SP's LandForces December 2011-January 2012

December 2011-January 2012

SP’s

Volume 8 No 6

AN SP GUIDE

TREASURE

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IN THIS ISSUE

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ROUNDUP

T h e O N LY j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

PAGE 6 Pick Up the Pace

The emerging threats and challenges mandate that India should be prepared to fight hybrid wars in the future.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor PAGE 9 Raging Debate on AFSPA Act in J&K

Minister of Defence India I am glad to know that SP Guide Publications, New Delhi is bringing out special editions separately for Indian Air Force, Indian Navy and Indian Army.

Since Shri Sukhdeo Prasad Baranwal founded SP Guide Publications in 1964, it has come a long way in publishing monthly journals and magazines of repute on defence and strategic matters.

In this context, its flagship publication SP’s Military Yearbook deserves a special mention.

I send my best wishes for the successful publication of these special editions on Indian Armed Forces.

A.K. Antony

>> I N D O - P A K W A R 1 9 7 1 PHOTOGRAPH: Indian Army

General (Retd) V.P. Malik PAGE 11 Offensive in the Mountains The decision on the Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) is not only about the capability and the implications. It is also about the message that India is, by its raisings, sending to China. The message is one of deterrence and resolve. It is not an aggressive one, but the second prong of India’s strategy.

Colonel (Retd) Ali Ahmed PAGE 13 Exercise Sudarshan Shakti

The exercise aims to test and confirm fresh concepts, manoeuvres and structures that will finally allow one of the world’s largest land forces to fight its next war more nimbly, with drastically less response time and much greater lethality.

Special Correspondent PLUS First Indo-Afghan Strategic Alliance Harmony in Asia-Pacific Region Geospatial Intelligence and C4I2 News in Brief

10 14 15 17 18

Lest We Forget On the 40th anniversary of India’s victory in the Indo-Pak War 1971, Lt General (Retd) J.F.R. Jacob, the author, who was then the Chief of Staff in the Indian Army’s Eastern Command, narrates how thorough planning, coordination and bold execution led to the surrender of the Pak Army.

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>> I N D O - P A K W A R 1 9 7 1 PHOTOGRAPHS: Indian Army

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N DeceMBer 16, the 40th anniversary of the unconditional public surrender of Lt General A.A.K. Niazi and 93,000 military men of the Pakistan eastern command, let us pay tribute to all those in Bangladesh and India who gave up their lives in the struggle for the liberation of Bangladesh. A special tribute must be paid to the people of Bangladesh who rose against the Pakistani oppressors and resisted them most gallantly. Let us also not forget the tremendous contributions of the freedom fighters of Bangladesh and the east Bengal battalions who fought along with the Indian armed forces.

On the midnight of March 26, 1971, Lt General Yahya Khan ordered the Pakistan Army to crack down on Dhaka University and other areas. Sheikh Mujibur rehman, the hero of the freedom struggle and leader of the struggle for the liberation of Bangladesh, was arrested. the brave people of Bangladesh led by rehman, later deservedly recognised as the father of the nation, rose up and resisted the Pakistan Army. the east Bengal battalions moved into India and the refugees streamed into India.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to help the freedom struggle and gave a verbal order to the Indian Army to help the freedom fighters in east Pakistan. An official order came from her on April 29, 1971.

Meanwhile in early April, many leaders began arriving at Kolkata, prominent amongst them were tajuddin, Nazrul Islam, Mansur Ali, Qamaruzzam, colonel Osmani and Group captain Khadkar. A government in exile was established in a bungalow at 8 theatre road, Kolkata. During my interaction with them, the leaders said that they wanted to have a meeting of the parliamentarians at Baidyanath tala to declare their independence. I suggested that they should issue a declaration as was done by charles de Gaulle in World War II. tajuddin asked for a draft declaration. I gave him a short draft, which was expanded by legal experts. the declaration was issued on April 17, at Baidyanath tala within east Pakistan. We arranged the defection of personnel of the Pakistan Deputy high commission in Kolkata and they integrated the government at 8 theatre road. the Government of India asked us to assist the freedom fighters. After my reconnaissance, we initially set up eight camps in the border areas and each camp had the capacity to train 1,000 recruits. the Army headquarters spelt out three tasks: l to advise and guide the provisional government. l to organise and equip a guerrilla force of 20.000 to be expanded to 1,00,000. l to plan and conduct guerrilla operations in east Pakistan.

We divided the area of operations for the freedom fighters into different sectors. Major Ziaur rehman was to be responsible for the chittagong sector. Major Khalid Musharraf for comilla, Major Saifullah for Mymensingh, Wing commander Khademul Bashar for rangpur, Lt colonel Quazi Nooruzaman for rajshahi, Major Abu Osman chowdhury for Kushtia, and Major M.A. Jalil for Khulna. “tiger” Siddiqui was to operate from tangail as did Sqaudron Leader Nurul Kadar.

Group captain Khadkar played a pivotal role in overseeing the operations of the freedom fighters, as General Muhammad Ataul Ghani Osmani was most of the time out at Sylhet with his east Bengal battalions. he formulated the tasks and guided the operations of the freedom fighters. his contribution to the successful operations of the freedom fighters was a crucial factor in the freedom struggle. the freedom fighters played a decisive role in the freedom struggle. they attacked the Pakistan Army and their infrastructure, created an environment of fear among the

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AD gunners in action At the surrender ceremony

Pakistani PoWs being marched to captivity

Pakistan Army by lowering their morale.

Due credit must be given to them for their decisive contribution in the liberation of Bangladesh.

In early April, Field Marshal Sam hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw called me up to say that the government wants eastern command to move in immediately into east Pakistan. I explained that we had mountain divisions with no bridges or motor transport.

We needed time for training. the monsoon was about to break. he asked by when we should move in. I said not before November 15, by when the terrain should be reasonably firm. he asked for a brief, which I sent by hand with Brigadier Adi Sethna.

A meeting was held in the operations room in Delhi which was attended by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Minister of Defence, external Affairs, Finance, home, the Defence Secretary and the Director Military

Operations. Manekshaw read out my brief and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi accepted that we could move in after November 15.

Our Strategy We assessed that General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi of Pakistan Army, would defend

‘I did not blackmail him.

Had I failed to get Niazi to surrender, the UN would have made us go back the next day. I did not fail.’

the towns and territory. We therefore adopted the following strategy: l Dhaka, the centre of gravity of east Pakistan, was to be the final objective. l Fortified towns to be bypassed. l thrust lines were to be along subsidiary tracks. l Subsidiary objectives were to be communication, command and control centres. l the Pak Army was to be drawn to the border areas by operations of the Mukti Bahini.

We made our outline plans accordingly and sent them to the Army headquarters.

Logistics was of paramount importance. We developed the infrastructure and built up logistical cover. About 30,000 tonnes were moved to tripura for a corps.

Large tonnages were moved to tura, North Bengal and West Bengal. this we did during the monsoon before the receipt of any orders.

When the war started, troops did not have to look back, as everything was in place. creating logistical backing was critical to our success. regrettably, the bridges were only released in mid-August and were old World War II repairable pontoon bridges. We were able to repair these in time. the maps we had were about 50 years old. courtesy Mukti Bahini, we were able to get the latest Pakistani maps which the Survey of India reproduced. the reproduced maps were issued to our troops in November.

In mid-August, Manekshaw and Major General K.K. Singh came to Fort William with their draft operation instructions. they spelt out the objectives to be the “entry ports”of Khulna and chittagong. Dhaka was not an objective. I pointed out that Dhaka was the centre of gravity and it was imperative that we take Dhaka. Manekshaw supported, but Lt General Jagjit Singh Aurora disagreed. he was adamant that it was not necessary to capture Dhaka. Air chief Marshal P.c. Lall in his book, My Years with the IAF, confirms that Dhaka was never an objective. he states that there was no coordination between service headquarters and that once the limited objectives were agreed to, each service did what it thought was best.

We did not take either Khulna or chittagong but won the war. We had to find troops to take to Dhaka. In November, we moved down three brigades from the chinese border. When Manekshaw got the information, he ordered them back.

In October, we planned the air drop of a battalion group at tangail to take part in the capture of Dhaka. the drop was planned to take place on D plus 7 and the link up 24 hours later. the drop and link up took place as planned. the operation order for the drop, issued in October, was signed by Air Vice Marshal charandas Gurudas Devasher who was the SASO, eastern Air command; Brigadier Matthew thomas of 50 Parachute Brigade and myself.

In November, we sent captain Ghosh of 50 Parachute Brigade to tangail to mark the dropping zone and to inform Siddiqui that he was to advance with our troops to Dhaka, which Siddiqui did not do.

In a master stroke, Prime Minsiter Indira Gandhi had the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty signed. this ensured that the chinese dared not intervene. the Soviets moved 40 divisions to the Sinjiang border and seven to the Manchurian border. throughout the operations for the liberation of Bangladesh, Indira Gandhi stood firm and determined.

She took pragmatic decisions. She never wavered. Due credit for her decisive contribution must be given to her.

On November 22, a decision was taken to move up to some 15 km into east Pakistan to counter Pakistan’s artillery fire. We used this opportunity to create jumping off areas for the coming operations. this drove Yayha Khan in desperation, to order the bombing of

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D I T O R I A L

India is in an unenviable position with two adversaries, Pakistan and China, on its north-westernand north-eastern flank respectively. All the threenations are armed with nuclear weapons, andhence prudence and wisdom should precludearmed conflict in this region. However, the realityis quite different. The regional dynamics are suchthat limited conventional wars are seen as a pos-sibility and a sense of uncertainty exists.

Moreover,nuclear weapons have not deterred Pakistan from waging a proxy war since 1989 and they are continuing to do so while professing friendship at thepolitical levels.

China, on the other hand, is so shaping the environment in the region that it could undertake military operations via land, sea and air at short notice and is going full steam ahead for creating infrastructure on land and at sea to ensure such a capability. India, on the other hand, is so embroiled in domestic issues, which are a result ofits poor administration and governance that it is unable to appreciate the external and internal threats and challenges, which are looming large onthe horizon in order to take corrective measures. Hence, the preparedness status of our armed forces and

especially the Army, is abysmal, as compared to our principle adversary, China.

Based on India’s security parameters, we need to prepare for a broad spectrum of threats and challenges that may be thrust upon us and our genius should reside in utilising the available budget in building a superior military capability through tri-service synergy and not through exclusive, single service focus. This demands apolitical-military-bureaucratic synergy which is conspicuous by its absence. Apart from apathy inthe arena of weapons and equipment procurement, we are lagging far behind China in infrastructural development in the Northeast and thiscould prove disastrous in war as it would precludespeedy movements of troops and logistics and we would be denied flexibility in our responses to battlefield situations.

In our modernisation efforts and operational preparedness vis-à-vis China, the Indian Army lacks long-range firepower, modern air defence capability, night fighting capability, surveillance capability in the mountains, network-centricity andcommunication assets, cyber warfare capability, army aviation assets, modern weapons and gear

for the infantry soldier, aerial and ground mobility at unit and formation level, and precision munitions.

To top it all, our war wastage reserves in many critical items, are down to unacceptably low levels.

Years of accumulated neglect have created hollowness in our capabilities and in the institutional and organisational resilience of the Army.

Courage and bravado of our soldiers and offi-cers notwithstanding, we need the political and bureaucratic leadership to be far more responsive to the needs of the second largest Army in the world, if they have to acquit themselves with honour and glory in future conflicts.

With this issue SP’s Land Forces completes eight years of publication. We take this opportunity to wish our readers a happy and prosperous new year. Jai Hind!

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

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Continued from page 2 our airfields in the west, on December 3. the war had started.

We put our offensive plans in operation. the thrusts into east Pakistan went as per our plans. the para drop went off well and by December 13 our troops reached the outskirts of Dhaka.

On December 13, the Soviets vetoed a US resolution. they said there would be no more vetoes; USS enterprise was in the straits of Malacca. there was consternation in Delhi. We were on the outskirts of Dhaka.

Manekshaw sent us an order to go back and capture all the towns we had bypassed, but not Dhaka. he copied this order to our corps commanders. We told our corps commanders to ignore this order and to proceed with the offensive as planned. It reminded me of Vice Admiral Lord Nelson at the battle of copenhagen in 1801, who on being asked to withdraw a flag signal, he put his telescope to his blind eye and said, ‘’I see no signal to withdraw. Attack.’’ the rest is history.

We had not captured any town. I was being blamed for the strategy for not capturing towns. If a cease fire was ordered, we had no captured towns to show (Jessore and comilla were abandoned by the Pakistan Army). On December 14, we got an intercept regarding a meeting in government house. the Air Force bombed the house. the Governor resigned. that evening, Niazi and Farman Ali went to see the American consul General, Spivack with the following ceasefire proposal : l ceasefire under the UN l hand over the government to the UN l Withdrawal of all personnel by the UN l No reprisals there was no mention of India. the ceasefire proposal was given to Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in New York on December 15. It was rejected outright by Bhutto. he stormed out of the UN Security council meeting later that night swearing to fight on.

On the morning of December 16, Manekshaw called up saying, “Jake go and get a surrender.” I asked if I could negotiate on the draft instrument of surrender that I had earlier sent him. he said ‘‘You know what to do, just go”. the UN was in session. I took with me the draft that I had sent which remained unconfirmed. I took a chopper to Dhaka. representatives from the UN met me and wanted to come with me to take over the government. I thanked them and declined. Niazi had sent me a Pak Army car with a Brigadier. there was fighting going on between the freedom fighters and the Pakistan Army. We had

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hardly gone a few hundred yards when the Mukti Bahini fighters fired at the car. I jumped out. they recognised my olive green uniform and stopped firing. they wanted to kill the Brigadier. I persuaded them to let us continue to Niazi’s headquarters. On reaching there, I had the draft instrument of surrender read out. there were snarls from the Generals there. Niazi said, ‘’Who said I was surrendering, you have only come for a ceasefire.’’ Farman Ali said that they did not recognise the joint Indo-Bangladesh command. I took Niazi aside and told him that I could not give him better terms as we had discussed this on the wireless. We had included protection of

all who surrendered as also that they would be treated with respect as per the Geneva convention. I told him if he surrendered, we would ensure protection of all military personnel, their families and ethnic minorities. If he did not surrender, we obviously could not take any responsibility for their safety. I added that if he did not surrender, I would order the resumption of hostilities and the bombing of Dhaka cantonment. I gave him 30 minutes to answer and walked out.

