` S E P T E MBER 2 0 2 6
I S S UE 53
COLLEAGUES THE OFFICIAL SV PARTNERS NEWSLETTER
IN THIS ISSUE
"BUT WE ARE A SECURED LENDER... JUST CHECK THE PPSR"
" Bu t We A re a Secured Lender... Just Check the PPSR"
Frank O'Neill - Director | Mackay
This was the response we recently encountered during a liquidation involving a large logistics and transport business. With this position, three stakeholders were involved: 1. 2. 3.
The Company (in liquidation); an equipment hire company; and a secured lender.
At face value, the position appeared reasonable. PPSR registrations existed. The hire company was the registered owner of the trailers. A third-party lender had funded the equipment. Everyone involved considered themselves protected.
possession of the trailers for more than two years, section 34 of the PPSA became highly relevant to whether the lender's PMSIs remained continuously perfected and retained priority. The result was a perfect PPSA storm: • • • •
The legal position, however, was very different! The Company had numerous trailers in its possession under long-term hire arrangements. Those arrangements were open-ended, month-to-month equipment leases and, in substance, constituted PPS leases pursuant to section 13 of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth). Critically, the trailers had remained in the Company's possession for more than two years. This is where the issues began. In this matter, the hire company had circa $1 million worth of trailers in the Company's possession for several years. The issue was not that PPSR registrations did not exist at all. Rather, the registrations had not been perfected against the company actually in possession of the assets. Instead, various registrations had been lodged against the hire company itself. That distinction proved critical. As cases such as Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (in liq) (receivers and managers appointed) v General Electric International Inc and OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Alleasing Pty Ltd demonstrate, the PPSA can produce tough outcomes where perfection requirements are not strictly satisfied. That is precisely what occurred here. Because the interests were not properly perfected against the grantor in possession, section 267 of the PPSA operated such that the relevant interests vested in the Company upon the commencement of the liquidation. To make matters more complex, a third-party lender had funded the purchase of some of the trailers and had registered PMSIs over the equipment, with those PMSIs having been granted by the hire company. However, because the Company had retained
assets worth substantial sums vested in the Company; the liquidators were entitled to realise the equipment for the benefit of creditors; the lender, which believed it held enforceable security, was suddenly exposed; and the hire company remained liable to the lender, but without the underlying assets required to satisfy that debt.
Ultimately, the hire company and lender were required to release PPSR registrations to allow the liquidation and realisation process to proceed. One of the recurring misconceptions we still encounter is: "we own the asset, therefore we are safe”. Under the PPSA, ownership alone is not enough. A party can have genuine ownership, signed agreements, active financing arrangements and longstanding commercial dealings, and still lose priority because the registration is defective. Importantly, these issues often remain invisible until an insolvency event forces parties to test the validity of their security interests. The lesson for financiers, equipment hire businesses, accountants and lawyers is straightforward: registering a security interest is not a "set and forget" exercise. The PPSR position particularly where: • • • • •
requires
ongoing
The Ins and Outs of a Director’s Remuneration
What Will a Recession in Australia Mean for Corporate Insolvency Rates? (Opinion Piece)
S c a n t o re a d m o re articles
review,
equipment remains in a customer's possession for extended periods; leases roll over indefinitely; entities restructure or refinance; security positions evolve over time; or registrations were originally prepared years earlier by third parties.
Once an insolvency appointment occurs, there is very little room for commercial arguments or intentions. Either the security interest is perfected correctly, or it is not. By the time liquidators and insolvency lawyers are debating those issues, it is usually already too late.
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W h a t t h e ATO Looks for in a Successful Small Business Restructure – A Guide for Professionals Advising Clients in Financial Difficulty
s v p a r t n e r s .c o m . a u 1 8 0 0 2 4 6 8 01
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S V P A RTNER S A Final Thought
In this matter, that distinction changed the outcome entirely.
The PPSA is indifferent to commercial expectations.
For those relying on the PPSR, the lesson is clear: never assume that being "secured" means you are protected. Verify it before someone else is appointed to test it.
It does not ask what the parties intended, who paid for the asset, or who believed they were protected. It asks whether the security interest was perfected in accordance with the legislation.
