1_9788411473477

Funded by the European Commission Program Training of National Judges on EU Competition Law

978-84-1147-346-0

(Director)

Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris

ALTA CALIDAD EN INVESTIGACIÓN JURÍDICA

JUAN IGNACIO RUIZ PERIS (Director)

COMPETENCIA, COMPENSACIÓN DE DAÑOS Y MERCADOS DIGITALES COMPETITION, DAMAGES COMPENSATION AND DIGITAL MARKETS

COMPETENCIA, COMPENSACIÓN DE DAÑOS Y MERCADOS DIGITALES

El presente libro reúne en formato bilingüe los principales trabajos elaborados con ocasión de del curso Digital Platforms, e-Commerce and Damages and European Competition Law, (DEFCOMCOURT 5) desarrollado al amparo del programa Training of National Judges on EU Competition Law de la Comisión Europea.

Los trabajos están firmados por un conjunto de autores —magistrados y académicos— de gran calidad, tanto nacionales como extranjeros, a los que agradezco especialmente su participación en esta obra.

Los dos temas que se abordan son de gran actualidad.

Tanto el continuo desarrollo del Derecho de compensación de daños en el ámbito de la competencia como la aplicación del Derecho de la competencia a los mercados digitales, con multas milmillonarias a empresas del nivel de Google y la reciente aprobación de la ley de mercados digitales, son cuestiones punteras que atraen la atención de jueces académicos y también de profesionales, que tienen en ambas un nuevo campo de negocio.

monografías

monografías

monografías

COMPETENCIA, COMPENSACIÓN DE DAÑOS Y MERCADOS DIGITALES COMPETITION, DAMAGES COMPENSATION AND DIGITAL MARKETS

COMITÉ CIENTÍFICO DE LA EDITORIAL TIRANT LO BLANCH María José Añón Roig

Catedrática de Filosofía del Derecho de la Universidad de Valencia

Ana Cañizares Laso

Catedrática de Derecho Civil de la Universidad de Málaga

Jorge A. Cerdio Herrán

Catedrático de Teoría y Filosofía de Derecho.

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México

José Ramón Cossío Díaz

Ministro en retiro de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación y miembro de El Colegio Nacional

Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot

Juez de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos Investigador del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM

Owen Fiss

Catedrático emérito de Teoría del Derecho de la Universidad de Yale (EEUU)

José Antonio García-Cruces González Catedrático de Derecho Mercantil de la UNED

Luis López Guerra

Catedrático de Derecho Constitucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Ángel M. López y López

Catedrático de Derecho Civil de la Universidad de Sevilla

Marta Lorente Sariñena

Catedrática de Historia del Derecho de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Javier de Lucas Martín

Catedrático de Filosofía del Derecho y Filosofía Política de la Universidad de Valencia

Víctor Moreno Catena

Catedrático de Derecho Procesal de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Francisco Muñoz Conde

Catedrático de Derecho Penal de la Universidad Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla

Angelika Nussberger

Catedrática de Derecho Constitucional e Internacional en la Universidad de Colonia (Alemania) Miembro de la Comisión de Venecia

Héctor Olasolo Alonso

Catedrático de Derecho Internacional de la Universidad del Rosario (Colombia) y Presidente del Instituto Ibero-Americano de La Haya (Holanda)

Luciano Parejo Alfonso

Catedrático de Derecho Administrativo de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Consuelo Ramón Chornet

Catedrática de Derecho Internacional Público y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad de Valencia

Tomás Sala Franco

Catedrático de Derecho del Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social de la Universidad de Valencia

Ignacio Sancho Gargallo

Magistrado de la Sala Primera (Civil) del Tribunal Supremo de España

Tomás S. Vives Antón

Catedrático de Derecho Penal de la Universidad de Valencia

Ruth Zimmerling

Catedrática de Ciencia Política de la Universidad de Mainz (Alemania)

Procedimiento de selección de originales, ver página web: www.tirant.net/index.php/editorial/procedimiento-de-seleccion-de-originales

