Estonian Defence Forces Annual Report 2018

Yearbook 2018

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aastaraamat

Estonian Defence Forces

Yearbook 2018

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CONTENTS 4.

PREFACE Major General Martin Herem Commander of the Defence Forces

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SECURITY POLICY AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO RUSSIA IN 2018 Military Intelligence Centre

18. SECURITY AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF NATIONAL DEFENCE Military Intelligence Centre 24. A YEAR OF PROGRESS AND PARTNERSHIP Giles Harris 28. BACK IN DENMARK – WITH FRUITFUL EXPERIENCES Per B. Jørgensen 32. NATO MULTINATIONAL DIVISION NORTH EAST – FACTA, NON VERBA Antti Viljaste 36. FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE CYBER COMMAND Veikko Kannel 42. ACHIEVING INTEROPERABILITY IN MALI Kristjan Karist

EDF yearbook on web: https://issuu.com/kaitsevagi In english https://issuu.com/kaitsevagi

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CONTENTS 48.

ESTPLA-25 CONCLUDED THE LEBANON MISSION Kristjan Leimann

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FREE MARKET WEAPONS PROCUREMENTS INCREASE COMPETITION AND STRINGENCY Ingrid Mühling

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SIIL DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE SYSTEM WORKS Indrek Sirel

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SIIL SET NEW TARGETS FOR THE DEFENCE LEAGUE Meelis Kiili

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THE IMPORTANCE OF BATTLEFIELD MEDICAL TRAINING Indrek Olveti

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IN CONSCRIPT SERVICE WITH A DISABILITY Raiko Jäärats

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NATIONAL DEFENCE INDUSTRY IS PART OF THE DEFENCE CAPACITY OF ESTONIA Taavi Veskimägi

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PREFACE Major General Martin Herem Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces

In 2018, the Estonian Defence Forces achieved its planned development. The battle readiness development indexes of the Defence Forces give cause for immense satisfaction.

Exercise Siil 2018 demonstrated the size and quality of the operation of the units of the Defence League. Although the around 9,000 armed members of the Defence League were less than the number of active members, it was still a considerable military capacity with its size and degree of organisation.

In national defence and nationhood as a whole, the morale of the members of the Defence League that participated in the exercise is a value in itself and a message to Estonian citizens, allies and potential enemies — defending independence is as important as putting food on the table. Besides, this is not a self-sacrificing will to defend the country, but an organised activity. The latter was demonstrated by the systematic operation of the territorial defence regional command staffs and their capability to lead the units at their command and the good cooperation with the Women’s Voluntary Defence Organization, battalion-sized battle groups and covertly operating fighting groups.

Foreshadowed by the training exercise Siil, many did not likely notice the extra reservist training Okas taking place. However, this training exercise also proved that the morale of our reserve units was high and that the Defence Forces were able to use it as intended.

Only a few years ago it would have been hard to believe that it would not take more than two days from the decision to organise a training exercise to units of reservist equipped according to wartime requirement reaching destinations all over Estonia. Extra reservist trainings have become part of the reservist training, the second example of which is the training exercise Okas for the Logistics Battalion at the end of the year. It is good that the exercise showed us several shortcomings in the formation of units as well as equipment. However, a battalion of reservists ready to perform military assignments formed in two days is a fact. The sense of duty of the citizens must be recognised in this aspect as well.

It must be said that our allies nod in recognition if they see these results.

From here on, the effort is to increase the quality of arranging extra reservist trainings, including the preparation of conscripts and training of service members as well as procurement of equipment. The aim is to have the extra reservist trainings to be the yardstick to measure the health of the Estonian national defence and a normal part of day-to-day activities.

A great leap of development to the defence capacity of our region is the establishment of the Multinational Division North headquarters, which commenced in January 2018 and was completed in March 2019. The headquarters has a long way to go to achieve full capacity in the national defence of Baltic States, but an important first step has been made.

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The main role of the headquarters is to lead Estonian, Latvian and Danish units within the operational plan of the Multinational Corps Northeast. In addition, this is a command element that can command additional NATO units in the Baltic region, which means that integration with our NATO allies is becoming increasingly stronger. However, this development does not mean our own national defence capacities and the Headquarters of the EDF, who have their own duties to be performed on the territory of the Republic of Estonia and in parallel to other NATO structures, will disappear. The new structure has already been included in the Spring Storm exercise taking place in May. We have not neglected our obligations towards allies either. Although in 2018 we ended foreign missions in Lebanon and Kosovo, we sent platoon-sized units to Afghanistan and Mali. With its capacity to quickly respond to international conflicts, the Republic of Estonia is and will remain a reliable partner to its allies.

