Court Funding - PowerPoint Response on State's Motion to Dismiss

Ralston et al. v.

State of Washington

Constitution

Executive

Legislative

Courts

Constitution

Executive

Legislative

Courts

The People

Plaintiffs cause of action is analogous to McCleary v. State.

Mathew and Stephanie McCLEARY, on their own behalf and on behalf of Kelsey and Carter McCleary, their two children in Washington's public schools; Robert and Patty Venema, on their own behalf and on behalf of Halie and Robbie Venema, their two children in Washington's public schools; and Network for Excellence in Washington Schools (“News”), a statewide coalition of community groups, public school districts, and education organizations, Respondents/Cross–Appellants, v.

STATE of Washington, Appellant/Cross–Respondent.

McCleary 173 Wn.2d at 528

Plaintiffs cause of action is analogous to McCleary v. State.

In McCleary, the State contended that the trial court erred by requiring basic education to be funded by state-level sources. It argued that the legislature could discharge its duty to make ample provision for funding education by authorizing nonstate tax sources that are otherwise “dependable and regular.”

Specifically, the State argued that the constitution allowed it to make ample provision for education using a combination of federal funds as well as local funds not derived from excess levies.

The Supreme Court disagreed: “the State’s reliance on local dollars to support the basic education program fails to provide the “ample” funding Article IX, Section 1 requires.

McCleary 173 Wn.2d at 528

Plaintiffs cause of action is analogous to McCleary v. State.

Article IX, Section 1 states that “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.”

The Supreme Court has read it to “confer[] on children in Washington a positive constitutional right to an amply funded education.” McCleary v.

State, 173 Wn.2d 477 (2012) .

Inadequate funding is never a justification for denying a constitutional right. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825 (“the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial.”).

Proposed Class Action Complaint Under the UDJA, citizen litigants allege constitutional violations that have resulted in their filed cases being unnecessarily delayed due to inadequate court funding which has negatively impacted the courts’ ability to administer justice as outlined through Supreme Court Justice Judiciary Reports from 2000 – 2021.

“‘The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.’”

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). Cited in Putman, 166 Wn.2d at 979 striking down the statutory requirement of a certificate of merit in medical negligence cases which interfered with the right of access to the courts.

The court has the inherent authority to assure adequately funded courts as a function of separation of powers.

A separation of powers violation occurs when the action or inaction of one branch threatens the integrity of another.

Hale v. Wellpinit Sch. Dist. No. 49, 165 Wn.2d 494 (2009).

Juvenile Dir., 87 Wn.2d at 245 • “separation of powers … dictates that the judiciary be able to ensure its own survival when insufficient funds are provided by the other branches” • “courts possess inherent power, that is, authority not expressly provided for in the Constitution, but which is derived from the creation of a separate branch of government, and which may be exercised by the branch to protect itself in the performance of its constitutional duties.”

Zylstra, 85 Wn.2d 748-49, 56 • The Legislature’s power of appropriation “does not in any way impair the inherent power of the judiciary to require payment of necessary funds for the efficient administration of justice.”

• Justice Utter concurrence: In the exercise of their power to determine and compel payment of sums of money “the inherent power of courts is not exhausted when the needs of administration of justice have been declared and urged upon the legislative councils. There remains a narrower area in which the courts have inherent power to go further than merely declare the existence of a need. It is an area in which the courts have inherent power to bind the State or the county contractually.”

Unnecessary delays implicate the right of trial by jury • Washington guarantees an “inviolate” right to trial by jury. Wa. Const. art. I, § 21.

• Sofie statutory cap on damages struck down for violating the constitution.

• a constitutional right is violated not just when the right is entirely denied, but when the challenged law or action “burdens,” “impinges,” “interfere[s],” with or “implicate[s]” the underlying right. First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wn.2d 203 (1992).

The Legislature has a mandatory constitutional duty to fund our courts • Const. Art. IV §13: ½ salary of each superior court judge shall be paid by the state the other ½ by the county • The counties were also to pay all costs of facilities and support staff RCW 2.28.139. Salary of Sup. Ct Judges (1914) – skeletal state gov’t.

