Reply Memo in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Court Funding Case

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THE HONORABLE KRISTIN RICHARDSON ORAL ARGUMENT NOTED FOR Hearing Date: Sept. 10, 2021 Hearing Time: 11:00 a.m.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY JENNIFER RALSTON, CALEB MCNAMARA, THE ESTATE OF MCNAMARA, BRAEDEN SIMON, ABIE EKENEZER, JESSE HUGHEY, TIM KAUCHUK, JORDAN PICKETT, DANIEL PIERCE, SEAN SWANSON, JOEY WIESER, QUINN ZOSCHKE, AND JEFF CUSHMAN,

No. 21-2-06462-7 SEA REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Defendant.

153780423

Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, Washington 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1 AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT .......................................................................... 1 I.

Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Seek Statewide Judicial Funding ....... 1

II.

Plaintiffs’ Legal Remedies Foreclose This Suit ............................... 3

III.

Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Viable ..................................................... 4

IV.

Dismissal with Prejudice Is Warranted ........................................... 7

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 7

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

Page CASES Atl. Cas. Ins. v. Oregon Mut. Ins., 137 Wn. App. 296, 153 P.3d 211 (2007) ............................................................ 4 City of Bothell v. Barnhart, 172 Wn.2d 223, 257 P.3d 648 (2011) ................................................................. 6 Doe AA v. King County, 15 Wn. App. 2d 710, 476 P.3d 1055 (2020) ....................................................... 4 Evergreen Moneysource Mortg. v. Shannon, 167 Wn. App. 242, 274 P.3d 375 (2012) ............................................................ 6 Foss v. Dep’t of Corr., 82 Wn. App. 355, 918 P.2d 521 (1996) .............................................................. 1 Grant County Fire Protection Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 150 Wn.2d 791, 83 P.3d 419 (2004) ................................................................... 3 In re Det. of Reyes, 176 Wn. App. 821, 315 P.3d 532 (2013) ............................................................ 4 King v. King, 162 Wn.2d 378, 174 P.3d 659 (2007) ............................................................. 4, 5 Lewis County v. State, 178 Wn. App. 431, 315 P.3d 550 (2013) ............................................................ 3 Matter of Salary of Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976) ................................................................... 2 O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer, 362 Mass. 507, 287 N.E.2d 608 (1972) .............................................................. 2 Pimentel v. Judges of King Cnty. Superior Ct., 197 Wn.2d 365, 482 P.3d 906 (2021) ................................................................. 3 Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center, 166 Wn.2d 974, 216 P.3d 374 (2009) ................................................................. 5

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wn.2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989) ................................................................. 5 Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wn.2d 286, 347 P.2d 1081 (1959) ................................................................. 6 Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wn.2d 743, 539 P.2d 823 (1975) ................................................................... 2 STATUTES RCW 2.08.061 .......................................................................................................... 6 RCW 43.135.060 ...................................................................................................... 6 OTHER AUTHORITIES Wash. Const. art. I, § 10 .................................................................................. 1, 4, 5 Wash. Const. art. I, § 21 .................................................................................. 1, 5, 6 Wash. Const. art. I, § 22 .......................................................................................... 6 Wash. Const. art. I, § 29 .......................................................................................... 6 Wash. Const. art. IV, § 13 ....................................................................................... 6 Wash. Const. art. IX, § 1 ..................................................................................... 6, 7

MOTION TO DISMISS Case No. 21-2-06462-7 SEA 153780423

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INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is not legally viable. Private litigants lack standing to seek statewide funding on the judiciary’s behalf; to the extent such funding may be sought through litigation, only courts have the power to sue. Even if Plaintiffs had standing, article I, sections 10 and 21 of the Washington Constitution do not compel statewide judicial funding. And the undisputed availability of legal remedies forecloses Plaintiffs’ sweeping requests for equitable relief. Dismissal with prejudice is warranted.

AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT I.

Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Seek Statewide Judicial Funding Plaintiffs conflate two separate issues: standing to assert individual rights

under article I, and standing to invoke the judiciary’s “inherent power” to seek funding. Opp. 14-18. They have neither.

Standing for individual rights: Plaintiffs’ desire to expedite their civil jury trials “is not within the zone of interests protected by any constitutional guarantee in question.” Foss v. Dep’t of Corr., 82 Wn. App. 355, 364, 918 P.2d 521 (1996). They do not claim they have been shut out of the courts in violation of article I, section 10, nor do they claim their jury demands were denied or revoked in violation of article I, section 21. See Mot. 14, 23-29. Instead, Plaintiffs allege injuries outside those provisions’ scope—that their court cases are delayed—even as they disavow “seeking any type of relief from this Court in their individual lawsuits.” Opp. 31. Additionally, Plaintiffs cannot solve their redressability problem: the next budget will not impact their trials. See Mot. 20. The disconnect

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between cause of action, injury, and requested relief defeats standing. See Mot. 11, 18-20.