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SECURITY POLICY AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO RUSSIA IN 2018.

Military Intelligence Centre

The fundamental character of the security policy of the Russian Federation (RF) and the means used to implement it has remained largely unchanged. The Kremlin still sees NATO and chiefly the USA as their main strategic opponent.

To achieve security policy goals, both covert and direct military intervention is being used, information operations organised, economic pressure exerted and selected targets (politicians, entrepreneurs, scientists, journalists and opinion leaders) influenced in every possible way. In addition, considerably large resources are being allocated to armed forces as well as to intelligence and security services.

SECURITY POLICY In March 2018, Vladimir Putin was again selected as the President of the RF, which solidifies the continuity in the state’s security policy. This continuity was manifest in security policy related positions with the continuance of Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov.

President Putin outlined the basis of the foreign policy of his last presidency in his speech at the Federal Assembly on 1 March. A large part of the speech was dedicated to depicting an military opposition with the western nations and the supremacy of the state’s armed forces that can overcome any opponent.

Rhetorically, this was a challenge to the opponent because a considerable part of the speech was focused on the development of new weapon systems with no counterparts in the armaments of western nations. At the same, it is clear that at least partially this was due to a direct focus away from the economic and social problems troubling the county and paying less attention to them.

The international position of the RF is two-fold. In the eyes of western nations, a lot of political credit and trustworthiness has been lost since the annexation of Crimea and Eastern-Ukraine. In 2018, this trend showed an even faster growth with the assassination attempt of Sergey and Julia Skripal, spying on the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), meddling in the democratic process of western nations, societal manipulation with fake news, social media, etc. As a result of the events, western nations are paying more attention to attempts of the RF to interfere with the internal matters of other states, such as elections.

According to the narrative of the RF itself, the state has gained a sufficiently strong position in the world to challenge the effective security architecture.

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However, the more western nations see through the “soft influence activities” and propagation of lies, the RF’s actual power and position in the international arena will reduce to the use of military force and threats thereof.

Important keywords that describe the relations of the West and RF in 2018 are armament control (primarily in relation to violation of the INF Treaty) as well as stagnation in the implementation of the Minsk Protocol, i.e. the stalemate in Ukraine. Cooperation with the USA has subsided rapidly in areas where it had thus far been rather constructive, such as aeronautics and space research.

However, it appears that Kremlin’s efforts in presenting the RF as a superpower has paid off at least partially. According to Pew Research Center’s survey conducted in 25 countries, increase of the power of the RF is noted, albeit with a negative connotation. Although the RF faces a lot of problems, including sanctions by the USA and EU and deepening geopolitical isolation, Putin has still found opportunities to increase Moscow’s influence.

For example, the relatively successful and affordable campaign in Syria has enabled the Kremlin to enjoy influence in the Middle East comparable to that during the Soviet Union. As a bonus, the prestige of the weapon systems of the RF has increased in the Middle East, one of the main weapon markets of the planet.

ECONOMY RF’s economic outlook during 2018–2020 is modest, 1.5%–1.8% according to predictions. This is regardless of the data published by Rosstat, according to which RF’s economy grew by 2.3% in 2018. Possible manipulation with statistics is primarily for domestic consumption and motivated by ideological reasons.

The high price of oil may however have a positive effect on the prediction.

On the initial estimate of the Ministry of Economic Development of the RF, the earnings of the state budget of last year were 19.45 trillion roubles, i.e.

102.7% of planned. As expenses were 16.71 trillion roubles, the surplus was 2.7%, i.e. 2.75 trillion roubles. Although the budget was planned with a deficit of 1.3% of the GDP, the increase of oil revenues increased the earnings of the state budget more than expected, therefore resulting in the surplus.

