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22ND ANNUAL

STUART KINARD ADVANCED DWI SEMINAR

Available In Person, Livestream, & On-Demand At Your Own Pace For Up to a Year

NOVEMBER 5-6, 2026 MENGER HOTEL SAN ANTONIO, TX COURSE DIRECTORS: BOBBY BARRERA, HAROLD DANFORD, MICHAEL GROSS, & ADAM KOBS P: 512.478.2514 • F: 512.469.0512 • www.tcdla.com • 6808 Hill Meadow Dr, Austin, TX 78736


22ND ANNUAL STUART KINARD ADVANCED DWI SEMINAR INFORMATION Date Location Course Director Total CLE Hours

November 5-6, 2026 Menger Hotel, 1204 Alamo Plaza, San Antonio, TX 78205 Bobby Barrera, Harold Danford, Michael Gross, & Adam Kobs 12.00

Ethics: 1.00

Thursday, November 5, 2026 Time

CLE

Daily CLE Hours: 6:00 Ethics: 0.00

Topic

Speaker

8:00 am

Registration & Continental Breakfast

8:45 am

Opening Remarks

Course Directors

9:00 am

1.00

Application of Blood Data & Roadmap for Criminal Defense Cases

Ashley Morgan

10:00 am

1.00

Voir Dire

Mark Thiessen

11:00 am 11:15 am

Break 1.00

12:15 pm 1:30 pm

Cross-Exam of an AO

Nico LaHood

Lunch On Your Own 1.00

2:30 pm

ALR

Jonathan O’Hara

Break

2:45 pm

1.00

DWI Case Updates

Doug Murphy

3:45 pm

1.00

Voir Dire & AI

Robert Hirschhorn

4:45 pm

Adjourn

5:00 pm

Menger Bar for TCDLA Member Social

TCDLA :: 6808 Hill Meadow Dr :: Austin, Texas :: 512.478.2514 p :: 512.469.9107 f :: www.tcdla.com


22ND ANNUAL STUART KINARD ADVANCED DWI SEMINAR INFORMATION Date Location Course Director Total CLE Hours

November 5-6, 2026 Menger Hotel, 1204 Alamo Plaza, San Antonio, TX 78205 Bobby Barrera, Harold Danford, Michael Gross, & Adam Kobs 12.00

Ethics: 1.00

Friday, November 6, 2026 Time

CLE

Topic

Daily CLE Hours: 6.00 Ethics: 1.00 Speaker

8:00 am

Registration & Continental Breakfast

8:30 am

Opening Remarks

Course Directors

8:45 am

1.00

Discovery & AI

Don Flanary

9:45 am

1.00

Intoxication Manslaughter & Felony DWI Strategies

Bobby Barrera

10:45 am 11:00 am

Break 1.00

12:00 pm 1:15 pm

Collateral Consequences

Stephanie Stevens

Lunch On Your Own 1.00 Ethics

Ethics

2:30 pm

1.00

Drug DWI

Sean Darvishi

3:30 pm

1.00

Cross-Exam of the Blood Expert

Billy McNabb

2:15 pm

4:30 pm

Aaron Diaz

Break

Adjourn

TCDLA :: 6808 Hill Meadow Dr :: Austin, Texas :: 512.478.2514 p :: 512.469.9107 f :: www.tcdla.com


Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

22nd Annual Stuart Kinard Advanced DWI Table of Contents Thursday, November 5, 2026 speakers topic Ashley Morgan Johnathan O’Hara Bobby Barrera Robert Hirschhorn

Gas Chromatography: A Practical Guide to Evaluating Forensic Evidence Texas Administrative License Revocation DWI Manslaughter & Felony Trial Strategies The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of an Effective 30-Minute Voir Dire in a Criminal Case

Friday, November 6, 2026 speakers topic Don Flanary Stephanie Stevens Aaron Diaz

Discovery and AI Collateral Consequences Ai, Ethics, & Discovery in The Modern Dwi Case

Sean Darvishi

Drug DWI

Billy McNabb

Cross Examination of the Prosecution Blood Number Witness


Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

22nd Annual Stuart Kinard Advanced DWI November 5-6, 2026 The Menger Hotel San Antonio, Tx

Topic: Gas Chromatography: A Practical Guide to Evaluating Forensic Blood Alcohol Evidence

Speaker:

Ashley Morgan 924 McCullough Ave San Antonio, TX 78215 210.858.8972 phone ashley@soyarsmorganlaw.com email www.soyarsmorganlaw.com website

6808 Hill Meadow Dr :: Austin, Texas :: 512.478.2514 p :: 512.469.9107 f :: www.tcdla.com


GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EVALUATING FORENSIC BLOOD ALCOHOL EVIDENCE A primer for defense attorneys on how the science works, where it can fail, and which challenges are worth bringing.

Ashley Morgan Soyars & Morgan Law, PC 924 McCullough Ave. San Antonio, TX 78215 ashley@soyarsmorganlaw.com


Gas Chromatography: A Practical Guide to Evaluating Forensic Blood Alcohol Evidence A primer for defense attorneys on how the science works, where it can fail, and which challenges are worth bringing

Introduction A blood alcohol concentration (BAC) report looks like a single, authoritative number. Behind it sits a chain of human and instrument steps: a venipuncture, a tube, a transport and storage history, a laboratory workflow, a gas chromatograph, and a data review. Each step has its own failure modes, and each leaves a paper trail. The attorney who understands those steps can ask precise questions, retain the right expert, and decide which challenges are worth making. This paper explains what gas chromatography (GC) is, how headspace GC is used to measure ethanol in blood, and the legal and scientific defenses commonly raised against blood alcohol results. It uses Texas authority as its primary legal framework, because the offense definitions and case law cited here are Texas law. Attorneys elsewhere should substitute their own jurisdiction's statutes and cases. The core science applies everywhere. One principle governs the rest: pick your defense based on the facts of your case. A jury that hears six weak challenges will often discount the one strong one. Study the discovery first, then choose.

Part I: What Gas Chromatography Is The core idea: separate first, then quantify Gas chromatography separates the components of a vaporized mixture and then measures each one. Separation happens because different compounds interact differently with a stationary phase, a thin coating inside a long, narrow column, while an inert carrier gas (commonly helium, sometimes hydrogen or nitrogen) pushes the vapor through. Compounds that interact weakly with the stationary phase move quickly and exit the column first. Compounds that interact strongly move slowly and exit later. The time a compound takes to exit, measured from injection, is its retention time. The rule to remember is that an instrument cannot reliably measure what it has not first separated. If ethanol and another compound exit the column together (co-elute), a detector that cannot tell them apart will report a combined signal. Much of the cross-examination of a GC analyst comes back to this point.

The parts of a gas chromatograph • •

Inlet (injector). A heated port where the sample is vaporized and swept into the column by the carrier gas. Column. The tube that does the separating. Capillary columns are narrow (typically a fraction of a millimeter in inner diameter) fused-silica or similar tubes with the stationary phase coated on the inner wall, and they offer high resolving power. Packed columns are filled with coated particles and were more common in earlier decades. Which column a laboratory uses, and its


• •

•

dimensions and phase, is set out in the lab's written method. Do not assume. Read the method and the instrument records for your client's run. Oven. The column sits in a temperature-controlled oven. Temperature affects retention times and separation, so oven settings and their stability matter. Detector. The device at the end of the column that produces a signal as each compound exits. Blood alcohol laboratories overwhelmingly use the flame ionization detector (FID), which responds to compounds that burn in a hydrogen flame. Other detectors include thermal conductivity detectors, electron capture detectors, and mass spectrometers (MS). An FID is sensitive and robust but does not identify a compound. Identification rests on retention time, which is why laboratories confirm ethanol on a second column (discussed below). Data system. Software that records the signal, integrates the peaks, compares them against calibration data, and calculates the result.

The chromatogram The output is a chromatogram: time on the horizontal axis, detector response on the vertical axis. Each compound appears as a peak. Retention time identifies the compound by comparison with known standards. Peak area (or height) is proportional to the amount of the compound reaching the detector and is the basis for quantitation. A good analytical peak is tall, narrow, and symmetrical. It is separated from its neighbors and starts and ends at the baseline. Broad, tailing, split, or shouldered peaks, drifting baselines, and unexplained extra peaks all suggest something about the sample, the column, or the method that deserves a question.

Part II: Headspace GC for Blood Alcohol Why headspace Blood is a messy matrix. Injecting it directly would foul the inlet and column with proteins and salts. Headspace gas chromatography (HS-GC) avoids this by analyzing only the vapor above the sample. A blood aliquot is sealed in a vial and heated at a controlled temperature, and volatile compounds such as ethanol move from the liquid into the gas above it. At a fixed temperature, the concentration of ethanol in that headspace is proportional to its concentration in the liquid, so a measured sample of that vapor reflects the original blood concentration. The reliability of that proportionality depends on every vial, calibrator, control, and case sample being prepared and heated the same way.

The laboratory workflow While each laboratory's procedure differs, a typical sequence runs as follows. 1. Retrieval and equilibration. The tube is taken from refrigerated storage and allowed to reach room temperature. Laboratories commonly place the tube on a rocker or invert it to mix. The kit usually contains two tubes. One is analyzed and the other is repackaged and returned to storage. 2. Opening. The tube is opened, ideally in a ventilated hood, carefully enough to avoid splashing or introducing airborne contaminants.


3. Aliquoting. A small, precisely measured volume of blood is removed with a pipette and transferred to a headspace vial. Good practice is to pour the blood into a clean container and pipette from that container rather than putting a pipette into the evidence tube. 4. Internal standard. A known amount of a compound that is not expected in the sample (commonly n-propanol or t-butanol) is added to each vial. Because every vial gets the same amount, the ratio of the ethanol peak to the internal standard peak corrects for small variations in injection volume and vapor transfer. 5. Sealing. The vial is capped with a crimped septum to keep the vapor in. 6. Autosampler run. Vials load onto an autosampler, which heats and agitates each one, pierces the septum with a syringe or gas-tight transfer system, withdraws headspace vapor, and delivers it to the inlet. The run proceeds unattended, so the log and the sequence record what happened while no one was watching. 7. Dual-column confirmation. Many laboratories split the injected vapor between two columns with different stationary phases, each with its own detector. Ethanol must appear at its expected retention time on both. Two columns make it much less likely that another compound is masquerading as ethanol, because a co-eluting compound on one phase is unlikely to co-elute on the other. 8. Calibration, controls, and review. Results are calculated from a calibration curve built from standards of known ethanol concentration. Quality control samples (blanks and ethanol controls at known values) are run alongside the case samples. An analyst, and usually a second reviewer, reviews the data before the result is reported in grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.

What a chromatogram review should look for When you receive the chromatograms for your client's run, review them with these questions in mind, and have a defense toxicologist look at them too. 1. What peaks are present, and are all of them identified? Unidentified peaks raise the question of what they are and why they were not identified. 2. Do retention times for ethanol and the internal standard fall within the method's acceptance windows on both columns? 3. Are peaks well shaped and resolved from neighbors? Tailing, fronting, or overlapping peaks can compromise integration. 4. How was the integration done? Check whether baselines were drawn automatically or manually, and whether any peaks were manually reintegrated. Ask for the software audit trail. 5. Is the internal standard response consistent across the batch? An internal standard peak in your client's vial that differs sharply from the others suggests a preparation or injection problem. 6. Do the blanks, calibrators, and controls look right, and do they bracket the case samples? Look for carryover in blanks run after high samples. 7. Do the two columns agree? The reported result may be an average of two values, and a large disagreement between them is worth asking about. 8. Is there any sign of other volatiles? Compounds such as acetaldehyde or n-propanol can appear when ethanol has been produced by microorganisms in a specimen. The method must be capable of detecting them for their absence to mean anything. Note that this cuts both ways: if the lab's method looks for them and finds none, that evidence helps the State.


Part III: Collection and Preservation The blood kit and the gray-top tube Evidentiary blood alcohol draws are typically collected in a gray-top tube containing sodium fluoride (NaF) as a preservative and potassium oxalate as an anticoagulant. A commonly used 10 mL tube contains roughly 100 mg of sodium fluoride and 20 mg of potassium oxalate, corresponding to about 1% NaF by weight per volume. Not all brands use the same quantities, so check the manufacturer's specification for the lot used. The two additives do different jobs. Potassium oxalate binds calcium and prevents clotting, so the specimen remains whole blood. Sodium fluoride inhibits enzymes in glycolysis and suppresses the metabolic activity of most microorganisms, which limits both loss of ethanol and new ethanol formation in the tube. Sodium fluoride does not stop every possible source of change, and the literature on its limits is discussed in Part IV.

Items to check on the kit •

• • •

Expiration date. Check the date on the kit and the tube. Even if the additives remain chemically effective, manufacturers do not guarantee vacuum and seal integrity after expiration. A compromised seal raises the possibility that room air or contaminants entered the tube. Courts frequently treat this as a weight issue, so the argument is stronger when supported by expert testimony explaining why it matters. Tube type, volume, and fill. Confirm that the tube is the correct type and was filled adequately. Records of how much blood the analyst found in the tube are often in the case file. Mixing. The tube should be inverted several times after collection so the additives mix with the blood. Poor mixing can leave a clotted or inadequately preserved specimen. Skin preparation. Look at what was used to clean the draw site, whether it was in date, and whether it was alcohol-free. In a properly performed draw this is rarely significant, but the record is useful for assessing technique and sterility.

Storage and transport Refrigeration slows microbial growth and chemical change but does not stop it. Samples that sit unrefrigerated in a patrol car, an evidence locker, or the mail present a stronger argument than samples with continuous refrigerated storage. Match the draw time, storage, transport, receipt, and testing dates in the case report against refrigerator temperature logs. The time between draw and analysis also matters. Some authors have recommended prompt analysis because fluoride-preserved samples are stable for a limited period under ordinary conditions (Kaye 1980).

Part IV: Common Defenses to Blood Alcohol Results Defenses fall into three groups: challenges to how the blood was obtained, challenges to the specimen's integrity and the lab's analysis, and challenges to how the State presents the result at trial.


A. Challenges to the draw Constitutional challenges. A blood draw is a search. A warrantless draw is presumptively unreasonable unless an exception applies. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), upheld a warrantless draw under exigent circumstances and emphasized that the draw must be performed in a reasonable manner. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013), held that the natural dissipation of alcohol does not create a per se exigency. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception covers breath tests but not blood tests. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019), a plurality, addressed unconscious drivers. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held in State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), that the Texas implied consent statute does not by itself supply a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Evaluate the warrant, the affidavit, any claimed consent, and any claimed exigency. Statutory challenges. Texas law specifies who may draw blood at an officer's direction. See Tex. Transp. Code § 724.017. Texas also has a statutory exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of the law. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23. Whether a particular violation requires suppression depends on the facts and the case law, so research the current decisions on your specific issue.

B. Challenges to specimen integrity Post-collection fermentation (the yeast defense). Ethanol is produced when yeast or other microorganisms ferment sugar. If a contaminated specimen is not adequately preserved, ethanol can form in the tube after the draw. The State's usual answer is that three barriers prevent this: sterile collection, the preservative, and refrigeration. A defense challenge examines each. The literature is mixed, and the attorney should know both sides. Blume and Lakatua (1973) reported microbial ethanol formation in contaminated blood samples. Chang and Kollman (1989) examined the effect of temperature on ethanol formation by Candida albicans in blood, and later commentary describes that organism as one that sodium fluoride did not reliably inhibit. Dick and Stone (1987) addressed alcohol changes in drivers' blood from microbial contamination. On the other side, a study of aviation accident specimens from the Federal Aviation Administration's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute found no significant increase in ethanol at 1% sodium fluoride at the temperatures tested. A South African doctoral study that inoculated fluoride and non-fluoride tubes with Candida albicans and monitored them for up to nine weeks reported that ethanol concentration did not increase over time, although it still recommended refrigeration and at least 1 g/100 mL fluoride. Yajima and colleagues reported that C. albicans produced ethanol in postmortem blood at room temperature, more readily in blood with higher glucose or glucose dilution, and recommended adding sodium fluoride immediately. The practical conclusion is that the defense is fact dependent. It is most credible where the specimen was unrefrigerated or stored warm for a long period, the tube was underfilled or poorly mixed, the preservative amount is questionable, there is evidence of contamination at collection, the client has a medical condition affecting blood sugar or yeast burden, and the result is modest rather than extreme. Retain an expert early. A claim that fermentation produced a very high result will be harder to sustain than a claim that it pushed a borderline result over 0.08. Serum, plasma, and whole blood. Ethanol distributes in the water fraction of blood, and serum and plasma contain more water than whole blood. Serum and plasma ethanol concentrations are therefore higher than whole blood concentrations from the same person. Published serum-to-whole-blood ratios


average around 1.12 to 1.14, with ranges extending from about 1.04 to 1.26 across studies (Winek and Carfagna 1987; Rainey 1993). This matters in two settings. First, hospital specimens are usually serum or plasma, and a hospital result cannot be compared directly to a whole-blood legal limit without conversion. Second, if a forensic whole-blood tube is improperly mixed before sampling, the cells can settle, and an aliquot drawn from the plasma-rich layer could overstate the whole-blood concentration. Ask the lab how it mixes tubes before sampling, how long a tube sits before aliquoting, and whether the process is documented. Hemolysis. Hemolysis is the rupture of red blood cells, which releases hemoglobin into the surrounding fluid. It can result from a poor draw: a tourniquet left on too long, probing for the vein, vigorous shaking, drawing through a bruise, or rough handling afterward. Hemolysis is a mark of poor collection technique and is useful for questioning the quality of the draw. Be careful about overclaiming, however. Hemolysis does not by itself turn a whole-blood specimen into serum, and I am not aware of a body of literature showing that hemolysis, on its own, materially changes a headspace GC ethanol result. Use it as a technique and credibility point unless your toxicologist can tie it to a measurable effect in your case.

C. Challenges to the laboratory analysis Chain of custody. Request both the arresting agency's chain of custody and the laboratory's internal chain of custody. They are separate documents. In Texas, the State must establish the beginning and end of the chain of custody, and where it does so, gaps in between generally go to weight rather than admissibility, absent evidence of tampering or alteration. See Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Chain of custody challenges therefore succeed on exclusion mainly where there is a real break at the start or end or evidence of tampering. More often their value is in showing that the specimen sat unrefrigerated, was handled by unidentified people, or was outside controlled storage for long periods. Calculate how long the analyst had the specimen out of the refrigerator. Sample preparation. The details of the bench work are where contamination, evaporation, and crosscontamination can arise. Ask how the tube was brought to room temperature and for how long, whether it was mixed, whether it was opened in a hood, whether the pipette went into the evidence tube or into a transfer container, whether the pipette was electronic or manual, and what the maintenance and calibration records show. Ask how the pipette was cleaned between samples and how the volumes were verified. Ethanol is volatile, so open vials and delays between aliquoting and sealing create opportunities for loss. Method validation and quality control. The strongest scientific challenges are often to the lab's validation and quality control. ANSI/ASB Standard 036 (Standard Practices for Method Validation in Forensic Toxicology) sets minimum validation requirements, including parameters such as bias, calibration model, carryover, and interferences. ANSI/ASB Standard 017 addresses metrological traceability, and Standard 054 addresses quality control programs in forensic toxicology laboratories. Request the validation file for the method, and ask whether the validation was performed in whole blood matrix, whether it covered the concentration range of your client's result, and whether it tested for common interfering volatiles. An article in LCGC reported that its authors had rarely encountered a blood alcohol method validated according to Standard 036 and argued that laboratory validation practices often fall short, so the point is worth testing against your own lab's records, though the article is an advocacy-leaning commentary, not a survey.


Measurement uncertainty. No measurement is exact. ANSI/ASB Standard 056 (Standard for Evaluation of Measurement Uncertainty in Forensic Toxicology, 2025) sets minimum requirements for how laboratories evaluate the uncertainty of quantitative toxicology results. Ask for the lab's uncertainty budget and the expanded uncertainty at the reported concentration, and whether it was reported or considered. A result of 0.082 g/100 mL has a very different meaning at the lower end of its uncertainty interval than a stated flat 0.082. The relevance to a per se charge is greatest when the result is close to the legal limit. Calibration and controls. Ask how calibrators and controls were prepared, whether they were traceable to certified reference materials, whether the controls fell within acceptance limits, and whether any failed run was repeated or discarded. Check whether the calibration curve spans the result, and whether the case result was determined from a single run or replicates. Accreditation. Texas requires accreditation for most forensic analyses used in criminal cases, subject to statutory exceptions. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.35. Read the statute's current text, including the consequences it attaches to noncompliance. In addition, accredited laboratories typically operate under ISO/IEC 17025, and a lab's own procedures set the "must" and "shall" requirements that an analyst cannot disclaim on the stand. The analyst's qualifications and independence. Review the testifying analyst's CV, training, proficiency testing history, and whether that analyst actually performed and reviewed your client's analysis. Whether the person who testifies is the person who did the work is a Confrontation Clause question, discussed next.

D. Challenges at trial Confrontation. Testimonial forensic reports cannot generally be introduced through a witness who did not perform or observe the testing. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), held that forensic laboratory certificates are testimonial. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), held that the State cannot satisfy the Confrontation Clause by calling a surrogate analyst who did not perform or observe the test. Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), addressed an expert who conveyed an absent analyst's statements as the basis for the expert's own opinion, and held that if those statements are offered for their truth they are hearsay for confrontation purposes. Determine who ran the test, who reviewed it, and who will testify. Reliability. Scientific testimony must be relevant and reliable. See Tex. R. Evid. 702; Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Headspace GC is a well-established technique, and a challenge to the technique as a whole is unlikely to succeed. Reliability challenges are more productive when aimed at how the technique was applied in your case, including validation, uncertainty, and quality control. Retrograde extrapolation. If the State uses the result to estimate your client's BAC at the time of driving, the reliability of that extrapolation is a separate issue. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals discussed the reliability requirements for retrograde extrapolation testimony in Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Challenge the expert's knowledge of the individual's characteristics, the time between driving and the draw, and the assumptions about absorption and elimination. The legal definitions. Under Texas law, "alcohol concentration" means grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood (or 210 liters of breath, or 67 milliliters of urine), and a person is intoxicated if the


alcohol concentration is 0.08 or more, or if they lack the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of alcohol. Tex. Penal Code §§ 49.01(1)-(2). Enhancement thresholds appear in § 49.04. The per se definition makes measurement precision legally meaningful near the line.

Part V: A Discovery Checklist When discovery arrives from a laboratory you have not dealt with before, work through it in this order. 1. Read the laboratory's policies, procedures, and instructions. Mark every statement that says the lab "must" or "shall" do something. These become impeachment material when an analyst says a requirement is optional. 2. Review the State expert's CV and credentials. 3. Find your client's laboratory case number. It will be on the report with the BAC. Use it to locate every document that concerns the analysis. 4. Find the batch sheet, solution log, and toxicology case worklist. These show what was run and in what order, and which other samples were analyzed alongside your client's. The analyst's notes will often record the condition of the blood and the volume received. 5. Read the main case report. Record the dates and times for the draw, storage, transport, receipt, and each testing event. Compare them to refrigerator logs. 6. Examine the chain of custody and evidence notes. Calculate the time the specimen was out of storage during analysis. 7. Review the chromatograms. Look for unidentified peaks, poor peak shape, integration changes, and internal standard variation. Ask the lab for the software audit trail and any reintegration records. 8. Request instrument maintenance records, pipette calibration records, and the validation file for the method. 9. Request calibration and control records, including certificates for reference materials, and the lab's measurement uncertainty documentation. 10. Consider whether to request independent retesting of the retained second tube, and consult an expert about preservation and handling before doing so.

Part VI: Choosing Your Defense No single defense fits every case. A few guiding questions help narrow the field. •

•

• •

How close is the result to the legal limit? The closer it is, the more valuable uncertainty, calibration, and quality control arguments become. A very high result is a poor candidate for a fermentation theory. What does the paper show about the specimen's history? Gaps in refrigeration, delays, unexplained handling, and expired materials support integrity arguments. A clean, continuous record does not. Was the draw lawful? Constitutional and statutory challenges can end the case outright, so evaluate them first. Who is going to testify? Confrontation issues turn on this, and they should be raised before trial.


•

Is there a defense expert, and have you given them the full file? A challenge without expert support is an argument. A challenge with expert support is evidence.

The goal is a coherent, believable story about where the number may be wrong, supported by the State's own records. Study the science, read the lab's own rules, and ask the analyst questions that the documents can answer.

References Cases • • • • • • • • • • •

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011). Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016). Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013). Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019). Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024). State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Statutes and rules • • • •

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 38.23, 38.35. Tex. Penal Code §§ 49.01, 49.04. Tex. R. Evid. 702. Tex. Transp. Code § 724.017.

Scientific and technical sources • • • • • • •

Blume, P. & Lakatua, D.J., The Effect of Microbial Contamination of the Blood Sample on the Determination of Ethanol Levels in Serum and Blood, 60 Am. J. Clin. Pathol. 700 (1973). Chang, I. & Kollman, S.E., The Effect of Temperature on the Formation of Ethanol by Candida albicans in Blood, 34(1) J. Forensic Sci. 105 (1989). Dick, G.L. & Stone, H.M., Alcohol Loss Arising from Microbial Contamination of Drivers' Blood Specimens, 34 Forensic Sci. Int'l 17 (1987). Kaye, S., The Collection and Handling of the Blood Alcohol Specimen, 74 Am. J. Clin. Pathol. 743 (1980). Rainey, P.M., Relation Between Serum and Whole-Blood Ethanol Concentrations, 39 Clin. Chem. 2288 (1993). Winek, C.L. & Carfagna, M., Comparison of Plasma, Serum and Whole Blood Ethanol Concentrations, 11 J. Analytical Toxicology 267 (1987). Yajima, D., Motani, H., Kamei, K., Sato, Y., Hayakawa, M. & Iwase, H., Ethanol Production by Candida albicans in Postmortem Human Blood Samples: Effects of Blood Glucose Level and Dilution, Forensic Sci. Int'l.


•

• • • • •

•

• •

Federal Aviation Administration, Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, study of sodium fluoride and microbial ethanol formation in aviation accident specimens, DTIC ADA423300, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA423300.pdf. University of Pretoria doctoral thesis on ethanol stability and Candida albicans in fluoride and non-fluoride blood specimens, https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/67899. AAFS Standards Board, ANSI/ASB Standard 017, Standard for Metrological Traceability in Forensic Toxicology. AAFS Standards Board, ANSI/ASB Standard 036, Standard Practices for Method Validation in Forensic Toxicology (1st ed. 2019). AAFS Standards Board, ANSI/ASB Standard 054, Standard for a Quality Control Program in Forensic Toxicology Laboratories. AAFS Standards Board, ANSI/ASB Standard 056, Standard for Evaluation of Measurement Uncertainty in Forensic Toxicology (1st ed. 2025), https://www.aafs.org/asb-standard/standardevaluation-measurement-uncertainty-forensic-toxicology. Accredited Forensics Laboratories Are Not Properly Validating and Controlling Their Blood Alcohol Determination Methods, Chromatography Online (LCGC) (Aug. 1, 2022), https://www.chromatographyonline.com/view/accredited-forensics-laboratories-are-notproperly-validating-and-controlling-their-blood-alcohol-determination-methods. International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 17025:2017, General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories. National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009).


Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

22nd Annual Stuart Kinard Advanced DWI November 5-6, 2026 The Menger Hotel San Antonio, Tx

Topic: Texas Administrative License Revocation

Speaker:

Johnnathan O’Hara Danford Law Firm 813 Barnett St Kerrville, TX 78028-4521 830.257.4045 phone jonathan@danfordlaw.com email www.thedwiguy.com website

6808 Hill Meadow Dr :: Austin, Texas :: 512.478.2514 p :: 512.469.9107 f :: www.tcdla.com


Texas Administrative License Revocation Jonathan O’Hara September 2026 A DWI arrest usually starts two cases. While the prosecutor decides whether to file a criminal case in either county or district court, the Department of Public Safety can pursue a separate civil suspension of the person’s driving privileges before the State Office of Administrative Hearings. The two cases often share the same facts and potential witnesses, but they ask different questions, apply different standards, and result in different outcomes. A prompt hearing request preserves the client’s chance to contest the suspension. What the administrative law judge is allowed to consider turns on careful use of discovery, admissibility objections, and subpoenas. And the findings made at that hearing are usually much harder to undo on appeal. This paper follows an ordinary ALR case from the officer’s specimen request through notice, preparation, the hearing, and judicial review. It covers both a test failure under Transportation Code Chapter 524 and a specimen refusal under Chapter 724. Along the way, case law is organized around the issues counsel must address.

The two statutory paths A qualifying test result (failure) sends the case down the Chapter 524 track. A refusal sends it down Chapter 724 instead. A refusal case begins with implied consent. A person arrested for an offense involving operation of a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated is deemed to have consented to giving a specimen of breath or blood for analysis.1 Before the officer can request that specimen, he must give the driver the statutory warnings, orally and in writing, including what happens if the driver refuses and what happens if the result comes back over the limit.2 The warning tells the driver that a refusal can mean a suspension of at least 180 days, and that an officer may still seek a warrant for a specimen despite the refusal. A later warrant draw does not erase the historical fact of an earlier refusal, therefore counsel needs to identify which administrative event DPS is alleging. Chapter 524 concerns a failed intoxication test after consent. In an adult case, § 524.035(a) requires DPS to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person had the alcohol concentration specified in Penal Code § 49.01(2)(B) while operating a motor vehicle in a public place or while operating a watercraft and that the officer had reasonable

1 Tex. Transp. Code §§ 724.011–.012. 2 Id. § 724.015.


suspicion to stop or probable cause to arrest.3 A separate provision reaches a minor with any detectable alcohol, under the circumstances the statute specifies.4 And § 524.035(d) places an express limit on any affirmative finding when the specimen analysis comes back below the statutory concentration. The judge may not suspend an adult’s license if their blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit.5 This structure puts the test result, and its admissibility, at the center of a failure case. Chapter 724 asks different questions. Under § 724.042, the hearing turns on whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to stop or arrest the person; whether probable cause existed to believe the person was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated (or the specified watercraft while intoxicated); whether the person was arrested and asked to give a specimen; and whether the person refused.6 As we can see, the Department must prove several elements, any of which defense counsel may contest – the arrest, the specimen request, the refusal, etc. Counsel should read the DIC forms and the officer’s narrative against those elements. For adults, the ordinary Chapter 524 suspension runs 90 days if there is no alcohol or drug related enforcement contact in the preceding ten years, and one year if there is.7 A Chapter 724 refusal generally runs 180 days, or two years if the driving record shows a qualifying prior contact within ten years.8 Minor failure cases carry their own graduated periods — 60, 120, or 180 days — tied to specified prior convictions.9 It is worth identifying the correct period early, both to advise the client accurately and to make sure any alleged enhancement is actually supported by the driving record. Keep three standards separate throughout the case. DPS carries a preponderance burden at SOAH. A court reviewing the ALJ’s decision applies the substantial evidence framework rather than holding a new hearing. And a reviewing court generally cannot reverse for a qualifying legal or procedural error unless the error prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.10

3 Tex. Transp. Code § 524.035(a); see Tex. Penal Code § 49.01(2)(B). 4 Tex. Transp. Code § 524.035(a)(1)(B). 5 Id. § 524.035(d). 6 Id. §§ 724.042–.043. 7 Id. § 524.022(a)(1)-(2). 8 Id. § 724.035(a)–(b). 9 Id. § 524.022(b). 10 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174.


Notice and the first decisions The officer’s duties and DPS’s notice process depend on which event triggered the case. In a Chapter 524 case, the arresting officer reports information about the arrest and the specimen analysis, and DPS may issue or mail notice when the result was not available for service at release.11 In a refusal case, the officer files the refusal report, and the notice procedure runs through §§ 724.031–.034.12 The first thing to note is the date notice was received, or is statutorily presumed received. In either path, DPS must receive a hearing request within 15 days after the person receives notice, or is presumed to have received mailed notice.13 Mailed notice is generally presumed received on the fifth day after mailing.14 Without a timely hearing request, the ordinary effective date is the 40th day after receipt or presumed receipt.15 A timely hearing request nixes the automatic 40th day suspension and stays the suspension until the ALJ’s final decision.16 Because the request has to be received within that window, document the method, the time, and the confirmation of submission. Do not rely on an assumed mailing rule. A client who changes addresses should understand that giving counsel or SOAH a new address does not automatically change the address on file with DPS. Remember, the hearing request protects the right to litigate. It does not, by itself, secure a single exhibit or a live witness. The hearing itself ordinarily has to be set no earlier than the eleventh day after notice of the setting — absent an agreement to waive that interval — and before the initial suspension effective date.17 Section 524.032(b) requires rescheduling when SOAH receives the driver’s qualifying continuance request before the fifth day preceding the scheduled hearing; subsection (c) limits the continuance available under that section, with a narrow additional medical-condition provision.18 Those subsections also govern Chapter 724 hearings.19 Other grounds for continuance appear in the SOAH rules.20 The practical point 11 Tex. Transp. Code §§ 524.011–.014. 12 Id. §§ 724.031–.034. 13 Id. §§ 524.031, 724.041(a). 14 Id. §§ 524.013(b), 724.033(b). 15 Id. §§ 524.021(a), 724.035(c). 16 Id. §§ 524.032(d), 724.041(c). 17 Id. §§ 524.032(a), 724.041(b). 18 Id. § 524.032(b)–(c). 19 Id. § 724.041(g). 20 See 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 159.207.


is this: distinguish a statutory timely request from a later good-cause motion, and do not assume an informal agreement with opposing counsel has actually changed the setting. That distinction affects appearances too, not just calendaring. A later continuance motion should state its particular reason, the number of earlier motions by each party and, when written, the required service and conference certifications. Except for a hearing rescheduled under the timely-request provision, the parties must appear unless SOAH has notified them relief was granted.21 A person who requests a hearing and then fails to appear without just cause waives it, and DPS’s determination becomes final.22 In a refusal case, that determination may not be appealed at all.23 A default requires adequate proof that notice of hearing was properly filed and served.24 The defaulting party can move within ten business days after the default decision issues to vacate it for good cause. If the judge finds good cause, the judge has to vacate the order and reset the hearing.25 Conversely, if DPS fails to appear through counsel without good cause, the case is dismissed with prejudice.26 Confirm the hearing link, time, case number, witness appearance method, and the status of any pending motions before the hearing. A missing witness and an absent party carry very different consequences under the rules. At intake, get the notice, identify the statutory path and its deadlines, request the hearing, and preserve whatever documents the client already has. The DIC-23 officer report, DIC-24 warning, and DIC-25 suspension notice commonly form the core of the administrative file. The arrest narrative, SFST information, specimen records, and the client’s own account reveal the facts of the case.

Building the hearing record SOAH’s Chapter 159 rules shape the hearing in practice. Discovery is narrower than in an ordinary civil suit. Parties may inspect and copy nonprivileged documents or records the other party has, but depositions, interrogatories, requests for admission, and automatic initial disclosures are not permitted.27 A discovery request cannot be filed before SOAH has jurisdiction and initially scheduled the hearing, and it is served on the proper party

21 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 159.207(b)–(d). 22 Tex. Transp. Code § 524.036. 23 Id. § 724.044. 24 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 159.213(c)–(d). 25 Id. § 159.213(f). 26 Id. § 159.213(e). 27 Id. § 159.151(c)–(d).


directly, not filed with SOAH as an exhibit.28 Note that the discovery obligation is reciprocal although, in practice, respondents rarely provide any discovery, with the exception of exhibits to be used at the hearing, which must be prefiled. Under the current rule, a response ordinarily has to go out within five days of receipt; a party who does not have a requested record has must say so, and supplement once it is obtained.29 Make targeted requests early enough to review the response and decide whether more evidence, or a witness, is needed. Breath testing records show how a specific rule can beat a general request. The driver may seek inspection, maintenance, and repair records for the particular instrument, covering 30 days before and 30 days after the test. When DPS actually has the records, the rule gives it ten days to produce them and, after payment of reasonable copying charges, imposes a specific exclusion consequence if DPS fails to produce properly requested records.30 If DPS does not have them, it has to identify the proper third-party source if known. A subpoena duces tecum can reach relevant third-party records.31 Late production, fewer than ten days before the hearing, can support a continuance.32 The details matter because “DPS never gave me the records” is a much weaker record than a timely, properly directed request, and a response or nonresponse with proof of payment where required, and a request for the precise relief the rule authorizes. Electronic exhibit practice takes planning too. Exhibits ordinarily have to be prefiled at least two days before the hearing, numbered and paginated, with bookmarks when several exhibits are combined into one document.33 An exhibit admitted without prefiling must be electronically filed by the next business day. The record can be supplemented only with exhibits admitted or preserved by an offer of proof.34 Audio and video must be filed in a format the judge can actually review. The rule also calls for confidential designation to prevent inadvertent public access to personal information. Video is most useful when it is actually admitted, or made part of an offer of proof, with a record identifying the relevant time segments. Simply possessing a body camera clip does not make it part of the appellate record. When the image and the officer’s description diverge, decide whether the video establishes a contradiction. That distinction will matter both to the ALJ’s factual findings and to the scope of later review.

28 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 159.151(a), (b), (e), (f). 29 Id. § 159.151(g)–(h). 30 Id. § 159.151(j). 31 Id. § 159.151(j)–(k). 32 Id. § 159.151(i). 33 Id. § 159.53. 34 Id. § 159.53(c)(5)(E).