WHAT THE ATO LOOKS FOR IN A SUCCESSFUL SMALL BUSINESS RESTRUCTURE A GUIDE FOR PROFESSIONALS Jason Cronan (Director) | Sunshine Coast
Small Business Restructures (SBRs) continue to be a viable option for companies to compromise debts owed and to allow them to continue operating. The ATO is the largest creditor in most SBRs, and therefore its vote often decides whether the SBR is accepted. Understanding how the ATO assesses an SBR proposal can assist you better position a client before an appointment. Below are some key issues to consider. 1.
Compliance – Lodgements and Payment History
A prerequisite for an SBR is all taxation lodgements need to be up to date, and employee entitlements paid. Even if lodgements and entitlements are now up to date, the ATO typically views poor historical lodgement and payment compliance unfavourably. What to do – Paying something to the ATO is better than nothing! If payment compliance is poor, paying regular, affordable amounts is viewed more favourably. 2.
Director Loans and Drawings
The ATO will scrutinise director loan accounts. Large debit balances, unexplained drawings, Division 7A breaches, or personal expenses run through the company can all undermine an SBR proposal. The ATO may not accept an SBR where a director has ‘profited’ at the ATO’s expense.
What to do – Some factors to consider include reducing / repaying the loan, minimising drawings / personal spending, paying wages instead of taking drawings, having a plan to repay amounts owed and including director personal contributions in the SBR proposal. 3.
Demonstrable Cash Flow Viability
SBR proposals can last up to 3 years. For proposals over time, a cash flow forecast must be provided for the period of the SBR to demonstrates the ‘restructured’ business can trade profitably to meet post-appointment obligations and the SBR repayments. What to do – Critically review historical financial performance and identify areas for improvement (e.g. revenue improvement opportunities such as new markets or increasing prices, reviewing and reducing excessive costs and expenses, consider the profitability of certain projects, etc). Ensure forecasts are realistic, demonstrate improved financial performance to meet ongoing financial obligations and the SBR, and changes to financial performance can be supported by sound reasoning. If time permits, implement these changes prior to the SBR to help prove financial improvement and change. 4.
A Reasonable, Affordable Proposal
The ATO compares the SBR against a liquidation outcome (including recoveries from assets
of the company, insolvent trading, voidable transactions and loan accounts). The SBR should deliver a better return, be supported by the company's actual financial position, and be capable of being funded from genuine trading surplus or third-party contributions. Shorter SBR periods with credible funding are generally preferred over extended terms. 5.
Extenuating Circumstances
Often extraordinary factors, such as Covid 19, one-off financial impacts to the business, natural disasters, and health problems contribute to a company’s financial distress. The ATO will consider such factors where it can be shown they have materially contributed to the company’s financial difficulties. What to do – Provide relevant evidence to support any connection between one-off or extraordinary events contributing to the financial position and any changes that will assist mitigate any future impact. 6.
Early Advice
Seek professional advice from SV Partners at an early stage to help provide your clients the best opportunity to prepare a successful SBR. We continue to see strong support from the ATO for SBR proposals that consider these factors.
THE INS AND OUTS OF A DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION Hillary Orr (Consultant) and Travis Olsen (Director) | Adelaide
The ability of a director to draw remuneration is dictated by a company’s constitution. If the constitution stipulates that a director has no entitlement to remuneration then they will be unable to claim. If there is no constitution then a director will need a contract of employment, written resolution or shareholder agreement to have an entitlement to remuneration. While an accountant will work with a director, who has an entitlement to receive remuneration, to minimise the client’s tax position within the confines of the
Income Tax legislation, there can be occasions when such a structure does not benefit the client
Workers Compensation Schemes
who are dependent for income on a deceased worker who suffered a workplace fatality. The compensation is based on the Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) of the worker paid during the twelve-month period prior to the injury by the employer under whose employment the injury occurred.
In South Australia, the Return to Work Act 2014 (SA) sets out the provisions for compensating workers who suffer a work injury or dependents
The legislation is complex and there are a number of exemptions for certain classes of workers and contractors. While a director may
This article discusses some of the anomalies associated with the remuneration of a director of a company in adverse circumstances.