COMPETENCIA, Competencia, compensación de daños y mercados digi COMPENSACIÓN DE damages DAÑOS Competition, compensation and digital mark Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris (Dir) Y MERCADOS DIGITALES COMPETITION, DAMAGES COMPENSATION AND DIGITAL MARKETS Director

JUAN IGNACIO RUIZ PERIS Autores

Alberto Arribas Hernández Eduardo Pastor Martínez Paul Hitchings Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris Jaume Martí Miravalls Enrique Sanjuán y Muñoz Purificación Martorell Zulueta Marcus Smith David Ordóñez Solís Marina Tavassi Salvador Vilata Menadas of National Judges onLaw EU Program Competition Law Program´ Training of NationalTraining Judges on EU Competition AgreementAgreement number: HT.5691 SI2.813925 number: /HT.5691 / SI2.813925 Funded by European Commission Funded by European Commission

tirant lo blanch Valencia, 2022

Copyright ® 2022 Todos los derechos reservados. Ni la totalidad ni parte de este libro puede reproducirse o transmitirse por ningún procedimiento electrónico o mecánico, incluyendo fotocopia, grabación magnética, o cualquier almacenamiento de información y sistema de recuperación sin permiso escrito de los autores y del editor.

En caso de erratas y actualizaciones, la Editorial Tirant lo Blanch publicará la pertinente corrección en la página web www.tirant.com.

© Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris (Director)

© TIRANT LO BLANCH EDITA: TIRANT LO BLANCH C/ Artes Gráficas, 14 - 46010 - Valencia TELFS.: 96/361 00 48 - 50 FAX: 96/369 41 51 Email: tlb@tirant.com www.tirant.com Librería virtual: www.tirant.es ISBN: 978-84-1147-347-7 Si tiene alguna queja o sugerencia, envíenos un mail a: atencioncliente@tirant.com. En caso de no ser atendida su sugerencia, por favor, lea en www.tirant.net/index.php/empresa/politicas-de-empresa nuestro procedimiento de quejas.

Responsabilidad Social Corporativa: http://www.tirant.net/Docs/RSCTirant.pdf

ÍNDICE GENERAL PRÓLOGO...............................................................................................

13

Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris

COMPETITION LAW &TECHNOLOGY (PLATFORMS AND E-COMMERCE) THE PROPOSAL OF EU DIGITAL MARKET ACT, A EUROPEAN ANSWER TO APPLICATION’S PROBLEMS OF CLASSICAL COMPETITION LAW TO GATEKEEPERS Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris I. State of the question......................................................................

17

II. DMA presentation.........................................................................

23

III. Gatekeeper designation requirements.............................................

29

IV. Gatekeeper’s obligations................................................................

32

V. Selected questions..........................................................................

1. Undertaking.............................................................................

2. Exclusivity................................................................................

3. Tying agreements.....................................................................

4. Transparence on advertisement services for advertisers and publishers.................................................................................

5. Self preferencing.......................................................................

6. Closed ecosystems....................................................................

7. Interoperability........................................................................

8. Multi-homing...........................................................................

9. Terminating provisions.............................................................

10. Data use and portability...........................................................

11. The comeback of structural remedies.......................................

34 34 34 35

VI. Main open problems......................................................................

48

VII. Final remarks.................................................................................

50

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 45

8

Índice

MERCADOS REGULADOS Y COMPETENCIA DESLEAL: LA JURISPRUDENCIA EUROPEA SOBRE EL MODELO DE PLATAFORMAS DIGITALES (UBER FRANCIA Y UBER ÉLITE TAXI) Alberto Arribas Hernández I. El caso Uber Élite Taxi...................................................................

1. La aplicación de la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia por el Juzgado de lo Mercantil nº 3 de Barcelona...............................

55

II. El caso Uber France.......................................................................

63

III. El caso AIRBNB.............................................................................

65

IV. El caso STAR TAXI APP................................................................

68

V. Algunos pronunciamientos de Tribunales nacionales.....................

1. El caso “UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC”.................................

2. El caso CABIFY.......................................................................

69 70 73

61

LA PRESTACIÓN DE SERVICIOS A TRAVÉS DE PLATAFORMAS DIGITALES: REGULACIÓN EUROPEA E INTERPRETACIÓN JURISPRUDENCIAL David Ordóñez Solís I. Introducción..................................................................................

