigation. However, he denied having received such. He was arrested by the police with another case of robbery and another case filed for homicide. He also denied having known co-accused Polo. What he only knew was that Polo was detained in Mandaluyong City. Meanwhile, no case was filed against Polo because the subpoena sent to him returned and that no preliminary investigation was done to him. However, after the trial ensued, the RTC rendered a judgment finding accused Dasmarinas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and acquitting his co-accused Polo of the crime. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC finding the accused Dasmarinas guilty as charged. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE AND RULING 1. Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of the offense charged? No. The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal lacks merit, but the Court holds that the conviction of Dasmarinas for murder cannot be upheld. He is properly liable only for homicide. According to the Supreme Court, the acts constitutive of treachery in the information, without anything more, did not suffice for such term was a conclusion of law, not a factual averment. The consequences are dire for the State if the standards of sufficiency are not followed because the accused should be found and declared guilty only of the crime properly and sufficiently charged in the information. The failure of the information supposedly charging murder to aver the factual basis for the attendant circumstance of treachery forbids the appreciation of the circumstance as qualifying the killing; hence, the accused can only be found guilty of homicide. The information herein did not make any factual averment on how Dasmariñas had deliberately employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the act — setting forth such means, methods or forms in a manner that would enable a person of common understanding to know what offense was intended to be charged — that tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the accused arising from the defense that the victim might make. As earlier indicated, to merely state in the information that treachery was attendant is not enough because the usage of such term is not a factual averment but a conclusion of law.

EILEEN P. DAVID VS GLENDA S. MARQUEZ G.R. NO. 209859 JUNE 5, 2017 CASE DOCTRINE Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

ISSUE AND RULING 1. Whether the RTC of Manila have jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa? 2. Whether or not the respondent, on her own, have legal personality to file the petition for certiorari before the CA. 1. Yes. The RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa. The express provision of the law is clear that the filing of criminal actions arising from illegal recruitment before the RTC of the province or city where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense is allowed. Likewise, with the case of Estafa arising from such illegal recruitment activities, the outright dismissal thereof due to lack of jurisdiction was not proper, considering that as per the allegations in the Information, the same was within the jurisdiction of Manila. During the• preliminary investigation of the cases, respondent even presented evidence that some of the essential elements of the crime were committed within Manila, such as the payment of processing and/or placement fees, considering that these were deposited in certain banks located in Manila. 2. Yes. The respondent has the legal personality to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Court has ruled that a private offended party can file a special civil action for certiorari questioning the trial court's order acquitting the accused or dismissing the case, viz: In such special civil action for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he/she may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in the name of said complainant.

FACTS Respondent Glenda Marquez alleged, among others, that she is a resident of Sampaloc, Manila and that sometime in March 2005, petitioner approached her in Kidapawan City and represented that she could recruit her to work abroad. It was further alleged that petitioner demanded payment of placement fees and other expenses from the respondent for the processing of the latter's application, to which the respondent heeded. Respondent's application was, however, denied and worse, the money that she put out therefore was never returned. In her Counter-Affidavit and Counter Charge, petitioner averred that it was physically impossible for her to have committed the said acts as she was in Canada at the alleged time of recruitment as evidenced by the entries in her passport. Petitioner further averred that she was never engaged in the recruitment business. The petitioner alleged that the amount deposited in her account was not for her but was just coursed through her to be given to her friend in Canada who was the one processing respondent's application, as evidenced by a certification to that effect issued by the said friend. Further, petitioner argued before the Prosecutor that assuming arguendo that the allegations of recruitment were true, the case should be filed in Kidapawan City and not in Manila.

DEOGRACIA VALDERRAMA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JOSEPHINE ABL VIGDEN G.R. NO. 220054 MARCH 27, 2017 CASE DOCTRINE The Court ruled that the required conformity of the public prosecutor was not a mere superfluity and was necessary to pursue a criminal action. A private party does not have the legal personality to prosecute the criminal aspect of a case, as it is the People of the Philippines who are the real party-in-interest. The criminal case must be under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, when the public prosecutor does not give his or her conformity to the pleading of a party, the party does not have the required legal personality to pursue the case.

FACTS The Metropolitan Trial Court filed 4 Information for grave oral defamation against Valderrama pursuant to a complaint filed by Vigden. During the trial, Vigden was present but the private prosecutor was absent despite notice. On motion of the defense, the Metropolitan Trial Court considered the prosecution to have waived its right to present further evidence and required a formal offer of its documentary evidence within 5 days. The prosecution failed to offer ots evidence within 5 days from hearing. Valderrama filed an opposition arguing that the public prosecutor did not his conformity to Vigden’s Motion to Reconsider, in violation of Rule 110 Section 5 of the rules of Court, and the Motion to Reconsider’s Notice of Hearing “was defective because it was not addressed to the parties, and did not specify the date and time of the hearing”. She further argued that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period allowed for motions of reconsideration. Finally, she contended that the eight year delay in the prosecution of cases violated Valderrama’s right to speedy trial.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether or not the public prosecutor’s conformity to the motion for reconsideration is necessary? Yes. The respondent’s Motion to reconsider was fatally defective and should have been denied by the Metropolitan trial court. The public prosecutor’s conformity to the motion to Reconsider is necessary. In this case, there is no conformity from the public prosecutor. This circumstance was not denied by the private respondent. Private respondent merely claimed that the Office of the City Prosecutor did not object to the filing of the Motion to Reconsider. Respondent also did not set a hearing for the Motion To Reconsider. Instead, she simply submitted it for Metropolitan Trial Court’s immediate consideration. Since Vigden’s Motion to Reconsider was laden with procedural defects, the Metropolitan Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, its orders should be declared void.

MAYOR “JONG” AMAD CORPUS JR AND CARLITO SAMONTE VS HON JUDGE RAMON PAMULAR OF BRANCH 33, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIIJA, MRS PRISCILLA ESPINOSA AND NUEVA ECIJA PROVINCIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FLOR FLORENDO G.R. NO. 186403 SEPTEMBER 5, 2018

CASE DOCTRINE An allegation of conspiracy to add a new accused without changing the prosecution's theory that the accused willfully shot the victim is merely a formal amendment. However, the rule provides that only formal amendments not prejudicial to the rights of the accused are allowed after plea. The test of whether an accused is prejudiced by an amendment is to determine whether a defense under the original information will still be available even after the amendment is made and if any evidence that an accused might have would remain applicable even in the amended information.

ISSUE AND RULING 1. Whether or not Judge Ramon Pamular committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he allegedly admitted the Amended Information in clear defiance of law and jurisprudence, which proscribes substantial amendment of information prejudicial to the right of the accused? 1. Yes. The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended information are similar to that of the original information except as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte's co-accused and the insertion of the phrase "conspiring and confederating together." The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic theory of the prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelita. Hence, the amendment is merely formal. Rule 110, Section 14 similarly provides that in permitting formal amendments when the accused has already entered his or her plea, it is important that the amendments made should not prejudice the rights of the accused. In People v. Casey, the Court laid down the test in determining whether an accused is prejudiced by an amendment. Thus,the test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of information has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance — not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original information, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded selfdefense. While conspiracy is merely a formal amendment, Samonte will be prejudiced if the amendment will be allowed after his plea. Applying the test, his defense and corresponding evidence will not be compatible with the allegation of conspiracy in the new information. Therefore, such formal amendment after plea is not allowed.

FACTS Angelito Espinosa was shot by Samonte at Corpuz Street, Cuyapo Nueva Ecija on June 4, 2008. Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceedings, information for murder dated June 5, 2008 was filed against him. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense. Priscilla (wife of the deceased also filed an unsworn but signed reply to the affidavit of witnesses before first assistant Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-charge Floro Florendo. Bonifacio (Asst Public Prosecutor) was not able to comply with the directive to personally submit his resolution by January 22,2009 prompting Florendo to order him to surrender the records of the case as the latter was taking over the resolution of the case based on the evidence presented by the parties. In his January 26, 2009 Resolution, Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelito’s murder. He directed the Bling of an amended information2009 where he reinstated the Regional Trial Court October 7, 2008 Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of the murder complaint against Corpus. They averred that Judge Pamular’s action was premature considering that the motion to amend Information has yet to be scheduled for the hearing. Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned. Thus, the original charge against Samonte of murder and his deliberate manner of shooting Angelito remain unaltered. before the Regional Trial Court. Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a Review Resolution dated January 26,

PEOPLE VS LIPATA GR 200302 APRIL 20, 2016 CASE DOCTRINE "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.