I was extremely worried. Niazi had 26,400 troops in Dhaka and we had about 3,000 stationed 50 km away. I had nothing in my hand. Aurora and his entourage were

to land in a short time. the ceasefire was about to expire.

I went back after 30 minutes. the draft was on the table. I asked Niazi three times whether he accepted the draft instrument of surrender. he did not respond. I picked up the draft and said that I took it as accepted. there were tears in Niazi’s eyes. I told him he would have to surrender on the race course in front of the people of Dhaka. he resisted surrendering in public but reluctantly agreed. I told him he would provide a guard of honour. he said that there was no one to command it. I said his ADc would command it. We worked out the modalities for local surrenders. After lunch, we proceeded in Niazi’s car to the airport to meet Aurora and his entourage. they arrived at 1630 hours. We then went to the race course. the ceremony was basic and simple.

We hardly had any troops in Dhaka. there was neither the resources, nor the time for any frills. It was imperative to get the document signed at the earliest.

A ceasefire was converted within a few hours into an unconditional public surrender, the only one in history. After the documents were signed, there were tears in Niazi’s eyes. the people of Dhaka rushed to lynch Niazi. We had difficulty in getting him to safety.

Later, the hamoodur ur rehman commission of enquiry had questioned, ‘’General Niazi, you had 26,400 troops in Dhaka and the Indians were in a few thousands outside, you could have fought on for at least two more weeks. the UN was in session and had you fought on for even one more day, the Indians would have had to go back. Why then did you accept a shameful unconditional public surrender and provide a guard of honour commanded by your ADc?’’ Niazi replied, ‘’I was compelled to do so by General Jacob who blackmailed me into surrendering.” this he had repeated in his book, Betrayal of East Pakistan. I did not blackmail him. had I failed to get Niazi to surrender, the UN would have made us go back the next day. I did not fail. the Pakistan National Defence college study of the war stated, “the Indians planned and executed their offensive in a textbook manner. It was a classic example of thorough planning, minute coordination and bold execution. the credit clearly goes to General Jacob’s meticulous preparations in the Indian eastern command and implementation by his corps commanders.’’ thus was born a new nation, Bangladesh, and India emerged as a regional superpower.

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Pick Up the Pace The emerging threats and challenges mandate that India should be prepared to fight hybrid wars in the future which may involve the armed forces in simultaneously fighting limited conventional conflicts on two fronts, out of area operations, counter-insurgency and counter-proxy war operations in the domestic arena, low intensity asymmetric wars, cyber wars, and United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking operations PHOTOGRAPH: BAE Systems

Archer - 155mm FH77 B05 L52

n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

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LOBAL AND reGIONAL SecUrItY concerns along with the growing internal security problems define India’s security environment. the conventional threats from traditional adversaries colluding with each other, continuing presence of terrorist and fundamentalist forces in its western and eastern neighbourhood has prompted India to carry out force accretion in order to maintain a high level of defence vigilance and preparedness to face any challenge to its security. the developments across India’s western border is alarming and dangerous as the drift in both Pakistan and Afghanistan shows the lack of state control and break down of economy, law and order, and governance. Both states are staying afloat because of the aid from the international community. Moreover, there is also the ever present possibility of hostile radical fundamentalist elements gaining access to the weapons of mass destruction in Pakistan. the proxy war conducted by Pakistan and the various radical jehadi outfits promoted by them through the instrumentality of terrorism are continuing unabated. In the east, china’s challenge to India’s security is looming large on the horizon. Its strategy of encircling India through its neighbours and confining it within the subcontinent is apparent and palpable apart from its outlandish claims on Indian territory of Arunachal Pradesh. Internally, India faces a series of low-intensity conflicts characterised by tribal, ethnic and left-wing movements and ideologies, and these conflicts have the capacity of deflecting the Indian Government from their long-term social and economic development plans. India is also affected by drug trafficking and proliferation of small arms. thus the security challenges

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facing India are varied and complex. India’s response to these threats and challenges has always been restrained, measured and moderate in keeping with its peaceful outlook and reputation as a responsible and peaceloving country Indian Army’s 600-odd modernisation schemes amounting to over `70,000 crore in the eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-12) continue to be encumbered with elaborate bureaucratic procurement processes. the refined Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) over the years has done little to accelerate the pace of modernisation. A dispassionate analysis would indicate that the gap between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) apparently is widening in favour of the latter. Moreover, faced with a two-front threat, India needs to accelerate the pace of modernisation of the Indian Army, duly prioritised and executed within laid down timeframes.

Future Trends in Warfare Analysis of current and past conflicts in the world, the emerging technologies, geostrategic environment and the emerging challenges; indicate various trends in preparation for and conduct of warfare. While the details of evaluation and appraisal differ in their content and quality, some shared conclusions with regard to the future trends emerge quite clearly. Future warfare will be highly uncertain because the boundary between war and peace is blurred and state boundaries too are being made irrelevant by non-state actors. today, we are confronted with a fluid, nonlinear and adaptive battle space. It seems that full-scale conventional wars will be unlikely. the factors of globalisation and “nuclearisation” of the region, devastating effect of modern weaponry, sensitivity to large number of casualties, collateral damage and the crippling effects of war on economy of a nation

militate against full-scale all out wars. Moreover, technology which will play a pre-dominant role in designing the conduct of future wars does provide other options of waging different types of wars. the costs involved and the complexities of war waging may force nations to join allies/coalitions, and weaker states will use “asymmetric warfare” to fight more powerful opponents while the more powerful states will use positive asymmetry through c4ISr capabilities to deliver significant lethal and non-lethal effects with precision, speed and crushing power.

Globalisation and interconnectedness will make wars transparent, thus challenging the political utility of using armed forces. hence military power is likely to be used selectively in an integrated and synergetic manner and with increasing discrimination in choosing means as well as ends as there will invariably be an international pressure on warring parties.

In large standing armies, two or three generations of warfare will coexist as has been the experience in all previous wars in history. American led world order will continue to be challenged by Islamic terror networks, sheltered by weak authoritarian states e.g. Afghanistan-Pakistan region, and funded by the richer nations of the Islamic world. the strategy of global leadership and engagement by the United States, based on the assumption that such a role is natural, will continue in the foreseeable future. care will have to be taken to work within the limits of international law, including its precepts on the minimum use of force and proportionality of response. this rule however does not apply to superpowers like the US.

Combat Status to be Achieved by Indian Army the Indian Army is organised, equipped and

trained for second and third generation industrial age; low and medium level technology and conflicts. In view of the developments in our neighbourhood and particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Pak-china collusion, have brought South Asia to the centre stage of conventional and subconventional conflict and instability. Additionally, terrorism, low-intensity conflict motivated by economic disparity, religious fundamentalism, narcotics trade, threat of nuclear weapons falling in wrong hands, etc remain issues of concern in our region. hence the emerging threats and challenges mandate that India should be prepared to fight hybrid wars in the future which may involve the armed forces in simultaneously fighting limited conventional conflicts on two fronts, out of area operations, counter-insurgency and counter-proxy war operations in the domestic arena, low intensity asymmetric wars, cyber wars, and United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. the Indian Army’s focus should be on a preparedness profile and status which has rapid Deployment Forces for defensive and offensive operations, smaller fully integrated Strike Forces (integrated with air power and air assault formations) for the initial stages of offensive operations followed by larger “follow up” formations if the war lasts longer than anticipated. Additionally, it should have forces for low-intensity conflict operations (LIcO), power projection and out-of-area contingencies. the Indian Army would also need Special Forces for special operations and a nuanced internal security/counterinsurgency force for LIcO through reengineering of its existing forces.

Net-centric warfare (NcW) capable forces and c4ISr capabilities will become a necessity with enhanced situational awareness, capability of identifying, monitoring and destroying targets in near real time with enhanced ranges and lethality to achieve ascendancy over the enemy. the aim would be to employ overwhelming firepower/force at the point of decision. the backbone of such a structure would be a well designed communication architecture at the national level with integrated networks which are integrated with the sensors which would be required to speedily transmit fused and integrated data through command and control echelons enabling greater situational awareness for commanders at all levels.

Modernisation Plans the modernisation plans of the Indian Army in certain specific areas are as follows: Arty Firepower As part of its more than `20,000 crore artillery modernisation plan, the Army is looking at inducting several types of howitzers through inter-governmental pacts and global tenders. the last major acquisition of towed gun-howitzers was that of 400 pieces of 39-calibre 155mm Fh-77B howitzers with a range of 30 km from Bofors of Sweden in 1987, which got embroiled in political controversy. this gun proved its mettle in the Kargil conflict. After about 25 years of neglect during which the 100mm and 122mm field guns of russian origin and the indigenously developed and manufactured 75/24 Indian Mountain Gun joined the long list of

M O D E R N I S AT I O N << Indian Army’s 600-odd modernisation schemes amounting to over `70,000 crore in the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-12) continue to be encumbered with elaborate bureaucratic procurement processes obsolete equipment, the Army still awaits the procurement of about 1,500 howitzers of 155mm, 52 calibre. Out of these, 400 are to be procured outright and 1,100 manufactured indigenously with transfer of technology (tot). the request for proposal (rFP) for these guns was issued in the beginning of the year 2011 and it is expected that the evaluation process would be underway.

Additionally, 145 ultra light howitzers were to be procured from the US through the foreign military sales (FMS) route from BAe Systems. the fate of this procurement is also hanging in balance due to legal complications. the Army also needs 120 tracked and 180 wheeled 155mm howitzers for its Artillery divisions for use in offensive operations, the fate of which is unknown.

One hundred and eighty pieces of 130mm M46 russian medium guns have been successfully “up-gunned” to 155mm calibre with ordnance supplied by Soltam of Israel. the new barrel length of 45-calibre has enhanced the range of the gun to about 40 km with extended range ammunition. however, the project for manufacture of ammunition which was to be done by the IAI of Israel, has been delayed as the firm has been blacklisted.

It is now reliably learnt that when the Bofors 155mm howitzers were procured in 1987, transfer of technology was done and it has now been revealed that the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) has been sitting on these designs for the past 25 years. On being coaxed by the Army, the OFB have now accepted to produce prototypes of 155mm/ 39 calibre, 45 calibre and 52 calibre guns for trials by the Army. counter-bombardment (US term counter-fire) capability is also being upgraded, but at a slow pace. At least about 40 to 50 weapon locating radars (WLrs) are required for effective counter-bombardment, especially in the plains; but only a dozen have been procured so far. In addition to the 12 AN-tPQ 37 Firefinder WLrs acquired from raytheon, USA, under a 2002 contract worth $200 million, Bharat electronics Limited is reported to be assembling 28 WLrs. these radars will be based on both indigenous and imported components and are likely to be approved for introduction into service after extensive trials that are ongoing. the radar is expected to match the capabilities of the Firefinder system and will have a detection range of about 40 km.

Air Defence Artillery the corps of Army Air Defence holds a large variety of guns and missile systems. It has 40mm L/70, Zu-23-2 twin gun, ZSU-23-4 Schilka and tanguska in its inventory. the 40mm L/70 which is about four decades old needs immediate replacement. considering the high costs of new weapon systems, the Army is going in for weapon upgrades for L70, ZU-23-2 twin gun, and ZSU-23-4 Schilka. Meanwhile, the Army is also looking for successors to L-70 and the ZU-23-2.

Successor to Schilka (ZSU-23-4) already exists in the form of tangushka, but in limited numbers. A request for information (rFI) has already been issued to find a

replacement for Schilka.

In the missile systems, Kvadrat (mediumrange) and OSA-AK (short-range) are also at the end of their life cycle. they were to be replaced by Akash and trishul surface-to-air (SAM) missiles but since these Defence research and Development Organisation (DrDO) projects have been inordinately delayed, they will also require replacements by foreign procurement. the process for acquiring a successor of OSA-AK in the form of quick reaction Sam (Qr-SAM) is in progress. Similarly, the successor of Quadrat is to be a medium-range SAM (Mr SAM). It is understood that a joint development programme of DrDO with Israel has been undertaken and when it fructifies, it will meet the requirement of Mr SAM for all the three services. two regiments of Akash SAMs are now being inducted for static missions of protecting vulnerable areas (VAs) and vulnerable points (VPs).

One major weakness in the overall air defence matrix is the lack of a battlefield management system which is also linked with the national air defence network. Bharat electronics Limited (BeL) has now undertaken the development of such a system.

Armour the Army has already equipped two of its regiments with Arjun tanks out of the 124 Arjun main battle tanks (MBts) ordered by it earlier. As a result of the good performance of Arjun tanks with the units and satisfactory feedback from the crews, an additional 124 Arjun Mark II tanks have now been ordered for another two regiments. these tanks will have substantially upgraded capabilities of firepower, mobility and protection. these are likely to be given by 2013. As regards the t-90 tanks, 310 had been ordered from russia earlier. Of these, 124 fully assembled tanks were directly imported

from russia and 186 kits were imported for assembly in India. the first indigenously assembled t-90S rolled out from the heavy Vehicles Factory (hVF) Avadi on January 7, 2004. these tanks have now been fully operationalised. Additional 347 t-90S tanks have been inducted into service which brings the total to 647 t-90S tanks. the defects in the fire control systems of t-90S tanks due to excessive heat in the turrets during the summers is being remedied through air-conditioning of the interior. the programme launched to modernise the t-72 M1, Ajeya, MBts is still unsatisfactory and has not progressed. Around 1,700 t-72 M1s have been manufactured under licence at hVF, Avadi. the t-72 M1 modernisation programme under Project rhino will extend the service life of the MBt by 20 years and enhance its accuracy with new fire control system (FcS) whose trials are under way. this will give night fighting capa-

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>> M O D E R N I S AT I O N PHOTOGRAPHS: SP Guide Pubns

Information Systems At the forefront of capacity building in network-centric warfare (NcW) is the tactical command, control, communications and information (tac c3I) system under development with various subsystems catering to aspects of automated command and control, decision support, control of artillery fire, air defence, air space management, battlefield surveillance, battlefield management, etc. the tac c3I is expected to be fully operational in the latter half of this decade.