II. La regulación europea de las plataformas digitales: las libertades económicas fundamentales y la armonización de las legislaciones nacionales en el mercado interior europeo.....................................

1. La Directiva de servicios en el mercado interior.......................

2. La Directiva sobre procedimiento de información en materia de reglamentaciones técnicas relativas a los servicios de la sociedad de la información..........................................................

3. La Directiva sobre el comercio electrónico...............................

III. La jurisprudencia europea sobre las plataformas digitales colaborativas y su recepción por los tribunales nacionales.......................

1. El caso Uber.............................................................................

2. El caso Airbnb..........................................................................

3. El caso Star Taxi App...............................................................

4. La recepción de la jurisprudencia europea por los tribunales nacionales................................................................................

IV. Conclusión.....................................................................................

78

80 81 82 84 84 85 88 92 94 97

9

Índice

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) AND ALGORITHMS COLLUSION Enrique Sanjuán y Muñoz I. Purpose of this work and why it is needed.....................................

1. Artificial intelligence, algorithms and AI antitrust concerns......

2. The problems I wish to attend..................................................

3. Is this Science Fiction?..............................................................

102 102 107 111

II. The techniques for learning............................................................

114

III. Pro and anticompetitive effects when we use algorithms in AI.......

1. Old wine in new bottle?...........................................................

2. Pro-competitive effects.............................................................

3. Does it undermine competition in some way?..........................

4. The interaction between platforms with AI..............................

5. Predictable agent and autonomous machine.............................

118 118 121 122 124 125

IV. Self-Preferences and Personalization or vice versa..........................

126

V. Conclusion: We need one rule of reason and a shut-down button..

130

ANTITRUST DAMAGE CLAIMS PLURALIDAD DE PROCEDIMIENTOS Y ACUMULACIÓN Salvador Vilata Menadas I. INTRODUCCIÓN........................................................................

139

II. APLICACIÓN PRIVADA DEL DERECHO DE LA COMPETENCIA................................................................................................

141

III. ACUMULACIÓN DE ACCIONES vs. ACUMULACIÓN DE PROCESOS...................................................................................

1. Acumulación de acciones.........................................................

2. Cesión de los derechos de crédito.............................................

3. Acumulación de procesos.........................................................

148 149 151 154

APLICACIÓN TEMPORAL DEL RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO RELATIVO A LAS ACCIONES DE DAÑOS POR INFRACCIÓN DEL DERECHO DE LA COMPETENCIA: ESPECIAL REFERENCIA A LAS ACCIONES NO SOMETIDAS A LA DIRECTIVA 2014/104/UE Jaume Martí Miravalls I. INTRODUCCIÓN: APLICACIÓN TEMPORAL DE LAS ACCIONES DE DAÑOS POR INFRACCIÓN DEL DERECHO DE LA COMPETENCIA.....................................................................

157

10

Índice

II. RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO APLICABLE A LAS ACCIONES DE DAÑOS NO SOMETIDAS A LA DIRECTIVA 2014/104...................

1. Tribunal competente................................................................

2. Vinculación de las resoluciones de competencia en el ámbito civil..........................................................................................

3. Algunas cuestiones sobre legitimación activa y pasiva..............

4. Responsabilidad conjunta y solidaria.......................................

5. Prescripción..............................................................................

THE ASSESSMENT OR QUANTIFICATION OF DAMAGES IN COMPETITION INFRINGEMENT CASES. THE POSITION UNDER ENGLISH LAW..............................................................

163 168 169 171 177 179

191

Marcus Smith

COMPENSATION OF DAMAGES IN ITALY Marina Tavassi I. The culture of competition in Italy.................................................

