Spanda Journal | The Placebo efect

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EDITORIAL

T H E PE R P L E X I T Y OF THE UNSEEN Come, do not stop at the gate: Life and Death, the two guardian angels, will transmute into the Guardians of the Threshold, and let you in. There lies Beauty, Truth, and Goodness, the attributes of Love, and the primeval promoter of g| IN THIS ISSUE life who subtly affects the whole being. I will be grateful E D I T O R I A L | SAHLAN MOMO if you could spread the good The Perplexity of news: “Come Death, I’m waitthe Unseen 2 ing for your call.” Realistic FABRIZIO BENEDETTI models should be integrated in The Many Placebo Effects 5 the vision, they are needed as EDZARD ERNST long as we partake of this The Ethical Implications of Using Placebo in Clinical dimension. What needs to be Practice 9 reviewed after all? The inexplicCHRISTOPER J. BEEDIE able that not even the finest All in the Mind? Pain, degree of angels could disclose Placebo, and Ergogenic to itself? Be my guest, I request Effect of Caffeine in you to step in: therein no abyss Sport Performance 12 from where to surface, indeed KURT GRAY ~ nothing is there, neither time DANIEL M. WEGNER nor space, nothing, Nothing at The Sting of Potential Pain 20 All. Still the dualistic vision is creeping in this momentary JOHN N. WILLIAMS The Ethics of dimension in which we all live.

Placebo-Controlled Trials Placebo.

The body is a device to calculate the astronomy of the spirit.

Look through that astrolabe and become oceanic.

RUMI, Mathnawi.

D

O NOT BE SURPRISED BY

a pale aesthetical glance, beauty is still one of the best veils to look throughout this world.

Beauty encompasses all, all and everything, like Truth and Goodness. Once freed from time we wander to the accomplished deed immune to all illness. Having accomplished its mortal function, the physical body returns to its forming elementals whilst the soul progresses to its further mansion, the house of misericordiæ endowed with prophethood. Indeed, there is no ‘time’ if there is no ‘be’, and surely there is no ‘die’ if there is no Thee.

Taxi downtown to uncover in Developing Countries to what really matters: there are Ut placet in mente dei? An Prevent Mother-to-Child more invisible things than visible apophatic utterance uncovers Transmission of HIV 23 ones. It is not what we see, that the world: get rid of all fears and ABSTRACTS 29 is of importance, but what we do statements of joy. No ground not see that is the real substance. around, no glamour, breathe There is only one possible deeply and plunge into the equation valid for all planes of Unknown: “Hallo, who are you?” You or me?!? the being, where each particle is shaped by the Definitely a day to celebrate and rejoice, hallelu-yah sublime fashioner of the wor[l]d, an exquisite – a dynamic shared field of awakened awareness in sense of the phrase, a lace vaulting in a vacuum. the higher collective consciousness is at play.

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Once the top-down stream of consciousness has been granted, the U conversion of the energy occurs and all blessings are gathered into the humane dimension. A new chapter is being chiselled into the soul: long seated marks are eradicated in a purification process to get rid of all rights – only the physical death will temporarily procrastinate freedom.

The human soul is bound to transit through the realm of quantity to progress further; it needs to experience its ‘physical’ body as an essential step to reach up anew – only because we dwell on the relative realm of time and space this process is perceived as bottom-up. A conversion of energies akin to the one taking place at puberty or conversely at old age,

intention (imma), if there is no meaningful iatus or temporal diastema between intention and execution, that action is effortlessly attuned with the flow of the dharma, is one with it. In the occasion, even the freewill vanishes, as it is one and the same with the cosmic will. The intention is a focused attitude toward a well defined goal, a pro-tension to its realization by virtue of its own entelechy to advance further and overcome all limits; in other terms, the perennial drive of life pro-tensed towards its fulfilment. The kernel is that the two energies and their actions – anode and cathode, or ruh-illofi and ruh al-kuds or whatever other combination of opposites it may be – are really simultaneous, and

when the life energy inverts its polarity, changes direction – the superabundance of a force inevitably produces its opposite. On a different level, this parallels the principle of equilibrium in the natural world in which any extreme is opposed by the system to restore balance. “Cold things warm, warm things cool, wet things dry and parched things get wet,” enantiodromia, an old acquaintance of mine used to say. The ensuing plans of the being are plainly passages from one stage to the next, at times ignited by rites in the human endeavour. In consciousness (cit), it is a shift, a leap into a new state.

In Reality, in absence of time, the past, the present and the future are condensed into the ‘now’, that means that the shift already happened, is taking place and will occur, altogether at the same time, its awareness depending from which state of our individual consciousness we are witnessing it.

Placebo. Here is not the unrestrained surge of the unconsciousness into consciousness at work, as the villain maintains, rather their simultaneously merging into oneness. To contemporarily perceive the two fluxes is certainly vital, but being aware of the action while displaying the ‘activity’ without interfering in the process is definitely a step ahead.

When the performance of an action is one with its

actually the same; if observed through the binary manner to perceive the world of the thinking mind, they appear to be two, for duality houses in time, but in the dimensionless gathering place of the soul they are one, just one.

In the midst of all this, by sightseeing randomly in the groove of the path, we gladly report of a few landmarks along its landscape, certainly not of the inexplicable goal. We all are mixed blood, we are all bastards, it depends from which stance we are looking at ourselves. To the body, it may look like health, to the spirit, as spiritual health, in between, as a spiritual-material wealth. Placebo: something pleases and soothes the wounds and recovers them to their original state. The way in which the synapses communicate in our brain counterparts our social networking. This parallelism of planes may be applied to the whole of the manifestation, as all entities are connected through their dimensionless centre by the axis mundi crossing in every possible direction. Devoid of time and space, no direction is at bay, everything happens contemporary in the present, every and nowhere. The thinking mind is unable to grasp this hierophany, this darshan, unless it affords to be one with its own working process and lifts its hold on it, only then intuition

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are now needed, at least in ourselves to start with.

Where has it gone that ability to keep together and jointly strive for a clear direction? Where has Politics vanished? Still busy with old credentials, with models, concepts and visions of old, from ten to one, and then bottom up. A thousand of existence ago ‘ten’ was deprived of its wholeness and became ‘one’. If 1 is equal to 0, if uniqueness in wholeness is attained, if one is the whole, then the tensorial membrane between the two worlds within consciousness self-shapes itself according to its own inborn input, and the world is informed by matter.

To transmute into its further stage, the soul links spirit to matter into a whole.

The whole manifestation is nothing but how we perceive our own projection on it, the projection of our particular ‘self ’ in its reflexive mode. A paradox, a koan, no doubt, contrary to any opinion and beyond any reasonable doubt. Indeed the paradox has always been a powerful device to explore the reality: by unveiling it, the opposites are reconciled: inside and outside become paler and all boundaries are loosened and lost. The ‘apparent’ movement between the two polarities makes consciousness spark and it gives rise to the whole. An itinerarium animi in which an inclusive reform of the I, and of the ability of the soul to manifest the reality is most in demand. The middle world between spirit and matter, the mundus imaginalis, links ta physica to ta meta, in its ‘imaginal’ geography – not a phantasys – the tensorial membrane – and the soul – receives the ‘impressions’ of the spiritual world and reverberates them into the world of matter as mundane outcome – let us not forget that to show is not to perform.

Not a novel vision for sure, but one former to the dissection of spirit and matter in time, a compound which still grants to placebo its effect, that, according to the followers of the divided reality, shouldn’t indeed be there. Spear me to detail further, we could disperse a few. Enjoy the issue. ©

emerges as an insight in the heightened consciousness. Seen from the realm of quantity, intuition looks faster and finer than thought: the manipulator of matter. Placebo.

Harmony is a palintropos in a reflexive tension, like the bow and the lyre. To be in a reflexive tension, to be self-reflexive is to be re-flexed in oneself. The entire matter lies on the capacity to be utterly empty, aloof from the whole lot, yet gladly allow the energy to flow by its own course, according to its own pace, synchronic to the rhythm of the body: the inner and outer are here focused in a spiritual-material alliance.

Certainly consciousness is not made up of matter, it is much finer, deeper and higher than matter, is an assembly of relations in a reflexive tension. Indeed, what really matters in all human affairs are the quality of the relations, not its su[o]bjects (persona), for, the former – being immaterial – will last; while the latter will perish. Yesterday I would have liked to give you a rose, not solely a rose but a flowering rose in your pose, in your improbable chest. But you were not present, emptiness around, not even the bristle of a leaf, or the cry of an angel, nor the glance of your eyes I once thought blue. The whole universe couldn’t compete with that hue: a triumph could not have been better, certainly no better than you. How long should I stand at your dazzling face before joining with you? Placebo. Pinocchio identified himself with his dream and became human. Who for God’s ‘shake’ (quiver, spanda) would prefer a placebo instead of a real shot? “The spiritual life is knowledge in the time of trial”: a charming thought in actual fact, which certainly needs a skilled cryptographer to endorse it as a whole. Nothing can exist without movement, yet the ultimate movement takes place in consciousness where time has no grip: an endless cycle of expansion and contraction, of internalization and externalization of consciousness itself, relating to the most elevated plane (citananda) of the manifestation.

At times it appears as the direction is nowhere to be found: no longer faiths nor religions to cling to, no more containers of a long lost content, just the reality that inspires and sustains them is here. No sound came out of their tongues but their hassle to slaughter each other: fundamentalist to their roots, who lost connection with the original life. Be assured, everything passes and changes, they too soon will be gone. Let’s swing the ladder to the encounter of the two seas. Prospero or Papageno?

Even though these bastards deserve a diamond as crown, for now I can only offer them a leaded basin and a blade of red iron lore – transmute… transmute… Thought and self-awareness are the two parts of the same unfolding process of doing, the non-discursive state of consciousness can hardly, if ever, be conveyed into words. A good intention is not enough; action must follow. Placebo.

Theory, poiesis, praxis… theà horào, yes, we all saw the goddess, but global thought and local action S P A N D A

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RAINER MARIA RILKE ,

Duineser Elegien.

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THE MANY PLACEBO EFFECTS F A B R I Z I O

B E N E D E T T I

to clinical practice and neuroethics. The terms placebo effect and placebo response are often used as synonymous, thus both terms will be used here.

E X P E C T A T I O N S

Most of the research on placebos has focused on expectations as the main factor involved in g | OVERVIEW Fabrizio Benedetti, MD is Professor of placebo responsiveness. In genPhysiology and Neuroscience at the eral, expectation is aimed at University of Turin Medical School preparing the body to anticipate and at the National Institute of an event in order to better cope Neuroscience, Italy. He has been The miserable with it, and as such offers a clear nominated member of The Academy evolutionary advantage (Kirsch, of Europe and of the European have no other 1999). There are several mechaDana Alliance for the Brain. He has written the books Placebo Effects nisms through which expecta(Oxford 2008) and The Patient’s tion of a future event may affect medicine Brain (Oxford 2010). different physiological functions.

Email: fabrizio.benedetti@unito.it.