A useful review of the arrest packet moves through the encounter in order. If there is a caller, compare the dispatch or caller’s information with the officer’s stated reason for first contact. Also, compare the report’s order of events with timestamps, camera footage, and radio traffic. Identify exactly what the officer first observed, e.g. driving behavior, odor, speech, eyes, or balance. Then identify the arrest, the warning, the request, and the driver’s response. Some apparent inconsistencies are just narrative compression. Others determine whether a fact is true, arose before the stop, before the detention was prolonged, or only after arrest. Distinguish what the officer personally perceived from another officer’s information, a civilian report, or a conclusion copied into a DIC form. The case turns on admissible facts actually supporting or calling into question a statutory finding — not on how many forms repeat the same bare assertion. The rules of evidence that apply in a nonjury civil case generally apply here too, subject to the Administrative Procedure Act and the ALR-specific rules.35 Hearings must be fair and expeditious; the judge may manage the order and length of proof, but shall exclude irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious testimony or evidence.36 This is a streamlined civil hearing, but it still calls for specific evidentiary objections and a usable record.

Documentary proof and the right to examine an officer Texas Department of Public Safety v. Caruana explains why so many ALR cases proceed on paper.37 The officer’s report in that case was unsworn. The Texas Supreme Court rejected the argument that the administrative rule admitting a sworn officer report necessarily excluded an unsworn one.38 Texas Rule of Evidence 803(8), the public records exception, supplied an independent basis for admission.39 So the absence of the arresting officer, the hearsay character of the narrative, and the lack of an oath are not, alone or together, automatic grounds to exclude the report. Counsel has to identify a real foundation, trustworthiness, or admissibility problem, or use the subpoena procedure to require a witness. The Fifteenth Court applied that same principle in Texas Department of Public Safety v. Saintes.40 DPS offered a sworn DIC-23, DIC-24, DIC-25, and a separate unsworn DWI report

35 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 159.211(b). 36 Id. § 159.211(a)(3)–(4). 37 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Caruana, 363 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. 2012). 38 Id. at 561. 39 Id. at 561–65. 40 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Saintes, No. 15-24-00092-CV, 2025 WL 1710798 (Tex. App.—

15th Dist. June 19, 2025) (mem. op.).


setting out the trooper’s observations and SFST results.41 The court held the ALJ could admit the unsworn report under Rule 803(8), even though it was not “incorporated by reference” into the DIC-23, and reinstated the suspension.42 Rule 803(8)’s trustworthiness proviso still permits a proper challenge, but a vague objection will not suffice. The defense can change that posture by subpoenaing the officer. The current rule recognizes admission of a report as a public record while preserving the driver’s right to subpoena its author.43 If a timely subpoenaed officer fails to appear without good cause, “information obtained from that officer” is inadmissible. The subpoenaing party can instead seek enforcement of that provision, although the judge may grant DPS a continuance. The exclusion is source specific — an absent officer’s information may be central to DPS’s case, but independent admissible information from another officer or source does not vanish just because a subpoenaed witness failed to show. Identify exactly which exhibit assertions come from that officer, and what proof remains after exclusion. In practice, DPS will usually dismiss a case upon the officer’s failure to appear at the hearing. The subpoena power is limited. A Texas attorney may issue a subpoena for the officer primarily responsible for the stop, and another for the officer primarily responsible for probable cause to arrest; if the same person did both, only one subpoena issues under that authority.44 Additional officers, and nonofficers generally, require a good-cause request to the judge.45 For a breath test operator or technical supervisor, that rule calls for a request no later than ten days before the hearing and an affidavit, based on personal knowledge, establishing a genuine issue about the test’s validity that requires the witness’s appearance.46 The related statutory deadline in § 524.039(a) is discussed below. The current version of the service rule makes the mechanics consequential. The subpoena must reach the witness at least five days before the hearing and include the notice, or sufficient instructions for appearance, including conference details when applicable. The rule specifies permissible service methods: personal delivery, acknowledged electronic service, certified mail or signature-required express delivery in appropriate circumstances, and certain agency-approved alternative service for peace officers. The subpoena and proof of service must be filed at SOAH at least three days before the hearing, with documentation appropriate to the chosen method.47

41 Saintes, No. 15-24-00092-CV, 2025 WL 1710798, at *3. 42 Id. at *4-5. 43 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 159.211(c)(2); id. § 159.103. 44 Id. § 159.101(b). 45 Id. § 159.101(c). 46 Id. § 159.101(c)(1)(C). 47 Id. § 159.103(b)–(d).


When an officer shows up for the hearing, it can be a great discovery tool in general. But hopefully, the report is such that you will have something to focus on which may be fruitful. Useful questions may concern what the officer actually saw before activating the emergency lights to effect detention, how he determined a traffic statute was violated, or whether he corroborated 911 caller’s alleged observations. If the issue is reasonable suspicion of DWI, the inquiry may focus on the few seconds between the officer’s approach and his request that the driver exit the vehicle. In a refusal case, it may be which specimen the officer requested or what the driver exactly said after the warning, or whether an unsuccessful attempt may have been caused by inability. Focused examination reconstructs that sequence and freezes testimony. Case law shows why the procedural steps are more than clerical. In Curry v. Texas Department of Public Safety, defense counsel did not establish adequate service.48 Without a valid predicate for the no-show remedy, the ALJ could quash the subpoena and admit the report.49 In Manley v. Texas Department of Public Safety, the officer repeatedly failed to appear despite efforts and continuances aimed at permitting examination.50 The court concluded that proceeding without the promised opportunity to question the officer violated due process and resulted in the absence of the rudiments of fair play51. Manley applied older rule language, so its procedural detail is not a substitute for the current rule — but it is a reminder that a meaningful examination right cannot be treated as a formality. Hodge v. Texas Department of Public Safety distinguished an administrative opportunity to examine a witness from the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, which does not apply to civil ALR proceedings.52 But if you are put in a situation where you are being unfairly limited or precluded from examining an important witness, argue Manley.

The stop and the move into a DWI investigation The initial Fourth Amendment question is often the inception of the encounter. In Texas Department of Public Safety v. Axt, entry into a police parking lot that was open to the public with raised access arms did not supply the officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal trespass based on the objective facts.53 Just stating an offense does not replace

48 Curry v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 472 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015,

no pet.). 49 Id. at 355. 50 Manley v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 04-06-00547-CV, 2007 WL 247681 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio Jan. 31, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). 51 Id. at *3. 52 Hodge v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 01-12-00259-CV, 2013 WL 4680378 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh’g). 53 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Axt, 292 S.W.3d 736 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009).


specific facts that fit the legal elements. State v. Hardin held that § 545.060(a) requires an unsafe failure to maintain a single lane; a brief drift over a lane line, without traffic or danger, did not justify the stop there.54 In State v. Cortez, touching the fog line did not establish driving on an improved shoulder.55 Compare the alleged conduct with the video if you have it, the surrounding traffic if applicable, and the particular statute before conceding a traffic basis. Timing can decide the issue before any intoxication evidence enters the picture. State v. Griffey arose when a restaurant manager reported a person passed out behind the wheel in a drive-thru.56 When the officer arrived, Griffey was awake at the window, yet he blocked her vehicle with the patrol car, and only smelled alcohol after detaining her.57 The court held the facts known at the time of the detention were insufficient.58 The real lesson here is about timing: observations made after the seizure cannot retroactively justify it. Reconstruct a parked-car contact, accident response, welfare inquiry, or dispatch call to identify exactly when a consensual contact became a detention, and exactly what facts were known to the officer at that moment. A lawful initial stop does not come with a perpetual license to investigate DWI. Texas Department of Public Safety v. Rodriguez is useful because the record established a traffic basis but did not adequately connect the stop to the ensuing intoxication investigation.59 The question is whether facts learned during the traffic encounter gave reasonable suspicion to extend or redirect the detention toward DWI. Ask exactly what the officer noticed after contact and before ordering the driver out or administering tests, and whether those observations actually appear in the report, the recording, or contemporaneous communications, or whether they conflict. Evidence of drinking has to be analyzed with care. In Domingo v. State, a public intoxication case, odor of alcohol alone did not provide reasonable suspicion of intoxication or the loss of the normal use of mental or physical faculties.60 Domingo is an analogy but State v. Evans offers a direct example.61 After a speeding stop, a trooper detected alcohol and heard Evans admit to two whiskey drinks. Yet the trial court found prompt and safe

54 State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 875–77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). 55 State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 205–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). 56 State v. Griffey, 241 S.W.3d 700 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d). 57 Id. at 702. 58 Id. at 707. 59 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Rodriguez, 953 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ). 60 Domingo v. State, 82 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.). 61 State v. Evans, 500 S.W.3d 528 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016).


compliance with the stop, normal speech and communication, no fumbling or balance problem, and ordinary standing and walking. The court affirmed the finding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of DWI and probable cause to arrest. This was only possible because defense counsel elicited testimony about all of the things the driver did well or “normally.” The case shows that the totality of the circumstances includes not only incriminating facts, but all of the facts, even those that are good for the defense. Test the quality of each asserted cue. Remember that NHTSA dropped red, bloodshot eyes as a cue long ago, labeling it too subjective with commonplace alternative causes.62 That does not technically make the observation completely irrelevant, case law supports its consideration as one of many factors in the almost infinite “totality.” But we must tell judges what NHTSA found because, otherwise, most will not know.

The connection to operation Some cases feature strong evidence of intoxication but a disputed connection between that condition and operation in a public place. Texas Department of Public Safety v. Allocca involved a person asleep in his vehicle, parked in his ordinary workplace space, seat reclined, car in park, headlights off, engine running for air conditioning.63 No witness saw recent driving. No crash, no erratic parking, no comparable fact established recent intoxicated travel. The court held that substantial evidence did not support probable cause of intoxicated operation on that record.64 The case is especially useful for separating the inference of present intoxication from the inference of operation at a relevant time and place. In State v. Espinosa, the Court of Criminal Appeals distinguished Allocca in considering a stronger circumstantial connection between the occupant and the functioning vehicle.65 Direct observation of driving is not invariably required, the totality can establish the relevant nexus through position, vehicle condition, location, recent movement, and surrounding circumstances. Resist both shortcuts: assuming a running engine proves operation while intoxicated, and assuming a sleeping occupant cannot have operated. The useful inquiry is what the admissible evidence actually permits the ALJ to infer about who used the vehicle, when, where, and in what condition. That distinction also disciplines cross-examination. If the officer never saw the car move, establish when the officer arrived and whether he observed or collected any additional evidence, e.g. whether the hood was warm, whether the tires or vehicle position 62 Jack W. Stuster, The Detection of DWI at BACs Below 0.10, DOT HS 808 654, Nat’l

Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (1997). 63 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Allocca, 301 S.W.3d 364, 368-69 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009,

pet. denied). 64 Id. At 369-70. 65 State v. Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d 659, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).


suggested recent travel, or what opportunity existed for drinking after parking. The answers may cut either way. The goal is to expose the inferential links or lack thereof.

Specimen requests and what qualifies as a refusal The law is clear that refusal is broader than a spoken “no.” In Ott v. Texas Department of Public Safety, the Court found that nonresponsive answers or evasive behavior after the warnings could support an ALJ’s finding of refusal.66 Similarly, Texas Department of Public Safety v. Sanchez involved an apparent attempt to give a breath specimen that did not produce an adequate sample.67 The Court found the ALJ could evaluate whether the failure to follow through stemmed from genuine inability, equipment difficulty, or an intentional failure to provide the requested specimen.68 DPS does not have to negate every hypothetical innocent cause in the abstract. Note the officer’s instructions, what the defendant actually said, the number and duration of attempts if any, machine messages, and respiratory or medical issues. That makes the factual issue concrete. The same expressor-intentional distinction shows up in the statutory treatment of refusal evidence at a later trial.69 Although the refusal element is rarely litigated, it can be won depending on the facts. Perhaps the defendant was made to believe he had a choice. Also, the legal propriety of a request can matter. In Texas Department of Public Safety v. Hutcheson, the driver testified he understood the arresting officer himself intended to draw blood at the jail.70 The officer was not shown to be authorized to perform the draw, and DPS did not rebut with any evidence of a qualified person or plan to move to an appropriate setting. On that record, the court held the proof insufficient to sustain the refusal as presented.71 On the other hand, Stowers v. Texas Department of Public Safety makes two distinct points about a Chapter 524 failure case.72 First, the driver waited until closing argument to complain about § 724.017’s requirements on who drew blood and where. Because the

66 Ott v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 958 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). 67 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Sanchez, 82 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002). 68 Id. at 510-511. 69 Tex. Transp. Code § 724.061. 70 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Hutcheson, 235 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2007, pet. denied). 71 Id. at 316. 72 Stowers v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 465 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2015).


evidentiary complaint was not raised when the result was admitted, it was not preserved.73 Second, § 524.035 does not add affirmative proof of § 724.017 compliance as a separate element DPS must establish in every failure hearing.74 These holdings do not make § 724.017 meaningless — a timely, supported objection to the admissibility of the result can still matter. Stowers itself distinguished Hutcheson’s refusal setting, where the legality of the proposed request had been developed in evidence. Therefore, specify whether the argument concerns a statutory element, the admissibility of a particular result, or the legal propriety of the requested specimen, and raise the issue at the appropriate time. Where the driver submitted a specimen, the number is not the end of the inquiry. Examine identification of the person and sample, the timing between operation and collection, the certification or qualification requirements, and an actual basis for a trustworthiness or statutory objection. Mireles v. Texas Department of Public Safety rejected a categorical requirement of retrograde extrapolation testimony before a later test could support an ALR finding about alcohol concentration while driving.75 That holding does not preclude case-specific challenges to timing or reliability. In breath cases, § 724.016 requires a specimen taken and analyzed under DPS rules by a certified person.76 Section 524.038 lets a certified breath test technical supervisor address instrument reliability and validity by affidavit, covering the instrument, the result, and compliance with the state program.77 Under § 524.039(a), counsel may apply to SOAH for the operator’s or technical supervisor’s subpoena no later than the fifth day before the hearing, and must show good cause.78 SOAH Rule 159.101(c)(1)(C) sets an earlier ten-day filing deadline and requires a personal-knowledge affidavit establishing a genuine issue about the breath test’s validity that necessitates the witness’s appearance. Satisfy the tenday rule and the affidavit requirement whenever possible. Under § 524.038(d), an affidavit from a witness whose presence was timely requested under that section is inadmissible if the witness fails to appear without good cause.79 These provisions sit alongside the general discovery and subpoena rules.

73 Stowers, 465 S.W.3d 257 at 265. 74 Id. at 264-65. 75 Mireles v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 132 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam). 76 Tex. Transp. Code § 724.016. 77 Id. § 524.038. 78 Id. § 524.039(a). 79 Id. § 524.038(d).


In blood cases, § 724.017 addresses who is authorized to take the specimen and requires a sanitary place.80 Section 724.018 gives a person who supplied a specimen access, on request, to full information about its analysis.81 Records of collection, labeling, transfer, testing, and preservation can illuminate a real foundation or reliability problem. But think carefully about the nature of that problem. Stowers’s distinction between an affirmative statutory element and an evidentiary issue is especially important here.

The ALJ’s decision and judicial review The ALJ applies the statute to the admitted record. In a failure case, an affirmative finding on both issues sustains the suspension; otherwise DPS must reinstate or rescind as the statute directs.82 In a refusal case, the ALJ must find affirmatively on each § 724.042 issue to sustain the suspension.83 The decision is final when signed.84 Counsel who intends to challenge the result needs the exact order, the findings, the admitted exhibits, any excluded material preserved by offer of proof, and the recording. The client should get prompt advice about the effective date, the possibility of further judicial review, and any need for an occupational license. Mireles defines the reviewing court’s task. Substantial evidence review asks whether the ALJ’s decision has a reasonable evidentiary basis and is supported by more than a scintilla. The court does not reweigh testimony or substitute its preferred factual result just because the evidence might support a different conclusion.85 With that said, and as the Supreme Court of Texas explained in Texas Department of Public Safety v. Alford, only the ALJ’s findings are entitled to deference, but whether they constitute substantial evidence is a legal question.86 Review runs on SOAH’s certified record, with no additional testimony. A narrow statutory mechanism permits an application for additional material evidence that could not, for good reason, have been presented earlier. The court may direct its taking before an ALJ rather than hear the evidence anew.87 If the court remands for additional evidence, the

80 Tex. Transp. Code § 724.017. 81 Id. § 724.018. 82 Id. § 524.035(b)–(c). 83 Id. § 724.043. 84 Id. § 524.035(e); id. § 724.041(g). 85 Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131. 86 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Alford, 209 S.W.3d 101, 103-4 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). 87 Tex. Transp. Code § 524.043.


appellant must file a request for relief with SOAH, including the remand order, within ten days after the order is signed. The remand does not stay the suspension.88 There is a second limitation even when counsel identifies error. Under Government Code § 2001.174, the reviewing court may reverse or remand only when substantial rights were prejudiced because the decision falls into one of the specified categories: constitutional or statutory violation, unlawful procedure, other error of law, lack of substantial evidence, or arbitrary or capricious action.89 In Texas Department of Public Safety v. Kimbrough, the officer’s failure to timely send his report to DPS led the ALJ to exclude the officer’s report, which contained the evidence needed by DPS to establish the facts supporting the stop and arrest, thereby denying it the opportunity to meet its burden.90 The Court found that exclusion erroneous and a violation of DPS’s substantial rights. Texas Department of Public Safety v. Nordin illustrates the opposite: the decision to not exclude the report and suspend the defendant’s license, despite DPS missing the same report deadline, did not warrant reversal as there was no violation of defendant’s substantial rights.91 This seems unfair to us as defense attorneys, but there is some logic there. The appellant must establish the defect and its consequences on his substantial rights – most commonly, his ability to litigate or have a full and fair hearing. In sum, preservation begins well before the final order. A claim about an unavailable witness needs a request, an explanation of materiality, and a ruling. An objection first voiced in closing is too late. A disputed subpoena requires proof of service and a request for the remedy the rule allows. For an excluded defense exhibit or testimony, an offer of proof is needed to let the reviewing court understand the evidence and why it mattered. When an ALJ proposes to proceed despite missing discovery or an unavailable witness, seek the appropriate continuance or enforcement relief and put the resulting harm on the record. None of this needs to turn the hearing into a prolonged civil trial. It just needs to build a compact record that can actually be reviewed. The statutory appeal has to be filed no later than the 30th day after the ALJ’s decision becomes final, in the county court at law of the county of arrest or, where there is none, the county court. If the county judge is not a licensed attorney, the case must transfer to a district court for the county on a party’s motion or the judge’s own motion.92 DPS may

88 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 159.255(f)–(g); Tex. Transp. Code § 524.043(e). 89 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174. 90 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Kimbrough, 106 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2003, no pet.). 91 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Nordin, 971 S.W.2d 90, 95-6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

1998, no pet.). 92 Tex. Transp. Code § 524.041(a)–(b).


appeal only on an issue of law.93 The driver must provide the required certified copy to DPS and SOAH.94 The appellant is responsible for the appellate record. Under the current SOAH rule, a written transcript request, with a file-stamped or certified petition, should go in within ten days after filing the appeal, with the applicable transcript cost paid.95 A motion for rehearing is not a prerequisite to appeal. Chapter 524 governs appeals from Chapter 724 hearings as well.96 Filing an appeal does not guarantee the client can drive until it is decided. Section 524.042 gives a stay only if the specified prior suspension and conviction disqualifiers are absent. Even when available, the statutory stay lasts no more than 90 days from the appeal filing and cannot be extended.97 After a sustained suspension ends, the license is not automatically restored, the statutory reinstatement fee is $125 unless the action was rescinded or not sustained, and other eligibility requirements may still apply.98 Treat the administrative appeal, the temporary stay, occupational license eligibility, and reinstatement as distinct subjects. Conflating them is a common, and costly, misunderstanding about what the client is actually authorized to do right now. The civil character of the appeal continues beyond county court. Texas Department of Public Safety v. Tran shows that final judgments, postjudgment motions, plenary power, and the appellate timetable are governed by civil procedure unless a specific ALR provision supplies a different rule.99 Criminal defense counsel accustomed to criminal appellate deadlines should calendar this track separately. An adverse ALJ ruling also calls for practical advice apart from whether an appeal is viable. The client needs to know when the temporary permit or hearing stay ends, whether an appellate stay actually applies, whether a separate suspension exists, and whether the client can get an occupational license for essential purposes. An occupational license application is a court matter under the applicable Transportation Code provisions and local filing practice — not relief the SOAH judge can simply tack onto the ALR order. A limited license carries its own conditions and does not authorize operation of a commercial motor

93 Tex. Transp. Code § 524.041(d). 94 Id. § 524.041(c). 95 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 159.255. 96 Tex. Transp. Code § 724.047. 97 Id. § 524.042. 98 Id. §§ 524.051, 724.046. 99 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Tran, 672 S.W.3d 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2023).


vehicle. We should not assume or imply that the filing an ALR appeal removed every impediment on our client’s driving record.

The criminal case and the administrative result The ALR is a civil proceeding, separate from the related criminal case. Chapter 524 generally makes a criminal disposition immaterial to the suspension, except in the event of an acquittal, which rarely happen before the ALR hearing.100 Chapter 724 expressly describes the administrative determination as civil and independent and denies ordinary estoppel of criminal issues.101 Texas Department of Public Safety v. Varme is a useful reminder that dismissal of a DWI prosecution is not an acquittal, something many clients are disappointed to learn.102 Nor is a prosecutor’s decision never to file the criminal charge an acquittal because that term presupposes that the person was charged and jeopardy attached.103 The reverse effect is limited too. In State v. Brabson, a favorable ALR probable cause determination did not collaterally estop the criminal prosecutor from litigating probable cause.104 Reynolds v. State reaffirmed that holding en banc, and squarely rejected the argument that federal constitutional double jeopardy collateral estoppel under Ashe v. Swenson compels a different result.105 Tharp v. State likewise rejected the argument that an administrative suspension is a first criminal punishment barring a later DWI case on double jeopardy grounds.106 Independence does not make the two proceedings factually unrelated. An officer may testify under oath at SOAH before criminal discovery is complete, and that testimony can expose an inconsistency, clarify timing, or narrow an account of the stop. The ALR hearing is important in and of itself, and certainly important to our clients. It can also provide extremely useful information for the criminal case. It is often especially vital in setting up future motions to suppress.

100 Tex. Transp. Code § 524.015. 101 Id. § 724.048. 102 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Varme, 262 S.W.3d 34, 39 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2008, no pet.). 103 Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Norrell, 968 S.W.2d 16, 19-20 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 1998, no pet.). 104 State v. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 105 Reynolds v. State, 4 S.W.3d 13, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.

436 (1970). 106 Tharp v. State, 935 S.W.2d 157, 160-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).


Conclusion The best way to approach an ALR case is to follow it in time while keeping the statutory track in view. Notice opens a short window to request a hearing and preserve driving privileges until the ALJ decides the case. Discovery and subpoenas shape the record and determine whom counsel can examine. The stop cases ask what justified the initial seizure; the prolonged detention cases ask what facts justified extending the encounter into a DWI investigation. In a failure case, the proof centers on operation, the specimen, and alcohol concentration. In a refusal case, DPS must establish the statutory grounds for the stop and arrest, probable cause to believe the person operated while intoxicated, a specimen request, and a refusal. Once the ALJ decides the case, substantial evidence review and the preservation rules sharply limit the ability to repair a weak record. At each stage, counsel should identify the element at issue, when the relevant facts arose, what the officer knew, and what the admissible evidence actually proves. For most clients, the SOAH hearing is the only real opportunity to contest the suspension. It can also expose weaknesses in the officer’s account while the criminal case is still developing. The opportunity is brief, and the preparation invested can have a big impact on our clients.


Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

22nd Annual Stuart Kinard Advanced DWI November 5-6, 2026 The Menger Hotel San Antonio, Tx

Topic: Defending Vehicular Crimes DWI Manslaughter & Felony Trial Strategies

Speaker:

Bobby Barrera Robert J. Barrera, P.C. 408 Dwyer Ave San Antonio, TX 78204 210.422.7448 phone bobby@bobbybarrera.com email www.bobbybarrera.com website

6808 Hill Meadow Dr :: Austin, Texas :: 512.478.2514 p :: 512.469.9107 f :: www.tcdla.com


The Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

Stuart kinard advanced dwi Seminar November 5th and 6th, 2026

Defending Vehicular Crimes DWI Manslaughter & Felony Trial Strategies

By:

BOBBY BARRERA BOBBY BARRERA LAW 408 Dwyer Ave., San Antonio, Texas 78204 (210) 227-7372 (210) 224-5890 FAX bobby@bobbybarrera.com With Assistant in Research and Revised by MORGAN GILLETTE 408 Dwyer Ave., San Antonio, Texas 78204 (210) 227-7372 (210) 224-5890 FAX morgan@bobbybarrera.com


TDCLA: Defending Vehicular Crimes: DWI Manslaughter & Felony Trial Strategies The introduction to Texas Law on Vehicular Crimes provides a foundation for understanding the complex legal landscape surrounding not only DWI manslaughter and other related DWI felony offenses but their legal distinctions from other driving manslaughter cases. In Texas, vehicular crimes, particularly those involving DWI that result in death, are treated with utmost seriousness, reflecting the state's commitment to road safety and legal accountability. Many jurisdictions apply “standard” punishment recommendations which include prison. These offenses are governed by a combination of statutes and case law which define the elements of the crime, the potential defenses, and the range of penalties upon conviction. Texas law distinguishes DWI manslaughter from other vehicular homicides based on factors such as the driver's intoxication and the “causal connection” between that intoxication and the fatality. Recent years have seen significant developments in societal attitudes towards drunk driving and public safety. Understanding these laws, these prevailing attitudes and the potential defenses is essential for effective representation of the accused in these types of cases. This introduction aims to provide an overview of the current legal framework, setting the stage for a deeper exploration of trial strategies and defense mechanisms in the context of DWI manslaughter and related vehicular felonies in Texas. Now that the BS is over, let’s look at actual practice! MOTION PRACTICE I think it is important to emphasize the discovery process and the filing of motions not only to discover what evidence the State intends to use, but just as important, to LIMIT what they can use if they FAIL to produce what the Court Orders. I have attached my generic Morton/39.14 Discovery Motion. I’m not representing this as the “go to” motion but in it is buried numerous 1


special requests that are often missed by the State in its review of the Motion as the requests are innocuously buried in the body. My Motion (Attachment 1) makes the following request in Paragraph 4: All reports and records of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons, including all resulting final reports, on any tangible or material evidence to be used in this cause, including but not limited to any and all medical records, drug tests, blood tests, breath tests and any other forensic reports or data which call for an expert opinion and/or were prepared by an expert, whether or not the preparing expert will testify at trial, and the name and address of each person who made such report, test, experiment or comparison. There is nothing bolded or highlighted therein. In my last jury trial, while not a vehicle case, the State put on the record that they had provided “all the records” related to the blood test at the time I filed the Motion and readily agreed to its entry with the Court. The judge signed the Order. I never received another document production from the State, until trial. I had no expert, so I really didn’t need any of the records I requested. My client had a BAC .22. On trial day, the DPS lab expert showed up with a file containing numerous records, data run sheets, confirmation sheets, etc. I moved to Voir Dire the expert under TRE 705 outside the presence of the jury. I established in the record: 1) the date of the creation of the documents: 2) that they were available to the State since that date: 3) that they were in the expert’s file the entire time; 4) that the State had never asked her for them, even after the discovery Order was signed; 5) that the records were material to the expert’s testimony and conclusions; and 6) that without them, she could not render an expert opinion on the contents. I further established that my expert, had I hired one, would certainly have needed those records in order to prepare any testimony as to the validity of the blood draw. I 2


marked all the records she brought for purposes of my Limine and appeal. I then moved in Limine to exclude all her testimony for the failure of the State to comply with Morton, §39.14, and Watkins. (Attachment 2 is the Motion I used which was actually originally authored by Andrew Del Cueto). I moved that under Heath the proper remedy was exclusion. I did not move for continuance. The Judge was not happy with me or the State. I re-urged that the Court had “Ordered” (though not necessary to preserve error) that the State produce the records. It was clearly helpful to modify the Judge’s demeanor that I reminded him that the State had agreed to the Order and that they had totally ignored his Order. The Judge finally acquiesced and Granted the Limine and excluded all evidence of the Blood draw. As a practice note, I always move to Limine the State from stating to the Jury in opening statements what the “result” of the blood draw or breath test is under the “skunk” theory that once they hear it, they are going to be thinking about that result in relation to any and all arguments you are making about your client not being intoxicated. Some Counties have a standard court “approved” Production Order for the Blood or Breath testing supporting documentation. I have attached as Attachment #3 the STANDARD JOINT ORDER FOR DISCOVERY OF BREATH TEST RECORDS and as Attachment #4 the BLOOD DRAW ORDER which is used in Bexar County. The use of this Motion and request is two fold: 1) it puts the State on notice of what exactly they are required to produce; and 2) it is absolutely necessary when you are hiring your own expert either to consult or testify. Even without that Order though, those results and analysis are absolutely required to be produced if relied upon by the expert in the rendition of their testimony. Smith v. Arizona, 602 US 779 (2024); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 US 647 (2011) and Heath v. State, 696 SW3rd 677 (Tx. Crim. 2024). Strictly from a personal observation of trial practice, unless you have an expert to review those records it is pointless to request them unless you have some expertise in the interpretation of the data and can 3


spot issues simply from a review thereof. Also keep in mind that if the State is relying upon any expert opinion, YOU are entitled to an expert. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US 68 (1985). I have attached an example of an Ake Motion for your review and modification for use in trial. Additionally, for purposes of “indigency”, the financial resources of your client, not his “family”, are the measure by which the Court must approve the Ake Expert. So even if you are retained by the “family” of the Defendant, you are still entitled to an expert by appointment upon the filing of the proper motion showing indigency. The discovery process is where we obtain all the evidence the prosecution intends to use, including police reports, breathalyzer or blood test results, and witness statements. Moreso, considering these vehicular cases almost always have an accident reconstruction expert for the State, be sure you demand full compliance with Morton and §39.14, well in advance of trial. Get you expert appointed early as well. In any accident/death case, you are entitled to an expert to review the evidence which the State’s expert will use to try and convict your client. I have attached some generic Motions to Suppress based upon different issues of blood, breath, SFST’s, admissions, etc. (Attachment #5) These Motions seek to exclude evidence obtained in violation of Constitutional rights or statutory law, or evidence gathered without probable cause or a proper warrant. These motions can significantly weaken the prosecution's case if key evidence is deemed inadmissible prior to trial. Please review for your case specifics and certainly, for current case law status. I have attached a Requested Special Instructions for the jury charge when you raise a fact issue as to the illegality of the collection of evidence. (Attachment #6) You can modify this form to fit your facts or evidence collection issues. I want to highlight the critical role of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article §38.23 in our defense strategies, especially in DWI manslaughter and intoxication assault cases. This article, a 4


fundamental aspect of Texas criminal practice and procedure, mandates the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the law. It clearly states that any evidence acquired by an officer or other person in violation of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the United States, cannot be admitted in evidence against the accused in any criminal trial. But see, McClintock v.State, 541 SW3d 63, (Tx. Crim. App. 2017). I often rely on Article 38.23 when challenging the admissibility of crucial evidence such as BAC tests, field sobriety tests, and statements made by my clients, and issues related to probable cause. For example, if a BAC test was conducted without proper consent or in violation of statutory procedures, I argue for the exclusion of the results based on this article. Similarly, I meticulously examine the circumstances under which confessions or incriminating statements were made. If these were obtained without proper Miranda warnings or under coercive conditions, I move to have them declared inadmissible. The goal is not only to protect your client’s right but to protect the record for appeal. Facts and issues not raised and documented thoroughly can result in the dreaded appellate language of “because of counsel’s failure to develop the record, the point of error is waived.” POWER OF THE MOTION IN LIMINE When dealing with a business records affidavit (BRA), counsel should view the document with an eye on each specific line in the affidavit and compare it to the TRE 902.10(B). (10) Business Records Accompanied by Affidavit. The original or a copy of a record that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6) or (7), if the record is accompanied by an affidavit that complies with subparagraph (B) of this rule and any other requirements of law, and the record and affidavit are served in accordance with subparagraph (A). For good cause shown, the court

5


may order that a business record be treated as presumptively authentic even if the proponent fails to comply with subparagraph (A). (A) Service Requirement. The proponent of a record must serve the record and the accompanying affidavit on each other party to the case at least 14 days before trial. The record and affidavit may be served by any method permitted by Rule of Civil Procedure 21a. (B) Form of Affidavit. An affidavit is sufficient if it includes the following language, but this form is not exclusive. The proponent may use an unsworn declaration made under penalty of perjury in place of an affidavit. 1. I am the custodian of records [or I am an employee or owner] of and am familiar with the manner in which its records are created and maintained by virtue of my duties and responsibilities. 2. Attached are pages of records. These are the original records or exact duplicates of the original records. 3. The records were made at or near the time of each act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis set forth. [or It is the regular practice of t to make this type of record at or near the time of each act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis set forth in the record.] 4. The records were made by, or from information transmitted by, persons with knowledge of the matters set forth. [or It is the regular practice of t for this type of record to be made by, or from information transmitted by, persons with knowledge of the matters set forth in them.]

