Estonian Defence Forces Annual Report 2017

Yearbook 2017

aastaraamat

Estonian Defence Forces

Yearbook 2017

1

CONTENTS 4.

PREFACE General Riho Terras, Commander of the Defence Forces

8.

SECURITY POLICY AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO RUSSIA IN 2017 Colonel Kaupo Rosin, Commander of the Military Intelligence Centre

20.

FIRST YEAR OF EFP PRESENCE IN ESTONIA Colonel Giles Harris DSO MBE Commander OP CABRIT

22.

COOPERATION WITH LATVIA Colonel Eero Rebo, Commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade

24.

NATO ALLIED FORCES IN THE BALTIC STATES ACCORDING TO THE PROPAGANDA OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Sergeant Indrek Halilov, Analyst of the Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces

32.

BALTIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SPECIAL FORCES Jaak Uustal, Estonian Special Operations Forces

36.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARMOUR SCHOOL AND ARMOURED MANOEUVRING CAPACITY Major Jaan Kessel, Commander of the Armour School of the Scouts Battalion

42.

CONTRIBUTION OF THE NAVY TO THE SAFETY OF THE CITIZENS OF OUR COUNTRY Captain Jüri Saska, Commander of Estonian Navy

EDF yearbook on web: https://issuu.com/kaitsevagi In english https://issuu.com/kaitsevagi

2

CONTENTS 46.

PROVISIONAL AIRFIELD AT PIIBE ROAD Colonel Riivo Valge, Acting Commander of Estonian Air Force

50.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ADDITIONAL RESERVISTS TRAINING OKAS 2017 Lieutenant Simmo Saar, Strategic Communications Department

54.

MILITARY SCIENCE—SUPPORT FOR LONG TERM CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT Lieutenant Colonel Sten Allik, Centre for Applied Research, ENDC

58.

INVICTUS GAMES 2017 Second lieutenant Taavi Laasik Staff Officer, Public Affairs Section of the Estonian Defence Forces HQ

62.

WESTERN ESTONIA AND THE ISLANDS ARE PROTECTED Lieutenant Colonel Tõnu Miil, former Commander of Regional Command West

66.

CYBER RANGE 2011-2018 Major Uku Valtenberg, Deputy Commander, Headquarters Staff and Signal Battalion

70.

THE YEAR OF SMART POWER Major Uku Arold, Strategic Communications Department

3

4

PREFACE General Riho Terras, Commander of the Defence Forces

The Estonian Defence Forces will be celebrating their 100th Jubilee this year, just like the Republic of Estonia. Our country and its defence forces have overcome similar challenges; we have been struck by the same fateful events and rejoiced alongside the people. The Estonian Defence Forces was created to protect our country against any and all adversaries. We do this based on our independent defence capacity and with help from our allies – in a prudent and practiced manner.

We live in a hectic world, where limits are constantly tested, where a turbulent security environment and arising confrontations have become so regular that we might not even give them our full attention when focused on our daily lives and tasks. Hotbeds of crisis show no signs of cooling down, solutions seem far away and those involved only act based on their specific interests.

Therefore, ensuring peace and fostering stability alongside our allies will remain a part of the Estonian security and defence policy. This can include activities directly on the battlefield, in complex diplomatic exchanges or more indirectly, in the form of humanitarian and medical aid.

The civil war in Syria has lasted for 7 long years now and taken the lives of more than 400,000 people. As the most extensive humanitarian disaster in modern times, this civil war has forced millions of people to leave their homes and there is currently nothing to indicate that could return any time soon.

What we find worrisome is the situation where the interests of allies collide and a conflict between the United States and Russia on Syrian territory continues to be a possibility.

North Korea’s plans are not easy to understand. Threats and missile tests alternate with peaceful diplomacy. Trading with a regime that treats its people unlawfully is not a value-based activity in the long run and will make the opposition between North Korea and the rest of the world topical again. Any armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula would be clearly disturbing and dangerous for our security as such a conflict would be extensive in scope and impact and would not be limited to regional consequences.

The crisis in Ukraine is ongoing. There is no breakthrough on the horizon, which would indicate that the self-proclaimed republics in eastern Ukraine are about to forfeit their power and territory. Ukraine cannot allow that any part of the country, in addition to Crimea, would be taken over by a foreign power.

Russia, in turn, is in a complex diplomatic situation, where the continued use of the “Krim nash” (Crimea is ours) slogan does not allow for restoring normal political and economic relations with the democratic world. Military action is underway and, even if it is interrupted, the world is still faced with another long-term frozen conflict.

Russia’s activities keep NATO on its toes. Just recently, the ZAPAD 2017 exercise showed the kind of activity pattern we have been seeing a lot lately, in which lies are intertwined with half-truths, diversions with actual activity

5

schemes, and covert threats with accompanying claim that the West is Russophobic and misjudges things. However, the truth is that we do not misconstrue events and Russia was in fact using this exercise to practice attacking member states of NATO. Vladimir Putin has been elected president of Russia once again. What will his next steps be? Naturally, there is no way to know. Peaceful times are expected to last at least until the FIFA World Cup in June and July, as Putin wants to use the football competition as a reputation campaign for the country. However, in his pre-election speech on March 1, 2018, Putin emphasized that they are working on developing completely new capabilities in transporting a nuclear weapon to its target, while making reference toward the democratic world. It is important to acknowledge that Russia, whose economy can be compared to that of the Netherlands or Italy at best, has no other means of frightening the West than a nuclear weapon. Consequently, that is what Russia has decided to use in other words to get a seat at the table again, to be a global player once more.

When we turn from wider security issues back to the activities of the Estonian Defence Forces, it is worthy of mention that the previous year brought along significant development once again to the Estonian Defence Forces. The biggest step was no doubt the arrival of the eFP Battle Group and its integration with the 1st Infantry Brigade. This is a very clear message for us and for any potential adversaries: NATO is united; we act in unison and ensure our security together.

This is the best deterrence option to combat the plans of any adversary.

The arrival of the NATO Battle Group in the Baltic States and Poland was a direct result of the NATO Warsaw Summit. We described a threat in our region, to which NATO gave a clear and unequivocal response and acted accordingly – allies arrived to cement our security. Another NAT Summit will be held soon in Brussels. We expect this meeting to lead to more actions that will improve the quality of our protection even more.

In the long run, the development of the Estonian Defence Forces affects the approval of the National Defence Development Plan. This will define a number of remarkable objectives for us, such as the purchase of self-propelled artillery and firearms, extensive procurement of ammunition, creation of Cyber Command, increase of conscripts to 4,000 soldiers per year, development of home guard, and creation of an Infantry and Artillery Battalion for the 2nd Infantry Brigade. This will significantly increase the combat capability of the Brigade.

The snap exercise “Okas” was organised again last year and it was a success. This time, reservists from the Viru Infantry Battalion of the 1st Infantry Brigade were invited to a reservist-training course with a 24-hour notice. 524 reservists participated in this exercise. We are very grateful for their service!

Once again, “Okas” proved the necessity and readiness of the Reserve to protect our country and people.

We will continue to participate in various missions alongside our allies. We will be returning to Afghanistan and Mali with platoon size units. This is our contribution of cooperation with our allies; we are always willing to participate, if we have sufficient forces and corresponding political intent. An alliance also means that they are ready to participate in the security services of Estonia.

6

This is demonstrated by the ever-increasing cooperation with France and continued frequent relations with the United Kingdom and Denmark.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize an event that is especially close to my heart: the participation of our soldiers in the Invictus Games in Canada. Being present there and seeing the motivation and work of our athletes, they are most worthy of our gratitude. They are the best bearers of our ideals.

Moreover, we must support and encourage them in every way.

7

8

SECURITY POLICY AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO RUSSIA IN 2017 Colonel Kaupo Rosin, Commander of the Military Intelligence Centre

The fundamental character of the security policy of the Russian Federation (RF) and the means used to implement it remained largely unchanged in 2017.

As before, NATO member states as a whole and the United States (the U.S.) separately were treated as strategic opponents of the RF. Both covert and direct military intervention (the latter despite possible violations of international legislation), interference activities and information operations continued to be used as security policy instruments. Among others, the development of the armed forces and internal security took up the largest amount of national resources.

SECURITY POLICY OF THE RF: EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND REMOTE FOREIGN COUNTRIES However, RF information operations and propaganda attacks targeting the USA intensified significantly during the past year. Consequently, during the second half of the year, routine statements were made by the top authorities and power elite of RF. The content of which was that the U.S. is waging a proxy war against armed forces of the RF in Syria, as well as supporting and directly ensuring the military offensives by Islamic extremist fighters made towards RF units. Therefore, it is co-responsible for deaths and injuries among the RF armed forces.

The framework for this propaganda narrative primarily is made up of the frustration of the top authorities of the RF, the source of which is the determination of the administration of the United States to adhere to transatlantic values and their continued commitment to ensuring the security of their NATO allies.

Secondly, armed opposition groups operating in Syria were able to carry out several attacks on the VF armed forces, which resulted in the deaths of high-ranking officers and senior officers of the VF armed forces. Thirdly, the VF political elite perceived the need to consolidate its national auditorium prior to the Russian presidential elections held in March 2018, using the narrative of intensified opposition with the United States as a major global power to do so.

In 2016, the special services of the RF organized a failed coup attempt in Montenegro, the aim of which was to destabilize the political situation in Montenegro right before the country’s expected accession to NATO. Last year, security authorities of member states notified the alliance of attempts made by the RF to interfere in the French presidential election and in the illegal independence referendum organised in the Spanish autonomous community of Catalonia.

The increased activity of the foreign and security policy of the RF in North Africa and Africa is also noteworthy. The VF continued to support units of

9

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who controls most of the eastern part of Libya, including the bases on the territory of Egypt. At the same time, the RF and Egypt signed several large-scale EPA-s (Economic Partnership Agreement) and a bilateral agreement was compiled, which, upon entry into force, would allow the air force and Aerospace force planes of the RF to use the air bases of the Egyptian armed forces.

At the end of 2017, the RF received approval from the United Nations’ to deliver light weapons to the security forces of the Central African Republic (CAR) – assault rifles, sniper rifles, grenade launchers, etc.1 Along with the weapons, RF advisers arrived on the territory of the CAR as well. They began training the security forces of the CAR once in country.

RF instructors teach members of the CAR security forces on a base set up in the territory of the neighbouring country Sudan as well. The Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and genocide, had previously visited Russia in November 2017 and had, during that visit, held negotiations with top authorities of the RF concerning the intensification of bilateral military cooperation and the establishing of a RF military base on the Sudanese territory.

In official terms, the RF instructors operating in the CAR are the personnel of so-called private military companies, i.e. employees of private legal persons. In reality, the activities of such companies (e.g. the Wagner Group) are controlled, to a substantial degree, by Russian special services and the owners of these private military companies are persons who have close links to top authorities of the RF. It is significant that Libya, the Sahel region and the CAR play a significant role in the foreign and security policy of several member states of the European Union and NATO. One of the consistent goals of Moscow’s diplomacy and strategic communication is to portray the RF as a “constructive partner” whose involvement is indispensable in solving important international security problems. However, the RF continues to violate a whole range of international legislation acts, including the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Accords, and there is reason to suspect the RF armed forces and the leaders of the armed forces in complicity of war crimes.

MILITARY AND SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN BELARUS AND THE RF In spite of temporary tensions in bilateral relations, cooperation between the RF and Belarus in military and security policy matters remained very frequent during the last year as well. Even at the peak of economic conflicts and disputes between the RF and Belarus in the first half of 2017, the leaders of both countries refrained from mentioning a possibility of restricting security cooperation. According to representatives of the RF and Belarus, the latter is above all conflicts.

At the same time, work began on compiling a new version of the Military Doctrine of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. The previous version of the

According public sources, Russia provided a total of 5,200 assault rifles, 900 pistols, 840 machine guns, 140 sniper rifles, 270 RPG grenade launcher and 20 anti-aircraft guns to the security forces of the CAR.