For example, the expectation of a negative outcome is aimed at but only anticipating a possible threat, I N T R O D U C T I O N thus increasing anxiety, whereas hope. the expectation of a forthcoming PLACEBO EFFECT IS A positive outcome may reduce psychobiological pheanxiety and/or activate the neunomenon occurring in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE ronal networks of reward mechthe patient’s brain folanisms (Price et al, 2008). lowing the administration of an inert substance, or of Indeed, anxiety has been found a sham physical treatment such to be reduced after placebo as sham surgery, along with administration in some studies. If one expects a verbal suggestions (or any other cue) of clinical distressing symptom to subside shortly, anxiety benefit (Price et al, 2008). Therefore, the effect that tends to decrease. In brain imaging studies reduced follows the administration of a placebo cannot be activation of anxiety-related areas during a placebo attributable to the inert substance alone, for saline response can be observed (Petrovic et al, 2005). The solutions or sugar pills will never acquire therapeutic best evidence that anxiety takes part in placebo properties. Instead, the effect is due to the psychosoresponses is shown by the nocebo effect, which is cial context that surrounds the inert substance and opposite to the placebo effect (Benedetti et al, the patient. We now know that there is not a single 2007). In order to induce a nocebo effect, an inert placebo effect, but many, with different mechasubstance is administered along with negative vernisms and in different diseases, systems, and therabal suggestions of clinical worsening, e.g. pain peutic interventions (Benedetti, 2008b; Enck et al, increase. Overall, expectations of a negative out2008). In other words, different processes may be at come, such as pain increase, may result in the work in the patient’s brain in different conditions. amplification of pain, and several brain regions, Sometimes it is anxiety that is modulated, at some like the anterior cingulate cortex, the prefrontal other times reward mechanisms are involved, and cortex, the insula, and the hippocampus have been in some other circumstances different types of found to be activated during the anticipation of learning, or even genetic variants, may take place in pain in a variety of studies. Nocebo hyperalgesia placebo responsiveness. In this sense, the placebo has been studied in some detail also from a pharmaeffect is a melting pot of neuroscientific concepts cological perspective, in order to identify possible and ideas, ranging from anxiety and reward mechaneurotransmitters that are involved in anxietynisms to Pavlovian conditioning and social learninduced pain increase. By using an anxiogenic nocebo ing, and from neurogenetics and neurophysiology procedure, it was shown that cholecystokinin (CCK)

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plays a crucial role. In fact, the pharmacological blockade of CCK receptors prevents the occurrence of nocebo responses.

Not only can expectations of future events modulate anxiety, but they may also induce physiological changes through reward mechanisms. These mechanisms are mediated by specific neuronal circuits linking cognitive, emotional, and motor responses, and are traditionally studied in the context of the pursuit of natural (e.g., food), monetary, and drug rewards. There is compelling experimental evidence that the mesolimbic dopaminergic system, the main reward network, may be activated in some circumstances when a subject expects clinical improvement

L E A R N I N G

Learning is another mechanism that is central to placebo responsiveness. Subjects who suffer from a painful condition, such as headache, and who regularly consume aspirin, can associate the shape, color and taste of the pill to pain decrease. After repeated associations, if they are given a sugar pill resembling aspirin, they will experience pain decrease. Not only can shape, color and taste of pills be associated to clinical improvement, but countless other stimuli as well, such as hospitals, diagnostic and therapeutic equipments, and medical personnel features. The mechanism that underlies this effect is conditioning, whereby a conditioned (neutral) stimulus, e.g.

after placebo administration. This was observed in Parkinson’s disease (de la Fuente-Fernandez et al 2001), depression (Mayberg et al 2002) and pain (Scott et al 2007). In the case of the placebo response, the reward can be conceptualized as the clinical improvement.

the color and shape of a pill, can become effective in inducing the reduction of a symptom if repeatedly associated to an unconditioned stimulus, i.e. the active principle contained in the pill.

Conditioned immune responses can be obtained both in animals and in humans. For example, Goebel et al (2002) showed that behavioral conditioning of immunosuppression is possible in humans.

Repeated associations between cyclosporine A and a flavored drink induced conditioned immunosuppression in healthy male volunteers, in which the flavored drink alone produced a suppression of the immune functions. In the endocrine system, similar effects can be found. The hypoglycemic effects of insulin can be conditioned by pairing insulin with a conditioned stimulus in animals and in humans, and several other hormones, such as the growth hormone and cortisol, can be conditioned as well (Benedetti, 2008a, 2008b).

Several neuropharmacological and neuroimaging studies investigated neither anxiety nor reward mechanisms, making it impossible to state specifically whether the observed placebo responses were attributable to a reduction in anxiety or to the activation of the reward circuitry. In all probability, here too anxiety and/or reward mechanisms play a role, depending on the experimental condition. In any case, these studies have provided evidence that a complex neural network is involved during the placebo analgesic and the nocebo hyperalgesic responses (for a detailed review, see Zubieta and Stohler 2009; Tracey 2010).

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just when reduced connectivity of the prefrontal lobes with the rest of the brain was present. The loss of these placebo-related mechanisms reduced the overall effectiveness of the treatment, and indeed a dose increase was necessary to make up for this loss in order to produce adequate analgesia.

According to this view, the impairment of prefrontal connectivity would reduce the communication between the prefrontal lobes and the rest of the brain, so that no placebo and expectation mechanisms would be triggered. In recent years this notion has been supported by the deactivation of the prefrontal cortex in the experimental setting.

On the basis of previous experiments on the blockade of placebo analgesia by the opioid antagonist naloxone, Eippert et al (2009) conducted a study to investigate the location of naloxone action in the brain. By combining naloxone administration with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), these authors found that naloxone reduced placebo effects as well as placebo-induced responses in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the rostral anterior cingulate cortex. Therefore, as it occurs for prefrontal degeneration in Alzheimer’s disease, placebo analgesic responses are disrupted by the pharmacological blockade of prefrontal opioidergic functioning in the experimental setting.

More complex forms of learning can be involved in placebo responsiveness, whereby different cognitive factors play a crucial role. For example, social learning is a form of learning, whereby individuals in a society learn from one another by observation and imitation. Placebo effects may involve social learning as well. In other words, the mere observation of others responding to analgesics may lead to robust placebo analgesic responses (Colloca and Benedetti 2009).

G E N E T I C S

A central issue in placebo research is whether an individual in whom a placebo works possesses one or more specific characteristics, which can reliably identify him a priori as a “placebo responder”, with important implications for both clinical trials design and personalized therapy optimization.

Results have so far been rather inconclusive, with demographic, psychosocial, personality, and behavioral variables all proposed to play a role, but all inconsistently present across different trials.

Recently, however, some genetic variants have been found that are particularly responsive to placebo treatment. For example, there is some experimental evidence that some genetic variants affect placebo responses in psychiatric disorders, such as social anxiety (Furmark et al, 2008) and depression (Leuchter et al, 2009). In social anxiety, it was found that the reduced stress-related activity in the amygdala which accompanied the placebo response could be observed only in subjects who were homozygous for the long allele of the 5-HTTLPR or the G variant of the TPH2 G-703T polymorphism, but not in carriers of short or T alleles. In depression, subjects with monoamine oxidase A G/T polymorphisms (rs 6323) coding for the highest activity form of the enzyme (G or G/G) had a significantly lower magnitude of placebo response than those with other genotypes.

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Prefrontal degeneration in Alzheimer’s disease and pharmacological blockade of prefrontal opioidergic transmission are not the only conditions in which placebo responses are disrupted. The inactivation of the prefrontal cortex, particularly the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, by means of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) has the same effect (Krummenacher et al, 2010). Therefore, the inactivation of prefrontal regions by transcranial magnetic stimulation has the same effects as those induced by pharmacological blockade or prefrontal degeneration in Alzheimer’s disease. On the basis of all these studies, a normal functioning of prefrontal areas appears to be critical for placebo responsiveness. In the presence of a loss of prefrontal control, we also witness a loss of placebo response.

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R E S P O N S E

Benedetti et al (2006) studied Alzheimer patients at the initial stage of the disease and after one year, in order to see whether the placebo component of the therapy (an ever-present part of the drug effect which makes the overall outcome greater than that produced purely by the intrinsic principle) was affected by the disease. The placebo component of the analgesic therapy was correlated with both cognitive status, as assessed by means of the Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB) test, and functional connectivity among different brain regions, as assessed by means of electroencephalographic connectivity analysis. It was found that Alzheimer’s patients with reduced FAB scores showed reduced placebo component of an analgesic treatment. In addition, the disruption of the placebo component occurred S P A N D A

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R E S E A R C H

D I R E C T I O N S

Despite the recent explosion of neurobiological placebo research and the recent findings that help us better understand both human biology and clinical practice, several issues need further clarifications and many questions still remain unanswered. First of all we need to know where, when, and how placebos work across different diseases and therapeutic interventions. Second, a better understanding of the contribution of different mechanisms, such as expectation, anxiety, reward, learning, genetics, in different types of placebo responses is in order, and this would surely help identify the social, psychological and neurobiological determinants of the different placebo effects. Third, we need to understand why t h e

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FURMARK T., APPEL L., HENNINGSSON S., AHS F., FARIA V., LINNMAN C., et al (2008). “A link between serotonin-related gene polymorphisms, amygdala activity, and placebo-induced relief from social anxiety”, in J Neurosci 28: 13066-13074.

GOEBEL MU., TREBST AE., STEINER J., XIE YF., EXTON MS., FREDE S., et al (2002). “Behavioural conditioning of immunosuppression is possible in humans”, in FASEB J 16: 1869-1873.

KIRSCH I. (1999). How expectancies shape experience, American Psychological Association.

KRUMMENACHER P., CANDIA V., FOLKERS G., SCHEDLOWSKI M., SCHÖNBÄCHLER G. (2010). “Prefrontal cortex modulates placebo analgesia”, in Pain 148: 368-374.

L EUCHTER AF., JT., M C C RACKEN HUNTER AM., COOK IA., ALPERT JE. (2009).

“Monoamine oxidase a and catechol-o-methyltransferase functional polymorphisms and the placebo response in major depressive disorder”, in J Clin Psychopharmacol 29: 372-377.

M AYBERG HS., S ILVA JA., B RANNAN SK., TEKELL JL.. MAHURIN RK., MCGINNIS S., et al (2002). “The functional neuroanatomy of the placebo”, in Am J Psychiatry 159: 728-737.

PETROVIC P., DIETRICH T., F RANSSON P., ANDERSSON J., CARLSSON K. (2005). “Placebo in emotional processing–induced expectations of anxiety relief activate a generalized modulatory network”, in Neuron 46: 957-969.

P RICE DD., F INNISS DG., B ENEDET TI F. (2008). “A comprehensive review of the placebo effect: recent advances and current thought”, in Annu Rev Psychol 59: 565-590.

SCOTT DJ., STOHLER CS., EGNATUK CM., WANG H., KOEPPE RA., ZUBIETA JK. (2007). “Individual differences in reward responding explain placebo–induced expectations and effects”, in Neuron 55: 325-336.

TRACEY I. (2010). “Getting the pain you expect: mechanisms of placebo, nocebo and reappraisal effects in humans”, in Nature Med 16: 1277-1283.

some subjects respond to placebos, whereas other subjects do not, a critical point that is likely to be clarified by pursuing further research into both learning and genetic mechanisms. ©

R E F E R E N C E S

AMANZIO M., BENEDETTI F. (1999). “Neuropharmacological dissection of placebo analgesia: expectationactivated opioid systems versus conditioning-activated specific subsystems” in J Neurosci 19: 484-494.

BENEDETTI F. (2008a). “Mechanisms of placebo and placebo–related effects across diseases and treatments”, in Annu Rev Pharmacol Toxicol 48: 33-60.

——, (2008b). Placebo effects: Understanding the mechanisms in health and dis(Oxford: ease Oxford University Press).

——, A RD UI N O C., S., C O S TA S., V IGHET TI TARE NZI L., R AI NERO I et al (2006 a ) . “Loss of expectation-related mechanisms in Alzheimer’s disease makes analgesic therapies less effective”, in Pain 121: 133–144.

——, MAGGI G., LOPIANO L., COLLOCA L. (2007). “When words are painful – Unraveling the mechanisms of the nocebo effect”, in Neuroscience 147 : 260-271.

L., C O LLO CA B ENE DET TI F. ( 2009 ). “Placebo analgesia induced by social observational learning”, in Pain 144: 28-34.