Standing for inherent power: Plaintiffs do not dispute that they lack standing to “assert[] another’s legal rights,” Mot. 11, or that “inherent” judicial authority is nondelegable, Mot. 15-16. Yet they repeatedly invoke “inherent” judicial authority that does not belong to them. See Opp. 11-18. Even if they had asserted a viable cause of action—which they have not—Plaintiffs offer no reason why they should be permitted to invoke a governmental branch’s inherent power to seek funding for itself, nor could they. See Opp. 14-20. Under Washington precedent, this power belongs solely to the courts. Matter of Salary of Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d 232, 237, 247 n.3, 552 P.2d 163 (1976) (“court action to compel funding of its own functions” is possible) (emphasis added); Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wn.2d 743, 748, 539 P.2d 823 (1975) (absent adequate funds, “the court would be both obligated and empowered to protect its proper functioning”) (emphasis added).1 Claiming a right to exercise inherent judicial authority to seek funding through litigation is no less outlandish than claiming other inherent judicial powers, such as holding parties in contempt or sanctioning unethical lawyers.

Plaintiffs try to avoid this problem by reframing their lawsuit as “asking the Court to exercise its inherent authority,” Opp. 14-15, 27, but a private lawsuit

Plaintiffs’ out-of-state authority supports this conclusion. Opp. 8-9 & n.4.

Four of those cases were initiated by courts. The other involved enforcement of “an invoice” issued by a judge with “authority to bind a county for the payment.”

O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer, 362 Mass. 507, 508, 287 N.E.2d 608 (1972).

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seeking to remedy alleged harm to civil litigants is not a request that the judicial branch litigate its own funding claims. Cf. Opp. 18 (conceding that not “every lawsuit” is “an exercise of judicial power”).

Plaintiffs’ invocation of substantial-public-importance standing cannot overcome these barriers. Opp. 20-21. This “rare” exception applies only to issues that “affect every citizen in the State.” Lewis County v. State, 178 Wn. App. 431, 440, 315 P.3d 550 (2013). Most citizens are not civil litigants experiencing alleged “delays in having their cases tried.” Opp. 21. Plus, the doctrine’s concern with issues “escap[ing] review,” Grant County Fire Protection Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 150 Wn.2d 791, 803, 83 P.3d 419 (2004), does not apply absent a viable cause of action. See infra at 4-7.

II.

Plaintiffs’ Legal Remedies Foreclose This Suit That Plaintiffs “could have pursued several alternative remedies” but “did

not” precludes the requested equitable relief. Pimentel v. Judges of King Cnty.

Superior Ct., 197 Wn.2d 365, 374, 482 P.3d 906 (2021); Opp. 30-31; Mot. 21-22.

They contend these alternatives will not “remedy the funding crisis.” Opp. 31. But again, the only claimed injury is “delays to their day in court.” Opp. 19. Legal remedies are undisputedly available to redress this. That Plaintiffs “prefer” a structural remedy does not make the “alternative remedy” inadequate. Pimentel, 197 Wn.2d at 376.

Citing no authority, Plaintiffs further urge that this suit is not a collateral attack. Opp. 31. But they seek a declaration that delays in their underlying lawsuits have “violate[d] the[ir] constitutional rights.” FAC ¶ 9.2. A “declaratory judgment action” addressing an issue in a pending proceeding is the definition of

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a collateral attack barred by the “priority of action rule.” Atl. Cas. Ins. v. Oregon Mut. Ins., 137 Wn. App. 296, 302, 153 P.3d 211 (2007); see Mot. 22.

III.

Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Viable Plaintiffs do not appear to defend their First, Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth

Causes of Action. See Mot. 22-30; Opp. 21-30. The Second and Third fail as a matter of law.

Second Cause of Action: “Article I, section 10 . . . requires courts [to] conduct judicial proceedings openly and without delay.” Doe AA v. King County, 15 Wn. App. 2d 710, 718, 476 P.3d 1055 (2020) (emphasis added). The Washington Supreme Court has stressed that section 10 is limited to “two contexts: the right of the public and press to be present and gather information at trial and the right to a remedy for a wrong suffered.” King v. King, 162 Wn.2d 378, 388, 174 P.3d 659 (2007) (cleaned up). Neither is implicated here.

Plaintiffs fail to identify any precedent construing section 10 to require structural, affirmative, inter-branch funding reform. Opp. 27-28. In fact, Plaintiffs acknowledge Reyes’s teaching that section 10 is a “command to the judiciary”—not the branch with appropriations power. Opp. 27 (citing 176 Wn. App. 821, 830 315 P.3d 532 (2013)); Mot. 24. While Reyes addressed different facts, Opp. 27, that is irrelevant: Reyes is on-point in recognizing that section 10 is a direction to the judiciary, not the Legislature. Moreover, the Supreme Court has cautioned against “broadly expanding” section 10 to establish a right even to modest public funding for legal representation. King, 162 Wn.2d at 391. Section 10 cannot be read to require the expansive public funding sought here.