RULE 111 ISSUE AND RULING Whether or not the appellant’s death extinguishes his criminal and civil liability. Appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza's criminal and civil obligations ex delicto shall be declared extinguished by his death prior to the final judgment. In 1994, this Court reconciled the separate doctrines on the matter of whether the death of the defendant awaiting appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil responsibility in People v. Bayotas. We concluded that the criminal case is extinguished upon the death of the accused awaiting appeal of his conviction, since there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action initiated therein for the recovery of civil responsibility ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, based on the offense.

FACTS At about 6:00 p.m. on September 1, 2005, after arriving home from work, Rolando Cueno immediately went to her aunt Mercelinda Valzado's house, which was situated just a block away from their house, to ask for Malunggay leaves. Appellant, Larry Lipata and a certain Rudy attacked the victim by repeatedly stabbing him. The attackers, including the appellant, used a bottle of tres cantos, an ice pick, and a broken piece of Red Horse glass. The victim managed to take the knife away from the appellant at one point and brandished the same towards his attackers. The victim's sister-in-law, Mercelinda Valzado, screamed for assistance and pleaded with the attackers to stop, but they did not stop stabbing the victim. Following that, the victim dropped to the ground. The appellant and the other attackers fled the scene upon seeing the victim crash. Mercelinda hurried the victim to a hospital with the aid of some friends, but he was pronounced dead upon arrival. The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt and of paying damages to the heirs of Rolando Cueno. A notice of appeal was filed by the Defendant via the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). The Quezon City Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 October 2012, informed this Court that appellant passed away on 13 February 2011.

DY VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 189081, AUGUST 10, 2016 CASE DOCTRINE Two kinds of acquittal: (1) because no crime was committed; (2) because prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The effect on the civil liability depends on why the accused was acquitted. The criminal liability and civil liability are separate and distinct. They may coexist but their existence is not dependent on each other.

ISSUE AND RULING WON petitioner should still be civilly liable for the crime of estafa when she has already been acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of estafa? Civil liability arising from a crime. A crime is a liability against the state. It is prosecuted by and for the state. On the other hand, civil liabilities take a less public and more private nature. Civil liabilities are claimed through civil actions as a means to enforce or protect a right or prevent or redress a wrong. Nevertheless, our jurisdiction recognizes that a crime has a private civil component. It is in recognition of this dual nature of a criminal act that our RPC provides that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. This is the concept of civil liability ex delicto.This is reinforced by Article 30 of the same code which refers to the filing of a separate civil action to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense. The RPC fleshes out this civil liability in Article 104 which states that it includes restitution, reparation of damage caused and indemnification for consequential damages.Difference between civil and criminal proceedings. Quantum of proof needed: guilty beyond reasonable doubt for criminal proceedings; only preponderance of evidence in civil proceedings , this is why the civil liability may still survive even after the accused is acquitted due to the prosecution’s failure to prove that the accused’s guilt is beyond reasonable doubt. The criminal liability and civil liability are separate and distinct. They may coexist but their existence is not dependent on each other.

FACTS The former General Manager of MCCI was Gloria Dy. The design of the warehouses in their Numancia Property was among the companies in which she supported (property leased by MCCI from PNB). Dy suggested the acquisition of a property owned by Pantranco to Mandy in May 1996. Mandy decided to take a P20 million loan backed by a chattel mortgage on the warehouses in the Numancia Property from the International China Bank of Commerce (ICBC). The supervision of the payment of the loan was assigned to Dy. MCCI issued a notice of foreclosure in February 1999. MCCII released approximately 25 checks amounting to P21 million (all payable to cash). Mandy had the checks delivered to Dy. Mandy says that he supplied the checks with the order to use the checks to pay the loan to the petitioner. On the other side, Dy testified that she had encashed the checks and given Mandy the money back. Eventually, ICBC foreclosed on the property as MCCI continued to default on its obligations. Mandy finally discovered that ICBC had not earned a check. Now, the complainant claims that because she was convicted for failing to prove all the elements of the crime alleged by the prosecution, no crime was indeed committed. As there was no wrongdoing, it is not necessary to award any civil responsibility ex delicto.

SUPREME TRANSPORTATIO N LINER INC V ANTONIO SAN ANDRES G. R. NO. 200444 AUGUST 15, 2018 CASE DOCTRINE Section 1 of the present Rule 111, which is known to have been initiated in criminal cases, is simply an action for the recovery of civil damages arising out of the crime or exdelicto. All such civil proceedings pursuant to Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and can be brought separately and tried individually, even without any reservation in the form of criminal proceedings.

FACTS Petitioners Supreme Transportation Liner Inc and Felix Ruz attack the CA's decision affirming the RTC's judgment rejecting their counterclaim on the ground that it would be tantamount to double damage recovery. Ernesto Belchez was driving a passenger bus, Mabel Tours Bus, operated by Antonio San Andres (San Andres) along Maharlika Highway, Brgy, at about 5:00 AM on November 5, 2002. Malabanban Norte, Quezon, Candelaria. The Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a Toyota Revo while crossing the highway and instantly swerved to the left, but in the process, hit head on the petitioner Supreme's owned bus operated by Ruz. San Andres lodged a lawsuit against petitioners claiming actual damage to the Mabel Tour Bus and unrealized profits for damages. The petitioners subsequently filed their response with Counterclaim, arguing that San Andres had no cause of action against them because the San Andres driver driving the Mabel Tours Bus was responsible for the vehicle accident. Supreme charged that it sustained damages, by way of counterclaim.RTC dismissed the appeal from San Andres as well as the counterclaim from petitioners for not reserving the right to institute a separate civil suit. The petitioners appealed, but the CA upheld the RTC's ruling.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether or not the petitioners’ counterclaim was correctly denied by the RTC. NO. Despite their inability to reserve the right to bring a separate civil suit in the criminal case they brought against the respondent's driver, the petitioners' counterclaim is permissible and should not have been dismissed by the RTC and the CA. However, there is a different story on whether or not they will recover damages for their counterclaim, as they could first demonstrate that they could not recover damages again for the same event. The CA concluded that the cause of action of the petitioners should be limited to the recovery of civil damages ex delicto, since the criminal case for criminal negligence pursuant to Article 3655 of the Revised Penal Code was brought against the respondent's driver. The CA was evidently of the opinion that the appeal of the petitioners against the respondent was limited to the recovery of his subsidiary responsibility as employer of the driver under and pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the CA pointed out that the nonreservation of the civil component of the criminal case by the petitioners barred them from bringing a separate civil action on the grounds of Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The CA thus erred. It wrongly appreciated the essence of the cause of action of the petitioners as presented in their counterclaim. Failure to make a reservation in criminal proceedings would not constitute a denial of the right, on the grounds of these articles of the Civil Code, to bring a separate and distinct civil suit. And after the filing of a criminal action, the prescriptive duration for civil cases based on certain articles of the Civil Code is still running. Indeed, civil proceedings based on certain articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil litigation considered to have been brought in the criminal proceedings.

RAMONES VS. SPOUSES GUIMOC GR. NO 226645 AUGUST 13, 2018 CASE DOCTRINE According to Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, "except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages." Of such exceptions, Rule 141 of Section 21 of the Rules of the Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which was represented in SC Circular No. 35-2004 and was already in place at the time the information was filed, specifies that it is appropriate to pay the filing fees in cases of fraud. Subsequent rulings now consistently hold that "when insufficient filing fees are initially paid by the plaintiffs and there is no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply."