DE LA F UENTE -F ERNANDEZ R., RUTH TJ., S OSSI V., S CHULZER M., C ALNE DB., S TOESSL AJ. ( 2001).

“Expectation and dopamine release: mechanisms of the placebo effect in Parkinson’s disease”, in Science 293: 1164-1166.

EIPPERT F., BINGEL U., SCHOELL ED., YACUBIAN J., KLINGER R., LORENZ J., et al (2009). “Activation of the opioidergic descending pain control system underlies placebo analgesia” in Neuron 63: 533-43.

ENCK P., BENEDETTI F., SCHEDLOWSKI M. (2008). “New insights into the placebo and nocebo responses”, in Neuron 59: 195-206.

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THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF

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PL ACEBO

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CLINICAL

PRACTICE

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The subject of placebo is notoriously complex, and discussions of this topic are often too abstract to provide practical guidance. It might therefore be helpful to focus on a concrete example: homeopathy.

The best evidence available to date strongly suggests that highly dilute homeopathic remedies are pure placebos e.g.9,10. That is to say, they are devoid of specific A LT E R N AT I V E S therapeutic effects. Yet it is undeniable that many physicians and other healthcare professionals regularly use homeopathy. Many It takes of them must be aware of the evidence and employ it as a a wise “benign placebo” e.g.11. The question thus is whether this prevadoctor lent behaviour can be ethically justified. to know

Edzard Ernst (1948, Wiesbaden, Gerg| many) a British citizen since 1999, is the first Professor of Complementary Medicine in the world. He was born and trained in Germany and began his medical career at a homeopathic hospital in Munich. In 1993, he left his chair in Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (PMR) at the University of Vienna to set up the department of Complementary Medicine at the University of Exeter & Plymouth, UK. He became director of Complementary Medicine of the Peninsula when 2 ~ A R G U M E N T S I N Medical School (PMS) in 2002. He is F A V O U R the first occupant of the Laing chair not to in Complementary Medicine.

Physicians using placebos, such Ernst is the editor-in-chief of two as homeopathic medicines, in prescribe. medical journals, Perfusion and clinical practice might claim do Focus on Alternative and Compleso because they want to help mentary Therapies. Ernst once conGRACIÁN their patients via a beneficial tributed a regular column to the placebo effect4-6. Prescribing a Guardian newspaper, frequently highly diluted homeopathic reviewing news stories about complementary medicine from an evidenceremedy is, of course, unlikely to based perspective. have direct adverse effects. Many patients expect to Since his research began on alternative modalities, Ernst receive a prescription when consulting their doctor, has become “the scourge of alternative medicine” for puband many believe in homeopathy, i.e. they are lishing critical research that exposes methods that lack docuunaware of the evidence 9,10 and convinced that homementation of efficacy. Email: edzard.ernst@pms.ac.uk.

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opathic remedies generate specific effects. Issuing a prescription for a homeopathic remedy should therefore be ethically commendable, particularly in cases where no drug therapy is indicated 12.

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E C E N T S U RV E Y D ATA F RO M S E V E R A L C O U N T R I E S

indicate that many clinicians use placebo in their clinical practice 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, often on a regular basis. Reasons for doing this include: ~ to follow the wish of the patient; ~ to avoid conflict; ~ to calm the patient; ~ to comply with patients’ demand for receiving some sort of medications; ~ to prevent the patient complaining.

According to these data, prescribing placebos is clearly considered to be ethically justifiable by a large proportion of clinicians.

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A R G U M E N T S

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At first glance this line of argument seems compelling.

However, several counter-arguments emerge, once we scrutinize the issue in more depth.

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A critical analysis of the most frequent reasons for placebo-use (see above) is revealing. The desire of physicians to help their patients does not seem to be a prominent factor. On the contrary, the reasons provided demonstrate that placebo-use is not altruistically motivated but prompted mainly by convenience. It is t h e

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the adherence to treatment and the clinical outcome14-17. Placebo-prescriptions cannot be used as substitutes for acknowledging uncertainty, exploring patients’ concerns, beliefs and preferences, considering non-pharmacological therapies and inviting shared decision making18,19. These actions would be consistent with the physician’s ethical responsibilities of non-maleficence, beneficence and respect for patients without, at the same time, depending on the deception of issuing a placebo.

quite simply easier for a doctor to write a prescription for a placebo than to discuss with the patient that no such prescription is required or no effective treatment is available. The hope of avoiding conflict and the desire to prevent a complaint are, of course, understandable motives, but they have little to do with the physician’s duty to help patients. Physicians’ convenience, it would seem, is not a reason that is grounded in medical ethics.

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The prescription of placebos in clinical practice is usually based on what might be called paternalistic deception. Only a small proportion of clinicians

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Firstly, the placebo might be administered instead of a treatment that has specific therapeutic effects.

Secondly, the placebo might not be free of adverse effects. Homeopathic remedies, for instance are unlikely to cause adverse effects, but other types of placebos clearly do. For example, physicians often use impure placebos, i.e. treatments that are under-dosed or not indicated for a particular condition. A frequently prescribed impure placebo is an antibiotic for a non-bacterial infection4,6. Such impure placebos can cause serious, direct harm through their pharmacological actions. Antibiotics have a range of direct adverse effects and, can harm the population at large through the development of bacterial resistance.

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Not telling the truth undermines trust which is an essential ingredient of any therapeutic relationship.

A good therapeutic relationship can improve both S P A N D A

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Clinicians using placebos in routine practice should consider at least two important risks of this approach.

would tell their patients the true nature of this prescription 6. Without pretending that the homeopathic placebo is effective beyond placebo, doctors cannot expect their patients to experience a clinically relevant placebo-effect. Truthfully telling a patient that the prescribed remedy contains no pharmacologically active ingredient would not generate expectation of benefit. Thus little or no placebo-response would result from telling the truth. However, doctors would “violate the principle of respect for patient autonomy and contravene the legal and ethical requirement to obtain informed consent”13, if they decided to deceive patients, even if it were “for their own good”.

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5 NITZAN U., LICHTENBERG P. (2004). “Questionnaire survey on use of placebo”, in BMJ 329: 944-946.

6 SHERMAN R, HICKNER J. (2008). “Academic physi-

prescribed for will almost inevitably result in the medicalization of common states of reduced wellbeing. Such conditions are best treated by re-assurance and honesty. Prescribing a placebo in such situations would simply reinforce the belief that there is ‘a pill for every ill’. This would be neither honest nor helpful. Braillon therefore stressed that “a placebo is a dangerous tool” because it encourages “disease-mongering” 20.

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cians use placebos in clinical practice and believe in the mind-body connection”, in J Gen Intern Med 23(1): 7-10.

7 TILBURT JC., EMANUEL EJ., KAPTCHUK TJ., CURLIN FA., MILLER FG., (2008). “Prescribing ‘placebo treatments’: results of national survey of US internists and rheumatologists”, in BMJ 337: a1938.

8 FÄSSLER M., GNÄDINGER M., ROSEMANN T., BILLERANDORNO N. (2009). “Use of placebo interventions among Swiss primary care providers”, in BMC Health Services Research 9: 144-152.

9 ERNST E. (2010). “Homeopathy: what does the ‘best’ evidence tell us?”, in MJA 192: 458-460.

10 SHANG A., HUWILER-MUNTENER K., NARTEY L., JUNI P., DORIG S., STERNE JA. ET AL., (2005). “Are the clinical effects of homoeopathy placebo effects? Comparative study of placebo-controlled trials of homoeopathy and allopathy”, in Lancet 366: 726-732.

11 DU Y., KNOPF H. (2009). “Paediatric homeopathy in Germany: results of the German Health Interview and Examination Survey for Children and Adolescents (KiGGS)”, in Pharmacoepidemiol and Drug Safety 18: 370-379.

12 JÜTTE R., HOPPE J-D., SCIRBA P. (2010). “Stellungnahme des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats der Bundesärztekammer ‘Placebo in der Medizin’”, in Deutsches Ärzteblatt 107(28-29): 1417-1421.

13 MILLER FG., COLLOCA L. (2009). “The legitimacy of placebo treatments in clinical practice: evidence and ethics”, in Am J Bioethics 9(12): 39-47.

14 STEWART MA. (1995). “Effective physician-patient communication and health outcomes: A review”, in CMAJ 152: 1423-1433.

15 ONG LM., DE HAES JC., HOOS AM. (1995). “Doctorpatient communication: a review of the literature”, in Soc Sci Med 40: 903-918.

16 DIMATTEO MR. (2004). “‘Variations in patients’ adherence to medical recommendations: a quantitative review of 50 years of research”, in Med Care 42: 200-209.

17 HASKARD ZOLNIEREK KB., ROBIN DIMATTEO M. (2009). “Physician communication and patient adherence to treatment. A meta-analysis”, in Med Care 47(8): 826-234.

18 SCHENKER Y., FERNANDEZ A., LO B. (2009). “Placebo prescriptions are missed opportunities for doctor-patient communication”, in Am J Bioethics 9(12): 48-54.

19 HROBJARTSSON A. (2008). “Clinical placebo interventions are unethical, unnecessary, and unprofessional”, in J Clin Ethics 19: 66-69.

20 BRAILLON A. (2009). “Placebo is far from benign: it is disease-mongering”, in Am J Bioethics 9(12): 36-38.

21 CROW R., GAGE H., HAMPSON S., HART J., KIMBER A., THOMAS H. (1999). “The role of expectancies in the placebo effect and their use in the delivery of health care: A systematic review”, in Health Technol Assess 3(3): 1-97.

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In the vast majority of situations, effective treatments with proven effects beyond placebo are available – they may only be symptomatic rather than curative but they are helpful nevertheless. If, in such cases, we want to increase patient benefit through maximising placebo-effects, we should realize that the sympathetic and empathetic administration of any therapy would result in a placeboeffect, in addition to the specific effect of the prescribed therapy, particularly if expectancy is maximized 21. Thus prescribing a homeopathic remedy to generate a placebo-effect is usually not only unnecessary, it would also deprive the patient of the specific effect of that treatment. This would clearly not be ethical.

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The prescription of placebos in clinical practice creates an ethical dilemma. On the one hand, clinicians might want to ease the suffering of their patients. On the other hand, this approach violates important ethical principles. The solution is to analyse this behaviour (self ) critically. Once we do this, we are likely to find that much of such placebo-prescribing serves the convenience of clinicians rather than the welfare of the patient. Where possible, it should be avoided and replaced with more ethical and professional behaviour. © R E F E R E N C E S

1 BERTHELOT JM., MAUGARS Y., ABGRALL M., PROST A. (2001) . “Interindividual variations in beliefs about the placebo effect: a study in 300 rheumatology inpatients and 100 nurses”, in Joint Bone Spine 68(1): 65-70.

2 NORHEIM AJ., FONNEBO V. (2002). “Attitudes to the

contribution of placebo in acupuncture - A survey”, in Complementar Ther Med; 10(4): 202-209.

3 LIM EC., SEET RC. (2003). “Attitudes of medical students to placebo therapy”, in Intern Med J 37(3): 156-160.

4 HROBJARTSSON A., NORUP M. (2003). “The use of placebo interventions in medical practice - a national questionnaire survey of Danish clinicians”, in Evaluation & the Health Professions 26(2): 153-165.

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ALL IN THE MIND?

