Contents
PAGE About the Author
I-5
An Overview
I-9 CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY
1.
Short title and commencement
1
2.
Definitions
14 CHAPTER II
UNFAIR MEANS AND OFFENCES 3.
Unfair means
62
4.
Conspiracy for unfair means
66
5.
Disruption to conduct public examination
68
6.
Other offences
70
7.
No premises other than examination centre shall be used for public examination
71
8.
Offences in respect of service providers and other persons
72
CHAPTER III PUNISHMENT FOR OFFENCES 9.
Cognizable offences
75
10.
Punishment for offences under this Act
79
11.
Organised crimes
82
I-7
CONTENTS
I-8 PAGE
CHAPTER IV INQUIRY AND INVESTIGATION 12.
Officers empowered to investigate
84
12A.
Fast tracked investigation and Special Fast Track Courts
89
12B.
Appeals
97 CHAPTER V MISCELLANEOUS
Members, officers and employees of public examination authority to be public servants
101
Protection of action taken in good faith by any public servant
102
15.
Provisions of this Act to be in addition to other laws
105
16.
Power to make rules
105
17.
Laying of rules
107
18.
Power to remove difficulties
107
13. 14.
CHAPTER VI AMENDMENT TO THE CRIMINAL LAW (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 1944 19.
Amendment of Ordinance 38 of 1944
109
SCHEDULE
110
SUBJECT INDEX
111
Appendix I
: Provisions of other Acts referred to in Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024
113
Appendix II : Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Amendment Act, 2026
115
Appendix III : Statement of objects and reasons
119
Appendix IV : Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 1944
121
Appendix V : Section 112 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (As applicable w.e.f. 1-7-2024)
131
Appendix VI : Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Rules, 2024
133
PUBLIC EXAMINATIONS (PREVENTION OF UNFAIR MEANS) ACT, 2024* [1 of 2024]
An Act to prevent unfair means in the public examinations and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. BE it enacted by Parliament in the Seventy-fifth Year of the Republic of India as follows:— CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY
Short title and commencement. 1. (1) This Act may be called the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024. (2) It shall come into force on such date† as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint. COMMENTS SECTION NOTES
1.1 General
The Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Public Examinations Act’ or ‘PEA’) received the Assent of the President on 12-2-2024.
Section 2(1)(k) of PEA defines “Public Examination”.
* Dated 12-2-2024. †Notification No. S.O. 2422(E), dated 21-6-2024 - In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 1 of the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 (1 of 2024), the Central Government hereby appoints the 21st day of June, 2024 as the date on which the provisions of the said Act shall come into force.
1
S. 1
PUBLIC EXAMINATIONS (PUM) ACT, 2024
2
Section 1 relates to Short Title and Commencement of the Act.
Section 1 provides that the PEA shall come into force on such date as the Central Government appoints by Notification in the Official Gazette. The PEA has come into force with effect from 21-6-2024.
Section 1 is silent on “Extent”. This means that the PEA will apply all over India without exclusion for any States or UTs.
1.2 Aims and Objects of PEA According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the PEA Bill, the following are the avowed aims and objects of the Legislation:
Malpractice in public examinations lead to delays and cancellation of examinations adversely impacting the prospects of millions of youth. At present, there is no specific substantive law to deal with unfair means adopted or offences committed by various entities involved in the conduct of public examinations by the Central Government and its agencies. Therefore, it is imperative that elements that exploit vulnerabilities of examination system are identified and effectively dealt with by a comprehensive Central legislation. PEA seeks to fill this void. [Para 2 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons]
The objective of the PEA is to bring greater transparency, fairness and credibility to the public examination systems and to reassure the youth that their sincere and genuine efforts will be fairly rewarded and their future is safe. [Para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons]
The PEA is aimed at effectively and legally deterring persons, organized groups or institutions that indulge in various unfair means and adversely impact the public examination systems for monetary or wrongful gains.