Carrier Mortar Tracked Vehicle

Tunguska-M Gun/Missile Air Defence System.

bility through a thermal imager integrated with the tank’s FcS. three hundred t-72 tanks of the Army have been fitted with thermal imaging standalone sights (tISAS) while 300 more are in the pipeline bringing the total to 600 tISAS. however, the overall night fighting capability of India’s armour is currently inadequate and operationally unacceptable. the modernisation of the t-72 is way behind schedule due to complicated procurement procedures exacerbated by delayed decision-making and in-house disagreements. the t-90, the improved t-72 M1 tanks and Arjun tanks will constitute India’s armour might in the future till a new MBt is chosen or designed indigenously.

www.spslandforces.net

Mechanised Infantry Mechanised Infantry has been equipped with the BMP-2 IcV and 81mm carrier mortar tracked vehicle (cMtV). A command post, an ambulance, armoured dozer and engineer and reconnaissance vehicles have also been developed based on the BMP chassis. the research and development of future IcV is currently being done and it is expected that it will be manufactured indigenously. the SS-11 B1 AtGM system has been replaced in missile battalions by MILAN shoulder-fired anti-tank guided missiles (AtGMs).

Infantry the Defence Acquisition council (DAc) has approved of a new assault rifle, 5.56mm calibre and a new generation carbine. the assault rifles under consideration are the heckler and Koch G 36 modular 5.56mm, assault rifle (German), the Beretta 70/90 (Italy), SAr 21 of Singapore technologies, heckler & Koch, XM8 (USA), Steyer A3 (Austria), tavor tAr 21, and IMI Galil 5.56

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and 7.62 from Israel, Arsenal AK-74 (Bulgaria), herstal F-2000 (Belgium), and SIG SG 551(Switzerland) among others. New bullet proof jackets, ballistic helmets, and boots anti-mine are also being procured. the infantry is also looking for a man portable third generation anti-tank guided missile under barreled grenade launchers, 60mm mortars, enhanced range 81mm mortars, and thermal imaging night sights for assault rifles. Bullet proof vehicles and shot guns are being procured for counter-insurgency operations. Incidents like 26/11 have underlined the need to equip all infantry battalions suitably for rapid reaction. this is being achieved by procuring specialised items for the Ghatak Platoons (commando Platoons) of Infantry Battalions. Multimode grenades have been indented with the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) while rFP has been issued for the ammunition of the rocket Launcher Mark III. the infantry is also being provided with multi-purpose vehicles (MPVs), light bullet proof vehicles (Lt BPVs), light strike vehicles (LSVs) and additional snow mobiles.

F-INSAS the future infantry soldier as a system (F-INSAS) is being initiated to make the infantryman a weapon platform with situational awareness, increased lethality and sustainability in the digitised battlefield.

F-INSAS is to be effected in three phases: Phase I includes weapons, body armour, clothing and individual equipment; Phase II is the target acquisition system and Phase III comprises the computer subsystem, radio sub system, software and software integration. the infantry is planning to develop Phase III of F-INSAS by themselves rather than being part of the battlefield management system (BMS) of the Army. this will amount to re-inventing the wheel.

Communications the tri-service defence communication network (DcN) is some years away. the tactical communication system (tcS) has been inordinately delayed and rFP is yet to be issued. the latter is also a setback to the required corps level test beds for the tac c3I subsystems. the Plan AreN system is mostly outdated. the AScON currently has limited capability to provide data links. the Army intranet is not wholly secure and the Army wide area network (AWAN) caters only to text messaging albeit later versions are planned to also have voice and video capability.

Special Forces Special Forces are force multipliers in times of both war and peace. Special Forces should primarily look beyond the borders to nip asymmetric threats in the bud and control the fault lines of our adversaries. their tasking should include asymmetric warfare, unconventional/fourth generation warfare, special operations, reconnaissance, psychological operations, counterproliferation and the like. equipping of Special Forces is lagging woefully. “Packaged equipping” of sub-units has not taken off and critical equipment like laser target designators are yet to be provisioned. the Army’s emphasis has been on expansion, ignoring the universally acknowledged four Special Forces global truths: l humans are more important than hardware l Quality is better than quantity l Special Forces cannot be mass produced

l

competent Special Forces cannot be created after emergencies arise.

It would be prudent to first consolidate the existing seven Special Forces battalions and fully equip them before adding any more.

Army Aviation Corps Army Aviation, being a young arm of the Army, has been under modernisation, since its raising in 1986, and the pace has been in sync with the overall growth of the Army.

Besides, the ‘Lancer’ helicopter, advanced light helicopter (ALh) Dhruv has been in service with the Army Aviation for more than 10 years. the Army has four squadrons of Dhruv helicopters currently, which will increase to eight in due course. there are a few more modernisation projects in the pipeline, ALh weapon system integrated (WSI) and battlefield support helicopters which need to be inducted as soon as possible to give the necessary operational capabilities to the Army. chetaks (Aerospatiale SA316 Alouette III) and cheetahs (Se316B Alouette II) helicopters have been in service of the nation for a long time. the vintage of the helicopters however is posing increasing challenges for maintenance of these machines. the rFP for 197 reconnaissance and surveillance helicopters was given about two years back. Out of these, 66 helicopters are planned for the IAF and 131 for the Army. It is believed that the trials and evaluation of these helicopters having been completed, the deal would be finalised in the near future.

Restructure & Revitalise Douhet had stated way back in 1921, “Victory will smile upon those who anticipate changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after changes occur.” Our challenge is to find the appropriate balance between the old methods of conducting war and the new ways. there is no option but to restructure our organisations, our force levels, introduce new technologies and doctrines, and more importantly change our mindset in order to address the changing nature of threats and challenges which confront India in the future.

Conceptual Changes and Accretions Western Theatre

Eastern Theatre

In any offensive operations planned on the subcontinent, the aims would either be to capture the territory or destroy the enemy forces or a combination of both. Any territory captured across international boundary would invariably have to be returned though it could temporarily be used for post-conflict bargaining. the territory captured across disputed border like the line of control, may be retained though in the present global environment that would also not be realistic. hence destruction of forces would be a more important objective which would have a long-term economic impact on the adversary. For destruction of large armoured and mechanised forces, battles will have to be planned and orchestrated according to an integrated theatre plan so that larger forces comprising more than one strike corps can be employed synchronously from one theatre or from two different theatres to cause maximum destruction of enemy forces. to achieve this capability, the jointmanship between the Indian Army and IAF will have to be of a far superior order and will involve joint planning from the conception stage and joint execution of operational plans. the transformation being attempted by the Indian Army will focus on these issues.

eastern theatre (eastern Army and Air commands) has always had serious voids in terms of offensive and defensive capability, firepower, aerial strike and transportation capability and mobility, light armour for high altitude areas, cyber and electronic warfare capability, and air defence capability. It seems that some of these voids are now being addressed. two divisions namely 56 and 71 have already been raised with their headquarters at Zakhama in Nagaland and Missamari in Assam. the media has reported an accretion of 1,260 officers and 35,011 soldiers on account of these two formations. Additionally, a Strike corps comprising two divisions costing about `60,000 crore is planned to be raised in the future to impart offensive capability to the Indian Army in the Northeast.

It is also reported that India will spend more than `60,000 crore over the next five years on developing military infrastructure and capabilities for the western and eastern fronts. If we take a conservative estimate of the defence capital outlay in the 2012-17 timeframe crossing `4,00,000 crore, then along with the infrastructure and the cost of raising the Strike corps for the Northeast, it adds up to a staggering figure of `5,20,000 crore.

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Raging Debate on AFSPA in J&K The debate on the removal of the ‘disturbed area’ tag, and thus revocation of AFSPA from parts of J&K, should be viewed in that light and not as a confrontation between state political leadership and the Army. A public debate on such a sensitive security issue is best avoided.

PHOTOGRAPH: PIB

n GENERAL (RETD) V.P. MALIK, FORMER CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF

A

LOt hAS BeeN written about the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Should we start its gradual revocation, or wait till overt and covert security threats in the state are further weakened or eliminated? the raging debate through social and regular media has not only politicised a sensitive security issue and made it more difficult to decide, it has also created an undesirable confrontation like situation between political leaders of the state (some outside also!) and the Army, and further demonised the AFSPA and maligned the Army in public perception. this would also make it difficult for the central Government to promulgate AFSPA anywhere in future and thus restrict its ability to call for Army assistance for countermilitancy operations. counter-militancy operations are conducted in three stages. In the first stage, when secessionists’ activities and militants’ violence are at their peak–as was faced in Kashmir Valley in 1990 and the law and order situation does not permit adequate governance–the affected area is declared a ‘Disturbed Area’ by the state and the centre. this legality paves the way for application of the AFSPA in the affected area to enable the Army to conduct effective anti-militancy operations. In the second stage, military pressure on the violence perpetrators enables return of administration and resumption of constitutional processes. the third stage sees full-fledged functioning of governance and civil administration and return of the Army to barracks. there are no clearly defined dividing lines in these stages due to frequent setbacks in counter-militancy operations and the law and order situation. these stages, therefore, tend to merge into each other and require informed and perceptive decision-making at strategic and operational levels. During transition, particularly between the second and third stages, it is not uncommon to see a hot politico-military debate on the employment of the Army or the application of AFSPA in affected areas.

So, the first point I wish to make is that the current debate on the removal of the ‘disturbed area’ tag, and thus revocation of AFSPA from parts of J&K, should be viewed in that light and not as a confrontation between state political leadership and the Army. A public debate on such a sensitive security issue is best avoided.

In this context, let me narrate some personal experiences.

In early 1990, I was commanding a division that had troops deployed for counterinsurgency operations in Nagaland and Manipur. A political party leader, in order to garner students’ support and votes, made the removal of the AFSPA a major electoral issue. After he won the elections and became the chief Minister, I called on him and asked what he planned to do about the AFSPA. he said that in view of the popular demand, he would write to the home Ministry and demand its revocation from the state. I told

Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir Omar Abdullah

the chief Minister that it was OK with me. I will pull out troops from the 60-odd posts, concentrate them outside Manipur and train them for their primary role of fighting a conventional war. “But you cannot do that!

What will happen to the law and order situation?” he said. I told him politely but firmly that I couldn’t help him to maintain that without a proper legal cover for my troops.

Despite several elections in Manipur since then, the state, unfortunately, continues to have a ‘disturbed area’ tag on it and continues to have Army deployment on countermilitary missions.

In late 1993, when I was commanding a corps in Punjab, we assessed that the law and order situation was adequately under control and we could pull out a brigade from an area for conventional training and redeployment. the chief Minister and the Director General of Police expressed serious concern but went along with me when I told them that Army would be made available at short notice if required. Fortunately, there was no such requirement.

In late 1997, then chief Minister of J&K asked 15 corps to remove Army deployments within Anantnag, Badgam, Baramula and Sopore towns. We agreed and redeployed troops outside these towns. there was near normalcy in Kashmir Valley in 1998. Next year, however, despite the Lahore Declaration, Pakistan Army intruded into Kargil sector and forced us to go to war.

After a resounding defeat and loss of face in Kargil, Pakistan pushed foreign militants into the Valley and managed to intensify militancy. Sopore became a militants’ stronghold. It took a division size operation to get rid of them from this town and three more years to bring back militancy in the Valley to the 1998 level.

Under the AFSPA, in a ‘disturbed area’, a commissioned officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer or any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces can: l Arrest without warrant any person who has committed a cognizable offence and

may use suitable force, if necessary to do so. enter any premises without a warrant to arrest a terrorist/suspect, or to recover a wrongfully confined person, stolen property, or arms/explosives wrongfully kept. l Fire upon/use force, even causing death, against any person contravening law and order or carrying weapons, ammunition or explosives, if in his opinion it is necessary for maintenance of law and order and after giving due warning. l Destroy an armed dump or fortified position or a shelter from which armed attacks can be made or can be used for training by hostiles, if necessary to do so. the Act lays down that the arrested persons will be handed over to the nearest police station ‘with the least possible delay’, and no prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding can be instituted against any person in respect of anything done under this Act except with the previous sanction of the central Government. the AFSPA may have been described as a ‘special power’. But those of us who have commanded troops in such situations have always looked upon it as a legal protection to conduct effective operations. On the flip side,

AFSPA the AFSPA has been much demonised by civil society groups and the media in recent years. two aspects need to be noted. Firstly, the AFSPA can be applied only after an area is declared a ‘disturbed area’ by the state/centre. Secondly, it provides a legal cover for Army personnel in carrying out ‘effective’ counter-militancy operations.

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>> A F S P A / F I R S T whenever law and order situation improves in a ‘disturbed area’ and we have elected representatives governing the state, they find it difficult to continue with this Act. the reasons are: l Democratic societies all over the world abhor large scale and extended deployment of troops in their midst. l human rightists and the media over the years have dubbed the AFSPA as a ‘draconian’ power given to the military against the civilians. It has become a convenient tool for the secessionist elements, and those in opposition, to embarrass the government and demand withdrawal of troops. l Despite strict discipline and training, there are aberrations of human rights violations by troops. these aberrations can be reduced but seldom eliminated in the kind of operational duties which have to be performed.