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S V P A RT NERS
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be a working director of a company that does not necessarily mean that they will be entitled to AWE if they are not paid a wage from which tax has been deducted and in respect of which superannuation payments have been made. Hence a distribution of profits to a director as a shareholder of the company or the director as a beneficiary of a trust of which the company is the trustee may not be classified as a wage. This can substantially reduce a working director’s entitlement or the entitlement of dependents. While the incidence of injury is not normally contemplated, there may be benefit in giving consideration to payment of even a minimum wage to a director. This is particularly relevant if the work carried out by a director is in an industry that has a higher incidence of accidents such as truck driving. It should be noted that WorkCover legislation is state based legislation and varies from state to state. The comments in this article relate to South Australia. Exemptions in insolvency for a Director remunerated as an employee The Corporations Act 2001 (Act) makes provision for the employees of an insolvent company to be paid in priority to the unsecured creditors of the company.
Where a director is paid as an employee and therefore has tax deducted from their wage and superannuation paid, the director, their spouse and any relative (as defined in the Act) are considered excluded employees. This means that any excluded employee is limited to a priority of: •
$2,000 for unpaid wages and superannuation; and $1,500 for unpaid leave entitlements.
•
The balance of all other entitlements rank equally with all remaining creditors. The Fair Entitlements Guarantee Act 2012 (FEG) is generally available to employees of a company which has gone into liquidation and where the liquidator has insufficient funds to meet the priority claims of employees. The specifics of the mechanics for making a claim are outside of the scope of this article but it is relevant to note that excluded employees are excluded from claiming pursuant to FEG. Director paid via distributions As noted above, a director is often not formally employed by a company but rather receives compensation from distributions in their capacity as a shareholder of the company or beneficiary
of the trust. Where a director is paid via distribution, the usual accounting treatment for the distributions/ drawings taken throughout the year is to record them as a loan payable by the director. When the distribution is made, the loan is credited with the distribution, thereby reducing the loan payable. Where such an arrangement can cause issues for the director is in the event of a liquidation where the drawings exceed the distributions. This can leave a debt payable by the director that a liquidator is required to pursue should the company be placed into liquidation. Such action to recover the loan may include taking steps to make the director bankrupt. In addition, the existence of director debit loan accounts may cause issues with creditors voting favourably on any proposal for a restructure via either a voluntary administration or a small business restructuring. When working with a director to determine how they may be paid it is important to consider the pros and cons of the elected payment method taking into consideration the industry and its risk from both a personal injury and financial risk perspective.
WHAT WILL RECESSION IN AUSTRALIA MEAN FOR CORPORATE INSOLVENCY RATES? (OPINION PIECE) Matthew Bookless (Director) - Gold Coast
The 'R' word has been mentioned more in recent weeks, which tends to attract the attention of most observant liquidators, and I have not been immune. A word of warning, this article contains enough graphs and statistics to make Alan Kohler blush, so if such things trigger you, I apologise and will not be offended if you park your eyeballs here. Since 2022, Australia's corporate insolvency rate (as a proportion of total businesses) has been increasing quickly (by almost 300%). Company Insolvencies
Quarterly, share of businesses, seasonally adjusted*
%
%
0.25
are considered as a proportion of total registered companies. Australia has recorded relatively few technical recessions since 1970 and the historical relationship between recession and corporate insolvency rates has been anything but predictable when considered in isolation. What could we expect from a new recession? I have explored whether the consumer confidence index may provide greater context to the periods of recession, allowing us to better anticipate the relationship between recession and corporate insolvency rates at any given point in time. The below chart plots Australian consumer confidence since 1973.
0.25
0.20
0.20 Share of registered companies
0.15
0.15
0.10
0.10 Share of operating businesses
0.05 0.00 *
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
0.05
2020
Shaded areas indicate two consecutive quarters of negative growth in GDP, and the two subsequent quarters after. Earliest observation June 1967. Latest observation December 2024. Series break in June 2004. Shares prior to this are calculated relative to registered companies; shares after June 2004 are calculated based on the total number of businesses operating at the end of each financial year. Data from 1967 to 1991 are annual estimates based on data for some states. Sources: ABS; ASIC; RBA.
