First Response to Marshall Gillis Archana Murthy, Texas A&M University

First Response to Marshall Gillis Archana Murthy, Texas A&M University

Plato’s theory of forms is the metaphysical foundation upon which an entire theory of Platonic philosophy is built and studied, even today. This paper on the blending of Change and Rest by Marshall Gillis discusses The Sophist, a Platonic dialogue in which it is debated whether the forms are being or coming-into-being – that is, whether they change or rest. This paper argues that the forms of change and rest (henceforth notated as Change and Rest) must blend together because this is the only way for anything to be known, or for knowledge to exist.

Gillis claims that to know a form is to change it while its essential nature rests. (For example, if I know about the form of the good, the Good is changed because it is now known by me. However, it rests and stays the same because it is still the Good.)

The first issue that becomes apparent in this claim is the way that Change, Rest, and knowledge are discussed. It becomes increasingly confusing as to whether change and rest are forms or properties. This is because they are treated as properties (they are applied to forms and applied to objects in a spatiotemporal space) but also called forms. If they are forms, then why do Change and Rest need to change and rest? This is not made clear. Furthermore, in the middle of the paper, Change and Rest are named “objects of knowledge” (Gillis 5). The meaning of this is even more difficult to discern. Is knowledge ontologically before Change and Rest, for them to be objects of knowledge? The bottom line is that if Change and Rest are not in fact forms, then the reason for discussing the necessity of these forms blending is brought into question.

This same confusion is highlighted in Gillis’s argument against Leigh. Leigh claims that forms neither change nor rest because change and rest are only applied in a spatiotemporal space. Leigh seems to be referring to change and rest as properties while Gillis refers to them as forms, which makes any argument to this end ineffective. However, Gillis goes on to claim that forms do change and rest but gives an example of something that occurs in a spatiotemporal space (a football play), which does not address the argument. In fact, all his examples refer to tangible or particular forms (libraries, football passes) and none refer to universal forms (justice, love, intelligence). If nontangible examples were given (if that is possible) then the point being made may have been strengthened.

However, the core issue with this idea comes down to the discussion of Cambridge changes (wherein something is considered changed because it is predicated differently). An example of this change given in the paper is a woman changing her name upon marriage – something about her is changed but she still remains the same person. Not only does Gillis claim that Cambridge changes are how forms blend, because they are able to change while still resting in their essential nature, he also claims that Cambridge changes are what allow forms to be predicated in the real world which is necessary to be real and “fully participate in Being” (Gillis 8).

This idea is fundamentally against how Plato thought of the forms. Plato describes the forms as unchanging truths residing in heavens of which the tangible world around us is a mere imitation. As humans, we strive to learn the forms but if we fail to do so, the forms still exist. The forms are independent of us and this material world. Plato would not agree with the thought that “a football play is only valuable insofar as it can actually be performed” (Gillis 8). The existence of the forms is not dependent upon what (we believe) is possible in our physical space. The forms are organized in a heavens-down model, not a world-up model.

Furthermore, the way a Cambridge change is used here attempts to place forms in a limbo between changing and not changing and seems to dodge choosing one or the other. When a woman changes her name upon marriage, either it is a fundamental change (she now is a part of a new family, she has a responsibility to someone other than herself), or it is not and nothing about her fundamentally changes. It cannot be both a change and not a change at the same time. If that woman did change fundamentally with the act of being married, then she is not the same in her essence. I say this not to argue against the existence of Cambridge changes, but to show that even if they did exist, they would not apply to this argument with the forms. Either a Cambridge change is not a real change (in which case the forms do not change, only rest), or it is a real change (in which case the forms change and do not rest).