197

II. The transposition of the Damages Directive in the Italian System..

199

III. Right to Full Compensation and Damages Relief...........................

204

IV. Quantification of Damages and Passing-on....................................

205

V. Disclosure of Evidence and Access to the NCA Dossier.................

213

VI. Effect of National and Foreign Decisions.......................................

215

VII. Joint and several liability...............................................................

220

VIII. Quantification of harm and passing-on..........................................

222

IX. Limitation Period...........................................................................

224

X. Cooperation with NCAs................................................................

225

XI. Temporal application.....................................................................

230

XII. Reforms Outside the Scope of the Damages Directive....................

236

XIII. Conclusion.....................................................................................

238

COMPENSACIÓN DE DAÑOS EN ESPAÑA Eduardo Pastor Martínez I. Organización judicial.....................................................................

243

II. Tiempos de cambio........................................................................

248

III. Un camino previo..........................................................................

249

IV. Nuevos desarrollos........................................................................

254

V. Un punto de inflexión y algunas conclusiones................................

257

11

Índice

ANÁLISIS PROCESAL DEL INFORME SOBRE CUANTIFICACIÓN DEL DAÑO Purificación Martorell Zulueta I. Introducción..................................................................................

263

II. Un apunte introductorio sobre la aportación de la prueba pericial en el proceso civil español..............................................................

265

III. Análisis versus valoración vinculada a las particularidades propias de las acciones de reclamación de daños por infracción de las normas de la competencia...................................................................

1. Admisibilidad de la prueba pericial..........................................

1.1. En relación con el objeto de la prueba..............................

1.2. Rectificación de errores, ampliación o adenda..................

1.3. Dos apuntes finales...........................................................

2. El perito y sus cualidades.........................................................

3. La pericial como acto de comunicación....................................

4. Expectativas judiciales sobre los informes periciales para la cuantificación del daño.............................................................

5. La defensa de los informes periciales y el desarrollo del juicio: introducción de nuevos elementos / alegaciones.......................

IV. La valoración de los informes periciales al tiempo de dictar sentencia..................................................................................................

1. Consideraciones generales........................................................

2. Un apunte de experiencia en torno a la valoración de los informes periciales sobre cuantificación de daños............................

270 271 271 273 274 275 277 279 280 283 283 287

MOCK TRIAL: QUANTIFICATION OF HARM IN AN EXCLUSIONARY ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CASE Paul Hitchings I. Case Description............................................................................

294

II. Structure of the Mock Trial............................................................

1. Participants and roles...............................................................

298 299

III. Block 1: Theory of harm................................................................

1. Questions from P. Hitchings to G. Siotis (Claimant).................

2. Questions from T. Reher to S. Kohnz (Defendant)....................

3. Questions from P. Hitchings to G. Siotis (Claimant).................

4. Discussion................................................................................

299 299 305 311 314

IV. Block 2: Estimation method...........................................................

1. Questions from T. Reher to S. Kohnz (Defendant)....................

2. Questions from P. Hitchings to G. Siotis (Claimant).................

3. Discussion................................................................................

316 319 324 327

PRÓLOGO El presente libro reúne en formato bilingüe los principales trabajos elaborados con ocasión de del curso Digital Platforms, e-Commerce and Damages and European Competition Law, (DEFCOMCOURT 5) desarrollado al amparo del programa Training of National Judges on EU Competition Law de la Comisión Europea.

Los trabajos están firmados por un conjunto de autores —magistrados y académicos— de gran calidad, tanto nacionales como extranjeros, a los que agradezco especialmente su participación en esta obra.

El texto incluye igualmente los materiales relativos al Mock Trial que se desarrolló en la sesión de daños con la intervención de destacados profesionales, que sin duda será de gran utilidad tanto para los magistrados que se ven confrontados a este tipo de casos, como para aquéllos que ejercen ante los Tribunales.

Los dos temas que se abordan son de gran actualidad. Tanto el continuo desarrollo del Derecho de compensación de daños en el ámbito de la competencia como la aplicación del Derecho de la competencia a los mercados digitales, con multas milmillonarias a empresas del nivel de Google y la reciente aprobación de la ley de mercados digitales, son cuestiones punteras que atraen la atención de jueces académicos y también de profesionales, que tienen en ambas un nuevo campo de negocio.