The PEA shall serve as a model draft for States to adopt at their discretion. This would aid States in preventing the criminal elements from disrupting conduct of their State level public examinations. [Para 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons]
Till such time the states pass a law along the lines of PEA, they can act against paper leak in State Government public exams by invoking section 112 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 which come into force with effect from 1-72024.
Once any state passes a law like PEA, it can act against paper leaks in public exams of the State Government under such law as well as under section 112 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
The Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 (the Act/PEA) was enacted to prevent resorting to unfair means in public examinations and to provide for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. The Act, being a pan-Indian legislation, aims at effectively deterring persons, organised groups and institutions from indulging in unfair means thereby committing offences, adversely impacting the sanctity of public examinations. The objective of the Act is to bring
3
CH. I : PRELIMINARY
S. 1
greater transparency, fairness and credibility and inspire confidence in the public examinations system. The PEA provides a comprehensive national legal framework to prevent unfair means in public examinations. The Act applies to examinations conducted by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), Staff Selection Commission (SSC), Railway Recruitment Boards (RRBs), Institute of Banking Personnel Selection (IBPS), National Testing Agency (NTA), Ministries and Departments of the Central Government and their attached and subordinate offices for recruitment, as well as such other authorities as may be notified by the Central Government. All offences under the Act are cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable, with stringent provisions relating to imprisonment, fine and attachment of property. [PIB Press Release, dated 27.07.2026] 1.3 Amendments made to PEA by the 2026 Amendment Act The 2026 Amendment Act has made amendments to Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Act and has inserted new Sections 12A and 12B in the Act in order to achieve the above objectives The amendments seek to further strengthen the provisions of the Act to effectively deter unfair means and organized malpractices in public examinations by providing for:
fast-tracked investigation,
speedy trial through Special Fast Track Courts,
appointment of Special Public Prosecutors,
time-bound disposal of appeals and
more stringent penal provisions.
1.4 Aims and Objects of the amendments made by the 2026 Amendment Act Post the enactment of PEA, there have been some incidents of question paper leakages and malpractices in examinations conducted by public examination authorities, which tend to affect the transparency and fairness of the public examinations system. Hence, in order to further strengthen the fairness, to enhance the credibility of the public examinations system and to facilitate speedy trial and ensure timebound investigations of offences under the Act, the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Amendment Act, 2026 (the 2026 Amendment Act) makes amendments to the Act to achieve the following objectives: (i) to empower all State Governments and Union territory Administrations to designate any Court of Session to be a Special Fast Track Court to try offences under the Act; (ii) to provide that the proceedings in such Special Fast Track Courts are continued on a day-to-day basis and the trial shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of filing of the charge sheet;
S. 1
PUBLIC EXAMINATIONS (PUM) ACT, 2024
4
(iii) to empower the Central Government to also constitute a Special Task Force for investigation of any offence, if necessary; (iv) to provide that the investigations for offences under the said Act are completed within a period of two months; (v) to empower all State Governments and Union territory Administrations to appoint one or more Special Public Prosecutors for conduct of cases under the said Act; (vi) to enhance the term of imprisonment and fines provided therein for offences committed under the said Act; and (vii) to provide for an appeal mechanism as against any judgment, sentence or order to a bench of two Judges of the High Court, and for disposal of the same within a period of three months from the date of admission of appeal. The amendments have been brought in to reinforce the existing legal frame work in view of incidents of question paper leakages and organized examination-related mal practices reported in recent years. They are aimed at ensuring greater accountability, strengthening deterrence against such offences and safeguarding the integrity of public examinations. The above amendments are aimed at further strengthening the legal framework for preventing examination related mal practices, including question paper leakages, impersonation and organized cheating, while ensuring swift investigation, speedy trial and timely disposal of appeals. By strengthening deterrence against such offences and ensuring prompt delivery of justice, the Amendments seek to uphold the integrity, fairness and transparency of public examinations, protect the interests of deserving and meritorious candidates, and reinforce public confidence in the integrity, fairness and transparency of the country’s public examination system. [PIB Press Release, dated 27.07.2026] 1.5 Date of coming into force of the Amendments The amendments made by the 2026 Amendment Act shall come into force from the Date of Presidential Assent to the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Amendment Bill, 2026. There are no provisions in the 2026 Amendment Act enabling the Central Government to decide the date of enforcement of the amendments or to enforce the amendments in a phased gradual manner. 1.5-1 Basic rule of Interpretation
Plain words in a Statute - The basic rule in interpretation of any statutory provision is that the plain words of the statute must be given effect to. It is only in the case of ambiguity that the principle of strict/liberal interpretation would arise.1
Function of the Court - The interpretative function of the court is to discover the true legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the court must,