6


5. The records were kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity. [or It is the regular practice of t to keep this type of record in the course of regularly conducted business activity.] 6. It is the regular practice of the business activity to make the records. A couple of years ago I tried a vehicular manslaughter case where an Allstate BRA proved to be the key to my success. In that case, the Allstate BRA failed to satisfy several critical foundational requirements. Specifically, the document: (1) was neither an “affidavit” nor “unsworn declaration”; (2) failed to state for whom she was associated with, Allstate or Esurance; (3) failed to state how many pages were attached; (4) failed to state that the “records were made at our near the time of each act, event…made therein”; (5) failed to show that the records were “made by, or from information transmitted by, persons with knowledge…”; and (6) failed to state that it was the “regular practice of the business to make the records”. These deficiencies were not merely “technical” as they went directly to the foundation required for admission under Rule 803(6). Because the custodian failed to provide the necessary foundation for the records, the State could not rely on the BRA alone to establish their admissibility. Because of the deficiencies in the actual wording of the BRA, the Court granted my MIL and excluded the Allstate records from introduction as evidence. As a result of cutting that link, the State’s expert could not testify as to the identity of the owner of the vehicle in the accident as the “ownership” was only established by the link to the records which the Expert had reviewed from Allstate. Absent that link, the conversations with the “owner” were excluded as well as all the testimony related the vehicle’s condition, etc. as it was now not “materially related to the case”. The entire prosecution cratered as a result of the DA not having reviewed the BRA prior to trial. 7


The trick is to wait until the jury is sworn in so that jeopardy attaches and then file the MIL. The State can always cure this issue by calling the witness live but in our case, she was in Michigan! The practical consequence were dramatic and significant as had the State complied, my client would surely have been convicted. The lesson for trial counsel is straightforward: never assume that a document labeled a “business records affidavit” actually satisfies the requirements of Rule 803(6). Counsel should scrutinize the document before trial and compare its contents against each foundational requirement of both rules of Evidence. A deficient BRA can provide an effective basis for a motion in limine, an objection during trial, or both. As a side practice note, the denial of a MIL does not protect the record and you must repeat the same objections when the State attempts to introduce the records during trial or your objection is waived, despite being ruled upon in the MIL. Attacking The Intoxication Element Of Present Offense Obviously, attacking the intoxication element of any DWI or intoxication manslaughter offense, particularly concerning the blood draw and lab results, is the first pivotal aspect of the defense strategy in these cases. This approach often involves challenging the procedures used in the collection, storage, and analysis of the blood sample, as well as the accuracy and reliability of the lab results. The use of experts is considered fundament in attacking these results. My experience however is that many juries rely on what they see and hear, particularly in terms of the video evidence of SFTS. Sometimes the complexities of the terminology of science and chemistry are beyond the comprehension of most jurors so the KISS principle is always important in your explanations of the invalidity of the tests. The second aspect of these trials is destroying the “but for” link between the accident and the intoxication. Eliminate either one and the case MAY go 8


away depending upon the other factors generally alleged in a Manslaughter indictment, e.g., reckless driving, speeding, failure to do…… Scrutinize the chain of custody of the blood sample, arguing that any mishandling or lack of proper documentation could compromise the integrity of the sample, as seen in cases like Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), which emphasized the importance of the chain of custody and the right of the accused to confront the forensic analyst who prepared the report. The State will argue that they don’t have to prove the chain of custody, which is true, but jurors want to know how the evidence ties to the Defendant and if it is reliable. I use the example during Voir Dire as follows: “You walk out of your house at 6:00pm. A Subway sandwich is laying on your porch. You ordered it at 11:00am from DoorDash. You don’t know where it’s been since it left the restaurant, who delivered it, when they delivered it, or if it was refrigerated. Are you going to eat it?? Of course not!” Additionally, the defense can challenge the qualifications of the personnel who conducted the blood draw or the lab analysts, as well as the accreditation and standards of the laboratory itself, drawing on the principles established in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), which highlighted the necessity for forensic analysts to testify about lab results in criminal cases. Furthermore, you may present expert testimony to dispute the accuracy of the BAC level reported, pointing out potential issues such as fermentation of the sample, contamination, or improper calibration of testing equipment. By casting doubt on the reliability of the blood draw and lab results, attempt to undermine the prosecution's assertion that the defendant was legally intoxicated at the time of the offense, if at all. Again, Keep It Simple Stupid. It's your responsibility to ensure that all evidence used against your clients was obtained in full compliance with the law. This involves a thorough examination of law enforcement actions during 9


both the arrest and the evidence collection phases. Situations like an unjustified traffic stop, improper administration of field sobriety tests, or a failure to obtain a necessary warrant for a blood draw, are all potential grounds for challenging evidence under Article 38.23. Utilizing Motions to Suppress and Motions for Discovery are key strategies as they can significantly undermine the prosecution's case. If vital evidence is excluded, the prosecution's ability to prove essential elements of the offense, such as the level of intoxication or causation of the accident, can be severely weakened. NHTSA Statistics and VOIR DIRE While NHTSA’s statistics provide valuable insights into the risks associated with alcoholimpaired driving, you should be prepared in Voir Dire to address the inconsistencies of “statistics” and how the State only wants to emphasize the outrageousness of the totals without letting the jury know that actual calculation of “alcohol related” in those stats. Show the jury that the methodologies used in gathering and interpreting the data or socially directive and emotionally motivated. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) provides extensive statistics on alcohol-impaired driving, highlighting significant road safety issues. Drivers are alcohol-impaired when their blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) are .08 grams per deciliter or higher. The latest report by NHSTA states that any fatal crash involving a driver with a BAC of .08 g/dL or higher is considered an alcohol-impaired driving crash. In 2021, the NHTSA reported 13,384 fatalities in crashes involving drivers with a Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) of 0.08 grams per deciliter (g/dL) or higher, accounting for 31% of all traffic fatalities for that year. Additionally, there were 2,266 fatalities in incidents where drivers had BACs ranging from 0.01 to 0.07 g/dL. A motor vehicle traffic crash is defined as an incident that involved one or more 10


motor vehicles in-transport that originated on or had a harmful event (injury or damage) on a public trafficway, such as a road or highway. The highest percentage of alcohol-impaired drivers involved in fatal crashes in 2021 were motorcycle riders accounting for 28%. In passenger vehicles there were 54% drivers killed with a BAC of .01 to .07 g/dL who were unrestrained, meaning they had no seat belt on at the time of impact. Accordingly, 43% of passenger vehicle drivers who had no alcohol (.00 g/dL) were unrestrained, and 66% of passenger vehicle drivers who had a BAC of .15 g/dL or higher were unrestrained. While there is no explicit data provided by NHTSA, it can be inferred that 69% of traffic crash fatalities did not involve alcohol-impaired drivers, indicating that these crashes were due to factors such as distracted driving, speeding, road conditions, mechanical failure, or other nonrelated alcohol factors. These stats can be critical as the destruction of the nexus between intoxication and the “accident” can result in an acquittal. A critical point of contention is the NHTSA’s broad definition of alcohol-related accidents. The agency considers any involvement of alcohol, even below the legal impairment limit, in its categorization. This approach potentially overestimates the role of alcohol in accidents, especially in cases where alcohol presence was minimal and not the direct cause of impairment. Additionally, the NHTSA's criteria include incidents where any involved individual, not just the driver, had a BAC of 0.01% or greater, further broadening the scope of what is considered an alcohol-related accident. This inclusion raises questions about the direct correlation between alcohol presence and causation of accidents, a distinction crucial in legal defenses. From the perspective of a defense attorney, several aspects of these statistics are subject to scrutiny. First, the NHTSA's methodology in data collection and reporting can be questioned. The reliance on police reports and state data systems might introduce inconsistencies or biases, as the 11


criteria for categorizing an accident as alcohol-related might differ across jurisdictions. Moreover, a significant portion of BAC values for motor vehicle collisions are often missing or unknown, leading to estimations that may not accurately represent the true scope of alcohol-impaired accidents. Defense attorneys also highlight the variability in individual alcohol tolerance and question the presumption that a specific BAC level uniformly indicates impairment across all drivers. They argue that other factors such as road conditions or driver distraction can contribute significantly to accidents, suggesting that alcohol might not be the primary cause in every reported case. The focus on alcohol-related statistics might overshadow these other critical factors in road safety. Use this type of statistical manipulation by NHTSA to neutralize the “somebody needs to do something to stop these tragedies” argument made by the State. NEXUS: MANSLAUGHTER/INTOXICATION ASSAULT: ACCIDENT OR MISTAKE? Intoxication Manslaughter 49.08 The primary statute governing DWI manslaughter in Texas is found in the Texas Penal Code. Specifically, Section 49.08, titled "Intoxication Manslaughter," states that a person commits an offense if they operate a motor vehicle in a public place, and are intoxicated, and by reason of that intoxication cause the death of another by accident or mistake. Under this statute, "intoxication" is defined, as per Section 49.01(2) of the Texas Penal Code, as not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those substances, or any other substance into the body; or having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. These statutes and cases form the legal backbone for defending DWI manslaughter charges in Texas. They highlight the importance of a thorough understanding of both the statutory 12


definitions and the nuances of case law interpretations in crafting effective defense strategies. Defense attorneys must be adept at navigating these legal complexities to effectively challenge the prosecution's assertions regarding intoxication and causation, and to raise reasonable doubt in the minds of jurors. In Texas, the charge of intoxication manslaughter under Penal Code Section 49.08 takes on an even more severe dimension when considering the implications of prior DWI convictions and the potential for the prosecution to elevate the charge to felony murder. This escalation is particularly pertinent under Texas Penal Code Section 19.02(b)(3), which stipulates that a person commits an offense if they commit or attempt to commit a felony, and in the process or in furtherance of that felony, commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. In the context of intoxication manslaughter, if the defendant has 2 prior DWI convictions, these can serve as a basis for enhancing the current DWI charge, thereby elevating the offense from a misdemeanor to a felony. This enhancement is crucial because with the DWI now classified as a felony, if a death occurs as a result of the defendant's actions while driving intoxicated, the prosecution has the grounds to charge the defendant with felony murder. This is based on the premise that the death occurred in the commission of a felony (the enhanced DWI), fulfilling the criteria of Section 19.02(b)(3). The implications of this are significant, as a conviction for felony murder carries a 5-99 year sentence as opposed to just a maximum of 20 years for intoxication manslaughter. This possibility underscores the critical importance for defense attorneys to meticulously challenge prior DWI convictions and rigorously contest the enhancement of the current DWI charge, as these elements are pivotal in determining whether the defendant faces charges for intoxication manslaughter or the graver charge of felony murder. Attacking Causal Connection 13


A defense attorney's strategy in attacking the causal connection, as outlined in Texas Penal Code Section 6.04(a), is a critical aspect of defending against charges like intoxication manslaughter or assault. Section 6.04(a) stipulates that a person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for their conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient. In cases of intoxication manslaughter, the prosecution must prove that the defendant's intoxication directly caused the accident which caused the victim's death. A defense attorney might challenge this causal link by introducing evidence or expert testimony that suggests alternative causes or contributing factors to the incident, such as mechanical failures, road conditions, or actions of the victim or third parties. This strategy aims to create reasonable doubt about the defendant's direct responsibility for the outcome. For instance, the defense might argue that while the defendant was indeed intoxicated, the actual cause of the accident and resulting death was an unforeseen event, like an animal on the road, or another driver's erratic behavior, which would have caused the accident regardless of the defendant's intoxication. By casting doubt on the direct causal link between the defendant's intoxication and the victim's death, the defense seeks to disrupt the chain of legal causation necessary for a conviction. This approach requires a thorough investigation of the accident, often involving accident reconstruction experts, and a detailed examination of all possible contributing factors. Successfully challenging the causal connection under Section 6.04(a) can be a decisive factor in the outcome of a trial, potentially leading to an acquittal or a lesser charge for the defendant. As mentioned above, NHTSA includes other data in their annual report pertaining to road conditions, time of day, and even the months in which these accidents occurred. I want to focus on 14


a critical aspect often encountered in cases involving accidents where the circumstances might not have resulted in death but for certain factors. This is a nuanced area in DWI defense, especially in cases like intoxication manslaughter. When I handle such cases, my approach involves a detailed analysis of the accident's circumstances. It's crucial to assess whether the death would have occurred irrespective of my client's alleged intoxication. For instance, if there are contributing factors like hazardous road conditions, the actions of the victim, or mechanical failures, these can be pivotal in the case. My strategy often includes gathering expert testimony and conducting thorough investigations to demonstrate that the death might have occurred regardless of my client’s intoxication. This aspect of defense is vital in these complex cases, as it can significantly influence the outcome, potentially reducing the severity of charges or penalties. Understanding and articulating these nuances is essential for any defense attorney in this field, as it can be the difference between a conviction for a severe offense like intoxication manslaughter and a lesser charge. Use of Experts [ACM & EDR] In defending against charges of intoxication manslaughter or assault, particularly in cases where causation or the specifics of the accident are in dispute, a defense attorney often relies on expert testimony to reconstruct the accident and analyze critical data. Experts in accident reconstruction play a pivotal role in these cases. They utilize their knowledge of physics, engineering, and vehicle dynamics to piece together how the accident occurred and to challenge the prosecution's narrative of events. These experts can provide crucial insights into the sequence of events leading up to the crash, potentially undermining the causation factor that links the defendant's alleged intoxication to the accident.

15


A key component of this reconstruction often involves analyzing data from the Airbag Control Module (ACM) or the Event Data Recorder (EDR), commonly referred to as the vehicle's "black box." These devices record various parameters before, during, and after a crash. Experts can extract and interpret this data, which can include the vehicle's speed, braking patterns, steering angles, and even occupancy data and seat belt usage. This information is vital in reconstructing the accident's dynamics and can be instrumental in challenging the prosecution's claims about the defendant's driving behavior and the accident's cause. The ACM data can be particularly revealing in cases where there's a sudden change in the vehicle's direction. This change can trigger the ACM, capturing critical data at key moments. Experts can analyze this data to provide insights into the order of impacts and the severity of each impact, which can be crucial in understanding the crash's mechanics. For instance, if the data shows that the defendant was not speeding or did not fail to brake as alleged, this could significantly impact the case's outcome. Moreover, the use of such expert testimony can be a game-changer in court. It can transform abstract data into understandable narratives that explain what happened during the accident. This can be especially powerful in front of a jury, as it provides a scientific basis for the defense's version of events, countering the often emotionally charged nature of intoxication manslaughter cases. In summary, the strategic use of experts in accident reconstruction and the analysis of ACM and EDR data is a critical component of the defense in vehicular crime cases, offering a means to challenge the prosecution's assertions about causation and the specifics of the accident. Stacking Sentences

16


The concept of "stacking" sentences in Texas, particularly in the context of intoxication manslaughter cases involving multiple victims, is a critical aspect of legal strategy and client counseling. "Stacking" refers to the practice where a court imposes consecutive sentences for each offense or victim, rather than allowing the sentences to run concurrently. This approach can lead to significantly longer prison terms for the convicted individual. As outlined in Texas Penal Code Section 49.08, each death resulting from a single incident of intoxication manslaughter can be charged as a separate offense, potentially leading to multiple convictions and clearly longer sentences. TPC 3.03 specifically references Intox Assault and Manslaughter can be stacked. The judge's decision to stack sentences is influenced by various factors, including the nature of the offenses, the defendant's criminal history, and the specific details of the incident. Prosecutors might advocate for stacking in cases that are particularly tragic or high-profile, aiming to increase the sentence's punitive impact. The implications of sentence stacking are profound, affecting not just the length of imprisonment but also parole eligibility. In Texas, parole eligibility is calculated based on the total sentence length, meaning that stacked sentences can substantially delay a defendant's opportunity for parole. For defense attorneys, an acute awareness of the potential for sentence stacking is essential, especially in cases with multiple victims. This knowledge is crucial for formulating plea negotiations, shaping trial strategies, and providing accurate legal advice to clients about the possible outcomes of their case. Defense strategies might include negotiating plea agreements that prevent sentence stacking or challenging the imposition of consecutive sentences during sentencing. The possibility of sentence stacking highlights the severity with which Texas law approaches DWI offenses leading to multiple fatalities or injuries, making it a pivotal

17


consideration in the defense of intoxication manslaughter cases. Other issues to trade include the agreement to a longer sentence in exchange for no finding of a “deadly weapon”. This amendment permits the trial court to cumulate sentences in cases of intoxication manslaughter involving more than one death. Alternatively, the second clause permits the plea bargaining for a single criminal action disposition of such cases that will permit consecutive sentences. The presence of one intoxication manslaughter count will allow the sentence for that offense to run consecutively with all other sentences imposed. In Yvanez v. State, the appellant plead guilty to four counts of intoxication manslaughter and one count of intoxication assault. The jury assessed a 40-year sentence on each manslaughter count and a 10-year sentence on the assault count. Yvanez v. State, 991 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The trial court ordered all the sentences to run concurrently except for count two (manslaughter), which the court ordered to run consecutively to all other counts. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously upheld the decision and stated the trial court was authorized to “stack” the intoxication manslaughter sentence onto any or all of the other intoxication manslaughter sentences. The sentence on count two (manslaughter) was ordered to run consecutively to each of the other three manslaughter sentences but not to the intoxication assault sentence, which it ordered to run concurrently with the initial three manslaughter sentences. Additionally, in 2009, the legislature added the offense of intoxication assault to those which are exempt from mandatory concurrency sentences when tried in the same criminal proceeding. Papke v. State, 982 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. App.­—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d). The trial court must choose to either stack or cumulate the sentences. II. INTOX ASSAULT 18


Intoxication Assault Section 49.07, titled "Intoxication Assault," states that a person commits an offense if they operate a motor vehicle in a public place, aircraft, watercraft, or amusement ride while intoxicated, and by reason of that intoxication cause serious bodily injury to another. In this context, "serious bodily injury" is defined as an injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Tex. Pen. Code § 49.07. This offense is a third-degree felony. In defending against charges under Section 49.07, attorneys must be adept at scrutinizing the evidence presented to establish serious bodily injury and the direct causation by the defendant's intoxication. This often involves a detailed analysis of medical records, expert testimony, and the circumstances of the incident. Additionally, understanding the nuances of this statute is crucial for negotiating plea deals or for arguing for lesser charges in cases where the line between serious injury and just bodily injury may impact the classification of the offense as even a felony? Bodily Injury In Texas law, the definitions of "serious bodily injury" and "bodily injury" are crucial in understanding various criminal charges, particularly those related to vehicular offenses such as DWI and intoxication assault. According to Texas Penal Code Section 1.07(46), "serious bodily injury" is defined as an injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. This definition is critical in the context of intoxication assault under Section 49.07(b), where causing "serious bodily injury" to another while operating a motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or amusement ride under the influence elevates the offense to a more serious level. On the other hand, "bodily injury," as defined in Section 1.07(8), refers to physical pain, illness, or 19


any impairment of physical condition. This is a broader and less severe category of injury compared to "serious bodily injury" and is often cited in less severe assault cases. The distinction between these two types of injuries is significant in legal proceedings, as the severity of the injury directly impacts the charges and potential penalties. For instance, in cases involving DWI, the presence of "serious bodily injury" as opposed to mere "bodily injury" can transform a charge from a misdemeanor to a felony, carrying more stringent consequences. Therefore, understanding and accurately interpreting these definitions is essential for legal practitioners handling cases in these domains. Keep in mind that the SBI inquiry is the “disfiguring and impairing nature of the injury” at the time of the injury. Bleab v. State, 483 SW3d 29 (TCA 2016). Many times the State will argue that “left untreated” the injury would be “serious”. The actual definition used by Bexar County DA office when they request SBI opinions from medical providers includes the “left untreated” example in their document request. Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon Comparing the definitions of "serious bodily injury" and "bodily injury" in the context of intoxication assault under Texas Penal Code Sections 1.07(46), 1.07(8), and 49.07(b) with the offense of Aggravated Assault with a deadly weapon under Section 22.02 is also a potential charging issue. Aggravated assault, as defined in Section 22.02, involves causing serious bodily injury to another, or using or exhibiting a deadly weapon during the commission of an assault, which only requires “bodily injury”. This later definition is contra to the intoxication assault definition which particularly requires "serious bodily injury." The Aggravated Assault statute is often used in Indictments when there are a factors other than intoxication, such as excess speed, dangerous driving evidence, failing to maintain a single lane or use of alcohol are present. These 20


evidentiary factors, combined with the “use or exhibition of a ‘deadly weapon’” can constitute the offense. Additionally, for Agg Assault, the State only need prove “recklessness” as an element. This form of indictment does have its benefits however in that with Aggravated Assault, the Defendant is eligible for Deferred Adjudication which is clearly foreclosed with alcohol offenses. While both offenses consider the infliction of bodily injury as a crucial factor, the definition of a serious bodily injury is definitely required in Intoxication Assault cases. This is clearly an area for expert medical consultation to distinguish, based upon the “legal” definition of what makes an injury “serious”. In all these cases, the manner and means of the use of the vehicle can impact both probation eligibility and parole. The vehicle itself can be construed as a “deadly weapon” if used or intended to be used in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury however it is not per se a deadly weapon. This application aligns with certain intoxication assault cases or aggravated assault cases where the manner of vehicle operation under intoxication, or independent of the intoxication, is so reckless that it is deemed equivalent to using a deadly weapon as a result of the “manner” of its use. Simply using the vehicle to commit the offense of DWI does not constitute the “use of a deadly weapon”. Couthren v. State 571 SW 3d 786 (Tx. Crim.App 2019). Stipulating Priors, Older Convictions & Judicial Clemency In defending against a charge of Felony DWI in Texas, a nuanced strategy focused on attacking the indictment can be pivotal. One effective approach is stipulating to priors, where the defense acknowledges certain previous convictions while strategically preventing the introduction of potentially prejudicial details about those convictions. This tactic aims to control the narrative and limit the prosecution's ability to paint the defendant in a negative light based on their past. If a defendant stipulates to two prior convictions, the State may read the indictment at the beginning 21


of trial mentioning the two prior convictions but may not give any evidence of them during trial. Tamez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Where the defendant agrees to stipulate to priors, the State cannot offer those priors into evidence. Robles v. State, 85. S.W.3d 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Multiple Victims: Intoxication Assault & Manslaughter Multiple Counts In Texas, Intoxication Assault (Texas Penal Code Section 49.07) is a third-degree felony and when multiple victims are involved, the prosecution can charge the defendant with separate counts of Intoxication Assault for each victim. The same goes for Intoxication Manslaughter (under Texas Penal Code Section 49.08).The decision whether sentences for each count run concurrently or consecutively is at the discretion of the judge, as per Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Section 42.08 and more specifically, Tx. Penal Code §303(b)(1)(A). This discretion allows the judge to consider the specifics of the case, including the number of victims and the circumstances of the offense, to determine the structure of the sentences. However, the specific exclusion of Texas Penal Code 49.045: Driving While Intoxicated With Child Passenger only constitutes a “single offense” regardless of the number of children in the vehicle. Under that offense: (a) A person commits an offense if: (1) the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; and (2) the vehicle being operated by the person is occupied by a passenger who is younger than 15 years of age. (b) An offense under this section is a state jail felony.

22


The charge applies regardless of the number of children in the vehicle; the presence of even one child under 15 years old elevates the misdemeanor charge of DWI to a felony. The offense is charged as a single count of DWI with a Child Passenger regardless of the number of children present. Ex Parte Cook, 630 SW 3rd 65 (Tex.Crim.App. 2021). Keep in mind however, there could be additional charges such as Deadly Conduct, Tx. Penal Code §22.05, Class A misdemeanor, or Reckless Endangerment Tx. Penal Code §22.041(c) which specifically applies to children under the age of 15. The latter is a State Jail Felony unless the child is placed in “imminent” danger of death or serious bodily injury. Additional charges could apply based on the circumstances, but these are generally not multiplied by the number of children in the vehicle. Charges such as child endangerment, may also apply depending on the specifics of the case and the discretion of the prosecutor. PROBATION ISSUES Under Texas law, juries have the discretion to recommend community supervision for individuals convicted of DWI, including felonies. This is particularly relevant in cases where the defendant is a first-time offender or when there are mitigating circumstances that may persuade a jury towards a more lenient sentence. It's important to remember that juries can assess probation in cases where the judge cannot. This is especially true in cases where the indictment contains an allegation of deadly weapon. Tx. Code Crim. Proc 42A.054. This inclusion can force a Defendant into a jury trial strictly to apply for probation. I have attached a Motion to Quash wherein the Deadly Weapon enhancement was included despite the fact there was no evidence in the police report to support any probable cause to show the “manner and means elements”. In that case, the Defendant was asleep at the wheel in a parking lot. DEADLY WEAPON INSTRUCTION WITH MOTOR VEHICLE 23


In scenarios where a motor vehicle is argued to be a deadly weapon, the situation typically arises when handling cases involving serious injury or death. Texas law allows for a vehicle to be classified as a deadly weapon, but it is not per se a deadly weapon. Again, this finding can significantly affect the sentencing and parole eligibility of my clients. A sample jury instruction might read: “A vehicle is considered a deadly weapon when it is used or intended to be used in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” The key elements for this classification hinge on how the vehicle was operated during the incident. In developing a solid defense strategy, it is critical to scrutinize whether the operation of the vehicle in the specific instance indeed meets this threshold. It’s not enough for the vehicle to merely be involved in an incident; it must have been used in a way that could cause significant harm. Bringing in an expert to analyze the driving pattern, speed, the area where the incident occurred, and any other relevant factors can help negate the instruction and even allow for a plea deal to be made with the state. Challenging the prosecution's claim that the vehicle was used as a deadly weapon is vital. If I can successfully argue against this classification, it can lead to a more favorable outcome for my client, particularly in terms of sentencing and future parole possibilities. It’s a complex aspect of Texas law where thorough knowledge and strategic defense are crucial. Inside a Vehicular Manslaughter Trial I represented a defendant charged with manslaughter arising from a nighttime motorvehicle collision. The indictment alleged, among other things, that my client turned onto a lane of traffic in an unsafe manner and failed to maintain a proper lookout. Those allegations, however, cannot be fully understood without first examining the circumstances immediately preceding the collision.

24


My client was approaching an intersection and activated his turn signal in preparation for making a left turn. The physical characteristics of the roadway were significant. As a driver approaches the intersection, the roadway rises toward the intersection, creating a miniature hill. That elevation change substantially limits a driver's ability to see approaching traffic before beginning the turn. The difficulty was compounded by the fact that the collision occurred at night and the approaching vehicle was a motorcycle, which presented a substantially smaller visual profile than a passenger vehicle. The State also alleged that my client was driving at a speed that was not reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. That allegation became a central issue in the case because the State's evidence concerning my client's speed and driving conduct came, in significant part, from events occurring several minutes before the collision. Approximately three minutes before the collision, my client had been traveling at a high rate of speed and had passed another vehicle in a no-passing zone. That driver later testified that my client was speeding and driving recklessly. The State relied upon that testimony to establish the circumstances surrounding the charge and, in particular, to connect my client's earlier driving conduct with the subsequent collision. But there was a critical distinction between my client's driving several minutes before the collision and his conduct at the moment of the collision. By the time my client reached the intersection and began making the left turn, he was traveling at less than five miles per hour. Thus, while the State presented evidence that my client had been speeding and had engaged in dangerous driving earlier, the evidence concerning his actual speed at the time he encountered the motorcycle was significantly different. 25


That distinction became one of the central issues at trial. The question was not simply whether my client had driven recklessly at some point before the collision. The more consequential question was whether his conduct at or immediately preceding the collision satisfied the culpability required for criminal manslaughter. The defense therefore focused on separating the earlier driving conduct from the circumstances confronting my client at the intersection: the nighttime conditions, the crest in the roadway, the limited sight distance, the difficulty of perceiving an approaching motorcycle, and my client's significantly reduced speed as he initiated the turn. In other words, the State's evidence painted the events as one continuous course of reckless driving. The defense sought to examine the events more precisely, distinguishing what occurred several minutes before the collision from what my client was actually doing in the seconds immediately preceding it. Ultimately, the tactics you choose may dictate the result or outcome of the trial. Exploring all of these issues well in advance of trial will allow you not only to properly advise your client in the decision-making process but will also prepare you for the weaknesses in the State’s case, or your case, with sufficient time to prepare for the ultimate trial of your client’s life.

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Attachment 1


CAUSE NO. 00000 STATE OF TEXAS V. DEFENDANT

§ § § § §

IN THE DISTRICT COURT _____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

MOTION AND ORDER FOR DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION PURSUANT TO ART. 39.14, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC., HEATH, and MICHAEL MORTON ACT TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: Now comes, DEFENDANT NAME, Defendant, and pursuant to Article 39.14, Tex. Code Crim. Proc., the Michael Morton Act, State v. Heath, and Brady v. Maryland, and the VIth Amendment to the United States Constitution, files this Motion for Discovery and Inspection of evidence and in support thereof would show the Court as follows: I. Defendant hereby requests that the State produce copies to the Defendant, by and through his counsel of record, and to permit the inspection and the electronic duplication, copying and photographing of all non-privileged documents and physical evidence which are in the possession of, custody of, or control of the State, including all relevant law enforcement agencies, relating to the offense charged in the above styled cause of action and requests that the Court Order them to timely produce all requested items and any other items or evidence material to the States’ case or the defense thereof, as soon as practical: 1.

All confessions, admissions and statements, in writing, signed or alleged to have been

signed by Defendant in connection with this offense with which Defendant is charged. 2.

All confessions, admissions and statements, oral in nature and set down and preserved


under Art. 38.22, Tex. Code Crim. Proc., made by or alleged to have been made by Defendant in connection with the offense with which Defendant is charged. 3.

All written, oral and recorded statements and memoranda of said statements made by

or alleged to have been made by Defendant to any investigating officer or law enforcement agent or agency, or to any third party which are in the possession of or within the knowledge of the District Attorney's office or agents thereof, including state and federal law enforcement, probation or parole agents or agencies, including but not limited to any written consent to a search of the Defendant's home or vehicle which may have been signed by the Defendant which relate to or bear upon the Defendant’s guilt or innocence. 4.

All reports and records of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons, including all

documents related to the testing, preparation of data, test data results, procedures used to produce results, raw data results from each test runs and the resulting final reports, on any tangible or material evidence to be used in this cause, including but not limited to any and all medical records, drug tests, blood tests, breath tests and any other forensic analysis reports or data which call for an expert opinion and/or were prepared by an expert, or upon which an expert designated by the State will testify thereto, whether or not the preparing expert will testify at trial, and the name, address and Curriculum Vitae of each testifying person who made such report, test, experiment or comparison. Smith v. Arizona. 5.

All handwritten and/or typed notes of any police officer or other law enforcement

agent who investigated and/or participated in any manner in this case, or any witness which may be called by the State. This request includes all notes taken by any interviewer of any witness, including the State’s agents, which would tend to impeach the credibility of any testifying witness’s statements, whether written or orally made in Court pursuant to Brady v. Maryland.


6.

The names and addresses of all persons who were interrogated and/or interviewed in

conjunction with this offense who have provided any exculpatory information to the State regarding the Defendant pursuant to Brady v. Maryland. 7.

All photographs and/or digital images, videotape or audiotape recordings which were

made in the investigation of this case which may be introduced into evidence or which depict any evidence pertaining to this investigation, including but not limited to “body cams” and “dash cams” or other drone images and videos. 8.

The prior criminal record of all informants, agents, witnesses and complainants who

may testify against Defendant, including all arrests and convictions, whether as a juvenile or adult, including but not limited to: (a) all final convictions for all felonies and/or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude which have occurred in the past ten (10) years measured from the date of conviction or release from incarceration, whichever is later; (b) all felony convictions and misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude which have resulted in a suspended sentence which has not been set aside; and (c) all felony convictions and misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude which have resulted in the person being placed on probation and which period of probation has not expired. 9.

Any and all evidence, including any contradictory statements or reports which tend to

impeach the credibility of any State witness, and all evidence which is or may be exculpatory as to Defendant, or which may constitute evidence of any defense which may be available to the Defendant. 10. A specification of any prior misconduct and/or conviction which the District Attorney

intends to use or may use to impeach the Defendant herein and/or any defense testimony or witness, as to Defendant's good character and reputation, which specifications should include the


date, time, place and nature of such misconduct and/or conviction in order to fully apprise and notify Defendant of all such evidence and permit the Defendant adequate time to challenge its relevancy, materiality and accuracy prior to trial. This request is made pursuant to Rule 404(a)(1), (b) and (c), and 609(f), Tex. R. Crim. Evid., and Arts. 37.07 §3, and 38.37 Tx. Code Crim. Proc. 11. Copies of all search and\or arrest warrants and the affidavits used to support and

obtain the issuance of same. 12. A listing of all physical evidence and other items which were seized pursuant to any

of said warrants which were executed in this case or which may be introduced in evidence at trial. 13. Produce all Key Cards, Dispatch records, Incident Detail Reports and specifically

including all vehicle data related to the arresting officer’s vehicle contained in the vehicle computer or any other computer which records speed and GPS location information and any other data relating to communications received by or made to all officers dispatched to the location of the arrest or who participated in the investigation of this case and or the Defendant’s arrest. This request includes but is not limited to all data electronically saved in any form including video and audio recordings and any “911” calls made related to the offense or complaint. 14. A list of witnesses that the State intends to call during the trial of the case in chief,

potential rebuttal witnesses and any punishment witnesses. 15. A list of expert witnesses that the State intends to call during the trial of the case in

chief pursuant to §39.14(b) TX Code Crim. Proc. and copies of all reports and data which the expert produced or reviewed in preparation for the expert’s testimony in court. 16. All exculpatory Brady evidence related to the investigation of the case and the guilt of

the Defendant including but not limited to all contradictory or impeachment evidence concerning the testimony or statements of any witness including the complainant(s). Said impeachment


evidence includes that which is within the knowledge of the District Attorney’s office whether in the form of “work product” or hearsay and includes all knowledge of any pending, ongoing or concluded criminal or civil investigations of any officer or witness in the case as same bear upon the witness’s credibility or motives in testifying. II. Defendant would further show the Court that production of all the above evidence is the only fair and proper method of showing the good faith of the District Attorney in this case, the truth of all such matters which the District Attorney intends to introduce into evidence against Defendant, and to ensure that Defendant has adequate time to inspect, examine and test all of such evidence for its respective validity, authenticity and identity. III. In support of this Motion, the Defendant would show the Court as follows: 1.

The items requested are in the possession, custody and control of the State of Texas

by and through its agents, the police or the prosecuting attorney's office, and the Defendant has no other means of ascertaining the disclosures requested. 2.

The items requested are not privileged.

3.

The items and information are material to this cause and to the issues of guilt or

innocence and punishment to be determined in this cause. 4.

The Defendant cannot safely go to trial without the timely production of such

information and inspection, nor can the Defendant adequately prepare the defense to the charges against him. 5.

That absent such discovery and timely production, the Defendant's rights under:

Article 39.14, C.C.P.; Article I, Sections 10, 15 and 19 of the Constitution of the State of Texas;


the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America; Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. U.S.; Heath v. State and the Michael Morton Act will be violated, to Defendant's irreparable injury and thus the Defendant will be deprived of a fair trial and Due Process herein. WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Defendant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court will grant this Motion for Discovery and Inspection in all things, or in the alternative, that this Court will set this matter down for a hearing prior to trial on the merits and that at such hearing this Motion will be in all things granted. Respectfully submitted, BOBBY BARRERA LAW 408 Dwyer Ave., San Antonio, Texas 78204 TEL: (210) 227-7372 FAX: (210) 201-2935 Bobby@bobbybarrera.com /s/ SIGNATURE______ Attorney Name State Bar No. 000000 Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion and Order for Discovery and Inspection has been forwarded to the Bexar County District Attorney’s Office on this _____ day of _________, 2026. /s/ SIGNATURE____ Attorney Name


CAUSE NO. 00000 STATE OF TEXAS V. DEFENDANT

§ § § § §

IN THE DISTRICT COURT ______ JUDICIAL DISTRICT BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER FOR DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION PURSUANT TO ART. 39.14, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC., HEATH, SMITH v. ARIZONA, and the MICHAEL MORTON ACT The Court having considered the Defendant’s Motion for Discovery hereby GRANTS the below enumerated paragraphs as indicated in each Paragraph. The State is further ORDERED to timely produce the discovery items as granted herein to the Defense counsel as soon as practicable but in no event later than Thirty (30) days before trial, whichever date is sooner. The Court hereby GRANTS each of the below as indicated. 1.

All confessions, admissions and statements, in writing, signed or alleged to have been signed by Defendant in connection with this offense with which Defendant is charged. GRANTED_______________

2.

All confessions, admissions and statements, oral in nature and set down and preserved under Art. 38.22, Tex. Code Crim. Proc., made by or alleged to have been made by Defendant in connection with the offense with which Defendant is charged. GRANTED_______________

3.

DENIED_______________

DENIED_______________

All written, oral and recorded statements and memoranda of said statements made by or alleged to have been made by Defendant to any investigating officer or law enforcement agent or agency, or to any third party which are in the possession of or within the knowledge of the District Attorney's office or agents thereof, including state and federal law enforcement, probation or parole agents or agencies, including but not limited to any written consent to a search of the Defendant's home or vehicle which may have been signed by the Defendant which relate to or bear upon the Defendant’s guilt or innocence. GRANTED_______________

DENIED_______________


4.

All reports and records of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons, including all documents related to the testing, preparation of data, test data results, procedures used to produce results, raw data results from each test runs and the resulting final reports, on any tangible or material evidence to be used in this cause, including but not limited to any and all medical records, drug tests, blood tests, breath tests and any other forensic analysis reports or data which call for an expert opinion and/or were prepared by an expert, or upon which an expert designated by the State will testify thereto, whether or not the preparing expert will testify at trial, and the name, address and Curriculum Vitae of each testifying person who made such report, test, experiment or comparison. Smith v. Arizona. GRANTED_______________

5.

All handwritten and/or typed notes of any police officer or other law enforcement agent who investigated and/or participated in any manner in this case, or any witness which may be called by the State. This request includes all notes taken by any interviewer of any witness, including the State’s agents, which would tend to impeach the credibility of any testifying witness’s statements, whether written or orally made in Court pursuant to Brady v. Maryland. GRANTED_______________

6.

DENIED_______________

The names and addresses of all persons who were interrogated and/or interviewed in conjunction with this offense who have provided any exculpatory information to the State regarding the Defendant pursuant to Brady v. Maryland. GRANTED_______________

7.

DENIED_______________

DENIED_______________

All photographs and/or digital images, videotape or audiotape recordings which were made in the investigation of this case which may be introduced into evidence or which depict any evidence pertaining to this investigation, including but not limited to “body cams” and “dash cams” or other drone images and videos. GRANTED_______________

DENIED_______________


8.

The prior criminal record of all informants, agents, witnesses and complainants who may testify against Defendant, including all arrests and convictions, whether as a juvenile or adult, including but not limited to: (a) all final convictions for all felonies and/or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude which have occurred in the past ten (10) years measured from the date of conviction or release from incarceration, whichever is later; (b) all felony convictions and misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude which have resulted in a suspended sentence which has not been set aside; and (c) all felony convictions and misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude which have resulted in the person being placed on probation and which period of probation has not expired. GRANTED_______________

9.

Any and all evidence, including any contradictory statements or reports which tend to impeach the credibility of any State witness, and all evidence which is or may be exculpatory as to Defendant, or which may constitute evidence of any defense which may be available to the Defendant. GRANTED_______________

10.

DENIED_______________

A specification of any prior misconduct and/or conviction which the District Attorney intends to use or may use to impeach the Defendant herein and/or any defense testimony or witness, as to Defendant's good character and reputation, which specifications should include the date, time, place and nature of such misconduct and/or conviction in order to fully apprise and notify Defendant of all such evidence and permit the Defendant adequate time to challenge its relevancy, materiality and accuracy prior to trial. This request is made pursuant to Rule 404(a)(1), (b) and (c), and 609(f), Tex. R. Crim. Evid., and Arts. 37.07 §3, and 38.37 Tx. Code Crim. Proc. GRANTED_______________

11.

DENIED_______________

DENIED_______________

Copies of all search and\or arrest warrants and the affidavits used to support and obtain the issuance of same. GRANTED_______________

DENIED_______________


12.

A listing of all physical evidence and other items which were seized pursuant to any of said warrants which were executed in this case or which may be introduced in evidence at trial. GRANTED_______________

13.

Produce all Key Cards, Dispatch records, Incident Detail Reports and specifically including all vehicle data related to the arresting officer’s vehicle contained in the vehicle computer or any other computer which records speed and GPS location information and any other data relating to communications received by or made to all officers dispatched to the location of the arrest or who participated in the investigation of this case and or the Defendant’s arrest. This request includes but is not limited to all data electronically saved in any form including video and audio recordings and any “911” calls made related to the offense or complaint. GRANTED_______________

14.

DENIED_______________

A list of expert witnesses that the State intends to call during the trial of the case in chief pursuant to §39.14(b) TX Code Crim. Proc. and copies of all reports and data which the expert produced or reviewed in preparation for the expert’s testimony in court. GRANTED_______________

16.

DENIED_______________

A list of witnesses that the State intends to call during the trial of the case in chief, potential rebuttal witnesses and any punishment witnesses. GRANTED_______________

15.

DENIED_______________

DENIED_______________

All exculpatory Brady evidence related to the investigation of the case and the guilt of the Defendant including but not limited to all contradictory or impeachment evidence concerning the testimony or statements of any witness including the complainant(s). Said impeachment evidence includes that which is within the knowledge of the District Attorney’s office whether in the form of “work product” or hearsay and includes all knowledge of any pending, ongoing or concluded criminal or civil investigations of any officer or witness in the case as same bear upon the witness’s credibility or motives in testifying.


GRANTED_______________

DENIED_______________

SIGNED AND ENTERED THIS ____ DAY OF _________, 2026.