1

10

doctrine has been in force since 2001 and was intended for the establishment of a Union State between Belarus and Russia; the new doctrine should take into account both the military doctrines approved by the RF itself at the end of 2014 and those enforced in Belarus in 2016.

In addition, legislative amendments and agreements were concluded, which will make the launch of the RF-Belarus joint regional air defence system faster in the event of a crisis and will enable the pre-deployment of the equipment and weapons of RF armed forces on the territory of Belarus during the “period of imminent risk of aggression”. 2 Additionally, an important arms deal was signed between the RF and Belarus last year: In June 2017, at the aviation exhibition Le Bourget-2017, a contract was signed, with the total cost of $ 600 million, according to which the RF would supply Minsk with 12 Su-30SM multirole fighter jets. Belarus is to finance the purchase of the jets with a loan from the RF. The Belarusian Air Force currently has 37 MiG-29 fighter jets, but only 12 of them, i.e. the equivalent of a squadron, are modernized to the MiG-29BM level.

The context of the Su-30SM supply contract is partially made up because of the dispute between Moscow and Minsk, which has lasted for years, over how the air defence of Belarus should be ensured. For years, Moscow has pressured Minsk to allow Russia to deploy a RF Aerospace force unit (two to four squadrons, i.e. 24–48 aircraft) on the Belarusian territory.

However, the Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has argued that the Belarusian Air Force would be able to ensure the air defence of the country by itself, if the RF would agree to supple modern weaponry. For the first time, Belarus announced its desire to acquire Su-30SM fighter jets in 2012.

ZAPAD 2017 One of the most important military events in 2017 was the operative-strategic exercise Zapad 2017. According to the official version from Moscow, Zapad 2017 took place 14–20 September on the territory of the RF and Belarus. It was strictly defence-related and focused on the fight against terrorism. According to the official narrative submitted by the RF, 12,700 service members of the armed forces of the RF and Belarus took part in the exercise, and the training activities took place predominantly on the territory of Belarus.

The reality was significantly different from the official version given by the RF. First, Zapad 2017 was not defence-related and the focus of the exercise was not a fight against terrorism. On the contrary, during this exercise, participants practiced conducting a large-scale, conventional military offensive against the Baltic States and other NATO allies.

However, the RF’s armed forces were not limited to preparations for a regional conflict in the Baltic Sea region – practice involved attacking targets of The period of imminent danger of aggression – this term is not explicitly defined, but given the emphasis on hybrid warfare in the military thinking of the RF, it is likely considered to be a situation between two countries, in which their relationship is exacerbated to the point where it can bring about the use of force. However, this does not allow for the countries’ general preparations for a war, strategic deployment or a declaration of war.

Period of danger – according to the traditional RF military terms, this is a period preceding the outbreak of hostilities. The duration of such periods can vary a lot; a period of danger brings about worsening international relations and tensions between potential opponents can intensify to the extreme. During this period, the combat readiness of forces is increased, strategic deployment will take place and a wartime regime is applied in economy.

2

11

NATO allies across virtually the entire European theatre of war, using a longrange air force and precision weaponry among other methods do so.

Worthy of mention is also the attention that was directed at suppressing the enemy’s – NATO allied forces – command and communication systems with electronic means of warfare during the exercise. At the same time, units of the armed forces of the RF also practiced their activities in a situation where electronic warfare has interrupted their communication and control.

Additionally, in the general framework of the Zapad 2017, mobilization exercises across the country were carried out, as were extensive civil defence exercises (organised in a greater extent than previously), cooperation in a crisis situation was practiced between the armed forces and civilian authorities and the economy’s readiness to support the armed forces in a war situation was tested.

At the same time, more emphasis was placed on the transfer of units to the western part of Russia from other parts of the country, using an aerosol cover among other means of Aerospace intelligence to hide the movement of units.

All of the aforementioned indicates a preparation for a full-scale war with a conventional opponent.

Secondly, Zapad 2017 took place in a vast geographical area extending from the Black Sea in the south to the Kola Peninsula and the Barents Sea in the north. A number of training activities took place in Belarus, but the centre of gravity of the exercise in the context of both the participating units and the scenario was elsewhere.

Thirdly, the number of service members participating in the Belarusian exercise remained within the limits that had been openly declared, but the actual total number of participants in Zapad 2017 was multi fold of what had been disclosed. According to estimates from public sources, 40,000 to 70,000 service members took part in the exercise.

As the fourth point, contrary to official statements by the RF, Zapad 2017 was not limited to a weeklong period of 14–20 September, during which the so-called active phase of the exercise took place, incl. demonstrations for the highest military and political management of the RF. The aforementioned weekly period preceded and followed a series of integrated training sessions.

For example, in July and August 2017, the military capacity of the navy of the RF increased significantly on the Baltic Sea – a significant number of RF naval vessels arrived in our region from the Northern Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla. The reason for their arrival to the Baltic Sea was participation in the RF’s naval parade held in St Petersburg on 30 July.

On the day following the parade, a joint exercise was organised in the Gulf of Finland involving the vessels that took part of the parade, the Western Military District of the Russian Armed Forces and the Navy. Aircraft, helicopters and anti-aircraft missile systems of the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces and the Russian Air Force were also involved. At the same time, Airborne operations and amphibious operations were conducted at three islands in the Gulf of Finland close to the Estonian coast: Bolshoy Tyuters, Hogland and Moshchny Islands.

Less than two weeks later, during 9–11 August, a tactical exercise on the regiment level of the 76th Guards, Air Assault Division was organised in the

12

vicinity of Estonia, in the Pskov Oblast, at the Strugi Krasnye Polygon and the Kislovo landing area. During the exercise, led by Andrey Serdyukov, Colonel General of the Russian Armed Forces and Commander of the Russian Airborne Troops, participants practiced the capture of an aerodrome under the control of an opponent with an airborne operation.

A whole series of exercises in the preparatory framework of Zapad 2017 took place in Belarus, in several cases the exercise was the first of its kind. In May 2017, a joint exercise between the armed forces of the RF and Belarusian electronic warfare units was held for the first time; the first joint exercise of engineer units of the RF and Belarus named Dnepr 2017 took place in June.

During the joint exercise of logistics command and combat service structures exercise of the RF and Belarus, which was held during 21–25 August and was a first of its kind, participants practiced deploying a field overland pipeline and organizing of mass filling stations for machinery. Linked to the aforementioned was also the joint air force exercise held during 23–25 August, during which participants practiced, among other things, the use of highways for landing and take-off of aircraft.

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND ARMS PROCUREMENT Compared to record defence budgets in 2015–2016, the nominal military expenditure of the RF decreased slightly last year and amounted to 3.037 trillion rubles (ca 45.67 billion euros). A decline in official and public military spending should continue this year and the next as well, according to the federal budget for 2018–2020.

However, the following factors should be kept in mind.

Firstly, this is only a reduction in public and nominal military expenditure.

However, in the state budget of the RF, the share of classified military expenditure has grown with each year and this tendency seems to persist. According to analysts at the publishing company Jane’s, if the classified expenses of the budget are added to the public budget part, the spending on armed forces and law enforcement agencies will increase by 260 million rubles when compared to 2017 and will, with the classified budget parts, make up a total of 5.096 trillion rubles.

Secondly, the government of the RF has the right, if necessary, to channel up to 10% of the total federal budget into financing the fields of defence and security. Only a government decision is required to do so, there is no need for an approval to a budget amendment from the parliament.

Thirdly, the military capabilities of the RF continued to increase in 2017, and will continue to increase this year as well, despite the nominal budget reduction.

It is true that the aforementioned will not allow military capabilities to increase as fast as set out in the official force development and procurement plans.

According to official figures, the RF’s armed forces received a total of 2,055 units of new and modernized equipment in 2017.

Modernized T-72 and T-80 tanks continued to be delivered to the land forces of the RF as well as continuous testing of the new T-14 Armata. By the end

13

14

of 2017, however, no new versions had been adopted in any unit. If we take into account the continued modernization of the T-72 and T-80 tanks, it can be assumed that there will not be a mass addition of Armata tanks to the armed forces of the RF in the next couple of years.

During the year, two brigade sets of Iskander-M Tactical Ballistic Missile Systems were officially handed over to the forces as well. Therefore, by the beginning of 2018, only two missile brigades of the armed forces of the RF have not been armed with Iskander-M Tactical Ballistic Missile Systems; one of these brigades is located in Kaliningrad. The missile brigade in Kaliningrad will receive the aforementioned weapon systems in the first half of 2018.

The implementation of the Ratnik personal combat uniform in the army also continued. Although the transition to new firearms, planned alongside the aforementioned, has not been carried out yet.

During the year, more than 30 vessels for different purposes were delivered to the Navy of the RF. Most noteworthy among those are the Steregushchiy-class corvette Sovershennyy and the Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate Admiral Makarov. On 30 November 2017, the icebreaker Ilya Muromets was transferred to the Navy. The rest of the vessels are tugboats, motorboats and auxiliary ships. For example, the delivery of the Admiral Gorshkov frigate, which is the first of its class, and the large landing ship Ivan Gren were postponed to this year.

In 2017, the Russian Aerospace Forces received a total of 49 different aircraft in the framework of national defence orders: 17 Su-30SM fighter jets; 16 Su-34 tactical bombers; 10 Su-35s fighter jets, 6 Jak-130 jet trainers. Those numbers are slightly lower than during previous years: 101 units of flight equipment were obtained in 2014, that number was 89 in 2015 and 70 in 2016.

The decrease of supply volumes in 2017 when compared to previous years, was explained, by officials of the RF, with the orders for MiG-29SMT and MiG-29KR/KUBR jets, which were fulfilled in 2015–2016, and the completion of the Su-30M2 deliveries. In addition, the number of orders for Jak-130 jet trainers has also been reduced.

DEVELOPMENTS IN SERVICES In the Western Military District of the Russian Armed Forces the formation of the 20th combined arms army continued in 2017. According to the Army Commander, the main obstacles are poor living conditions and lower salaries in comparison to many other regions.

The land forces as a whole, have reintroduced the 2S4 Tyulpan, 2S5 Giatsint and 2S7 Pion heavy artillery systems, which had previously been used relatively little. In addition to the creation of the 45th Heavy Artillery Brigade (Western Military District), new sub-units have also been created in the Southern Military District and the Central Military District. This is allegedly due to the experience gained in recent conflicts (particularly in Ukraine). On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that these weapon systems were originally designed for launching nuclear munition and that nuclear shells are still present.

There were four major exercises organised in the Airborne forces (ABF) during the course of the year (in Crimea in March, in Pskov in July and August, in Ulyanovsk in October), during which various ABF units practiced cooperating

15

with one another. The official scenario of the exercises focused mainly on seizure of air bases. A short-term goal of the ABF is to achieve the capability to drop an airborne regiment, in full composition, with its equipment. According to the ABF staff, they do not currently have that capability.

By the end of the year, tank companies had been formed in all assault corps of the ABF, including in the 76th Guards Air Assault Division in Pskov. In the past, the heads of the armed forces of the RF have announced their plan of forming tank battalions in all assault corps – the formation of tank companies can be seen as a step towards that goal.

Work has begun on eliminating shortcomings in the number of pilots in the Russian Air Force and the Russian Aerospace Forces: in October 2017, the Russian Minister of Defence Sergey Shoygu announced that another 1,300 pilots are needed in the armed forces, and in the years to come, the number of pilots will be increased to 3,200 people. In comparison: In 2016, an average of 2,300 pilots served at the Russian Aerospace Forces. In the light of these plans, admissions to flight schools increased dramatically.

At the same time, the average flight hours of pilots at the Russian Armed Forces have risen to a level comparable with NATO member states – in 2016, pilots of Russian Armed Forces collected an average of 120 flight hours per person.