Deseo agradecer igualmente la colaboración de Qualcomm y la Fundación “El Quijote” que han colaborado en la financiación del proyecto.

Esperamos que el libro sea de su interés.

JUAN IGNACIO RUIZ PERIS

Catedrático de Derecho mercantil Universidad de Valencia

COMPETITION LAW &TECHNOLOGY (PLATFORMS AND E-COMMERCE)

THE EU DIGITAL MARKETS ACT, A EUROPEAN ANSWER TO APPLICATION’S PROBLEMS OF CLASSICAL COMPETITION LAW TO GATEKEEPERS1 JUAN IGNACIO RUIZ PERIS

Catedrático de Derecho mercantil University of Valencia (Spain)

SUMMARY: I. State of the question. II. DMA presentation. III. Gatekeeper designation requirements. IV. Gatekeeper’s obligations. V. Selected questions. 1. Undertaking. 2.

Exclusivity. 3. Tying agreements. 4. Transparence on advertisement services for advertisers and publishers. 5. Self preferencing. 6. Closed ecosystems. 7. Interoperability.

8. Multi-homing. 9. Terminating provisions. 10. Data use and portability. 11. The comeback of structural remedies. VI. Main open problems. VII. Final remarks.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION As the Recital 1 of the proposal of DMA says digital platforms improve the number and quality of business matches between undertakings and customers —in particular for SME— by the opening of new business opportunities and facilitates cross-border trade in benefit of professional users and consumers.

These general advantages, are present in all kind of digital platforms with independence of its size2.

1

2

This paper is an output from research project PID2021-128111OB-I00 MCIUE Concentrations, damages, abuse and cooperation in digital markets and has been elaborated thanks to the Senior Mobility Subvention PRX21/00653 of the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Formación Profesional.

The last estimation is 10.000 platforms in Europe, none of each may be qualified as Gatekeeper.

18

Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris

But in western economies —we exclude from this paper the Asian digital market situation, in particular this one of China3—, there are a phenomenon that has important consequences in relation with market competition.

Some of these platforms know as GAFAM - Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft —all them North American— seems to have a dominant position in some markets and, in opinion of the European and American competition authorities, use it in an unfair and anticompetitive way. They are known as Gatekeepers.

Recital 33 of the DMA says that unfairness should relate to an imbalance between the rights and obligations of business users where the gatekeeper obtains a disproportionate advantage.

Its ground would be the risk of elimination for professional users of the ability to adequately capture the benefits resulting from their innovative or other efforts. So, predatory practices, discrimination, selfpreferencing and encroachment.

In the words of the Recital 33, “Due to their gateway position and superior bargaining power, it is possible that gatekeepers engage in behaviour that does not allow others to capture fully the benefits of their own contributions, and unilaterally set unbalanced conditions for the use of their core platform services or services provided together with, or in support of, their core platform services. “

In the view sustained in that Recital such imbalance is not excluded by the fact that the gatekeeper offers a particular service free of charge to a specific group of users, and may also consist in excluding or discriminating against business users, in particular if the latter compete with the services provided by the gatekeeper.

That make Gatekeepers different to the other thousands of digital platforms on the view of competition law.

3

Some Chinese digital giants as Alibaba and Tencent are near the global market capitalization of Amazon, but their number of professional and end users in Europe is not yet enough large to be qualified as Gatekeepers. See WADE, M.; JIALU, S. Figure 1: The market capitalization of the world’s top 10 Internet companies (Yahoo Finance, October 25 2017). The note includes information about the dominant western digital companies and their Chinese counterparts.

The EU digital markets act

19

Over the last few years, on both sides of the Atlantic, we have witnessed a continuous conflict between the Competition Authorities and these large digital platforms GAFAM identified as Gatekeepers.