AFSPA, Human Rights and the Army Keeping in view the incidents of human rights (hr) violations by some personnel when AFSPA is applicable, the Army, over the years, has taken several preventive measures. these include setting up of human rights cells at Army, command and corps headquarters to monitor, seek factual details and take follow up action on all hr-related cases (received from any source) and to maintain records. these cells, after investigations, prepare a ‘Detailed Investigation reports’ (investigation is conducted jointly with civil authorities sometimes) for submission to higher headquarters and preparation of affidavits to the National human rights commission.

According to statistics made available to me in July 2011, 1,485 cases of human rights violations were reported in Kashmir Valley from 1990 to July 2011. Out of these, 1,439 cases (96.9 per cent) were proved false. In 43 cases proved true, 96 personnel were punished. As punishment, four officers were cashiered/awarded rigorous imprisonment (rI), 33 personnel dismissed from service, 17 personnel reduced in ranks/awarded imprisonment in military custody, one person forfeited seniority for promotion, and 14 personnel were awarded ‘Severe reprimand’. I doubt if any civil court would have acted faster or stricter on this issue. there has also been a strong drive on continuous training and briefing of troops employed in such operations to respect

It is incorrect and unfair on the part of political authorities to put pressure on the Army through social and regular media human rights and avoid collateral damage. A ‘code of conduct’ (appreciated by the Supreme court) is issued to every individual. the ‘rules of engagement’ have been modified. Wherever possible, operations are conducted jointly with the civil police and made accessible to the media. In the last year and a half, beside preventing infiltration and conducting only intelligence based joint operations, the Army in Kashmir Valley under Lt General Ata hasnain, has taken some extraordinary people-friendly initiatives. these include reducing visibility of personnel and convoys on roads during the day, ‘Jee Janab’ (cultural sensitivity) and ‘Awam aur Jawan, Aman hai Mukam’ (the soldiers and populace want peace as their objective) and the Kashmir Premier League matches to engage the youth. these initiatives have made substantial contribution in improving civil military relations and ensuring peaceful summer.

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned civilised measures, there is still a need for the Army to become more transparent on human rights violation cases and where necessary, expedite sanction from the central government to prosecute personnel guilty of deliberate human rights violations. that would be in the interest of Army discipline as well as for creating confidence in public.

AFSPA in J&K the chief Minister of J&K, supported by his political heavyweight father in the UPA’s Union cabinet, the Left Front and some other party leaders have made a strong pitch for revocation of AFSPA from selected districts in the state. the political view point is that these districts are no longer considered ‘disturbed’, our relations with Pakistan are improving, and the AFSPA-considered as ‘an oppressive military regime’ needs to be selectively revoked to provide the requisite atmospherics of bringing peace to the state. the

chief Minister is justified in considering the issue although it is apparent that under the cover of this demand, there is also an element of political expediency to hijack the AFSPA agenda from opposition parties and separatists.

Unfortunately, there is considerable confused thinking about the AFSPA. A member of the centre appointed interlocutors on J&K has stated publically that “in a free India, which attained freedom by practising nonviolence, laws like the AFSPA, which jeopardise democratic and human rights, have no relevance”. One wonders if the Union home Minister would agree with such an argument! the interlocutor stated further that “despite various suggestions made from time to time to the State Government, there is no worthwhile monitoring mechanism to ensure effective implementation of recommendations for ameliorating the condition of the people.” And yet, the same interlocutor opines that “programmes like Operation Sadbhavna, designed, managed and financed by the security forces for providing education and health-care facilities, should be ideally left to the local bodies, as has been the practice in other states.” In the current governance environment in J&K, it is difficult to see any linkage between implementation of State development programmes and the AFSPA. the Army, opposed to selective revocation of the AFSPA, believes that Pakistan Army has not given up its efforts to support militancy and terrorism in the State. the current run of peace is, at best, fragile. the secessionist elements in the State have not been adequately neutralised. they continue to provide logistic support to anti-national elements and have used, or created, opportunities during many summers in the past— except last summer—to raise ‘azadi’ flags and slogans. Selective revocation of AFSPA will make its assets (including Srinagar Airfield) and convoys vulnerable. Selective revocation of AFSPA may also revive overt and covert militancy in these areas, as has been experienced in Imphal in the past. the Army feels that more time and effort is required to bring about normalcy in the State.

Pakistan Army and the ISI have always been a major factor in the militancy swings of J&K. they treat and nurture Jehadi terrorist groups as a strategic asset and a hedge on Pakistan’s eastern and Western borders. the ISI continues to support these groups, their

training and communication networks in POK despite its pre-occupation on the Afghan border. the Army believes that there is no change in Pakistan Army’s strategic agenda. continuing military-terrorists nexus in Pakistan has been confirmed in the latest ‘Memogate’ exposure.

Conclusion I have no doubt that every Indian would like to see the end of terrorism and militants’ violence in J&K. More so the security forces, who have lost 6,013 personnel since 1988 due to such violence in the state. this is possible only through a synergetic effort of the political leadership, state administration and the security forces including the Army, on the ground. the synergetic effort has to be focused on public; to restore its confidence in the polity and administration; to ensure that it denies support to militants and enables their isolation. the militants will then either fall in line or get eliminated.

While it is desirable to give more and more political space to the State leadership, the AFSPA is necessary till we are fully confident of checking infiltration from across the border and the overt and covert support to the militancy in the State is reduced considerably. the need for legal cover to soldiers conducting counter-militancy operations is unquestionable. Due to changed circumstances, it is essential to review the conduct of operations in the areas suggested for revocation of the AFSPA. My suggestions would be to (a) further reduce army footprints in all civil areas.

Let the civil police take over operations in the areas recommended by the State chief Minister and call for military only when the operation is beyond its capability (b) military convoys passing through these areas should continue to be protected (c) the Army should be more transparent in its dealing with human rights aberrations, and (d) the central Government should explain reasons whenever permission to prosecute a person accused in human rights violations is not given.

I believe that it is incorrect and unfair on the part of political authorities to put pressure on the Army through social and regular media. this is not in the interest of objective decision-making or cordial civil military relations. Political leaders in ‘disturbed areas’ need to assess the security situation and resolve such issues through a consensus in Unified command instead of making sensitive security issues a public agenda.

F I R S T PHOTOGRAPH: SP Guide Pubns

Army’s First Mobile Robot The remotely operated vehicle Daksh will come handy for anti-terrorist operations in addition to the battlefield exigencies, and will be an asset for the bomb disposal units of the Army

www.spslandforces.net

T

he Indian Army has acquired its first mobile robot, the remotely operated vehicle (rOV) ‘Daksh’, which will equip the force to handle and clear improvised explosives devices and other hazardous objects. the first batch of six units of a total consignment of 20 was handed over to the Army in the premises of the research and Development establishment (engineers) (r&De(e), part of the Defence research and Development Organisation (DrDO) that has developed the indigenous system at Dighi near Pune. the rOV which underwent extensive user trials in Jammu and Kashmir prior to limited series production has “a robust manipulator arm having six degrees of freedom” which can be extended to remotely extract IeDs, in addition to a

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detachable x-ray equipment that can be used to confirm the presence of the explosives, he said.

Daksh which can also come handy for anti-terrorist operations in addition to the battlefield exigencies, will be an “invaluable asset” for the bomb disposal units of the Army, according to Major General rakesh Bassi, Director General (combat engineers), who accepted the rOV on behalf of the Army.

S. Guruprasad, Director r&De(e) said, “Daksh is capable of climbing stairs as well as negotiating cross country terrain and has an on board shotgun for blasting through door locks and breaking the windshield to handle likely car bombs.” “It is also capable of towing a suspected vehicle away from a crowded area.”

S. Sundaresh, Defence Secretary and

chief controller r&D of DrDO, said, “Daksh has been developed indigenously with the involvement of private sector and has strengthened an industrial base in the country for development of

robotics. he said that the state-of-the-art design of ‘Daksh’ offered good export potential with possible international collaborations.

M O U N TA I N ST R I K E CO R PS

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Offensive in the Mountains The decision on the Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) is not only about the capability and the implications. It is also about the message that India is, by its raisings, sending to China. The message is one of deterrence and resolve. It is not an aggressive one, but the second prong of India’s strategy PHOTOGRAPH: Indian Army

n COLONEL (RETD) ALI AHMED

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he cABINet cOMMIttee ON Security has recently approved the raising of a Mountain Strike corps (MSc) along with two independent mountain brigades. the MSc is to be located in the eastern theatre with its headquarters at Panagarh and the two independent mountain brigades would be at Ladakh and Garhwal himalayas.

It will take time to set up the MSc as it involves an expansion by 86,000 troops, reportedly the largest since mechanisation in the 1980s. even as the organisation busies itself with the personnel, acquisitions, budgeting, logistics and infrastructure details; there is a necessity to also concentrate on the very purpose of the MSc, in the interim. What will it be deployed for and employed to do? how will it deliver on its objectives? What are the implications in terms of the ‘two front’ rubric? the nuclear backdrop cannot be lost sight of either. this article attempts to set the stage for discussions by attempting an outline of the implications of the capability from a public information point of view. It first discusses the reason why an MSc is to come about and then on what operational task it would be required to undertake.

The Necessity the logic behind the proposal is that there needs to be an offensive component to deterrence. currently, India’s is a defensive deterrent posture with respect to china. the philosophy subscribed to is deterrence by denial. the idea is to make any ingress so costly that the attacker would have to pay costs out of proportion to the gains made, even while making any such gains a questionable proposition. however, in relation to the nature of the adversary and its strength, it is assessed that such deterrence lends itself to being tested by the adversary. In light of china’s military modernisation, it requires reinforcing. china has been creating the requisite infrastructure and rapidly increasing its deployment of force capacity. the resources for operations will require placement over the preceding summer seasons and subject to perma-frost, etc over the duration.

Besides, the figures that find mention in the media is of the need for half a million troops to be placed in perspective. the operations will be at the very end of a long line of communications, where the terrain will dictate deployment levels.

If ‘teaching a lesson’ is intended, then it would suffice for India to give a ‘bloody nose’ in emulating Vietnam. For this, defensive deterrence is adequate and is being further strengthened by the two divisions under raising. these will not only thicken defences, but also provide sectoral reserves for counter attack and hold lines in depth in case adverse situations develop. however, given the chinese depth it has in military resources, both manpower and material, it would be able to pay a formidable price for the gains it seeks. territorial gains will be tangible, but political ends are the more consequential. Learning from the 1979 lessons, china may be prepared to pay a higher price. this means that even if there are formidable defences, effective defence will be difficult, all things being equal.

With the MSc, India is catering for expansive war aims not impossible to visu-

A patrol in the mountains

alise, such as may be the case when a hegemonic war is forced on it. china is after all the only challenger to the offshore balancer, the US. India, due to its own power trajectory, has become a player and may on that account need to be ‘fixed’. the capability for fighting back needs to be on hand from before. the MSc therefore helps decrease the possibility of the ‘more likely’, even while enabling coping with the ‘less likely’, but in the ‘worst case’ scenario.

From the approval of the MSc, it appears that a switchover to deterrence by punishment has been deemed desirable. the raisings of the two divisions currently under way in Nagaland and Assam will ensure that deterrence by denial is not neglected.

Supplementing this with deterrence by punishment will only reinforce deterrence. therefore, the raising of the MSc is as much the creation of a capability, as also an exercise in deterrence in demonstrating resolve.

It shifts India’s posture from defensive deterrence to offensive deterrence.

Anticipated Missions the Kargil War has proven that it takes considerable force levels to retake the lost territory. this owes to higher force ratios for attack in mountains of the order of 9:1. Multi-directional attacks, attacks in echelons, holding of firm base, infiltration manoeuvres, securing lines of communications, recreating reserves, etc are all tasks that consume troops. this implies that offensive capability even of the order of an MSc will be fairly meagre in mountains. the operational ambition must be tailored accordingly. An offensive capability gives the theatre commander an ability to respond as also to be proactive, but the objectives must be ‘doable’.

A template for thinking on strike corps valid for strike corps in the plains sector can be adapted for the MSc. In terms of response options, there is the counter attack mode in which the territory taken is to be recaptured through a corps counter attack. this would be reactive and would be dependent on the nature and location of the enemy attack. the aim would be to retrieve the territory and restore the status quo ante. Since Kargil has proven that retaking territory can prove costly in terms of casualties, there is a case for a counter stroke or a corps level ‘riposte’. this must aim at slicing off the territory lost by targeting the launch pad or base area, thereby enabling retaking of the territory in the long haul. the second option is in launching a counter offensive. this could be at a place and choice of own choosing, other than in

areas in which enemy forces have made significant headway. the aim would be to take at least an equivalently valuable territory so as to arrive at a trade off on the negotiating table. It will help in political face saving by presenting the enemy with a military quid pro quo. the more significant capability that the MSc confers is the ability for proactive offensive. this enables wresting of the initiative at the very outset, thereby keeping the enemy reactive. the prerequisite for this is a timely political go-ahead, predicated on political will. this is not infeasible in light of the national interests in a given strategic circumstance. Proactive offensives may also be in the context of an ongoing conflict in another theatre requiring response in the theatre of location of the MSc. the latter is more likely to be the case since India’s strategic doctrine is not compliance but deterrence.