Last year, the strengthening of units of the Russian Aerospace Forces continued with the addition of new fighter jets in the western part of the country. In this light, the 159th Fighter Aviation Regiment, which is located in Bessovets near St Petersburg, received 14 Su-35S fighter jets last year. If we take into account the machinery that is involved in the Syrian operations on a temporary basis and previous deliveries, there is currently the equivalent of two squadrons of modern fighter jets (24 aircraft) in Bessovets.

The 14th Fighter Aviation Regiment in Kursk received an additional squadron of Su-30SM fighter jets (12 jets) and at the end of this year, another squadron of these jets should arrive at Kursk.

Last year, modern Su-30SM fighter jets were also delivered to units in the Kaliningrad Oblast.

At the same time, further efforts were made to strengthen the air defence capacity in the Baltic Sea region: Another long-distance anti-aircraft rocket system S-400 division was stationed in Zelenogorsk in the St. Petersburg region (1488th Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment), preparations were completed at the same time for setting up another S-400 division in Kaliningrad.

2017 was the first time in the Russian Navy that two Buyan M-class corvettes, armed with Kalibr cruise missiles, were on the Baltic Sea throughout the entire training year. The Baltic Fleet also organized the first long-distance operation to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea with two Steregushchiy-class corvettes. This was an operation that was arranged primarily to gain experience in using a ship class meant for use in coastal areas during a long-distance operation and in offshore conditions.

In the summer, however, the military capabilities of the RF on sea had a sharp increase on the Baltic Sea, due to the naval parade organized in St Petersburg on 30 July. This is an event that the RF intends to organize annually

16

from now on.

In the context of the NATO South Wing, it is noteworthy that the RF Navy has established an essentially permanent presence in the Mediterranean: two Kilo II class diesel submarines, which belong to the Black Sea Fleet, are located at support bases on the Syrian coast, a vessel contingency of surface vessels will be added as well.

VF’S INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY CONFLICTS In Syria, with massive support from armed forces of the RF, the forces loyal to the regime of Bashar al-Assad have significantly expanded the territory under their control. By the end of last year, armed groups of opposition forces had withdrawn into limited enclaves due to constant pressure and the terrorist organisation Daesh, which had previously controlled significant areas, had been forced into remote desert areas of the country. Support from the RF includes air support, advising and planning of military operations.

The RF’s military operations in Syria have also led to accusations of war crimes: according to UN investigators, the Russian Air Force committed a war crime by attacking a market in the Atareb settlement in Northeast Syria last year, on 13 November (killing 84 people, including five children).

The situation has been re-enforced in which the Al-Assad regime, with support from the RF and Iran, can eliminate the opposition either by military means or by dictating the terms of reference of conflict resolution from the position of power.

At the same time, losses of the Russian contingent operating in Syria also increased during the second half of the year. On 19 September, 29 military police officers of the RF were hit by an intense attack from the rebels in the Hama province. On 22 September, Colonel Valery Fedyanin, Commander of the 61st marine brigade of the Russian Northern Fleet, was fatally injured in the Hama province.

Lieutenant General Valeri Assapov died in the Deir ez-Zor region on 23 September when a mortar attack hit the al-Assad regime’s command post. General Assapov was the commander of the a RF military advisors group that operated at al-Assad’s regime forces, he personally led the combat operations organised to take over the Deir ez-Zor region and he is currently the highest ranking serviceman of the RF to have been killed in Syria.

In October, two crewmembers died when a fighter jet of the Russian Armed Forces that had taken off from the Hmeimim Air Base was shot down; on 31 December another two service members of the RF died when the same air base was struck by a mortar attack from rebels. According to unconfirmed data, the mortar attack rendered several RF’s jets unusable.

The administration of the RF responded to the losses with public accusations aimed at the U.S., which, according to Moscow, tolerates and assists Daesh terrorists with organising attacks.

The military operations of the RF have continued vigorously after President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Syria, during which Putin once again announced the beginning of departure of the RF’s military contingent. The military presence

17

of the RF in Syria is secure and significant, and allows the air force, long-distance air defence, Iskander-M Tactical Ballistic Missile Systems, coastal defence missile complexes and naval forces to influence regional operational environments.

In Ukraine, low intensity, but real combat continued in 2017 – 194 Ukrainian fighters were killed and 1,111 fighters were injured during the year. In Donbass, the RF’s military intelligence continued to use various innovative tactics of the GRU, including tactics in the field of electronic combat, against Ukrainian units.

At the same time, RF continued to influence Ukraine with hybrid warfare instruments, striving to achieve a seizure of power by pro-Russian political forces at both the regional and national level. Following the prohibition of Russian social media networks in the territory of Ukraine, the influence activities shifted to the “street and church”, to put it figuratively: the protest movement in Kyiv intensified, as did the conflict between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church “wings” that are subordinate to the Patriarchate of Moscow and Constantinople.

The extensive cyber attack against Ukrainian authorities and infrastructure that occurred in June and July can also be considered hybrid war.

18

19

20

FIRST YEAR OF EFP PRESENCE IN ESTONIA Colonel Giles Harris DSO MBE Commander OP CABRIT

Looking back a year to when I first arrived in January 2017, I reflect on how blank the canvas was for Operation CABRIT or enhanced Forward Presence.

We were focussed simply on getting the troops and vehicles here in good order. RSOM and Media Ops were the two things we focussed on in February and March last year, and for both of them we were wholly reliant on our Estonian hosts, who did brilliantly, and the ever-patient NFIU. From there on it was all about integration. We went from 3 or 4 people to 1,200 troops and suddenly there was a real sense that the eyes of the world were on us, or at least the eyes of NATO and Estonia were on us, and maybe some other eyes too. The RIFLES and the French Army contingent showed their ability in integrating both within the Battlegroup then upwards in the Estonian Brigade, which all came together on the big summer exercises Spring Storm and Sabre Strike. Whilst that was going on, in Tallinn the team were focussed on STRATCOM, preparing for the next ROTO, and building a network that would enable us to support the Estonians and help NATO make eFP work in the long term. When I think of the summer of 2017 I see the 1st Estonian Brigade gathered after Ex Spring Storm, with a UK BG and French Mechanised Company looking as if it had been there for years – a great achievement by the Brigade and the Battlegroup too. It is something the Danish contingent has done brilliantly since.

Once the dust had settled in late Summer, we all paused for breath and focus shifted to understanding what the actual requirement would be in crisis. Over the next six months we sought to understand what all the problems were likely to be in reality and then communicated these up the national chains of command. We also needed to mature the Force Design – what the Battlegroup should be – and make judgements about what the training programme should look like too. This was a critical consultation period to make sure all the nations involved in Estonian eFP were comfortable in how we would help defend Estonia and the Baltics, and how we would train to do so. That took us to the back end of last year, 2017, and set a firm foundation for eFP going into 2018.

This year has begun by refining our plans and organising the means to stress-test them over the forthcoming exercises. We are very comfortable with the Battlegroup in the Brigade and comfortable with our part in the plan. Now we must make sure the processes above the Battlegroup, at the national level, are oiled properly so we can release the Battlegroup into the fight at the right time and place, with all the policy permissions it needs to fulfil its role in the defence of Estonia. In addition, we look to further develop the long term training programme and social opportunities for our people here. That is the business at the front end of this year.

21

As well as sorting out the business of initiating eFP here in Estonia, we have been very much involved in supporting the NATO chain of command as it begins to respond to the ‘new normal’ of having assigned ground troops in the region. I think we play a critical role in being good NATO partners to enable this, to give all the information and all the support they need, to make this a proper viable regional plan. This is on-going work that has come along leaps and bounds in the fast paced year since we arrived.

I think effective communication has been really critical. I look back last year to when there were only a handful of us and it was very much hand-tomouth, day to day ‘fire-fighting’ as we lurched from one high-profile visit to another, or conference or briefing. It felt like we were in the spot light but without having learnt any lines. Now, a year later, we are in the business of looking to the horizon with more certainty in what we are trying to achieve.

We enjoy an excellent network in the STRATCOM area, and it gets better by the month (we welcome the recent arrival of an Icelandic stratcom specialist for example). We have found the Estonians to be far thirstier for information about NATO, defence and security than we are used to in the UK. We have become more and more novel and innovative and more connected on a personal level with Estonians over the last year I hope, which has been really encouraging.

I would not want to underplay the training experience that the Battlegroup have had in Tapa and the Central Training Area in fact all over Estonia.

They have had more training opportunities than they would have anywhere else, and novel ones as well. They have coined the phrase ‘Cold Jungle’ – it is a new type of training they will not have done anywhere else. It has also been a great opportunity for us to do joint training as well. We have had Typhoons deployed, we have Wildcat helicopters deploying. I think purely as an experience for the individual soldier it has been hugely valuable. There is a huge amount of goodness to be got out it for the British Army as a whole, too.

This includes us learning from the Estonians of course, as well as reminding ourselves of some of our own lessons such as transporting vehicles across Europe by rail and road. While operationally focussed, the deployment itself has been a huge benefit for our Army in training value.

Lastly, we have had an amazing amount of fun and I think we are going to have a huge amount more. It was not much fun when we got here – we were working hard! We knew it was important to have a smile on our face, but there was not too much time to indulge in anything other than setting up the mission. Having got all the things that I have mentioned done, we are now in a position to normalise our existence here. We have lived a summer and winter now so we know what is out there to do and I think for the next summer and winter there should be a lot more NATO troops out and about both in and out of uniform and across the whole country.

22

We owe a huge amount of gratitude to Estonia and Estonians in how we have been welcomed and supported. The effort has been hugely impressive.

2018 has already been very special because of the Centenary of Estonian Independence, and our pride in being a part of the legacy, and we look forward to another year alongside our Estonian partners as part of this new NATO mission.

23

24

COOPERATION WITH LATVIA Colonel Eero Rebo, Commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade

The Ministry of Defence, the Headquarters of the EDF as well as the service arms and branches cooperate closely with our southern neighbours in national defence matters. Many projects are also ongoing directly between units. As one should talk about what he knows best, in the following, I shall focus on the cooperation between the 2nd Infantry Brigade and our southern neighbours.

First, a few words about the general national defence situation in Latvia.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LATVIAN NATIONAL DEFENCE With the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, the national defence budget has been gradually increased in Latvia, with the aim in sight to achieve 2% of the GDP. The improved funding has enabled our southern neighbours to start with a number of ambitious projects.

The Latvian Land Forces, which is a brigade that consists of two manoeuvre battalions, a combat support battalion, a combat service support battalion and a headquarters company, located in Adaži, has acquired 123 light tracked vehicles CVR(T) of British origin in various versions (Scimitar, Sultan, Spartan). As well as 47 mobile howitzers M109A5Ö of Austrian origin have been purchased, that will mainly go to the 1st Combat Support Battalion of the Latvian Land Forces. However, the Zemessardze, a volunteer organisation similar to our Defence League, will also receive a portion of the equipment to supplement their armaments.

Developing armaments necessitates new approaches in training as well: until the present time, the basic training of the Zemessardze troops has been arranged during the weekends, but from now on, people joining the organisation will take part in a longer and more intensive training course. This is a big step forward, which will most certainly ensure better training results. This is very important, especially considering the fact that at this side of the border, the people joining the Defence League bring with them the knowledge, experience and skills acquired during their conscript service, but in Latvia (unlike Lithuania), the re-establishment of the conscript service is not yet seriously talked about (at least not among the politicians).

In connection with the acquisition of the new and more sophisticated armaments and technical equipment, a few hundred professional combatants will also be recruited into the Zemessardze, who will be mainly serving in combat support units in eastern Latvia.

