TESTIMONIO ESSAY

I give a description of the nature of testimony in this essay that is consistent with Timothy Williamson's (2010) book Knowledge and Its Limits In particular, I address concerns raised by Jennifer Lackey (2007) and Elizabeth Fricker (2006) and defend what I refer to as "the simple view," which holds that witness is just assertion At the same time, I address concerns raised by the Williamsonian position that knowledge is the norm of assertion I com- compare favorably with C A J Coady's (1992) and Peter Graham's (1997) testimony accounts I also acknowledge a category of truthful statements, or "disclosures," and I leave open the possibility of a "strict view" that considers testimony to be disclosure I contend fallaciously that I do not have an ambiguous understanding of the nature of witness along these lines because of awareness as recommended 2 the simple view We require a definition of testimony to define the scope of our investigation as epistemologists of testimony One theory, which we'll refer to as "the simple view," That is that assertions are all that witness is Which is: Only if S argues that p does S certify that p Consider the following example as an instance of this theory on the nature of witness Suppose I respond, "Umm It'll rain," when you inquire about the weather for the remainder of the day Then, when it is sunny, you may mockingly remark, "And you said it would rain!" This can be done because I was merely expressing my opinion and not in a serious way when I forecasted a downpour You could interpret this as evidence that I did not testify that it would rain when I said it would rain I concur However, this does not refute the straightforward interpretation of testimony Because I just speculated that it would rain rather than making an assertion

WRITTEN BY: KAYKAY MAYAO