PAIN , PLACEBO EFFECT, AND ERGOGENIC EFFECT OF CAFFEINE IN SPORT PERFORMANCE C H R I S T O P H E R

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experimental findings and the anecdotal reports of athletes 5,11. Furthermore, caffeine-induced pain reduction could explain, in part, both biologic and placebo effects of caffeine on performance. Such a pain hypothesis is supported by a number of factors. Firstly, caffeine has well documented hypoalgesic or pain-reducing properties12, secondly, pain is a limitSenior Lecturer/Programme Director, ing factor on performance 13, g| CHALLENGES Canterbury Christ Church University, thirdly, pain is highly placebo Canterbury, UK. Email: christoresponsive 14 , and lastly, the A man pher.beedie@canterbury.ac.uk sports in which ergogenic effects of caffeine have been who is I N T R O D U C T I O N observed tend to be those in which athletes experience sub‘of sound mind’ H E E RG O G E N I C E F F E C T S O F stantial levels of sustained pain caffeine on sports perwithout the relief of regular is one who formance are well docdisruption of activity associated 1 umented . Although with stop-go or interactive keeps the these effects have been sports. Given that pain is also observed in a wide variety of highly socially modifiable and inner madman sports, they are generally more context-dependent 14, a pain evident in endurance and sushypothesis might explain the under lock tained high-intensity closed skill interindividual variability in sports than in interactive and caffeine response observed in and key.

2 stop-go sports . The ergogenic sport research 15. The present effects of caffeine can be obtained paper aims to examine the at doses at or below the daily PAUL VALÉRY potential influence of psychoso3 intake of normal populations , cial factors in the ergogenic and below levels representing effect of caffeine in the context health risks. Caffeine is not curof caffeine-induced pain reduction. The article will rently proscribed by the World Anti-Doping Agency. review selected findings demonstrating placebo Several mechanisms for the ergogenic effects of cafeffects of caffeine on sports performance, hypoalfeine have been proposed, including enhanced fat gesic effects of caffeine on sports performance, and oxidation, sympathetic nervous system enhanceplacebo effects on pain in experimental and clinical ment, reduction in central fatigue, attenuation of medicine. It will also briefly discuss implications neuromuscular conduction block, and potentiation for research. of muscular force output for given input4. These mechanisms are not consistently supported by P L A C E B O E F F E C T S O F C A F F E I N E O N research evidence, eg, Graham et al concluded that S P O R T P E R F O R M A N C E there is very little evidence to support the fat oxida1 tion theory , whilst Tarnopolsky suggested there is Placebo effects of caffeine on sports performance no evidence for caffeine-induced changes in periphhave been reported in three recent experimental eral nerve conduction or neuromuscular transmisstudies. Beedie et al examined the possibility of a sion4. The lack of consistent support for any one dose-response relationship to placebos presented as physiologic mechanism, and the fact that an increas“zero”, “low”, and “high” dose caffeine among seven ing number of studies in sport and elsewhere have well-trained competitive cyclists5. Measures were demonstrated significant and substantial placebo power, heart rate, oxygen uptake, and blood lactate. effects of caffeine5,10, suggests that psychologic factors Following habituation and baseline trials, subjects might play a significant role in caffeine effects. were informed that, over three experimental trials, they would receive a placebo, or 4.5 mg/kg or 9.0 Perhaps the obvious psychologic factor to consider mg/kg caffeine double-blind and randomly is pain. The proposal that caffeine ingestion assigned.

However, a biologically inert placebo was reduces pain in performance is supported by both

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influence on performance in the absence of caffeine.

A possibly harmful negative placebo (nocebo) effect relative to baseline was present when subjects were correctly informed that they had ingested no caffeine (-1.9% ± 2.2%). No substantial changes relative to baseline were observed in mean heart rate, although clear and substantial increases in blood lactate were evident following the receipt of caffeine. The within-subject CV for power in deceptive conditions at 2.8% was 1.7 times larger than the CV when subjects were truthfully informed that they were receiving caffeine, indicating the possibility of some disparity between internal sensations and instructions amongst some subjects. The authors suggested that their data supported the ergogenic efficacy of caffeine, but noted that in the absence of caffeine, the negative effect on performance of negative expectation was somewhat more substantial than the positive effect of positive expectation (a finding that could inflate effect sizes in placebo-controlled studies).

administered in all experimental conditions. Postexperimental baseline trials were also conducted. A dose-response relationship was evident in experimental trials, with subjects producing 1.4% (range, -4.6%1.9%) less power than baseline when they believed they had ingested a placebo, 1.3% (-1.4%-4.1%) more power than at baseline when they believed they had ingested 4.5 mg/kg caffeine, and 3.1% (0.4%-6.7%) more power than at baseline when they believed they had ingested 9.0 mg/kg caffeine. Of further interest was the fact that no substantial differences in any measured physiologic variables between baseline and experimental conditions were observed.

Follow-up interviews with each subject indicated that five subjects believed that they had experienced a placebo effect, proposing mechanisms such as pain reduction, fatigue resistance, changes in strategy, and reduced arousal.

Pollo et al investigated the effects of a caffeine placebo on quadriceps muscle performance and perceived fatigue6. Forty-four recreationally active males were divided into four groups, ie, two control and two placebo (n=11 each). In the first experiment, a placebo was deceptively administered, with the suggestion that it was a high dose of caffeine. This resulted in a significant increase in mean muscle work (11.8%-16.1%, P< 0.01) but no perceived decrease in muscle fatigue (P> 0.05). In the second experiment, placebo caffeine administration was accompanied by a conditioning procedure whereby the weight to be lifted was surreptitiously reduced.The load was then restored to the original weight and placebo caffeine administered again. Compared with the first experiment, the placebo effect was larger, with a significant increase in muscle work ( 22 . 1%-23 . 5% , P< 0 . 01 ) and a decrease in perceived muscle fatigue (-7.8-10.1, P< 0.01). The authors suggested that their findings indicated a central mechanism of topdown modulation of the global performance of muscles by placebo and underscore the role of learning in the placebo response.

Foad et al used the balanced placebo design with 14 well-trained competitive cyclists in a study examining the effects of caffeine and placebo on 40 km laboratory cycling performance7. Subjects performed two 40 km time trials in each of four experimental conditions (informed caffeine/received caffeine, informed no-treatment/received caffeine, informed caffeine/received placebo, and informed no-treatment/received no treatment). Measures were power, oxygen uptake, blood lactate, and heart rate. The authors reported a very likely beneficial main effect on mean power of receiving caffeine (3.5% ± 2.0%), and a possibly beneficial main effect of being informed of caffeine (0.7% ± 1.4%). A substantial interaction between belief and pharmacology (2.6% ± 3.3%) indicated that caffeine exerted a greater effect on performance when subjects were informed that they had not ingested it, while belief exerted a greater S P A N D A

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Evidence for placebo effects associated with caffeine has also been provided elsewhere 8-10. It is evident from these findings that whilst caffeine ingestion often exerts an influence on behavior, so too can beliefs about caffeine, and about whether or not caffeine has been ingested. These findings beg several questions as to the likely ergogenic mechanisms of caffeine and suggest a significant psychologic contribution.

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As suggested above, perhaps the most likely psychologic contribution would be pain reduction. There is a large body of evidence attesting to the hypoalgesic properties of caffeine in both medicine16 and physical activity5,12,17,18. Consistent with this are data demonstrating that subjects’ ratings of perceived exertion are lower when given caffeine19. Pain is a highly complex biopsychologic phenomenon, and even a brief overview of theories and potential mechanisms is well beyond the scope of this paper.

It is reasonable to suggest that whilst pain is certainly not a necessary condition of sports performance, athletes in endurance and sustained short-duration sports routinely experience pain in competition.

Many will experience pain with little respite for a substantial part, if not for the entirety, of their event (as stated above, it is in such sports that caffeine’s ergogenic efficacy has been most widely demonstrated, lending further weight to the pain hypothesis).

Gliottoni et al state that there is an expanding body of evidence that acute exercise is a natural stimulus that might transiently, safely, and reliably produce muscle pain12, whilst Cook et al suggest that not only are descriptors used to describe pain during exercise similar to those that have been used to characterize clinical pain conditions20, but that pain t h e

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ratings during exercise as measured by the short form of the McGill Pain Questionnaire are nearly one standard deviation above the mean scores associated with other laboratory methods of inducing pain21. Research has suggested that ingestion of caffeine significantly reduces the pain response during performance12,17,18,22,23. Oâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Connor et al reported that caffeine ingestion has a dose-response effect on reducing leg muscle pain during exercise22. Motl et al reported that leg muscle pain ratings were significantly and moderately reduced after a high dose (10 mg/kg body weight) of caffeine18. Maridakis et al reported that caffeine produced a large and statistically significant hypoalgesia effect during maximal quadriceps contraction23. Gliottoni and Motl reported that caffeine administration resulted in a large reduction in leg muscle pain intensity ratings17. Gliottoni et al reported that caffeine ingestion is associated with a moderate hypoalgesic effect during highintensity cycling12. Theoretically, any intervention that reduces perceived exertion or pain should also increase the perceived headroom for effort, and therefore has the potential to enhance performance.

A hypoalgesic effect driven by caffeine could be direct, ie, the action of caffeine attenuates the perception of pain. Indirectly, caffeine actions could influence other biologic processes that attenuate the pain response. The effect could also result from both direct and indirect processes simultaneously.

Whichever way, and significantly for the present discussion, the large body of research in medicine and psychology demonstrating substantial placebo effects on pain could shed some light on the placebo effects related to caffeine and sports performance.

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Montgomery and Kirsch exposed subjects to experimental pain at baseline, and in subsequent trials surreptitiously reduced the pain stimulus whilst a placebo analgesic cream was administered (the latter process designed to lead subjects to believe that the cream had reduced the pain)24. Subjects were then split into two groups, the first was correctly informed about the deception, and the second was not informed. On re-exposure to the pain at baseline level, subjects who had been correctly informed of the deception experienced no pain relief when the placebo analgesia cream was applied, whilst those in the second group reported substantially lower pain. The authors also assessed subjectsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; expectation of analgesia, and reported that this accounted for 49% of the observed effects. The authors concluded that an analgesic response can be conditioned, but that the conditioned response might be either reversed or suppressed by correct information or negative expectation respectively.

Levine et al administered active painkillers covertly and placebo painkillers openly to two groups of subjects following dental surgery25,26. They reported that the overt injection of a saline placebo described as morphine was as effective as a covert injection of morphine. Similarly, Benedetti et al compared the open administration of five different painkillers with the hidden and automated administration of the same drugs 27,29. The authors reported that in hidden administration conditions the time taken for postoperative pain to diminish by 50% was greatly increased for all drugs compared with open administration.

These findings suggest that anticipation of analgesia is a factor in perceived analgesia.

Pollo et al treated postoperative patients with a painkiller on request for three consecutive days, as well as with a saline placebo (patients were given the intravenous saline as a background infusion in addition to the routine analgesic treatment)30. Subjects were divided into three groups, the first being told nothing about the saline, the second that they had a 50:50 chance of receiving the painkiller or a placebo, and the third that the saline solution was a potent painkiller (these three conditions forming, respectively, natural history, double-blind, and deceptive administration groups). The authors reported that, compared with the natural history group, a 20% decrease in requests for analgesia was observed in the double-blind group, and a 34% decrease in requests was observed in the deceptive administration group. The authors concluded that instructions that induce a certain expectation of analgesia induce greater placebo analgesia than those that induce uncertain expectation, a finding subsequently supported in a meta-analysis of 14 similar studies31.

P A I N

Pain is highly susceptible to social and psychologic modulation14, and perhaps because of this, over the last few years, pain has become one of the most fruitful areas of research into mind/body interaction. In short, evidence from such research demonstrates that expectation of pain relief can modify the subsequent effectiveness of administered substances, be they active analgesics, such as morphine, or inactive placebos. These effects can be both hypoalgesic and hyperalgesic. Several complex designs have been used to elucidate this phenomenon, ranging from covert manipulation of experimental pain stimuli, to direct comparison of the effects of the hidden/deceptive administration of biologically active treatments with the overt administration of biologically inactive substances. Studies using such designs are informative in demonstrating the degree to which pain can be modified by psychosocial processes, such as conditioning and expectation. On that basis, they are of interest to those investigating or using interventions in which pain reduction might be a factor in their efficacy.