The Zemessardze has also rearranged its structure to a great extent. When previously the territorial command was based in three districts, now the districts were first renamed into brigades and, at the end of 2017, an additional command unit for one of the brigades was formed. Therefore, the command of the 1st Brigade of the Zemessardze is located in Riga, the 2nd Brigade, at the moment located in Riga, will move to Valmiera as soon as the infrastructure will be ready, the 3rd Brigade is located in Rezekne and the command of the 4th Brigade executed from Liepaja.

25

Compared to the previous districts, the territorial division has also changed substantially and the structure is undergoing a considerable modernisation.

It is only natural that these various developments also require the development of the infrastructure. The more so, considering the fact that as part of the eFP (Enhanced Forward Presence – increased presence of the allied forces in the Baltic States and Poland) an allied battle group lead by Canada has arrived in both Estonia and Latvia. Partly because of the eFP but also to support the development of their own plans, in Adaži, construction works are ongoing to expand the accommodation and workstations and considerably improve the training fields.

In addition, the developing Zemessardze, with locations throughout Latvia, is expanding its bases and training fields in different regions. Problems and narrow-minded confrontations, at least concerning the extension of the Zemessardze’s exercise fields, are the same as they are on this side of the border.

CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION WITH THE ZEMESSARDZE The focus of the cooperation of the 2nd Infantry Brigade is on the 2nd (responsible for North Latvia) and 3rd (covers East Latvia) Brigade of the Zemessardze. In addition to achieve an overview of the situation, our aim is to make habitual the cooperation between our and Latvian brigades near the border as well as between other units. We also plan to participate together in the major training event Siil 2018 (Hedgehog 2018), where we shall have the opportunity to exercise in practice the cross-border coordination and cooperation in a conflict situation. There, the units of the Zemessardze would still fight on Latvian soil.

The 2nd Infantry Brigade and the Zemessardze have also previously participated in the exercises on either side of the border. For example, we have conducted special communication exercises in order to first ascertain the bottlenecks, and then, eliminate these together. Equally important is the understanding we have obtained from command post exercises about the way we fight.

This year, we aim to involve the 2nd Brigade of the Zemessardze into the training cycle of the 2nd Infantry Brigade: As part of the CAX (Combined Arms Exercise – a training exercise on joint action of different branches). The Simulation Centre of the ENDC will try in practice to establish a post in Latvia, which will hopefully serve as a model for future exercises as well.

As the commanders of the brigades of the reformed districts of the Zemessardze, the Latvians have appointed experienced senior officers who have through their work experience and military training obtained an ability to cope with the complicated tasks they face. The experience, competence and activity of the commanders can somewhat make up for the insufficient staffing of the administration and staffs of the brigade.

We are in close contact with the 1st Brigade of the Latvian Land Forces, i.e. the professional service members of Latvia, as we both participate in the training cycle of the Danish Division. In addition to that, in the last Spring Storm

26

exercise, one of their infantry companies participated within the 2nd Infantry Brigade and showed professionalism in every way.

In conclusion, during the last years, the cooperation between the defence forces of Latvia (mainly Zemessardze) and the 2nd Infantry Brigade has been increasingly strengthening. This is the only way to proceed since we share a common land border and, in case of a possible conflict situation (but also in case of a natural disaster), the organisation of cross-border operations requires more coordination than it does at the domestic level.

For the purpose of facilitating our operations in times of crisis, our current conscripts, the future reservists, attend exercises in Latvia, in order to demonstrate our equipment and skills, but also to strengthen the brothers in arms spirit amongst the service members of our two neighbouring countries. By looking at the development of the cooperation with our southern neighbours as a training cycle, it can be said that we will conduct our interim exam during the exercise Hedgehog 2018: after that we can analyse our mutual cooperation and to ascertain the areas that need improvement together with our Latvian colleagues.

It is certainly welcoming to see additional resources being allocated to Zemessardze. The material and human resources added to the southern area of responsibility of the 2nd Infantry Brigade give us too the confidence that a possible enemy will not be able to simply pass us and cut us off from one another, but will be met with a powerful force.

27

28

NATO ALLIED FORCES IN THE BALTIC STATES ACCORDING TO THE PROPAGANDA OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Sergeant Indrek Halilov, Analyst of the Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces

The allied forces of NATO have been in Estonia for a year now and therefore it is fitting to look back at 2017 and see what has been the reaction of Russian propaganda.

The propaganda of our eastern neighbour continued to assert that the economic situation of the Baltic States is bad, that the states exist merely thanks do the subsidies granted by the European Union and that within the Soviet Union the life in Estonia was thriving and the future prosperous. In addition to the usual narratives of the Russian media, one could increasingly notice information campaigns focusing on topics related to national defence.

One of the reasons for that was the arrival of the allied NATO forces in the Baltic States in the spring of 2017, that immediately gave rise to criticism by the Russian propaganda media. The first major Russian information operations were launched already before the arrival of the troops in the Baltic States and were targeted against the allied units to be stationed in Lithuania and Latvia. From last year, three major topics can be singled out that were connected with the arrival of the allied NATO units in the region and used to try and attack Estonia and the other Baltic States.

The first reaction was caused by the arrival of the allied units in MarchApril 2017. Attempts were made to make the warnings given by the intelligence agencies concerning Russian-lead agents who would lure the arriving service members using “honey traps” (beautiful women working for a foreign country who could compromise their victims in many ways) to look ridiculous. Attempting to show the warnings as especially ridiculous, a NTV correspondent visited a striptease bar allegedly in Tallinn, and interviewed an employee there who said that she was very much looking forward to the visits of the NATO service members.

The topic of “honey traps” emerged again when the Danish unit rotated to Estonia at the beginning of 2018. Then many Russian propaganda channels published an ironic instruction on how to recognise a female agent from Moscow. According to the instruction, a NATO service member should evaluate their own appearance from 1 to 10, and if the result would have been 5, it meant that he had a reason to become suspicious if a woman whose appearance was a 9 or 10 approached him.

Such an ironic and ridiculing style is quite characteristic to the Russian propaganda whose main objectives include presenting an irreverent attitude towards the warnings coming from Estonia and the other Baltic States.

29

The second major information campaign against Estonia started during the Spring Storm 2017 exercise. The media repeatedly stressed how many accidents had happened, and many of the incidents were amplified. A good example was the incident where Estonian conscripts drove on a public road that ran through private land, and that irritated the landowner so much that he fired a few shots in warning.

Rossija1, one of the most-viewed Russian TV channels described the incident as an example of normal communication between the local people and the service members of the allied forces. It was stated in the TV news that the heavy machinery of NATO intruded the private land and posed a threat to the children playing in the yard of the simple Estonian farmer, which forced him to grab a gun and protect his family’s rights.

This is a good example of how Russian propaganda seeks to use every opportunity to discredit the activities of the allied forces in Estonia, by creating an impression of them as criminal bosses who cannot be punished. During the year, much news could be found that summed up the “crimes” conducted by the service members of the allied forces in the Baltics.

From the Baltic States, Estonia received the least amount of attention on this topic. One of the reasons for that is that the Russian special services do not expect as much success from provocations initiated in Estonia than in other Baltic countries. Estonia has contributed the most, if compared with the other Baltic countries, to reveal hostile propaganda. For example, the blog “Propastop” was established and mainly relies on civilian initiatives. The major Estonian daily newspapers regularly publish its revelations about the lies of Russian propaganda.

The third extensive wave of propaganda news against the Baltic countries and Estonia was launched in connection with the Zapad 2017 exercise.

During the exercise, the Russian media published propagandistic narratives pointing at the hysteria and double standard of morals of the West— on the one hand, the selfish and Russo-phobic Baltic nations as well as Poland and Ukraine, who spread fear against Zapad in order to get more allied forces to their territories, economic benefits and political credit. On the other hand, the hypocrite NATO and the U.S. who actually organise many and more extensive exercises in the eastern part of Europe, and actively increase their presence near the Russian border.

The Russian media made it very clear to their audience that the panic about the Zapad exercise is merely a hysteric reaction of a few Russo-phobic countries. For example, in a Zapad-related discussion held at “an international discussion club” „ККККККККККККККК КККК-КККК“ in Kaliningrad, the events were described as follows: “The reactions of Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic States constitute an act of a psychological war. The headquarters of this war are situated in Washington, Brussels and Riga. In the latter, the NATO Centre of Excellence for Strategic Communication, where the command of this psychological war, is situated.” And the supposed main aim of such an information campaign is only to veil the expansion of the NATO military presence towards the East.

30

If compared with the other Baltic countries, the Estonian context was less used in the propagandistic narratives tied with Zapad. Russian media paid a bit of attention to a comment made by Jüri Luik, the Minister of Defence, on the Zapad exercise to newspaper Vedomosti, especially to his remark that the number of troops participating in the exercise could be approximately 100 000 or even more. Some channels picked up this remark as another example of the extent of the hysteria of the western countries concerning the Zapad exercise.

The allies and NATO are getting more and more attention by the Russian propaganda media and there is no reason to hope that the number of information operations directed at the Baltic States would decrease. The amount of coverage has increased primarily in connection with the increasing number of NATO exercises in the region, and the stronger the relations and cooperation between the allies, the more the Russian propaganda tries to undermine and destroy it by amplifying even the most minor problems.

31

32

BALTIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SPECIAL FORCES Jaak Uustal, Estonian Special Operations Forces

After the restoration of independence, the defence-related cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has been quite active and various cooperation formats have been developed – BALDEFCOL, BALTNET, BALTRON, the regular staff meetings and working meetings of the managements of the defence forces, etc. On the one hand, such cooperation formats are necessary, but on the other hand, they are inevitable. All of the Baltic States are very small, if viewed separately, and therefore, it is natural that they possess quite limited resources. Considering the various threat scenarios, it is clear that we are situated in one of the spheres of influence of a potential enemy.

The Special Operations Forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have made big developments during the last years. They have participated in various international projects, but what is the most important—the role of the Special Operations Forces has become more visible in the defence plans of the states.

Both in crises, early stages of war or conflict (i.e. mainly hybrid warfare), stages of conventional war as well as in possible future partisan fighting. The Special Operations Forces must function in the range of the whole conflict spectrum, starting from peacetime support for the units of the Ministry of Interior and Intelligence service to ending a possible occupation.

Therefore, it is inevitable, as with other areas, that the cooperation between the special operations forces of the Baltic States has received more and more attention. Important here is that the cooperation has been mostly initiated by the people on the working level, who have clearly noticed the necessity, and not by the higher political level. The cooperation has slowly started with various exercises, trainings and meetings in various areas of activity (equipment, armament, intelligence, communication, etc.).

Lately, the participation in each other’s exercises has become more frequent and the meetings of commanders and experts have become regular. As of 2017 the Special Forces participate in the work of the Baltic Combined Joint Staff Element (B-CJSE), forming a separate section there. Special force service members have brought along a different way of thinking and have come out with a number of different initiatives.

The concept of cross-border operations should be pointed out here. It has been decided in the B-CJSE as well as in the meetings of commanders that a Lead Nation for different fields (communication, intelligence, equipment and logistics) is needed to develop better cooperation. For example, Estonia, the Lead Nation in the communication field, coordinates exercises, training, various procedures and developments in the field of communication.

The formation of a joint unit for the NATO Response Force (NRF) has become, without doubt, one of the most outstanding cooperation projects. As of 2017, there is a joint Baltic task group (Special Forces Task Group) within the NRF. The task group includes a staff, Special Operations Task Units from all three states and various support elements.

33

34

The command of the Baltic task group is carried out by way of rotation. In 2017, the Lead Nation was Lithuania, this year, the Lead Nation is Latvia and Estonia will be the Lead Nation in 2019. It is the task of the Lead Nation to man most of the staff and support elements, also to arrange the exercises necessary for certification.

In the course of the joint development of the NRF, a number of ideas have come up about how to make the cooperation even more effective. One interesting idea that initially came from the Headquarters of the NATO Special Operations Forces (NSHQ) is that the NRF units to be formed by the Special Operations Forces should be regional. That means that the joint Baltic unit would act in this region only. The greatest advantages of this solution would be a substantial decrease of transfer costs and good knowledge of the region.

