7 minute read
Theology & Philosophy
RAD
This year the T&P department has seen a return of our flagship trip to the How the Light Gets in Philosophy Festival. There was also an exciting collaboration between our Isaiah Berlin Society and the Classics Society as we met to discuss theological and philosophical questions surrounding the historical Jesus. Lachlan Murray won the Moral Philosophy Prize for his essay on persistence through change, a version of which is reproduced below.
Football clubs seem to be always changing. Arsenal, for example, proudly claims to be founded in 1886. Back then, they consisted of a gaggle of munitions workers who called themselves Dial Square, in reference to a sundial on the top of their factory. Today, on the other hand, they are a multi-million pound company. Since their creation, they have changed their name at least two other times, their badge has seen several iterations, and the club has moved within Woolwich before transitioning to its current spot in Islington. Obviously none of the players or coaches or kits are the same as when Arsenal was founded. Yet few would state that today’s Arsenal is a different club altogether.
Philosophers have for thousands of years considered questions of identity. My question bears clear similarities to one concerning the ship of Theseus. A ship, ‘returned from Crete’, was preserved by Athenians who ‘took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their places.’ Was the preserved ship the same as the original one? If not, at what point did it lose that identity? These questions were developed by Thomas Hobbes. Suppose the original planks replaced from the ship were collected and used to make a new ship. Which of the two final ships (A the ship preserved by Athenians, or B the ship of original planks reconstructed into the original design), if either, was the true ship of Theseus?
Many famous philosophers have recorded their thoughts on this paradox. There are three principles of identity often considered in these debates, namely an object goes where its parts go, objects can withstand gradual change, and transitivity of identity must be maintained. Three of the proposed solutions simply choose to deny one of these axioms. One solution, for example, denies that an object goes where its parts go. Followers of Aristotle would disagree, believing that all objects are a combination of matter and form. Aristotle would argue that Ship B (the original matter) was the true Ship of Theseus, as the same planks are used in the same construction– the same matter and form. Another solution says that at some point, an object can no longer withstand change. This solution feels particularly flawed though, as the removal of a certain plank which loses the ship’s identity is arbitrary– why does removing the 100th plank change the ship’s identity, but not the 99th? ➦
Some would even take this solution a step further, arguing that an object can never withstand any gradual change. As soon as something changes, an object loses its identity. ‘We both step and do not step in the same rivers. We are and are not, ’mused Heraclitus. The most common interpretation of Heraclitus here is that both the river and the person stepping into it are always changing. Heraclitus argued that we live in a world of flux, and many interpret his words to mean that our identities are also in constant flux. Thus, Heraclitus would likely argue that a football club is never truly the same football club – the moment it changes, it loses that identity.
Heraclitus’ arguments were famously challenged. Quine distinguished rivers from river stages. Quine argues here that any object is formed of infinite snapshots in time. Together, these individual parts create an identity. Quine argues that each of these parts is different from one another so the object (a collection of these parts) can withstand gradual change.
Quine was a perdurantist (believing all things consist of temporal parts as opposed to an endurantist who believe objects are ‘wholly present whenever they exist’). Perdurantism conceives objects as four-dimensional; objects have a defined location in space and a defined location in time. There are two versions of perdurantism – stage theory and worm theory.
The former ascribes identity to the individual temporal parts, such that any object identity only exists within that snapshot. While this may be an intuitive theory, it omits important qualities of football clubs such as history and legacy.
The latter, worm theory, on the other hand, is of great significance to the question; it is often argued to be the sole solution to the Ship of Theseus problem which does not deny any of the axioms of identity. Worm theorists, like Quine, would argue that Ship A and Ship B are both Ships of Theseus. In Hobbes’ thought experiment, they would argue that there were never three ships (the ship before change, ship A and ship B), but instead only two (a worm-like collection of temporal parts for the preserved ship and a separate collection for the ship gradually built with the original matter.) These two ships share a fourdimensional identity at the start before diverging. Transitivity of identity is maintained, because the snapshot defining the ship before change is not the same as the final snapshots of ship A nor ship B (and the two final snapshots are not the same as each other.) This theory could be applied to a football club. Arsenal’s initial fourdimensional identity, at the moment of its creation in 1886, is clearly not the same as its identity today (as time and the matter have changed). Worm theorists would suggest that despite change, there has only been one club: the ever-increasing collection of unique temporal parts throughout its 136-year history.
Although worm theory provides an interesting solution, it can seem counterintuitive and impractical. We all view the world from a conscious mind existing through the present. It is difficult to hear that the present versions of ourselves are merely infinitesimally small pieces of our identities. As American philosopher Ted Sider once jokingly put it, ‘if you wanted to embrace (...) somebody, you’d have to cling to them from cradle to grave.’ What’s more, perdurantism sets some dangerous precedents. For example, if temporal parts are linked but separate, should a present temporal part face punishment for the crimes of a past temporal part? If a criminal bears a different identity, how can punishments be fair? Additionally, at what point does something gain its identity if all the unique momentary snapshots are connected? If you trace anything far enough back, it stems from collisions in stars or supernovas. At what point does an existence start and end? Is timber different from the paper or book it produces? When does the food I eat become a part of me?
To see a better theory, take these examples: it’s useful to say that Mo Salah is the same identity he was at the start of last season, despite more than half of the cells in his body being different. On the contrary, it is not useful to say that Liverpool’s starting XI is the same now as it was at the start of last season, even though more than half of the same players will still be picked. Both the team and the players have identities, yet we choose to define these with different standards. Thus, I do not believe that objects have a clear, intrinsic identity. Different things are defined in different ways. So this is not a question about the nature of objects, but about the way we choose to discuss them. Hume argued this point. Questions about identity ‘can never possibly be decided’ as ‘we have no just’ way to do so. With no constant matter or intrinsic identity, the responsibility of defining a football club lies either with football associations or football fans (or both).
In the FA handbook, a football club is ‘any club which plays the game of football in England and is recognised as such by The Association.’ This definition unhelpfully leaves the meaning of ‘club’ vague, but does highlight one critical point about the nature of a football club: its recognition of existence and status by its respective association. The FA does this by grouping football clubs under clear legal identities. It could be argued that these clubs gain their identity through their accepted application to the FA and retain this identity through the FA’s continued recognition of them.
However, many football fans would say that they are a part of their club, despite no legal attachments. They dictate the identity of a club through their continued following and recognition of the side. In addition to Arsenal’s official website, the fans also proudly date their origin back to the 19th century. Therefore, the supporters, like the associations, believe a football club can undergo changes while retaining its identity.
Generally, I believe a football club’s cultural influence and beloved fanbase is a more important component of its identity than its legal presence.
Fans choose to believe that their club is the same, partly out of pride for the club’s history, but largely out of ease. With no other way to determine why a club stays the same, fans take the easiest option. I therefore believe that the thing which makes a football club the same over time is the way it is perceived by followers of football. ❚