Some illustrative examples of such studies are briefly described below.

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were replicated several times in both experimental and clini-calsettings. At the University of Turin, Benedetti et al further demonstrated that as well as the opioids, cholecystokinin, a neurotransmitter with an antiopioid action, plays a role in both placebo analgesia35 and nocebo hyperalgesia32. Subsequent research has demonstrated, for example, placebo-induced activation of brain areas involved in the pain response36, placebo-induced deactivation of brain areas involved in pain processing37, and correlations between the magnitude of placebo analgesia and dopamine activity38.

postoperative patients2 8 , 2 9 . The authors reported that patients who were aware that their treatment had been discontinued were more likely to request further morphine than those who were unaware that their treatment had been interrupted. Similarly, Benedetti et al demonstrated pain increases associated with the administration of a placebo expected to increase pain in both clinical 32 and experimental patients33. The authors concluded that, in the same way that positive expectations of pain relief might induce or enhance actual pain relief, negative expectations might have the opposite effect.

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In a study of the placebo analgesia mechanism related to sports performance, Benedetti et al investigated the placebo analgesic effects of morphine on a pain endurance test39. Subjects had a tourniquet wrapped around their forearm and were required to squeeze a hand spring exerciser repeatedly until they could no longer continue. During precompetition training, two “teams”, A and B, received no pharmacologic substance whilst teams C and D were trained with morphine. During competition, team A received no treatment while teams B and C were given placebo morphine one hour before competition. Team D also received what they believed was morphine, but they actually received naloxone (which would be expected to antagonize the opioid pathways). As hypothesized, the largest placebo effect on pain tolerance was observed in team C who received both the morphine preconditioning in the “training” trials and also believed they had ingested morphine in the competition trials. In team D, who had received morphine in preconditioning trials, naloxone negated the morphine

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Whilst early research into the psychosocial modulation of pain tended to focus on demonstrating the effect and speculating as to mechanisms, recent research has gone beyond this to investigating mechanisms in real time using technology such as positron emission tomography and magnetic resonance imaging. A classic experimental model is the administration of an agent known to antagonize the pathway that an administered placebo analgesic purports to mimic. For example, naloxone antagonizes the action of opiates such as morphine.

Therefore, naloxone would also be expected to antagonize placebo analgesia if the same mechanisms as for morphine were responsible. In the first study of its kind, Levine et al demonstrated that naloxone did in fact disrupt placebo analgesia, concluding, logically, that the endogenous opioids are involved in the placebo response34. These findings S P A N D A

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psychologic factors are rarely considered legitimate variables in experimental research. This is despite the growing experimental evidence for placebo effects on sports performance. Whilst this literature is reviewed elsewhere43, it suffices to state that placebo effects on sports performance resulting from the belief that an ergogenic substance had been ingested have been reported in 12 well-controlled studies5-7,39-43-50. Most of these effects were in the range of 1%-5%. In three studies, nocebo (or negative placebo) effects were observed as the result of subjects either being given negative information about an intervention44, having previous negative experience with caffeine5, or for reasons that were not entirely clear12. Many of the positive effects were similar in magnitude to the effects of the substance that the placebo mimicked.

In the few studies in which the biologically active substance was administered alongside the placebo, as is the case in the traditional placebo-controlled study, results were arguably not as easily interpretable as those in which placebos only were administered. This suggests that the interaction of belief and biology in real time, or that order effects in which subjects were able to detect the presence or otherwise of the active substance, might have created tension between information (e.g. “Today you have been given a placebo”) and perception (e.g. “I’m sure this feels like I have been given caffeine”). This finding in itself warrants further investigation. Whilst knowledge that placebos might be powerful in the absence of the biologically active substance they mimic, such an application is rare in the real world which scientific research aims to inform.

preconditioning effects. These findings suggest conditioned activation of endogenous opioids after placebo administration, although a correlation between morphine and placebo suggests the possible contribution of nonopioid mechanisms. It is noteworthy that the placebo analgesic responses were obtained after only two morphine administrations separated by as much as a week. These long time intervals suggest that pharmacologic conditioning procedures have long-lasting effects (with implications for the use of proscribed drugs in training and competition).

Collectively, the findings above and many others suggest not only that placebo effects have biologic mechanisms, but that these mechanisms may be similar or identical to those of the drug the placebo mimics. Given this, and given the reduced ratings of perceived exertion/pain observed in both caffeine and placebo caffeine research, it is reasonable to speculate that pain reduction might be one mechanism by which both the biologic and placebo effects of caffeine on sports performance operate.

I M P L I C A T I O N S

It is proposed above that pain might be a factor in the observed ergogenic effect of both caffeine and placebo caffeine on sports performance. This proposal was supported by a brief review of research that has demonstrated the placebo effects of caffeine on sports performance, the hypoalgesic effects of caffeine in exercise, and the psychosocial modulation of pain responses. It is suggested that if pain reduction is a key factor in the ergogenic effect of caffeine, the findings of the latter body of research will be instrumental in elucidating mechanisms and explaining interindividual variability to response to caffeine. Specifically, these findings suggest that: an analgesic response can be conditioned and that the conditioned response might be either reversed or suppressed by correct information or negative expectation, respectively; that expectation of analgesia is a factor in perceived analgesia; that instructions that induce a certain expectation of analgesia induce greater analgesia than those that induce an uncertain expectation; and that negative expectations of analgesia associated with an analgesic intervention might offset some of the effectiveness of that intervention. If pain is indeed a factor in the ergogenic effect of caffeine, all of these findings are of interest to researchers investigating the phenomenon.

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Burke, in reviewing the caffeine and performance literature, argued strongly for more ecologically valid investigations of the phenomenon2. It is fair to argue that, in order to understand any intervention fully, it is necessary to determine how it operates in the real world, outside of the laboratory.

However, there are many aspects of the ergogenic effect of caffeine that can be examined in the laboratory, one of which is the contribution or otherwise of psychologic factors. The degree to which the brain is capable of modulating the biologic effect of an intervention, be that modulation trivial, as is likely the case with a strong poison, or substantial, as has been suggested is the case with several complementary medicine treatments, is still little explored in sports performance. Biomedical research is increasingly utilizing sophisticated and elegant designs to investigate this area, and in doing so, is providing a firm biologic basis for what were previously perceived as purely psychologic phenomena.

The differences between the laboratory and the field and between research and competition are critical factors. Arguably as important, however, are differences

Beyond these findings, evidence from over fifty years of scientific research indicates that when a person receives any of a number of biomedical interventions, ranging from tablet to surgery, the brain might play a role in modulating the effectiveness of that intervention14,40-42. Whilst this fact is recognized by sports scientists, and is accounted for in our use of the placebo-controlled experimental design, such S P A N D A

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between the subjects’ certainty of having received an intervention or of not having done so, or between their lack of faith in an intervention or extreme confidence in the same intervention. Burke also highlighted the interindividual variability in response to caffeine ingestion in performance research2. Much of this variability is likely the result of factors such as habituation, diet, training status, and available physiologic resources. The research described above suggests that, if pain reduction is indeed a mechanism of the ergogenic effects of caffeine, several psychosocial factors might also modulate the ergogenic effects of caffeine. It has been suggested that some athletes are nonresponsive to caffeine. It

even in the absence of caffeine. In this respect it is also useful to evaluate whether a subject believes they were given caffeine or placebo in any one trial.

Several recent studies have demonstrated that subjects who believed themselves to be in placebo control or no-treatment conditions performed below baseline, suggesting a potentially powerful nocebo effect. Such an effect is perhaps associated with the hope/anticipation of a positive intervention being replaced by the disappointment/anxiety of no intervention. It is important to distinguish between controlling for current use of, or habituation to, caffeine and for previous use. Whilst the physiologic effects of caffeine might be extinct after a few days,

is, however, possible that if caffeine responses are context-dependent, an athlete who would not respond to caffeine in one context, for example, with no explicit expectation of effect, might respond in another context when given an explicit expectation or when exposed to a conditioning stimulus with false-positive performance outcome feedback. These factors are largely related to the subject’s expectations, or conditioned responses, to the caffeine intervention, and these themselves are dependent on either previous experience or currently available information. Therefore, to understand better the effects of caffeine on performance, these psychosocial factors should be treated as variables of interest in caffeine research. Previous experiences of caffeine could be assessed, and in doing so, several aspects of the caffeine experience, including whether the previous intervention had a positive or negative effect on performance, or whether it was associated with any side effects, such as nausea or insomnia, could be factored in. It is also useful to evaluate the subjects’ expectations of caffeine. As was demonstrated by Beedie et al 5, expectations of a negative effect can result in a substantial nocebo effect on performance,

conditioned responses, expectations, or both, might persist for several years or even indefinitely.

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The suggestion that caffeine’s mechanisms might relate in part to psychologic factors is intuitively appealing, especially when considering the multiple feedback loops between brain and body during performance. However, to date, little research in sport has examined, or even considered, such biologic and psychologic interactions in this context. This is not surprising, given the complex links between perception of effort and pain and the biologic reality at that exact point in time. However, if sports scientists are to understand fully the mechanisms of interventions, such questions must, at the very least, be asked, if not immediately or easily answered. A substantial body of biomedical research has demonstrated that brain and body interact in response to the administration of a substance about which the subject has some expectation, be that expectation positive or negative. This is of course the case when an athlete uses caffeine, ie, the athlete has some expectation of an effect. Given the failure to definitively support several longstanding theories of caffeine’s ergogenic t h e

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17 GLIOTTONI RC., MOTL RW. (2008). “Effect of caf-

effects described by Tarnopolsky above4, and the increasing database of studies attesting to the potential psychologic contribution to the action of ergogenic aids in sports performance42, it is perhaps timely to investigate the pain hypothesis, and consider psychosocial variables that might modulate the pain response, in future caffeine and performance research. ©

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50 PORCARI J., FOSTER C. (2006). “Mind over body:

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ACE fitness matters”, available from http://www.acefitness.org/getfit/PlaceboStudy2006.pdf [Accessed December 5, 2006]. ab

ab Now, my tongue, the mistery telling Of the glorious Body sing.

THOMAS AQUINAS ,

Pange Lingua Gloriosi.

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THE STING O F P O T E N T I A L PA I N K U R T

G R A Y

~

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M

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W E G N E R

reduction of pain without a change in physical stimulation when context, expectations, or sugar pills challenge the interpretation of a sensation as painful (e.g., Fields, 2008). The nocebo effect, in turn, is the experience of pain without any physical stimulation – as when participants report headaches when told that a (nonexistent) electric current is passing through their P R O P O S A L heads (Schweiger & Parducci, | g Kurt Gray is Assistant Professor at 1981). These variations in pain Department of Psychology, University experience seem to depend on of Maryland, US. Email: kurtgraythe meaning of the stimulus: A @umd.edu.

Old age sugar pill is meant to decrease Daniel M. Wegner is a social psycholpain, whereas electric current is ogist, John Lindsley Professor in Memmeant to increase pain. In an is the most ory at William James Department of interpersonal context, the meanPsychology, Harvard University, US, ing of an action is derived from and a fellow of the American Associaunexpected the perceiver’s perceptions of tion for the Advancement of Science.