• RCW 43.135.060 (1979): Prohibiting unfunded mandates on counties including increased levels of service unless fully reimbursed by the state. AG Gordon Op: when the legislature authorizes a new judicial position, it has increased levels of service and is required to reimburse that county for all resulting expenses (such as increased payroll more courtrooms and added court staff). Upheld and cited by our Supreme Court.

• RCW 2.08.061 (1996): requires counties to fund all expenses of new judicial positions beyond the State’s one-half share.

expressio unius est exclusio alterius If the framers had intended that counties have constitutional responsibility for other expenses of the superior courts and such other courts as the legislature might establish, it would have employed the same language as §13 to create concurrent responsibility.

• expressio unius est exclusio alterius – the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the other.” Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wn.2d 286, (1959).

• The omission excludes from the constitutionally assigned county responsibility all which is left unsaid. Cf. State v. Williams, 29. Wn. App. 86, (1981).

The UDJA RCW 7.24.020 affords standing to a party 1) within the zone of interest protected by statute or constitutional provision and (2) who has suffered an “injury in fact, economic or otherwise.” Nelson v. Appleway Chevrolet, Inc., 160 Wn.2d 173(2007) ; Washington State Hous. Fin. Comm’n v. Nat’l Homebuyers Fund, Inc., 193 Wn.2d 704, (2019).

for justiciable controversies, if these elements are met: “(1) parties must have existing and genuine rights or interests; (2) these rights or interests must be direct and substantial; (3) the determination will be a final judgment that extinguishes the dispute, and (4) the proceeding must be genuinely adversarial in character.” Id. The UDJA is “liberally construed and administered,” RCW 7.24.120, and “standing is not intended to be a particularly high bar.” Washington State Hous. Fin. Comm’n, 193 Wn.2d at 712.

The UDJA RCW 7.24.020 affords standing to the plaintiffs because they are 1)within the zone of interest protected by statute or constitutional provision • Const. Article I, §10: Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay. people have a right of access to courts; indeed, it is ‘the bedrock foundation upon which rest all the people’s rights and obligations.’” Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr., P.S., 166 Wn.2d 974 (2009) • Const. Art. I. § 21: Jury trial right. “‘[j]ustice delayed is justice denied’ is literally true for money,” because it “deprives [a plaintiff] of its productive use during that time.” Lane v. City of Seattle, 164 Wn.2d 875(2008).

• Separation of Powers. which assures that the “‘activity of one branch [does not] threaten[] the independence or

integrity or invades the prerogatives of another.’” City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 158 Wn.2d 384 (2006) (quoting State v.

Moreno, 147 Wn.2d 500 (2002)). Because “governments . . . are established to protect and maintain individual rights,” Wa. Const. art. I, § 1, separation of powers serves to prevent arbitrary government actions, I.N.S. v.

Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (according an individual standing to challenge a one-house veto of executive action), and “can serve to safeguard individual liberty.” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014).

The UDJA RCW 7.24.020 affords standing to a the plaintiffs 2) who have suffered an “injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”

• The test for whether there is a qualifying injury “is not meant to be a demanding requirement.” City of Burlington v. Washington State Liquor Control Bd., 187.

Wn. App. 853 (2015).

• Plaintiffs need only show that they were “specifically and perceptibly harmed” by the challenged action. Save a Valuable Env’t (SAVE) v. City of Bothell, 89 Wn.2d 862 (1978).

The UDJA RCW 7.24.020 affords standing to a party for justiciable controversies, if these elements are met: “(1) parties must have existing and genuine rights or interests; (2) these rights or interests must be direct and substantial; (3) the determination will be a final judgment that extinguishes the dispute, and (4) the proceeding must be genuinely adversarial in character.”

The UDJA is “liberally construed and administered,” RCW 7.24.120, and “standing is not intended to be a particularly high bar.” Washington State Hous. Fin. Comm’n, 193 Wn.2d at 712.

Public interest standing exists “[w]here a controversy is of serious public importance and immediately affects substantial segments of the population and its outcome will have a direct bearing on the commerce, finance, labor, industry or agriculture generally,” and therefore supports the proposition that “questions of standing to maintain an action should be given less rigid and more liberal answer.” Farris v. Munro 99 Wn.2d 326 (1983) (quoting Washington Natural Gas Co. v. PUD 1, 77 Wn.2d 94, 96, (1969).