______________________________ JUDGE PRESIDING


Attachment 2


CAUSE NO. 000000 STATE OF TEXAS VS. DEFENDANT

§ § § § §

IN THE DISTRICT COURT ____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

MOTION IN LIMINE AND TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE; MEMORANDUM OF LAW: DISCOVERY AND ARTICLE 39.14, TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE and ORDER I. Art. 39.14: Then and Now Discovery is governed by Art. 39.14 of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Art. 39.14 was originally enacted in 1965. TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. (1965).1 Art. 39.14 was amended in 2013 and the amended version took effect in 20142 in a way that “revamped 39.14 completely” and represented “an overhaul of discovery in Texas.” Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). This overhaul was known as the “Michael Morton Act.” Before the Morton Act amendment, Art. 39.14 was a restrictive discovery vehicle for defendants. Defendants directed their requests for discovery to the trial court, who would exercise its discretionary authority to order discovery upon a showing by the defendant of “good cause”: (a) Upon motion of the defendant showing good cause therefor and upon notice to the other parties, except as provided by Article 39.15, the court in which an action is pending shall order the State before or during trial of a criminal action therein pending or on trial to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing by or on behalf of the defendant of any designated documents, papers, written statement of the defendant, (except written statements of witnesses and except the work product of counsel in the case and their investigators and their notes or report), books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are 1

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., 317, ch. 722, § 1 See Michael Morton Act, Act of May 14, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 49, § 2, sec. 39.14, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 106 (codified as an amendment to (Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 39.14 Vernon 2015). In an effort to increase governmental transparency and help prevent Wrongful Convictions, Texas Gov. Rick Perry signed Senate Bill 1611, on May 16, 2013. See Gov. Perry Signs Senate Bill 1611, The Michael Morton Act, (2013), http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/govdocs/Rick%20Perry/2013/press051613.pdf (last visited January 2015). The Act was named in honor of Michael Morton, the Texas man who spent 25 years in prison after being wrongfully convicted and exonerated of his wife’s murder. See id. The Texas Senate and the Texas House of Representatives unanimously passed the Michael Morton Act, which went into effect on January 1, 2014. See Michael Morton Act, supra at 108 (reflecting 31 state senators in favor with no senators opposed, and 146 state representatives in favor with no representatives opposed to the Act). 2

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in the possession, custody or control of the State or any of its agencies. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking the copies and photographs of any of the aforementioned documents or tangible evidence; provided, however, that the rights herein granted shall not extend to written communications between the State or any of its agents or representatives or employees. Nothing in this Act shall authorize the removal of such evidence from the possession of the State, and any inspection shall be in the presence of a representative of the state. (Pre-Morton version of Art. 39.14(a))(emphasis added). A defendant now makes his request for discovery directly to the prosecution; the trial court does not play a role and does not order discovery. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 39.14(a). “On the whole, the statutory changes broaden criminal discovery for defendants, making disclosure the rule and nondisclosure the exception.” Watkins, at 277. The changes are dramatic: (a) Subject to the restrictions provided by Section 264.408, Family Code, and Article 39.15 of this code, as soon as practicable after receiving a timely request from the defendant the state shall produce and permit the inspection and the electronic duplication, copying, and photographing, by or on behalf of the defendant, of any offense reports, any designated documents, papers, written or recorded statements of the defendant or a witness, including witness statements of law enforcement officers but not including the work product of counsel for the state in the case and their investigators and their notes or report, or any designated books, accounts, letters, photographs, or objects or other tangible things not otherwise privileged that constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and that are in the possession, custody, or control of the state or any person under contract with the state. The state may provide to the defendant electronic duplicates of any documents or other information described by this article. The rights granted to the defendant under this article do not extend to written communications between the state and an agent, representative, or employee of the state. This article does not authorize the removal of the documents, items, or information from the possession of the state, and any inspection shall be in the presence of a representative of the state. (post-Morton version of Art. 39.14(a))(emphasis added). II. Inadmissible Testimonial Statements In Crawford, the court held out-of-court statements by witnesses that are testimonial are barred under the Confrontation Clause, unless witnesses are unavailable and defendants had prior opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, regardless of whether statements are deemed reliable. The court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment ensures a procedural guarantee of reliability. Thus, the court’s ruling primarily addresses the admissibility of “testimonial” statements under the Confrontation Clause and Sixth 2


Amendment.3 Under Crawford, “testimonial” statements include, but not limited to, affidavits, custodial examinations, prior examinations the defendant would reasonably be expected to cross-examine.4 In Crawford, at trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce into evidence a recorded statement by the accused’s wife describing the incident.5 The trial court allowed the tape to be played for the jury and convicted defendant—the wife was unable to testify at trial because of the state’s marital privilege. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the taped statement violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right.6 Therefore, a testimonial statement of an unavailable declarant may only be admissible after the defendant had prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.7 Furthermore, the court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to cross-examine witness’s testimony against him.8 The confrontation requirement absolutely cannot be met by questioning one witness about another’s testimonial statements, even if a court believes that the questioning provides a fair enough opportunity for a defendant to cross-examine. In Bullcoming, a sample of defendant’s blood was sent to a laboratory for testing, who was administered by one forensic analyst who issued a report detailing the test was properly administered.9 At trial, the state introduced the analysts report but did not call the analysts to the stand. Instead, called another scientist from the same laboratory. Defendant objected to the introduction of the report without the forensic analyst’s presence on the grounds it would violate his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. The trial court admitted the evidence and defendant was convicted. Defendant has appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.10 According to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, testimonial statements witness absent from trial can only be admitted where the declarant is unavailable, and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. III. Duty To Disclose All Relevant Evidence In State v. Heath, decisions affirmed that Texas law by statute requires prosecutors to disclose all relevant evidence in possession, regardless of whether prosecutor had knowledge.11 Meaning, it demands that evidence be disclosed as soon as it is reasonably possible.

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Crawford v. State, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1365 (2004). Id. at 1364. 5 Id. at 1357. 6 Id. at 1374. 7 Id. 8 See. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011). 9 Id. at 2707. 10 Id. at 2713. 11 State v. Heath, 642 S.W.3d 591, 596 (2022). 4

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The trial court in Heath excluded a 911 call from evidence due to state’s failure to disclose in a timely manner. The State appealed, attempting to determine whether “the state” term refers to law enforcement. The term applies to both prosecutors and law enforcement agencies. Therefore, with the enactment of the Michael Morton Act in Art. 39.14(a) which requires “as soon as practicable after receiving a timely request from the defendant the state shall produce.”12 The Heath ruling is monumental in criminal law, the rule reinforces the state’s obligation to ensure timely and comprehensive evidence disclosure.13 IV. MOTION IN LIMINE AND TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF GEOFENCE The Defendant would show that in this case the Indictment was filed January 23rd, 2023. In due course the State allegedly began uploading all information in its possession related to the case. Both the State and the Defense filed Motions for Disclosure of Expert Testimony. The Defense, in reliance upon the fact that no “geofencing” report was tendered, did not engage an IT expert to review any information related to that issue. As part of the request to “finalize” the discovery the Defendant filed an Art. 39.14 request on the 8th day of August, 2024 requesting: 4. All reports and records of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons, including all resulting final reports, on any tangible or material evidence to be used in this cause, including but not limited to any and all medical records, drug tests, blood tests, breath tests and any other forensic reports or data which call for an expert opinion and or were prepared by an expert, whether or not the preparing expert will testify at trial, and the name and address of each person who made such report, test, and experiment or comparison. As of that date, no expert report had been tendered. The expert report in question was not tendered until the 16th day of August, 2024. Said report was tendered in violation of both the Court Order and the Heath case. As a result of the failure to produce, the Defendant moves to exclude ALL evidence related to the Geofencing reports, including but not limited to “location” data or opinions, methodology, and cell site locations pursuant to Art. 39.14, and State v. Heath, 642 S.W. 3rd 591 (Tex. App. 2022). Additionally, the State filed “STATE’S LIST OF WITNESSES” listing therein fiftyeight (58) expert witnesses, none of whom have created or produced evidentiary reports and testimony relating to geofencing or even cell phone data collection or interpretation. Accordingly, none of them are able to give expert testimony as to any issue in this case as it relates to geofencing or analyzing cell phone records. The expert report in question is a document entitled “Cell Phone Analysis”. Said report is a compilation and analysis of cell phone records allegedly belonging to the Defendant. Said report was created by FBI SA Ryan 12 13

State v. Heath, 642 S.W.3d 591, 596 (2022). See Id. at 597.

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Dowling with the Cellular Analysis Survey Team located in Houston, Texas. The “STATE’S LIST OF EXPERT WITNESSES” fails to identify or mention Mr. Dowling. Presumably the State intends to call FBI SA S. Mullen as its expert witness to testify as to the “results of” the data analysis performed by Mr. Dowling. The data compilation and conclusions are clearly “testimonial” in nature and are inadmissible hearsay. The attempted introduction of said testimony is in clear violation of Crawford v. State, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, Heath v. State, in addition to the Defendant’s Right of Confrontation and Cross-Examination under the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Though not necessary for enforcement of the request, but material to the failure to produce this evidence, the Court signed an Order for discovery and inspection which was violated by the State in this case. Heath dictates that all evidence be disclosed as soon as it is reasonably possible, regardless of when the prosecutor becomes aware. The Court in Heath affirmed that trial courts have the authority to exclude evidence not disclosed in accordance with Art. 39.14, even absent a showing of bad faith by the prosecution. The geofencing reports were produced on the 17th day of September 2024, fourteen (14) days before jury trial and not produced timely and as reasonably possible. The Defendant would show that the records requested were in existence in June of 2021 and were in the “care, custody or control” of the State and were never timely presented for analysis. As a result of same, without waiving the above basis in Limine, the Defendant never hired a cell phone “expert” to review the data as no expert report was ever produced. Accordingly, the Defense objects to the introduction of any testimony related to any comparison made by any alleged expert in this regard related to the Geofencing or Cell phone data analysis. GRANTED ___________

DENIED ___________

V. MOTION IN LIMINE AND TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION EXPERT Under the same premise as above, and including the citation to Tx. Rules Evid. #702, 704 and 705, the Defendant moves to Limine any testimony as to “accident reconstruction”, the interpretation of damage to any vehicle in question as to the causation of the damages, or that the photographs depict damage “consistent with” any evidentiary issue in the case, or otherwise. Said area of testimony is clearly within the ambit of expert testimony and until such time as the State proves the expertise of said witness, the testimony should be excluded. GRANTED ___________

DENIED ___________

VI. MOTION IN LIMINE AND TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF ALL REPORTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS RELATED TO THE DEFENDANT’S CAR ACQUIRED FROM ALLSTATE INSURANCE. The Defendant would show that the investigating officer in this case relied upon a file received from Allstate Insurance Company which is the company handling the Defendant’s 5


vehicle and his alleged auto damages claim. The Defendant would show that the “affidavit” fails to comply with the strict requirements of Tx. Rule Evid. 902(10) and 803(6). In particular, the Document: 1. is neither an “affidavit” nor an “unsworn declaration”; 2. fails to state for whom she is the custodian, whether for ALLSTATE or ESURANCE; 3. fails to state how many pages are attached which clearly fails to identify the authenticity of any records attached; 4. fails to state that the “records were made at or near the time of each act, event, … made therein”; 5. fails to show that the records were “made by, or from information transmitted by, persons with knowledge of the matters set forth therein; and finally, 6. fails to state that it was the “regular practice of the business to make the records.” The Defendant would further show that the Subpoena Duces Tecum is directed to the Custodian of Records for “ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY” in Northbrook Illinois but the State’s 902(10) notice identifies the alleged records custodian “Vione Calhoun” from “ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY” in Dallas, Texas. That entity was never served nor was the Defendant given records which could be reasonably identified as to who the actual custodian was for which legal entity. In short, the Document wholly fails to comply with either 803(6) or 902(10) and the documents allegedly attached thereto are inadmissible as hearsay. GRANTED ___________

DENIED ___________

Therefore, the Defendant moves to exclude all testimony from any of these witnesses or the testimony related to the subjects and evidence described above. WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Defendant respectfully prays that this Court grant this Motion In Limine and order the State and its witnesses not to refer to or allude to any of the above without first approaching the bench and complying with the above requests for proof of admissibility. In addition, the Defendant requests that the State specifically inform the respective witnesses of the Order of the Court in this regard. Respectfully submitted, BOBBY BARRERA LAW 408 Dwyer Ave., San Antonio, Texas 78204 TEL: (210) 227-7372 FAX: (210) 201-2935 Bobby@bobbybarrera.com /s/ SIGNATURE Attorney Name State Bar No. 000000 Attorney for Defendant

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THE COURT ORDERS AS INDICATED HEREIN. SIGNED ON THE ___ DAY OF ______________, 2026. _______________________________ JUDGE PRESIDING

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion has been forwarded to the Assistant District Attorney, Bexar County, Texas, on this _____ day of ______________, 2026 and E-file service and email. /S/ SIGNATURE Attorney Name

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Attachment 3


CAUSE NO. 000000 STATE OF TEXAS V. DEFENDANT

§ § § § §

IN THE DISTRICT COURT _______ JUDICIAL DISTRICT BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION OF RECORDS RELATED TO THE BLOOD TESTING TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, the above referenced Defendant, by and through the undersigned counsel, and moves this Court to allow and order the discovery set forth below. These requests are brought pursuant to: 1. TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Article 39.14. 2. TEXAS TRANSPORTATION CODE §724.018, which mandates the disclosure upon request of “full information concerning the analysis of the specimen shall be made available to the person or the person's attorney.” 3. TEXAS RULE OF EVIDENCE 705(a), which provides for the court to order pretrial disclosure of all facts and data on which an expert will rely in rendering an opinion rather than waiting until cross examination when disclosure would materially delay continuation of trial. 4. The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Texas Constitution Article I, §§ 13 and 19. 5. The right to effective assistance of counsel, the right to be informed of the nature of the accusation, the right of confrontation and cross-examination and the right to compulsory process as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Texas Constitution Article I, §10. Without the items sought by this discovery, Defendant and his counsel cannot evaluate the validity of the test pretrial as an essential component of developing a trial strategy that would cast doubt on the reliability and believability of the testing in this case. Moreover, because Defendant must, when requested, identify the expert witnesses he will use at trial, pretrial information concerning the testing is required to retain and identify pretrial the necessary expert witnesses that will be needed at trial. Defendant seeks an order requiring the State's attorney and the State's agents to produce and permit examination, inspection and copying by Defendant, undersigned counsel, co-counsel, and experts employed by the Defendant, counsel or co-counsel of the following items.

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Protocols, Methods, and Standard Operating Procedures 1. The general laboratory protocol or standard operating procedures manual, by whatever name it is known. 2. The protocol, method, and standard operating procedure, by whatever name it is known, specific to the test used in this case. 3. The protocol for the calibration of the machine(s) used to test the sample in this case. 4. The protocol for calibration of all equipment, including flasks, containers, pipettes, balances or other equipment used in testing the sample at issue in this case. 5. The protocol for the preparation of all samples, solutions, reagents, mixtures, or other substances used as, as part of, or in relation to or as internal standards, controls, mixtures, or standards in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. 6. The quality control protocol for all solutions, reagents, mixtures, or other substances used as, as part of, or in relation to internal standards, controls, mixtures, or standards in the batch in which the sample in this case was run.

Method Validation and Parameters 7. Documentation evidencing validation of every method contained within the protocols applicable to the test in this case or used on the specimen in this case. This specifically includes methods and protocols used in relation to the test in this case, calibration of all the equipment used in relation to the test in this case, used with respect to the preparation of all solutions, reagents, mixtures, or other substances used as, as part of, or in relation to or as internal standards, controls, mixtures, or standards in the batch in which the sample in this case was run, and all protocols and methods contained in items 1 through 6 as it relates to the testing in this case. 8. The raw electronic data files produced by the gas chromatograph (GC) used in this case (and generated or stored on attached software) from the sample in this case for all samples, internal standards, standards, mixtures, and controls run in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. 9. Documentation evidencing and reflecting the machine settings and parameters, by whatever name(s) known, used by the GC used in this case (and generated or stored on attached software) on the sample in this case for all samples, internal standards, standards, mixtures, and controls run in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. 10. Documentation evidencing and reflecting the integration settings, values, and parameters, by whatever name(s) known, used by the GC used in this case (and generated or stored

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on attached software) on the sample in this case for all samples, internal standards, standards, mixtures, and controls run in the batch in which the sample in this case was run.

The Batch in This Case 11. The chromatograms produced from all samples, internal standards, standards, mixtures, and controls run in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. 12. Any logs, reports or spreadsheets, or other documents, in whatever form, reflecting the analytical results of all samples, internal standards, standards, mixtures, and controls run in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. 13. All lab notes, case files, case reports, or bench notes, by whatever name(s) known, and in whatever form, as well as all documents contained in the testing folder specific to the test in this case. This includes a copy of the case or testing folder itself, if it contains any notations or entries. These documents should be produced as one group of items so that an independent analyst can know everything contained within the case folder. 14. All chain of custody documents and records, whether maintained manually or electronically generated, specific to the specimen(s) in this case and to the case folder in this case. 15. All documents, whether manually maintained or electronically recorded, reflecting, evidencing, or concerning, the identity of any person(s) involved in the acquisition, transportation, transmittal, storage, analysis, disposal, or other possession or manipulation of the specimen(s) from which the analysis in this case was performed. 16. All documents, including emails, reflecting communications within the lab or between lab personnel and others outside the lab regarding the drafting or editing of any audit or quality control report or related to the analysis or specimens in this case. 17. If the lab received more than one vial or container of blood or other substance, records reflecting which vial was tested in this case.

The Machine(s) in This Case 18. Documents reflecting the brand and model number of the machine, and all attached or integrated components, that was used for testing in this case. For example, if this test was done by gas chromatography, then this requests the brand and model of the GC, the auto sampler, if one was used, the flame ionization detector, if one was used, and the mass spectrometer, if one was used -- all of which would be considered attached or integrated components of the machine used to conduct the test.

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19. The operator's manual for whatever machine and attached or integrated components were used to test the sample in this case. For example, if this test was done by gas chromatography, then this requests the protocol or operator's manual of the GC, the auto sampler, if one was used, the flame ionization detector, if one was used, and the mass spectrometer, if one was used -- all of which would be considered attached or integrated components of the machine used to conduct the test. 20. Linearity plots for the GC used in this case from three years prior to the test in this case to the present. 21. All warranties for all machines, and all attached or integrated components, used for testing the sample or any standard or control used in the batch in which this sample was tested.

Calibration of the Machine 22. All calibration results and chromatograms for calibrations on the machine on which the sample in this case was tested -- for 60 days before the test at issue until 60 days after the test at issue, or to the present if less than 60 days. 23. All logs, reports, spreadsheets, or other documents, in whatever form, reflecting the calibration of all equipment including balances, flasks, containers, pipettes, or other equipment used in testing the sample at issue in this case. 24. Records reflecting the calibration of weights on any balance or instrument related to or used in blood alcohol testing for three years before the test in this case to the present.

Quality Control and Assurance 25. All logs, reports, spreadsheets, or other documents in whatever form, reflecting quality control and assurance testing of all equipment including balances, flasks, containers, pipettes, or other equipment used in testing the sample at issue in this case. 26. All records reflecting internal testing or quality control testing of all substances and solutions, reagents, or mixtures used as, as part of, or in relation to samples, internal standards, controls, mixtures, or standards in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. 27. If any solution used in any sample, internal standard, control, mixture, or standard in the batch in which the sample in this case was run was purchased from an outside supplier, any quality control certificate provided by the supplier or manufacturer with or applicable to such solution as well as all internal testing or quality control documentation applicable to such item.

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28. Documents reflecting the expiration date of all externally purchased solutions or reagents as well as all internally made solutions or reagents used in the batch in which the sample in this case was tested. 29. All balance quality control records on any balance instrument related to or used in blood alcohol testing in relation to the sample in this case for three years before the test in this case to the present. 30. All refrigeration logs, reports, or other documents in whatever form, for all refrigerated compartments in which the sample, internal standards, controls, mixtures, standards, and reagents used in or in relation to the analysis in this case were stored or kept at any time.

Proficiency Testing 31. All proficiency testing results for the section of the laboratory testing the sample in this case as well as for the person who conducted the testing in this case -- both for the three years preceding the test and for any such testing since the testing in this case, including: a. Any and all submission documents received from proficiency testing entities relating to proficiency testing with respect to the analyst in this case. b. Any and all chromatograms and related documentation (including the calibration chromatograms and all other chromatograms in the batch of the samples comprising the proficiency testing) of the proficiency samples tested by the analyst in this case. c. Any and all internal documents, including memorandums, emails or other correspondence, relating to the full chain of custody (both before and after submission) and submission of the allegedly unknown proficiency samples to the analyst who tested the samples in this case. d. Any and all documents contained in the case file for the proficiency tests of the allegedly unknown proficiency samples analyzed by the analyst who tested the samples in this case. e. Any and all documents reflecting submission of the allegedly unknown proficiency samples analyzed by the analyst who tested the samples in this case to the entity conducting the proficiency testing. f. Any and all documents received from the entity conducting the proficiency testing with respect to results of the proficiency testing relating to the analyst who tested the samples in this case. This specifically includes the summary report of expected results for the proficiency testing (and the manufacturer’s information sheet) against which the proficiency test results are judged.

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g. Any and all documents received from the entity conducting the proficiency testing relating to the analyst who tested the samples in this case indicating, reflecting, or evidencing the range of results for all participants in the proficiency testing. h. To the extent that documents responsive to any prior portion of this order do not identify the analyst who tested the samples in this case, any and all documents identifying the analyst who tested the samples in this case and relating non-name identifiers to the name of the analyst in this case. This item specifically requires the production of any and all documents sufficient to allow the identification of the analyst in this case from any and all documents that simply list numbers or other non-name identifiers. i. Any and all documents relating to internal communications, in whatever form, relating to the results of the proficiency testing from or to the analyst in this case. j. Any and all documents, as set forth above, in whatever form, relating to retesting of proficiency samples related to the analyst who analyzed the samples in this case. k. Any and all documents reflecting preliminary beta testing of samples used for later proficiency testing with respect to proficiency testing within the scope of this order.

Maintenance and Repair Records 32. All internally generated maintenance or repair records or logs for the machine and all attached or integrated components for the two years preceding the test in this case and since the test in this case. 33. All documents, apart from those in the prior item, evidencing or concerning maintenance for or repair of the machine, and all attached or integrated components, by any outside repair facility or source -- for two years preceding the test in this case and at any time since the test in this case. 34. All records, other than those responsive to the prior two items, evidencing or concerning the return of the machine to the manufacturer or supplier for maintenance or repair -- for two years before the testing in this case and at any time since the test in this case. 35. Documents evidencing the purchase of parts to be used in the operation or maintenance of the machine, and all attached or integrated components, used in the testing in this case -- for two years before the test in this case and at any time since the test in this case.

Audits and Accreditation

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36. All documents reflecting lab accreditation (for forensic labs, this specifically includes, without limitation ASCLD and DPS accreditation) and all reports to or of, or communications to and from, any accrediting entity in the three years prior to the test in this case and at any time since the test in this case. This specifically requests not only the accreditation certificate, but also the initial evaluation and final report(s) generated as part of the accreditation process. The documents should include any accreditation in effect at the time of the test in this case as well as any accreditation subsequent to the time of the test in this case. 37. Any and all documents in whatever form reflecting correspondence or communications between the lab and any accrediting entity with respect to accreditation or continuation or renewal of accreditation. 38. All annual accreditation audit evaluations and reports prepared for ASCLD-LAB since the lab’s last complete accreditation. 39. All reports of internal audits for the last three years or since the time of the test in this case of the section of the laboratory performing the test used in this case as well as the report of any overall lab audit that includes machines, components, chemicals, reagents, storage facilities, or anything else used in connection with the testing of the sample, internal standards, controls, mixtures, or standards in the batch in this test. 40. All reports of external audits for the three years preceding the test in this case and at any time since the test in this case of the section of the laboratory performing the test used in this case as well as the report of any overall lab audit that includes machines, components, chemicals, storage facilities, or anything else used in connection with the testing of the sample, internal standard, mixtures, standards, and controls in the batch in this test.

Log Books and Records 41. Log Book records for three years prior to the test in this case to the present for: a. The GC log book, by whatever name known, reflecting all maintenance and repair. b. The log books for all equipment ancillary to the GC (e.g., auto sampler, FID, etc.). c. The balance log book for any balance used for any equipment used in blood alcohol testing. d. Ethanol or other Standards or controls. e. N-propanol or other internal standard.

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f. 95% (or pure) ethanol solution. g. All Stock solutions. h. NaCl or other salts or substances used in sample preparation, i. Volatile Mixture standard j. Negative Controls k. Validation, verification, and use of all externally purchased solutions.

Other Lab Documents 42. Any and all testimony evaluations for any person listed on chain of custody documents in this case. 43. All Quality Action Plans for or regarding blood alcohol testing of or for any person listed on chain of custody documents in this case from three years prior to the test in this case to the present. 44. Annual self assessment reports from three years prior to the test in this case to the present for the section of the lab testing the sample in this case. 45. All deviation request forms regarding any and all aspects of blood alcohol testing from three years prior to the test in this case to the present. 46. All Client complaints and client complaint logs regarding blood alcohol testing or persons involved in blood alcohol testing of the sample in this case from three years prior to the test in this case to the present. 47. Client survey results regarding blood alcohol testing from three years prior to the test in this case to the present. 48. Annual vault inspection reports and records from three years prior to the test in this case to the present for any vault or storage facility in which the sample in this case was stored. 49. Regarding any person listed on chain of custody documents in this case: a. Any and all training records. b. Employment application. c. Any and all Curriculums Vitae (CV’s) and resumes. d. Performance reviews for three years prior to the test in this case to the present. 50. Laboratory Staff and Meeting Documentation related to blood alcohol testing for three years prior to the test in this case to the present.

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51. Critical Supply and Service List related to blood alcohol testing for three years prior to the test in this case to the present. 52. Approved Vendor List related to blood alcohol testing including for the critical Supply and Services List for three years prior to the test in this case to the present.

Inspection 53. An opportunity for the defense and defense experts to view, visually inspect, diagram and photographically record the GC and all ancillary equipment used to test the sample in this case as well as the area, and all immediately adjacent and adjoining areas, in which the machine(s) used in this case are kept. This specifically also includes all other electronic devices in the room, as well as adjoining (side, above or below) and nearby rooms (within approx. 100 feet) which may emit radio frequency interference, i.e., photocopying machines, radio transmitters, microwave ovens, computer terminals, etc.

In support of this Motion, Defendant will show: 1. The matters requested are in the exclusive possession, custody and control of the State of Texas by and through its agents, a law enforcement agency, or the prosecuting attorney's office, and the Defendant has no other way to obtain said information other than through this motion and an order from this court. 2. The items requested are not privileged. 3. The items requested are material and necessary for the preparation of the defense in this case. 4. Absent all of the requested discovery, Defendant's rights under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 39.14, Texas Constitution Article 1, Section 10, United States Constitution and its Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and Texas Transportation Code § 724.018 will be violated to his irreparable injury and thus, will deprive the Defendant of a fair trial. 5. This Motion is made in good faith and not for delay. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant respectfully prays that this motion be granted in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted, BOBBY BARRERA LAW

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408 Dwyer Ave., San Antonio, Texas 78204 TEL: (210) 227-7372 FAX: (210) 201-2935 Bobby@bobbybarrera.com /s/ SIGNATURE Attorney Name State Bar No. 000000000 Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion and Order for Discovery and Inspection has been forwarded to the Bexar County District Attorney’s Office on this ______ day of ____________, 2026. /s/ SIGNATURE Attorney Name

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Attachment 4


CAUSE NO. 000000 STATE OF TEXAS V. DEFENDANT

§ § § § §

IN THE DISTRICT COURT _______ JUDICIAL DISTRICT BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION OF RECORDS RELATED TO THE BLOOD TESTING Before the Court is the Defendant's Motion for Discovery. The Court is of the opinion that the motion is well taken and should be GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED that the Bexar County Medical Examiner, Forensic Toxicology Laboratory, produce to the Defendant, through his counsel, William M. Clanton, 101 Stumberg, San Antonio, Texas 78204, on or before 5 p.m. on the tenth day after the date of this order, as follows. 1. The general laboratory protocol or standard operating procedures manual, by whatever name it is known. GRANTED

DENIED

2. The protocol, method, and standard operating procedure, by whatever name it is known, specific to the test used in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

3. The protocol for the calibration of the machine(s) used to test the sample in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

4. The protocol for calibration of all equipment, including flasks, containers, pipettes, balances or other equipment used in testing the sample at issue in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

5. The protocol for the preparation of all samples, solutions, reagents, mixtures, or other substances used as, as part of, or in relation to or as internal standards, controls, mixtures,

Page 11 of 22


or standards in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. GRANTED

DENIED

6. The quality control protocol for all solutions, reagents, mixtures, or other substances used as, as part of, or in relation to internal standards, controls, mixtures, or standards in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. GRANTED

DENIED

7. Documentation evidencing validation of every method contained within the protocols applicable to the test in this case or used on the specimen in this case. This specifically includes methods and protocols used in relation to the test in this case, calibration of all the equipment used in relation to the test in this case, used with respect to the preparation of all solutions, reagents, mixtures, or other substances used as, as part of, or in relation to or as internal standards, controls, mixtures, or standards in the batch in which the sample in this case was run, and all protocols and methods contained in items 1 through 6 as it relates to the testing in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

8. The raw electronic data files produced by the gas chromatograph (GC) used in this case (and generated or stored on attached software) from the sample in this case for all samples, internal standards, standards, mixtures, and controls run in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. GRANTED

DENIED

9. Documentation evidencing and reflecting the machine settings and parameters, by whatever name(s) known, used by the GC used in this case (and generated or stored on attached software) on the sample in this case for all samples, internal standards, standards, mixtures, and controls run in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. GRANTED

DENIED

10. Documentation evidencing and reflecting the integration settings, values, and parameters, by whatever name(s) known, used by the GC used in this case (and generated or stored

Page 12 of 22


on attached software) on the sample in this case for all samples, internal standards, standards, mixtures, and controls run in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. GRANTED

DENIED

11. The chromatograms produced from all samples, internal standards, standards, mixtures, and controls run in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. GRANTED

DENIED

12. Any logs, reports or spreadsheets, or other documents, in whatever form, reflecting the analytical results of all samples, internal standards, standards, mixtures, and controls run in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. GRANTED

DENIED

13. All lab notes, case files, case reports, or bench notes, by whatever name(s) known, and in whatever form, as well as all documents contained in the testing folder specific to the test in this case. This includes a copy of the case or testing folder itself, if it contains any notations or entries. These documents should be produced as one group of items so that an independent analyst can know everything contained within the case folder. GRANTED

DENIED

14. All chain of custody documents and records, whether maintained manually or electronically generated, specific to the specimen(s) in this case and to the case folder in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

15. All documents, whether manually maintained or electronically recorded reflecting, evidencing, or concerning, the identity of any person(s) involved in the acquisition, transportation, transmittal, storage, analysis, disposal, or other possession or manipulation of the specimen(s) from which the analysis in this case was performed. GRANTED

DENIED

16. All documents, including emails, reflecting communications within the lab or between

Page 13 of 22


lab personnel and others outside the lab regarding the drafting or editing of any audit or quality control report or related to the analysis or specimens in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

17. If the lab received more than one vial or container of blood or other substance, records reflecting which vial was tested in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

18. Documents reflecting the brand and model number of the machine and all attached or integrated components that were used for testing in this case. For example, if this test was done by gas chromatography then this requests the brand and model of the GC, the auto sampler, if one was used, the flame ionization detector, if one was used, and the mass spectrometer, if one was used -- all of which would be considered attached or integrated components of the machine used to conduct the test. GRANTED

DENIED

19. The operator's manual for whatever machine and attached or integrated components were used to test the sample in this case. For example, if this test was done by gas chromatography, then this requests the protocol or operator's manual of the GC, the auto sampler, if one was used, the flame ionization detector, if one was used, and the mass spectrometer, if one was used -- all of which would be considered attached or integrated components of the machine used to conduct the test. GRANTED

DENIED

20. Linearity plots for the GC used in this case from three years prior to the test in this case to the present. GRANTED

DENIED

21. All warranties for all machines, and all attached or integrated components, used for testing the sample or any standard or control used in the batch in which this sample was tested. GRANTED

DENIED

Page 14 of 22


22. All calibration results and chromatograms for calibrations on the machine on which the sample in this case was tested -- for 60 days before the test at issue until 60 days after the test at issue, or to the present if less than 60 days. GRANTED

DENIED

23. All logs, reports, spreadsheets, or other documents, in whatever form, reflecting the calibration of all equipment including balances, flasks, containers, pipettes, or other equipment used in testing the sample at issue in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

24. Records reflecting the calibration of weights on any balance or instrument related to or used in blood alcohol testing for three years before the test in this case to the present. GRANTED

DENIED

25. All logs, reports, spreadsheets, or other documents in whatever form, reflecting quality control and assurance testing of all equipment including balances, flasks, containers, pipettes, or other equipment used in testing the sample at issue in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

26. All records reflecting internal testing or quality control testing of all substances and solutions, reagents, or mixtures used as, as part of, or in relation to samples, internal standards, controls, mixtures, or standards in the batch in which the sample in this case was run. GRANTED

DENIED

27. If any solution used in any sample, internal standard, control, mixture, or standard in the batch in which the sample in this case was run was purchased from an outside supplier, any quality control certificate provided by the supplier or manufacturer with or applicable to such solution as well as all internal testing or quality control documentation applicable to such item. GRANTED

DENIED

Page 15 of 22


28. Documents reflecting the expiration date of all externally purchased solutions or reagents as well as all internally made solutions or reagents used in the batch in which the sample in this case was tested. GRANTED

DENIED

29. All balance quality control records on any balance instrument related to or used in blood alcohol testing in relation to the sample in this case for three years before the test in this case to the present. GRANTED

DENIED

30. All refrigeration logs, reports, or other documents in whatever form, for all refrigerated compartments in which the sample, internal standards, controls, mixtures, standards, and reagents used in or in relation to the analysis in this case were stored or kept at any time. GRANTED

DENIED

31. All proficiency testing results for the section of the laboratory testing the sample in this case as well as for the person who conducted the testing in this case -- both for the three years preceding the test and for any such testing since the testing in this case, including: a. Any and all submission documents received from proficiency testing entities relating to proficiency testing with respect to the analyst in this case. b. Any and all chromatograms and related documentation (including the calibration chromatograms and all other chromatograms in the batch of the samples comprising the proficiency testing) of the proficiency samples tested by the analyst in this case. c. Any and all internal documents, including memorandums, emails or other correspondence, relating to the full chain of custody (both before and after submission) and submission of the allegedly unknown proficiency samples to the analyst who tested the samples in this case. d. Any and all documents contained in the case file for the proficiency tests of the allegedly unknown proficiency samples analyzed by the analyst who tested the samples in this case. e. Any and all documents reflecting submission of the allegedly unknown

Page 16 of 22


proficiency samples analyzed by the analyst who tested the samples in this case to the entity conducting the proficiency testing. f. Any and all documents received from the entity conducting the proficiency testing with respect to results of the proficiency testing relating to the analyst who tested the samples in this case. This specifically includes the summary report of expected results for the proficiency testing (and the manufacturer’s information sheet) against which the proficiency test results are judged. g. Any and all documents received from the entity conducting the proficiency testing relating to the analyst who tested the samples in this case indicating, reflecting, or evidencing the range of results for all participants in the proficiency testing. h. To the extent that documents responsive to any prior portion of this order do not identify the analyst who tested the samples in this case, any and all documents identifying the analyst who tested the samples in this case and relating non-name identifiers to the name of the analyst in this case. This item specifically requires the production of any and all documents sufficient to allow the identification of the analyst in this case from any and all documents that simply list numbers or other non-name identifiers. i. Any and all documents relating to internal communications, in whatever form, relating to the results of the proficiency testing from or to the analyst in this case. j. Any and all documents, as set forth above, in whatever form, relating to retesting of proficiency samples related to the analyst who analyzed the samples in this case. k. Any and all documents reflecting preliminary beta testing of samples used for later proficiency testing with respect to proficiency testing within the scope of this order. GRANTED

DENIED

32. All internally generated maintenance or repair records or logs for the machine and all attached or integrated components for the two years preceding the test in this case and since the test in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

33. All documents, apart from those in the prior item, evidencing or concerning maintenance for or repair of the machine, and all attached or integrated components, by any outside repair facility or source -- for two years preceding the test in this case and at any time since the test in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

Page 17 of 22


34. All records, other than those responsive to the prior two items, evidencing or concerning the return of the machine to the manufacturer or supplier for maintenance or repair -- for two years before the testing in this case and at any time since the test in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

35. Documents evidencing the purchase of parts to be used in the operation or maintenance of the machine, and all attached or integrated components, used in the testing in this case -- for two years before the test in this case and at any time since the test in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

36. All documents reflecting lab accreditation (for forensic labs, this specifically includes, without limitation ASCLD and DPS accreditation) and all reports to or of, or communications to and from, any accrediting entity in the three years prior to the test in this case and at any time since the test in this case. This specifically requests not only the accreditation certificate, but also the initial evaluation and final report(s) generated as part of the accreditation process. The documents should include any accreditation in effect at the time of the test in this case as well as any accreditation subsequent to the time of the test in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

37. Any and all documents in whatever form reflecting correspondence or communications between the lab and any accrediting entity with respect to accreditation or continuation or renewal of accreditation. GRANTED

DENIED

38. All annual accreditation audit evaluations and reports prepared for ASCLD-LAB since the lab’s last complete accreditation. GRANTED

DENIED

39. All reports of internal audits for the last three years or since the time of the test in this case of the section of the laboratory performing the test used in this case as well as the report of any overall lab audit that includes machines, components, chemicals, reagents,

Page 18 of 22


storage facilities, or anything else used in connection with the testing of the sample, internal standards, controls, mixtures, or standards in the batch in this test. GRANTED

DENIED

40. All reports of external audits for the three years preceding the test in this case and at any time since the test in this case of the section of the laboratory performing the test used in this case as well as the report of any overall lab audit that includes machines, components, chemicals, storage facilities, or anything else used in connection with the testing of the sample, internal standard, mixtures, standards, and controls in the batch in this test. GRANTED

DENIED

41. Log Book records for three years prior to the test in this case to the present for: a. The GC log book, by whatever name known, reflecting all maintenance and repair. b. The log books for all equipment ancillary to the GC (e.g., auto sampler, FID, etc.). c. The balance log book for any balance used for any equipment used in blood alcohol testing. d. Ethanol or other Standards or controls. e. N-propanol or other internal standard. f. 95% (or pure) ethanol solution. g. All Stock solutions. h. NaCl or other salts or substances used in sample preparation, i. Volatile Mixture standard j. Negative Controls k. Validation, verification, and use of all externally purchased solutions. GRANTED

DENIED

42. Any and all testimony evaluations for any person listed on chain of custody documents in this case.

Page 19 of 22


GRANTED

DENIED

43. All Quality Action Plans for or regarding blood alcohol testing of or for any person listed on chain of custody documents in this case from three years prior to the test in this case to the present. GRANTED

DENIED

44. Annual self assessment reports from three years prior to the test in this case to the present for the section of the lab testing the sample in this case. GRANTED

DENIED

45. All deviation request forms regarding any and all aspects of blood alcohol testing from three years prior to the test in this case to the present. GRANTED

DENIED

46. All Client complaints and client complaint logs regarding blood alcohol testing or persons involved in blood alcohol testing of the sample in this case from three years prior to the test in this case to the present. GRANTED

DENIED

47. Client survey results regarding blood alcohol testing from three years prior to the test in this case to the present. GRANTED

DENIED

48. Annual vault inspection reports and records from three years prior to the test in this case to the present for any vault or storage facility in which the sample in this case was stored. GRANTED

DENIED

49. Regarding any person listed on chain of custody documents in this case: a. Any and all training records.

Page 20 of 22


b. Employment application. c. Any and all Curriculums Vitae (CV's) and resumes. d. Performance reviews for three years prior to the test in this case to the present. GRANTED

DENIED

50. Laboratory Staff and Meeting Documentation related to blood alcohol testing for three years prior to the test in this case to the present. GRANTED

DENIED

51. Critical Supply and Service List related to blood alcohol testing for three years prior to the test in this case to the present. GRANTED

DENIED

52. Approved Vendor List related to blood alcohol testing including for the critical Supply and Services List for three years prior to the test in this case to the present. GRANTED

DENIED

53. An opportunity for the defense and defense experts to view, visually inspect, diagram and photographically record the GC and all ancillary equipment used to test the sample in this case as well as the area, and all immediately adjacent and adjoining areas, in which the machine(s) used in this case are kept. This specifically also includes all other electronic devices in the room, as well as adjoining (side, above or below) and nearby rooms (within approx. 100 feet) which may emit radio frequency interference, i.e., photocopying machines, radio transmitters, microwave ovens, computer terminals, etc. GRANTED

DENIED

It is further ORDERED that any evidence within the scope of the items granted above be provided by the State to defendant's attorney at his office, on or before 5 p.m. on the tenth day after the date of this order. It is further ORDERED that this order is continuing and the State will immediately make available to the Defendant's attorney any subsequent discoverable matter within the scope of the above granted items within 48 hours of the time it learns of or obtains such discoverable matter. It is further ORDERED that any items herein not produced in violation of this order shall

Page 21 of 22


be and are excluded from evidence in this case if offered by the State. It is further ORDERED that testimony concerning the items not produced in violation of this order or the information contained in those items shall be and are excluded from evidence in this case if offered by the State. It is further ORDERED that all orders herein for viewing, visual inspection, diagramming, and photographic recording are to occur during normal business hours at a mutually agreeable time, but in no event later than 10 business days after Defense counsel transmits this order to the law enforcement agency involved and specifically requests an agreeable time to view, visually inspect, diagram, and photographically record the items permitted in this order. It is further ORDERED that any law enforcement agency, or person or entity having a contract with such law enforcement agency, shall be allowed as a copy cost that amount, and only that amount, that would be allowable under the Texas Public Information Act for copying the documents required to be produced by this order.