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Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center, 166 Wn.2d 974, 216 P.3d 374 (2009), does not salvage Plaintiffs’ section 10 claim. Opp. 27-28. That case says nothing about court funding; it held that a legislative barrier “to the discovery process violate[d] the plaintiffs’ right of access to courts.” Id. at 979. A “command against legislative interference with the right of access,” Opp. 27, is not an affirmative order for new funding legislation. Cf. King, 162 Wn.2d at 390 (whereas “physical barriers to access and services” and “court-imposed fees” can present “obstacles” to court access, reading section 10 to create affirmative rights to publicly funded services is “more than an insignificant linguistic leap”).

Third Cause of Action: Plaintiffs offer no precedent interpreting section 21 to confer a speedy civil trial right, much less to mandate legislative funding to implement it. Opp. 28-29. As previously discussed, section 21 requires courts to provide jury trials to certain litigants; it applies to the Legislature only insofar as it prohibits that branch from revoking the right. Mot. 26-28. Plaintiffs call this a “narrowing” of the right, but they offer no authority for a broader reading. Opp. 28-29.

Plaintiffs lean heavily on Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., but it simply held that “the Legislature cannot intrude into the jury’s fact-finding function in civil actions” by capping damages. 112 Wn.2d 636, 651, 771 P.2d 711 (1989). That is consistent with the State’s amply supported position that section 21 guarantees a jury will hear the case, “not when or how” they hear it. Mot. 29. This Court should reject Plaintiffs’ invocation of precedents addressing qualitatively different constitutional rights. See Opp. 29 & nn.16-19. It should focus on the fact that Plaintiffs’ position would wrongly “engraft” a speedy trial provision—and the

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right to related legislative appropriations—onto section 21, when this was intentionally omitted. Mot. 27 (comparing Wash. Const. art. I, § 21 with § 22).

Unpleaded theories: Instead of defending the First Cause of Action as pleaded, under article I, section 29, Plaintiffs offer new theories.2 These unpleaded theories should be disregarded. See Evergreen Moneysource Mortg. v.

Shannon, 167 Wn. App. 242, 256, 274 P.3d 375 (2012) (“A complaint must state the nature of a plaintiff’s claims and the legal theories upon which the claims rest.”). In any event, they are meritless.

Plaintiffs invoke the expressio unius canon to infer an “implied” funding duty from article IV, section 13. Opp. 23. But section 13 covers only “Salaries of Judicial Officers,” not other expenses. And the canon yields to “the facts and circumstances surrounding the adoption” of the provision. Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wn.2d 286, 295, 347 P.2d 1081 (1959). Plaintiffs admit that the Washington Supreme Court has long recognized section 13’s consistency with the historical understanding that superior-court funding would be “furnished wholly by the counties.” Opp. 9; Mot. 3. Once again, Plaintiffs improperly ask the Court to disregard text and precedent and “engraft” new provisions onto the Constitution.

City of Bothell v. Barnhart, 172 Wn.2d 223, 229, 257 P.3d 648 (2011).

Plaintiffs also urge an “analogy” to precedents applying article IX, section 1. Opp. 23-24. As already discussed, the “lack of any comparable Plaintiffs also briefly invoke RCW 43.135.060. Opp. 12-13. No precedent recognizes a private cause of action under this statute, and Plaintiffs assert none.

Moreover, RCW 2.08.061 is not a “mandate.” It conditions new judicial positions on counties funding their “expenses,” consistent with counties’ funding responsibility. See Mot. 2-4.

2

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language” here makes the extraordinary and wholly unique constitutional duty to fund education inapposite. Mot. 25. Plaintiffs offer no response, other than to pointlessly note that article IX, section 1 does not contain the word “funding” (though it does establish a “paramount duty” to make “ample provision for the education of all children”). Opp. 22. Plaintiffs’ unpleaded, meritless arguments should be disregarded.

IV.

Dismissal with Prejudice Is Warranted Plaintiffs do not request leave to amend or dispute that amendment would

be futile. See Mot. 31.

CONCLUSION The amended complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.

Dated: September 7, 2021 I certify that this memorandum contains 1,747 words, in compliance with the Local Civil Rules.

s/ Gregory F. Miller Harry H. Schneider, Jr., WSBA No. 9404 Gregory F. Miller, WSBA No. 56466 David T. Martin, WSBA No. 50160 Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, Washington 98101-3099 Telephone 206.359.8000 Facsimile 206.359.9000 Email: HSchneider@perkinscoie.com Email: GMiller@perkinscoie.com Email: DMartin@perkinscoie.com Kristin Beneski, WSBA No. 45478 Washington Attorney General’s Office 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 464-7744 kristin.beneski@atg.wa.gov Counsel for Defendant State of Washington

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On September 7, 2021, I caused to be served upon the below named counsel of record, at the address stated below, via the method of service indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document.

Karen K. Koehler Garth L. Jones Daniel R. Laurence Gemma N. Zanowski Edward H. Moore Stritmatter Kessler Koehler Moore X Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Via hand delivery Via U.S. Mail, 1st Class, Postage Prepaid Via Overnight Delivery Via Facsimile Via Eservice

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

EXECUTED at Seattle, Washington, on September 7, 2021.

s/ June Starr June Starr, Legal Assistant

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