Twenty years ago the technological disruption, the same market and some actions as in the case Microsoft have been enough to apparently maintain a workable competition, but the current GAFAM platforms are more unassailable by new entrants than their predecessors, such as MySpace, Altavista or MSNMessenger, due to the more pronounced network effects, the control of the data of their professional clients and end users, the creation of closed ecosystems that trap the client and the policy of acquisition of new entrants and phagocytization or elimination, depending on the case, of their technologies, which can make their gatekeeper position in the market longer-lasting and less contestable than that of their predecessors.

Closed ecosystems are an extremely important instrument for strengthening the market power position of a gatekeeper, and their opening is one of the least traumatic solutions —much less so than structural deconcentration measures in particular— for increasing competition in the market4 without risk to technological innovation5.

The main questions raised by the application of classical competition law are what is the relevant market, whether these acquisitions reduce competition but increase innovation or reduce both competition and innovation, whether or not they are financed by monopoly rents or derived from the abuse of the dominant position they hold, or the possible barriers to entry that a policy of predation of successful or potentially successful initiatives could entail for possible alternative concentrations between new entrants.

From a behavioral perspective, the abuse of a dominant position and, in particular, exclusionary self-preferential discriminatory conduct, together with conduct aimed at reinforcing the dominant posi4

5

About this question see the report by FRANCK, J. U.; PEITZ, M. Market Definition and Market Power in the Platform Economcy, Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) 2019. https://cerre.eu/publications/ market-definition-and-market-power-platform-economy/.

About ecosystems see the reflection of LIANNOS, I. “Reorienting competition law”, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Volume 10, Issue 1, March 2022, Pages 1-31, https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnac003.

20

Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris

tion in the market with exclusionary effects, such as blocking users from uninstalling pre-installed programs or applications, have been the types of conduct prosecuted on both sides of the Atlantic.

In Europe, the application of Article 102 TFEU to these platforms, has given rise to a series of decisions by the Commission6 and also by some national authorities such as the German Bundeskartellamt7,

6

7

The European Commission has developed in recent years an intense investigative and punitive action in the sector of digital platforms with significant fines imposed on Google and other digital companies, one of whose latest episode, was the June 2021 investigation to Google for abuse of dominant position in the online advertising sector, focusing on conducts in the collection of data, the sale of advertising space, and Google activity as an intermediary in the advertising market, paying particular attention to Google’s vertical integration at all levels of the advertising chain. The conducts under investigation were: 1. the obligation to use Google services or ads to purchase display ads from You Tube. 2. The obligation to use Google Ad Manager to manage them. 3. Apparent self-preferential discrimination conduct in favor of Google AdExchange AdX, formerly known as DoubleClick Ad Exchange, an advertising platform that allows publishers to make profits through the publication of ads. Access restrictions imposed on its competing advertisers regarding the identity and behavior of their users. 5. Plans to ban third-party cookies in Chrome. 6. Plans to hide the advertising identifier on Android smart mobile devices from third parties. The 11 March 2022 The Commission launched an investigation on a possible infraction of articles 101 and 102 TFEU about the 2018 “Jedi blue” agreement between Google and Meta (former Facebook) in the on line advertisement market.

Last 6 of July of 2022 the Bundeskartellamt formally determined that Amazon. com, Inc. is an undertaking of paramount significance for competition across markets. Amazon and its subsidiaries are thereby subject to extended abuse control pursuant to Section 19a of the German Competition Act (GWB). Section 19a GWB entered into force in January 2021 that enables the Bundeskartellamt to prohibit undertakings which are of paramount significance for competition across markets from engaging in anti-competitive practices. The Bundeskartellamt is currently conducting two proceedings against Amazon based on standard abuse control regulations that were in place before introduction of Section 19a GWB. In one proceeding the Bundeskartellamt is investigating whether Amazon exercises influence on the pricing of sellers on Amazon Marketplace by means of price control mechanisms and algorithms. In a second proceeding the Bundeskartellamt is examining the extent to which agreements between Amazon and brand manufacturers (inter alia Apple), which exclude third-party sellers from selling brand products on Amazon Marketplace, constitute a competition law violation. In 2018, the Bundeskartellamt conducted an abuse proceeding against Amazon’s general terms of business and certain practices vis-à-vis third-party sellers. The proceeding was concluded in 2019.