Signed and entered this

day of ____________, 20_____.

________________________________ JUDGE PRESIDING

Page 22 of 22


Attachment 5


CAUSE NO. 000000 STATE OF TEXAS V. DEFENDANT

§ § § § §

IN THE DISTRICT COURT _______ JUDICIAL DISTRICT BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: Now Comes, DEFENDANT NAME, Defendant, and moves the Court for an order suppressing the fruits of the illegal detention, arrest, and interrogation of the Defendant. In support thereof, Defendant would show the Court as follows: I. On or about the 1st day of November, 2018, Defendant was illegally detained and then arrested without a valid warrant or probable cause by law enforcement agents of the City of San Antonio. II. The Defendant moves the Court to suppress the fruits of said illegal arrest as provided under the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution; Article 1, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution and Articles 1.04, 1.05, 1.06, and Chapter 14, and Article 38.21 and 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Said evidence should be suppressed as violative of the above laws for the following reasons: (A) The arrest and/or detention of the Defendant was without probable cause or reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts and any evidence resulting therefrom is per se illegal as "fruit of the poisonous tree". Wong Sun. (B) No evidence exists which would support a legal arrest under Chapter 14, Tx. Code Crim. Proc. and any evidence resulting therefrom is per se illegal as "fruit of the poisonous tree". Wong Son.

1


(C)

The blood draw of the Defendant was without probable cause or reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that the Defendant was in possession of evidence or contraband related to the offense of Driving While Intoxicated and any evidence resulting therefrom is per se illegal as "fruit of the poisonous tree". Wong Sun.

(D)

Any blood evidence that was procured was done so without a valid warrant or legal authority and was therefore procured in violation of the IVth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 1 §9 of the Texas Constitution, and Article §38.23 Tx. Code Criminal Proc. III.

FURTHER, any oral or written statement made by or alleged to have been made by the Defendant should also be suppressed in that said statement was made by the Defendant in response to interrogation or was made when the Defendant was substantially deprived of his freedom or made under circumstances which gave rise to the appearance of such substantial deprivation of freedom by the apparent and actual threat of the use of force and restraint on the part of the detaining law enforcement officers and: was made in violation of Arts. 38.21 and 38.22, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; was made in violation of Miranda; was made in violation of Articles 1.05 and 1.051, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; was not voluntarily made in violation of Jackson v. Denno; and was made in violation of Article I, §9 of the Texas Constitution; and the IVth, Vth, VIth, and XIVth Amendments to the United States Constitution. IV. The Defendant would show that immediately before his arrest he was driving his motor vehicle and the arresting officer stopped and detained him without reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that the Defendant had committed, was committing or was about to commit an offense. The Defendant would show that the arresting officer did not witness any criminal driving offense nor any other criminal offense which would allow the warrantless detention and or the arrest

2


of the Defendant for Driving While Intoxicated. The Defendant was also specifically questioned about his conduct and actions for the express purpose of gathering evidence supporting the officer’s probable cause to arrest the Defendant who was not free to leave the location, was the focus of a criminal investigation, was in handcuffs and detained, and who provided answers to specific questions related to his culpability for the offense he was ultimately charged with. WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Defendant prays that the Court grant this Motion and suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal stop, detention, arrest, interrogation and blood draw of the Defendant and to rule all evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible at trial. Defendant further requests the Court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in the event the Court denies this Motion and rules such arrest valid and the evidence obtained therefrom to be admissible. Respectfully submitted, BOBBY BARRERA LAW 408 Dwyer Ave., San Antonio, Texas 78204 TEL: (210) 227-7372 FAX: (210) 201-2935 Bobby@bobbybarrera.com /s/ SIGNATURE Attorney Name State Bar No. 000000000 Attorney for Defendant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion and Order to Suppress has been forwarded to the Bexar County District Attorney’s Office on this ______ day of ____________, 2026. /s/ SIGNATURE Attorney Name 3


CAUSE NO. 000000 STATE OF TEXAS V. DEFENDANT

§ § § § §

IN THE DISTRICT COURT _______ JUDICIAL DISTRICT BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

On this ____ day of __________, 2026, came on to be heard Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Detention, Arrest, Interrogation and Blood draw of the Defendant and after having been duly considered, it is accordingly ORDERED that said Motion is hereby GRANTED as follows: _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________. IT IS FURTHER ACCORDINGLY ORDERED that all evidence obtained from the above described violations is also ORDERED SUPPRESSED.

SIGNED this _____ day of____________, 2026.

___________________________ JUDGE PRESIDING

5


Attachment 6


CAUSE NO. 0000000 STATE OF TEXAS VS. DEFENDANT

§ § § § §

IN THE DISTRICT COURT _____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

DEFENDANT’S SPECIAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION #1 You are instructed that no evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United states of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case. Our law provides that a person who is in custody has a right to remain silent and may not be interrogated by any law enforcement officer without first being advised of his Miranda warnings including his right to remain silent. The term “custody” has been defined to include 1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way; 2) when law enforcement officers tell a suspect that he may not leave; 3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of moment has been significantly restricted, and 4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave. In this case, an issue has been raised as to whether the Defendant was in custody at the time that he responded that he was the driver of the automobile. Therefore, you are instructed that before you may consider this evidence, if any, that he was the driver of the automobile, that you must first find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the response, if any, was not the result of custodial interrogation in violation the Defendant’s right to remain silent. Unless you so find


beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you shall not consider the evidence for any purpose in arriving at your verdict. Your answer to this question must be unanimous.You are instructed to answer the Special Instruction Question below. ANSWER TO SPECIAL INTRUCTION #1. WE THE JURY, FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE RESPONSE BY DEFENDANT AS TO BEING THE DRIVER OF THE AUTOMOBILE (strike one) (WAS) (WAS NOT) THE RESULT OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION.

Respectfully submitted, BOBBY BARRERA LAW 408 Dwyer Ave., San Antonio, Texas 78204 TEL: (210) 227-7372 FAX: (210) 201-2935 Bobby@bobbybarrera.com /s/ SIGNATURE Attorney Name State Bar No. 000000000 Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion has been forwarded to the Assistant District Attorney, Bexar County, Texas, on this ____ day of ______, 2026 by E-file service.

/s/ SIGNATURE Attorney Name


§3:1020 Probable Cause to Arrest (Modified for my cases) MEMBERS OF THE JURY: You are instructed that no evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused in the trial of any criminal case. You are further instructed that our law permits the stop, arrest, detention, and search of a person by a peace officer without a warrant only when probable cause exists to believe that an offense against the laws of this state or of the United States have been violated. An officer is permitted to make an arrest of a motorist if the officer has probable cause to believe the motorist has committed or is committing an offense. By the term “probable cause,” as used herein, is meant where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, and of which he has trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. In this case, a factual dispute may exist as to whether the officer………(add your facts in dispute. This can be related to a blood draw, arrest, search warrant, etc. Detail the evidence that may exist as a result of the illegality, e.g., if the illegality is the arrest, ALL evidence, if the illegality is the warrant, only the evidence obtained from the warrant, if the illegality is a MIRANDA violation, only the confession or evidence obtained therefrom.) Therefore, if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the peace officer lawfully obtained the evidence, you may consider it. If you have a reasonable doubt that the peace officer lawfully obtained the evidence (describe that evidence), you may not consider it for any purpose.


NOTES This instruction is found in Coleman v. State, 45 S.W.3d 175 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001), overruled on other grounds, Johnson v. State, 95 S.W.3d 568 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (as originally drafted by trial court, 38.23 instruction shifted burden of proof, but appellate court redrafted instruction for future use). See also, Ramos v. State, 991 S.W.2d 430 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999). For another example of a 38.23 on probable cause to arrest, see Gerron v. State, 119 S.W.3d 371 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003, no pet.).


Attachment 7


CAUSE NO. 0000000 THE STATE OF TEXAS

§ § § § §

v. DEFENDANT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT _______ JUDICIAL DISTRICT BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

MOTION TO QUASH ENHANCEMENT PARAGRAPH OF A DEADLY WEAPON ALLEGATION IN INDICTMENT NOW COMES DEFENDANT NAME, Defendant (Movant), and files this Motion to Quash the enhancement paragraph alleging the use of a deadly weapon in the indictment and would for cause show the following: 1. On March 30, 2021, Officer A. Lopez #036 (Affiant) of the Lytle Police Department signed a Probable Cause Affidavit based on observations or credible information relating to the Defendant. Affiant was dispatched for a report of a “male asleep at the wheel in the drive thru” of a Whataburger. Affiant made contact with Defendant asleep at the wheel. Affiant arrested Defendant for Driving While Intoxicated 3rd or More. See “Exhibit A.” 2. On July 12, 2021, the Grand Jury for this Court indicted Defendant on one count of Driving While Intoxicated 3rd or more PC49.09(b). See “Exhibit B.” The indictment charged that on or about March 30, 2021, Defendant then and there operated a motor vehicle in a public place while Defendant was intoxicated. The indictment presented prior convictions for driving while intoxicated. The indictment attached the following enhancement paragraph: “And it is further presented that the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, towit: a motor vehicle, during the commission of the primary offense.” 3. Defendant seeks to quash the enhancement paragraph contained in the indictment. The 1


inclusion of a deadly weapon allegation prohibits the Defendant from applying for probation with the Judge of the Court as a deadly weapon finding limits a defendant's eligibility for community supervision from the judge. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42A.053(b) (West 2021); Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. §§ 508.145(d)(1), 508.149(a)(1), & 508.151(a)(2) (West 2021). 4. The Grand Jury may return an indictment only on a finding of probable cause to believe an individual committed a crime. Portley v. State, 109 S.W.3d 84, 86 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2003, no pet.). The statutory definition of a deadly weapon includes “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (West 2021) (emphasis added). A motor vehicle is not a deadly weapon, per se, but upon review of facts in the record, a motor vehicle may become a “deadly weapon”. Brister v. State, 449 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained that to justify a deadly weapon finding under section 1.07(a)(17)(B), the State must establish “only the manner” (emphasis added) in which it was used or intended to be used was “capable” (original emphasis) of causing death or serious bodily injury. Moore v. State, 520 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Tucker v. State, 274 S.W.3d 688, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). To sustain a deadly weapon finding requires evidence that others were “actually endangered, not merely a hypothetical potential for danger if others been present. Cates v. State, 102 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Mann v. State, 13 S.W.3d 89 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. granted) (emphasis added). An automobile may be a deadly weapon when “driving it in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury” Tyra v. State, 897

2


S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (emphasis added). 5. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals employs a two-part test to determine a deadly weapon finding involving use of a motor vehicle: “first, the Court evaluates the manner in which the Defendant used the motor vehicle during the felony; and second, the Court considers whether, during the felony, the motor vehicle was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Sierra v. State, 280 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (emphasis added). Therefore, sufficiency of the evidence in determining a deadly weapon finding as it relates to a motor vehicle hinges “upon the specific testimony in the record about the manner of use.” Brister, supra at 494 (emphasis added). In a driving while intoxicated case, determination in whether a motor vehicle was used as a deadly weapon “requires a fact intensive inquiry into the manner in which an intoxicated driver used the vehicle.” Couthren v. State, 571 S.W.3d 786, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Pruett v. State, 510 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). “To support a deadly weapon finding, there must be evidence that the manner of driving was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury apart from the fact of a collision and the defendant's intoxication.” Couthren, 571 S.W.3d at 790. 6. Probable cause must be based on “specific, articulable facts,” and not merely the opinion of a law enforcement officer. Bakhoum v. State, No. 14-19-00762-CR, 2021 WL 3923988, at *4 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] Sep. 2, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The test for probable cause is an objective one…requir[ing] a consideration of the totality of the circumstances facing the arresting officer. Torres v.

3


State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing, Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a particular person has committed or is committing an offense” Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 7. Defendant would present that, based upon the information sworn to in the Probable Cause Affidavit, and all of the evidence presumably presented to the Grand Jury, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “C”, there is no evidence upon which a “probable cause” finding could have been made by the Grand Jury. As there is no evidence of the “manner and means” of the use of the vehicle as required in Sierra, the inclusion of an enhancing paragraph alleging the use of a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon amounts to prosecutorial overreaching and a violation of the district attorney’s duty “not to convict, but to see that justice is done.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 2.01 (West 2021). The inclusion of the enhancing paragraph without examination of the facts in the record circumscribes the test laid out in Sierra and constitutes a denial of Due Process which harms the Defendant’s substantive trial rights. Consequently, by its unsupported inclusion in the Indictment, the Defendant’s rights under the 5th Amendment are violated as are the Defendant’s Due Process rights. As a result of the inclusion of the enhancement, the Defendant is prohibited from pleading to the indictment before a judge without being subjected to a guilty finding upon an element of enhancement for which there is no evidence. Further, in this case, the Defendant is ineligible for probation from the jury as he has a prior final felony conviction. Therefore, the State is

4


denying him the opportunity for probation by including an enhancement paragraph in the indictment for the sole purpose of eliminating his opportunity for probation having full knowledge that no evidence exists upon which a rational trier of fact could find that the motor vehicle was a deadly weapon. 8. The Defendant would attach as Exhibit “C” he entirety of the evidence tendered by the State to the Defendant’s counsel pursuant to the Michael Morton Act. Said Exhibit “C” will be tendered upon presentation of the Motion to the Court as it includes audio and visual files. There are no articulable facts contained in any of those reports or evidence to support a probable cause finding to include the enhancement in the Indictment based upon the requisites of the factual examination of the evidence as required by Sierra. WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant prays that this Court grant the instant motion and quash the enhancement paragraph alleging the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon. Respectfully submitted, BOBBY BARRERA LAW 408 Dwyer Ave., San Antonio, Texas 78204 TEL: (210) 227-7372 FAX: (210) 201-2935 Bobby@bobbybarrera.com /s/ SIGNATURE Attorney Name State Bar No. 000000000 Attorney for Defendant

5


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion has been forwarded to the Assistant District Attorney, Bexar County, Texas, on this ____ day of ______, 2026 by E-file service.

/s/ SIGNATURE Attorney Name

6


Attachment 8


CAUSE NO. ---------STATE OF TEXAS

v.

DEFENDANT

§ § § § § § § §

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

________ JUDICIAL DISTRICT

BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

AKE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF INVESTIGATOR TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, DEFENDANT NAME., Defendant in the above-styled and numbered cause, by and through his attorney of record, ATTORNEY NAME, and files this Motion for Appointment of Investigator; and in support thereof would show this Honorable Court as follows: I. In the instant case, the Defendant was arrested by law enforcement and is charged with the offense of Manslaughter. II. The indictment alleges an accident causing death and the State has retained an alleged expert in the field of Accident Reconstruction. Said expert will presumably testify as to the causation of the accident and the relative position of the vehicles at the time of the accident. Additionally, there exists data from the onboard computer of the vehicles which requires an expert to interpret and analyze the data. A compelling need exists in this case for the assistance of an expert investigator in this field to address these material issues in aiding the defense prepare for trial. A denial of the retention of an expert would materially deprive the Defendant of


his rights pursuant to the 5th and 6th Amendments to the United States Constitution and would be a denial of Constitutionally protected Due Process. The evidence sought to be reviewed and examined is material to the defense of the Defendant. Quinones v. State, 592 S.W.2d 933, 940 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). III. The Defendant is indigent and lacks the funds to secure such an independent expert by his own financial means. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); McBride v. State, 838 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Art. 26.05. Defendant requests that the Court appoint Colten Rodriguez of J. Eftekhar and Associates, a licensed engineer in the State of Texas, to assist in Defendant’s defense as a consulting expert. Wherefore premises considered, the Defendant prays that this Court appoint Colten Rodriguez to serve as Defendant’s consulting expert to assist counsel in the preparation of Defendant’s defense and that the Court order the County Auditor to pay the expert’s fee for such services. Respectfully submitted, BOBBY BARRERA LAW 408 Dwyer Ave., San Antonio, Texas 78204 TEL: (210) 227-7372 FAX: (210) 201-2935 Bobby@bobbybarrera.com /s/ SIGNATURE Attorney Name State Bar No. 000000000 Attorney for Defendant


CAUSE NO. ---------STATE OF TEXAS

§ § § § § § § §

v.

DEFENDANT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

________ JUDICIAL DISTRICT

BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER APPOINTING INVESTIGATOR On this the _____ day of ____________, 2024, came on to be heard Defendant's Motion for Appointment of a Consulting Investigator and having duly considered same, this Court is of the opinion said Motion should be GRANTED. It is therefore accordingly ORDERED that _______________, or an agent representative of _______________ be appointed as a consulting Investigator to aid the Defendant in his preparation for trial and the Court hereby authorizes said expert to submit vouchers for his reasonable and necessary services and expenses in preparation for trial and for his appearance and testimony therein, if necessary. SIGNED and ENTERED this _____ day of _________________, 2024.

______________________________ JUDGE PRESIDING


2024CR6206 STATE OF TEXAS v.

FREDERICO CHAVEZ JR.

§ § § § § § §

IN THE DISTRICT COURT 227TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

AKE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF EXPERT TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, FREDERICO CHAVEZ JR., Defendant in the above-styled and numbered cause, by and through his attorney of record, Robert J. Barrera, and files this Motion for Appointment of Investigator; and in support thereof would show this Honorable Court as follows: I. In the instant case, the Defendant was arrested by law enforcement and is charged with the offense of Manslaughter. II. The indictment alleges an accident causing death and the State has retained an alleged expert in the field of Accident Reconstruction. Said expert will presumably testify as to the causation of the accident and the relative position of the vehicles at the time of the accident. Additionally, there exists data from the onboard computer of the vehicles which requires an expert to interpret and analyze the data. A compelling need exists in this case for the assistance of an expert investigator in this field to address these material issues in aiding the defense prepare for trial. A denial of the retention of an expert would materially deprive the Defendant of


his rights pursuant to the 5th and 6th Amendments to the United States Constitution and would be a denial of Constitutionally protected Due Process. The evidence sought to be reviewed and examined is material to the defense of the Defendant. Quinones v. State, 592 S.W.2d 933, 940 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). III. The Defendant is indigent and lacks the funds to secure such an independent expert by his own financial means. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); McBride v. State, 838 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Art. 26.05. Defendant requests that the Court appoint Colten Rodriguez of J. Eftekhar and Associates, a licensed engineer in the State of Texas, to assist in Defendant’s defense as a consulting expert. Wherefore premises considered, the Defendant prays that this Court appoint Colten Rodriguez to serve as Defendant’s consulting expert to assist counsel in the preparation of Defendant’s defense and that the Court order the County Auditor to pay the expert’s fee for such services. Respectfully submitted, BOBBY BARRERA LAW 408 Dwyer Ave., San Antonio, Texas 78204 TEL: (210) 227-7372 FAX: (210) 201-2935 Bobby@bobbybarrera.com /s/ SIGNATURE Attorney Name State Bar No. 000000000 Attorney for Defendant


CAUSE NO. ---------STATE OF TEXAS

§ § § § § § § §

v.

DEFENDANT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

________ JUDICIAL DISTRICT

BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER APPOINTING EXPERT On this the _____ day of ____________, 2024, came on to be heard Defendant's Motion for Appointment of a Consulting Expert and having duly considered same, this Court is of the opinion said Motion should be GRANTED. It is therefore accordingly ORDERED that _______, or an agent representative of _____________________ be appointed as a consulting expert to aid the Defendant in his preparation for trial and the Court hereby authorizes said expert to submit vouchers for his reasonable and necessary services and expenses in preparation for trial and for his appearance and testimony therein, if necessary. SIGNED and ENTERED this _____ day of _________________, 2024.

______________________________ JUDGE PRESIDING


Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

22nd Annual Stuart Kinard Advanced DWI November 5-6, 2026 The Menger Hotel San Antonio, Tx

Topic: The Good, the Bad & the Ugly of an Effective 30Minute Voir Dire in a Criminal Case

Speaker:

Robert Hirschhorn Cathy E. Bennett & Associates 3411 Cross Timbers Rd Suite 700 Flower Mound, TX 75028 972.434.5879 phone rbh@cebjury.com email www.cebjury.com website

6808 Hill Meadow Dr :: Austin, Texas :: 512.478.2514 p :: 512.469.9107 f :: www.tcdla.com


The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of an Effective 30-Minute Voir Dire in a Criminal Case By: Robert B. Hirschhorn & Alexandra C. Figari

Often, the process of jury selection is akin to making sausage – the process is ugly but the finished product is a thing of beauty. Witness a recent aggravated assault with a deadly weapon prosecution: An argument in a bar escalated into a serious confrontation involving deadly weapons outside. A jury was left to sort out criminal culpability or lack thereof. Prior to trial, the defense, lead by the legendary criminal defense attorney Dick DeGuerin, was under the impression from the lead counsel that the judge only gave the parties in a felony criminal case an hour for voir dire, and that the judge only used jury questionnaires in capital murder cases. The defense wanted to use a questionnaire because jurors are hesitant to convey their true thoughts, feelings, and opinions in the courtroom.1 The defense enlisted the assistance of the authors, who prepared a specialized one-page questionnaire2 on triplicate carbonless paper with a cardboard backing.3 This methodology was employed for its efficiency.4 It takes a prospective juror 15 minutes or less to fill out the one-page questionnaire, and the triplicate carbonless paper eliminates the need for copies to be made. Before presenting the questionnaire to the judge, Mr. DeGeurin sent a copy to the prosecutor. After negotiating with the prosecutor, changes were made and the questionnaire was sent to a copier service.5 The judge liked the concept and efficiency of the one-page, triplicate carbonless questionnaire and approved its use. The jurors were brought into the courtroom and told by the judge that there were pre-trial matters that needed to be addressed. Rather than having the jurors wait around all day, he told the

1

The authors believe there are several reasons that motivate jurors not to disclose their true beliefs: (a) the fear of public speaking; (b) an unwillingness to publicly express private thoughts; (c) the desire not to be judged by their peer group; (d) their discomfort that they would not want to disclose such thoughts to people on the panel that they might know from their neighborhood, work, school, civic organizations, church, etc.; and, (e) jurors have the mistaken belief that if they speak up they are likely to be chosen to serve on the jury. 2

A copy of the actual questionnaire used in this case is attached as Appendix A.

3

The purpose of the cardboard backing is to provide the jurors with a hard surface for filling out their questionnaire. Thus, the need for a clipboard is eliminated. 4

Time is spent filling out the questionnaire, copying the instrument, and then giving the lawyers a reasonable amount of time to review the completed questionnaires. 5

The triplicate carbonless form with a cardboard backing costs approximately 50 cents per questionnaire. The Champion

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panel to please take their time in filling out the questionnaire and then asked them to return at 9 a.m. the following day for jury selection. He also admonished the panel not to discuss the case nor do any internet research. We believe that giving the attorneys the night to review the completed questionnaires has benefits that far outweigh the detriments. The detriments are immediate but limited: The start of trial is delayed and the entire jury panel is required to return the following day. However, the benefits maximize efficiency: (1) the lawyers have the opportunity to review the information contained in the questionnaire; (2) the lawyers have the time to carefully prepare the substance of their voir dire and prepare relevant and meaningful follow-up questions to individual panel members; (3) the lawyers may reach an agreement on jurors that should be excused based on their questionnaire answers because of a hardship or clear cause; (4) the parties may review the questionnaires and decide to settle the case, thereby saving valuable judicial time and resources; (5) the additional time allows the court to hear and resolve any outstanding pre-trial matters relating to the case; and (6) the court can utilize the time to deal with other matters on the docket. In this case, Dick DeGeurin mirrored what each juror did: He filled out the questionnaire and showed it to the jury on the Elmo document display system. At the very least, he demonstrated he was willing to go public on what a juror might believe to be intrusive questions.6 In addition to personalizing Mr. DeGeurin, this approach also proved to be helpful because it provided some relief to the jurors since he didn’t immediately start off his voir dire by posing questions to the panel members. During voir dire, Dick DeGuerin focused on a series of specific, non-commitment questions,7 the answers to which he would either “loop”8 to other jurors or use to find out who on the panel had a different point of view. The different point of view approach was used when a juror gave an answer that was favorable to the defense. Finding out who had a different point of view would yield important information with respect to potential 6

Caveat: Be careful of controversial answers. One of the questions on the questionnaire asked the jurors to name three people they do not admire, and one of the people on Dick DeGuerin’s list was former Vice President Dick Cheney. This case was tried in McLennan County, the county where former President George W. Bush had his ranch, and many of the jurors admired George W. Bush and did not share this negative opinion of Cheney. 7

A copy of the voir dire questions prepared by Author Hirschhorn and used by Dick DeGuerin is attached as Appendix B. 8

This is a term coined by one of the authors whereby a lawyer asks an open-ended question to one of the jurors and then “loops,” or repeats, that answer to another juror and asks for their response. This technique of looping is remarkably effective at stimulating a discussion among the jurors, but it is also extremely time consuming and can only be effectively used when the lawyer has an hour or more to conduct voir dire. The Champion

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challenges for cause or peremptory strikes. The key to an effective voir dire is to minimize your expectations and maximize your time. To accomplish this, it is essential that you know what your judge will expect, tolerate, and allow. Before the start of trial, you need to look into a number of key considerations: How your judge conducts voir dire; how much time will be given for voir dire; will the judge allow a questionnaire; how the judge handles challenges for cause (that is, does the judge take up cause issues as they arise or will the judge take up cause at the end of voir dire); does the judge want challenges for cause fully developed during voir dire or will the jurors be brought back at the conclusion of voir dire for further questioning; does the judge conduct the questioning of the cause jurors or does the judge allow the lawyers to ask the additional questions; and does the judge handle hardship, if at all, at the beginning of voir dire or at the end. To conduct an effective voir dire, it is imperative that the lawyer learns how the judge handles voir dire and what the judge will allow and will not allow. Once you have this critical information, there is a very simple five-step method for effectively using the time allotted: (1) break the ice; (2) primacy – starting strong; (3) elimination questions – designed to identify unfavorable jurors; (4) catch-all questions; and (5) recency– ending strong.

BREAKING THE ICE By the time the jury panel arrives in the courtroom, they have been inconvenienced, herded like cattle, and feel frustrated at the apparent inefficiencies of the criminal justice system. Many members of the panel are mad and frustrated. You can’t really blame them. In this day and age of fast food, the internet, Google, and Twitter, people expect things to happen at light speed, not at snail’s place. By the time you stand up to start the voir dire process, the range of emotions felt by the panel range from disinterest to outright contempt. Your job is to disarm and bond with this hostile group of strangers in a matter of seconds. Before launching into your remarks, we recommend you break the ice by saying “Good morning/afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.” A simple “hello” works well, too. When there is virtually no response, you should say, “I really need your help. When I said hello, not many folks responded. I didn’t do a good job so let me try this again.” This time say the same ice breaking words slower and a little louder. Your panel will respond and the ice will be broken.

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PRIMACY – START STRONG Research has shown that jurors will remember the first thing and the last thing you talk to them about.9 Therefore, start strong with your power statement. Your power statement is a simple one-sentence reason for why the jury should find in your favor. From the prosecutor’s perspective, the power statement can be as simple as, “This is a case about a man who intentionally chose to... .” The power statement for the defense is often a reflection on the theory of defense. If you have an affirmative defense, the power statement must reflect that – e.g., “When [name of client] believed his life was threatened, he did what the law allows of him and what his instincts told him: Fire the gun to protect yourself.” In many criminal cases, the trial is about “reasonable doubt” and not an affirmative defense. In that situation, the lawyer needs to frame “reasonable doubt” in terms of “could, would, and should.” That is, the power statement needs to be along the lines of what the police could have done, would have done, or should have done.10 This type of power statement gives the jury food for thought and reasons to look for reasonable doubt. After the power statement, you should ask your first question.11 As a general rule, this question should be an open-ended education question.12 The purpose of an education question is to make the jury aware of some important aspect of your case. For example, in a case where the basis of the charge is the conduct of the defendant, you might start out by asking the jurors to tell you about a time when their conduct was misunderstood or misinterpreted. If the juror you ask can’t think of a time, or if you don’t like the answer he or she gives, ask another juror the same question. If you like the answer the second juror gives, you will want to ask the remaining panel members to raise their hands or number cards13 if they agree with the answer that the juror just gave (Note: You should repeat the

9

This concept is referred to as primacy and recency.

10

You will notice that this power statement contains a trilogy. The power of trilogies is well established: “friends, Romans, countrymen,” “red, white, and blue,” “the good, the bad, and the ugly,” “they came, they saw, they conquered,” and our favorite, “If the glove, doesn’t fit, you must acquit.” 11

In most courts, the judge will introduce the prosecutors and defense attorneys. If that does not occur, then at this point, you should make the introductions before starting with your first question. 12

Voir dire questions are designed to either educate or eliminate prospective jurors.

13

We strongly believe in using numbered cards. In fact, many district courts now provide them. The numbered cards correspond to each juror’s number, and are put on laminated, letter-size-paper. These cards are extremely helpful to the court, the court reporter, and the parties to determine who is responding to a question. The Champion

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exact answer just given by the juror).14 You should then ask the jurors who disagree to please raise their cards. In a truncated voir dire, you will not have the time to find out why the juror disagrees – just note the fact that they disagree.

ELIMINATION QUESTIONS The bulk of your time in a 30- or 45-minute voir dire should be spent asking questions designed to identify unfavorable jurors. We refer to these types of questions as “elimination questions.” The purpose of asking elimination questions is to make sure a person’s belief system is not in conflict with your theory of the case. For example, from the prosecution’s perspective, there are some jurors whose value system does not allow them to pass judgment upon others. Another example is that there are some jurors who believe that if a defendant raises self-defense, it must have merit. From the defense perspective, an example is the belief that if a person has been charged with a crime, they are most likely guilty. Additionally, some jurors have a strong belief or value system that the only people who should carry guns are police. The effective use of elimination questions is the true art of a 30-minute voir dire. This is where time management is crucial for the lawyer. As we said earlier, you need to limit your expectations. By that we mean it is unrealistic to expect that you can cover 10 or 15 topics in a 30-minute voir dire. We believe that you can effectively cover four to six topics and that you should allot approximately five minutes per topic. Your job is to determine what the most important topics are for you to cover. In advance of trial, you need to list your voir dire topics and rank them in order of importance. In most criminal cases, when deciding what questions to ask, you should consider questions that relate to publicity, nature of the charge, prior record for same or similar crime, any affirmative defense, reasonable doubt, and the defendant not testifying. Because of the limitations placed on attorneys by virtue of cases such as Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), it is improper in many jurisdictions for lawyers to ask commitment questions. Therefore, you must think in terms of global issues and not case-specific facts. Ask yourself, “What will cause me to lose this case?” Think conceptually, not factually. By sticking to this agenda, you will have the time to ask proper and important questions. How you ask these questions is equally important. Open-ended questions are the best vehicle for quality information, but a 30-minute 14

This is the concept known as “looping.”

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voir dire does not afford you the luxury of time you need when asking this type of question. Our rule of thumb is for every 15 minutes of voir dire, you can ask one openended question. Thus, you typically only have time to ask a couple of open-ended questions. With this limitation, you need to think carefully about the two areas that you really need to hear jurors express their views about. When you ask an open-ended question, follow the same protocol that we outlined earlier. Pick a juror and ask the openended question. If the juror does not have an opinion or if you do not like the answer, pick another juror and ask the same question. If you do not like that answer either, pick a third juror and try the question one last time. If this juror does not give a favorable answer, then you should give the answer you are looking for, and ask a fourth juror what their reaction or opinion is. Once the favorable answer is out there, you should “loop” the answer and ask the jurors to raise their cards if they agree. Finish this topic by requesting that the jurors raise their cards if they disagree.15 Close-ended questions are most often used by trial lawyers, but this type of question does not give you the crucial information needed to exercise cause challenges and peremptory strikes. This type of question is typically asked in a “yes” or “no” format. There is value in asking close-ended questions, but we suggest making a few changes. First, when you ask a close-ended question, ask the jurors to raise their cards if their answer to the question would be “yes.” Then ask the jurors to raise their card if their answer is “no.” Keep track of this information to find out which jurors did not raise their hand at all. These are usually the jurors who end up serving on the jury, and yet you know virtually nothing about them. We suggest that you find out which jurors did not raise their hands and ask them whether they would answer the question “yes,” “no,” or “I just don’t know.” Second, we suggest that the question should be framed as one in which the juror has to agree or disagree (as opposed to a yes or no answer). Finally, ask the jurors if they have “ever had an experience with ... ” or “ever felt or believed that ... .” No more than one-third of your time and questions should be of the close-ended variety. Finally, we come to what the authors call “scaled” questions. We believe that these are the most efficient and helpful questions in a short voir dire. The premise behind the

15

You need to keep track of the jurors who disagree. What works best is if you have someone keep track of the numbers of the jurors who have raised their cards. Even if you do not have someone that can assist you with this task (and in cases of violent crimes, it is never a good idea to have your client keep track of this information – it will scare some of the jurors), you should always slowly and loudly call out the numbers. This way, there is no confusion on your team as to whether a certain juror raised their card. It will also assist the court reporter and the trial judge. This will be important if the question goes to the issue of a potential challenge for cause. The Champion

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scaled question is that on any given topic there are a variety of opinions that will be harbored by the jury pool, and your job is to ask each of the jurors their opinion. An example of a scaled question is, “On a scale of 0 (very negative) to 10 (very positive), what is your opinion of the police?” You should plan on using two or three scaled questions during your voir dire. Here are a few words of advice regarding scaled questions. First, sprinkle them throughout the voir dire. Do not ask them in succession because there is a tendency for the jurors to give the same answer each time without giving much thought to the question or their answers. Second, ask the panel to please tell you the number that reflects their honest and true beliefs and to not worry about how the other jurors answered the same question. Third, we would recommend putting your scaled questions in a PowerPoint presentation.16 In the past we used either poster board or flip charts to display scaled questions, but we found that the jurors in the back rows couldn’t read the question or the scaled answers. We have also found that verbally stating the scaled question is counterproductive because the jurors will ask you to repeat the question or the scaled options and that takes away from the efficiency and flow. Fourth, repeat the answer given by each juror. This will serve the purpose of making sure you have written down the correct information given by the juror. Fifth, if a juror asks if he or she can explain their answer, you need to politely tell them that you would love to hear their reasons, but the judge has only given you a limited amount of time, and you have a few more matters that you need to cover before your time is up. Assure the juror that if you have any time left over, you will come back to them and give them the opportunity to tell you their reason. Finally, if you have substantially more jurors than you realistically expect to reach, tell the panel that you are not going to visit with the remaining jurors because it is unlikely you will reach them. In a typical felony case, you will be exercising your strikes to the first 32 qualified jurors. Add to that number any alternates that will be empaneled. Many judges will empanel one or two alternates. Therefore, your qualified pool will be 35 or 36 members of the panel.17 We would recommend obtaining the scaled answers to 36 jurors, plus the number of jurors you expect to lose for hardship or cause.

