Reprinted with the kind permission of Defence International Magazine
EXECUTIVE
FORUM Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, talks to Gwyn Winfield of Defense International about the developing role of NATO
GW: We are now in the situation where NATO is in Sudan, a scenario that would have been unthinkable five years ago. It is a dynamic situation there at the moment; while the African Union (AU) troops are being flown in, the killing would seem to have stopped mainly because most of the villages have been destroyed. With both NATO and the US performing airlift, how does NATO fit into the whole force mix? HdS: NATO – and by this I don’t just mean the US; it includes many other allies as well – are working to a time schedule decided by the African Union. The moment that the battalions are ready, a number of allies – Brits, Americans and Dutch – will fly in the different battalions (eight in total) of the AU. The Nigerians went in first in Nigerian aircraft funded by the UK, and Americans are in the process of flying them in now. Between now and an unspecified number of weeks the eight battalions bringing the force up to strength will be brought in. The larger part of the airlift is being done by NATO, although a few are happening under the EU banner – but we shouldn’t be parochial and get into theology. I am interested in the practical support. The second part is a UN sponsored MapEX, a map exercise where we have NATO people participating in Darfur. The third element leadership training of the AU, which is taking place as we speak in Nairobi where the AU has a centre of excellence – created with UK support. GW: It is so much activity but there are problems, for example with the AU rules of engagement – they can do very little and are not organised. It is a case of closing the stable door after the horse has bolted; tens of thousands of people have been driven out already, so whatever you do the end result will not be very impressive. Couldn’t NATO do more? HdS: I would answer yes, but as things stand NATO cannot and will not do more. It would mean a completely different situation and approach. There is no possibility of doing anything greater because the Security Council because it is deadlocked on Darfur. I have not been there, but what I heard from the AU is that where they are they are doing a good job. But the AU cannot do everything given their mandate and rules of engagement, but that does not mean that NATO can do more. We are doing what we have been asked to do by the AU.
Behind all this there is the mantra that for African problems you should seek African solutions – this is a test case for the AU. It is not up to NATO to take on a bigger role, unless the AU asks for it, and that would have to be put on the table and I don’t know what the reaction would be in this building. That is an “if”; it is a virtual rather than real scenario at the moment. GW: How do the new NATO nations fit into Darfur? All the nations that you have mentioned have been “old” NATO using key enablers such as airlift, but the new nations lack these sorts of resources. HdS: There is, in the whole NATO transformational process, the conversation about what are called the critical enablers. The comparison with other missions is a valid one, as part of the critical enabler discussion always involves strategic and tactical lift. The modern military may ask if there is a difference between strategic and tactical, so I just define them as strategic being over longer distances and tactical as in-theatre. When you bring it down to basics, this becomes “how many C17s does NATO have and how many C130s and C160s?” The new NATO allies, and you cannot blame them for this, are not in a position, yet, to participate fully when you talk about heavy lifting into Darfur. This does not mean that they don’t participate, as they have given political support to this operation. You are right in saying that, for example with my countrymen, how can the Dutch participate? Not because they have C17s, but because they have two DC10 tankers which they can rearrange for troop transports. Why do the Americans participate? Well, they have C17s! I have come out before and will do so again on the debate about transformation: NATO should own more critical enablers, perhaps on the basis of AWACs, on which nations can draw (and you can devise a system to do this). It is part of the common funding debate and they should be commonly funded. It is obvious that if the AU comes and says, “NATO, can you lift battalions into Darfur?” you can do two things. Firstly you can call on the nations that have strategic lift. Only the US and the UK own C17s, and I consider the C17 the standard strategic transporter, as the C5 is much too big. Secondly, you can call on nations that have C130’s and equivalents. These are key for NATO’s transformation process – the airlift, sealift and air-to-air refuelling. I don’t want to make a distinction between old and new NATO allies, as the new NATO
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