1. CCE v. Bhalla Enterprises (2005) 8 SCC 308.
5
CH. I : PRELIMINARY
S. 1
if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only, then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional.2
Interpretation of Statement of Objects and Reasons [“SOR”]
Every statute shall have to be considered in its entirety and picking up of one word from one particular provision and thereby analyzing it in a manner contrary to the statement of objects and reasons is neither permissible nor warranted. There are certain fixed canons of construction and interpretation of statutes and the High Court’s finding as regards the office of competent authority being administrative is not only an infraction of the statute but contrary to all norms and canons of construction. A statute cannot be read in the manner as it has been by the High Court. True intent of the legislature shall have to be gathered and deciphered in its proper spirit having due regard to the language used therein. Statement of objects and reasons is undoubtedly an aid to construction and a useful guide but the interpretations and the intent shall have to be gathered from the entirety of the statute and when the language of the sections providing an appeal to a forum is clear and categorical no external aid is permissible in interpretation of the same. The legislature has deliberately used “every order” and if the restrictive meaning is attributed, as has been so done by the High Court, then the word “every” in any event becomes totally redundant but since the legislature avoids redundancy every word used in the particular provision shall have to be attributed a meaning and attribution of any meaning to the word “every” by itself would negate the interpretation as found favour with the High Court. The word “every” has been totally ignored, which is neither permissible nor warranted.3
The basic purpose of interpretation of statutes is further to aid in determining either the general object of the legislation or the meaning of
2. Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta (2005) 2 SCC 271. 3. State of Maharashtra v. Marwanjee F. Desai (2002) 2 SCC 318.
S. 1
PUBLIC EXAMINATIONS (PUM) ACT, 2024
6
the language in any particular provision. It is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accordance with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtful interpretation, be presumed to be the true one. The intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute. On the other hand, it is not impermissible, but rather is acceptable, to adopt a more reasonable construction and avoid anomalous or unreasonable construction. A sense of the possible injustice of an interpretation ought not to induce Judges to do violence to the well-settled rules of construction, but it may properly lead to the selection of one, rather than the other, of the two reasonable interpretations. In earlier times, statutes imposing criminal or other penalties were required to be construed narrowly in favour of the person proceeded against and were more rigorously applied. The courts were to see whether there appeared any reasonable doubt or ambiguity in construing the relevant provisions. Right from the case of R. v. Jones, ex p Daunton (1963) 1 WLR 270 : (1963) 1 All ER 368 (DC), the basic principles state that even statutes dealing with jurisdiction and procedural law are, if they relate to infliction of penalties, to be strictly construed; compliance with the procedures will be stringently exacted from those proceedings against the person liable to be penalized and if there is any ambiguity or doubt, it will be resolved in favour of the accused/such person. These principles have been applied with approval by different courts even in India. Enactments relating to procedure in courts are usually construed as imperative. A kind of duty is imposed on court or a public officer when no general inconvenience or injustice is caused from different construction. A provision of a statute may impose an absolute or qualified duty upon a public officer which itself may be a relevant consideration while understanding the provision itself. (See Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn. by P. St. J. Langan and R. v. Bullock (1964) 1 QB 481 : (1963) 3 WLR 911 : (1963) 3 All ER 506 (CCA).)4
In Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. v. RBI (1992) 2 SCC 343], it is observed and held by Apex Court that the function of the court is to see that lawful authority is not abused but not to appropriate to itself the task entrusted to that authority. It is further observed that a public body invested with statutory powers must take care not to exceed or abuse its power. It must keep within the limits of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith and it must act reasonably. Courts are not to interfere with economic policy which is the function of experts. It is not the function of the courts to sit in judgment over matters of economic policy and it must necessarily be left to the expert bodies. In such matters even experts can seriously and doubtlessly differ. Courts