16

A sample PowerPoint presentation is attached as Appendix C. In addition to using a PowerPoint to display your scaled questions, it can also be used to introduce other topics such as a visual depiction of burden of proof. 17

The Texas Government Code states that each side is entitled to one peremptory strike if one or two alternates will be empaneled. Texas Govt. Code Section 62.02. The Champion

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CATCH-ALL The last substantive area of your voir dire requires you to end with a “catch-all question” that is designed to find out if there is any other important information for the jurors to share with you, and if there are any other reasons why a juror could not be fair and impartial. We recommend asking the following questions: “Is there anyone sitting out there saying to themselves, if only the lawyer had asked me this question, he would have learned something very important about me?” and “Other than those jurors who have already told us that they would have a problem serving as a juror in this case, is there anyone else on the jury panel, for whatever reason, who feels they cannot be a completely fair and impartial juror?” Your goal is to give the jury every possible opportunity to inform the lawyers and the court that this is not the right case for them.

RECENCY – END STRONG Finally, you always want to end strong. In most instances, this means you should either repeat the power statement that you used to start voir dire, or, if a juror has said something profoundly helpful during voir dire, you should consider reminding the panel of what their fellow juror has said. The power that a jury possesses is enormous. You may want to consider leaving the jury with this thought: Juries in this country have a profound power and responsibility, and in this case, you will have the power and responsibility to decide if [name of client] had the right to defend himself or herself.

CONCLUSION The foundation for an effective, time-limited voir dire largely depends on your level of preparedness. If you enter voir dire with an understanding of the judge’s expectations, the issues most central to your case, and the best way to approach those issues in voir dire, then you’ve already won half the battle of jury selection. Employing the techniques discussed in this article, such as the use of a juror questionnaire, the concept of primacy and recency, and an approach focused on elimination questions, will allow you to keep the jury engaged and get valuable feedback on the most important issues in your case. Streamlining your time with the panel using these methods is the most effective way to approach a 30-minute voir dire, and will lead to a successful jury selection that will likely translate into a successful outcome at the end of trial.

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Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

22nd Annual Stuart Kinard Advanced DWI November 5-6, 2026 The Menger Hotel San Antonio, Tx

Topic: Discovery & AI

Speaker:

Don Flanary Flanary Law Firm One International Center 100 NE Loop 410, Ste 650 San Antonio, TX 78216 210.738.8383 phone donflanary@hotmail.com email www.flanarylawfirm.com website

6808 Hill Meadow Dr :: Austin, Texas :: 512.478.2514 p :: 512.469.9107 f :: www.tcdla.com


Discovery and AI A Practitioner’s Guide to the AI in 2026

Prepared for the

Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association Stuard Kinard Advanced DWI Seminar November 2026

Donald H. Flanary, III Flanary Law Firm, PLLC donflanary@hotmail.com 210-738-8383 100 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 605 San Antonio, Texas

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I. INTRODUCTION A criminal defense practice in 2026 is a data problem. A single federal drug conspiracy indictment can arrive with terabytes of pole-camera video, weeks of intercepted phone calls, thousands of pages of DEA-6 reports, and a witness list that requires background research on twenty cooperators. A State Online Solicitation prosecution can turn on a Cellebrite dump of tens of thousands of chat messages. In each of these cases, the lawyer’s job has not changed: identify what actually happened, find the government’s weak points, and prepare to try the case. What has changed is the volume of raw material that stands between the lawyer and that job. This paper is a practitioner’s field guide to the artificial-intelligence platforms, agents, and applications that have matured enough to actually help with that work. It is written for Texas criminal defense lawyers, and the goal is not to persuade the reader that AI will replace lawyers. It will not. The goal is to give the reader a better understanding of the current landscape, a critical view of what each category of tool is genuinely good at, an honest catalog of the ways these tools fail and a working stack that a solo or small-firm criminal defense practice can adopt today.

II. FOUR HONEST USE-CASES FOR AI IN A CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE Before surveying the tools, it is worth stating the four use-cases where AI has already earned its keep in this author’s practice. These are not aspirations. They are workflows already running in an active federal and state criminal defense caseload, and each is illustrated in the tool sections that follow.

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A. Reading the record faster than humans can The single largest productivity gain from AI in criminal defense is not drafting. It is reading. Modern language models with million-token context windows can ingest and summarize an entire federal indictment, several thousand pages of discovery, or a full-day’s worth of bodycamera transcripts in a single session and answer specific questions grounded in that material. 1 Document-grounded tools such as Google’s Notebook enforce citation back to the source page, which lowers hallucination risk when the goal is synthesis rather than argument. 2 For a defender, this converts a two-day discovery review into a two-hour session with a follow-up read to verify anything load-bearing. B. Converting audio and video into searchable text A body-camera file, a jail call, a wiretap intercept, or an interrogation video is functionally unsearchable until it has been transcribed. AI transcription now approaches 96 to 98 percent accuracy on clean audio, and purpose-built defender tools such as JusticeText automate transcription, speaker labels, and clip creation from the exact media types that dominate a criminal caseload.3 The relevant caveat is that AI transcripts are not automatically admissible; they are a research tool that turns hours of media into a searchable corpus for cross-examination and impeachment.4

1MindStudio, Claude’s 1M Token Context Window, https://www.mindstudio.ai/blog/claude-1m-token-context-

window-ai-agents (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 2Bruce Rosenberg, Document-Grounded AI: A Better Path for Legal Research, 98 Wis. Law. No. 11, https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=98&Issue=11&ArticleID =31346 (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 3 TechCrunch, JusticeText Taps AI to Transcribe Evidence for Public Defenders (Sept. 20, 2023), https://techcrunch.com/2023/09/20/justicetext-taps-ai-to-transcribe-evidence-for-public-defenders/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 4Sonix, Court-Admissible Transcription Software, https://sonix.ai/resources/court-admissible-transcription-software/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

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C. First drafts of routine work product AI is a competent first-drafter for structured, formulaic work: motions for continuance, discovery-status letters, standard suppression motions, sentencing memoranda skeletons, cover letters to opposing counsel, and client-update letters. It is not a competent final-drafter for anything with real strategic weight. The workflow that actually works is to have the AI generate a first pass, then edit that pass ruthlessly with the attorney’s voice, verified authority, and the case-specific facts. This paper takes the position that a defender who uses AI to skip the reading is negligent; a defender who uses AI to skip the typing is efficient. D. A second opinion on legal analysis The most under-rated use-case is treating AI as a private, on-call second-chair. Running a suppression theory, a proposed cross-outline, or a plea-agreement clause through two or three different frontier models (Claude, GPT, and Gemini, for example, or Perplexity’s built-in “model council”) catches weak arguments before they leave the office. This paper does not treat AI as an authority. It treats AI as an infinitely patient junior lawyer who reads fast, drafts fast, and never gets offended when the partner rewrites the work.5

III. THE 2026 AI LANDSCAPE The 2026 AI market is confusing on purpose. Vendors overlap. Consumer products masquerade as enterprise platforms. Legal-specific platforms borrow features from generalpurpose assistants. The categories below organizes the landscape by the job the tool actually does, which is the only classification that matters when a lawyer is deciding what to buy.

5MindStudio, The Multi-Model AI Agent Council, https://www.mindstudio.ai/blog/multi-model-ai-agent-council

(last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

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A. General-purpose assistants These are the frontier models a lawyer will use for most day-to-day thinking, brainstorming, and drafting work: OpenAI’s ChatGPT (GPT-5 and GPT-5.5, with context windows now reaching one million tokens), 6 Anthropic’s Claude (Opus 4.6/4.8 and Sonnet 4.6, with persistent Projects that hold case files and instructions across every conversation on a matter),7 Google’s Gemini (including Deep Research and NotebookLM), 8 Perplexity (Comet, Deep Research, Labs, Projects, and Perplexity Computer, which runs a coordinated “council” of nineteen underlying models), 9 and xAI’s Grok (which has real-time access to public social-media data but has also drawn regulatory scrutiny for deepfake-imagery misuse).10 Pricing runs from free to roughly $200 per month at the top consumer tier, with enterprise plans above that. For a solo practitioner, one paid seat on Perplexity or ChatGPT and one paid seat on Claude is the practical starting point. B. Legal-specific research and drafting platforms These are the products marketed directly to lawyers, layered on top of proprietary case-law databases and citators. Thomson Reuters’s Westlaw Precision AI and CoCounsel, and LexisNexis’s Lexis+ AI and Protégé, remain the two dominant legacy platforms, both priced for

6OpenAI, GPT-5, https://openai.com/index/gpt-5/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 7Anthropic, Organize Your Legal Workflows Using Projects, https://claude.com/resources/use-cases/organize-your-

legal-workflows-using-projects (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 8Google, Gemini Deep Research, https://support.google.com/gemini/answer/15719111?hl=en (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 9 TechCrunch, Perplexity’s New Computer (Feb. 27, 2026), https://techcrunch.com/2026/02/27/perplexitys-newcomputer-is-another-bet-that-users-need-many-ai-models/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 10 Reuters, EU Opens Investigation into X over Grok’s Sexualised Imagery (Jan. 26, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-opens-investigation-into-x-over-groks-sexualised-imagery-lawmakersays-2026-01-26/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

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firms rather than solos, CoCounsel bundles run into the hundreds of dollars per user per month. 11 Harvey is a BigLaw-focused platform priced for enterprise buyers, running $500 to $1,500 per user per month.12 The three platforms in this bucket most realistic for a Texas solo criminal defender are Paxton AI (self-serve at $499 per month with a 7-day trial),13 vLex’s Vincent AI (selected by the Minnesota Board of Public Defense for approximately 950 public defenders statewide, which is the largest indigent-defense AI deployment on record), 14 and Descrybe.ai (a low-cost research tool that added its own citator in 2025).15 Midpage is an AI-native legal research plug-in that added full U.S. case-law coverage and a citator in 2025 and is worth watching. 16 C. Criminal-defense-specific platforms This is the smallest and most important bucket for the audience of this paper. TrialKit was purpose-built for criminal defense discovery, handling text, audio, image, and video ingestion in a single searchable case workspace. 17 JusticeText was built specifically for public defenders and automates transcription, speaker labeling, and clip creation for body-camera, interrogation, and jail-call media, the exact evidence stream that dominates a Texas criminal defense caseload. 18

11CostBench, CoCounsel Pricing, https://costbench.com/software/ai-legal-tools/cocounsel/ (last visited Aug. 5,

2026). 12Vaquill, Harvey, Legora & CoCounsel Pricing Reality, https://www.vaquill.ai/blog/harvey-legora-cocounselpricing-reality (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 13Paxton AI, Pricing, https://www.paxton.ai/pricing (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 14Clio, Vincent AI Selected by Minnesota Board of Public Defense, https://www.clio.com/enterprise/blog/vincentai-minnesota-public-defenders/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 15LawNext, Descrybe.ai Launches Paid Suite, https://www.lawnext.com/2025/06/free-legal-research-site-descrybeai-launches-a-paid-suite-of-legal-research-tools-including-its-own-citator.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 16Midpage.ai, https://www.midpage.ai/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 17TrialKit Emerges from Stealth with $4.25M in Funding, https://www.trialkit.ai/library/trialkit-emerges-fromstealth-with-4-25m-in-funding-bringing-ai-powered-discovery-for-criminal-defense (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

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Both platforms should be evaluated together because they overlap on media handling while diverging on case-management scope; Section V returns to that comparison. D. Transcription and media platforms This bucket runs from consumer voice recorders to enterprise transcription services. Plaud sells an AI voice recorder with 112-language transcription, speaker labels, and custom vocabulary at consumer prices,19 making it the practical choice for client interviews and dictation. Rev offers both AI-only transcription and human-verified transcription with a claimed 99 percent accuracy, the human tier is the one the defender wants for anything filed, offered as an exhibit, or used for witness impeachment. 20 OpenAI’s Whisper is free and open-source and can be self-hosted for firms that want to keep audio out of vendor clouds entirely. 21 Descript remains the leader in transcript-based video editing (edit the text and the media follows) which is ideal for demonstrative exhibit creation from raw recordings. 22 Real-world accuracy varies dramatically from marketingpage claims: vendor benchmarks of three to eight percent word-error rate on clean audio can degrade to twenty or thirty percent on the compressed, cross-talking, background-noise-riddled audio that dominates actual body-cam and jail-call files.23 E. Document and discovery review platforms Enterprise e-discovery platforms (Relativity aiR, Reveal/Brainspace, Everlaw, and DISCO’s Cecilia) dominate BigLaw civil litigation and are generally priced beyond the reach of a

19Plaud, Plans & Pricing, https://www.plaud.ai/pages/plaud-ai-plan-pricing (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 20Rev, Pricing, https://www.rev.com/pricing (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 21OpenAI, Whisper, https://openai.com/index/whisper/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 22

Descript, Pricing, https://www.descript.com/pricing (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

23novascribe.ai, Most Accurate Transcription Software, https://novascribe.ai/compare/most-accurate-transcription-

software (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

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solo criminal defense budget. Two options fit small-firm criminal work: Logikcull’s pay-as-yougo pricing at roughly $40 per gigabyte per month with no minimum, and Nextpoint’s per-seat pricing with no data or hosting fees. For most Texas criminal cases, TrialKit remains the default and Logikcull or Nextpoint should be evaluated only for document-heavy (non-media) discovery productions. F. Voice, video, and image generation and deepfake detection This bucket is where the defender’s risk awareness matters more than the defender’s dayto-day practice. Voice-cloning tools such as ElevenLabs can produce a convincing clone of a real person’s voice from a sub-minute audio sample.24 OpenAI’s Sora 2, released publicly in September 2026, produces cinematic AI video with synchronized dialogue and sound effects. 25 The detection side of this market (Deepware, Reality Defender, Sensity, Hive, Truepic) offers tools that claim ninety-plus percent accuracy on ideal media, but independent testing collapses those numbers to 56 to 79 percent on real-world compressed video, and human evaluators still outperform automated tools on the hardest cases. 2627 A defender should know these tools exist and should never present any of them to a jury as dispositive. Companion speakers at this seminar address deepfake detection in depth.

24Coval, ElevenLabs Review 2026: Voice Cloning & Synthesis, https://www.coval.ai/blog/elevenlabs-review-2026-

voice-cloning-and-synthesis-capabilities-explained/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 25OpenAI, Sora 2, https://openai.com/index/sora-2/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 26Adaptive Security, How to Evaluate Deepfake Detection Tools, https://www.adaptivesecurity.com/blog/how-toevaluate-deepfake-detection-tools (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 27Cross-Paradigm Deepfake Detection Systematic Review (arXiv 2026), https://arxiv.org/html/2603.04456v1 (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

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G. Agents and automation The 2025-2026 story in AI has been the rise of agents, systems that do not just answer questions but take actions across the web and across files. Perplexity Comet is a Chromium-based AI browser that can execute multi-step tasks in-page.28 ChatGPT Agent Mode reasons, browses, fills forms, and connects to email and document repositories. 29 No-code automation platforms such as Zapier, Make, and n8n let a solo firm connect intake, calendar, document, and AI systems without writing code, and n8n specifically can be paired with self-hosted models to keep client data off third-party clouds entirely.3031 For a criminal defense practice, agents are still an emerging category; the most defensible current use is intake automation and standing status-letter workflows, not autonomous work on client matters. H. Agentic orchestration and multi-model councils The final bucket is the one that ties everything else together. Persistent “projects” or “spaces” in Claude, ChatGPT, and Perplexity let a lawyer scope a workspace to one matter, upload the file, and stop re-explaining the case in every conversation. 32 Multi-model councils, running the same prompt through two or three frontier models and reconciling disagreements, are emerging as a best practice specifically because they catch hallucinations before filing. 33 Perplexity

28HUMAN Security, Perplexity Comet, https://www.humansecurity.com/ai-agent/perplexity-comet/ (last visited

Aug. 5, 2026). 29OpenAI Help Center, ChatGPT Agent, https://help.openai.com/en/articles/11752874-chatgpt-agent (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 30Zapier, Legal Automation, https://zapier.com/automation/legal-automation (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 31n8n Community, Building a Self-Hosted Agentic AI Workflow with n8n & Ollama, https://community.n8n.io/t/building-a-self-hosted-agentic-ai-workflow-with-n8n-ollama/286956 (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 32Perplexity, Spaces Are Now Projects, https://www.perplexity.ai/hub/blog/spaces-are-now-projects (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

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operationalizes the council pattern natively; a solo can otherwise assemble the same discipline by keeping active tabs open in ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini and asking each the same question when the answer matters. 34

IV. WHAT I ACTUALLY USE The categories in Section III is descriptive. This section is prescriptive. It walks through the four tools that this author actually uses on active federal and state criminal cases, in the order they enter a matter, with concrete examples of how each earns its cost. This is the “hands-on” promise of the paper’s title. A. Perplexity — the always-on research and drafting partner Perplexity is the tool I reach for first on almost every case. It is best understood not as a chatbot but as an answer engine with inline citations, coupled with an agentic operating layer (Comet, Labs, Projects, Perplexity Computer) that runs a coordinated council of the frontier models (Claude, GPT, Gemini, Grok, and Perplexity’s own Sonar) inside a single interface. A concrete workflow: on receipt of a new federal indictment, the author opens a Perplexity Project scoped to that matter, uploads the indictment and any known discovery, and asks the council to identify the strongest known constitutional and statutory challenges to each count based on Fifth Circuit precedent, with citations. The council output is then treated as a research map, not an answer. Every case cited is verified in Westlaw or Lexis before it appears in any filing. The reason for the model council layer is that hallucination rates drop meaningfully when two independent

34

LawNext, Perplexity Makes Its Move Into Legal (June 2026), https://www.lawnext.com/2026/06/perplexitymakes-its-move-into-legal-unveiling-industry-features-at-computer-for-counsel-event.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

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models agree on an authority, disagreement is a red flag, agreement is a starting point for verification. B. Plaud — AI voice recording and transcription for client and witness work Plaud is a hardware device paired with a mobile app that records, transcribes, and summarizes conversations across 112 languages, with speaker labels and custom vocabulary. The workflow is straightforward: the device rides in a shirt pocket during client meetings, jail visits, and (with appropriate consent) witness interviews. Transcripts are available within minutes and can be piped into the case file. Remember, transcripts are internal work-product, not certified transcripts. They are search-and-review documents, and anything used at trial is either offered through a witness or run through a human-verified transcription service such as Rev. C. TrialKit — the criminal-defense discovery platform TrialKit was purpose-built for criminal defense: it ingests unlimited discovery of mixed types (PDFs, images, audio, video), transcribes media automatically, generates timelines, flags key facts, and supports natural-language search across the entire case corpus. In my practice, TrialKit is the second thing opened after Perplexity on a new federal matter. A concrete example: on a federal drug conspiracy with roughly 400 hours of pole-camera footage, TrialKit’s automated transcription and search reduced the initial “what do we actually have” review from an estimated three weeks of paralegal labor to approximately two days of attorney and paralegal time working the search interface. The platform did not identify the winning cross-examination questions; the lawyer did. The platform made it possible for the lawyer to find the moments where the questions would land.

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D. Descript — the demonstrative exhibit and content editor Descript is not a discovery tool; it is a content tool. Its distinguishing feature is transcriptbased editing: the user edits the text of a transcript and the underlying video or audio edits itself. In my practice, I use Descript for the creation of demonstrative exhibits and impeachment clips from body-cam or interrogation footage. The transcript is generated in TrialKit or JusticeText, and Descript is used to cut and combine the relevant clips into a demonstrative that can be shown to a jury. E. How the four fit together I use all of these tools together. Perplexity handles research and drafting orientation and never gets the final citation-verification call. TrialKit handles discovery ingestion and search and never gets the legal-research call. Plaud handles capture and transcription of the lawyer’s own meetings and never appears as an offered exhibit without a human-verified transcript behind it. Descript handles demonstratives and never touches raw discovery review. This partition matters because it lets the lawyer answer the standing-order question, “did you use AI, and did you verify the output?” with a defensible, tool-by-tool answer.35

V. FOUR TOOLS WORTH ADOPTING NEXT The four tools below fill genuine gaps in the operating stack described in Section IV. They are chosen specifically to complement rather than duplicate Perplexity, Plaud, TrialKit, and Descript. They are ordered by expected return on effort.

35

Gentry Locke, AI Standing Orders Proliferate as Federal Courts Forge Own Paths, https://www.gentrylocke.com/article/ai-standing-orders-proliferate-as-federal-courts-forge-own-paths/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

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A. JusticeText — audiovisual evidence for defenders JusticeText is the single most criminal-defense-native product in this document that a Texas defender may not already have. It was built specifically for public defenders, it automates transcription of body-camera, interrogation, and jail-call media with speaker labels and one-click clip creation, and it has been adopted at scale — the Virginia Indigent Defense Commission uses it statewide for public-defender training and case work.36 It functionally overlaps with TrialKit on media handling, so the honest recommendation is to demo both against a live case and choose based on which better fits the mix of media-heavy versus document-heavy discovery in that practice. B. NotebookLM — document-grounded case-file synthesis Google’s NotebookLM (rebranded Gemini Notebook in mid-2026) is a source-grounded research notebook: the user uploads documents, and the tool answers questions strictly from those documents with citations back to the source page. 37 It is free at the entry tier and bundled into Google AI subscriptions above that. Practical criminal-defense workflow: upload the indictment, offense reports, discovery index, and expert reports into one Notebook and ask it to build a chronology, flag inconsistencies between the offense report and the body-cam transcript, or draft a first-pass cross-outline grounded only in the record. The tool’s Audio Overview feature can compress a fifty-page expert report into a podcast-style summary, useful, but verify anything loadbearing against the source page. 38

36StateScoop, Virginia Public Defenders Use AI to Analyze Body-Cam Video, https://statescoop.com/justicetext-

virginia-public-defenders-body-cam-video/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 37Google, NotebookLM, https://notebooklm.google/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

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C. ClearBrief — citation-verification insurance ClearBrief is a Microsoft Word add-in that verifies whether every citation in a brief actually supports the claim made, hyperlinking the evidence for the entire team. 39 It is not a generative-AI tool, which means it carries none of its own hallucination risk. D. Claude Projects — a persistent, matter-scoped workspace and 1M-token context Claude is already available inside Perplexity’s council, so this recommendation is not about model access. It is about workflow. A Claude Project is a persistent, matter-specific workspace that carries custom instructions and uploaded files across every conversation on that case, 40 and the newer Claude Opus 4.6/4.8 and Sonnet 4.6 models support one-million-token context windows with roughly ninety percent retrieval accuracy across the full window. 41 In practice: one Claude Project per active federal case, holding the indictment, discovery index, and defense theory, functioning as a lightweight “second opinion” workspace alongside the Perplexity Project on the same matter. This turns multi-model cross-verification into a repeatable five-minute habit rather than a special occasion. E. Honorable mention — Paxton AI Paxton AI is the only dedicated legal-research-and-drafting platform in this survey that is priced and packaged for a solo practitioner: $499 per month, self-serve, with a seven-day free

39LawNext, ClearBrief Launches Cite Check Report (Dec. 2025), https://www.lawnext.com/2025/12/clearbrief-

launches-cite-check-report-to-give-law-firm-partners-an-audit-trail-against-ai-hallucinations.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

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trial.42 It is worth a trial specifically to compare its citation-grounding discipline against Perplexity Deep Research on a real Texas criminal-procedure question before committing budget. It is not on the priority-adoption list because Perplexity plus Claude already covers most of the same ground, but for a practice that wants one dedicated “legal AI” subscription rather than a stack of generalpurpose ones, Paxton is the honest answer.

VI. WHAT’S AHEAD FOR AI A. Agentic legal work OpenAI’s CEO Sam Altman has stated publicly that 2025 saw the arrival of agents that can do real cognitive work, and 2026 will likely see the arrival of systems that can produce novel insights.43 In practical terms, this means the AI-agent-as-junior-lawyer model described in Section II is likely to expand from research and drafting into workflow orchestration: an agent that monitors PACER for new filings on assigned cases, checks in-court deadlines against a firm calendar, generates status letters, and flags upcoming statute-of-limitations events. The practitioner’s duty of supervision under Rules 5.1 and 5.3 does not disappear when the subordinate is a machine.

43OpenCrewAI, Sam Altman’s 2026 AI Agents Roadmap, https://www.opencrewai.com/blog/openai-sam-altman-

2026-ai-agents-roadmap (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

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B. On-device models and the confidentiality frontier Apple’s next-generation Apple Intelligence exposes its on-device Foundation Model directly to developers via a Swift API, including offline operation. 44 Google’s Gemini Nano runs fully on Android with sub-second latency and complete offline privacy. For a defense practice, ondevice models are the clearest path to running AI on highly sensitive client material (jail calls, medical or mental-health records, protected-order pleadings) without any cloud transmission at all. This is the confidentiality-first workflow of 2027 and it is worth watching closely. C. Long context and full-trial ingestion Claude, Gemini, and GPT-5.5 now support one-million-token context windows.45 Practically, an entire multi-thousand-page discovery production or a full multi-day trial transcript can be loaded into a single AI session as a routine — not exotic — workflow. Independent testers still find that models lose coherence well before their advertised limit and that accuracy degrades most in the middle of the document, 46 so verification discipline remains essential even at one million tokens. D. Real-time transcription in courtrooms Verbit’s Legal Capture markets next-generation real-time transcription of legal proceedings, aimed at court reporting agencies and law enforcement. 47 Expect adoption in state

44Apple Newsroom, Next Generation Apple Intelligence (June 2026),

https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2026/06/apple-intelligence-brings-powerful-ai-capabilities-into-everydayexperiences/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 45Framia, GPT-5.5 Context Window Reaches 1M Tokens, https://framia.converge.ai/page/en-US/news/gpt-5-5context-window-1m-tokens (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 46Groundy, Million-Token Context Window: What Can You Actually Do?, https://groundy.com/articles/milliontoken-context-window-what-can-you-actually/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026). 47Verbit, Real-Time Transcription for Legal Proceedings, https://verbit.ai/verbit-launches-revolutionary-real-timetranscription-service-for-legal-proceedings/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2026).

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and federal courtrooms to accelerate, and expect a live professional-responsibility debate about the role of certified human court reporters.

VI. A PRACTITIONER’S CHECKLIST The checklist below is the operating rule set behind everything above. It fits on a single page and is meant to be printed and posted above the workstation of anyone in the firm who touches AI output. A. Before adopting a tool •

Confirm the vendor’s data-handling practices. No client material is uploaded until this is confirmed in writing.

•

Confirm that the tool does not use client data to train its models by default.

•

Read the vendor’s security and confidentiality documentation. If none exists, the tool does not touch a client matter.

•

Vet the tool against ABA Formal Op. 512 and Texas Op. 705 before adopting.

B. Before filing any AI-assisted work product •

Every case citation is verified in Westlaw or Lexis against the actual case, not a summary.

•

Every quotation is verified against the source page, not against a paraphrase.

•

Every statute is verified against the current code, not a training-data snapshot.

•

The substantive analysis is asked of at least two different frontier models before any decision is made.

•

The brief is run through ClearBrief or an equivalent citation-verification pass before filing.

•

The lawyer of record reads every sentence and takes ownership as the drafter.

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C. Before appearing in a court with an AI standing order •

Familiarize yourself with the standing order.

•

The required certification is prepared and included with the filing.

•

A file record is kept documenting which AI tools were used, on what portions of the filing, and how they were verified.

D. Before offering AI-derived evidence at trial •

The five-gate framework is worked in advance: FRE 901/902 authentication, 401–403 relevance and prejudice, 801–807 hearsay, 702 and Daubert reliability, and 1001 et seq. best evidence.

•

Foundation witnesses are identified and prepped to speak to the tool’s reliability and process.

•

An affirmative deepfake-authentication challenge is prepared if the opposing party’s digital evidence is at all suspect, without conjuring doubt where the record does not support it.

VII. CONCLUSION AI does not change what criminal defense lawyers do. It changes how much of the raw material we can look at, how fast we can build a first draft, and how many different perspectives we can bring to bear on a hard question before we file. That is a real advantage, and Texas criminal defense lawyers who learn to use it will do better work on more cases per year than lawyers who do not. But the advantage runs one way. AI does not verify authority. AI does not develop the theory of the case. AI does not read the jury. AI does not stand up when the judge calls the case. Every one of those jobs remains the lawyer’s, exactly as it always has been.

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Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

22nd Annual Stuart Kinard Advanced DWI November 5-6, 2026 The Menger Hotel San Antonio, Tx

Topic: Collateral Consequences Speaker:

Stephanie Stevens St. Mary's School of Law 2507 NW 36th St San Antonio, TX 78228-3918 210.431.5710 phone sstevens@stmarytx.edu email

6808 Hill Meadow Dr :: Austin, Texas :: 512.478.2514 p :: 512.469.9107 f :: www.tcdla.com


COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES by Stephanie Stevens STUART KINARD ADVANCED DWI SEMINAR November 5-6, 2026

Stephanie L. Stevens 2507 NW 36th Street San Antonio, TX 78228 (210) 431-5710 sstevens@stmarytx.edu


Collateral consequences of criminal convictions encompass a broad spectrum of legal disabilities and social repercussions that extend beyond the direct penalties imposed by courts. This paper will try to address some of the collateral consequences that can flow from a criminal conviction. As there are numerous possible consequences, the paper will not cover every possibility. Additionally, the paper will primarily focus on convictions in Texas. I. EMPLOYMENT One of the most pernicious consequences of ending up in criminal court is the possible loss of employment, current or future. Texas Occupations Code § 53.021 allows licensing authorities to revoke, suspend, or deny licensure to applicable persons with felony or misdemeanor convictions. Many jobs require licensing and thus, it bears checking on licensing requirements to know if your client will be negatively impacted. Some of these jobs include: Athletic trainer Attorney Physical therapist Midwife Professional Counselor Engineer Architect Landscape architect Chiropractor LVN or RN (nurses) Real estate broker Acupuncturist


Dental Hygienist Pawnbroker Dietician

II. LOSS OF FUNDED ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS A. Student Loans or Grants 1. Federal Law The Drug Free Student Loans Act of 1998, 20 USC 1091, allows that any person convicted of “any offense under Federal or State law involving the possession or sale of a controlled substance” can be temporarily or permanently ineligible for federal loans or grants. The length of ineligibility runs from a oneyear period for a first possession to an indefinite period for a third possession or second sale or distribution offense. Juvenile court delinquency cases do not disqualify a person from receiving loans, nor do convictions that have been dismissed or expunged. Likewise, if a conviction is reversed, eligibility returns. Some relief may exist in the form of a successfully completed drug rehabilitation program approved by the Secretary of Education, if two unannounced drug tests are included. In this instance, a student can end the ineligibility period early.