ISSUE AND RULING WoN the CA correctly deleted the award of damages. NO. In this case, it is undisputed that the amount of P500.00 charged by the plaintiff was insufficient, under the grounds of Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.No. 04-2-04-SC to cover the demanded filing fees for her estafa case. However, it is equally undisputed that, as determined by the Clerk of Court of the MTC, she paid the full amount of docket fees, which is proven by a certification issued for it dated April 11, 2016. Furthermore, the applicant has repeatedly expressed her willingness to pay additional docket fees if necessary. In her petition, she argues that she is "very much willing to pay the correct docket fees which is the reason why she immediately went to the clerks of court and records show that she paid the [MTC] of the amount assessed from her." Indeed, on the part of the petitioner, the above allegations contradict any bad faith, much more believe any intention to defraud the government. As such, applying the abovediscussed criteria, the Court is of the opinion that the court has properly gained jurisdiction over the case. However, in compliance with Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of the Court, the petitioner should compensate the deficiency that is deemed to be a lien on monetary awards in her favour.

FACTS WoN the CA correctly deleted the award of damages. NO. In this case, it is undisputed that the amount of P500.00 charged by the plaintiff was insufficient, under the grounds of Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.No. 04-2-04-SC to cover the demanded filing fees for her estafa case. However, it is equally undisputed that, as determined by the Clerk of Court of the MTC, she paid the full amount of docket fees, which is proven by a certification issued for it dated April 11, 2016. Furthermore, the applicant has repeatedly expressed her willingness to pay additional docket fees if necessary. In her petition, she argues that she is "very much willing to pay the correct docket fees which is the reason why she immediately went to the clerks of court and records show that she paid the [MTC] of the amount assessed from her." Indeed, on the part of the petitioner, the above allegations contradict any bad faith, much more believe any intention to defraud the government. As such, applying the abovediscussed criteria, the Court is of the opinion that the court has properly gained jurisdiction over the case. However, in compliance with Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of the Court, the petitioner should compensate the deficiency that is deemed to be a lien on monetary awards in her favour.

PEOPLE VS ARAMBULO GR 186597 JUNE 17, 2015 CASE DOCTRINE These conditions must be present for a civil suit to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case in order to delay the criminal proceedings before the civil case is eventually resolved: (1) the civil case includes facts that are closely similar to those on which the criminal trial is based; (2) the resolution of the issue or issues posed in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

ISSUE AND RULING W/N there is a prejudicial question? Yes. The plaintiff claims that in SEC cases, any decision of the trial court as to the issue of who are the lawful officers or directors of Anaped does not decide the respondents' responsibility to remit rental collections in favor of Anaped. The petitioner stresses that Buban was an officer of Anaped at the time the request for remittance of the rental collections was made against the respondents and all his previous actions are legitimate and binding until such time as his authority is validly revoked. In addition, the petitioner warns that even during the pendency of the SEC proceedings, the responsibility of respondents to remit the collection still remains as the money remitted goes directly to the company and not to the individual who requested the remittance. Finally, the petitioner is of the opinion that the issue relating to Buban's authority to seek remittance may only be treated as a defense in the scam case and not as a basis for suspension of proceedings.A prejudicial question is one that occurs in a case whose resolution is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in it and whose knowledge relates to another tribunal. It is a dispute based on a fact separate and distinct from the crime, but so closely linked to it that it decides the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal proceedings, it must appear not only that the case contains facts closely similar to those on which the criminal prosecution will be based, but also that the problem or problems posed in the resolution.

FACTS Respondent Victoria Arambulo (Victoria), Gungab, Reynaldo, Domingo Reyes,Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes are the heirs of Sps Pedro Reyes and Anastacia Reyes. Anaped Estate, Inc. was incorporated as part of the estate planning or as a conduit to hold the Properties of the estate of Pedro Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.(Buban), as Vice-President and General Manager of Anaped Estate, Inc. led a complaint for estafa against Victoria and her husband Miguel Arambulo, Jr.(Miguel) before the office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City. He alleged that Victoria failed to remit the rentals collected from the time the ownership of the commercial apartments was transferred to Anaped.In their motion for suspension of proceedings, the respondents claimed that settling the SEC cases in their favour would inevitably lead to their acquittal in the criminal case, in particular as to whether the Rodrigo and Buban party were the legal representatives of the company and whether they were properly allowed to make a claim for remittance.

PEOPLE VS. ADOLFO GOYALA G.R.NO. 224650 JULY 15, 2020 CASE DOCTRINE Given the fact that the period has expired and regardless of the status of the appeal before the DOJ, the court has no discretion but to proceed with the arraignment.

RULE 116 PEOPLE V BRENDO PAGAL G.R.NO. 241257 SEPTEMBER 29. 2020 CASE DOCTRINE At the trial stage. When the accused makes a plea of guilty to a

FACTS Adolfo Goyala was accused of statutory rape. Goyala filed a Petition for Suspension on the ground of Prejudicial Question before ACP Oribe. However, ACP Oribe issued a Resolution finding probable cause against Goyala and recommending the filing of an Information for Statutory Rape. Goyala filed a Motion to Suspend Proceeding and hold in abeyance issuance of Warrant of Arrest. RTC denied Goyala’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings and hold in abeyance issuance of warrant of arrest. It reasoned that once a complaint or Information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests in the sound discretion of the court. The CA declared void and set aside the Orders of the RTC. The CA held the Goyala was deprived of his right to a full preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the Information against him.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether the proceedings in this case should continue to be held in abeyance despite the lapse of 60 day period provided for under Section 11 (C), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court It must be noted that during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings before the CA, the pending Motion for Reconsideration questioning the finding of probable cause was resolved against Goyala to appeal in an Undated Order. This prompted Goyala to appeal the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause to Department Justice Secretary. The petition was filed on October 25, 2015. Obviously, the 60 day period had ling expired and trial must proceed in due course. As explained in Crespo v Judge Mogul, when an Information has been filed in court, the prosecutor would be stripped of the power to dismiss the case, motu proprio. Instead, the court acquires the exclusive jurisdiction to decide what to do with the case even if it is against the position of the public prosecutor or even the Secretary of Justice. The 60 day period was enacted in recognition of the power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases and such ppower was never revoked by Crespo. As due deference to a coequal branch of government, the Rules allow a suspension of a criminal case to give an opportunity to Secretary of Justice to rectify, modify, or correct any mistake or error committed by his subordinates. Be that as it may, the Rules nevertheless see it fit to limit the suspension to only 60 days. Hence, given the fact that the period has expired and regardless of the status of the appeal before the DOJ, the court has no discretion but to proceed with the arraignment. The appellate court’s disquisition therefore, must be reversed considering the intervening events that have transpired.

capital offense, the trial court must strictly abide by the provisions of Sec.3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. In case the prosecution fails to present any evidence despite opportunity to do so, the trail court shall enter a judgment of acquittal in favor of the accused.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether RTC erred in convicting him on the sole basis of his guilty plea despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC failed to comply with the mandate of Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. There is no proof of whatsoever that the herein judge conducted the searching inquiry required. No other conclusion can be made other than that the RTC failed to discharge its duties. Pagal’s plea of guilt is improvident. What compounded the RTC’s strenuous oversight is the fact that the trial court penalized Pagal of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to present evidence of his guilt. This is indirect contravention of the mandate of the second duty stated in Sec. 3, Rule 116. In this regard, the Court agrees with the CA that Pagal’s guilt for the crime of murder was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is beyond cavil that the prosecution did not present any witness, despite being given four separate hearing to do so. Thus, the RTC’s conviction of Pagal relied solely on his improvident plea of guilty. The acquittal of Pagal is in order.

FACTS Brendo Pagal was accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder solely based on his plea of guilty. The RTC found the plea to be voluntary and with full understanding of its consequences. Thus, it directed the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant and to determine the exact degree of his culpability in accordance with Section 3, Rule 116 of Criminal Procedure. The RTC found Pagal guilty beyond reasonable doubt based solely on his plea of guilty. It stated that Pagal maintained his plea despite being apprised that he will be sentenced and imprisoned on the basis thereof. Pagal appealed the RTC Order to the CA and raised this singular error committed by the lower court stating that the trial court erred in convicting Pagal of the crime charged solely on the basis of the latter’s plea of guilty and despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The CA held that the RTC failed to comply with the requirements of Sec 3, Rule 116. Also, the CA observed that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction independent of the plea of guilty.