In essence that means that there would be a joint special operations task force (that knows the region very well) permanently present in our region. Many capacities of the unit should be strengthened or new capacities added to it, such as various intelligence disciplines and combat support elements.

In addition, it should be thought about how our closest allies could contribute to the unit. In connection with that, it is very interesting to observe the progress made by the Polish special operations forces and their growing interest towards the cooperation with the Baltic special operations forces. With the future in sight, ideally, a regional NATO Special Operation Component Command (SOCC) could form out of the joint special operations task force and the current developments, and this would play an important role in the NATO’s unit formation in general as well as in building an independent defence capacity for the Baltic States.

Regardless of the fact that the special operations forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have each taken slightly different paths for development and have placed slightly different emphases, now they have started to have, more and more, a common view on the regional cooperation in their visions for the future. Here the slight difference of the special operations forces might even be beneficial, as it would enable to learn from the experiences of each other in areas where the partners are better. As cross training strengthens the special operations forces as teams, why could it not be the same on the regional level.

35

36

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARMOUR SCHOOL AND ARMOURED MANOEUVRING CAPACITY Major Jaan Kessel, Commander of the Armour School of the Scouts Battalion of the 1st Infantry Brigade

Armoured manoeuvring capacity is a part of a set of capacities, one part of which is the establishment of an armour battalion, which we will be looking at closer in this article.

The establishment of something means a process that usually has clear starting and ending points. Having set a goal for ourselves, we possess a clear vision expressed in numbers and letters about what it should look like in order to meet our expectations and needs.

For the sake of simplicity and in order to cover the whole spectrum of aspects that we are dealing with as part of capacity development, it has been described using the DOTMLPFI (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability) model.

DOCTRINE For meaningful action, one should have a basis and a clear understanding why and how to proceed. This understanding must reach from the strategic level down to the lowest tactical level. In addition to the description of the capability, it has been necessary to establish a set of instructions, of regulations that would regulate the daily training activities, maintenance and safety of conducting those activities, as well as to amend the existing regulations.

As a basis for drafting those documents, we have used the long-term experience of other countries in using the armoured equipment and in relevant training and maintenance. The persons drafting the documents had a chance to attend various courses where they received good ideas about how to implement their knowledge in those environments. When using the armoured equipment daily, an understanding came as to what prerequisites were actually important in order to guarantee a long service for the equipment.

ORGANIZATION As a structured organization, we should not be unfamiliar with the situation where the roles within the organization are function-based to achieve a common goal. The timescale of the armoured manoeuvring capacity is a real challenge to us as an organization.

37

The fact that this way we as an organisation might create unreplaceable people, whose rotation or leaving the service would temporarily partly or as a whole paralyze the whole process, is a sign of insufficient communication.

When the baton is passed for one reason or another, one must bear in mind the ultimate goal and ensure the stability of the capacity development instead of trying to start anew.

TRAINING The preparations for covering this area have taken a long time. The training of specialists and experts able to provide technical support to units has been carried out in Finland, but mostly in the Netherlands. As to the training, today we need external support for some specific experts only in some very narrow areas.

We are ourselves, using our own Estonian instructors, able to train the personnel necessary for staffing and providing technical support to the units. We cooperate and share experiences with our allies and partners in the area of training. This kind of communication often helps to avoid problems that our allies, who have started off years before us, have faced.

Participating in the trainings and exercises with armoured equipment together with our units as well as with the allied units, and against each other’s units, has deepened the understanding of the commanders of the manoeuvring units about how to make use of their resources in order to combat against armoured units.

MATERIEL The materiel necessary for an armoured battalion for operations are listed, in black and white, in the lists of equipment. It is important to ensure their delivery to the end-user in time.

Looking at the materiel that can be obtained for carrying out better, more effective and realistic training, the spectrum becomes more colourful. The training materiel chosen up to the present time has justified itself entirely. We are using the Steel Beasts simulation system, which develops everything from individual skills in handling the joysticks of equipment to co-operation between troops. In loading exercises, we use the inert rounds, shells and grenades produced in Estonia.

In the spectrum of supplies, all the colours fade out when we reach the spare parts section of the combat equipment. On the one hand, the reason for that is that the lists are extremely long by volume, but on the other hand, the reason is we are Estonians. Similarly, to today’s practice in the car service stations, where one would not replace solely the piston cuffs, but the whole slide rest instead, the combat equipment catalogues are based on aggregate parts and not on the individual components. A devoted mechanic would not replace a whole suspension arm together with the hub because of a leaking seal.

38

LEADERSHIP What is the difference between an infantry platoon commander and an armoured platoon commander? One has to make decisions at the speed of 4 km/h, the other at 40 km/h. Having previously been an infantry unit among manoeuvring units for more than twenty years, it is now extremely important to prepare the current and future leaders for the armoured battalion.

We have started courses for officers and non-commissioned officers at the Estonian National Defence College, in order to raise the next generation of officers who would come after the current commanders who are mostly growing together with their sub-units today.

PERSONNEL This is the most valuable resource, the delivery times of which we have tried to shorten through public events and recruitment. This activity has to be continuous in order to ensure that the staffing of the units would not resemble the replacement of a camshaft while the motor is working.

The complexity of the equipment we use prescribes the requirements for the personnel, however, using such simple tools as a lever, a spade and a wrench is not so obvious in today’s urban life as it used to be some decades ago. In addition to the knowledge about how to apply the principles of manoeuvre warfare, an officer must also understand what might refer to a clogging fuel filter, what would be the results in that case and how to eliminate the problem in order to take his units to the battle.

FACILITIES In order to create facilities for training and storing/maintenance of technical equipment, there are large-scale projects ongoing for the benefit of all units.

The additional washing facilities have improved the maintenance possibilities of technical equipment. Because of the development of the small exercise area, the training options will improve for all units of the 1st Infantry Brigade. The Defence Forces as a whole will benefit from the development of the central exercise area and exercise areas at Soodla.

The driving training square under development will improve the quality of drivers’ training as well as spare the equipment. Those garages and shelters that are in use today for maintenance training are sufficient for the units to ensure the maintenance and repair works of machinery and equipment of sub-units.

INTEROPERABILITY Within the battalion, the interoperability capacity has been scrutinised in the course of various exercises. Most certainly, there are still some shortcomings to overcome; however, if compared with the time when the sub-unit first entered a garage, the difference is visible. The positive influence of the allied presence

39

40

can be felt, and that has provided extensive possibilities to test the readiness for cooperation with the other units. In addition, it is good for the development of the benchmark itself.

Where is the Armour School in this picture? The aim of founding the Armour School in 2015 within the Scouts Battalion of the 1st Infantry Brigade was to develop the armoured manoeuvring capacity focusing on establishment and training of a battle group to act within the armoured infantry battalion of the brigade together with the necessary combat support and service units.

41

42

CONTRIBUTION OF THE NAVY TO THE SAFETY OF THE CITIZENS OF OUR COUNTRY Captain Jüri Saska, Commander of Estonian Navy

In 2017, the Estonian Navy primarily operated at the international level—an Estonian navy officer was in command of the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 together with his Estonian colleagues who worked as his staff members. For the first time in the history of the Estonian Defence Forces, an Estonian officer was in command of a unit belonging to the NATO force structure. Commander Johan-Elias Seljamaa acted as the Commander of the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 from 22 June 2016 until 29 July 2017. In addition to that, in 2017, Wambola, a ship belonging to the Estonian Navy was appointed to serve the staff, which meant the responsibility of a flagship for the vessel.

One of the four groups of vessels under the command of the NATO naval command is the mine countermeasures group providing mine countermeasures competence and that can be sent by the alliance to different areas of the world in short notice. The Estonian Navy has participated in the activities of the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 for more than ten years now, participating in a battle exercise each half-year.

In 2017, the Navy made preparations for the mine countermeasures exercise Open Spirit to be held in Estonia in May 2018, during which it is planned to involve up to 800 service members from 15 different allied and partner states to neutralise historic mines. The participation of many diving teams from different task forces and participation of about 20 navy vessels is presently being coordinated. They will be carrying out search, identification and neutralisation of the mines from the World Wars that can be found on Estonian maritime routes. During Open Spirit held at Irbe Strait in 2017 under the command of the Latvian Navy, 56 historic mines were identified under water, 34 of these by the service members of the Estonian Navy.

The interest of the allies in the activities of Estonia in connection with mine countermeasures can be explained as an interest in our marine environment where a great number of mines have been laid during the World Wars; according to some sources, there could be some 80 000 mines in the Gulf of Finland. In addition to that, also torpedoes, bombs and ammunition. The size of the explosive ordnances laying down at the bottom of the sea may vary from a few dozen centimetres up to a few metres. Undertaking the mine countermeasures on the maritime routes provides the opportunity to simultaneously use the professional competences in peacetime and prepare for action in times of crisis. In addition to achievements in improving the cooperation in the field of defence, the civilians also indirectly benefit from the operations. Special attention is paid to those maritime routes in Estonia where active economic activities take place. The most checked are the bigger fishing areas and the main shipping lanes.

43

44

By the end of 2017, the Navy checked over the planned route of the Baltic connector (the planned 150 km long natural gas pipeline that would connect Finnish and Estonian natural gas networks), 80 km of which will be at the bottom of the sea and built by 2020. The Navy identified and destroyed 10 historic explosive ordnances.

A good example of the work performed is a moored mine of type EMC II of German origin located 12 nautical miles west from the island Naissaar. The mine laid during the World War II was at the depth of nearly 56 metres, at the bottom of the sea. Approximately half of the 450 kg mass of the mine consisted of explosive material. Generally, explosive ordnances in greater depths than 50 m do not pose any threats for the usual economic activities or ship traffic; however, in order to ensure the safety of the area determined for building the pipeline, the detected explosive had to be prioritized. Taking into consideration the nature of the mine countermeasures taken on the sea, the available technical solutions used and the specificity of the water environment, one can never give a 100% guarantee that there will be no incidents in the checked areas in the future. Therefore, the Navy has expressed readiness to react during the construction period as well.

In 2017, in the course of different searches, 52 different explosive devices were found on the Estonian maritime routes. As of the restoration of the Estonian Navy in 1993, more than 1200 explosive devices have been found from our waters and neutralised.

It has become a tradition for the mine disposal divers to make an ice camp on Lake Karujärv in Saaremaa, a popular recreational area used for swimming and relaxation in the summer. During Soviet times, the lake was used as an exercise field, and even today unexploded aerial bombs can be found around it.

In February 2017, eight mine disposal divers and am underwater doctor from the Navy participated in an underwater search. The mine disposal operation was carried out together with the Rescue Board with six experts. As a result of the cooperation that began in 2009, more than fifty explosive devices have been removed from the bottom of the lake and neutralised. The mine disposal divers arrange such ice camps each year as they must be trained to react in each situation, regardless of changing circumstances.

With the year 2018 an active development stage of the capacity development project will begin for the mine hunters that will make even better work results possible. The performance of the Navy is effective not only because of technical equipment and military training but also thanks to good internal cooperation with the Police and Border Guard Board, the Maritime Administration, the Environmental Board and the Environmental Inspectorate. The exchange of information with local governments and businesses is also important. It is always pleasant to act without disturbing anyone and to contribute to the well-being of the society with it. I thank all the members of the Navy, supporters and helpers for their good work.

Called by the sea—in defence of the sea!

45

46

PROVISIONAL AIRFIELD AT PIIBE ROAD Colonel Riivo Valge, Acting Commander of Estonian Air Force

During the last years, the A-10 attack aircrafts of our ally U.S., have repeatedly landed on the extension of Piibe road. In a way, this landing has turned to a public happening, and many thousands have attended the event already. Yet this is not an entertainment, but a serious military field training exercise, that is once again becoming an important manoeuvre since the Cold War. Several reasons exist why the military pilots should be ready to land in places like this, if necessary.