He is known for his work on mental the actor’s intention (Clark, of all things control (e.g., thought suppression) 1996), which means that intenand conscious will, and for originattional harms, unlike accidental ing the study of transactive memory harms, are meant to cause pain. that happen and action identification. His book, The possibility that the maliThe Illusion of Conscious Will, cious intent of other people to man. tackles the long-debated notion of free could be translated into addiwill through the scope of experimenLEV TROTSKY tional physical pain is suggested tal psychology. Wegner's ideas have by studies demonstrating that sparked interest among psychologists, similar areas of cortex respond neuroscientists, theologians, and to both physical pain and social philosopher interested in the nature of harms (Eisenberger, Lieberman, consciousness and freedom of action. & Williams, 2003). Social harms, which are presumably laden with intention, have also been shown H E N S O M E O N E S T E P S O N YO U R TO E O N P U R P O S E , to be more painful to relive than simple physical it seems to hurt more than when the perharms (Chen, Williams, Fitness, & Newton, 2008). son does the same thing unintentionally.

So, although a broken toe (or electric shock) may hurt, an intentionally broken toe (or electric shock) The physical parameters of the harm may should hurt more. not differ – your toe is attened in both cases – but the psychological experience of pain is changed nonetheless. Intentional harms are preM E T H O D meditated by another person and have the specific purpose of causing pain. In a sense, intended Forty-eight participants (68% female, 32% male) harms are events initiated by one mind to commuparticipated in a lab study of ‘‘psychophysical pernicate meaning (malice) to another, and this could ception in pairs.’’ Four participants were excluded shape the recipient’s experience. This study examfor suspicion and one participant was excluded for ined whether self-reported pain is indeed higher failing to follow instructions, leaving a total of 43. when the events producing the pain are underOn arrival, participants met their study partner – a stood as intentionally (as opposed to unintentionconfederate – and were escorted to an individual ally) caused by another person. room. They were then introduced to the psychophysical tasks of color matching, number estimaAlthough pain was traditionally conceived to be tion, pitch judgment, and discomfort assessment, solely physical in nature (Aydede, 2005), its experieach of which they completed. Discomfort assessence varies substantially with psychological context. ment involved being administered an electric shock The placebo analgesia effect, for example, is the

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and evaluating it on a 7-point scale ranging from not at all uncomfortable to extremely uncomfortable.

Shocks of 1-ms duration were delivered to the wrist of the dominant hand through a stimulator (Biopac Systems, Goleta, CA), with voltage precalibrated for each participant to be ‘‘very uncomfortable.’’ Voltages ranged from 40 to 75V between subjects. Participants evaluated two blocks of computer-administered electric shocks initially in an individual practice session as a baseline pain measure.

On each experimental trial, participants saw a computer screen with two potential tasks before completing one of them. When discomfort assessment

electric shock and also reinforced the intentional or unintentional nature of the shock. Pilot testing confirmed that shocks were perceived (on a 7-point scale) as more intentional in the intentional conditional (M=5 5.64, SD=1.49) than in the unintentional condition ( M=2 . 17 , SD=0 . 83 ), t( 24 )= 7 . 13 , p<. 01 , Prep=.99, and that the confederate was seen as more blameworthy (on a 5-point scale) in the intentional condition (M=2.43, SD=1.40) than in the unintentional condition (M=1.41, SD=0.67), t(24)=2.29, p<.03, Prep=.91. In both conditions, participants completed three blocks of experimental trials after the two practice/baseline trials.

INTENTIONAL ELECTRIC SHOCK UNITENTIONAL ELECTRIC SHOCK

EXPERIENCED PAIN

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3

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FIGURE

1 ~ Experienced pain as a function of whether electric shocks were perceived as intentional or unintentional.

was a potential task, the alternate task was evaluating the relative pitches of tones. On this and other trials, participants were told that the participant in the next room (the confederate) would select which task the participant would complete.

In the intentional condition, the confederate chose the discomfort-assessment task when it was an option, and participants received an electric shock.

In the unintentional condition, the confederate selected the pitch-judgment task when discomfort assessment was an option. In this condition, however, participants were told that the mapping between the selection and administration of tasks was switched, unbeknownst to the confederate, so they would always receive the task opposite to the one selected by the confederate. Thus, when pitch judgment was selected for them, they completed discomfort assessment and received an electric shock.

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Mean pain ratings from shocks in each of the 5 blocks (see FIGURE 1) were submitted to a 2 (condition: intentional; unintentional) x 5 (time: block number) between-within analysis of variance, which revealed the predicted interaction, F(4, 164)=3.09, p=.02, Prep=.93, π2=.07. A composite of the two practice blocks revealed no significant difference in experienced pain between conditions (t<1); however, an average of experienced pain in the three experimental blocks revealed that intended pain (M=3.62, SD=0. 99) was experienced as more painful than unintended pain ( M=3 . 00 , SD=0 . 78 ), t( 41 )= 2 . 21 , p=.03, Prep=.91.

Additionally, there was a significant decreasing linear trend of experienced pain in the unintentional condition, F (1,17)=20.18, p=.001, Prep=.99, suggesting that participants in this condition exhibited the standard pattern of habituation to repeated painful stimulation (Greffrath, Baumgartner, & Treede, 2007). In contrast, there was no linear trend in the

On their computer screen, participants saw both the confederate choice and the actual task to be administered (in advance), which ensured that participants were not surprised when they received an S P A N D A

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FIELDS, H.S. (2008). Pain: Mechanisms and management (2nd ed.) (New York: McGraw-Hill).

GREFFRATH, W., BAUMGARTNER, U., & TREEDE, R-D. (2007). “Peripheral and central components of habituation to heat pain perception and evoked potentials in humans”, in Pain 132, 301-311.

S CHWEIGER , A., & PAR DUCCI , A. (1981). “Nocebo: The psychologic induction of pain”, in Pavlovian Journal of Biological Science 16, 140-143.

intentional condition, F=0.08, suggesting that participants in this condition continued to feel the fresh pain of an intentional harm as time went on.

This study provides evidence that the experience of pain changes depending upon the psychological context in which people are harmed. Specifically, the meaning of a harm – whether it was intended – influences the amount of pain it causes.

Although people can become accustomed to the pain of an unintentional harm, the malice behind an intentional pain keeps it stinging. ©

ab

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

We thank assistant Tiffany Niver, Jane Fang, Daniel Liss, and Dan Scaduto. This work was supported by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Institute for Humane Studies, and National Institute of Mental Helalth Grant MH 49127.

R E F E R E N C E S

AYDEDE , M. ( 2005 ) .

“Introduction: A Critical and Quasi-historical Essay on Theories of Pain”, in M. Aydede (ed.), Pain: New essays on its nature and the methodology of its study (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press): 1-58.

CHEN, Z., WILLIAMS, K.D., F ITNESS , J., & N EW TON, N. (2008). “When hurt will not heal: Exploring the capacity to relive social and physical pain”, in Psychological Science 19 , 789-795.

CLARK, HH. (1996). Using language (New York: Cambridge UP).

N.I., E I S E NB E RG ER , LIEBERMAN, M.D., & K.D. W I LLI AMS , (2003). “Does rejection hurt? An MRI study of social exclusion”. in Science 302: 290-292.

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THE ETHICS OF PL ACEBO - CONTROLLED TRIALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO PREVENT MOTHER - TO - CHILD TRANSMISSION OF HIV * JOHN NICHOLAS WILLIAMS

there are clear differences from country to country which are morally relevant to the question above, our answer to it should be the same whatever the country in which such experiments are conducted.

Extracting a clear and consistent answer is not easy, given the emotional horror that surrounds even a suitably generalised question.

The consequences of the disg| REFLECTIONS ease are horrible and threaten John N. Williams is an Associate Professor in Philosophy at the School to multiply through successive of Social Sciences, Singapore Mangenerations. The horror is agement University. He received his accentuated by the innocence Apart PhD from Hull University, UK. His of the foetus as a recipient of research interests include paradoxes, of the those consequences, an innotheory of knowledge, philosophy of cence that remains regardless of religion and applied ethics. His known the academic question of research has been published in Acta whether the foetus is a person Analytica, American Philosophical and the or merely a potential person.

Quarterly, Analysis, Australasian Add to this the perplexing unknown, Journal of Philosophy, Journal of conundrum of placebo, with Philosophical Research, Mind, what Philosophy East and West, Philoits levels of ignorance. Finally, sophical Studies, Religious Studies, we must contextualise the else is Synthese, and Theoria. He is a co-ediproblem against the backtor of Moore’s Paradox: New Essays ground of the horrors built there? on Belief, Rationality and the First into developing countries, such Person, Oxford University Press 2007. as unequal and inadequate Email: johnwilliams@smu.edu.sg HAROLD PINTER resources, lack of education and poverty.

Where is a doctor or a researcher I N T R O D U C T I O N to look for guidance in such a L A C E B O - T R I A L S O N HIV- I N F E C T E D P R E G N A N T case? ‘Conscience’, isn’t any substantive answer, since women in developing countries like Thaidiffering consciences of doctors are just differing land and Uganda1,2 have provoked recent internalisations of some medical code. However, controversy 3,4. Such experiments aim to there is an authoritative code of medical practice, find a treatment that will cut the rate of which provides guidance, namely the Belmont vertical transmission more efficiently than existing Report 5. ‘gold standard’ treatments like zidovudine. Is such The Belmont Report provides an excellent sharpenan experiment morally justified? I think that the ing of the principles laid down in the unmodified right question to ask is this: “Is it always, never or Helsinki Declaration6. In essence, it urges three prinsometimes, morally justified to experiment on HIVciples: the Principle of Utility (there called Benefiinfected, pregnant women in developing countries cence), the Principle of Autonomy (there called (by means of placebo trials) in order to develop a Respect for Persons) and the Principle of Justice. new treatment X which will reduce the rate of The Principle of Utility has a negative and a posimother-to-child HIV transmission more effectively tive form. Its negative form states that than the existing (‘gold standard’) treatment Y?” ~ PB neg) It is one’s duty to refrain from doing harm while its positive states that

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~ PB pos) It is one’s duty to minimise harm and maximise benefit, to society in general, including that of future patients.

The Principle of Autonomy claims that individuals should be treated as autonomous agents, and that

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Put like this, the issue acquires a level of generality.

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persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to protection. In other words,

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~ PA) It is one’s duty to respect autonomous choices and to protect those with diminished autonomy.

~ PJ) It is one’s duty to distribute benefits (of research) fairly or at least, not worsen the imbalance of benefits and burdens of research among relevant groups.

These three voices of utility, autonomy and justice cannot, in themselves, provide clear guidance in all cases, since there are possible scenarios in which they give conflicting rulings. It seems reasonable to think that the negative voice of utility is not a total prohibition of any form of harm, such as a slightly painful injection. Rather it should be read as ‘Do not cause more harm than benefit to a single individual’, but this may still conflict with the positive voice of utility. Suppose that the general increase of good over harm to society in general (by means of a reduction of the number of children who will be born with HIV) can be purchased only at the cost of exposing the mothers in the experimental group to a risk of substantial harm that is greater than the chance of slight benefit. Since such exposure is itself a type of harm, the voice of utility is confused.

Now consider the cost to the mothers in the control group. Their babies are effectively condemned to HIV infection, the incidence of which could have been reduced by giving them the ‘gold standard’ standard treatment Y (for example, zidovudine) that is known to be effective in cutting the rate of vertical HIV transmission. In the name of both babies and their mothers, the negative voice of utility prohibits the experiment, while its positive voice demands it. Suppose further that HIV-infected mothers can only be recruited for the experiment by coercing them to participate or by withholding information about the risks involved (the absence of any effective treatment in the case of the control group and the risks-compared-to-benefits of treatment X in the case of the experimental group) relative to the benefits available to others (by means of the existing treatment Y). Here the voice of utility contradicts that of autonomy, since informed and free choice to participate has been ruled out. Or suppose that the treatment X, once available, will be restricted to a minority of HIV-infected pregnant women in countries wealthy enough to afford it, excluding those in the developing country in which they were originally developed. Even if we could be sure that the rate of vertical transmission would decrease worldwide, in line with the voice of utility, we would still hear the cry of injustice.