Sanctions have hindered the economic growth considerably, 2% per year according to various analysts. 2018 is however characterised by the growth of pressure from the sanctions: both the list of sanctions as well as reasons for their implementation has expanded. A similar trend seems to be continuing in 2019 if the RF does not change the course of its foreign policy, which can be considered unlikely. The continuation of the antagonistic policy may, however, result in the sanctions becoming exterritorial, the first signs of which are already becoming apparent.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS In 2018, the RF continued the conduct of influence activities both to the domestic audience as well as to the audience of western societies. The information war as one of the elements of hybrid war has become an integral part of

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Kremlin’s foreign and security policy. In essence, this is an integrated and cooperated state campaign designed to direct the discussions held in the society.

The efforts of Kremlin to make cracks into the cohesion of western societies, amplify the differences between countries and undermine the authority of international law is difficult to monitor if the content is outside the bounds of that presented in with conventional propaganda or in media channels. The spread of influence activities into scientific institutions, think tanks and fake NGOs through the use of networks of journalists, scientists, politicians and other influential public figures is a pattern that is increasingly paid more attention to. The “analyses” and carefully worded and “scientifically-proven” narratives produced by these networks that emphasise the freedom of speech and thought as well as other values effective in democracy only deepen the divisions in societies.

Mainly, the rise of Putin’s personal reputation has been a achieved, albeit primarily among the leaders of third world countries (i.e. Tunisia, Philippines, Syria). The influence of RF’s propaganda has been considerably smaller in western nations, with the exception of some (political) groups and their members operating in the periphery of some societies. In 2018, Putin was still popular in the RF despite a clear downward trend.

PAX RUSSICA The RF continues its efforts to keep former Soviet Republics in its sphere of influence. In Europe, Kremlin regards Ukraine and Belarus as strategically vital.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the RF has tried to integrate these countries in one way or another and turn them into so-called “vassal states”. This is probably connected at least partially with the Kremlin’s aim of creating buffer zones between itself and NATO and EU. After Ukraine shifted its direction towards the west, Belarus has become especially important for the Kremlin since its economy and foreign policy has been tightly connected to that of the RF’s until today. Belarus also plays an important role from the perspective of the so-called Pax Russica conception that in its essence is the dogma of Russian imperialistic ideology that was developed during 17–18th century and stipulated “the Russian civilisation trinity” made up of three brotherly nations.

It is not impossible that upon the end of the reign (be it forceful, voluntary or fatal) of the Belarussian leader Alexander Lukashenko, the chain of events may get out of control from Kremlin’s perspective and may lead to a revolution similar to that of Ukraine. However, a possible Belarusian shift towards the west would mean a multidimensional defeat for Kremlin. One of these dimensions would be economical since the RF’s trade with the west largely takes place through Belarus to avoid sanctions, but even more importantly, this would be a political defeat.

VOSTOK 2018 The main military event was Vostok 2018 that reached the Eastern Military District as per rotation and took place during 11–17 September. Unlike

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previous exercises, the scenario focused on strategic manoeuvres: The forces of the Central and Eastern Military District represented the opposition forces to make manoeuvres in various strategic directions. For the first time, the exercises included Chinese service members, which was primarily important symbolically from the perspective of RF-China relations.

According to official announcements, 297,000 combatants or a third of the Russian Armed Forces partook in the exercise and this should have signified the sustainability of the country’s military capability and ineffectiveness of international sanctions. In reality (contrary to Zapad 2017 where the number of participants was reduced manifold in official announcements), the number of participants probably did not exceed 50,000 and the majority of the activity took place in the Tsugol practice ground in the Zabaykalsky Krai.

Vostok 2018 comprised of the manoeuvres of the battalion’s tactical groups, massive air attacks and precision strikes against the enemy’s vital infrastructure in the depth of the operation area. The exercise was foreshadowed by the Chief of the General Staff Gerassimov’s statement that he wished to see non-standard solutions and not see a “war theatre prepared” a week ahead.

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND ARMS PROCUREMENT Many of RF’s defence officials have stressed the importance of the westwards operative direction in the national armament program 2018–2027 for which 19 trillion roubles have been planned to be spent. The national armament programme dictates the arms procurements of the RF, the modernisation of arms forces and development of new weapon systems. Although there were many difficulties in the fulfilment of the previous armament programme (2011–2020) supported by the economic recession, international sanctions, general outdatedness of technical know-how and corruption, this was the first time after the cold war that armament renewal was approached systematically. As a whole, the armament program set to end in 2027 focused on systems that increase the mobility, deployability, management and development of web-based systems. The armament programme falls into the context of the preexisting trend in which the RF’s armed forces are developed to hold a large-scale conventional conflict.