In case of the extension of Piibe road we are speaking about an unprepared airfield. The size of it—the length and the width—correspond to the general requirements of an airfield. What makes this road section different from an airfield is, most of all, the missing markings of the air traffic area, missing fixed aids for landing, navigation and communication and the fact that the road is not kept clean which is a requirement for an aircraft. One could ask, of course, why would we need such an unprepared airfield at all? There are at least three answers to that question.

Being stationary, the military airfields are easily vulnerable in case of warfare or crisis. As their locations are known, the enemy can easily damage the infrastructure of the aircrafts as well as the aircraft located there. A classic example of this is the Six-Day War in 1967, when the Israeli Air Force destroyed practically most of the Egyptian fighter aircraft that were neatly parked in their primary air bases and that did not even have the time to take off and fight back. Therefore, dispersing aircraft reduces the danger of their destruction in case of a strike.

To achieve this, a number of airfields must be used. One of the possibilities to increase the number of airfields is to use suitable road sections as well as former and present smaller airfields.

The other reason why pilots as well as aircraft must be capable of landing on such improvised airfields like the Piibe road is that upon technical problems or having been hit, it might be necessary to land the damaged aircraft as soon as possible. Such situations will most probably be faced more often in times of crisis or war rather than in peacetime.

The third important reason is that in time of war or crisis, it is good to have improvised airfields near the warfare region, where fuel and ammunition can be stocked, if needed. That would enable the aircraft—the planes as well as helicopters—to be quicker rearmed and refuelled, and if necessary, to get smaller maintenance works done and replace the tired pilots with fresh ones. Such extended improvised airfields allow to economise time and fuel during the operations and make the use of aircraft more effective in certain situations.

During the field exercises on Piibe road, the planes only landed, parked and took off again. In case they had been refuelled, rearmed, their technical inspection carried out and pilots replaced, the extension of Piibe road would have had to be more than just an unprepared airfield. In case a mobile communication

47

48

centre and basic navigation aids had been brought there, then this would have already constituted a Forward Operating Base (FOB). It is possible to establish such provisional support bases, depending on the situation, not only to road extensions but also to former Soviet airbases or to operating civil aerodromes. In connection with different trainings, the Estonian Air Force has established Forward Operating Bases at Tartu and Pärnu aerodromes, as well as at the former airbase in Tapa.

In case of a crisis, such improvised airfields or operating bases can be quite quickly and easily set up in many places all over the Baltic and Scandinavian region as well as all over Europe. The possible enemy would have to guess what are our and our allies’ opportunities and which locations we would use as improvised bases and airfields and which ones not.

The air operations carried out on Piibe road have been a good training opportunity for the U.S. pilots as well as to the members of the Estonian air force. This is also a good example of supranational cooperation on defence issues. The Civil Aviation Administration, the Police and Border Guard Board, the Rescue Board and many other state agencies and organisations have contributed to make a provisional airfield of the Piibe road. Without their support, establishing these improvised airfields would not have been possible. A wider military objective of performing such landings on roads is to demonstrate the skills and the ability of the NATO forces to carry out such operations.

Where, when and how many such improvised aerodromes will be established will remain a secret for the general public. Keeping one’s possible action plans in secret is also a part of military preparation.

49

50

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ADDITIONAL RESERVISTS TRAINING OKAS 2017 Lieutenant Simmo Saar, Strategic Communications Department, Headquarters of Estonian Defence Forces

In 2016, the Estonian Parliament passed an amendment to the National Defence Act, granting the Government the right to summon reservists to training within 24-hours. Until today, the Government has used the right twice, the last time the Government issued the decision to call 669 reservists of the Viru Infantry Battalion to service was in December 2017. Both calls—the one in 2016 as well as the Okas training in 2017—went very well and the reserve units achieved their combat power and gave much valuable information to the Defence Forces.

In December 2016, the Government called to service 303 reservists of the Infantry Company of the Võrumaa District of the Estonian Defence League and of the Headquarters Company of the Headquarters Staff and Signal Battalion who had completed their service in 2014. The reservists insured that 88% of two companies could be manned, and this would ensure their combat readiness in a crisis situation. The reservists who were called to service on 2 December 2016 were free to return to home just two days later. During this short period, some shooting exercises with service rifles were organised for reservists.

On 6 December 2017, the Government summoned a battalion-sized unit with a twenty-four hours notice. On December 7, 669 reservists had to be in Jõhvi by nine o’clock. Altogether 524 reservists participated in the additional reservists training Okas 2017, and they were home by the afternoon of December 10.

The reservists of the Viru Battalion of the 1st Infantry Brigade began their training at the Sirgala exercise area on December 8, where in addition to hand weapons training, squad rapid attacks were also rehearsed. On that day, the combat engineers, antitank fighters and gunners started to restudy their specialty weapons, the next day, live fire exercises were carried out with the 120 mm mortars. The whole command structure of the Estonian Defence Forces, the Navy, the Scouts Battalion from the 1st Infantry Brigade, a NATO battle group stationed in Estonia and the Belgian air defence fighters stationed at Ämari also took part of the supplemental reservist training Okas 2017.

WHAT WENT WELL? Estonia’s conviction that the reservists are willing and able to react quickly and come to service, has certainly been reassured. The supplemental reservists training carried out in 2017 showed that a battalion can be formed in a short time, and two days after the call from the Government, the freshly gathered unit can move out from the military base and start executing the orders from the Command of the Defence Forces.

51

52

We were reassured that the Estonian media would support the Defence Forces with communication, and that the call reaches the reservists. We also saw that the battalion staging teams were quickly able to hand out equipment to the reservists.

Once again, we saw that, like during the usual reservist’s trainings, the reserve commanders who have gone through conscript service would quickly be able to get accustomed to the military regime and lead the men in their command effectively. Which demonstrates the effectiveness of the national defence model based on conscription, because the skills acquired by the reservists during conscript service gives them the sufficient skills to defend this country.

WHAT COULD BE DONE BETTER? Although the general picture is good, it is not perfect. During the last supplemental reservists training, the leadership of the battalion pointed out the fact that the battalion was ready to receive the reservists already in the afternoon of December 6, however, the majority of the invitees turned up by the required time, that is by 9 am of December 7. The commanders of the battalion expressed that next time the reservists should be called to service so they could turn up as soon as possible and not by the time indicated on the invitation. This way the work load of the staging teams would be dispersed and the arrived reservists would be better and quicker served. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that a twenty-four hour advance notice is necessary for the reservists to allow them to make arrangements concerning their professional and private lives. Probably only a very small number are able to arrive in the unit within a few hours.

In connection with the additional reservists training in 2017, a problem with the public transport timetables appeared, as it was impossible to arrive in Jõhvi either by bus or train by 9 am of December 7. That left two options for the reservists—either to arrive in the evening of December 6 or use their own vehicles.

However, those are all details that cannot spoil the big picture. If necessary, the Defence Forces and the reservists are ready at the zero hour.

53

54

MILITARY SCIENCE—SUPPORT FOR LONG TERM CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT Lieutenant Colonel Sten Allik, Centre for Applied Research, ENDC

Research in new areas, inevitable for capacity development, general increase of the volume of activities and development of new competences—these are the keywords for describing the year 2018 from the viewpoint of defence related research and development activities. Moreover, the background of all this is more precise conformity with the requirements of long-term capacity development.

In 2017, many new projects that were a first of their kind in their respective areas in Estonia got started at the Centre for Applied Research of the Estonian National Defence College. As an example, the aim of one of such projects is to develop a long-term (10 years and more) cost and expenditure model of a warship in collaboration with the Faculty of Economy of Tartu University, taking into consideration the specificity of the capacity development, defence planning and resource calculating practices in Estonia. Based on that model, we can proceed to develop tax models for other capabilities. This was the fourth missing part of the whole picture the Defence Forces focuses on in their research and development activities: operation analysis, leadership, technology and resource management.

In collaboration with Tartu University, a project for studying non-kinetic operations started, mapping and analysing the deceptive notions trying to be created in the media sphere about the actions of Russia in security and military matters. The afore mentioned study will analyse, considering the Estonian context and the operational needs of the Estonian Defence Forces, how to notice the behind the scenes aims and regularities in a seemingly casual and spontaneous media sphere.

International cooperation has had an important role in improving the research and development capabilities of the Defence Forces. Mainly the collaboration on long-term goals within the framework of the NATO Science and Technology Organisation (NATO STO) has been important for us in order to increase our limited capabilities. Participation in the research groups whose work coincides with our needs, gives us an opportunity to take advantage of the top skills and knowledge of the other countries. Last year, the cooperation within the STO was remarkable for us, because for the first time Estonia led a STO working group (together with the Swedish Institute for Defence Studies (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut)) that analysed solutions for enhancing the military capabilities of small countries. This would enable them to raise the threshold as high as possible to prevent the enemy from attacking.

Still, regardless of the whole technological development, warfare still revolves around the person—the combatant. Estonia will always possess less weapons and firepower she would ideally need. All the more important is to develop

55

the capabilities we could compete with the best in the world with—these are our service members and their commanders. If the resources are limited, one can usually have a limited number of things, which are often referred to as fulfilling the minimum requirements. However, improving the trainings and development of management skills can give us many well-trained service members, and that is within our powers. In principle, military service, including service as a reservist, means lifelong learning. Based on the conscript service cycle 2016–2017, another stage complex study was carried out in collaboration with Tartu University and the National Institute for Health Development, and this gave us information about the attitudes of the conscripts, what motivates them, what they think of the training received in the conscript service and their opinions about their commanders, etc. The complex study on human resources was initiated, on the one hand, with the aim to give the units and staffs an opportunity to have an extensive overview of the men currently in service and, on the other hand, as a result of years long data collection, to create an opportunity to understand long-term developments. The analysis shows that the general direction is right, however, it also reveals that there are many things to consider and enough things that need development. The same study will be extended to all participants of the reservist trainings in the future. It is much safer to make long term and principal decision because of evidence-based knowledge to improve the training of the service members and the leadership capabilities of their commanders.

As first of its kind, the support provided by the research and development activities in the technology area to the development of armoured manoeuvring capacity in the preliminary phase of procurements should also be noted.

Namely, in collaboration with the Tallinn Institute of Technology, research has begun to ascertain which mortar solution, applied on CV90, would meet best the technical restrictions and operational needs. In addition, the work on the following themes continues: development of a new doctrine for the Navy; development of a Combat Situation Awareness System (CSAS) for the Estonian Defence Forces in collaboration with the Strategic Communication Centre; the integration of Threod UAVs in the activities of the wartime units during the Spring Storm exercise with the aim to test and share the experience mutually.

In 2017, the most important development occurred in the cohesion of the capacity development of the Estonian Defence Forces and military science. I am very optimistic about the development of this cohesion, and that military science will be more and more useful for the capacity development of the national defence of Estonia. This usefulness is based on two pillars – one of which is (as a broad concept) the understanding of a soldier of scientific results, and the other is the understanding of a scientist of military operations. Both pillars must be equally strong. This principle applies to planning and executing the research and development activities as well as to the implementation of their results, and begins with training of our future commanders. I dare say that we are on the right path.

I can see that military science will have more influence in the future. The skills of staff officers to select and express their problems to be studied, and to partici-

56

pate in the research work together with experts, has improved largely. Our more permanent partners in universities have developed a considerable competence in the military area. If Sõjateadlane (Estonian journal of military studies) used to search for scientific articles to publish, today there is a competition between those offering materials worth publishing. When speaking with the fellow service members about defence-related research and development activities, one can see that these are regarded as a natural part of the service, a necessity arising from military activities or as a matter of professional interes.