MAYOR AMADO CORPUS V JUDGE RAMON PAMULAR G.R. NO. 186403 SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 CASE DOCTRINE Rule 116, Section 3 provides for the grounds for suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in case of a pending petition for review of the prosecutor’s resolution filed before the Department of Justice.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether the arraignment of Amado Corpus may proceed after the lapse of the maximum 60 day period suspension provided under Rule 116 of the Criminal Procedure. Rule 116, Section 3 provides for the grounds for suspension of the arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in case of a pending petition for review of the prosecutor’s resolution filed before the Department of Justice. Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion before the RTC informing about their pending Petition for Review before the DOJ. Thus, Judge Pamular committed an error when he denied petitioners’ motion to suspend the arraignment of Corpus because of the pendecy of their Petition for Review. However, this Court’s rule merely requires a maximum 60 day period of suspension counted from the filing of a petition with the reviewing office. Therefore, after the expiration of the 60 day period. The trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. The filing of Petition for Review by the petitioner has lapsed the 60 day period hence, Judge Pamular can now continue with the arraignment and further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.

FACTS Angelito Espinosa was shot by Samonte. He was caught in flagrante delicto and thereafter was arrested. An Information for murder was filed against him. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded selfdefense. The wife of the deceased, Priscilla Espinosa, filed a complaint-affidavit captioned as Reply- Affidavit. RTC dismissed Prescilla’s complaint and attached affidavit of witnesses. She then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was opposed by Corpus. Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelito’s murder. He directed the filing of an amended information before the RTC. Florendo filed an undated Motion to Amend Information, praying for the admission of the amended information. Corpus and Samonte opposed this motion by filing Joint Urgent Manifastation/Opposition. Despite the Manifestation, Judge Pamular issued the assailed Order which granted the motion to amend the information and to admit the attached amended information. The assailed Order also directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.

ESTIPONA V LOBRIGO G.R. NO. 226679 AUGUST 15, 2017 CASE DOCTRINE Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre- trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre- trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion should not amount to grave abuse thereof.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether Section 23 of the RA 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of the said law. Is unconstitutional for being

NURULLAJE SAYRE VS DAX GONZAGA G.R. NO. 244413, 244415-16 FEBRUARY 8, 2020 CASE DOCTRINE A plea of bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains to the approval of the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.

ISSUE AND RULING

violative of the constitutional right to equal protection of the law. Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre- trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre- trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion should not amount to grave abuse thereof. If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.

Whether Judge Xenos acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he disregarded the provisions of OCA A plea of bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains to the approval of the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court states that Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. The use of the word “may” signifies that the trial court has discretion whether to allow the accused to make a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. Moreover, plea bargaining requires the consent of the accused, offended party, and the prosecutor. It is also essential that the lesser offense is necessarily included in the offense charged.

FACTS Estipona is accused for violation of Possession of Dangerous Drugs. Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a PleaBargaining Agreement praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and instead, to enter a plea of guilty. The prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Judgeg Lobrigo issued an Order denying the Estipona’s motion. The accused implies that Sec 23 of RA No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it suspends the operation of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.

FACTS Sayre was charged with violation of Sections 5, 11, and 12 of Article II of RA No. 9165. Sayre filed a Proposal for Plea Bargaining. Sayre filed a Motion for Approval of Plea-Bargaining Proposal with Modification to the OCA. He proposed that he be allowed to file an Application for Probation for the penalty of 6 months and 1 day to 4 years considering the maximum penalty is less than 6 years and that he be released from the custody of the Bureau of Jail Management upon its approval. The RTC deferred the pre- trial to afford Sayre another opportunity to convince the prosecution to accept his proposal.

PANGANIBAN VS VILLAPANDO G.R. NO. 214965, APRIL 26, 2017 CASE DOCTRINE As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.We have recognized that in certain situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice; (d) to promote public welfare and public policy; and (e) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof.

FACTS Villapando (assignee of Enhanced Electronics and Communications Services, Inc. of Condominium Unit No. 2821 and parking slot at the Legazpi Place in Makati City) file a complaint against (Maximo) and (Panganiban) Directors of ASB Realty Corporation for Violation of Sections 17,7 208 and 259 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957, otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree. Villapando alleged that there was failure on the part of Maximo and Panganiban and the other directors/officers of ASB to comply with PD No. 957 relative to the registration of contracts to sell and deeds of sale (Sec. 17), time of completion The common allegation in the complaints of Maximo and Panganiban was that Villapando committed perjury when the latter alleged in the complaint he filed against them that they were officers and directors of ASB at the time the Deed of Sale was executed between ASB and Enhanced Electronics on February 28, 1997. They claimed that they were not even employees of ASB in 1997 as they were both minors at that time. Villapando filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the person who filed the Information had no authority to do so. He asserted that the Information, as well as the Resolution finding probable cause against him, did not bear the approval of the City Prosecutor of Makati, Feliciano Aspi, which is contrary to Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. He then filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash Information25 on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. According to Villapando, violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957 are continuing crimes, hence, the allegations in the Information do not constitute an offense and a quashal of the same is warranted.

RULE 117

ISSUE AND RULING W/N the motion to quash will prosper. Yes. Villapando's liberty was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against him such that a resort to a petition for certiorari is recognized.As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.99The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform

CASTILLO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 216922, APRIL 18, 2018 CASE DOCTRINE "the motion to quash the search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress." Accordingly, the trial court could only take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in a motion to quash if (1) said issue was not available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter.39 Because petitioners' objection as to the particularity of the place to be searched was available when they filed their omnibus motion to quash, and there being no jurisdictional issue raised, their objection is deemed waived.

CABRAL VS BRACAMONTE G.R. NO. 233174 JANUARY 23, 2019 CASE DOCTRINE a court cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of its limited territory. In this relation, moreover, it has been held that the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.

ISSUE AND RULING W/N the Motion to quash will prosper regarding the venue where the information was filed Yes. Cabral is not wrong in saying that the crime of estafa is a

ISSUE AND RULING W/N the Motion to quash will prosperNo. The search warrant is valid and there was a complex crime committed.Judge Ong's inquiry underscored that Villador has a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed at the Felix Gumpal Compound on September 6, 2010. all the Constitutional and procedural requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are still present, namely: (1) probable cause; (2) such probable cause must be detennined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

FACTS Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio disappeared after going to Dimal’s house to negotiate for the sale of palay. The policemen searched the property of Dimal without warrant. Castillo was accosted by policemen and was tortured to implicate Dimal. Dimal was arrested by the Echague Police. On September 27,2010, the Echague Police filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Hagan, Isabela, a criminal complaint for Kidnapping for Ransom and Multiple Murder against Dimal, Castillo, Sapipi, Miranda, Marvin Guiao and Robert Baccay.They filed a motion to quash due to invalid search warrant and declare the seized items inadmissible.

continuing or transitory offense and may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place, the pieces of evidence on record point only to one place: Makati City. Time and again, the Court has ruled that "in criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements of the crime or offense was committed must be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere allegation is not proof and could not justify sentencing a man to jail or holding him criminally liable. To stress, an allegation is not evidence and could not be made equivalent to proof."17 Thus, since the evidence adduced during the trial showed that the offense allegedly committed by Bracamonte was committed somewhere else, the trial court should have dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction.

FACTS Bracamonte and Cabral executed a MOA n Makati City for the purchase of shares of stock in Wellcross Freight Corporation (WFC) and Aviver International Corporation (AV/VER).When the check was presented for payment, however, the drawee bank in Makati City dishonored the same for lack of sufficient funds. Consequently, for failure to settle the obligation, Cabral instituted a complaint for estafa against Bracamonte in Parañaque City.