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These examples show that the principle of utility will contradict those of autonomy and justice in cases that are at least possible. This means that we must decide in advance which voice has authority over which. As a matter of fact, most of us hear the least authority in the voice of utility. In examples such as those just considered, most will judge that maximising utility at the cost of injustice or at the cost of disrespecting the free choices of people (thus treating them as means to the end of increased health world-wide) is morally repugnant. Thus, one way to achieve consistency among the three principles that will fit the moral intuitions of many is to hold that the voice of utility must be obeyed, but only after the voices of justice and autonomy have been obeyed. Those who hear things that way will not be swayed in the least by the tinkering with the original wording of the Helsinki Declaration which was sent to the World Medical Association’s member associations in advance of the World Medical Association Council Session in Santiago, Chile on April 15, 1999.

Working from the background of the question towards empirical specifics, the Principle of Justice is the most effective choice of principles to apply first. If the degree of poverty of most pregnant HIVinfected mothers in the developing country (such as Uganda) will prevent them from buying the improved cure, if found, for several generations of HIV-infected offspring to come, while most of the relatives of the researchers (such as Americans) will be able to buy it as soon as it hits the market, then surely this is injustice. As for other scenarios, surely enlarging the relative size of burdened group versus benefiting group proportionally worsens the injustice. Given that injustice will be done, there is something morally wrong with the experiment, quite regardless of whatever else is ruled wrong by the other principles. Taking the three principles as a guide to procedure, we must at least postpone such experiments until enough economic aid has been given to these countries as makes the chances of benefit more fairly distributed. Otherwise the researchers should experiment upon their own extended geopolitical-economic kin. Given the commercial hegemony of the rich drug companies involved, their opposition to the production of cheaper ‘generic’ drugs and the huge disparity between levels of wealth in developing countries and developed countries, the chances of benefit to the burdened group were clearly not fairly available to them.

Let us now suppose (hypothetically but implausibly) that equality has been redressed or is not the issue.

What does the voice of autonomy tell us? There are two groups for whom it could speak, the foetuses and their mothers. Clearly the foetus is incapable of making choices, informed or not, so whether or not we say that they are potential persons or already persons, there can be no autonomous choices made by

The Principle of Justice states that ‘research should not unduly involve persons from groups unlikely to be among the beneficiaries of subsequent applications of the research’. The spirit of this principle is that

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ending up in the control group, in which case her foetus will certainly be born with HIV and a halfchance of ending up in the experimental group, with possible risks and benefits to the foetus which are uncertain. She must also understand that she faces these two outcomes in the teeth of the knowledge that treatment Y already exists, with its more certain risks and benefits to the foetus.

them which are respected or disrespected. In this respect, the voice of autonomy is neutral on the permissibility of the experiment. On the other hand, the principle of autonomy also commands us to â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;protect those with diminished autonomyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, which appears to include the foetus. If so, on balance, the voice of autonomy prohibits the experiment in the name of the foetus.

It might be objected that the class of those entitled to protection excludes non-persons such as the foetus. This objection clearly has little bite against those who hold that the foetus is to some degree a person at some stage in its development. Nor is it persuasive against those, including the mothers, who think that whether the foetus is an actual or potential person, it is still something valuable, which therefore needs protection.

It might be objected here that the lack of education among such mothers renders them incapable of understanding such information. If so, autonomy demands that education be a more pressing priority than medical research. The experiment must be postponed until the would-be participants are educated to a level that enables them to understand what choices are open to them. Since justice demands that the benefits of education be fairly distributed throughout the developing country in which the experiment is to take place, this means that the experiment must be postponed until any would-be sub-group of participants has a level of education that is representative of the whole population of that country.

How does autonomy speak for the mothers? It clearly prohibits the experiment unless the mother has made an autonomous choice to participate.

Autonomous choices must be informed choices. In the case of a non-placebo experiment in which the new treatment X is to be tested, this means that the mother must understand the risks and probable benefits to herself and her foetus posed by the new treatment X, as compared to risks and probable benefits conferred by the existing treatment Y. Since the probability of risks and benefits of the new treatment may be precisely what the experiment is designed to discover, it may not be possible to give her precisely this information. In that case, the mother must be informed of the degree of uncertainty of the probability of possible harms and benefits of the new treatment X, as compared to the degree of certainty already established of the probabilities of harms and benefits of the existing treatment Y. Anything less would not be full information.

C O M P L I C A T I O N S F R O M

P L A C E B O

This brings us back to the purpose of the placebo.

Suppose that an HIV-infected pregnant woman believes that she is receiving a new miracle drug that carries an ironclad guarantee of protecting her foetus from infection. In fact her belief is mistaken, for the drug she has been given is just sugar. It seems unlikely that her belief could have any positive psychological effect upon her foetus. In terms of the mother, the placebo seems to serve no useful purpose. So far, there is no justification for the creation of the control group, in which the foetuses are condemned to HIV infection. Thus the only other purpose that the placebo can serve is to separate the causal powers of X in reducing vertical transmission from the causal powers of the beliefs of the experimenters. A double-blind trial, in which the experimenters do not know which mother is receiving sugar or receiving X, will ensure that they will not bias the development of one group of foetuses over the other, by giving different levels of care to the two groups of mothers. The question to ask now is whether the increased accuracy of the results of the efficiency of X is worth the price of allowing the mothers in the control group to go untreated. The voice of autonomy tells us that the price need not be paid. Since mothers in both groups are persons equally deserving of care and respect, the experimenters have a duty to provide both groups with the best possible level of care, regardless of their beliefs about whose foetuses are most likely to be protected from vertical transmission. Once this duty is discharged, there is no possible justification left for the inclusion of the placebo group.

Thus there appears to be no need for a placebo group at all. Surely the ethical procedure would be to give the control group treatment Y instead. After all, are we

A R I S I N G C O N T R O L

In the case of a placebo experiment, things are more complicated. Placebos aim to separate the causal powers of X from the causal powers of the belief in those causal powers. For example, they aim to filter out cases in which a patient feels better simply because that patient believes (correctly or incorrectly) that the treatment will work. The belief in question may be held by the mothers or the experimenters or both. Clearly no such belief can be held by the foetus. Assume a simple single-blind placebo control in which each mother has a fifty-fifty chance of being selected for the control group to receive sugar as opposed to the experimental group to receive the new treatment X, such that no mother will know which group she is in. Obviously, this design of experiment rules out informing the mothers which group they are in, but this does not mean they can be given no information at all. Autonomy demands that each mother understand that she has a half-chance of S P A N D A

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not trying to measure the difference in effectiveness of the new treatment X as compared to the existing treatment Y? If the participants in both groups were fully informed of the experimental set-up, there would be no room for objection on grounds of autonomy, nor any room for objection on grounds of utility to the treatment of the participants in the control group, since this group is assured of the best known treatment available anyway.

Given my definition of a placebo as a control which aims to separate the causal powers of a treatment from the causal powers of belief (or faith) in that treatment, there is, strictly speaking, a conceptual difference between a placebo group and a ‘no treatment’

those in the ‘no-treatment’ group were not fully informed. Quinn et al 8 reported that 228 HIVinfected couples were left untreated for up to thirty months, and the decision to inform the uninfected persons that their partner was infected was left up to the infected persons themselves, although the experimenters regularly saw both. Surely this does not count as discharging a duty to give all parties concerned the full information. To so discharge it, the experimenters should have told each couple that one partner was infected as well as telling them that the infection would go untreated.

In the same project, the investigators treated half of the villagers for sexually transmitted diseases such

control group, which aims to help isolate possible unwanted side-effects of the treatment. In experiments to develop new treatments that are more effective in reducing the vertical transmission of HIV, a ‘no treatment group’ would help to isolate unwanted sideeffects of the new treatment on the foetus. I now turn to this issue.

as syphilis while leaving the other half untreated.

Their aim was to determine the effect of concurrent sexually transmitted diseases on the heterosexual transmission rate of HIV. Assume for the sake of argument, that this information was obtained and that it helped to develop more effective ways of cutting the HIV transmission rate. In terms of maximising the utility to society in general, the investigators were morally justified. Moreover, anyone who maintains consistently that the voice of utility always overrides the voices of autonomy and justice can defend the investigators, but that is not the moral framework I have suggested. Given that utility is subordinate to autonomy and justice, we need to ask whether the investigators infringed the informed choices of the villagers who were left untreated.

Deciding this is not easy. One way to look at it is to say that the untreated villagers were simply left alone by the investigators to carry on as before, so no interference took place. On the other hand, there is a clear sense in which the untreated villagers were selected by the investigators to form one half of the experiment. In this sense, they were intentionally included in the experiment by default. Therefore

‘

N O

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T R A T M E N T

G R O U P S

C O N T R O L L E D

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W I T H I N

S T U D I E S

Similar moral objections can be made to different kinds of experiments such as the Rakai project in Uganda7, in which the experimenters studied the effect of other sexually transmitted diseases on the rate of heterosexual transmission of HIV and the natural risk factors that determine the heterosexual transmission of HIV-1 over periods of unprotected sex. Such experiments use a ‘no-treatment’ group within a controlled study. Such an experiment is ruled unethical on the grounds of autonomy, if those who were left untreated were not fully informed that this was precisely what would happen to them. By the experimenters’ own admission, S P A N D A

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women will know that they are in a kind of desperate lottery that holds out a chance for the well-being of their unborn. Since the chances of protection for the foetuses in the experimental group are less than certain, they should know that overall, the odds are against them. Nonetheless, some basis for hope exists, which may well be the very reason why they have agreed to participate. Yet the experimenters know in advance that for each mother in the placebo group, all hope will be dashed. This burden of false hope and its certain disappointment surely represents a significant cost to this group of mothers.

The no-loss argument gains its plausibility from the claim that the personal utility of the volunteers is not decreased. But it ignores the salient fact that the volunteers start from a position of inequality.

Were justice done, the proven, if limited benefits of the existing treatment Y would be distributed fairly throughout the world to those in developing countries who need them most. Given that the inclusion of the placebo group is justified, the autonomous choice of the mothers would then be the more heroic one of taking a half-chance of no protection for their unborn and a half-chance of the uncertain degree of protection conferred by treatment X, in preference to the guarantee of the certain but limited degree of protection conferred by the existing treatment Y. Given, as I suggested above, that the inclusion of the placebo group is not justified, the autonomous choice of the mothers would then be the less heroic but still courageous one of trading the certain but limited degree of protection conferred by treatment Y for the possibly improved but uncertain degree of protection conferred by treatment X. In the original experiment, even those mothers who end up in the experimental group are doubly wronged. Firstly, they are wronged both in the name of justice and in the name of autonomy by being unfairly denied the choice of treatment Y. Then the experimenters restrict their choices to the options of no treatment (by refusing to participate) or the option of a half-chance of the uncertain benefits of treatment X (by consenting to participate). The restriction is genuine, since it is always within the power of experimenters to offer treatment Y as well. Since this is a perpetuation of the original injustice and an erosion of autonomy, this is a further wrong. In this respect, the wouldbe participant resembles a workman who has been unfairly denied any payment. His employer offers to toss a coin. If the coin comes down heads, the workman will receive half his wages; if tails, nothing. If he refuses the bet, again he gets nothing. The workman is first wronged by being deprived any payment. When the bet is offered, he has nothing further to lose. Yet surely the offer of the bet is a second wrong since it perpetuates the original deprivation of full payment, one that the employer is in a position to put right.

the voice of autonomy demands that the experimenters give them an informed choice to continue to participate, which in turn means telling them that they would go untreated. Had the villagers heroically agreed to forgo treatment for the sake of future generations then there could be no objection in the name of autonomy. Otherwise, continuing to include them in the experiment would be morally wrong. Against this, it might be objected that the investigators were not doing anything extraordinary, since the villagers would not have been treated in the ordinary course of events anyway.