DEVELOPMENTS IN SERVICE ARMS The Army continued training and armament with new weapon systems as last year. In addition to tanks and battle machinery, the units now have intelligence, communication, indirect fire and engineering capacities.

The armament was supplemented by 184 tanks, 290 BMPs and BMDs, and 241 BTRs. The first batch of tanks T-14 Armata shall reach the armed forces in 2019. The plan is to deliver 12 tanks T-14 and four repair-evacuation vehicles built on the T-16 Armata platform. The tanks are distributed to several units in different regions to test their operation in various conditions. The 20th Artillery Brigade gained one division of self-propelled howitzers 2S7M Malka and

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the 385th Artillery Brigade one division of self-propelled mortars 2S4 Tjulpan.

All divisions began with the formation of UAS subunits.

It was publicly announced that the 2nd Motorised Rifle Division within the 1st Tank Army has been completely re-armed with modernised fighting vehicles BMP-2M that are equipped with renewed weapon systems and have significantly updated nighttime sighting and vision apparatuses. In addition to new infantry fighting vehicles, the 2nd MRD received over 20 modernised self-propelled howitzers Msta-SM2. These are equipped with an automated fire control system and have increased the rate of fire. The option to use digital electronic maps increases the speed of orienteering of the howitzers in difficult geographical and weather conditions.

The 488th Motorised Rifle Regiment received more than 20 modernised tanks T-72B3. Compared to the previous modification, the driver of the T-72B3M is able to use an automated driving system, the tank is equipped with a new sighting system Sosna-U (automatic target transmission, thermal imaging camera, ballistics computer, etc.) and dynamic armour system Relikt.

Compared to previous versions, the tank also has a more powerful 1130 hp engine V-92S2F. As part of the national defence order, the Western Strategic Command was given communications and command units with communication systems Redut-2US, command and staff machines R149AKŠ, mobile digital radio relay stations R-166, and short-wave and ultra short wave field radios. At the end of the year, 15 satellite communication stations R-438 Belozer arrived.

The armament of rocket brigades within armies with Iskander-M rocket systems continues. In 2018, the 152th Rocket Brigade of the 11th Army Corps in Kaliningrad was armed. This year, the plan is to arm the 448th Rocket Brigade of the 20th Army in Kursk which is the last unit using the old systems OTR21 Tochka. There has been speculation in public sources of the formation of a rocket brigade within the 8th Army.

The Airborne forces received new communications equipment and automated guidance systems Dozor, UAVs, optical-electronical and air reconnaissance equipment. UAV sub-units were handed over approximately 15 multifunctional UAV systems Orlan-10 and Eleron-3 used for reconnaissance and correction of artillery fire. The Airborne forces are fully equipped with weapons and special equipment with over half of which is modern equipment.

By the end of the year the an Air Assault Battalion was formed within the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade. In all units, the formation of EW and UAV sub-units was completed. More than 70% of the Airborne forces have been built-up of contract service members. In 2018, the service arm received two battalion sets of fighting vehicles BMD-4M. With Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), one of the priorities of the previous as well as the new armament program has been the renewal of the strategic nuclear triad with the central of mass on land-based (shafts and mobile launching devices) intercontinental ballistic missiles. The land-based component of the nuclear triad is the pillar of the RF’s strategic deterrence. In 2018, the implementation of

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the modern SS-29 Yars missile continued in three SRF rocket armies, which in the long run replaces the outdated systems from the Cold War era.

In 2018, SS-X-30 (RS-28 Sarmat in RF’s nomenclature) tests continued. In the long run, Sarmat should replace the currently only heavy intercontinental missile SS-18 Satan used in the RF’s armament. According to Russia, in addition to nuclear warheads (MIRV) the SS-X-30 is capable of carrying the novel hypersonic glide vehicle Avangard as well. Although the RF is optimistic about the introduction of Sarmat, it is unlikely to be included in the armament of the SRF. In December 2018, the RF announced a successful testing of the Avangard system and of the goal of adding at least two of these systems into the armament in 2019. In consideration of the technical complexity and previous problems in the development, the statement should be taken with a grain of salt.