SALCEDO VS SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 223869960, FEBRUARY 13, 2019 CASE DOCTRINE

CAGANG VS SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 206438 JULY 31, 2018 CASE DOCTRINE general rule, the denial of a motion to quash is not appealable as it is merely interlocutory. Likewise, it cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The denial of the motion to quash can still be raised in the appeal of a judgment of conviction. The adequate, plain, and speedy remedy is to proceed to trial and to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Rule 117 section 3 states the ground for motion to quash. It stated clearly that for a motion to quash to prosper,the facts charged should not constitute an offense

ISSUE AND RULING W/N the Motion to Quash will prosperNo. According to the Sandiganbayan, all the Informations contained the requisite factual averments constituting the essential elements of the crime charge. It ruled that it is not material whether ninety-two or thirty Informations should be filed, in the determination of whether the Informations should be quashed on the ground that the allegations do not constitute an offense

ISSUE AND RULING W/N the Motion to Quash will prosper Yes. Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to quash simply signals the commencement of the process leading to trial. The denial of a motion to quash, therefore, is not necessarily prejudicial to the accused. During trial, and after arraignment, prosecution proceeds with the presentation of its evidence for the examination of the accused and the reception by the court Thus, in a way, the accused is then immediately given the opportunity to meet the charges on the merits. Therefore, if the case is intrinsically without any grounds, the acquittal of the accused and all his suffering due to thecharges can be most speedily acquired.The rules and jurisprudence, thus, balance procedural niceties and the immediate procurement of substantive justice. In our general interpretation,

FACTS Congressman Neil C. Tupas, Jr. (Cong. Tupas, Jr.) of the Fifth District of Iloilo requested the Commission on Audit (COA) to conduct an audit examination on the implementation of the various projects of the Municipality of Sara, Iloilo.the COA created a special audit team sometime in July 2008 that later on conducted a seven (7)-day audit investigation focusing on several priority projects of the Municipality of Sara funded by the Provincial Government of Iloilo and the Office of Senator Franklin DrilonCong. Tupas, Jr. filed three separate complaints affidavits charging petitioner Salcedo and other officials of the Municipality of Sara with violations of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (OMB-Visayas), Regional Office, Iloilo, arising from the alleged illegal releases of government funds.

therefore, the accused is normally invited to meet the prosecution's evidence squarely during trial rather than skirmish on procedural points.A party may, however, question the denial in a petition for certiorari if the party can establish that the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion: [A] direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice;" the promotion of public welfare and public policy; cases that "have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof;" or judgments on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition for certiorari.In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of the cited instances.

FACTS On February 10, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint alleging that Amelia May Constantino, Mary Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan of the Vice Governor's Office, Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption by diverting public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as "dummies.

SPS. PASCUAL VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS GR. NO. 202597 FEBRUARY 08, 2017 CASE DOCTRINE It is only at pre-trial that the rules allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, as provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court

ISSUE AND RULING Whether or not the court erred in its decision of dismissing the action with prejudice due to petitioner’s failure to appear during the Preliminary Conference. The petitioners received the assailed resolution of November 16, 2011 on November 24, 2011. The CA actually received the motion on December 12, 2011. Considering that Section 1 (d) of Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provided that motions sent through private messengerial services are deemed filed on the date of the CA's actual receipt of the same, the motion was already filed out of time by December 12, 2011. Needless to remind, the running of the period of appeal of the final resolution promulgated on November 16, 2011 was not stopped, rendering the assailed resolution final and executory by operation of law.14 To be clear, the rule only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment has earlier been filed the pre-trial may be the occasion in which the court considers the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. If no such motion was earlier filed, the pre-trial judge may then indicate to the proper party to initiate the rendition of such judgment by filing the necessary motion. Indeed, such motion is required by either Rule 34 (Judgment on the Pleadings) or Rule 35 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of Court. The pre-trial judge cannot motu proprio render the judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. In the case of the motion for summary judgment, the adverse party is entitled to counter the motion.

FACTS On February 14, 2011, the petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals (CA) in order to nullify and set aside the decision rendered in Special Proceedings Case No. 4577 by the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC) ordering the cancellation of their notice of lis pendens recorded in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-42190 of the Register of Deeds of Butuan City. On November 16, 2011, the CA promulgated the first assailed resolution dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment. Considering that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is an original action before the Court of Appeals, pre-trial is mandatory, per Section 6 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, whereby the failure of the plaintiff to appear would mean dismissal of the action with prejudice. The filing of a pre-trial brief has the same import. The Supreme Court has invariably ruled that while "litigation is not a game of technicalities," it is equally important that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

RULE 118

SPS. TAPAYAN VS. PONCEDA MARTINEZ GR. NO. 207786 JANUARY 30, 2017 CASE DOCTRINE Grounds for objection not raised at the proper time shall be considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court may not consider any other ground for objection, except those that were raised at the proper time.

FACTS The parties herein executed a Deed of Undertaking in reference to the DBP Mortgage. The DBP Loan was not paid when it fell due. Respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against petitioners before the RTC of Ozamis CIty.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether or not the plain copy of the Deed of Undertaking was admissible as proof of its contents, in violation of the best evidence rule under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Yes. The plain copy of the Deed of Undertaking was admissible for failure to raise a timely objection. The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section 3 of Rule 130. However, to set this rule in motion, a proper and timely objection is necessary.The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is (sic) the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.

LARA’S GIFT AND DECORS, INC., VS. PNB GENERAL INSURERS CO., INC. GR. NO. 230429 JANUARY 24, 2018 CASE DOCTRINE The requirements laid down in Sec. 2 of the JA Rule that the parties must file with the court and serve on the adverse party the Judicial Affidavits of their witnesses not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference. While the belated submission of evidence is not totally disallowed, it is still, to reiterate, subject to several conditions, which the petitioner failed to comply with. Specifically, the records are bereft of any justification, or "good cause," for the filing of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit during trial instead of during the pre-trial.

FACTS During the trial, petitioner's counsel produced the Questioned Documents in open court and asked Mr.Villafuerte to identify those documents, seeking to introduce and mark them as exhibits. Respondents immediately objected in open court to the introduction and presentation of the Questioned Documents on the grounds that they were neither touched upon nor covered by the witness' cross-examination, and that the same were being introduced for the first time at this late stage of proceeding, without giving the parties opportunity to verify their relevance and authenticity.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether or not the CA erred in disallowing the introduction of additional documentary exhibits during trial and the filing of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte. YES. The JA Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the submission of additional evidence even after trial had already commenced. The trial court has the discretion to allow the introduction of additional evidence during trial other than those that had been previously marked and identified during the pre-trial, provided there are valid grounds.The trial court precisely exercised this discretion. It allowed the introduction of the Questioned Documents during the re-direct examination of Mr. Villafuerte upon petitioner's manifestation that the same are being presented in response to the questions propounded by PNB Gen's counsel, Atty. Mejia,during the cross-examination.

BENJAMIN VERGARA VS. ATTY. EUSEBIO OTADOYGR. NO. 192320 APRIL 4, 2016 CASE DOCTRINE

DEMOSTHENES ARBILON VS. SOFRONIO MANLANGITGR. NO. 197920 JANUARY 22, 2018 CASE DOCTRINE

Pre-trial answers the call for the speedy disposition of cases. Under

Pre-trial is primarily intended to insure that the parties properly

Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the counsels and the parties are mandated to appear at pre-trial. Their non-appearance may be

raise all issues necessary to dispose of a case. The parties must disclose during pretrial all issues they intend to raise during the

excused only if there is a valid cause or if a representative appears on their behalf. If the defendant fails to appear, the RTC may allow

trial, except those involving privileged or impeaching matters. Although a pre-trial order is not meant to catalogue each issue that

the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte and may render judgment based on it.

the parties may take up during the trial, issues not included in the pre-trial order may be considered only if they are impliedly included in the issues raised or inferable from the issues raised by necessary implication.