However, it is not so clear that this means the investigators were not interfering. Given that the investigators selected this particular group of villagers for the control arm of the experiment, and then continued to withhold both treatment and information when they could easily have supplied both, were they not interfering? In selecting and then ignoring them, surely the investigators were actually doing something to them.

The scenario of the untreated villagers is no different in principle from that in which a group of pregnant HIV-infected mothers is left untreated as a control to a second group who are given a new treatment X, in order to help obtain information on (among other things) whether X will have unwanted side-effects on the foetus. Assume, for the sake of argument, that the information is obtained and that it is instrumental in reducing harmful side-effects to babies who are in general, less likely to be born with HIV (than when their mothers were treated with the original drug Y). Again, the voice of utility permits, even demands, the inclusion of the ‘no-treatment group’, but again, given that utility is subordinate to autonomy and justice, we need to ask whether the investigators infringed the informed choices of the mothers who were left untreated. If the investigators first selected them as a control arm and then withheld treatment and information (including the information that they were infected and that treatment was available), then the mothers’ autonomy was violated.

T H E

U T I L I T A R I A N

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N O

L O S S

’

D E F E N S E

9

Some commentators in the debate have argued that most HIV-infected pregnant women in developing countries would not be able to afford any sort of treatment against vertical transmission anyway. Thus the women in the original experiment are in a no-loss situation. They have a half-chance of ending up in the placebo group, in which case they are no worse off than they would be anyway and a half-chance of ending up in the experimental group, in which case they have a secondary chance (the degree of which is yet unknown) of protecting their foetus.

This argument suffers from a number of flaws. Are the women in the placebo group really no worse off than they would have been had they never participated? If autonomy has been satisfied, then the S P A N D A

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E F F E C T S

O F

M O D I F Y I N G

D E C L A C A R A T I O N

O F

T H E

R E F E R E N C E S

H E L S I N K I

1 CONNOR E. M., SPERLING R. S., GELBER R., KISELEV P., SCOTT G., O’SULLIVAN MJ. et al (1994). “Reduc-

Whereas the current Declaration assures research participants of ‘the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic method,’ the corresponding section in the modified Declaration adds the phrase ‘that would otherwise be available to him or her.’ This appears to vindicate the ‘no loss’ argument, since there is no treatment available to the would-be participants in the experiment should they not participate, given that they are too poor to afford any treatment, including treatment Y. But this vindication is an illusion. For one thing, there is an ambiguity in the phrase ‘available’. On one reading, treatment Y is not available to the group in the sense that they would not have been able to obtain it, had they never come in contact with the experimenters. However, in that sense, since the best treatment available otherwise is none, this amendment is just another way of saying that the group in question is assured of no treatment. We should therefore reject this amendment to the Declaration, in the name of both justice and utility as originally voiced by it. Utility demands that the benefit to society be maximised and justice demands that this benefit be fairly distributed. In other words, the group in question must be given a fair chance of treatment Y. The other, more sensible, reading of ‘available’ is that treatment Y is not available to the group as would-be participants who are now in contact with the experimenters. However, in this sense, treatment Y is available to them even if they now choose not to participate, since it is fully within the experimenters’ power to provide it. Thus even the modified declaration tells us that the experiment is morally wrong.

2

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tion of maternal-infant transmission of human immunodeficiency virus type 1 with zidovudine treatment”, in N Engl J Med 331: 1173-80.

S HAFFER N., C HUACHOOWONG R., M OCK P.A., BHADRAKOM C., SIRIWASIN W., YOUNG NL., et al (1999). “Short-course zidovudine for perinatal HIV-1 transmission in Bangkok, Thailand: A Randomised Controlled Trial”, in Lancet 353: 773-80.

LURIE P., WOLFE S. M. (1997). “Unethical trials of interventions to reduce perinatal transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus in developing countries”, in N Engl J Med 337: 853-6.

ANGELL M. (1998). “The Ethics of Clinical Research in the Third World”, in N Engl J Med 337: 847-9 [see also correspondence in N Engl J Med 1998; 338: 836-44].

N ATIONAL C OMMISSION FOR THE P ROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH. The Belmont Report. April 18, 1979.

DECLARATION OF HELSINKI IV, 41st World Medical Assembly, Hong Kong, September 1989. In: Annas GJ., Grodin MA. (ed.) The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Rights in Human Experimentation (New York: Oxford UP, 1992: 339-42.

WAWER MJ., S EWANKAMBO NK., S ERWADDA D., Q UINN TC., PAXTON LA., K IWANUKA N. et al (1999). “Control of sexually transmitted diseases for AIDS prevention in Uganda: a randomised community trial” in Lancet 353: 525-35.

QUINN TC., WAWER MJ., SEWANKAMBO N., SERWADDA D., L I C., WABWIRE-MANGEN F. et al (2000).

“Viral load and heterosexual transmission of human immunodeficiency virus type 1”, in N Engl J Med 342: 921-9.

PHANUPHAK P. (1998). “Ethical issues in studies in Thailand of the vertical transmission of HIV” in N Engl J Med 338: 834-5. ab

Given plausible assumptions about the level of poverty and education in the developing country targeted, the placebo-controlled trials of the type discussed are unethical violations of both justice and autonomy. In any case, no moral justification can be found for the inclusion of a placebo group. By contrast, the inclusion of a ‘no control’ group may be justified, but only when the experimenters have not interfered with the autonomy of its members. Experiments such as the Rakai project in Uganda are such unethical violations of autonomy. The development of third-world countries, in the form of economic development and education, must be priorities that come before such experiments. ©

ab

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The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

* This paper was first submitted when the author was a Fellow in Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore and subsequently revised at the Singapore Management University).

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THE

ETHICAL

E D Z A R D

E R N S T

IMPLICATIONS

IN

CLINICAL

OF

USING

PRACTICE

PLACEBO

K U R T

THE

By using the concrete example of homeopathy, this paper considers whether placebo use can be ethically justified.

On one hand, clinicians may want to help patients through a beneficial placebo effect, and highly diluted homeopathic remedies are unlikely to have adverse effects. Also, many patients expect to receive a prescription when visiting the doctor and believe in the effectiveness of homeopathy. However, the author presents several reasons the use of placebos may not be considered ethical. Recent survey data shows that the most frequent reasons for prescribing placebos are mainly for the physicians’ convenience rather than for altruistic motives. To obtain the placebo effect, physicians cannot tell the patient they are receiving a placebo, which goes against the ethical requirement for a doctor to obtain informed consent from a patient. This deception can undermine trust, which is necessary for good therapeutic relationships. Placebos, especially impure ones, also present the risk of producing adverse effects and may cause people to believe there is a medical cure for every state of reduced well-being. This paper suggests that an effective treatment that treats a patient’s symptom(s) will be more useful than a homeopathic remedy because the patient will get relief from his/her symptom(s) while also receiving the placebo effect. The author recommends that clinicians analyse their own behaviour to determine whether placebo use is in the best interest of the patient or for their own convenience.

C H R I S T O P H E R

ALL

IN

EFFECT,

THE

CAFFEINE

AND

IN

MIND?

J

.

ERGOGENIC

SPORTSS

THE

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I I

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.

INTENTIONAL

W E G N E R

PAIN

W I L L I A M S

OF

PLACEBO-CONTROLLED

DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES

TRANSMISSION

TO

OF

PREVENT HIV

Placebo-trials on HIV-infected pregnant women in developing countries like Thailand and Uganda have provoked controversy. Such experiments aim to find a treatment that will cut the rate of vertical transmission more efficiently than existing treatments like zidovudine. This scenario is first stated as generally as possible, before three ethical principles found in the Belmont Report, itself a sharpening of the Helsinki Declaration, are stated.

These three principles are the Principle of Utility, the Principle of Autonomy and the Principle of Justice.

These are taken as voices of moral imperative. But although each has intuitive appeal, it can be shown that

PERFORMANCE

J O U R N A L

ETHICS

IN

MOTHER-TOCHILD

The ergogenic effects of caffeine on performance are well documented. These effects are more evident in S P A N D A

OF

D A N I E L

N I C H O L A S

J O H N

PLACEBO

EFFECT

STING

~

This study tests whether the psychological context of pain affects the amount of pain an individual feels, namely whether intentional harm causes more perceived pain than unintentional harm. The researchers used an experiment in which the subjects were instructed to perform a series of tasks with a partner in a separate room, who was actually an accomplice. One task, discomfort assessment, involved the subject receiving an electric shock and rating his/her level of discomfort. One group was led to believe their partner intentionally chose for them to receive the shock rather than choosing for them to complete another task, while the other group was told the partner unintentionally chose for them to get the electric shock. The results show that intended pain was experienced as more painful than unintended pain. In addition, intended pain appeared to be felt fresh every time, rather than lessening as the subject became habituated to repeated painful stimulation.

B E E D I E

PAIN,

G R A Y

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:: SUMMARIES

:: ABSTRACTS

Due to the involvement of many mechanisms, the study of the placebo effect can be viewed as a melting pot of concepts and ideas for neuroscience. Indeed, there exist not a single placebo effect, but many, with different mechanisms and in different medical conditions and therapeutic interventions. In fact, expectation, anxiety and reward are all involved, as well as a variety of learning phenomena. There is also some experimental evidence of different genetic variants in placebo responsiveness. Pain and Parkinson’s disease are today the most productive models to better understand the neurobiology of the placebo effect, and the neural networks that are involved have been identified, such as an opioidergiccholecystokinergic-dopaminergic modulatory network in pain and part of the basal ganglia circuitry in Parkinson’s disease. Important implications emerge from these recent advances in placebo research, such as the impact of the psychosocial context on the patient’s brain.

::

endurance and short-duration, sustained-effort events than in interactive or stop-go sports. Experimentallyinduced placebo effects of caffeine on sports performance have also been observed in a number of recent studies. In the present paper it is argued that, given the nature of the sports in which caffeine effects are observed, the well documented hypoalgesic effects of caffeine, and the fact that pain is highly placebo-responsive, a reduction in perceived pain might be the common factor in both the biologic and placebo ergogenic effects of caffeine on sports performance. This idea is supported by evidence from medicine that suggests placebo effects are often associated with mechanisms similar or identical to those of the substance the subject believes they have ingested. Research findings from both biomedicine and sports medicine that attest to the interaction of biologic and psychologic factors in caffeine and pain responses are briefly reviewed. In conclusion, it is recommended that researchers investigate the pain hypothesis. Furthermore, researchers should consider psychosocial factors that might modulate the pain response as variables of interest in future caffeine and performance research.

EFFECTS

SUMMARIES

B E N E D E T T I

PLACEBO

::

MANY

ABSTRACTS

THE

::

F A B R I Z I O

there are possible scenarios in which they give conflicting prescriptions. To achieve consistency, one must be subordinate to the others. The voice of utility is taken as subordinate to those of justice and autonomy and it is shown that given plausible assumptions about the level of poverty and education in the developing country targeted, the experiment is ruled morally wrong in the name of both justice and autonomy.

Moreover, it is argued that no justification can be found for the inclusion of a placebo group, when strictly defined. By contrast, a ‘notreatment’ control arm might be justified, but only when the demands of autonomy are satisfied, demands that are more stringent than they might appear. A utilitarian defense of the experiment is examined, namely that the would-be participants are in a no-loss situation, and it is shown that this defense is seriously flawed. Finally, it is concluded that there is no justification for amending the Declaration of Helsinki. ©

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