57

58

INVICTUS GAMES 2017 Second lieutenant Taavi Laasik Staff Officer, Public Affairs Section of the Estonian Defence Forces HQ

The third Invictus Games took place in Toronto, Canada in September 2017.

Injured Estonian service members were very successful there and demonstrated superbly the reason for the founding of those games.

GAMES AS A SOURCE OF MOTIVATION From Estonia, a team of 15 veterans went to Canada, where they were supported, in addition to their accompanying family members, also by the members of the Estonian community in Toronto. The Invictus Games have become one of the most important events of the year for the injured veterans, for which they and their supporting personnel begin preparing many months earlier. The Personnel Service Centre of the Estonian Defence Forces organises different training camps and sports events for the injured veterans, and the veterans themselves are also systematically developing their skills.

The Veterans’ Summer and Winter Days organised by the Personnel Service Centre have become more sport-orientated, the share of physical training has increased at those events. Recognised trainers and experts have been asked to share their experience at those events. However, those camps, like the Invictus Games, are not merely sports events. In both cases, the quality time that is spent with the family is very important as well. All of the abovementioned is one of the reasons for the founding of the Invictus Games—to enable the veterans to be more active, to become more engaged with rehabilitation and developing their bodies and minds. To achieve this, it is important to have a fixed and desirable objective and support from the family. One can say that the Invictus Games have had a strong influence on the development of the rehabilitation programme of Estonian veterans.

INVICTUS GAMES IN CANADA— GRAND AND DIFFERENT KIND OF SPORT Created by Prince Harry of the United Kingdom in 2014, the international sports event for the injured veterans held in Toronto could also be given the honorary title of the Olympic Games of the Injured Veterans—a week long programme, 7 different competition venues, 12 medal fields and more than 550 competitors from 17 different countries. The conditions created for the participants were superb – the central venue of the games and accommodation of participants was in the centre of Toronto, the police escorted transport to multiple venues all over the city. Live streaming or direct broadcast of all competitions was arranged over the Internet or in various big TV channels, and many stars like Brian Adams and Bruce Springsteen appeared at the opening and closing ceremonies—the games were great in each respect.

The games were different from other competitions because at the Invictus Games, one does not compete with the other competitors but the main goal is to

59

60

beat yourself. Of course, the competition element was still there at the games held in Canada, and there was a chance to watch many exiting struggles. However, the games were special, because for many veterans the greatest victory and capability was to represent their country in Toronto and to participate in some event.

One of the best examples illustrating this was the 1500 m run for the visually impaired men, where the first three crossed the finish line hand in hand, feeling the joy of having passed the distance and cheered on by the spectators with a rapturous applause. It did happen that one person participated in four different fields because he could, wanted and was able to. Those examples demonstrate quite well the essence of the games and the motivation of the participants—to get the maximum of the games and to prove one’s abilities, first of all, to oneself.

Estonians won 8 medals and in a many cases came to the fourth or fifth place.

In indoor rowing, Sergeant Janno Lepik won two gold medals and Master Sergeant Ergo Mets won a bronze medal. Master Sergeant Egerd Erreline won a silver medal and Master Sergeant Jaune Engel a bronze medal in discus throw, and Staff Sergeant Martin Piisang won two bronze medals and one silver medal in swimming. More than the medals, the positive emotions received from the games, the time spent with the family and meeting and competing with brothersin-arms who share the same fate was probably worth more. For Estonians, the Invictus Games held in Canada was very memorable, successful, and hopefully also inspiring.

The growing interest of the injured veterans in Invictus Games gives us hope that in 2018 more people will wish to participate than there are available places on the team. Stronger competition within the team would be welcome, as it would invigorate the older participants as well as the new beginners. Hopefully the future games would motivate many more of our injured veterans to develop themselves with a purpose and test themselves.

Invictus Games is a multi-sport event created by Prince Harry in 2014 for the armed services personnel who were injured when fulfilling their duties in the service. Invictus means “undefeated” in Latin.

In 2017 the games were held in Toronto, Canada, from 23–30 September. Altogether 550 persons from 17 countries participated; the Estonian team consisted of 12 men and 3 women. Besides Estonia, the following countries participated in the games: Afghanistan, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Romania, Ukraine, United Kingdom and the United States.

In 2014 the games were held in London and in 2016 in Orlando, U.S. In 2018, the games will be held in Sidney, Australia.

61

62

WESTERN ESTONIA AND THE ISLANDS ARE PROTECTED Lieutenant Colonel Tõnu Miil, former Commander of Regional Command West and former Commander of Pärnumaa District of the Estonian Defence League

Orkaan (Hurricane) is a joint exercise of the units belonging to the Regional Command West, that is usually arranged in the first weekend of December each year, and that is an opportunity for the Pärnumaa, Saaremaa and Lääne Defence Districts of the Estonian Defence League to exercise joint action under a unified command. Each year, one of the defence districts arranges the exercise, the chief organiser of the 12th Orkaan exercise held from December 1–3 was the Saaremaa District of the Estonian Defence League. Besides Saaremaa, the activities of the Orkaan 2017 exercise took place also in Pärnumaa.

The Orkaan 12 exercise was an internal exercise, the aim of which was to develop cooperation between the Regional Command West and the Police and Border Guard Board, as well as to train proper functioning of different sub-units (defence of an object, patrol, construction of VCPs and subsequent activities in the VCPs). Cooperation between the Regional Command West, infantry companies of the Western Battlegroup and the Operations Control Centre of the Police and Border Guard Board was rehearsed in conditions of unconventional and conventional warfare.

Important topics at the training: 1. Staff’s command procedures (including formation) 2. Exchange of information between the staff of structural units, sub-units, cooperation partners and allied units via communication and information systems, and communication between sub-units and cooperation partners.

3. Performance of the internal defence tasks of sub-units in situations of unconventional and conventional warfare.

4. Activities of a sub-unit in an area occupied by the enemy.

In the exercise, the scenarios of unconventional warfare were used. Hostile forces had penetrated into the area of responsibility with squad and platoon-sized units tasked to impede the border control and prepare a bridgehead for the enemy’s regular forces crossing over to the territory of the Republic of Estonia.

Friendly units supported the Police and Border Guard Board in arranging additional checks at the border (establishment of vehicle checkpoints (VCP) and activities in the VCPs in peacetime under the command of the Police and Border Guard Board), and when the regular troops of the enemy arrived, proceeded with the conventional warfare (area control, defence of the area).

There were two active phases in the training: Phase 1 – formation of units, movement to the determined areas, preparation of the VCPs, control of the area, counterforce infiltration to the exercise area and obstructive activities in the VCPs. Phase 2 – beginning with the conventional activities, checking of the areas

63

of responsibility at the support sites, defence and delay, attack prepared by the counterforce.

The part of the training that was carried out in Saaremaa, took place in the area called Kilemägede in Leisi rural municipality. The goal was to carry out assaults and defence operations in semi-close and close terrains in accordance with the defence plans of Saaremaa. At the same time, in Kuressaare and in the vicinity, an internal exercise together with the Police and Border Guard Board was carried out in order to ensure internal security in time of crisis.

Most of the personnel that participated in Saaremaa, were members of the Defence League districts of Saaremaa, Pärnumaa and Läänemaa. In addition, an infantry platoon form the Kalevi Infantry Battalion, manned with conscripts using armoured vehicles, the Air Force, the Cyber Defence Unit of the Estonian Defence League and the members of the Rapla Defence District participated in the training. Altogether approximately 600 men and women.

In Pärnumaa, in the territories of Häädemeeste and Saarde rural municipalities, 500 people from the Pärnumaa Defence District, from the Latvian voluntary national defence organisation Zemessardze and from the Police and Border Guard Board were assembled. The aim of the part of the training that was carried out in Pärnumaa, was to rehearse the scenarios connected with ensuring internal security, hybrid warfare and civil protection.

Some police units were also involved in the exercise to test in the field the staff exercises carried out earlier. Our intention was to take the cooperation to the next level and test the cooperation between the police, the Latvian volunteers and the Defence League in conditions close to reality. It was important to find out how the command roles differ in different stages of a crisis.

In Häädemeeste rural municipality, a simulated border was marked down and the voluntary defenders of the state started to check it. The members of the Latvian voluntary national defence organisation Zemessardze and of the Defence League played the role of the opposing forces. The task was to try to pass the checkpoints and to obstruct the work of the units performing the border check at the same time.

On the 3rd of December, in Häädemeeste town, an anti-riot training was carried out, in the course of which the law enforcement unit of the Defence League and the regional support unit of the Police had a chance to rehearse cooperation in controlling a possible riot. The counterforce was enacted with the members of the Defence League and of the Women’s Voluntary Defence Organisation as well as by the members of the Latvian Information Operations Unit.

The Orkaan exercise ended with conventional warfare in the area of Urissaare and Massiaru. The units of the Pärnumaa Defence District of the Defence League defended the staff, and the task of the units of the Latvian voluntary national defence organisation Zemessardze was to destroy the defended staff.

One of the aims of Orkaan 12 was to ascertain how the responsibility would pass from the Police and Border Guard Board over to the units of the Defence League or Defence Forces and how the leadership would change. In this aspect, further coordination would be necessary, as well as clear setting of the tasks and instructions to

64

the units of the Police and Border Guard Board, the Defence League and the Defence Forces. It is important to know who has which rights and obligations in peacetime and how it will change in wartime.

The second very important lesson was testing communications and command systems between the Police and Border Guard Board, Latvian volunteer units and the Defence League, and subsequent mapping of the problems that had become apparent and a conclusion of agreements for the next steps. Thirdly, I consider this training as the most important one, because it was the first time we the Police and Border Guard Board, the Defence League and the Defence Forces went to the “field” together and played out such a scenario. Thanks to that we clarified many issues, especially for the personnel of the units, and the—units of the Police and Border Guard Board—got a better understanding how the Defence League and the Defence Forces act in such situations.

JOINT EXERCISE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, THE DEFENCE LEAGUE AND THE AIR FORCE On 16–17 August 2017 the Saaremaa District of the Defence League, the Estonian Navy and the National Guard of the State of Maryland arranged a joint exercise HEATWAVE. The exercise had 8 airplanes A-10 Thunderbolt from the U.S., a supporting airplane MC-130 for refuelling the attack aircraft, and 16 motor boats manned with volunteer rescuers at sea, as well as the members of the Defence Districts of Saaremaa, Pärnumaa, Harjumaa and Tallinn participating.

All together more than 60 people participated in the exercise. In addition, the aerodromes of Tallinn and Kuressaare, the Police and Border Guard Board, the Rescue Board, AS Saarte Liinid and the City Government of Kuressaare were involved as cooperation partners.

The scenario was that a hostile element situated in the Gulf of Riga is planning to take over the City of Kuressaare from the sea, as well as the surrounding areas and important hubs. The units of Saaremaa were supposed to deal with the situation, supported by eight attack airplanes A-10 and a supporting airplane.

The exercise went as planned. The boat teams of the Defence League (2-4 people in a boat), who enacted the enemy in the exercise, manoeuvred tactically on the sea and approached the ports in the vicinity of Kuressaare. The attack airplanes received that information and arrived in the area, searched the area and started to attack the boat groups, and following their tactics, prevented the boats from landing in ports or in other places suitable for landing. At the same time, the boat teams could carry out anti-air-raid drills and get an understanding what an air-raid looks like and what to do in case a powerful airplane attacks you with all the weaponry it is equipped with.

In summary, the exercise may be considered as a successful one. The cooperation between different agencies also went well, which allowed a smooth running of the exercise. Surely, the exercise was very useful for the newly developed coastguard units of the Defence League as well as for their personnel and the planners.

The people of Saaremaa also had a good opportunity to see our allied aircraft in action, and the activities of the Defence League from a slightly different, but from an important angle. A big thank you to the organisers and participants.