FACTS This case stemmed from a petition for habeas corpus decided by this Court in G.R. No. 154037. In that case, the petitioners were arrested for indirect contempt because they refused to comply with the probate court’s order to pay rentals to Anselma Allers’ estate. This Court ruled that their imprisonment was unwarranted as it violated the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for non-payment of debt.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Atty. Otadoy’s motion to postpone the pretrial conference.

FACTS Manlangit (respondent) in his complaint for recovery of possession with writ of replevin, alleged that he purchased on credit one (1) compressor and one (1) unit of Stainless Pump, 3 horsepower, single phase for P200,000 and P65,999, respectively, from Davao Diamond Industrial Supply ( Davao Diamond). respondent claimed that the compressor had been in the possession of petitioner from November 1997 up to the time of the filing of the complaint, that despite demand, petitioner failed to return the same to respondent.

ISSUE AND RULING

NO. The RTC had a legal basis to deny the motion for postponement. The SC ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Atty. Otadoy’s motion. Pre-trial

Whether or not the CA erred when it rule that respondent is the owner of the compressor, hence entitled to its possession.

answers the call for the speedy disposition of cases. Under Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the counsels and the parties are mandated to appear at pre-trial. Their non-appearance may be excused only if there is a valid cause or if a representative appears on their behalf.

Yes. The records of the case show that Leanillo paid the compressor in behalf of respondent. The answer of petitioner to the complaint of respondent stated that the former voluntarily assumed paying

If the defendant fails to appear, the RTC may allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte and mat render judgment based on it. In deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to postpone the pretrial, the court must take into account two factors: (a) the reason given, and (b) the merits of the movant’s case. We note that Atty. Otadoy’s failure to attach proof that he attended the alleged lectureship weighs heavily against him. In the present case, Atty. Otadoy not only failed to appear during pretrial; he also failed to file the mandatory pre-trial brief within the prescribed time.

the compressor since the same was beneficial to the mining operations of Double A. further, the receipts issued by Davao Diamond to Leanillo state that the same is “in partial payment of the existing account incurred by respondent” and is “in partial payment of respondent’s account with Davao Diamond relative to one (1) unit compressor.” Having ruled that Leanillo paid the compressor in behalf of respondent, the latter has therefore complied with his obligation to fully pay the compressor. Ownership of the compressor can now legally pass to respondent. As such, the latter has the right to possess the compressor since possession is an attribute of ownership.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPNES VS. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO AND JULIUS LACANILAO G.R. NO. 240053 OCTOBER 9 2019 CASE DOCTRINE Section 15 of Rule 119, which provides the examination of witnesses for the prosecution, states that “when it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date or returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending.”

ISSUE AND RULING Whether or not rule 119, section 15 rules of court is applicable in the instant case. Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is inapplicable in the instant case. Section 15, Rule 119 which applies to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, Mary Jane's deposition must be taken before the court where the case is pending. In other words, the appellate court opines that Mary Jane's testimony must be taken before the trial court, where the cases of respondents are being heard, and not in Indonesia.Section 15. Examination of a witness for the prosecution. - When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. Under the foregoing provision, in order for the testimony of the prosecution witness be taken before the court where the case is being heard, it must be shown that the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.

RULE 119

FACTS Mary Jane Veloso, Maria Cristina P. Sergio and Julius L. Lacanilao were friends and neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation and susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to bring on her trip. She then asked Cristina why the luggage was heavy but the latter simply replied that because it was new. The luggage was the same bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained prohibited drugs.The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. They informed the Indonesian Government that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and her testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius.Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should be made before and not during the trial.Also, they argued that such method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution

CECILIA RIVAC VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. NO. 224673 JANUARY 22, 2018 CASE DOCTRINE A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment and the only controlling guideline covering a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice. This remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice

FACTS On August 4, 2007, Rivac went to the jewelry store owned by private complainant Asuncion C. Fariñas where she received from the latter several pieces of jewelry in the aggregate amount of P439,500.00, which were meant for her to sell on consignment basis,[6] as evidenced by a document called jewelry consignment agreement. Fariñas and Rivac agreed that after seven (7) days, Rivac was obligated to either remit the proceeds of the sold jewelry or return the unsold jewelry to Fariñas should she fail to sell the same. However, despite the lapse of the aforesaid period, Rivac failed to perform what was incumbent upon her, causing Fariñas to send her a demand letter

ISSUE AND RULING Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that it was improper for the RTC to reopen its proceedings Section 24, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure governs the reopening of criminal cases for further trial. It states in verbatim: "At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice.Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, and in the furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appearsIn this light, the CA clearly erred in holding that: (a) it was improper for the RTC to reopen its proceedings because the latter court had already promulgated its judgment; and (b) assuming arguendo that what it did was a new trial, there were no grounds for its allowance. To reiterate, a motion to reopen may be filed even after the promulgation of a judgment and before the same lapses into finality, and the only guiding parameter is to "avoid the miscarriage of justice." As such, the RTC correctly allowed the reopening of proceedings to receive Fariñas's subsequent testimony in order to shed light on the true nature of her transaction with Rivac, and potentially, determine whether or not the latter is indeed criminally liable.

ISSUE AND RULING

GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN G. R. NO. 220598, 19 JULY 2016

Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail thedenial of the demurrers to evidence. Yes. The petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the denial of her demurrer to evidence.The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such aninterlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law.Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or thedemurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion

CASE DOCTRINE The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

FACTS Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo vs.People of the Philippines and the

Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016FACTS:On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Auditwhose charges were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after theirrespective demurrers to evidence were granted, except for Uriarte andValdes who were at large) for conspiracy to commit plunder.After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed theirdemurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish acase for plunder against them.The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case againstthe accused within its jurisdiction, except for petitioners and Valencia. Itheld that there was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired tocommit plunder.Petitioners filed this case before the Supreme Court on certiorari before theSupreme Court to assail the denial of their demurrers to evidence, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

ROSEMARIE ERIBAL BOWDEN, REPRESENTED BY FLORENCIO C. ERIBAL, SR., PETITIONER, V. DONALD WILLIAM ALFRED BOWDEN, RESPONDENT., G.R. NO. 228739 JULY 17, 2019 CASE DOCTRINE The rule barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is not absolute. The following are the recognized exceptions thereto: (i) when the prosecution is denied due process of law; and (ii) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused'[s] demurrer to evidence

FACTS Rosemarie Eribal Bowden (petitioner) was the registered owner of a 2004 Mitsubishi Pajero (subject vehicle) with Plate No. FFD 228.The subject vehicle was sold to Virgilio S. Ramos (Ramos) without petitioner's consent by her then husband Donald William Alfred Bowden (respondent), a British national residing in Iloilo City. The marriage of petitioner and respondent was dissolved by virtue of a Decree of Divorce dated June 12, 2006.Petitioner claimed that while she was in London, she entrusted the Original Receipt-Certificate of Registration (OR-CR) of the subject vehicle to her niece Juvelyn Enate.However, during petitioner's marriage with respondent, the latter executed an affidavit of lossof the OR-CR and submitted it to the Roxas City District, Office of the Land Transportation Office (LTO). This paved the way for the issuance of a new OR-CR to respondent which he used to execute a deed of saleof the subject vehicle in his favor. Respondent submitted the deed of sale to the LTO and a new CR was issued in his name. Both affidavit of loss and deed of sale bore forged signatures of petitioner, prompting her to file criminal complaints against respondent.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether or not the honorable court of appeals gravely erred in granting the appeal interposed by respondent considering that the order denying demurrer to evidence is merely a perceived error of judgment and not correctible by certiorari The petition is barren of merit.Under Section 23, paragraph 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, a criminal action may be dismissed on the ground of insufficiency of evidence in two ways: (1) on the court's initiative, after an opportunity to be heard is accorded the prosecution; and (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In both instances, the dismissal may be made only after the prosecution rests its case.When the accused files a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence, it is incumbent upon the trial court to review and examine the evidence presented by the prosecution and determine its sufficiency to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. If competent evidence exists, the court shall deny the demurrer and the accused may still adduce evidence on his behalf if the demurrer was filed with leave of court. If filed without leave, the accused submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the court finds the evidence insufficient to support a verdict of guilt, the court shall grant the demurrer and the criminal case shall be dismissed. Such dismissal is a resolution on the merits and tantamount to an acquittal. Any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal is a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.[26] Accordingly, an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence cannot be the subject of an appeal.It bears stressing, however, that the Court is not at all precluded from reviewing an order of denial if it is shown that grave abuse of discretion attended its issuance

BDO UNIBANK, INC., PETITIONER V. ANTONIO CHOA, RESPONDENT., G.R. NO. 237553 JULY 10, 2019 CASE DOCTRINE When a demurrer is granted in a criminal case, the private complainant can file a Rule 65 petition on the civil aspect of the case, as long as he or she can show that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he issued the Order granting respondent Antonio Choa's Demurrer to Evidence. RULE

119,SECTION

23.