A pre-emptive offensive, based on situational awareness of imminent enemy attack, is a possible variant. Since retaking territory is a difficult exercise, preventing loss of territory may prove alluring. however, this would entail prior preparedness, the levels of which are difficult to sustain over a long duration. Preemption strategies can also lead to misperceptions, resulting in a competitive ‘cold start’ scenario. this undercuts crisis stability with its unwelcome strategic implications. the MSc need not necessarily be employed as a whole. It must be capable of induction and employment in its constituent force levels, be it in its divisions and brigade sized forces. Mountains make firepower provision and sustenance of large forces difficult. therefore, the MSc must be exercised for employment not only as a whole but also in its constituent parts. the nature of the

The MSC need not necessarily be employed as a whole. It must be capable of induction and employment in its constituent force levels, be it in its divisions and brigade sized forces.

ongoing conflict may be such that it may not be employed as an integrated fighting formation, but employed piecemeal. If the Kargil War is taken as precedence, in case there is territory that has been lost to enemy action and there is an over riding strategic need for limiting the area of conflict, then the MSc may find action only in part. the ability for recreation of reserves must exist so that even if partially employed, the MSc has the ability to recoup its capability by absorbing either forces inducted into the theatre or preexisting reserves located therein. the corps must be capable of taking under command additional forces. the MSc must be versatile enough for moving out of the theatre for tasks elsewhere. the possibility of diplomatic action keeping one of the possible two fronts quiet cannot be ruled out in light of the precedence. In such a circumstance, the MSc is unlikely to sit out a war. the familiarity with the ‘other’ front must be equally high, given that the likelihood of outbreak of conflict to the west is higher in the middle-term. the MSc will, in such circumstance, be committed to an operationally happening situation. the employment therefore could well be directly in operations with telescoped preparatory procedures due to time pressure or for posturing. In the latter role, its very movement would be of significance, implying that a certain transparency may accompany the move. therefore, demands on situational awareness, flexibility, resilience and leadership at all levels will be exponential. Of considerable importance would be the manner it is able to retrieve, reel in, reform and re-launch. the transit will involve multiple modes of transport over great distances. even as the MSc is It enabled, it would be fighting in underdeveloped terrain. this will entail being Spartan, self-reliant and have the ability to work with traditional movement methods such as with porter, pony and manpack. high fitness levels, especially to transit to high altitude warfare in early timeframe, would be sine qua non. As a costly national resource, the MSc would require having an elite ethos. Its psychological conditioning must be of an equivalent order as its material preparation. All things being equal, the MSc may have little else to rely on.

Politically Right the decision on the MSc is not only about the capability and the implications. It is also about the message that India is, by its raisings, sending to china. the message is one of deterrence and resolve. It is not an aggressive one, but the second prong of India’s strategy. the strategy of engagement is well-known. the announcement prior to the Defence Secretary level talks between the two countries early this month, suggests that India wishes it to be made known, that it is not negotiating from a position of weakness but of equivalence. this is not only a message for china, but also for India. Since the negotiations will eventually entail a ‘give and take’, India would be unwilling to be dictated on this. If it has the requisite military power, then it would be making concessions if any, as the sovereign’s decision and not as something forced upon. therefore, the MSc raising has to be seen as fulfilling the political purposes too. But in so far as the military is concerned, India would require giving the military such a fine shape that china knows that half century on since 1962, it faces an India with a difference.

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>> T E C H N O L O G Y

Modern Trends in Artillery & Navigation Systems The Indian Army has entered into a period of massive 155mm gun acquisition either through global tendering or through indigenous efforts. It should be ambitious in its requirements in order to have the most modern 155mm guns with accurate navigation, elevation and azimuth system in order to defend the nation efficiently.

PHOTOGRAPHS: KMW, BAE Systems, Nexter

DONAR; (below left) DONAR front view; (below middle) CAESER; (below right) FH77B05

www.spslandforces.net

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rtILLerY GUNS AND rOcKet launcher systems have recently witnessed a quantum enhancement of their capability of accurate firing. this has been made possible by accurate navigation systems on the modern 155mm guns, which allows artillery to manoeuvre from forward concentration areas/hides to pre-determined gun positions without the conventional ‘gun convoys’. Accurate navigation and laying of guns is also possible on dark nights and during the most adverse weather condition of fog or low visibility, and at the same speed and accuracy as in daylight.

Gun/rocket batteries would no longer require survey. Modern technology has so revolutionised artillery manoeuvre that each gun has the ability to be independent and deployed in an autonomous mode. this is extremely important especially in a high intensity air or counter fire threat by surface means. the move and deployment is also possible without the global positioning system (GPS), which may be frequently jammed in battle. All the above capabilities are possible

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due to accurate navigation capabilities which are onboard modern 155mm guns.

Artillery philosophy lays emphasis on destruction rather than neutralisation, and hence the importance of accuracy of delivery means. With improved pointing systems, guns are able to align on the targets and bring down accurate and consistent fire quickly.

Such navigation and pointing/ alignment systems also have the ability to align on the move in a shoot and scoot mode. When it comes to the firing session, the gun shall be aligned “on the move” to reduce the delay to manoeuvre, be laid on the designated target as quick as possible, shoot directly to the target without needs of fire adjustment and scoot to the next firing position. contemporary gun systems have a range in excess of 40 km, while multi-rocket launches can fire up to a distance of 80 to 150 km. With their enhanced ranges, high accuracy of positioning and azimuth are of critical importance. today’s navigation systems enable modern artillery guns to have the following combined performances:

l

An orientation accuracy enabling firing errors contribution limited to 35 m at 40 km firing range, therefore better than 0.9 miles. l A fixation accuracy after a tactical travelled distance of 40 km of 20 m ceP (0.05 per cent of tD) in X,Y and five metre ceP in Z (0.02 per cent of tD). l A fast alignment time of five minutes and less than five minutes in case of “alignment on the move”.

Modern technology has so revolutionised artillery manoeuvre that each gun has the ability to be independent and deployed in an autonomous mode

l

An alignment on the move without the aid of GPS or Glonass.

Direct firing capabilities and night firing capabilities are now possible with the introduction of modern thermal image based sighting systems. these sights are directly mounted on the gun and can have a detection range of two km and engage a target at night at more than one km. the most recent artillery programmes in the world like for instance the truck mounted cAeSAr of Nexter and Archer of BAe, the towed guns Fh77B05 of BAe and Fh2000 of StK or the German DONAr, are all equipped with the most accurate navigation, heading and pointing system, sighting systems which enable them to have unsurpassed firing, and manoeuvring capabilities. the Indian Army has entered into a period of massive 155mm gun acquisition either through global tendering or through indigenous efforts. It should be ambitious in its requirements in order to have the most modern 155mm guns with accurate navigation, elevation and azimuth system in order to defend the nation efficiently.

A R MY ’ S VA LO U R

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Exercise Sudarshan Shakti The exercise aims to test and confirm fresh concepts, manoeuvres and structures that will finally allow one of the world’s largest land forces to fight its next war more nimbly, with drastically less response time and much greater lethality PHOTOGRAPHS: Special Correspondent

Armoured Assault using BMP-II Sarath Armoured Assault using T-90s, Arjun MBTs and BMP-II Saraths

Infantry in action Armoured Assault using T-90

9K58 Smerch & Pinaka MBRL systems providing fire support

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eScrIBeD AS ONe OF the largest and most ambitious war games India has ever conducted, exercise Sudarshan Shakti which played out over the last six weeks in India’s desert sector, was part of a huge effort to validate the integrated theatre offensive concept. contrary to stubborn perceptions that the Army is a bloated and lumbering force, Sudarshan Shakti aims to test and confirm fresh concepts, manoeuvres and structures that will finally allow one of the world’s largest land forces to fight its next war more nimbly, with drastically less response time and much greater lethality. that, at least, is the aim. the force level commitments for exercise Sudarshan Shakti have been unprecedented. the Army committed 50,000 troops, 500 armoured vehicles including improved t- 72 Ajeya, t- 90S Bhishma, Arjun battle tanks and BMP-II armoured personnel carriers to lead the swift assault across simulated enemy lines, with back-up support from the Army’s artillery and rocket regiments and the Indian Air Force (IAF) assault helicopters providing cover.

Officially, the government has described Sudarshan Shakti as a trendsetter for the “Integrated theatre concept”, adding that, “the transformation of the force is at making the Army a more agile, versatile, lethal and networked force. In this exercise, we will be trying out new structures, strategies, and test beds of

an integrated, seamless air-land battle.”

A decade since Operation Parakram— the touchstone confrontation in 2002 that compelled the enormous introspection that the Army went into to improve logistics and responsiveness—the Army is confident that it is a fleeter force. “there is a transformation at play, which we are testing and validating. At the end of Sudarshan Shakti, we will have a clear picture of whether the decisions we have taken work, and how well they work when compared to past practices,” said Lt General Sanjeev Langer, GOc 21 corps, India’s most potent strike formation.

While the Army still refuses to acknowledge any “cold Start” doctrine, the overarching purpose of Sudarshan Shakti is quite clear— test the deployment of more compact fighting units and formations without waiting for massing of forces. essentially, the integrated use of fighting elements including mechanised infantry, main battle tanks with close air support, forward air control and maintenance operations provided by IAF assault helicopters. the Army’s rocket and field artillery regiments provide the required softening of targets at stand-off range as forward units mount a blistering offensive. the integrated battlespace concept is not new to the military. It has conducted several exercises in the last few years to war game fights in an environment drenched in network-centric signals and sensors. In other words, a dramatically more transparent bat-

tlefield where surveillance, reconnaisance, communications intelligence, support measures, jamming and early warning take on a deeply important role, one that could turn the tide of the fight at hand.

While the Indian military is regularly criticised for war gaming in isolation without any meaningful jointmanship between the Services, Lt General Langer said, “With air support playing a major role in future battles, increased air assets of the IAF and Indian Army have been employed in an integrated manner. employment of attack helicopters, airborne special forces, air maintenance were practised during the exercise.” the concepts on transforming the Army, that have been put through the motions at Sudarshan Shakti, were authored by the Army’s Southern commander Lt General A.K. Singh, an armoured corps officer, and chief of the Army Staff, Lt General V.K. Singh, an infantryman.

Like the previous war games, including Vijayee Bhava, Vayu Shakti and Brazen chariots, the Army and the IAF also made full use of space assets during Sudarshan Shakti. For instance, the classified joint operations centre in Barmer sector of rajasthan, that oversaw the intelligence and communications feeds during the exercise, had realtime satellite feeds and information from other sources. “the use of space-based elements in the future battle will be a standard. We have certain technologies, and are testing some new

ones. All of these are pieces of the overall network centric standard that we are attempting to build. It is a long process, but we are working towards it,” said Lt General Langer.

While India did inform Pakistan about the exercise well in advance, the November 26 attack by NAtO in the Mohmand province that killed as many as 24 Pakistani troops, gave the Indian exercise a new complexion. certain sections of the Pakistani media interpreted Sudarshan Shakti to be a provocative pressure tactic on Pakistan by the Indian Army. In India, however, the Army dismissed all notions of the exercise being Pakistan-centric. “the exercise has certain objectives, and is not pointed at any country. We are testing certain concepts which we need for any future war, but this is not country-specific.

We have certain objectives. But historically, our Army has always played only the defensive role,” said Lt General Langer. exercise Sudarshan Shakti played out a time when the Army is steeped in efforts to modernise precisely the strike elements at play. Parallel efforts to procure new field artillery, stalled for more than a quarter century, are finally expected to take off in the next months, the Army is looking forward to speedier deliveries of the licence-built t-90S tank and the Arjun Mk.II will move into a phase of crucial trials in the desert sector next month. Separately, the Army is also looking to procure new battlefield communication equipment and sensors of all kinds.

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D I P LO M A C Y

Indo-Afghan Strategic Alliance While a trade agreement between India and Afghanistan makes sense, more so if Pakistan too is taken on board; it is the term “strategic alliance”, covering many areas of cooperation between the two countries, which is irritating Pakistan PHOTOGRAPH: PIB

n LT GENERAL (RETD) HARWANT SINGH

www.spslandforces.net

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NDIA’S PrOPeNSItY tO ShOOt at its feet is indeed phenomenal. Be it the giveaway of tibet, Shimla Agreement or Operation Blue Star, which resulted in the killing of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, or intervention in Sri Lanka through Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) which resulted in the killing of Prime Minister rajiv Gandhi. the more recent case being the handling of yoga guru ramdev and Anna hazare agitations; the flip-flop on Lokpal Bill; and foreign direct investment (FDI). the list is endless. the replay of the ‘Great Game’ in Afghanistan, at which the British had failed, is the latest misadventure by India. russians too had to beat a hasty retreat and now America and the UN will depart, without leaving any trace of peace or stability. In the case of russian intervention, it was America and Pakistan which played the spoil sport and now it is Pakistan which is playing the double game to negate American and UN efforts in Afghanistan. In the long run, it is Pakistan and china which will rally against the Indo-Afghan strategic alliance and there is little that India will be able to do in this case.

It is Afghanistan that has been the most difficult country for military campaigns and equally difficult to govern. Both the nature of terrain, climate and the warlike tribes that inhabit the land create an amalgam of harshness and lawlessness. even Alexander the Great experienced considerable difficulties in traversing through this land on his way to India.

While a trade agreement between India and Afghanistan makes sense, more so if Pakistan too is taken on board; it is the term “strategic alliance”, covering many areas of cooperation between the two countries, which is irritating Pakistan. this alliance covers a wide areas of trade and infrastructure; creating facilities to exploit minerals and hydrocarbons, education, etc. And more importantly, training and equipping Afghan National Security Forces. It also includes regular political contact and cooperation at the United Nations. this agreement has vastly enlarged the scope and span of cooperation with Afghanistan and has understandably raised alarm signals in Pakistan.

A consortium of Indian companies called AFIScO, which includes JSW Steel, JSW Ispat, Monnet Ispat, etc and public sector companies like the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) have cornered the rights to mine iron ore from hajigak group of mines (B, c and D blocks). But for transportation of this ore, a railway line is to be built from a port on the Iranian coast (close to Pakistani port of Gwadar being built by the chinese) and from there across Afghanistan to hajigak. Once the talibans come back, the operation of these mines and the railway will be in serious jeopardy.

Issues like India training the Afghan security forces, and the term “strategic alliance”, is what is conjuring up Pakistan’s worst fears more than the other provisions of the agreement. Pak military has always dreamt of exercising control over Kabul, albeit through a substitute. the possibility of this perceived enemy gaining influence in Kabul is an anathema for Pakistan. Speaking to David Bradlay of Atlantic Media company, General Musharraf reflected the Pak

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Dr Manmohan Singh with President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai in New Delhi

military’s view when he said, “In Afghanistan, there has been a kind of proxy conflict going on between Pakistan and India. India is trying to create an anti-Pak Afghanistan and has the vision to dominate the region and weaken Pakistan.”