0.00 2025
Whilst the number of external administrations in FY26 were at an all-time high, we are nowhere near the lofty highs of the '70's, when insolvency rates Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional Standards Legislation
*ANZ-Roy Morgan Australia
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S V P A RTNER S I have overlaid the consumer confidence data above onto the corporate insolvencies / recession data, as depicted below:
up' argument. If we adopt the patterns of the mid-80's and early '90s, we can now see the elevated corporate insolvency rate is also likely in response to plummeting consumer confidence, which is at an all-time low. In my opinion, the limited historical data supports that insolvency rates would increase meaningfully further in the event of a recession in the near future, so long as the consumer confidence index remained at its current level or declined further. Are higher insolvency rates possible? You may question whether the record insolvency numbers have largely cleared out the dead wood from the economy, leaving fewer distressed entities among the approximately 2.8m actively traded Australian businesses, thereby, muting the further impact a new recession may have on corporate insolvency rates.
Corporate insolvency rates fell during the 1970's recession, fell leading into the 1980's recession before staying flat, and they rose sharply leading into the 1990's recession. Whilst corporate insolvency rates during recessions appear to be somewhat unpredictable, when consumer confidence is added to the story it appears to provide more insight as to what corporate insolvency rates may do. The early 1990s recession (yep, the one we had to have) provides the clearest historical example of elevated corporate insolvency rates during a recession. Furthermore, when looking at consumer confidence, this index took a nose-dive from around 1984 (my birth year, so I try not to read into that) until around 1990, seemingly culminating in the 1990/1991 recession. The 2020 (Pandemic) technical recession produced an unusual result and should be relied on cautiously: formal insolvency activity was extremely subdued (apologies to the many liquidators still suffering from PTSD) notwithstanding the recession and consumer confidence had plunged coming into the pandemic which would have ordinarily, I expect, caused corporate insolvency rates to become elevated. I consider the Pandemic to be an anomaly due to the extraordinary Government support, temporary restrictions on creditor enforcement and other interventions that created an artificial insolvency environment. For this reason, the Pandemic data should not be relied upon too heavily when considering the correlation between recessions and corporate insolvency rates. It is no doubt true the elevated corporate insolvencies since the Pandemic (both numbers and rates) are to some degree making up lost ground from when insolvency was effectively paused, and by extension these elevated levels would have to be treated as somewhat artificial given their cause. However, I think we may have been placing too much weight on this 'catch
Scan to continue re a d i n g
However, when you consider that the net change of business entries and exits over the past three years (average of 2.8% increase in businesses year on year), is consistent with the three years prior to the Pandemic, and there are around 23% more actively traded business now (at 30 June 2026) compared to 30 June 2020, my view is the significant insolvency rates we have recently experienced do not appear to have caused a decoupling from the longer term trend and there is, therefore, likely sufficient dry lumber in the forest ready to ignite if a recession strikes and, importantly, consumer confidence remains at these record low levels, or deteriorates further. Pitfalls of insolvency predictions There are, of course, pitfalls to trying to predict what future insolvency rates will look like. The biggest one, which I perhaps should have opened with, is that my predictions on insolvency always seem to be wrong! Additionally, history argues against predicting an impact on insolvency rates from the GDP result alone. Whilst the addition of the consumer confidence data assists, as demonstrated above, Government policy can also impact the outcome significantly. Fundamentals remain the same While I may have set upon this folly hoping to stumble upon an undeniable method to predict insolvency rates during a recession, the reality is for most of us it is the economic circumstance of our clients that ought to attract our greatest attention. And what is undeniable here, is that the fundamental leading indicators to determine a company's risk of insolvency remain cashflow shortfalls, continuing losses, ATO and superannuation arrears, and creditor enforcement. These are things Xero or MYOB likely already know about your clients, but, sadly, I do not. Accordingly, a director needs to be willing to seek advice about the available options to avert a crisis and avoid becoming an unwilling piece of data feeding the insolvency charts.
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SV PARTNERS SYDNEY 20 YEARS This year marks a significant milestone as SV Partners Sydney celebrates 20 years of serving clients, supporting businesses and contributing to the insolvency and restructuring profession. Over the past two decades, the Sydney team has built a strong reputation for delivering trusted advice, practical solutions and exceptional service through changing economic conditions and an evolving business landscape. This achievement reflects the dedication, expertise and relationships that have been fostered along the way. As we celebrate this milestone, we extend our thanks to our clients, referrers and team members, past and present, who have been part of the journey. Here's to 20 years of success and to many more years ahead for SV Partners Sydney. Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional Standards Legislation
CONGRATULATIONS Daniel Drayton Associate Director (Newcastle) Congratulations to Daniel Drayton for successfully obtaining his registration as a Bankruptcy Trustee.