Demurrer

Evidence.

—

After

the

prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after

FACTS On February 28, 2008, an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City against Choa, then president and general manager of Camden Industries, Inc. (Camden). He was charged with violating Presidential Decree No. 115, or the Trust Receipts Law, to the prejudice of BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO), the private complainant.On August 20, 2014, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, which the trial court admitted in its September 12, 2014 Order. In the same Order, the trial court gave Choa 10 days to comment on the prosecution's evidence.On October 30, 2014, the prosecution filed its Opposition. Arguing that the Motion for Leave should be expunged from the records, it claimed that the pleading was pro-forma for being filed beyond the five (5)-day reglementary period under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Rules of CourtEven if the Motion was timely filed, the prosecution asserted that it should still be denied for lack of basis, maintaining that Choa's civil liabilities could not have been offset by the judgment award granted to Camden in the Pasig civil case. It points out that since Choa's civil liabilities stemmed from his criminal violations of the Trust Receipts Law, they could not be the subject of compensation

giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a nonextendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a nonextendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period often (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

JAVIER VS GONZALES G.R. NO. 193150 JANUARY 23, 2017 CASE DOCTRINE Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to promulgate a judgment in absentia and gives the accused the opportunity to file an appeal within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice to the latter or the latter's counsel; otherwise, the decision becomes final.

ISSUE AND RULING W/N there is a valid promulgation of judgmentYes there was. If the accused has been notified of the date of promulgation, but does not appear, the promulgation of judgment in absentia is warranted. This rule is intended to obviate a repetition of the situation in the past when the judicial process could be subverted by the accused by jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment.47 The only essential elements for its validity are as follows: (a) the judgment was recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) a copy thereof was served upon the accused or counsel.

FACTS Javier threw a grenade inside the house of Hermenigildo which caused his death and one Rufino. Their other companions sustained injuries with that said event.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PIMENTEL G.R. NO. 223099 JANUARY 11, 2018 CASE DOCTRINE our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable

ISSUE AND RULING W/N the judgement of acquittal is validYes. a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.

FACTS AAA testified that accused-appellant followed her, grabbed her, and brought her to the back of a school. There, accused-appellant removed AAA's shorts and t-shirt, laid on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina.5Two months later, accused-appellant went inside AAA's house through a window one night, undressed himself and AAA, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. On both occasions, accused-appellant threatened to kill AAA if she told anybody what had happened.

RULE 120

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ALAPAN G.R. NO. 199527 JANUARY 10, 2018 CASE DOCTRINE doctrine of immutability of judgment precludes modification of a final and executory judgment:

FACTS Spouses Alapan were charged with eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. In August 2005, the Spouses Alapan borrowed ₱400,000.00 from petitioner Brian Victor Britchford (petitioner) with a promise that they would pay the said amount within three (3) months. To secure the indebtedness, respondent issued eight (8) postdated checks.When the checks matured, petitioner deposited then at the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Olongapo City branch. One week thereafter, PNB informed petitioner that the checks were dishonored for the reason that the account against which the checks were drawn was closed. Petitioner immediately informed respondent of the dishonor of the checks.On their part, the Spouses Alapan averred that their account was closed only on the last week of October 2005 because they suffered business reverses. They nonetheless stated that they were willing to settle their monetary obligation.

ISSUE AND RULING W/N the judgement is validYes. Municipal Trial Court, San Felipe, Zambales (MTC), convicted respondent of eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Big. 22. It imposed a penalty of fine instead of imprisonment considering that respondent's act of issuing the bounced checks was not tainted with bad faith and that he was a first-time offender. On the other hand, the MTC acquitted Myrna because she did not participate in the issuance of the dishonored check.After the MTC judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued.There is no doubt that the MTC decision has long attained finality and that none of the aforementioned exceptions finds application in this case. Hence, the MTC decision stands and any other question involving the said decision must now be put to rest.

FELIMON MANANGAN V COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE G.R. NO. 82760 AUGUST 30, 1990 CASE DOCTRINE The petitioner has brought upon himself the most severe censure and a penalty for contempt for abuse of court proceedings, hopping from one forum to another, filing a labyrinth of cases and pleadings, thwarting the smooth prosecution of Criminal Case No. 639 against him for no less than twelve (12) years, and for masquerading as Filemon Manangan when his real name is Andres Culanag.

FACTS Criminal case No. 639 'People v. Filemon Manangan alias Andres Culanag' (Annex D, Petition, Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 20) was brought before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, First Judicial District of Bayombong on 30 June 1978, accusing the petitioner of 'execution of acts of intimidation' pursuant to Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code (the Criminal Case, for short). The Director of Lands had apparently provided the charge with his imprimatur.Furthermore, the petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeal had irregularly assumed jurisdiction, since Sandiganbayan had exclusive original jurisdiction over the case, taking the view that he was Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands, Region II, and that he allegedly committed the offense in relation to that office.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the Criminal Case against Culanag considering that he was Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands, Region II, and that he had supposedly committed the offense in relation to that office. NO. In his amended petition and second amended petition, the petitioner's argument that it is the Sandiganbayan who has exclusive jurisdiction over the criminal case does not hold water because he is not only ineligible for the position of Legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands, Region II, because he was not a lawyer, but also because the Director dismissed him from service on 27 March 1980.

RULE 121

GUELOS V. PEOPLE GR NO. 177000 JUNE 19, 2017 CASE DOCTRINE Section 14 of Rule 124, a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be filed at any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the CA convicting the appellant becomes final. Further, Rule 45, Section 1 clearly provides that a motion for new trial is not among the remedies which may be entertained together with a petition for appeal on certiorari.

FACTS Two separate information against the petitioners for Direct Attack Upon an Employee of a Person in Authority with Homicide was filed with the RTC. The information states that on 4 June 1995, at approximately 5:00 p.m. in the afternoon, at Barangay Boot, Tanauan Municipality, Batangas Province, Philippines, the accused, conspiring and confederating, acting jointly and mutually assisting each other, while armed with an Armalite Rifle, Nestor unlawfully and feloniously assaulted, assaulted and shot SPO2 Estelito Andaya and PNP, and while being held from the back by Gil and other companions, whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown, hit and inflicted gunshot wounds caused instantaneous death.A request for investigation was lodged alleging that the testimony of the witnesses of the prosecution was uncorroborated by proof to determine guilt. They said that Camacho was not carrying out his duties, that Carandang's injuries were not backed by evidence, and that Carandang's testimony was not rational. There was also a motion for a new trial based on alleged new and material facts questioning PO2 Carandang's credibility because his testimony was different from the one in the MTC Tanauan case pending.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether the motion for new trial based on new evidence should be grantedRULING:NO. The petitioners argue that the testimony of Carandang should be seen as fresh and material facts, rendering the conclusions of the trial court manifestly false, ridiculous or unlikely in the present case. Thus, without withdrawing their petition, the petitioners moved for a fresh trial on the basis of supposed newly discovered evidence. The petitioners' motion for a fresh trial would be dismissed. Section 1, Rule 121, states that the court can grant new trials before the judgment of conviction is final. Section 14, Rule 124, states that after appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before judgment of conviction of CA is final, a motion for fresh trial based on newly discovered facts may be filed.The petitioners state that Carandang could not recognize who struck him and killed Camacho at the MTC. But 10 years after the RTC testimony, this testimony was given in relation to the RTC trial that was given a year and 10 months after the incident. Therefore, there is no justification to merit the statement of new proof.The Court finds, in a criminal case and an appeal, that the case is simply a matter of law; whether or not the fundamental right of the accused to be told of the existence and reason of the allegation against them has been properly followed.