3


2. State Law Texas Education Code § 54.633 holds that one who commits a felony or Class A misdemeanor, or an offense under Chapter 481 of the Health and Safety Code will forfeit a prepaid higher education scholarship. A student must wait two years after completing a sentence for a felony or an offense under Chapter 481 of the Health and Safety Code to be eligible to receive a Texas grant. See Texas Education Code §§ 56.304, 56.354. It is also worth noting that many higher learning institutions have adopted policies that allow for expulsion or denial of conferring degrees to students upon conviction under a criminal statute. B. Food Stamp and Other Assistance Programs 21 USC 862(a) imposes a lifetime ban on food stamps and other federally funded assistance programs for drug felons unless the state the person lives in opts out. Texas does not opt out. Under 42 USC 1437(1)(b), a person convicted of a drug offense is excluded from federally subsidized or funded housing. Additionally, persons convicted of distribution offenses are ineligible for federal health care benefits. 42 USC 1320a-7. III. FIREARMS POSSESSION 4


Several state and federal laws restrict possession of firearms for certain convictions. A. Tex. Penal Code § 46.04 prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm. An order discharging a person from all penalties and disabilities pursuant to art. 42.12 § 20 allows a person to possess a firearm under state law, but it is less clear on the federal side whether such an order allows possession. After five years from release from confinement or community supervision, parole or mandatory supervision, a convicted felon in Texas may possess a gun at their residence. This does not include the parking lot or shared areas in an apartment or condominium. Shepperd v. State, 586 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). B. Tex. Penal Code § 46.04(b) makes it a class A misdemeanor for a person convicted of family violence assault to possess a firearm prior to the fifth anniversary of the later of 1) release from confinement or 2) the date of discharge from probation. C. Tex. Gov. Code § 411.172 limits a person’s ability to obtain a concealed handgun license if convicted. The legislature’s authority to “regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime” may be limited according to recent cases. See State v. Villanueva, 686 S.W.3d 752, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024)(Court of 5


Criminal Appeals refused to grant petition for review because it was not properly raised in the courts below, but opined that Texas Penal Code §46.02(a-1)(2)(A) could be unconstitutional when the criminal activity claimed is driving while intoxicated). The Texas Constitution was adopted in 1876 and included the right for Texas’ citizens to keep and bear arms. It reads as follows: Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defense of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime. Tex. Const. Art. I, §23. Judge Slaughter of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted that she would hold Penal Code Section 46.02(a-1)(2)(A) violates the Texas Constitution when it does not have any logical nexus to the prevention of crime as applied to a person committing DWI. Judge Newell, joined by Judge Hervey and Judge McClure, noted that “the Court’s refusal to grant discretionary review in this case should not be mistaken for a rejection of the merits of Appellee’s claims or Judge Slaughter’s arguments.” State v. Villanueva, 686 S.W.3d at 754. IV. VOTING RIGHTS The Texas Constitution Article 6, Section 1(a)(3) bars persons with

6


felony convictions from voting, but allows the legislature to insert exemptions. Tex. Election Code § 11.002(4) allows people with felony convictions to vote if they have “fully discharged their sentence.” V. DIVORCE AND CHILD CUSTODY Several family code provisions exist that allow for consideration of criminal matters in determining sole or joint conservatorship. For example, Tex. Family Code § 153.004 notes that evidence of abusive physical force against a spouse, child’s parent, or any person younger than 18 that is within two years of a divorce being filed can be considered. §153.004(b) prevents a judge from appointing joint managing conservators if credible evidence is present of a history or pattern of past or present abuse, child neglect, or sexual assault. This same provision allows a judge to limit access to a child upon a showing by a preponderance of evidence of certain sexual or physical abuse. §161.001 of the Texas Family Code provides for termination of the parent-child relationship if convicted or placed on community supervision or deferred adjudication for any offense listed in this section that caused the death or serious injury of a child. The list includes murder, assault, aggravated assault, abandoning or endangering a child, sexual 7


performance of a child and more. VI. SEX OFFENDER CONSEQUENCES A. CHILD SAFETY ZONES Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42A.453 prohibits those placed on community supervision for a laundry list of sexual offenses from going within 1000 feet of a premise where children commonly gather. This includes day cares, schools, playgrounds, youth centers and more. A defendant may request a modification with a showing that the zone interferes with the defendant’s ability to work or attend school or constitutes an undue hardship. B. RESTITUTION Art. 42.0371 requires mandatory restitution for kidnapped or abducted children in the amount necessary for medical, psychiatric, and psychological care and treatment for victims under the age of 17. C. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs registration. Lifetime registration is required for: Agg kidnapping w/ sex intent; agg sexual assault; burglary with sex intent; compelling prostitution under 18; continuous sex abuse; indecency with child by contact; indecency with 8


child by exposure and a prior indecency under 21.11(a)(2); trafficking persons; obscenity under TPC 43.23(h); possession or promotion child porn; prohibited sex conduct; sex assault; and sexual performance by a child. Ten year registration is required for: bestiality; compelling prostitution; indecency child by exposure; indecent exposure 2nd violation; online solicitation of a minor; 2nd degree prostitution; kidnapping with restraint of victim under 17. Registered sex offenders are also required to get a special driver’s license or identification card. D. PAROLE In continuous sexual abuse of a child cases or under the super aggravated sexual assault of a child case, an inmate is not eligible for parole. E. CIVIL COMMITMENT A sexually violent offender can be required to be committed, beyond any initial criminal sentence, if it is shown under Tex. Health & Safety Code Chapter 841 to be necessary. VII. DWI COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 9


A. Driver’s License Suspension and Jail As a Condition of Probation DWI 1st offense is a Class B misdemeanor which if probated does not result in any driver’s license suspension, as long as the defendant completes the DWI education course within 6 months of being placed on probation. Article 42A.406 CCP. Starting in 2019, the defendant arrested on or after September 1st is eligible for deferred adjudication with an interlock device as long as the defendant did not have a commercial driver’s license. The Transportation Code only refers to “convictions” and “final convictions” under Article 49 being subject to driver’s licenses suspension, so that a deferred adjudication should not result in any additional license suspension. If the sentence is probation, on a first offense, the trial court is without authority to order a corresponding license suspension as long as the condition of probation includes the required alcohol education course. Love v. State, 702 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App. Austin 1986). However, beware of Burg v. State, 592 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) which held this issue could not be raised for the first time on appeal as an illegal sentence. The Court held that the license suspension is not part of the 10


sentence or probation terms, and thus did not affect the legality of the sentence. The objection to suspending the license of a first time probated DWI, with the education course required, must be raised at the trial court to appeal any adverse decision. If the sentence is a jail sentence, the license is automatically suspended under Transportation Code §521.341 from 90 days up to one year per Transportation Code §521.344. The code states that the court shall grant the defendant credit against the suspension for the Administrative License Revocation suspension for failure of a breath or blood test or refusal to provide a specimen [referred to as ALR credit] against this mandatory suspension and the suspension may begin no later than the 30th day after the conviction as set by the court. See §521.344(c) Transportation Code for credit for refusal ALR suspension and §524.023(b)Transportation Code for credit for failure ALR suspension. Credit can only be applied to a first offense. Even if the DWI 2nd is reduced to a DWI-1st conviction, DPS will not honor a request for credit for the ALR suspension as the Transportation Code states the credit cannot be extended to a person who has been previously convicted for an offense under §49.04. DPS has in 11


the past interpreted “has been convicted” to exclude cases in which the person received deferred adjudication. Thus, it remains to be seen if a person has completed deferred adjudication for a DWI case and is subsequently convicted in a subsequent DWI case, whether the court can award credit for the ALR suspension that DPS will honor. DWI with .15 or higher is a Class A misdemeanor with no mandatory jail time, but if probation is granted, an ignition interlock device is required for half the term of probation. §521.344 (d)(2) of the Transportation Code provides that DPS may not suspend the driver’s license for someone placed on community supervision who is required to not operate a motor vehicle unless the vehicle is equipped with an interlock device. There is no driver’s license suspension as long as the person receives community supervision and is required to complete an education course, within 6 months of being placed on probation. DWI-1st offense under 21 years of age is either a Class B misdemeanor or a Class A misdemeanor if the alcohol concentration is .15 or higher. If the person is younger than 21 years of age at the time of the offense, the judge who places the defendant on community supervision must suspend the driver’s license for 90 days beginning on the date of the community supervision. Article 42A.407 (f)C.C.P. The judge must order as a condition of community 12


supervision, that the defendant not operate any motor vehicle unless it is equipped with an ignition interlock device. Article 42A.408(e)C.C.P. If the sentence is a jail sentence and not community supervision, then the license suspension is for one year. See §521. 343 Transportation Code. There is no ALR credit available to someone under 21 years of age at the time of the DWI offense. §521. 344 (c)(2) Transportation Code. DWI-2nd offense’s range of punishment is from 30 days up to one year in jail and/or up to a $4000.00 fine. The jail time can be probated, but 42A requires at least 72 hours of continuous confinement. Article 42A.401(a)(1) C.C.P. The jail time on a 2nd offense probation is up to a maximum of 30 days as a condition of probation. The license suspension is from 180 days up to two years. However if the prior DWI offense date is within 5 years of the conviction date, then the minimum license suspension is one year and the minimum jail time as a condition of probation is 5 days. See Article 49.09(h) Penal Code. The trial court does not have to give the defendant credit for time already served against the mandatory 72 hours of confinement. Martinez v. State, 427 S.W.3d 496 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2014) An open plea could not be set aside based on a claim of involuntariness, even though the defendant believed that she would not receive jail time. She had 13


pled unnegotiated to a DWI-2nd offense, which the appellate court noted required jail time as a condition of probation. Cortez v. State, 971 S.W2d 100 (Tex. App. Ft Worth 1998) This analysis would be the same, if the defendant pled guilty believing the driver’s license would not be suspended, but was notified by DPS that it was in fact suspended due to the conviction. The driver’s license suspension for a second offense is mandatory and no ALR credit can be given toward this suspension. Article 42A.407(b) C.C.P. starts out with the words “Notwithstanding Section 521.344(d-i), Transportation Code” which means that the Transportation Code provisions about not suspending the license if an educational course are required as a condition of probation, do not apply to convictions for 2nd and 3rd DWI offenses. The Texas Department of Public Safety will impose a one year suspension if they receive notice the defendant is required to attend a subsequent educational program, even if the charge is reduced to a DWI-1st offense, if the driving record reflects that the defendant has previously been required to attend an educational program, or it has been waived. See Article 42A.407 C.C.P. Felony DWI: The driver’s license suspension is from 180 days up to two years, with no credit for any ALR suspension. If the prior conviction is within 5 years, under Section 49.09(h), the driver’s license suspension must be for a 14


minimum of one year, up to two years. Probation including an interlock device, and required educational course will not prevent DPS from suspending the license, if the trial court fails to impose a suspension. See Article 42A.407(c)C.C.P. Driving While Intoxicated with child passenger younger than 15 year of age, is a state jail felony. Section 521.344 of the Transportation Code, states that anyone convicted under §49.045 is subject to a driver’s license suspension of not less than 90 days or more than one year. However, §521.344 (d) provides that DPS may not suspend the license if the person is required to complete an educational program during a period of probation. Article 42A.407 C.C.P. and §521.344 (d)(1) provide that the defendant may request that the jury make a recommendation about whether the driver’s license should be suspended, if the jury recommends community supervision. If the jury recommends against a suspension, none shall be entered by DPS. Intoxication assault that does not involve injury to a specified person listed in §49.09(b-1) Penal Code, [firefighter, EMS, police officer or judge], is a 3rd degree felony requiring a minimum of 30 days in jail, if the sentence is probated. If the person caused another to suffer a traumatic brain injury that results in a

15


persistent vegetative state, it is a 2nd degree felony under §49.09(b-4) Penal Code. If a jury recommends community supervision, it may also recommend that the driver’s license not be suspended. Otherwise, Section 521.344 Transportation Code provides that driver’s license can be suspended from 90 days up to one year. Intoxication Manslaughter that does not involve the death of a specified person in §49.09(b-1) is a 2nd degree felony requiring a minimum of 120 days of confinement, if the sentence is probated. It is a 1st degree felony if the victim is a firefighter, EMS, peace officer or judge. If a jury recommends community supervision, they may also recommend that the driver’s license not be suspended. Section 521.344 Transportation Code provides that the license may be suspended by the Court for not less than 180 days or more than two years. B. Ignition Interlock A judge may order the device on any DWI probated sentence. It is mandatory, however, if the breath/blood test is .15 or higher; for a DWI under 21; for a second or more subsequent offense and the priors were within five years; and if given deferred. C. FINES Transportation Code chapter 709 requires fines in the amount of $3000 for a first conviction; $4500 for a second or more conviction; and $6000 for a .15 or 16


higher. A court can make a finding of indigency and waive the fine. As of 2019, surcharges are no longer allowed. D. CHILD SUPPORT FOR INTOX MANSLAUGHTER Code of Criminal Procedure 42.0375 allows for ordering a defendant to pay child support for children of a victim who are under 18 or not yet graduated from high school. The criminal court shall determine the amount. VIII. JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS A. REFERRAL TO JUVENILE COURT AFTER EXPULSION Family Code §52.041 and Education Code §37.010 require any child expelled from school to be referred to a juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile court action is needed. B. PROBATION REQUIREMENTS FOR HANDGUN CASES Family Code §54.040 requires any child placed on probation for an offense involving a handgun to inform his or her probation officer of how he/she acquired the gun. C. SEX OFFENDER REQUIREMENTS 1. Registration Juveniles do not have to register in Texas. The juvenile may motion the court to conduct a hearing on whether the interests of the public require 17


registration. If the court does not find so, the court may exempt the juvenile or the parties can plea bargain to defer the decision on requiring registration to see how the child performs in treatment; or the court can allow the child to register nonpublically. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 62.351 and 62.352. 2. Conditions of probation Juvenile courts may order polygraphs and counseling. The courts shall order DNA samples collected. Tex. Fam. Code §54.0405. D. GRAFFITI If an owner consents, a juvenile can be ordered to restore property affected with graffiti by removing it. Tex. Fam. Code §54.046. E. JUVENILE COURT MAY ENTER ORDERS AFFECTING PARENTS Family Code §54.041 allows a juvenile court to order parents to participate in the juvenile’s rehabilitation including: “order any person found by the juvenile court to have, by a wilful act or omission, contributed to, caused, or encouraged the child’s delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision to do any act that the juvenile court determines to be reasonable and necessary for the welfare of the child or to refrain from doing any act that the juvenile court determines to be injurious to the welfare of the child;”

IX. NATIONAL INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL 18


CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS The NICC makes accessible to judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, defendants, victims, and the general public the collateral consequences that can flow from a criminal conviction. The ABA developed the NICC, which is a free, online database that attempts to identify each and every collateral consequence of a conviction in every jurisdiction’s laws. This includes the U.S. Code and Code of Federal Regulations. The website can be found at www.niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/consequences.

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Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

22nd Annual Stuart Kinard Advanced DWI November 5-6, 2026 The Menger Hotel San Antonio, Tx

Topic: AI, Ethics, & Discovery in The Modern DWI Case

Speaker:

Aaron Diaz Visiting Clinical Assistant Professor of Law St. Mary’s University School of Law 2507 NW 36th Street San Antonio, TX 78228 210.431.5753 phone adiaz39@stmarytx.edu email

6808 Hill Meadow Dr :: Austin, Texas :: 512.478.2514 p :: 512.469.9107 f :: www.tcdla.com


AI, ETHICS, AND DISCOVERY IN THE MODERN DWI CASE

22ND ANNUAL STUART KINARD ADVANCED DWI SEMINAR

AARON M. DIAZ VISITING CLINICAL ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW ST. MARY’S UNIVERSITY CELL: (956) 330-0154 EMAIL: adiaz39@stmarytx.edu

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 2026


I.

INTRODUCTION

Whether we want to accept it or not, artificial intelligence is growing exponentially in the legal profession. A recent State Bar of Texas survey found that “[i]n 2024, 30% of surveyed Texas attorneys reported using AI in their practice. By 2026, that number climbed significantly, with 62% indicating AI use in some form.”1 I only recently began incorporating AI into my practice and, admittedly, it has saved me countless hours developing cross-examination questions or creating defensive theories. The volume and type of discovery in criminal cases have also increased. Digital discovery, alone, can range from a few gigabytes of information to terabytes of data. Offense reports, medical records, expert reports, high-resolution images, and body worn camera footage can often take weeks to review. Artificial intelligence, when used properly, can help reduce the amount of time it takes to review high-volume discovery. But what ethical implications are involved when we lean on AI for discovery review? This paper explores those implications and the effect that AI has on the modern DWI case. The first section provides a basic overview of AI and how both law enforcement and defense lawyers utilize AI in practice. Section two delves into AI’s ethical implications based on the ABA’s guidance and the Texas State Bar ethics opinion 705. Section three discusses the Texas Responsible AI Governance Act, which the Texas legislature passed to regulate government entity AI developers and deployers. This paper will conclude by recommending best practices for defense lawyers to ethically use AI in their discovery practice.

II.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MODERN DWI EVIDENCE A.

What is Artificial Intelligence?

Artificial intelligence is defined as “the ability of a computer or computer controlled robot to perform tasks that are commonly associated with the intellectual processes characteristic of humans, such as the ability to reason.”2 Generative Artificial Intelligence or “gen AI” is a process that “create[s] original content such as text, images, video, audio or software code in response to a user’s prompts.”3 For example, a person inputs a prompt into ChatGPT that states: “I need to draft an email to an employer declining a job offer.” ChatGPT will take that prompt and generate a response that it believes is appropriate based on its knowledge of the employer and the person’s reason for declining the job. It can also be written in a neutral tone to avoid a negative relationship

State Bar of Texas AI in the Practice of Law, 1–2 (2026). Copeland, B.J., Artificial Intelligence, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence. 3 Cole Stryker and Mark Scapicchio, What is generative AI?, IBM https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/generative-ai. 1

2

2

(Oct.

2026)

(Mar.

2024)


between the person and employer. The dialog continues as the person edits ChatGPT’s response by inputting additional prompts to tailor ChatGPT’s draft email.4 B.

How are defense lawyers using AI?

For defense lawyers, gen AI can do more than draft an email—it can summarize pages of offense reports, bodycam videos, and photos in a fraction of the time it would take a human to review. In fact, companies specifically market AI software to lawyers for discovery review. JusticeText, for example, can transcribe body-worn camera footage and review discovery for inconsistencies.5 “Harvey” is another AI platform specifically designed for lawyers that can “streamline your entire process, from researching, drafting to reviewing.”6 I have experimented with multiple AI programs, but have found that Harvey performs best for my purposes. Below is a list of AI programs to consider in your practice. As with all AI programs, users should remember to verify the responses it generates. • • • • •

GC AI Westlaw Advantage and CoCounsel Legal Lexis+ with Protégé Harvey JusticeText C.

How is law enforcement using AI?

State and federal law enforcement agencies are also incorporating AI into policing, like drafting offense reports generated from bodycam videos. According to Axon, police officers spend 40% of their time writing offense reports.7 “Draft One,” developed by Axon, seeks to reduce the amount of time it takes an officer to write reports. This program sells itself as “a force multiplier for officers, leveraging generative AI and body-worn camera audio to produce high-quality draft report narratives in seconds.” Id. The program further claims to have safeguards to “help ensure accuracy and accountability,” while “clearer, more concise and consistent reports help accelerate justice.” Id. CLEAR Investigate is another program that promises to “reduce[] investigative research time by 47 percent.”8 Specifically, this AI software claims to help law enforcement “cut through The following link is a great resource if you are interested in learning about AI laws that are being implemented across the United States: If you are curious about AI laws being implemented around the United States: https://ai-lawcenter.orrick.com/texas/. 5 JusticeText, https://www.justicetext.com/product (last visited Oct. 13, 2026). 6 Harvey, https://www.harvey.ai/platform (last visited Oct. 13, 2026). 7 Axon, https://www.axon.com/products/draft-one (last visited Oct. 13, 2026). 8 CLEAR Investigate: Agentic AI for law enforcement, THOMSON REUTERS, available at https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/legal/lawenforcement?searchid=TRPPCSOL/Google/LegalUS_IV_CLEAR_Main_Search_NonBrand4

3


complexity, prioritize relevant insights, and advance investigations with greater precision, speed, and control.” Id. Earlier this year, Southeast Texas law enforcement agencies acknowledged using AI “tools to improve efficiency and enhance public safety.”9 Such tools include “license plate readers to realtime translation.” According to Beaumont Police Department Sgt. Haley Morrow, the department would be rolling out AI software that allows its officers to generate reports from their body-worn camera recordings.10 The software would also be able to translate from Spanish to English and vice versa.11 D.

Discovery Requests

Law enforcement’s use of AI has created new discovery implications. When an officer responds to a scene and activates his body-worn camera, AI software generates a draft report of the incident. The officer then reviews and edits the report before finalizing and attaching it to the case file. In doing so, the officer has created a new category of discoverable material: the AI prompt, the original AI draft, and the officer’s edits. Therefore, defense lawyers should include language in their discovery requests to cover these new categories.

III.

ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR USING AI

Comment 8 of ABA Model Rule 1.1 states that “a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.” The duty of technology competence is the foundation of the ethical framework for AI. ABA Model Rule 1.1, Comment 8, was amended in 2012 to explicitly include technology. Thirty-nine states have now adopted this language. It creates a two-sided obligation: you must understand both the benefits and the risks of technology relevant to your practice. For AI, this means understanding what generative AI can do—and critically, what it cannot do. As AI adoption grows across the profession, there's an emerging argument that failing to use available AI tools could itself become a competence issue, particularly when facing overwhelming volumes of discovery. But the duty cuts both ways—you must understand the hallucination risk and other limitations.

All_US/LawEnforcementDatabase&chl=ppc&cid=6681700&sfdccampaignid=701PA00000X07cqYAB&ef_id=Cj0K CQ jw4orUBhCjARIsAIbF3qxB3etnfOF96NmQcNAMpMuiOzgvvizcU0z4JrQBgwHeaGiF_1mDCawaAqEfEALw _wcB:G:s&s_kwcid=AL!7944!3!811485459829!e!!g!!ai%20for%20law%20enforcement&gad_source=1&gad_campai gnid=14393710772&gbraid=0AAAAADtqfRcaRgHieSPg1Wss13hecM6J3&gclid=Cj0KCQ jw4orUBhCjARIsAIbF3q xB3etnfOF96NmQcNAMpMuiOzgvvizcU0z4JrQBgwHeaGiF_1mDCawaAqEfEALw_wcB. 9 Gabby Gaspard & Camryn Burchett, Southeast Texas law enforcement adopts AI technology to aid crime-fighting, 12NEWS (Feb. 6, 2026), https://www.12newsnow.com/article/news/local/southeast-texas-law-enforcement-adoptsai-technology/502-9e338d8c-c6c5-4caa-91e8-77c698a4a61c. 10 Id. 11 Id.

4


A.

ABA Formal Opinion 512

ABA Formal Opinion 512, issued July 29, 2024, is the first comprehensive national ethics guidance on generative AI. It addresses the following four key areas: 1) Competence: attorneys must have a 'reasonable and current understanding' of AI tools — not just how to use them, but their limitations. You must verify accuracy, completeness, and watch for bias. 2) Confidentiality: this is perhaps the biggest risk area. When you input client information into a cloud-based AI tool, where does that data go? Is it used to train the model? You must review terms of service carefully. 3) Communication: the ABA says clients should be informed about AI use in their matters. This doesn't necessarily mean you need written consent for every AI use, but transparency is key. 4) Supervision: the same rules that apply to supervising associates and paralegals apply to AI. You are responsible for the output. B.

Texas State Bar Ethics Opinion 512

Texas Ethics Opinion 705 was issued in February 2025 by the Professional Ethics Committee, at the request of TRAIL—the Taskforce for Responsible AI in the Law. This is now the definitive Texas-specific guidance. Under TDRPC Rule 1.01—Competence—you must understand how generative AI actually works. You cannot just plug in a question and submit the output. You must critically assess and verify everything. Under Rule 1.05—Confidentiality—you must be cautious about what client information you put into AI tools. This includes vetting the tools’ privacy policies and training your staff. Rule 5.01—Supervision—says AI must be supervised like any nonlawyer assistant. The absolute bottom line from Opinion 705: independently verify ALL AI-generated information before you use it in any filing or client advice. No exceptions. Here is a breakdown of the four critical ethical duties: 1) Competence under Rule 1.01: you need to understand how AI actually works — not at a computer science level, but enough to know when something might be wrong. Always verify outputs. 2) Confidentiality under Rule 1.05: this is perhaps the biggest trap. When you type a client's DWI facts into ChatGPT, that data may be stored, used for training, or accessible to the provider. Use enterprise or private instances. Never put casespecific client data into consumer-grade AI tools.

5


3) Supervision under Rule 5.01: think of AI as a very fast, very confident, sometimes very wrong paralegal. You would never file something a paralegal wrote without reviewing it — treat AI the same way. 4) Candor to the tribunal under Rule 3.03: this is where attorneys have gotten in the most trouble. You must verify every case citation, every statutory reference, and every factual claim. AI hallucinations are not an excuse. C.

Cautionary Tales: When AI Goes Wrong

These cases should send a chill down every attorney's spine. Mata v. Avianca is the case that started it all—an attorney in New York submitted a brief with six completely fabricated case citations that ChatGPT generated. He was sanctioned $5,000 and became a national cautionary tale. Park v. Kim took it to the appellate level—the Second Circuit found that half the cited cases were fabricated and referred the attorney to the grievance panel. In Gauthier v. Goodyear, a case out of the Eastern District of Texas, attorney Brandon Monk was sanctioned $2,000 and ordered to complete additional CLE. And Ma v. Cogdell happened in Texas state court in 2025—attorney Lawrence Chang sanctioned $2,000. This is not solely a New York problem. Texas courts are actively looking for and sanctioning AI misuse. Recently, the Fourth Court of Appeals admonished a lawyer for citing four hallucinations in his brief.12 The lesson is simple: verify everything. IV.

TRAIGA AND BEST PRACTICES

The Texas Responsible AI Governance Act, or TRAIGA, went into effect January 1, 2026, and it has implications for both how you use AI in your practice and how your clients may be affected by government AI use. TRAIGA became effective January 1, 2026, and is codified in Texas Business & Commerce Code Chapter 552. On the prohibition side, it bans AI-driven manipulation of human behavior, government social scoring, unconsented biometric data capture, and AI systems that violate constitutional rights or enable unlawful discrimination. For defense attorneys, the prohibition on constitutional violations is significant—if law enforcement uses an AI system that violates your client’s rights, TRAIGA may provide an additional basis for challenge. On enforcement, only the Attorney General can bring actions—there’s no private right of action. But the penalties are substantial: up to $200,000 for uncurable violations, and up to $40,000 per day for continued violations. Also note that TRAIGA aligns with Government Code Section 2054.702, which establishes an AI Code of Ethics for state agencies incorporating the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. The Texas OAG’s Outside Counsel AI Policy is worth studying for two reasons. First, as a model for your own practice policy. Second, because it signals how the state’s chief law SAISD v. Becerra, 04-25-00724-CV, 2026 WL 2254556 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, Aug. 5, 2026) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 12

6


enforcement officer views AI in legal practice. Key requirements: human oversight is mandatory, you cannot submit unedited AI text as final work product, and sensitive data cannot go into public AI tools. Failure to comply is a material breach—you could lose your outside counsel contract. For DWI defense, TRAIGA creates new tools. If law enforcement is using AI for predictive policing to decide where to set up DWI checkpoints, or AI-generated police reports, you should be requesting discovery of those AI systems. Ask about the AI tools used, the algorithms, the training data, and any known biases. This is a new frontier in DWI defense. V.

CONCLUSION

Consider the following five key takeaways. First, know your discovery rights. The Michael Morton Act transformed Texas discovery practice. Demand everything you are entitled to, including crime lab portal access. Second, embrace AI thoughtfully. These tools can genuinely help you provide better representation, especially when facing overwhelming volumes of evidence. Third—and this cannot be overstated—verify everything. The cautionary tales we discussed should be seared into your memory. Fourth, protect client data. Confidentiality obligations don’t disappear because the tool is convenient. Fifth, stay current. AI technology is evolving at a pace we’ve never seen, and the ethical rules are evolving with it.

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Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

22nd Annual Stuart Kinard Advanced DWI November 5-6, 2026 The Menger Hotel San Antonio, Tx

Topic: Drug DWI

Speaker:

Sean Darvishi The Law Office of Sean R. Darvishi, PLLC 1235 North Loop W Ste 1125 Houston, TX 77008-4711 832.766.4019 phone sean@defendmetexas.com email www.defendmetexas.com website

6808 Hill Meadow Dr :: Austin, Texas :: 512.478.2514 p :: 512.469.9107 f :: www.tcdla.com


Drug DWI By: Sean Darvishi The Law Offices of Sean R Darvishi, PLLC 1235 N Loop W Suite 1125 Houston, Texas 77008 281-939-8839 (o) 832-766-4019 (c) 713-583-2896 (f) sean@defendmetexas.com I.

Introduction A Drug DWI can be one of the most intimidating case to handle if

you’ve never tried one. Drugs, both legal and illegal, are consumed by a large percentage of our population. Unfortunately, this leads to a lot of wrongful arrests for drug based DWI. The prosecutors often see drugs and think they have a home run of a case because they don’t know any better. Part of your role will be to educate. The often-stubborn State’s Attorney often becomes educated once they hear your cross and later, a two-word verdict from the jury. Lately, there has been increased focus on Drug Recognition Experts (“DRE”) and their role in prosecution. This “expert” designation by title is just fluff. These witnesses have not had real training on drugs, pharmacology, or clinical research. Luckily, your client has you as an attorney, who will be able to show the jury this. Once you are done with your cross-examination,


it should become clear to the jury that this is a bunch of hogwash. That is, if you want them to think that. Sometimes in trial, the DRE should be viewed as the gold standard. Below we will discuss this, and other tips for those putting 6 or 12 in the box and trying DUID cases. 1. Learn How to Talk About Drugs One of the biggest things that people initially struggle with is speaking about drugs with comfort. This process begins in Voir Dire and continues throughout the trial all the way through closing. I would encourage you to spend time talking to your loved ones, friends and acquaintances about drugs. Most importantly, the drug you are dealing with in your trial. Or a combination of various drugs. Marijuana is by far the easiest drug for most people to talk to, followed by cocaine and Xanax. Chances are this is because almost every single person knows someone who regularly or occasionally consumes these particular drugs. Lets be real, 20% of the United States has not legalized Marijuana. The opinion about Marijuana has changed drastically over the last few decades. Chances are, majority of your jury panel may have tried it in the past. Heck, some of them may have smoked it that morning. Some drugs are less comfortable talking about. The ones that tend to come to mind are PCP (phencylidine) and Meth (methamphetamine). The


chances of a prospective juror knowing much about these drugs outside of their Netflix binge of Breaking Bad is pretty slim. However, this can become your friend. The perception most people get of somebody on meth is likely the drastic version, which includes facial lesions, 2. Voir Dire is Your Friend (Tolerance Too!) You’ve heard it before and you are about to hear it again: Voir Dire is the most important part of a trial. This is particularly true when dealing with a drug based DWI. You need to select a jury which can be fair, but people don’t usually race to speak up about drug usage. I start with the classics typically: be straight up with me and hold nothing back and levels of burden of proof. I then put up a slide that says Innocent ______ proven guilty. They usually unanimously state “until” and I tell them they are wrong and explain how it is “unless.” I next go over presumptions. I follow it up with a question that always gets a HUGE range of responses to my surprise: “What is Worse?” and I put up the following options (A) Letting a Guilty Person Go; or (B) Convicting an Innocent Person.

People tend to express their true

emotions here and I get a good mix. If I get a jury full of “B”’s then I feel good about my chances. Lastly, before I get into contact I explain that there are a few things we don’t convict on. Namely “Maybe he did it”, “He probably did it”, (my favorite) “the State hasn’t proved it but come on”, or “lets send a


message.” I then usually tie this into my common them of “We Don’t Convict on Maybe’s.” So at this point, I have to address drug usage. The conversation can go many different ways but it depends if the State talked about it or not. Some prosecutors jump right in and some don’t. Some will ask about the particular drug at issue and some will dance around the subject. I put up the definition of intoxication except for I strike through the definition where alcohol is referenced. And I bluntly ask them, how do you prove someone is intoxicated on drugs? I ask them for specific examples. They give me answers like blood or urine, behavior, general observations, admissions and sometimes they bring up field sobriety tests. How you respond to that depends if you have a DRE in your case or not. If you do not, you further exclaim, “Oh so like field sobriety tests that are specific for drugs, right Mr. Smith?” And maybe spend a minute on explaining what a DRE is if you care to. Often times I find that the State will have blood but not a DRE, and so I will hit on the importance on it. On the other hand, if someone brings it up and you do have a DRE on the case, you want to ask about whether you care of not if these tests have been validated, have scientific backing, and if the one administrating it had


some specific medical training in order to detect these individuals. This will come to your aid later. Something I do in most DWI cases is tell the jury I want to demystify the process to them. We talk about how someone is pulled over and the officer smells alcohol or drugs and asks them to step out of the vehicle. They do these field sobriety tests and at this point are under arrest. I explain how it doesn’t matter if they blow a 0.00 at this point, they have been arrested. How they are then asked to offer more evidence against themselves (despite it not making a difference about the arrest) by providing breath or blood. And that the officer chooses which you can do. So if you were sober and they asked for blood, you would have to wait months for blood results and its not instant. The DA will accept charges on that. Then, for a drug case, I will explain how the DRE will ask for multiple things including even more field sobriety tests, despite the fact that you’ve already done them. At this point the jury panel is pretty interested and frankly, a little upset with how the process works. We then talk about how the process could be improved or how it would all ideally run. I usually get a response that goes with Defendant is detained, he performs SFSTs and at some point drugs are suspected. When this happens a DRE comes out and performs an examination on the individual.


They would then make a determination and ask for blood or get a search warrant for blood. Then, charges would not be filed until bloodwork verified the findings of a DRE. At that point a warrant would be issued. Obviously, this isn’t logistical always but a good idea to explore the individual facets. I continue the conversation to discuss tolerance. I ask why there is a per se limit for alcohol but there is not for drugs. Sometimes Colorado is brought up for marijuana and it can be addressed if so. I pull up a slide that has a picture of a blunt, Willy Nelson, and a little boy I call Johnny. I ask the panel that if they fired up the exact same blunt with the exact same amount and strain of weed if they would be equally intoxicated. I make sure to tell them that Willy is in fact Willy and that Johnny has never once tried marijuana. The answer is overwhelming that it may not even phase Willy but Johnny would be intoxicated at some point. We discuss tolerance and how it works. That they may even have the exact same levels in their blood but it doesn’t make a difference because Willy has tolerance and Johnny does not. I could prosecute Johnny if he was operating a motor vehicle on a public roadway, or at least try. Not so much with Willy. This is particularly effective in cases where no DRE was present to perform an examination. You follow this conversation up with a discussion on therapeutic levels. The easiest way to attack this is to ask when someone was involved in a car


accident and prescribed pain medication. This is easy for people to relate to and many people will openly discuss this. Your drive home point is just because drugs are in someone’s system does not mean they are intoxicated. Depending on how your client looks, I would transition the talk to appearance and behavior. I ask someone would look like on various drugs and supply various photos to help the conversation. If you do this, the most extreme of examples is typically your best approach because if your client doesn’t look as bad as the particular person, it helps your case. Lastly, I discuss the concept that the normal use of some people’s faculties is regularly lost or diminished and certain drugs help level that out. I use myself as a personal example since I was diagnosed with ADD as a young child and took medication to help me out. I explain how this would look on a drug test, but that with some knowledge of therapeutic levels that we could figure out it was not being abused. At this point your jury panel has a much more open perspective as to what a DUID case is like and how someone could be wrongly accused of it. 3. The DRE is Either Junk or The Gold Standard One of the toughest balances is deciding whether your jury should be led to believe that a Drug Recognition “Expert” is absolutely junk or whether it should be the gold standard. There are three typical situations that we


commonly see: (1) no examination was conducted by a DRE; (2) no examination was conducted by a DRE but the State plans to call a DRE to testify based off their observations (which we will address below); and (3) an examination was conducted by a DRE. Starting with scenario 1, which I believe to be the most common, you have to realize your prosecutor likely knows little to nothing about drug-based DWI’s, especially considering most of these will occur in misdemeanor court. When I have a situation like this and decide we are moving forward to trial I usually will point out to the prosecutor that it’s a drug only DWI with no DRE, just a test. What comes out of the prosecutor’s mouth next is important. Most of the time I hear, “well he has drugs in his system so I am comfortable moving forward.” If you hear this, you can just stop the conversation there. Your prosecutor is not dismissing the case and its likely best to get that out of your head. The best lesson you can give a prosecutor in a DUID case is to beat them good in trial. By the end of the trial, after the quick Not Guilty verdict, your prosecutor will be salty, but informed. And hopefully that takes care of future situations with this particular prosecutor, but we know how that goes. When it comes to this type of scenario, you will win this battle (like most) in voir dire. Most people are aware of drug tests that are administered


at work. We revert back to talking about marijuana and I ask the jury lets say someone smoked 7 days before work and they were drug tested, would it come up positive? Of course, the answer is yes. I then ask does someone stay intoxicated for those whole 7 days and the jury will be confused and say that’s not possible. And this is perfect because you are prepping them to realize that you need to have a method to determine intoxication and this will be the DRE. In this scenario the DRE is God’s gift to the world. All they had to do is contact someone and this wouldn’t be an issue. Usually in cross examination you could get the officer to admit if a fatality or major injury were to have occurred, that they could have gotten a DRE to the scene. I’ve learn this particularly infuriates most juries. Trial tip: compare the time of arrest and booking to the shift of the officer. Ask the officer early what their shift time is and write it on your easel. Then circle back around.

You can

commonly build the theme that the police simply weren’t going the extra mile, or even further than just the minimum. If the State rests and you’re ready to close you can also bring up in closing arguments that the State chose not to call a DRE to testify about what someone under that particular drug would typically look like in the field. Again this is pretty effective. Lastly, you should make sure you get your analyst to admit that they do not have an opinion of intoxication and have that written down. The analyst isn’t exactly your enemy


if they did a proper analysis, especially if done with a GC/MS where appropriate. You bring up possibilities of the range of effects, the half-life, and how not knowing the point of ingestion makes any potential intoxication opinion nearly impossible to provide.

Don’t be afraid to provide your

analyst/toxicologist any studies you will want to cross examine with but make sure you research the subject thoroughly before asking questions. In the second scenario, the state realizes they messed up by not initially having a DRE but calling one to testify. First, this situation, in my opinion, is not proper. Case law is pretty few and far between but I would highly recommend reading the opinion in Tullos v. State which is an unpublished opinion out of the 9th Court of Appeals which originally came out of Montgomery County Court at Law #5. It is the only case that goes in depth about this situation and explains why a “DRE Reconstruction” should not be allowed. The State has 1 or 2 weak cases they typically site which carry no more than a paragraph of conclusory opinion without offering so much as a single legal authority other than, “it’s the State so they can do it if they want.” I would highly recommend you taking that Tullos opinion and offering it to the trial court Judge days ahead of trial so that the Judge may familiarize themselves with the topic.


With that being said, when the State attempts to bring in a DRE to testify and you need to prepare for that, it all starts in Voir Dire. It is important to hit on topics involving people who do half-assed jobs giving half-assed results. That is exactly what is basically happening here. The DRE process itself involves a lot of physical interactions which include measuring of pupils and their light reactions, muscle tone, heart rate and pulse and an interview. The DRE is going to be making a load of assumptions and this will be easy to exploit if you are on your toes. At this point, depending on your facts, you must decide whether the DRE is junk or not. You can go with the theory that it works, but only when the full 12 steps occur, or that its hogwash and it wouldn’t have mattered if it occurs either way. Both ways can be effective. If you have the opportunity to see Doug Murphy present of DRE and how to beat them, I would highly advise. At a minimum, get the material. The last scenario is where the DRE is conducted and of course in this situation, you likely want the DRE to be demystified and treated how it should be: as an absolute junk “science.” If you do not have a copy of The Texas DWI Manual by Deandra Grant and Kimberly Tucker I would HIGHLY encourage you to purchase a copy. There is a great section about the DRE in there that I use in most of my trials. There is a detailed list of studies and the 12 steps within the first few pages of the section and its almost


guaranteed your DRE has not kept up with any studies outside of the “accreditation” study which itself is highly flawed. For insight: if a DRE interviews someone and they said they smoked marijuana 2 days prior, the DRE will obviously conclude that THC is the source of intoxication. And when blood results come back, even if it’s a metabolite (i.e. Not intoxicating), if it is there then it counts as a confirmed result even though its pretty much known that the subject was not intoxicated. You can really have some fun with things like this when you are in voir dire. The concept itself will infuriate and baffle some jurors, and this only will benefit you. 4. Prepare as if Blood Results Will Come In This is a tip I try to carry with all DWI cases. Plan for the results of the blood score to come in, even if you have a great suppression issue. Lets be real, there are some courts where you know you will not be getting blood results suppressed even if you have the most ideal facts going for you. The advantage of this is that most jurors have zero idea what the numbers mean. Everyone knows .08 for blood alcohol, but no one can really tell you what particular drug levels are and what they mean. The occasional juror may know 5-10 ng for active THC if they’ve visited Colorado or paid attention to their struggle with finding a hardline number. The issue here, which is a main issue in Layton, is that the number really


means nothing. When discussing THC, 3 ng for one person could be just as intoxicating at 7ng for someone else. I set this up in voir dire in a situation discussed above. Willie Nelson and Johnny smoke the same amount and their body processes it the same and thus have equal amounts of THC in their body. Johnny, who has never smoked before, is going to feel it well before Willie Nelson does. The concept is not hard to explain to a juror, but be aware if you don’t make this fact known, they will usually view it all as negative so be careful. 5. Know Your Case Law About Drug Based DWI’s There are a few cases that you want to familiarize yourself with when dealing with a DUID case.

These cases are Layton, Delarue, Delane,

Manning and Tullos. Each of these cases deals with a particular issue that becomes relevant to the point at hand. Layton deals with the relevance of a drug test without an accompanying DRE. Manning deals with the State’s inability to perform retrograde extrapolation in a situation where cocaine was found in the blood. Rather than go through each one of these cases and copy and paste the holding, I would encourage you to look up each case and read the opinion on it. If you do not read these opinions thoroughly you could very easily argue something incorrectly and have it end up biting you in the butt.


6. Prepare for the State to Try to Bring in a DRE to Testify Somebody gave the State the idea recently that if they did not have a DRE come in and perform an examination that somehow they can watch a dash camera or body camera and can form the same opinion. You can NOT let this happen. There is not very established case law on the matter so you have to take a cautious but aggressive approach. If the judge still allows the DRE to testify and provide an opinion of intoxication, make them pay. I recently had a judge allow this and by the end of the trial, there was clearly a look of regret on the prosecution. They called one of the top 3 DWI officers in Houston and the jury told us afterwards that they did not find him a bit credible. First, I would advise everyone to read the opinion of Tullos v. State as mentioned above.