4. See Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673.
7
CH. I : PRELIMINARY
S. 1
cannot be expected to decide them without even the aid of experts. It is further observed that it is not the function of the court to amend and lay down some other directions. The function of the court is not to advise in matters relating to financial and economic policies for which bodies like RBI are fully competent. The court can only strike down some or entire directions issued by RBI in case the court is satisfied that the directions were wholly unreasonable or violative of any provisions of the Constitution or any statute. It would be hazardous and risky for the courts to tread an unknown path and should leave such task to the expert bodies. This Court has repeatedly said that matters of economic policy ought to be left to the Government.5
Turning now to the text of the Act, one cannot but be impressed at once with the wording of the full title of the Act. Although there are observations in earlier English cases that the title is not a part of the statute and is, therefore, to be excluded from consideration in construing the statute, it is now settled law that the title of a statute is an important part of the Act and may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining its general scope and of throwing light on its construction, although it cannot override the clear meaning of the enactment. Thus, Privy Council in the matter of interpretation of Indian statutes as will appear from the observations of Lord Hobhouse in Maharani of Burdwan v. Murtunjoy Singh (1886-87) 14 IA 30 at pp. 35-36 : 1887 SCC OnLine PC 1] , namely, that “it is an error to rely on punctuation in construing Acts of the Legislature.” Same opinion was expressed by the Privy Council in L.P.E. Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen [L.P.E. Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen, (1928-29) 56 IA 93 at p. 100: 1928 SCC OnLine PC 93]. If, however, the Rule regarding the rejection of punctuation for the purposes of interpretation is to be regarded as of imperfect obligation and punctuation is to be taken at least as contemporanea expositio, it will nevertheless have to be disregarded if it is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. If punctuation is without sense or conflicts with the plain meaning of the words, the Court will not allow it to cause a meaning to be placed upon the words which they otherwise would not have.6 So long as the Rules relating to pleading and acting in particular jurisdictions of specified High Courts are allowed to remain valid and binding, no intention can be imputed to the legislature, without clear words to that effect, of abrogating these Rules with regard to the few persons who happen to be enrolled as Advocates of the Supreme Court. Far from achieving uniformity in any sense of the word, such step would lead to serious anomaly and practical difficulties of an enormous character.7
5. Small Scale Industrial Manufactures Assn. v. Union of India (2021) 8 SCC 511. 6. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose (1952) 2 SCC 237. 7. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose (1952) 2 SCC 237.