65

66

CYBER RANGE 2011-2018 Major Uku Valtenberg, Deputy Commander, Headquarters Staff and Signal Battalion

Cyber security is the fastest developing field of security, which is connected with all areas of society. In 2011, in order to stay competitive in this field and thanks to the initiative from Johannes Kert (Reserve Lieutenant General), the Cyber Range of the Estonian Defence Forces was established, with the aim to develop, create and ensure the capabilities in the area of cyber defence.

WHAT IS A CYBER RANGE? Cyber Range is a set of hardware and software that forms a virtual exercise field where one can test, rehearse or play through such situations that are not advisable to play through using real information and telecommunication services and systems. In Estonia, a community has emerged around the Cyber Range, consisting of businesses, organisations and people who deal with cyber defence matters every day and wish to protect the e-lifestyle of Estonia. E-lifestyle is something we call all the ICT services and solutions that make our daily life easier. Such solutions are, for example, e-banking, electronic identity, declaration of taxes, remote reading of the electricity meters, etc.

As there are no borders between states in the cyberspace, international cooperation is very important for ensuring cyber security, and in order to develop this cooperation many international trainings have been carried out in the Cyber Range since 2013. Cyber defence has become a part of the policies of NATO and EU and is an integrated part of the approach of those organisations to training and international cooperation. The interest of different states towards the cyber defence related training has increased considerably. At the same time, many agreements between states related to cooperation in the field of cyber security have already been concluded or are being prepared. Many states and private businesses have started to create cyber ranges of their own and to arrange trainings there, following the lead of the Defence Forces. The interest to support the exercises and trainings to be carried out at the Cyber Range has grown on the international as well as on the national level.

USE OF THE CYBER RANGE TO SUPPORT THE CYBER TRAININGS The Cyber Range has been used most extensively as the technical support environment for carrying out two international cyber exercises—the Locked Shields (LS) exercise arranged by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) and the Cyber Coalition (CC) exercise of NATO. Both exercises are related to technical matters of the cyber space, and the planning and execution of the exercises depends on the capability of the Cyber Range. The Cyber Range has also an important role to play in the development of the next generation via Cyber Olympics that were held for the first time in 2015. Today, the Cyber Olympics has been transformed into an event called Kübernaaskel

67

(Cyber Awl) that is organised in collaboration between the Ministry of Defence and the Tallinn University of Technology. The Defence Forces Cyber Range team develops and supports the technical environment together with their partners.

The Cyber Range is also used in various bilateral cooperation forms with countries with whom Estonia has not any direct relations concerning cooperation. This is possible due to the fact that the distance and location are unimportant factors in cyberspace, also since there are no borders between the states. With cooperation, the Cyber Range offers possibilities to participate in trainings and exercises that are complemented and developed following the training needs of the external partners. In the last seven years, the Cyber Range has reached a situation where each year thirteen or more events that need either technical support or development are arranged. This means that the Cyber Range team works at their full capacity and that the earlier set targets have been surpassed twofold.

COURSES In recent years, CCD COE has transferred their technical exercises to the infrastructure of the Cyber Range, and in connection with this, the latter is constantly maintained, developed and renewed, following the needs of the afore mentioned exercises and trainings. In the mentioned courses, the experts of the Defence Forces participate as well. The Cyber Range hosts an environment for conducting practical exercises also for the cyber defence related masters curriculum at the Tallinn University of Technology “Hacker attacks on information systems and corresponding countermeasures”, where the students can gain experience in taking countermeasures to hacker attacks.

Many other educational institutions have also shown interest towards the Cyber Range and the courses arranged there. However, at present, the Cyber Range intends to limit its activities to supporting the courses arranged by CCD COE and by the Tallinn University of Technology only, as its resources are limited and also the team is not big enough to satisfy all wishes. Work is being done to improve the situation.

It is also possible to use the infrastructure of the Cyber Range to test software by simulating the behaviour of different users as well as of equipment.

In addition to software testing, it is also possible to test hardware using the components of the Cyber Range. Until now, this has been done in the context of trainings only. Testing is complicated by the very tight time schedule of the Cyber Range as well as by the limitations imposed by the specific organisation of the Defence Forces.

NATO CYBER RANGE In 2013, the Cyber Range faced its first major challenges, because for the first time two major cyber defence exercises – “Locked Shields” (in spring) and “Cyber Coalition” (in autumn) were arranged. Considering the technical complexity and intensiveness of the two, “Locked Shields” was the more important one, as that

68

was an exercise during which one party had to defend itself in the Cyber Range against the cyber attacks launched by hackers. “Cyber Coalition” was specifically a NATO exercise, the transfer of the active phase command element of which to Estonia started already in autumn of 2012, and was supported by Liina Areng, an official of the Ministry of Defence. The success of the “Cyber Coalition” exercise also sparked NATO’s interest towards the Cyber Range of the Estonian Defence Forces. In 2014, this interest was amplified with the help of Ambassador Lauri Lepik, the erstwhile Permanent Representative of the Republic of Estonia to NATO, Kusti Salm, an official of the Representation, as well as Captain Andri Rebane from the Ministry of Defence. Thanks to them and to the work of many other people, we have reached the point where Estonia has concluded a cooperation agreement with NATO, according to which NATO will base its cyber range on that of the Estonian Defence Forces, and will contribute to the development of additional capabilities following the requirements of NATO. As of 2016, the Ministry of Defence of Estonia is leading a project for the development of the NATO Cyber Range in which experts from Estonia as well as from abroad are involved in, and to which NATO gave its approval in the end of 2017. The first calls for tenders were announced already at the beginning of 2018.

NATO is interested in introducing the cyber defence element into as many exercises as possible. Into exercises like Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation and eXamination eXercise (CWIX), Cyber Endeavour, etc. In addition to the cooperation with NATO, the Cyber Range continues the work directed at developing cooperation with the European Defence Agency (EDA), that involves collaboration with the allies that are not members of NATO, for example Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, etc. In parallel with all the achievements, as the volumes and quality of the exercises have rapidly increased during the recent years, the development of the Cyber Range has been continuously ongoing. During the years, many new cooperation partners have been found, in collaboration with whom many high-level cyber defence trainings and exercises have been carried out. I hope that this cooperation will continue for the sake of the common goal. May our e-Estonia stay safeguarded!

69

70

THE YEAR OF SMART POWER Major Uku Arold, Strategic Communications Department, Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces

In 2017, many information operations were conducted. The arrival and the activities of the allied troops is most certainly a part of defence readiness, however, from the point of view of NATO as well as of our Eastern neighbour, the main aim is to send a message. The message is clear—the allies stand as one, it is not a good idea to attack them. The general public of Estonia has received this encouraging message. Already in 2014, when the U.S. fighters and an infantry company arrived, one fourth of those who had doubts about the Estonia’s ability to defend itself changed their minds. Also the Russian Federation has clearly received the message and is taking it seriously, as can be seen from the outbursts of disinformation that demonise the eFP units.

The deployment of NATO battle groups in countries at risk is an example of the smart power of NATO. Smart power is a concept that refers to combining the influence achieved through liking, i.e. the soft power, with the potential of physical destruction, i.e. the hard power. Neither of these is more important than the other. The influence of the soft power lasts longer, the influence of the hard power can be produced quicker. As the enthusiastic slogan of the psychological operations units in many recent NATO military operations has read “Use psychological influence because physical wounds are quick to disappear!”.

Neither sympathy nor respect can be won just by force alone. Therefore, soft power is central when regimes are being replaced, in case of riots, but also in the entire defence strategy of weaker nations. Today, the mainstream way of thinking of the military of the Russian Federation preaching a non-linear warfare proceeds from an understanding that it is not possible to cope with NATO using the means of conventional warfare. Therefore, every method is used to weaken the opponent as much as is needed for the actions in line with the goals of Russia would seem the best solution for them. Non-military sanctions will hit various vulnerable areas of societies and are in the long run more effective and dangerous than that of artillery and military aircraft. According to the approach of Russia in the 1990s, the weapons of information warfare are weapons of mass destruction.

One cannot buy soft power from a shop. However, methods and measures that are in compliance with international humanitarian law and influence non-military targets can be developed. This is obligatory for endangered small countries. Outside support to the constitutional power of the country and a position in international relations is achieved through a positive image of the public authorities and not by intimidating with the police nor a nuclear attack.

2017 was a very important year for NATO —finally, unambiguous rules for strategic communication were established for the whole military structure of NATO. The aim of strategic communication is to entwine into a single influential message the words said and actions taken in the course of psychological operations, communication via media and information operations.

71

In 2017, the Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces approved the concept of Estonian information operations for the first time in history. The Estonian Defence Forces defines information operations as a way of thinking and procedures used in the decision-making via the media in order to assess or evoke the weighed influence on their units, on the population or a part of the population or on an adversary, for the purpose of synchronisation of the required capabilities and activities. The concept defines who is responsible and what is the general work allocation and gives practical instructions to commanders, staffs and soldiers at each level. The role of a single soldier is especially important, because those engaged in instant and mediated intelligence and subversion are in search for the weakest link. Even at today’s quite peaceful times, due to the cheapness of the technology, one can get hit in the barracks, in the woods or even while on leave. At the same time, the support to the Defence Forces and to the constitutional power as a whole depends on the ability of each service member to communicate with the civilians. The biggest challenge the Defence Forces faces in connection with implementation of the concept, is to use their capabilities in planning and decision making as smart power.

As there are no state borders in the media sphere, the results of actions at the tactical level to the plans at upper levels have to be taken into account. In addition, not only the influence on an anonymous hostile battle vehicle, but also the influence on human networks connected in various ways, commanders of the hostile forces, each in their own right, have to be considered. There are only a few guaranteed textbook solutions in the area of information operations. Each situation and topic requires smart officers who are able to find effective and creative solutions. Last year, many structural units of the Estonian Defence Forces studied the lessons learned from conflicts. A study group of the ENDC also published many thorough overviews concerning the anti-Ukrainian information operations.

In addition, big enterprises have recognised the threat of information attacks, and have started to introduce defence measures. In April, Facebook disclosed their action plan to avert the manipulations that are hostile for civil society and aim to influence political views and provoke conflicts between people for the sake of geopolitical games. Parts of these manipulations are fake news in the social media targeting specific groups, and largely propagated by robots.

The European Union has been very concerned about the spread of fake news, and has also tried to avert them. In 2017, the teams tackling this were enlarged.

In November, the topic got attention at the highest level, when, on the initiative of Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, an expert group on fake news was launched.

Most certainly those who organise the hostile influencing activities and those who are aware of and participate in these hostile activities, would not sit back and watch limitations set on their activities. Attempts are made to discredit the area of strategic communication by creating fake connections, spreading doubts and lies in the media, and by sending trolls to impede the work of the investigators of the hostile activities. The picture is the same in Brussels, in

72

Prague, in Podgorica, in Stockholm, in Helsinki and in Tallinn. It is a paradox of democracy that freedom of expression can also be used against democracy.

Societies must learn to be wiser and the state agencies must obtain capabilities to recognise the subversion conducted through information environments, and be able to at least mitigate the adverse effects.

In 2017, the developments in the areas of strategic communication and psychological defence were explained and guidance for using smart power was given to various state agencies by updating the fundamentals of the defence policy and by drafting a new National Defence Development Plan. Smart power is important.

73

Issued by: Strategic Communications Department, Headquarters of Estonian Defence Forces Executor: Stratcom Support Company, Headquarters Support and Signal Battalion Editors: maj Ülo Isberg, cpl Raiko Jäärats , Heiki Suurkask Design and implementation: Ragne Rikkonen-Tähnas, Stratcom Support Company, Headquarters Support and Signal Battalion

Photos: Estonian Defence Forces, Karl-Alfred Baumeister, Ardi Hallismaa, Roomet Ild, Karl Johanson, Leivo Laats, Hardi Liuhka, Kadri Paomees, Siim Verner Teder, scanpix.ee ISSN: 2613-4934

74