PETRONILO NAPONE, JR. AND EDGAR NAPONE V PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 193085, NOVEMBER 29, 2017 CASE DOCTRINE

FACTS At about 8:00 p.m. on 22 September 1992, at Barangay Mabunga, Municipality of Baungon, Bukidnon Province, Salvador and his son, Robert Espelita (Robert), arrived at Janioso's house to appeal for assistance. When Janioso came out of her home, she saw Salvador with blood on his forehead, and Calib Napone (Calib) with blood on his lip, mud-laden,7 and trying to get rid of Salvador, catching him by the back of his shirt collar. Calib is Senior's son and Junior and Edgar's brother. Thereafter, Janioso directed one of her employees to find a vehicle to be used to bring Salvador and Calib to the hospital. Janioso was Salvador's balae.Edgar and Junior, meanwhile, also left the car. Edgar hurled at Salvador a stone the size of a palm. Junior then shot Salvador with a small weapon three (3) times, hitting the latter on his face, causing him to collapse. Janioso hurried to Salvador's assistance immediately. She saw Junior running away with the pistol as she was attempting to raise Salvador. As her concern was to get Salvador to the hospital, she no longer took care of Edgar and Senior. Salvador was pronounced dead at the hospital.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether or not the Napones are entitled to benefit from any

The circumstances underlying the tragic occurrence warrant the recognition of a criminal offense's mitigating conditions of vindication. In order to be credited, the following conditions must be satisfied: (1) that there is a serious offense committed in the same degree by the person who committed the felony, his family, ascendants, descendants, legal, natural or adopted brothers or sisters or relatives; and (2) that the felony is committed in the vindication of that serious offense.

mitigating circumstance. The circumstances underlying the tragic occurrence warrant the recognition of a criminal offense's mitigating conditions of vindication. In order to be credited, the following conditions must be satisfied: (1) that there is a serious offense committed in the same degree by the person who committed the felony, his family, ascendants, descendants, legal, natural or adopted brothers or sisters or relatives; and (2) that the felony is committed in the vindication of that serious offense.Although the Napones did not witness it, they must have been infuriated by the assault on Calib that threatened his life. In their minds, the assumption that the Espelitas were responsible for the severe injuries received by a member of their family created rage that clouded their judgment. The Napones were filled with resentment after seeing Calib bloody, prostrate on the ground and maybe clinging for dear life, culminating in the attack on Salvador. Therefore, their actions were committed in vindication of a serious crime.

MERCEDES GATMAYTAN VS. SPS. DOLORGR. NO. 198120FEBRUARY 20, 2017 CASE DOCTRINE It is just as basic that a judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it becomes final and executory. Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. Accordingly, a final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land

FACTS The instant case stemmed from the RTC's March 27, 2006 Decision, resolving an action for reconveyance against petitioner Gatmaytan, and in favor of the respondents-spouses Francisco and Hermogena Dolor (Dolor Spouses). The RTC ordered Gatmaytan to convey the subject lot to the Dolor Spouses. Gatmaytan filed the Present Petition, insisting that the RTC's March 27, 2006 Decision has not attained finality as the April 14, 2006 service was made to her counsel's former address (at No. 117 West Avenue, Quezon City) as opposed to the address (at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon City) that her counsel indicated in a June 8, 2004 Notice of Change of Address filed with the RTC. Gatmaytan adds that the RTC noted the change of address in an Order, and directed that, from then on, service of papers, pleadings, and processes was to be made at her counsel's updated address at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon City.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether the RTC’s March 27, 2006 Decision has already attained finality, thus, precluding the filing of petitioner Gatmaytan’s appeal with the CA. It is just as basic that a judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it becomes final and executory. Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. Accordingly, a final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. In accordance with Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is timely filed, the judgment or final order from which it arose shall become final.In turn, Rule 37, Section 1, in relation to Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, allows for 15 days from notice of a judgment or final order within which a Motion for Reconsideration may be filed. In this case, none of the documents that petitioner adduced before this Court attests to the truth of her allegation that service to her counsel's new and correct address was made only on June 1, 2006. In her Petition, petitioner alluded to a receipt attached at the back of the RTC's March 27, 2006 decision. No copy of this receipt, however, was produced by petitioner. Lacking evidentiary basis, petitioner's contention that service upon her counsel's updated and correct address was made only on June 1, 2006 cannot be sustained. As her plea for relief hinges on this singular detail, we are constrained to deny such. Bereft of any avenue for revisiting the RTC's March 27, 2006 Decision, its findings and ruling must stand.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PANTOJA GR. NO. 223114 CASE DOCTRINE NOVEMBER 29,2017 FACTS On the night of 28 June 1957. Estelita Erotes was serenaded by seven young men. They were invited inside the house and Philippine Arme Sergeant Gestilio Pantoja came and wanted to seat beside Erotes who is beside Wenceslao Hernandez. Hernandez declined and the group left about 1:30 am. Pantoja left as well and armed himself with a rifle. He waited for the group to descend the house and followed them. Pantoja shouted, aimed at them and fired. Angel Marasigan and Wenceslao Hernandez were hit. Still Pantoja walked near them and shot at them four times. The Court of First Instance convicted him for the crime of murder.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether accused-appellant has clearly and convincingly proven his defense of insanity to exempt him from criminality. The Supreme court saw no reason to overturn the decision of the CA. A scrutiny of the evidence presented by accused-appellant fails to establish that he was completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he fatally stabbed the victim. Cederina tends to show that the accused-appellant exhibited signs of mental illness only after being injured in an altercation in 2003; that she observed changes in his personality and knew he had difficulty sleeping since then; and that he was confined at the NCMH on 8 July 2010 from where he subsequently escaped. Nothing in her testimony pointed to any behavior of the accusedappellant at the time of the incident in question; or in the days and hours before the incident, which could establish that he was insane when he committed the offense.

RAMON REVILLA VS SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 218232 JULY 24, 2018 CASE DOCTRINE To issue a Writ of Preliminary Attachment, there should be a factual foundation for the attachment of properties, and an adequate and fair opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification.

ISSUE AND RULING Whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment is properly anchored under Section 1 and 2 (B) and (C) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court The provisional remedy of attachment on the property of the accused may be availed of to serve as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered from the accused when the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused who is a public officer, in the course of his employment as such, or when the accused has concealed, removed or disposed of his property or is about to do so. It is indispensable for the writ of preliminary attachment to issue that there us a factual foundation for the attachment of properties, and an adequate and fair opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Considering the harsh and rigorous nature of a writ of preliminary attachment, the court must ensure that all the requisites of the law have been complied with; otherwise, the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction.

FACTS A case of Plunder was filed against Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles. Upon arraignment, Napoles and Cambe pleaded not guilty while Revilla refused to enter any plea, thus the Sandiganbayan entered a plea of not guilty in his behalf. Then, Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest against Revilla, Cambe and Napoles. On the same day, Revilla voluntarily surrendered to the PNP and filed a Motion to Elect Detention Facilities. Sandiganbayan ordered the turn over of Revilla and Cambe to PNP Camp Crame for detention. Revilla, Cambe and Napoles then filed an Application for Bail. Sandiganbayan denied applications for bail filed and held that the

RULE 127

prosecution duly established with strong evidence that Revilla, Cambe and Napoles committed the crime of plunder. The prosecution filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment/Garnishment alleging that the safeguarding of Revilla’s properties has become even more necessary after the Sandiganbayan denied Revilla’s application for bail and ruled that there is strong evidence of his guilt.