President hamid Karzai’s writ does not run over greater parts of Afghanistan. he has failed to get taliban to join in a dialogue. the recent killing of former President Burhanuddin rabbani who was appointed

by Karzai as an interlocutor with the taliban is an indication that the latter is not willing to accommodate Karzai in any future political dispensation. Pakistan’s own designs and its full backing of haqqani group is a factor that will inevitably play its full course after the American and United Nations (UN) troops leave Afghanistan. Pakistan’s obsession with ‘strategic depth’, flawed as it may be, is the raison d’être of its Afghan policy. It would not like India to fish in, what Pakistan considers its backwaters. Pakistan has had an inalienable relationship with the taliban and other terrorist organisations. It has travelled too far down the terrorist highway to pull back.

American frustration with Pakistan’s continued support to the haqqani network finally came out in the open, when Admiral Mike Mullen was forthright in his accusation of Pakistan’s ‘double game’ of running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. the US President Barack Obama and former President Bill clinton too have warned Pakistan against this duality in its stance. At some point, America will distance itself from Pakistan. America cutting down aid will impact rawalpindi, but will not dissuade it to delink itself from taliban. On the other hand, it will drive Pakistan more and more into the arms of china. establishing the taliban regime in Kabul gives Pakistan the added advantage. In that it would have neither the influence nor the power to aggressively assert Afghanistan’s historical claims to territories seized from defeated Afghan rulers by the Imperial British power. the British had termed the new boundary line as Durand Line.

While Pakistan is likely to view Indian

alliance with Afghanistan as an attempt to squeeze it from both sides, china may apprehend its exploitation of Afghan mineral wealth in jeopardy. china has already taken contract of copper mines in Afghanistan and is currently extracting this valuable mineral, as also exploring the possibility of more contracts. Moreover, china will be loathed at the prospect of the spread of Indian influence in this important region. china’s relentless quest for hydrocarbons and minerals in this region would seek to negate Indian influence in these countries so that its relentless quest for hydrocarbons and minerals go unhindered.

On its part India does not have the capacity and will to carry through this strategic alliance with Afghanistan, especially when Pakistan in cohorts with china, militates against it. For India there is no air or land link with Afghanistan except through Iran. the geography itself is a major roadblock against this alliance with Kabul. It will also bring to naught Manmohan Singh’s persistent efforts of befriending Pakistan. Flip-flop in its policy on the issue of granting most favoured nation (MFN) status to India is the result of uncertainty in the direction Pakistan wants to take; though it realises the tremendous economic advantage Pakistan will have from this trade agreement with India. In any case, India is well acquainted with the duality of Pak politics.

President Karzai has been making friendly overtures to Pakistan and calling it Afghanistan’s “twin brother”, but he knows it well that amendment is not possible and Pakistan has a different game plan in mind.

With the dateline of 2014 approaching fast, when the bulk of American and UN troops

Indian diplomacy has so far not done well with countries on its immediate periphery

will leave Afghanistan; and Pakistan’s intentions known, he has tried to latch on to the only country he could find willing to help him. On India’s part, the contours of this alliance and their likely fallout on Pakistan have simply not been fully thought through.

Given the constraints of geography and India’s own limitations to go the whole hog with Kabul, the deal should have been purely trade oriented; conceding Pakistan’s legitimate interests in that country and should have taken the latter on board in this arrangement. Karzai too needs to build better relations with Pakistan and assuage the misgivings and apprehensions. Peace in this region is in the best interests of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. For India to have transborder trade with central Asian republics and revival of something akin to the silk route can only be realised by fully involving Pakistan in this grandiose scheme, the latter too stands to enormously gain from such trade. that is the reality we must come to terms with and not give in to some fanciful scenarios. On the other hand, china is well on its way to building trade corridors with Pakistan and the Middle east and finally a land bridge linking the Pacific coastline with the Atlantic. the more recent development where NAtO helicopters attacked a Pakistan Army post on the Afghan border, killing two dozen soldiers has resulted in a nationwide protests against America and brought the Pak-US relations to a breaking point. While the precise reasons for this attack on the Pakistan post are not clear, with both sides fielding different versions, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani had ordered his troops to retaliate with fire any future attack by North Atlantic treaty Organisation (NAtO)/US troops. Pakistan has since taken over Shamshi Air Base in Balochistan, from where drone attacks were being launched by the US. Before leaving, the US troops destroyed stores that could not be carried. china has lost no time to rise to Pakistan’s defence. the immediate fall out of this incident is that Pakistan has stopped passage of NAtO supplies through its territory. More recently, it is threatening to deny Pak space to US aircraft. Pakistan declined to attend the Bonn conference in order to discuss the future of Afghanistan after the US troops withdraw. this conference is designed to engage all interested parties with vested interest in Afghanistan, the principal amongst these being Pakistan. While Pak-US relations will not break, it is likely to remain strained and cooperation will decrease, at least in the immediate future.

Indian diplomacy has so far not done well with countries on its immediate periphery. Given the ground reality, this hopping across Pakistan and working out a strategic tie up with Kabul to the exclusion of Pakistan, has its own pitfalls. All Indian investments in Afghanistan could come to naught. this alliance with Kabul will bring added pressure from china on the border with India, as detailed by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and the terrorist activity in Jammu and Kashmir could possibly increase. Such are the dynamics of the geopolitical realities of the region. Pakistan is quite unmindful of its disastrous policies in building Jehadi network and the inevitable fallout of these on itself and the consequent instability.

The author is a former Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Policy and Systems), Indian Army.

D I P LO M A C Y

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Harmony & Collaboration in Asia-Pacific Region South East Asia in tandem with East Asia is likely to be the arena of future US-China power tussle. If China indulges in strategic and military brinkmanship, localised armed conflicts may occur. The major powers need to intensify the cooperation efforts and stop revival of Cold War mentality that further destabilises the region. n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

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he ASIA-PAcIFIc eNcOMPASSeS numerous countries including Australia and New Zealand in the South and its locus in the Association of South east Asian Nations (ASeAN).

In a world where a bulk of the consumers in most countries reside outside the country’s border, Asia Pacific economic cooperation (APec) itself comprises 40 per cent of the global population. Many of these economies are growing faster than the world average and have together generated 56 per cent of global GDP in 2010. While the ASeAN sponsored ASeAN Free trade Area (AFtA) is gaining momentum, the east Asia Summit (eAS) too has focused on issues of trade, energy and security. Non-traditional security issues that affect the well-being, dignity and survival of humanity too need to be addressed. Future success of the region will depend upon improved global integration with the world becoming flatter in every aspect. cooperation in the region is overshadowed with strife in the South china Sea and lack of appropriate regional security arrangements. With world seaborne trade pegged to reach 41,800 billion tonne by 2014, half the global super tanker traffic transiting this region and lack of a multilateral approach to combat maritime security challenges holistically; strife and conflict are likely to heighten in the Asia Pacific region.

ASeA, established in 1967 as a geopolitical and economic organisation of 10 countries of South east Asia, has expanded over the years, aiming for accelerated economic growth, social progress, cultural development, protection of regional peace and stability. Post the east Asian Financial crisis of 1997, there has been better integration between the economies of ASeAN as well as the ASeAN+3 countries (china, Japan and South Korea). the bloc has also focused on peace and stability in the region, ratifying the South east Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone treaty. the idea of east Asia Groupings, mooted in 1995, resulted in a number of east Asia Summits (eAS) involving ASeAN, + 3 countries and countries that have Full Dialogue Partner status of ASeAN and signatories to the treaty of Amity and cooperation (tAc). eAS focuses on multiple issues of energy, finance, education, natural disaster

tions to sustain growth, deepening international integration and managing accompanying risks of economic and political instability through global systems is a priority. Measured in purchasing power parity terms, Asia’s share of global GDP will amount to around 31 per cent in 2020, with china accounting for over 14 per cent. hence, china and India will substantially impact the world economy. the scale and weight of income growth in Asia will have a huge impact on trade in goods and services globally and within the region. the income growth cannot be sustained without continuing to maintain the openness to international trade and private capital flows that has already helped successful growth. trade is an engine of driver in ASeAN and east Asia, but South Asia still has to cover more distance. At present, every state has enormous autonomy over trade matters—from PHOTOGRAPH: MEA

Regional Groupings Asia is a region with large standing armies, four declared nuclear weapon states, countries engaged in production and export of missiles and seven of the 10 most populous countries of the world. Its demography, civilisation and political diversity, provide additional volatility. It is estimated that in the next 25 years, Asia will account for 57 per cent of world GDP even though recession in the West affects the region. South east Asia derives its geostrategic significance by virtue of its location of sitting astride the waters that connect the Indian and the Pacific Oceans and strategic chokepoints of the Malacca, Lombok and Sunda Straits. Sea lines traversing AsiaPacific carry 50 per cent of global trade and 33 per cent of global oil. More than 550 million people inhabit South east Asia and regional economies total to more than $1 trillion (`50,00,000 crore) . economies of the US and its allies in the region depend on security of the sea lanes and stability of the region.

About 97 per cent of Indian trade is by sea and the $60 billion (`3,00,000 crore) annual India-china trade is predominantly by sea.

Major subregional groups are like ASeAN and South Asian Association for regional cooperation (SAArc) and cross-subregional blocs are ASeAN Free trade Area (APtA), APec, Bay of Bengal Initiative for MultiSectoral technical and economic cooperation (BIMStec), etc. Bilateral trade pacts are being pursued for deep integration. Subregions are also building up network with other countries and regions separately, for example, ASeAN+3, ASeAN+6, ASeAN-china, ASeAN-India. though trade is the main vehicle of collaboration, other areas are also included in the cooperation activities.

PM with leaders at the 9th ASEAN-India Summit in Bali

mitigation, environment, climate change, sustainable development and mutual appreciation of each other’s heritage and history leading to initiatives like revival of Nalanda University in India, a track II study on a comprehensive economic Partnership in east Asia (cePeA) and establishment of an economic research Institute for ASeAN and east Asia (erIA). Adoption of the “Singapore Declaration on climate change, energy and environment” led to mobilising financial support, capacity building, development of clean technologies, exchange of scientific and technical expertise, joint studies, promotion of public awareness and development of policy measures. china plays a significant role in South east Asia with its development making economic gains and strategic inroads in South Asia. the ASeAN-china free trade agreement signed in 2010 is well-known, as is also its participation in a lot of subregional cooperation arrangements.

India-ASeAN cooperation covers numerous fields like trade and investment, science and technology (including It, biotechnology, advanced materials, space sciences and their applications), tourism, human resource development, education including language training, transport, infrastructure, health and pharmaceuticals.

Trade Building regional architecture and institu-

taxes to procedures. through unilateral liberalisation process many of the Asian economies achieved high growth. Due to the diverse nature of economies, integration process through economic cooperation has become complicated and slow. that does not imply that Asian economies need to wait for further convergence. Initial conditions are important but not decisive for integration.

APec has facilitated growth of participants by optimising interdependence among Asia-Pacific economies and enhancing a sense of community, aimed at improving regional trade, economic performance and linkages for prosperity of the people in the

The challenge is to carefully consider the direction, structure and function of future regional security architecture through renewed diplomatic and defence initiatives

region. It has helped to reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade across Asia-Pacific, reducing business transaction costs by about 10 per cent and creating an environment to ensure safe and efficient movement of goods, services and people across borders through policy decisions, and economic and technical cooperation.

Free trade Areas (FtAs) enable free internal trade while external tariffs against outside countries differ among member nations. these factors create the “trade creation effect” and the “trade diversion effect” through respective actions of a shift in the geographic location of production from higher-cost to lower-cost member nations as well as a shift in the locus of production of formerly imported goods from lower-cost non-member nations to higher-cost member nations.

Security During the cold War, South east Asian region witnessed power play between the US and the Soviet Union with both having naval bases in the region and their fleets patrolling the high seas. With the rise of china, especially on the territorial and resources fronts, china’s policy is giving rise to conflict with its neighbours. economic prowess of china is supported by massive foreign direct investment (about $106 billion (`5,30,000 crore) in 2010 alone) which is a catalyst to growth.

Much that china may portray its peaceful intentions and say that its interests are purely economic, it’s territorial assertiveness and past record does not instill much confidence, which is likely to increase strife in the region directly affecting regional cooperation, economic and political security. A cross-section believes that the chinese mindset is well-rooted in its historical “tian Xia” (under the heaven) concept which views “all territories” as belonging to the chinese and due to which, the chinese, traditionally, attach no sense to territory. Due to chinese aspirations to emerge as the second pole in a new global strategic order, South east Asian region is increasingly emerging as the arena for US-china strategic power play. By and large, countries in the region (perhaps less North Korea) want continued US presence in the region even though economic and trade dependence of some is on china. there seems to be no sound mechanism in South east Asia to deal with issues like thailand-cambodia border problem or Malaysia-Indonesia sea boundary dispute. china’s claim to entire South china Sea, Spratley and Paracel group of islands has aggravated tensions. In recent years, South east Asian countries have built up their naval, submarine and fighter jets assets to upgrade defensive capabilities for withstanding aggressive instincts and strategic coercion by china.

One may expect South east Asian region heat up. there are fundamental positional differences between the US and china. the US says that the disputed Senkaku Island comes under the jurisdiction of the US-Japan Security treaty which china hotly contests. Further, the US says the South china Sea Islands dispute should be solved multilaterally while china says the issue should be solved bilaterally. china views South east Asia region as its strategic backyard and wants the US to quit

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>> D I P L O M A C Y / A R M Y ’ S V A L O U R the region, declaring South china Sea her “core concern”, implying that it is prepared to go to war to ensure sovereignty. concurrently, the US along with other nations has declared that Global commons which are not limited to maritime waters but extends to aerospace are common heritage of everyone and no country can declare sovereignty over them.