This is an unpublished opinion but provides a nice

breakdown about the issue. The opinion that the State is trying to elicit is the subject of expert testimony and a gatekeeper hearing should occur. DRE is not accepted in the scientific community. This should be emphasized. Even if it were, there is no way that a DRE can watch a video and meet the third prong of Kelly, that the test was properly administered. The DRE is a 12-step process, and it is impossible for these 12 steps to be administered.


You need to make sure that you make a very developed record and argument in case the Judge decides to allow the testimony. If the Judge allows, then get a demonstrative that has all 12 steps listed. Go through 1 by 1 each step of the DRE and cross out each step that wasn’t done. Give half-credit for ones that were not actually observed by the officer. Then go through a list of studies that state that the DRE process is unreliable in the first place and ask if they have read these studies. Drill it in the juries head that their voodoo magic science they are trying to boast wasn’t done properly and even if it was, it is entirely unreliable in the first place. 7. Always Know More Than the Analyst/Toxicologist/DRE You should always have a trial file and stack of cases and studies for any DUID case that you ever try. Coming unprepared is simply inexcusable. When it comes to the particular drug you will be dealing with you need to look at things such as White Papers, the Winek’s Chart, list serves, information banks and google. Google is a little dangerous in this regard but often helps get a quick general understanding.

I would also highly

recommend, if you are not already familiar, going to YouTube and typing in “Guy on ________” and insert the drug that you are dealing with. This may require you finding the street name first but generally you can get an example


of typically what is extreme. So for instance, if I were to go to YouTube and find search “guy on pcp” then I can expect to see a lot of crazy videos and examples of what “moonwalking” really looks like as opposed to what the DRE will tell you it looks like. You will be able to describe behaviors that you will then have to describe to a jury with ease. In a DWI, as we know, the State must prove intoxication at the time of driving.

This makes for a particular challenge because retrograde

extrapolation is typically not reliable for drugs, and each drug has a different half-life. Often times we are unaware when the point of ingestion for a drug occurred. This is important because you can play games with your analyst. For example, PCP has a half-life that ranges from 8 to 20 hours or so according to an analyst in one of my trials recently. PCP, when it comes to simply a number, is entirely unpredictable. A small amount in your system can be intoxicating to some but not others. Even a seemingly large amount cannot guarantee current intoxication. This is true because of its very long half-life. In the Journal of Analytical Toxicology, Vol. 21 October 1997 in the study Phencyclidine Blood Concentrations in DRE Cases by G.W. Kunsman, we see that DRE’s have confirmed intoxication in levels varying from 10ng/mL up to 120 ng/mL. So in the scenario where your client comes up with 20 ng/mL of PCP in their system, the first thought may be that they could


be intoxicated based on the number. However, without knowing the point of ingestion, we don’t know if this was enough to intoxicate. If the client said they smoked it a full day ago, they may have smoked 60 ng/mL worth, and it went through 3 half-life cycles which brings you down to 20ng/mL. You aren’t going to be intoxicated for 24 straight hours and a jury will recognize that if pointed out. Bringing up a scenario or hypothetical based on the numbers you are working with can be extremely effective. What is important is to control this conversation. In all likelihood you will be the dominating personality and it is important to exert that. Do not allow your toxicologist/analyst to provide long-winded answers or explanations when they should only be answering yes/no questions. You are telling the story and providing the narrative and they are confirming what you are telling the jury. Never lose sight of this. 8. Nail Down Your Toxicologist About Opinion of Intoxication One of the most effective things you can do is use a flip chart and write down highlights about the testimony of each witness when they are testifying. When it comes down to a toxicologist there are many avenues which you can use to attack results and intoxication. However, one of the most effective ways you can highlight this is by asking the toxicologist if they have an opinion of intoxication. Their answer will be no and you would write that


down. If you want to get cute about it (and I do this with most cases) you can ask them whether it is Reasonable to Doubt that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of driving due to the introduction of a drug. When I do this I write Reasonable very large, the word “to” very small, and “doubt” really large followed by intoxication. It is very important to note that you are not asking for a legal conclusion and the question is not really objectionable although the prosecutor will likely be piping hot about you asking it that way. 9. Field Sobriety Tests Can Be Your Friend It is pretty simple, but field sobriety tests can be relatively helpful to your case. First off, there is nothing about them that is standardized about field sobriety tests that is validated when it comes to drug usage. All statistics show studies involving alcohol. Funny enough, even if your client doesn’t look great, you can point out that even non-intoxicated by alcohol people can look just as intoxicated doing these tests because of the ridiculous physical activities it calls for. Additionally, some clients will look great on field sobriety tests. I have found this is particularly apparent with my Marijuana DWI clients. Use this to your advantage. Either you look good and it works for you or they look bad and these have literally zero scientific value for drug intoxication. Officers are very quick to puff their chest and explain how accurate they can be when detecting impaired drivers but when you hit them


with some facts and some studies that they are citing, they almost always fold under pressure. Even the officers that are DWI Taskforce and only do DWIs for a living likely haven’t read the validation studies. But you have. And if you haven’t you need to get on that immediately. Information is your friend and will help you navigate a quality cross examination without falling into any traps that you may accidently set yourself up for if you don’t pay attention. 10.

Stick It to Them –Demand More than Lazy Police Work &

Uneducated Prosecutors Your closing argument should be raw emotion. I can’t emphasize this enough. When you look like you care and that an injustice has occurred that only they can fix, the jury will notice. I promise. If you’ve never taken an acting class, now may be the stage in your life that you should. Depending on your facts, you may have a lot of various themes you could use. I personally prefer “we don’t convict on maybes.” This is because the State always has something going on where they do not have the ideal situation. Either they didn’t have a DRE, they tried to bring one in after the fact, the testimony of the DRE made them seem crazy, the toxicologist couldn’t say the individual was intoxicated, or the blood was suppressed.

There is

something that is always less than ideal for the state in DUID cases.


You need to make that push to your jury. Demand that your officers have better training, that the ADA should have prepared more and done the actual research on this particular blood result and that the State is going to just hope you hear the word “drugs” and freak out and give a conviction. Say those words. Don’t be afraid to call the State out and stare them right in the eyes when you do it. You can really get in someone’s head when you do that, and they will have no choice but to respond to you and spend their time addressing that isn’t even necessary. I often will tell a jury that I’ve never been a prosecutor and so I’ve never been to prosecutor school but they must tell them that if the facts aren’t going their way, to comment on emotion. Talk about people’s families driving on the same roads as this defendant. That they need to send a message. I tell them that this is an act of desperation, and that now that I’ve said it, they probably won’t. If you seem them writing or scratching something out I will point that out and say, “see, now they have to change their game plan.” You need to point out how overworked the prosecutors are and that they simply can’t make the time to properly educate them on DUID cases but now you hope that it has become clear: that you can’t try to convict someone on a maybe. These are the cases that the prosecutors have the most false confidence about and the cases that you have more opportunity to win than you can imagine. On the other hand,


people plea guilty to these cases every day who simply are not guilty of the crime, but because their lawyer has not properly educated themselves as to the whole process and how drugs work, they decide to take a deal. Do not be this lawyer. It takes a bit of time to read the literature, but it is knowledge that will put you ahead of the curve and will make you a better lawyer.


Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

22nd Annual Stuart Kinard Advanced DWI November 5-6, 2026 The Menger Hotel San Antonio, Tx

Topic: Cross Examination of the Prosecution Blood Number Witness

Speaker:

Billy McNabb 144 E San Antonio St San Marcos, TX 78666-5509 512.353.2136 phone billymcnabb@billymcnabb.com email www.billymcnabb.com website

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Cross Examination of the Prosecution Blood Number Witness by Billy McNabb That sinking feeling when we hear that this prospective client/ new case involves a blood test failure. I mean, blood tests are accurate, right? That is how those legal eagle DPS ALR attorneys describe it, after all. The “gold standard” is what prosecutors like to call it, and you can’t argue with technology, can you? So, what chance can we possibly have? But after surviving the initial wave of cynicism, it is time to start thinking like an advocate-how can I defend this case that involves a blood number over the legal limit? To me, in a failure case the most important thing is not the number, but the rest of the case. Meaning, but for the blood number, is it an otherwise winnable case? If the answer is no, then the blood number really doesn’t matter. If the answer is yes, then we are going to trial. The task then becomes either to raise doubt about the blood number, to minimize its impact, and/or to make that jury pull for you and not the prosecution. Through TXDLA courses we have heard from leading experts and advocates on the subject of gas chromatography. They are to be commended for sharing their knowledge with us. You have been exposed to more scientific principles than you can probably remember or ever put to use. So how do we take this mountain of information that we may only vaguely understand and somehow turn it into a defense? Or more specifically, what wins in a blood test case? What is important to that jury? I have been fortunate over the years to have had meaningful discussions and feedback from jurors on my cases. More often than not I will receive a call or an e-mail from at least one member of each jury. To be able to hear what they discussed, what they did and did not attach meaning to during their deliberations is invaluable. What I have gathered from these discussions is that jurors rarely have any concept of the scientific evidence that was presented over the course of a trial. Also, I have learned that the less scientific I am in my approach, the more anecdotally I can present the shortcomings of the scientific principles, the better my success has been. I say this with a caveat, this is not an absolute, but it seems the less scientific I appear to the jury the better chance for me personally. Another dynamic present in blood test cases that cannot be forgotten is that most often the blood draw was non-consensual. Most jurors may not have a problem with a non-consensual blood draw. However, no matter the jurisdiction, at least some jurors will take issue with the government assaulting a fellow citizen with a needle. Use this to your advantage. By the end of voir dire, you should know what each juror really thinks about non-consensual blood draws. Most of my success in blood test cases has not been so much getting the jury to disbelieve the blood test number, but more so about getting the jury to disregard it. This is a combination of my strengths as well as my weaknesses. I will never have as thorough an understanding of gas


chromatography as the Troy McKinney’s, Dr. V’s, and George Scharmens of the world. But at the conclusion of the prosecution’s direct examination of their blood test witness, no jury has any understanding of blood test methodology, and I try to use this to my advantage. It is along this theme of almost “ahh shucks”, country lawyer simplicity that I submit the following, a non-exclusive list of general considerations when defending a blood test case for those of us not flying at 30,000 feet: a Festivus for the rest of us! Be Yourself No matter what your style, no matter what phase of the case, always be yourself. A jury will not punish your client if you are not polished, but they will if they think you are being disingenuous. Jurors are people, and people in general know when someone is being sincere and when someone is not. Whoever you are, whatever you are, whatever you are not, be yourself. Even if you are not the most likeable person, the jury will like you more for being yourself than for trying to be someone you are not. Be Honest With The Jury, Admit Your Limitations If you don’t know much about the blood testing, it is okay to admit if you can work that into your overall strategy. That is more effective than trying to pretend you are blood test smart, and then make no progress in damaging the blood evidence against your client. Ask Questions That Yield Only The Answer You Want Do not give the witness any opportunity to explain a concept in a manner that is not helpful to your cause. I would rather the jury not understand blood testing versus me explaining it to them through my examination of the other side’s witness. The less the jury understands about blood testing, the better chance I have of success. Get In, Get Out Don’t be “that guy.” You know, the one that stays at the party until the bitter end. The one that wore out his welcome long ago. The same principle holds true for cross examination. Make points, or better yet set up points to be made in closing statement. If you linger around too long you run the risk of the jury attaching more significance to the blood test simply because you belabored it excessively in cross examination. The last thing you want is the jury thinking: “we have no idea how the blood test works, but it sure must have been bad because that defense attorney spent all day harping on it.” I have seen more than my share of defense attorneys snatch a defeat from the jaws of victory by violating this most simple principle.


Have Purpose Everything you do, or don’t do, needs to be for a reason. Even if it is not apparent at the time, it should be by the end of the trial. Writers call this foreshadowing, planting a seed whose significance is not readily apparent, but pays off in the end. Ask yourself, why am I asking this question? And just as importantly, why would I not ask this question? Be able to explain to yourself what your purpose is every step along the way. Don’t Legitimize The Prosecution Case I try to never use terminology in front of a jury that in any manner legitimizes any aspect of the prosecution’s case. It is a machine, not an instrument. There is a margin of error, not an acceptable level of deviation, or whatever sugar-coated phrase they call it. That person is not the State expert, that person is the prosecutor’s blood number witness. Or the prosecutions blood number advocate. Words and terminology can have a subtle, yet powerful effect on jury conscience. Use their terms, and you run the risk of subtly giving them and their case credibility. Give the Jury the Correct Lens As trial attorneys, we sometimes get desensitized and thereby blind to certain things that can influence a jury. For example, jurors knowing that a Judge signed a blood search warrant may equate that with the Judge endorsing the blood analysis that followed. Stop this dead in its tracks in voir dire, when you explain to the jury that a signed search warrant is not an endorsement of anything having to do with the blood, it is simply the judge saying, “if this is true, I authorize you to take the blood.” Another example of providing the jury the correct lens is the designation of your opponent, they are the prosecution not the State of Texas or the state or whatever. Prosecutors will refer to themselves as “the State of Texas” at every opportunity because they know that the subtle effect is that some jurors will grab onto that term of inclusion, seeing it as being on “the State of Texas” team as being synonymous with being a good Texan. Don’t Ask Questions Simply To Show Your Knowledge I often hear defense counsel questions that were asked for no reason other than the attorney trying to demonstrate some proficiency in blood testing. These types of questions only lend credibility to the test. Great! The attorney has shown that he can repeat something he learned somewhere along the way. But to the detriment of the only person that matters, the client, the attorney has also legitimized some aspect of the blood test. Makes me believe that if they demonstrated half as much about blood testing as they thought they knew they would win twice as many trials as they do.


Do Not Ask Questions Uh, come again-don’t ask questions? That’s right! Fact is, most questions probably should not be asked. Effective cross is as much about not asking questions as it is asking questions. And some questions are better asked rhetorically during closing statement and not during cross examination. Think of our beloved national pastime. A pitcher is not simply a pitcher, but falls into one of several roles: starter, middle reliever, setup, and the closer. The closer is the ace of your bullpen whose role it is to come in and get the final few outs to protect a lead. Leave any one of the others in too long and you’ve blown it for your closer. Similarly, ask too many questions of the prosecutor’s blood witness and you’ve blown it for your closer. Instead, save them for closing argument, with no opportunity for the prosecutor’s blood witness to explain/answer. When I do ask questions, often they are not so much actual questions as they are statements for which the witness is to agree. Indictment by question, the question which compels only one answer, the answer you want. Be Prepared No matter what, you always have the distinct advantage of being the most prepared, of knowing your case better than anyone else. Do just that, know your case and every single facet therein. Labs will have Standard Operating Procedures. Read them. Study them. Learn them. Then read them again. And again. There is no pop quiz at the end, so don’t feel like you are having to memorize them. Or even understand them in their entirety. Just read them and keep reading them and over time the concepts will begin to mean something. So that when something happens you can throw the red flag. Labs are members of associations. Prosecution blood witnesses will often tout these affiliations to bolster their credibility. However, they invariably tend to stray from these procedures out of convenience, or just plain laziness. When confronted, prosecution blood lab witnesses often back pedal, stating that these are not in fact requirements, but rather “suggestions.” Know the recommended procedures of the associations as well as the lab in question. When you anticipate some resistance by the prosecution witness on some concept that is important to your case, be prepared to handle the witness accordingly via learned treatises, prior testimony, etc... Don’t Ask Questions That Actually Further Your Opponents Cause Ask yourself what the purpose and ultimate effect is to each of your questions. If an answer to any of your questions can serve to actually hurt your case, or legitimize some aspect of theirs, then it is not a question that should be asked.


Control the Witness Prosecution blood witnesses tend to answer questions in a manner to further a prosecution instead of providing an answer rooted in science and objectivity. I call it agenda-driven testimony; they are testifying to secure a conviction and not as an objective, neutral and detached witness. Shut them down when they are not being responsive. Get them to answer your question instead of merely serving as a pulpit for them to spew their prosecution bias. Dynamics Dynamics exist that can influence every trial. Your job is to find them and use them to your advantage. For example, for years our lives were turned upside down by a worldwide pandemic. Many died, many were devastated financially. For many, life will never be the same because of a virus that originated in China. The very same China that produced the gray top tubes used to preserve blood specimens prior to police lab analysis. The very same gray top tubes that have been the subject of a large recall because the vials did not contain the required anticoagulant and preservative. The fact that we entrust something so important to a country whose people are so repressed they have to eat bats, cats, and rats should provide plenty of fodder for cross examination on the subject of vial recall. Also, think of the manner in which prosecutors greet and coddle the blood test witness. They are a witness for crying out loud! They are not supposed to pick a side, they are not supposed to cooperate with the prosecution and fight and argue with the defense. But they do. Every last one of them. It is a conditioning that is done by prosecutors intentionally. They get invited into the prosecutors office, get to suck down all the free Mountain Dews they can drink and all the Funyuns they can eat. They get whisked around the building by prosecutor staff and introduced to everyone like they are a star athlete. They get treated like a celebrity. That is purposeful. Intended to get an ownership and loyalty from the blood test witness. Don’t get blinded by the science What is the blood test witness capable of really testifying to? The accuracy of the result of the test at the time it was tested, at best. This does not necessarily correlate to the time of driving nor to the time the blood specimen was collected. If you notice pre-analytical errors in the gathering of the blood specimen, do not let them gaslight your juror with their knee-jerk “oh, that does not matter because of the preservative” or some other excuse. Keep pedaling, keep pointing out the hypocrisy of having proper procedures only to have the blood test witness try to shut you down with some prosecutorial gibberish with seemingly technical terms to try to go over your head.


Trust your gut, do not back down simply because the blood test witness can out-science you. Considering the above general concepts, the following are some sample areas for cross examination from past trials: Objectivity When a thorough review of the case reveals something that I know the prosecutor’s blood number witness will not like to admit/try to minimize, I usually begin with something along the lines of the following: -

you understand that you are a witness who is supposed to give honest, objective, and unbiased testimony and not just simply testify to help the prosecutor secure a conviction

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you are here only to testify to what you believe the blood test result to be from the time you tested it

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if there were any errors in the collection process prior to getting in to your hands that is not something you caused

Then move into having them make admissions about the substance of which you know you will be exposing issues: -

you have written procedures

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called Standard Operating Procedures

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the rules by which the test has to be performed

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they exist for a reason

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to make sure it is done right

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to make sure it is identifying compounds correctly

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to make sure it is measuring compounds correctly

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if the rules are not followed, then you can get the wrong result

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you are familiar with what is called the Society of Forensic Toxicologists

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you would agree that to be an authoritative source of testing blood for alcohol concentration

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they have promulgated procedures

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certainly, you would not disagree with any of their recommended procedures, would you


Venous BAC v. Arterial BAC -

when a person consumes ethanol, the body could be absorbing it

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meaning taking it in

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this is called absorption

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at some point our bodies begin to burn it off

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called metabolization

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post absorptive phase means the time at which our bodies begin to burn it off, metabolize it

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during this phase, metabolization phase, BAC in venous blood is higher than that in arterial blood

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the blood drawn here, the blood you tested was venous blood

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which has a higher alcohol concentration than what would have been in his arteries at the same time

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if he had his first drink, his first few drinks over an hour before his blood was drawn, then he was in the post absorptive phase

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meaning at the time his blood was drawn, the blood taken from him, venous, was actually higher alcohol content than other blood in his body

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higher concentration than that contained within his arteries Negative/Blanks and the Ethanol Carryover/Contamination Defense

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within each batch there is a sample tested that you call a blank/negative

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it is nothing but n-propanol

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it is not supposed to contain any amount of ethanol

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its purpose is to prove that there is nothing wrong with the machine

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or the analysis

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to detect carryover

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carryover can be a problem with this type of testing


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carryover is a form of contamination

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occurs when the substances in one test carryover into the next

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yielding a falsely high reported concentration

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the purpose of the blanks is to detect this type of contamination/carryover

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the Society of Forensic Toxicologists state in its regulations that these errors are the most serious type of error associated with this type of testing

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and that possible causes of the error must be thoroughly investigated

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including contamination of glassware

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and carry-over

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and other possible causes

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the significance of this type of error is mirrored in D.P.S. Standard Operating Procedures

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which states that blanks should contain no detectible volatile other than n-propanol

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and if a volatile contaminant is detected, the source of contamination will be identified

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and corrected

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the machine will run many samples in the same batch

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vial of his blood was loaded into a tray

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and many others are also in that same tray

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like forty other people

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you call that a batch

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someone’s specimen is run immediately before his

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and someone else is run immediately after

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in fact, 4 people before him

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those results were .22

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.21


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.17

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.24

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of the 4 specimens prior to his, all were twice the legal limit

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one 3 times the legal limit

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contamination in blank can come from many sources

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it can be carryover

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meaning the machine did not fully purge the ethanol out of the machine from the last specimen

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it could also come from a leaky septim

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septim is a rubber thing

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other sources of possible contamination

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the blanks were not immediately before his specimen was analyzed

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nor were they immediately after his specimen was analyzed

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best practice would be to run blanks in between each citizen’s specimen to ensure that there is no cross contamination, or carryover, from one subject to the next

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no law prevents you from doing that best practice

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this is what chemists do at the Dow chemical plant on the Gulf Coast, they run blanks between every sample

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to ensure no carryover

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Without blanks between each subject test, we can’t ensure that there was no carryover

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and this best method to prevent carryover, running a blank between each citizen’s specimen, is not something your lab does due to inconvenience

The following is regarding a blank in the batch in which my client was tested from a past jury trial. The test was performed by DPS lab on a dual column GC machine. The batch was run through each column two separate times, for a total of four tests. Each batch contained a blank, for a total of four blanks. Each run the blanks in column/channel A were clean, whereas the blanks in column/channel B each time detected ethanol.


The subjects BAC for both columns was virtually identical each time, thus I knew the prosecutions blood witness was going to try to minimize the presence of ethanol in one column when the machine did not detect it in the other column. My cross on this particular issue was something like as follows: -

according to the machine this blank contained detectible amount of ethanol

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contamination

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ethanol present at a time and place it is not supposed to be present

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DPS SOP’s require in just such an instance that the source of contamination be identified

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and corrected

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the source of this ethanol contamination was not at that time identified

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likewise, the source of the ethanol contamination was not corrected

Not surprisingly, the prosecutions blood witness tried to sugar coat the dirty blank by saying that it may not have been ethanol at all, but rather, “noise.” The witness also came up with the smallest number I’ve ever seen to represent the ethanol concentration, “if it was even ethanol” and was quick to point out that all the tests of the subjects from both columns were virtually identical. Instead of arguing with him about the significance/insignificance of the blanks, I was going to ask a few more questions, then save the rest for closing. -

what you just said, that ethanol was not present in the column A blanks, you said that without looking at a note

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because you reviewed the records and remembered that

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whatever the significance of the blank, you knew it at the time of the test

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in fact, you initialed each of the chromatograms

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including the ones that evidenced ethanol contamination in the blank we are talking about

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that is your initials, “jb”

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so you certainly knew prior to testifying today that the machine identified ethanol in the blank

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you understand that the prosecutor has a duty by law to see that justice is done

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did you speak to the prosecutor about this prior to testifying (One of the few times I ask a question that I do not know the answer to, but will cover it either way in closing)


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you agree that justice is the search for the truth, not just whatever it takes to convict a fellow citizen, but the search for the truth

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and in this search for the truth today, you and the prosecutor certainly did not bring up what you knew about until I pointed it out, that there was ethanol in the blank that was supposed to be free of ethanol

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S.O.F.T. regulations state the laboratory should exercise precautions so that carry-over of analyte into the next specimen does not occur.

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and the four other subjects tested immediately before his specimen, like we previously discussed, the machine reported ethanol concentrations of

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.22

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.21

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.17

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.24

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so of the 4 specimens prior to his, all were twice the legal limit

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one 3 times the legal limit

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and there were no blanks run in between any of those, it was just one specimen over the double legal limit after another

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S.O.F.T goes on to state that similarly, specimens with very low concentrations should be checked to ensure that carry-over from a previous very high positive has not occurred.

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and you did not do that, correct

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in fact, contrary to the regulations we just covered, you did absolutely nothing to ensure that no further carryover would occur by identifying and fixing the cause

That was the end of the examination regarding blanks, I saved the other questions for my “fly in the soup” closing. It went something like: He knew that there was ethanol in the blanks, heck, he put his initials on the things. So, yes, he knew. Then when the subject came up, he tried to sugar coat it, without even glancing at a document, he argued that the other column, column A, did not have contaminated blanks, and since all concentrations are virtually identical, the blanks were of no significance. What am I most disturbed by? That the regulations are being disregarded by not finding and fixing the source of the contamination. That such can falsely elevate fellow citizens ethanol


concentrations. Sure, that is disturbing. What really gets me is that he sure did not volunteer on his own that carry over contamination was present. He knew it all along, he damn sure did not bring it up during his scripted story during this trial with the prosecutor. That same prosecutor that has a duty to see that justice is done did not bring this up in the form of any question. And the same blood number witness who knew the prosecutor has a duty to see that justice is done sure did not bring it up, either. Is that justice? Or is that just trying to win, and throwing justice and fairness out the window? He was just going to sit there and hope that this dumb country lawyer didn’t bring it up. And if I didn’t, he would have never told you, even though he knew it all along. And you would have never known. Science is rooted in fact, objectivity, and full disclosure. Well, I may not know much about this blood nonsense, but I do know that when there is contamination, it can falsely elevate a citizen’s result. I know that the four peoples specimens tested before his were twice and triple the .08 legal limit. I know that when there was contamination, he disregarded his own rules and just plain common sense. I just wish I knew more about this test, so I could point out other things that he does not want you to know, ways that they don’t follow authoritative guidelines. Then he contradicts his own machine, and says that the ethanol in the blanks might not be ethanol at all, but rather “noise.” So, they are asking you to believe everything else about this machine, just don’t believe when the checks and balance to detect contamination actually detects contamination. Don’t pay attention to the machine on that point, he says. So, they bragged and bragged about how sensitive and accurate this machine was, and now he is essentially saying the machine is wrong? Really? Hey prosecutor blood witness, pick a story and go with it, it makes your argument more convincing. Yeah, I wish I knew more. So I could get him to admit whatever else it is that he doesn’t want you to know. And when he tries to minimize the significance by saying the ethanol, “if it is even ethanol,” present in the blank is so small it could not possibly effect the result because it was such an insignificant amount, don’t fall for that. That is like you calling the waiter over to tell him there is a fly in your soup, and he reaches down and scoops it out with a spoon and tells you enjoy your lunch. No one would stand for that. But that is what they are asking you to do in this case. They are not even willing to throw out your bowl, but even that would not be enough. You have to toss out the whole pot. The whole batch. And I submit to you that the presumption of innocence is more important than a pot of tortilla soup. Remember-don’t get blinded by the science and let them off the hook. “Confidence Level” DPS lab will prepare an ‘Alcohol Content Laboratory Report’ which will contain a “Confidence Level” number. When reporting an alcohol concentration DPS gratuitously throwing in a “99.7


Confidence Level.” In the mind of a juror, DPS is saying, in this particular case, that they are 99.7% sure that this individual had an alcohol concentration of .102. Gee, that sounds pretty compelling, does it not? Not hardly! A quick study of DPS own SOP’s shows that DPS is in fact not over 99% sure that the alcohol concentration was the reported result. Consider the following: -

take a look at your “Alcohol Content Laboratory Report”

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you discussed this with the prosecutor

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the prosecutor asked you about the stated confidence level of 99.7%

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you would agree that implies to the jury that you are 99.7% sure that the alcohol concentration was .102

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you would agree that you are in fact not that certain that the alcohol concentration was .102

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DPS admits that there is an uncertainty measurement of 9.4% built into every result that they report

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and 100% minus your recognized uncertainty measurement of 9.4%, that result is most certainly not 99.7%, is it

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good practice is to run controls of a known concentration within each batch

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and for the controls of a known concentration above 0.10, the results must be within 10% of the expected value

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so you are not really 99.7% sure that this sample was actually a .102, are you

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we have discussed what you call the confidence level and uncertainty measurement, so for those of us that are not part of the prosecutor and DPS team, which of these is what the rest of us would refer to as the margin or error

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is it the confidence level

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the uncertainty measurement

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or both Pre-analytical error

The blood draw. Too often it is the most looked over and forgotten piece of the blood test case. It is always recorded to some degree. Often the officer is in the way or some other beggars and hangers-on will obscure portions of the blood draw. But even then you still may be able to expose pre-analytical error.


Start with the site preparation. Did the blood drawer rub the cleansing agent back and forth? If so, there begins your cross examination of the blood drawer. Consider: -

you are not just going through the motions for posterity are you?

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you want to make the needle site sterile

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because if not sterile, then it is contaminated

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contamination can yield falsely high alcohol concentration results when the blood is tested perhaps weeks later

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you would not want that would you

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so to prevent that you would agree it is best you use methods in the blood collection to prevent contamination

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cleaning the site is of paramount importance, correct

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you would agree that on the video we see you rubbing the site back and forth with a betadine swab

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the best way to get the needle site clean is to actually start at the needle site and make everwidening circle, pushing microbes away from the needle site

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instead of just merely pushing the very microbes you are trying to get rid of just back and forth across the needle site

Beware, some may argue that recent literature suggests that back and forth with friction may be acceptable or preferred because friction may reduce microbes more effectively than gently painting the site with the cleansing agent. In that instance, consider: -

the key to this being the friction

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and not the act of rubbing microbes back and forth across the needle site

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if friction is preferred as you say, then the best method to ensure the site is free of microbes would be to use friction in ever-widening concentric circles

Another area of focus is how long after the cleansing agent was applied before the needle was inserted. Even if you cannot see the entirety of the blood draw, you can almost always determine how long after the site was prepared before the blood drawer inserted the needle. And the overwhelming majority of the time the needle is inserted immediately after the cleansing agent is applied.


Blood drawers commonly use betadine to prepare the needle site. For it to have any effectiveness, one has to wait for betadine to dry completely before inserting a needle. Allowing it to dry is critical. Betadine is used to kill bacteria, viruses, and fungi as it dries by releasing free iodine. Inserting a needle while it has any remaining moisture means the disinfectant has not finished its job, increasing the risk of microbes being present and entering the blood tube. For this reason, the needle site must dry completely. This typically takes 1.5-2 minutes. You may also see the blood drawer blowing or fanning air on the needle site to speed up the drying process. All that this is doing is introducing airborne microbes back onto the needle site. Once the blood is in the tube, it is required (say required, not supposed to whenever possible) to be inverted 8-10 times. Invert means to turn something upside down. It is not to be rocked back and forth, it is to be inverted. It is certainly not supposed to be shaken as is often the case as this can cause hemolysis. Of course, the blood drawer and prosecution blood number witness will argue that the tubes are visually inspected at the lab to ensure there is no hemolysis. And of course there is no way for you to question this, as they take no pictures of the vial at the lab. Or, perhaps there is a way to question it, after all. For example: -

I noticed that you and the officer both signed a form

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entitled “Affidavit of person who withdrew blood”

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we watched and heard that during the blood draw video

Show the witness the document and have it marked. -

this is the form, correct

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says affidavit right here, doesn’t it

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and near the bottom it says “sworn and subscribed”

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and there it has the officer’s signature

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you would agree, under oath and subject to the laws of perjury, that you and the officer never engaged in any oath so, you would agree that would not be true

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that would be untrue

What is the significance of this, you ask? To demonstrate to the jury not to just take their word for it. That things that are required to be done are not getting done the way they are required to be done. You are conditioning that jury to do what they should, to not assume things, to question the


prosecution’s case. Not just trust them. Because you have shown that jury things that were not done the required way, so why would they believe those same people about things that are required to be done that were not recorded. Do they only mess up this we get to see because they were recorded? And everything not recorded happened to have been done the required way? Of course not! Condition that jury to question. Condition that jury to not just assume things and take their word for it, because we have seen their handy work that was recorded and it was not very good. Candida albicans The person next to you is covered in them. They are everywhere. But one place they should never be is inside a blood vial. And despite prosecution attempts to minimize its effect if present in a blood vial, its presence can cause neo-formation of ethanol. The result will be a falsely elevated concentration at the time of testing. Be prepared. Have a learned treatise in hand to demonstrate to the jury through the state witness that the presence of candida albicans is not as harmless as the prosecutor team wants them to believe. Always check the tube expiration dates. Gray top tubes will have a powder inside that is comprised of two substances, a preservative and an anti-coagulant. You will not get any state witness to admit that these substances lose their potency after expiration. The expiration date is not so much a shelf life for the powder inside as it is the tube itself, or more specifically, the integrity of the tube seal. If the seal is compromised, ambient air could leak into the tube, bringing along its good friend candida albicans to feed on the glucose in the blood. I have covered this topic before as follows: -

on the subject of the blood vial, it contains a preservative and anticoagulant

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which if not mixed properly can cause the blood to clot

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if blood clots serum will form

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ethanol is drawn into the serum, not into the clot portion

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causing a falsely high ethanol concentration

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Candida albicans is a microorganism

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you don’t want candida albicans to be present in the vial

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because they can feed on the glucose present in a blood sample and actually cause ethanol production

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causing a BAC higher at the time of the test than what was actually in a person’s system at the time of the blood draw


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and this machine can’t distinguish this ethanol from ethanol that was present in the blood at the time of the blood draw

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this type of alcohol production requires two things

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microorganism (candida)

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and glucose

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the same glucose present in every blood sample

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so one of the two necessary ingredients for this phenomenon to occur is present, glucose in the blood in the vial

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less than perfect technique in prep and draw could result in candida being present in the vial

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did nothing to rule out the possibility of candida

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analyst did not test for it

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sodium fluoride does not prevent ethanol production by candida albicans (see Am.J.Cin.Path. 60:700-702, 1973)

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certain measures are taken to ensure that this does not occur

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refrigeration

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if not refrigerated properly this will occur

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refrigeration slows this process

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but does not stop it

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you don’t want candida to be present in the tube

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you did not test to ensure it was not present

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so you can’t say candida was not present, can you

The subject of neo formation was central in one of my first blood test trials. My client was charged with intoxication by having lost his faculties. The prosecution did not plead the BAC/per se theory of intoxication. Because intoxication is defined by statute, the prosecution does not have to plead a specific definition of intoxication. (State of Texas v. Barbernell). However, once the prosecution pleads a theory, it is bound by it (Black v. State of Texas), meaning that since they plead the faculty definition of intoxication, they should not get to introduce any per se intoxication theory/evidence.


So we fly the case under the radar so we can object at trial to any blood/per se evidence as such was not plead and therefore should not be admissible, right? Wrong! The prosecution, over our objection, was allowed to abandon the specifically plead faculty definition of intoxication, which took the charge back to the general statement of intoxication, and as such all theories of intoxication would be presented to the jury. Said the Judge...Proceed. “But, by allowing the prosecution to abandon the specifically plead faculty theory, now all definitions of intoxication are on the table. That abandonment over my objection is tantamount to a trial amendment, and I object” I said. Overruled. “Your Honor,” I said, “this is violating a doctrine that has never been doubted in our Constitutional system; that a person cannot incur loss of liberty for an offense without notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend. I mean, Article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution guarantees the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This guarantee enables the accused to learn in advance of trial and with reasonable certainty with what he is being charged so that he can prepare a defense.” Denied. Since the court was not impressed with the law, I tried a common sense approach, telling the court that allowing the prosecution to abandon the plead theory at trial was tantamount to ambush. Denied. “But Judge”, I said, “imagine the skullduggery this invites, that the prosecution can plead one theory, with no intention of doing anything but abandoning that theory at trial, only to offer a completely different and unpled theory at trial. That is exactly what this invites. Rabbit trails. Sand bagging. Bad faith. Ambush. A move that is calculated to injure our Constitutional rights. That is exactly why case law does not allow it.” Move along. So here I am in a blood trial, dealing with a blood test that should have never been allowed in evidence, my clients right to notice not only violated, but flat out sodomized. So I drew strength from my ALR motto, “we’re all gonna suffer” and proceeded to conduct the most lengthy and brutal 705(b) hearing outside the jury’s presence that I could muster. The prosecutors blood witness and I covered a myriad of topics. Once the jury was brought in and the prosecution began direct examination, I began to notice that many topics that were covered in the 705(b) hearing were not covered in front of the jury, including specimen refrigeration prior to testing. The prosecutor covered it at length outside the jury’s presence, but must have gotten lost and did not cover it in front of the jury. The sodium fluoride preservative was hardly covered at all in front of the jury. Oh well, not my job to tie up that little loose end! At this point, the prosecution had introduced into evidence a “Blood Withdraw Procedure” form. The procedure on the form itself recommended refrigeration. This and some other subjects were thoroughly covered outside the presence of the jury, but not in front of the jury. So despite the lengthy 705(b) testimony, I asked few questions of the prosecutor’s blood witness, knowing that many particulars had not been spelled out to the jury by the prosecutor’s blood witness.


In closing argument, among other things, we pointed out the length of time after the draw before the specimen was sent to the lab, that their own evidence required refrigeration, but there was not evidence before them of any such compliance. Discussions with jurors after the verdict, including a letter from one of the jurors on the case, reinforced my suspicion that the jury had no evidence before it as to the significance of the specimen not being refrigerated nor about several other preservation practices. Juror feedback is always an education. It teaches me what is important to them, what I can do better, and sometimes serves to reinforce some things I hold true. And by not filling in holes in the prosecutor’s case for them, and instead conducting some of our cross examination of the prosecutor’s blood witness in closing argument, we screwed up another perfectly good appeal when the jury returned its not guilty verdict.


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