S. 1
PUBLIC EXAMINATIONS (PUM) ACT, 2024
8
Where a statute, embodies a public policy and consequentially prescribes the presence of some conditions for grant of reliefs, parties cannot bypass the law by the exercise of a consent decree or order and mere judicial imprimatur may not validate such decree or order where the Court or Tribunal is not seen to have applied its mind to the existence of those conditions and reached its affirmative conclusion thereon. Such mindless orders are a nullity but where the stage of the proceedings, the materials on record and/or the recitals in the razi disclose the application of the judicial mind, the order is beyond collateral attack merely on the score that it does not ritualistically write into the judgment what is needed by the statute. The important facet of the law clarified in these decisions is that where high public policy finds expression in socio-economic legislation contractual arrangements between interested individuals sanctified into consent or compromise decrees or orders cannot be binding on instrumentalities of the State called upon to enforce the statute, although the tribunals enjoined to enforce the law may take probative note of the recitals in such compromise or consent statements in proof of facts on which their jurisdictions may have to be exercised. Further, if there is no evidence either by way of admissions in consent statements and razis or otherwise on the record, the reliefs sanctioned by the statute cannot be granted and orders or decrees which purport to grant them sans proof of the legal requirements will be a nullity.8
In Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras (1960) 3 SCR 887 it was held that clauses (1) and (2) of Article 31 of the Constitution of India, 1950 as amended grant a limited protection against the exercise of different powers by clause (2) of Article 31 property is protected against compulsory acquisition or requisition. The clause grants protection in terms of widest amplitude against compulsory acquisition or requisition of property, and there is nothing in the Article which indicates that the property protected is to be of individuals or corporations. Even the expression ‘person’ which is used in clause (1) is not used in clauses (2) and (2-A), and the context does not warrant the interpretation that the protection is not to be available against acquisition of State property. Any other construction would mean that properties of municipalities or other local authorities — which would admittedly fall within the definition of State in Part III either cannot be acquired at all or if acquired may be taken without payment of compensation. Entry 42 in List III and clause (2) of Article 31, operate in the same field of legislation: the former enunciates the content of legislative power, and the latter restraints upon the exercise of that power. For ascertaining whether an impugned piece of legislation in relation to acquisition or requisition of property is within legislative competence, the two provisions must be read together. The two provisions being parts of a single legislative pattern relating to the
8. See, State of Punjab v. Amar Singh (1974) 2 SCC 70.
9
CH. I : PRELIMINARY
S. 1
exercise of the right which may for the sake of convenience be called of eminent domain the expression “property” in the two provisions must have the same import in defining the extent of the power and delineating restraints thereon. In other words, Article 31(2) imposes restrictions on the exercise of legislative power under Entry 42 of List III. Property vested in the State may not therefore be acquired under a statute enacted in exercise of legislative power under Entry 42 unless the Statute complies with the requirement of the relevant clauses of Article 31.9
The Supreme Court in Varghese K. Joseph v. Custodian (2011) 3 SCC 394, held, at this stage the salutary object and reasons of the Act also will have to be taken into consideration while interpreting and applying the provisions of a statute wherein efforts are required to be made in construing the different provisions so that each provision will have its play and in the event of any conflict, a harmonious construction is required to be made so that an honest and bona fide investor is not duped of his hard-earned money which he invests by purchasing the equity shares of a company.
While the purpose or object of the legislation is to provide a remedy for the malady, the legislative intention relates to the meaning or exposition of the remedy as enacted. While dealing with the validity of a classification, the rational nexus of the differentia on which the classification is based has to exist with the purpose or object of the legislation, so determined. The question next is of the manner in which the purpose or object of the enactment has to be determined and the material which can be used for this exercise. For determining the purpose or object of the legislation, it is permissible to look into the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law was passed and which necessitated the passing of that law. For the limited purpose of appreciating the background and the antecedent factual matrix leading to the legislation, it is permissible to look into the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill which actuated the step to provide a remedy for the then existing malady. In A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti (1955) 2 SCR 1196 : AIR 1956 SC 246 : (1956) 29 ITR 349, the Statement of Objects and Reasons was used for judging the reasonableness of a classification made in an enactment to see if it infringed or was contrary to the Constitution. In that decision for determining the question, even affidavit on behalf of the State of “the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law there under consideration had been passed and which necessitated the passing of that law” was relied on. It was reiterated in State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1964) 1 SCR 371 : AIR 1963 SC 1241 that the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Bill, when introduced in Parliament, can
9. State of W.B. v. Union of India 1962 SCC OnLine SC 27 : (1964) 1 SCR 371 : AIR 1963 SC 1241.