A Vision Statement for ASeAN regional Forum (ArF) for 2020 was adopted at the 16th ArF Ministerial Meeting in July 2009.

It recognised ArF as the central pillar in the emerging regional security architecture, calling for strengthening ArF’s role in raising awareness on security challenges and intensifying confidence building and cooperation. the 18th ArF Ministerial held on July 23, 2011, adopted a Work Plan on Preventive Diplomacy as well as a Work Plan on Maritime Security, which provides the framework for taking forward cooperation activities in the respective areas.

Present Scenario there is no denying the fact that the AsiaPacific region is economically stronger than what it was more than a decade back and has managed to get over the 1997 recession comfortably. however, the increase in individual gross domestic products (GDPs) includes the profits made by the MNcs. the rapidity with which Asia-europe Meeting (ASeM) member countries have opened their economies in the last few years is impressive.

Although all of the South east Asian economies initially embarked on importsubstituting industrialisation, with time they shifted to export-oriented industrialisation policies. export-oriented industrialisation led to an opening of the economies for more markets and the promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a means of upgrading the industrial structures through the transfer and diffusion of advanced industrial technologies. As a result, the exposure of the economies to foreign trade became large.

While most Asian countries reduced their dependence on the US and eU, china has increased its share to these markets. Movements in both trade volumes and world market prices for traded commodities have impacted the foreign demand for ASeM country exports in various degrees. the importance of foreign firms in the export sector is well-documented and there is ample

evidence that export orientation is one of the most important determinants of the FDI flows. the current downturn in economic activity throughout Asia highlights the vulnerability of the export-led economic growth model to external shocks. this situation has engendered widespread interest in rebalancing the economies in a way that would shift export-driven growth to domestic demandled growth. trade is an engine in ASeAN and east Asia, but South Asia appears to be going slow. even within ASeAN, there are divergent views for further integration. As things stand today, every state has enormous autonomy over trade matters right from taxes to procedures. through unilateral liberalisation process many of the Asian economies achieved high growth. Due to diverse nature of economies, the integration process through economic cooperation has become complicated and slow. It does not imply that Asian economies need to wait for further convergence. Initial conditions are important but not decisive for integration. At the same time, less developed countries that have large pools of unskilled labour and use this force intensively for products that may be good for trade, have the danger of locking themselves in a stagnant situation inhibiting the domestic growth of elements of capital, entrepreneurship, technical skills and the like, which are indispensable for future development. the role of multinational corporations (MNcs) also needs to be examined dispassionately notwithstanding their contribution to development. MNcs, which are an omnipresent reality, need to be taken into account in analysing the impact of FtA on ASeAN development and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

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The Future though Asia-Pacific region countries have their own individual sovereignties, a future environment of closer cooperation should aim for the following: l help develop less developed countries in getting favourable trade concessions from developed countries in terms of lowered barriers for the export of labour-intensive manufactured goods and permit creation of “regional trading blocs” among developing countries at relatively equal stages

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of industrial development and similar market sizes.

Adopt measures avoiding resource allocation for socially undesirable projects— encourage MNc participation on basis of holistic growth. expand AFtA to a wider global economic zone encompassing entire Asia-Pacific region as a first step. AFtA within east Asian economies should not diminish the independence of ASeAN countries, subordinating them to stronger countries.

ASeAN and AFtA must acknowledge that strong member countries of the WtO do not desire total liberalisation, but only a liberalisation which favours individual national interests. to that end, ASeAN-WtO relations need to be treated with caution. Under FtA, which assures a total liberalised area, no institutions can regulate the activities of the MNcs. FtA must not be considered an extension of the actual WtO, but should be seen as a strong step towards concretising the MNcs dream. track III dialogue in ASeAN and AsiaPacific region needs to be encouraged to ensure public participation, holistic growth taking into account grassroots issues and empowering communities for better development.

More focus is required on issues like resource management, climate change, energy and environmental security, nuclear and missile proliferation, disarmament, poverty alleviation, counterterrorism and transnational crime. the current Asia-Pacific regional arrangements also fail to effectively separate political, economic and security issues which lead to an organisation like APec to also tackle non-traditional security issues, apart from economic cooperation.

ASeAN-India free trade pact does not include the “services” sector. Also, India can offer assistance to east Asian nations in building capabilities to protect sea lines of communication (SLOc) and South east Asian nations in the non-traditional security field.

Asian integration should be further improved through convergence mechanism among various groups. the cue can be taken from BIMStec which

focuses on micro issues like sectoral cooperation apart from macro issues like trade agreements. l Non-traditional security issues affecting the well-being, dignity and survival of humans are beyond the confines of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. cooperative inter-state mechanism is needed as the response would not suffice. l Finally, the region has the potential of conflict, as mentioned above. the ArF has a major role to play in this regard, including promoting peaceful discussions on territorial gains, maritime disputes and protection of SLOcs. conflict, chances of which are high, will retard progress in the Asia Pacific region. the dialogue could take a cue from the conference on Interaction and confidence Building Measures in Asia (cIcA) aimed at enhancing cooperation through elaborating multilateral approach towards promoting peace, security and stability.

Cooperative Arrangements to maintain high, sustainable economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region, nations need to control their own strategies within an international context in the post-economic crisis period. It is essential to strengthen cooperation at the regional level and define and undertake new initiatives in accordance with the changing dynamics. the Asia-Pacific region has the capacity to be a global driver especially since Asia’s unbridled capacity for growth has pushed it to the forefront. the changing regional security environment will have an impact on how Asia-Pacific can lead the region. the trends of the last decade indicate that this new century will be dominated by the power of technology and a globalised economic system.

South east Asia in tandem with east Asia is likely to be the arena of future US-china power tussle. If china indulges in strategic and military brinkmanship, localised armed conflicts may occur. the major powers need to intensify the cooperation efforts and stop revival of cold War mentality that further destabilises the region. the challenge is to carefully consider the direction, structure and function of future regional security architecture through renewed diplomatic and defence initiatives. ArF has a major role to play in this.

PHOTOGRAPHS: PIB

President Creates History President Patil became the first Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces to ride on a T-90 main battle tank, during Exercise Sudarshan Shakti

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President Pratibha Devisingh Patil along with Defence Minister A.K. Antony and Army Chief General V.K. Singh with a T-90 tank; (above) The President addressing troops during a Sainik Sammelan, after witnessing the Strike Corps Offensive Operation by GOC-in C Southern Command & GOC 21 Corps, at Pachpadra, Rajasthan on December 5, 2011

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T EC H N O LO GY

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Geospatial Intelligence and C4I2 In times to come, as India emerges as a global player and also gets increasingly involved in the UN-backed conflict management activities, we will need to continuously review our policies and carry out organisational adaptations to operate seamlessly with other member countries of the UN, at least the major ones PHOTOGRAPH: US Army

n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

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eOGrAPhIc, GeOSPAtIAL Or SPAtIAL data forms the foundation of all planned human activity. Disaster management, management and conservation of natural resources, infrastructure planning and development, and land use planning are just a few examples of areas in which decision-making is contingent on availability of accurate and high quality spatial data. Developments in digital technologies, particularly the rapid advancements in geographic information systems (GIS) and global positioning systems (GPS) have now made it possible to correlate and use diverse map information, in conjunction, at the click of a mouse. Intelligence plays a vital role in the decision-making process of any nation or organisation. With the end of the cold War, regrouping of traditional alliances and erstwhile blocks, and emergence of threat of transnational terrorism has forced government’s world over in adopting organisational restructuring to deal with aspects of national security. Unlike conventional warfare, terrorism is not restricted to specific battle ground or geographic space.

It can manifest in attacks and threats in the hinterland at any place and any time. thus, the geographic database for war fighting is no more restricted to areas adjoining international boundaries, rather, the effort has to include own territory as well. this also increases the volume of information that needs to be processed to filter out meaningful intelligence. the aim of any such system should, therefore, be to fuse data from multiple and sometimes unrelated sources to enable production of a comprehensive intelligence picture encompassing all aspects of information.

Geospatial Intelligence Geospatial Intelligence has been defined by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), which was the predecessor to National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) as “the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth”. this definition clearly depicts the magnitude of the effort required to build a database of geospatial intelligence so as to provide support to government agencies entrusted with the task of national security. the need for having access to maximum data pertaining to the topography and demography of an area of interest by the commanders of armies is well established over the years. transparent overlays with detailed supplementary information placed over printed topography sheets are just one example of this necessity. With computers and associated technology came the era of digital mapping where such supplementary data could be displayed, queried and processed, based on the requirement and very significantly without cluttering the base map. the capability of any application based on a GIS is limited to the quantity and quality of data provided as inputs. A digitised cartography map needs a huge amount of attribute data before it can become suitable as GIS input. While generally this data has been assumed to pertain to terrain features only, a true GIS ready map should logically cover the complete spectrum of data required by various disciplines of geodetic

science. this definitely calls for inputs even from agencies other than those dealing with topographic survey.

Infrastructure Needed to optimally exploit the available information in a geographic context, the military will have to rely on other agencies of the government. Any effort in isolation will leave large gaps in intelligence which would be crucial at the time of critical decision-making. It is, therefore, essential that any agency entrusted with the task of producing geospatial intelligence will essentially have to be multifaceted with representation from all agencies dealing with aspects of intelligence, cartography, oceanography, civic infrastructure creation, public utility, safety services and the like. cartography in an urban environment is a challenging task due to lack of natural features that can be selected as control points and the problem of line of sight for surveying.

Some of the major nations are well on their way to establish agencies dealing with this important aspect of intelligence. Post9/11, the United States has carried out a major restructuring of the government agencies and formation of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency by merging elements from the cIA (central Intelligence Agency), Defense Intelligence Agency, National reconnaissance Organisation (NrO), State Department, etc, in meeting a vital requirement of network-centric warfare (NcW) and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and interoperability (c4I2) systems in the modern era. NGA is undoubtedly a major arm of the United States Government assisting in implementing the national goals of USA. For production and analysis of data required as a base for geospatial intelligence, numerous agencies are involved. this would include high resolution imagery products, elevation data sourced through ground/air/space based survey, electronic intelligence (eLINt) and human intelligence (hUMINt) assets, cartographic data, inputs from agencies dealing with internal security, urban and rural development agencies, forest management agencies, intelligence community and the like. It is only when the seemingly unrelated events collected individually by these agencies are merged a comprehensive intelligence picture in the geographic domain can emerge.

Indian Scene Both the Kargil review committee (Krc) and the Group of Ministers (GoP) had made numerous recommendations with respect to issues related to streamlining the agencies in the country. however, a lot of work is yet to commence on the issues related to fusion of intelligence data. While within the armed forces, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) has been established, and at the national level the National technical research Organisation (NtrO) has come up, these steps may still not be sufficient to deal with aspects pertaining to geospatial intelligence. establishment of the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI) has been a good step but it will be awhile before it achieves the required capability. the NSDI aspires to develop the nation’s ability to create large volumes of different data sets in conjunction with one another in a networked environment, add value to it, and make available information to society, government, industry, business, research, etc. however, in the current dispensation, the NSDI deals with only ‘some’ aspects pertaining to creation of metadata from available geospatial data and does not cater to inputs from the intelligence

community or for that matter the defence services, which is a major flaw. Moreover, only through common conventions and technical agreements, standards, metadata definitions, network and access protocols; it will be easily possible for the NSDI to come into existence. Within the Indian armed forces, the DIA within hQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) is the central repository for all intelligence inputs pertaining to the three services including the imagery intelligence (IMINt) and eLINt. however, aspects of topography are yet to be integrated with the DIA, which again is a major flaw. Also, within the existing setup, adequate resources in terms of remote sensing, eLINt payloads and cartography are not available to produce high quality fused data.

Much more is required at the national level in terms of integration of various government agencies. While certain isolated linkages between certain government agencies have come into being, such connectivity has to be extended to all necessary arms of the government over a national security information grid for optimal exploitation of various multilayered data sets. though the National Information Grid (NAtGrID) stands sanctioned and is under establishment, ideally, a comprehensive geospatial intelligence data set should be able to generate large-scale maps, surface models to include natural and manmade structures, walk through critical infrastructure and buildings, and computer models to support aspects pertaining to nation building as well as national security. the establishment of the Disaster Management Authority of India recognises the importance of geospatial science in nation building. An organisation like this has to deal with varied amount of data pertaining to disparate sources of information in order to perform the assigned tasks. NAtGrID will be a basic prerequisite for the collection and assimilation of data coming from various parts of the country, dealing with different aspects of national security. till the NAtGrID is established, our existing/interim communication infrastructure is definitely not in a position to deal with information flow of a magnitude necessitated by large-scale disasters.

40th Issue

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News in Brief

BY SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT PHOTOGRAPH: Cornershot

range of 1,000 metres. the Army would prefer parallel supply of telescopic sights by the OeM, but definitely wants standard Mil 1913 picatinny rails on the weapon to mount different types of sighting systems. As with the two current weapons in service, the Army will be looking to use the new GPMGs in multiple modes: as an infantry weapon in different profiles, vehicle mounted and heliborne operations.

In March 2010, the Army said it was also interested in looking at a new 12.7x99mm heavy machine gun for use on a light strike vehicle/infantry fighting vehicle and in a ground role while mounted on vehicle and tripod respectively. A year later, the Indian Navy also announced its interest in purchase new hMGs specifically for the ship-mounted anti-piracy role.

INDIAN ARMY USES ARJUN IN LARGEST WARGAME cornershot capability for use with in-service under-barrel grenade launchers (UBGLs). the US-Israeli firm cornerShot is understood to have demonstrated the capability to the Indian Army on at least two occasions. the Indian paramilitary forces, particularly those engaged in anti-Maoist operations have also evaluated the capability.

