MMDA, GSIS sign deal on use of Pasig property

By Joel E. Zurbano

THE Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) on Wednesday signed an agreement with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for the temporary use of its property in Pasig City in connection with the MMDA’s Motorcycle Riding for that day, provided they worked or were on leave of absence with pay on the day immediately preceding the regular holiday. The computation is basic wage x 100 percent,” he said.

Academy program. GSIS president and general manager Jose Arnulfo Veloso gave MMDA chairman Don Artes the go signal to use for one year the 5,977-square meter vacant lot property of GSIS at the corner of Doña Julia Vargas and Meralco Avenue in Barangay Ugong.

The agreement stated that the MMDA shall clear the property of all impounded vehicles and will construct, renovate, and improve the site for the establishment of the Motorcycle Riding Academy, including the cost of maintenance and security services, which will generate P 1 million worth of savings for the GSIS.

When the day immediately preceding the regular holiday is a non-working day in the establishment or the scheduled rest day of the employees, they shall be entitled to holiday pay if they worked or were on leave of absence with pay on the day immediately preceding the nonworking day or rest day.

Meanwhile, for work done during the regular holiday, employees shall be paid 200 percent of their wage for the first eight hours.

“THE rule of ‘double jeopardy’ had a settled meaning in this jurisdiction… [i]t meant that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense” (Melo v. People, G.R. L-3580, March 22, 1950).

It is found in the common law of England, the Spanish law, the Constitution of the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of citizens.

“‘(T)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process.’ Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair” (People v. Arcega, G.R. 237489, August 27, 2020). The protection of the Constitution against a person being put twice in jeopardy for the “same offense” extends to an act that is punished both by law and ordinance.

Hence, the “conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act” (see Section 21, Article III, 1987 Constitution).

“The phrase same offense… has always been construed to mean… that the second offense… is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first (criminal) information, [and] that the two offenses are identical. There is identity [of] offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other” (Melo v. People, G.R. L-3580, March 22, 1950).

“Under [the] Rules [of Court] there is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information” (Melo v. People, G.R. L-3580, March 22, 1950 citing U.S. v. Lim Suco, 11 Phil. 484).