TAVOR RIFLE WITH INDIAN ARMY After several stops and starts, including problems with stability and the lack of certain features, the Israel-built IWI tavor tAr21 assault rifle is now comfortably in Indian use, inducted and operational in several agencies including the Army para commando units, marine commandos, rashtriya rifles, Special Frontier Force and certain paramilitary units. Fitted with an M203-class grenade launcher, the tAr-21 is likely to be ordered in larger numbers shortly. the Army has also begun fitting its tavors with telescopic sights, accessory rails, dual magazine clips, self-luminous reflex sight for the under-barrel grenade launcher and single eye night vision with head band. the light-weight fast-point/shoot Israeli weapon is being considered a mainstay design alongside the Belgian FN herstan F2000 bullpup assault rifle, the latter in use with agencies that include the VVIP Special Protection Group’s counter-assault force that was raised in 2008.

Apart from further inductions of both weapon types, the Army is engaged in a slew of small arms procurement efforts.

For instance, the tAr-21 and F2000 are likely contenders in a tender that the Army announced in December 2010—one that it will float shortly for a new modular assault rifle as part of its F-INSAS infantry modernisation programme. In May last year, the Army also announced its interest in procuring an unspecified number of 7.62mm amphibious assault rifles that could be used immediately after being brought out of water by special forces personnel.

Also, to augment Glock 17 and Fn-35 9mm pistols in service with the Special Forces and para units, the Army has been scouting over the last two years for a new 9mm semi-automatic sidearm. to round off its requirement, the Army is also looking out for a new 5.56mm close-Quarter battle carbine and 7.62mm light machine gun (LMG).

INDIAN ARMY LOOKING FOR NEW MACHINE GUNS

PRITHVI-II FAILS PHOTOGRAPH: DRDO

the indigenous Arjun main battle tank (MBt) was an integral part of the Army’s strike corps war game Sudarshan Shakti that played out over the last few weeks in rajasthan’s border sectors.

With 124 tanks in two regiments, the Army put the squadron of Arjuns through the paces as part of its integrated theatre offensive validation effort. Performing alongside the mainstay t-90S Bhishma and t-72 Ajeya, the Arjun is slowly finding an operational niche within the Army’s arsenal. the troubled programme, delayed for years by non-stop development and user trials, will however see limited scope in its current avatar. the Army is now preparing to test the Arjun Mk.2 early next year, a heavier version of the original and with a host of improvements including a crucial night-fighting capability (through a thermal imaging night sight for the driver), a capability to fire missiles from its primary 120mm gun tube, explosive reactive armour protection and advanced navigation features. the Army has placed an in-principle indent for 124 Arjun Mk.IIs, though this order will only be formalised if the DrDO’s combat Vehicles r&D establishment (cVrDe) succeeds in carrying out recommended modifications to the Arjun and integrating a host of fresh capabilities, including new advanced electronic equipment.

One of the dilemmas facing the programme currently is uncertainty over the number of Arjuns the Army will finally procure. With the future main battle tank (FMBt) programme soon to begin taking up development resources, scientists fear the Arjun programme may not recover the investments that the government has made in the project since the 1970s. the Army on its part is clear that it wants the Arjun, but only with a stipulated and non-negotiable list of modifications and improvements.

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ARMY LOOKING FOR CORNERSHOT CAPABILITY In the latest of a raft of small-arms acquisition efforts, the Indian Army has announced that it is looking to purchase new general purpose machine guns for its Parachute (Special Forces) battalions to augment and later replace the licence-built Belgian MAG-58 and Soviet-era PKM general purpose machine guns (GPMGs) currently in use by the battalions. the weapon needs to be fully interoperable with the current weapons in terms of ammunition compatibility (OFB 7.62x51mm rounds, which will have to be demonstrated in trials), with a barrel life of at least 20,000 rounds. the Army has stipulated that it requires a 7.62 x 51mm calibre weapon to serve as both a light and medium machine gun. the Army is looking for a weapon with greater range than an LMG and lighter than an MMG, with a maximum effective

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the Indian Army is looking ahead to acquire a system that allows it to mount in-service 9mm pistols enabling firing from around a corner—a capability widespread with tactical special units in the US and Israel. the Army is understood to be seeking the capability specifically for its rashtriya rifles units deployed in Jammu & Kashmir, the units regularly involved in firefights with militants holed up in residential areas.

After expressing initial interest in such a capability in 2009, the Army is now understood to be interested in giving this capability to its standard-issue 9mm pistols, which include the Austrian Glock 17, Italian Beretta 92 and German-Swiss SIG Sauer P226. the capability involves an enhancement kit integrated with an existing weapon system with a certain degree of dismantling. A video camera and monitor allows the user to point the weapon at a fulcrum around a corner and use the weapon to survey, target and fire accordingly. the Army also wants the

A crucial salvo test of the Prithvi-II tactical ballistic missile by the country’s Strategic Forces command had to be aborted on December 21 following a system failure. According to an initial estimate, propellant system glitches were detected in both systems very close to launch from the Integrated test range (Itr) off Orissa’s coast. the test was to validate firing two separate Prithvi-II missiles approximately 20 minutes apart as part of a salvo assault.

Unlike the solid-fuelled Agni family of ballistic missiles, the Prithvi series is liquid fuelled, and therefore has attendant workup, preparation and maintenance issues. the nuclear command and Army are both keen on a family of tactical surface-tosurface missiles that are containerised and fully road-mobile, allowing operational and deployment flexibility.

Sources reveal that the Prithvi series do serve as potent border deterrents in the present scenario, but their technology is rapidly reaching obsolescence considering the effort required to prepare and deploy the weapon system. In June this year, the Army tested the Prithvi-II to a high degree of accuracy, reaffirming the weapon’s guidance systems. In December 2010, the nuclear command tested two Prithvi-I ballistic missiles about an hour apart successfully. however, in April 2010, a Prithvi target missile malfunctioned on launch and pitched into the sea, spoiling a test of the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile defence system. the nuclear command plans to conduct a salvo test of the Prithvi-II in January.

US TO PROVIDE SUPER COBRA HELICOPTERS TO TURKEY

the US Defense Security cooperation Agency has notified congress of a potential sale of three Ah-1W Super cobra attack helicopters to turkey. Under the estimated $111 million foreign military sale (FMS), turkey also requested seven t700-Ge-401 engines, inspections and modifications, spare and repair parts, personnel training and training equipment and other related logistics support. the proposed sale will further enhance turkey’s ground defence capabilities as well as self-defence, modernisation, regional security, and interoperability with US and other North Atlantic treaty Organisation (NAtO) members. the helicopters will be sold from the US Marine corps’ (USMc) inventory and five contractor representatives will be assigned to turkey for a period of up to 90 days.

BOEING DELIVERS FIRST BLOCK III APACHE HELICOPTER TO US ARMY Boeing has delivered the first Ah-64D

>> SHOW CALENDAR 17-18 January, 2012 Integrated Missile Defense Systems Los Angeles Marriott Downtown, Los Angeles, cA, USA www.integratedmissiledefense.com 17-18 January, 2012 Airborne Early Warning and Battle Management Sheraton Park Lane, Piccadilly, London, UK www.airborneearlywarning.com 23-25 January, 2012 NCW 2012: Network Enabled Operations hilton Alexandria Mark center, VA, USA www.iqpc.com/Event.aspx?id=618534 24-27 January, 2012 Cyber Defence & Network Security the radisson Blu Portman hotel, London, UK http://www.cdans.org/Event.aspx?id=59 8092 30-31 January, 2012 Border Security Asia Pacific 2012 Grand copthorne Waterfront hotel, Singapore www.smi-online.co.uk/bordersecurityasia28.asp 20-23 February, 2012 International Armoured Vehicles FIVe, Farnborough, UK www.internationalarmouredvehicles.com 24-25 February, 2012 International Conference On Autonomous Unmanned Vehicles (ICAUV 2012) eagleton Golf resort, Bangalore, India http://icauv2012.org 27 February, 2012 Smart Border Technology Forum Venue to be confirmed, Dubai, UAe www.smartbordertech.com/Event.aspx?id =654930 27-29 February, 2012 Military Armor Protection Venue to be confirmed,Washington, Dc Metro Area, USA www.militaryarmorprotection.com

Apache Block III multirole attack helicopter to the US Army. the Ah-64D Apache Block III helicopter has been designed to benefit soldiers and battlefield commanders during peacekeeping missions worldwide. the helicopter incorporates 26 new technologies, including an improved drive system, new composite main rotor blade and enhanced digital electronic control unit. the new technologies will enhance the aircraft’s capabilities in combat aviation with improved performance and increased payload. the US Army has plans to acquire 690 Apache Block III aircraft while Boeing will produce 51 helicopters under a low rate initial production contract.

INDIAN ARMY RECEIVES SECOND BRAHMOS BLOCK II MISSILE the Indian Army has received the second regiment of BrahMos Block II variant supersonic cruise missile systems to bolster its combat capabilities. Lt General Vinod Nayanar, Director General Artillery, said, “We have guns for near range and Smerch rockets for ranges of 75 km. BrahMos is the system which has added tremendous firepower capability to the Indian armed forces for targets as deep as 300 km.” the second Block II variant missile regiment consists of mobile launchers, command post, replenishment systems, fire control systems installed with advanced electronic hardware and software as well as several communication systems. the 290-km range missile has a speed of Mach 2.8 and can be launched from land, ship, submarines and air platforms. the Army has already inducted a full Block-I regiment for precision attack.

POLARIS INDUSTRIES RECEIVES FIRST ORDER FOR INDIAN ARMY US-based vehicle maker Polaris Industries has received its first order from the Indian Army. Polaris military vehicles would strengthen the security in border areas. “We have already received our first order from the Indian Army,” Polaris India Managing Director Pankaj Dubey informed the media.

“Polaris light tactical vehicles would help achieve quick movement in anti-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations.”

than 200 systems have already been fielded to deployed units till date.

DRDO DEVELOPS ARTILLERY GUNS FOR INDIAN ARMY the DrDO is developing an indigenous 155mm 52-calibre howitzer for the Indian Army. DrDO chief V.K. Saraswat said that the laboratory is currently developing advanced metallurgy for the barrels to increase the howitzer’s firepower. Production of the selfpropelled howitzer is expected to be completed in the next four years. DrDO has begun the howitzer development work on a self-funding basis, but the project could not be accomplished due to issues pertaining to Bofors guns. the Indian Defence Ministry recently cancelled the procurement tender of 180 wheeled 155mm 52-calibre howitzers.

MDA TEST-FIRES THAAD MISSILE SYSTEM WITH STSS

the Indian Army will soon induct the rudra advanced light helicopter (ALh), armed with advanced air-to-air and anti-tank missiles, along the Pakistan border and western front. the twin-engine chopper is a variant of the ALh Dhruv helicopter and is armed with an array of guns, rocket pods, and air-to-air and anti-tank guided missiles. the aerial platform will enable Army field commanders to use decisive combat power anywhere in the battlefield. the weaponised helicopter is part of the modernisation and capability development efforts and is expected to boost the Army’s aerial firepower capabilities. the Indian Army will also induct and deploy 114 light combat helicopters (Lch) along the mountainous terrain.

US ARMY TESTS NEW WATER, FUEL CONTAINER SYSTEM the US Army paratroopers have recently completed testing of a new water and fuel container system for airdrops in Afghanistan. During two of the three test drops, the Lifeliner container-unitised bulk equipment (cUBe) safely delivered hundreds of gallons of water to the ground under dual, 100 ft-wide parachutes from over 1,000 ft. the new container can be transported by truck or sling loaded beneath a helicopter, is 40 per cent of the cost of existing equipment and can be easily handled for storage by one person. the 307th Brigade Support Battalion commander Lt colonel Paul Narowski said that the test validated the airdrop procedures for delivering 400 gallons of fuel, water or unitised supplies to forces anywhere on the battlefield. More

Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor Assistant Group Editor R. Chandrakanth Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia Sr. Copy Editor & Correspondent Sucheta Das Mohapatra Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Executive Vice President (Planning & Business Development) Rohit Goel Administration & Coordination Bharti Sharma, Survi Massey

the US Missile Defence Agency (MDA) has completed an integrated flight test of the terminal high-altitude area defence (thAAD) radar weapon system at the Pacific Missile range Facility at Kauai, hawaii. A thAAD interceptor missile successfully intercepted a medium-range target (Mrt) launched from a c-17 cargo aircraft and a short-range target (Srt) launched from a mobile platform.

During the flight test, the space tracking and surveillance system (StSS) demonstration satellites’ sensors tracked two different missile targets, displaying the system’s precision, real-time missile-tracking capability.

Northrop Grumman’s Aerospace Systems missile defence and warning Vice President Doug Young said that the StSS satellites demonstrated hard-body detection and

INDIA TEST-FIRES AGNI-IV MISSILE INDIAN ARMY TO INDUCT RUDRA CHOPPERS

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal

India has successfully tested its Agni-IV indigenous nuclear-capable advanced surface-to-surface ballistic missile from Wheeler Island, off the Orissa coast. the missile was fired from a road mobile launcher and hit the pre-designated target in the Bay of Bengal, meeting all desired mission objectives. the two-stage, 20 metre-long, 17t Agni-IV carries a payload of 800 kg and has a range of 3,000 km. the missile has been equipped with state-of-the-art technologies, including indigenously developed ring laser gryo and composite rocket motor.

INDIAN ARMY TO BE EQUIPPED WITH E-BOMB the Indian Army would soon be equipped with an “electromagnetic bomb” (e-bomb), terminal Ballistic and research Laboratory (tBrL) Director Dr Manjit Singh said, “It would be equally capable of damaging the communication system and other technologies ensuring maximum and sudden setback to the enemy.” the bomb, developed by tBrL, would be based on explosive-driven, highenergy pulse power technology, which can produce a pulse current of 1.4MA from energy released by 2.8 kg of explosives. the weapon would be designed to neutralise an enemy’s command, control and communication systems, as well as cause huge destruction without harming humans. the research and development phase on the weapon is expected to be completed within the 12th Five Year Plan period. the company is also producing more than one million multi-mode grenades (MMG) for the Army to replace the existing 36m grenades. tBrL is the ballistic laboratory of Defence research & Development Organisation.

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