The Aerospace Defence Forces continued the development of the integrated missile defence system (anti-ballistic missiles, early-warning radars, command chain). In 2018, five test runs were made in the Sary Shagan testing range with the modernised missile 53T6M of the missile defence system A-135. According to plans, the missile defence system will be modernised by 2020.

The modernisation of the strategic bombers Tu-95MS and Tu-160 to versions Tu-95MSM and Tu-160M (M1). The aircraft with updated avionics can be equipped with the cruise missile H-101. In January, the first strategic bomber Tu-160M2 manufactured after the Soviet Union made its first flight.

In January, the prototype IL-78M-90A of the tanker aircraft IL-78M built on the basis of the transport aircraft IL-76MD-90A made its first flight in the Ulyanovsk aircraft factory. After the first flight of the new generation tanker aircraft, a contract is likely to be made for the delivery of 30 aircraft which gradually replace the existing IL-78-D. At the end of the year, the Defence Ministry was handed over two new airborne command-and-control posts Tu214PU-SBUS and one modernised early warning and control plane A-50U. The development of the early warning and control plane A-100 based on IL-76MD-90A continued.

As part of the national armament programme, the renewal of the force continued with which the older generation fighters in the fighter aviation regiments are gradually being replaced by new and/or modernised versions. With the addition of the new multifunctional (capability to also attack land targets) fighters with larger operation areas and newer weapons compared to existent aircraft, the aviation capability of the RF will increase in the Baltic Sea region.

The Navy received the Karakut class small missile corvette Mytishchi that has Kalibr-NK cruise missile capability. Similarly to 2017, the presence of navy vessels of the RF increased due to the Navy parade that took place in Saint Petersburg in July. For example, the nuclear submarine Orjol arrived from the Northern Fleet, which was for the first time an Oscar II ship class, which stayed in the Baltic Sea. After the Navy Parade, a joint exercise of navy fleets was organised which included the Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet as well as the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, landings were organised to the Hmeljovka training area in Kaliningrad Oblast.

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PARTICIPATION IN CONFLICTS The processes of 2017 continued in Syria to consolidate the power of President Bashar al-Assad. With the support of the RF’s forces, regions of rebel forces and Da’ish were overtaken (for example Quneitra, Daraa and Suwaydah provinces in Southern Syria). The activity on the ground is still important but diplomacy gained an increasingly larger importance manifested by continuous RF-Turkey-Iran meetings and agreements, partial support of the operation to capture of Afrin by Turkey (no intervention), creation of a “demilitarised zone” and seeking contact with Kurds.

In Libya, the RF has settled in the navy base at Tobruk and increased RF’s support to General Khalifa Haftar who is fighting with the UN recognised and USA supported government, although publicly they have offered themselves as peace mediators. According to experts, the interests of RF are primarily economic and related to weapon procurements, oil export and continuing with the railway project, but the desire to increase their influence in the region and decrease that of the USA and EU should not be dismissed.

Compared to 2017, the incidents of contact (by 45% to 8,176) as well as fatalities of Ukrainian fighters (by 33% to 146) has decreased in Eastern Ukraine.

During 2018, it was repeatedly reaffirmed that both high ranking officers as well as units of the RF participate in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

The vessels of the RF detained Ukrainian cargo vessels on the Sea of Asov, restricted free navigation and caused considerable economic damage to Ukrainian harbours on baseless grounds. On 25 November, the patrol ships of the RF fired at and rammed the navy vessels of Ukraine in the Kerch Strait which were en-route from Odessa to Mariupol in order to increase their presence on the Sea of Azov. The Ukrainian vessels were detained and the seamen on-board were arrested. This was the first incident when the RF attacked Ukrainian ships when flying its own flag. The incident caused strong international pressure due to which the RF has decreased the time spent on inspection of Ukrainian ships and the traffic of cargo ships has improved.

Regardless of the opposition from the Russian Orthodox Church and politicians of the RF, Ukraine got its autocephalous orthodox church by the end of the year. For the moment, 430 congregations have transferred into the new Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate which has still the largest following, which is why the influence of the RF through churches decreases in a nation with a predominantly religious population. The pro-Russian church is forced to change its name for it to clearly indicate its affiliation to the Russian Orthodox Church.

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SECURITY AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF NATIONAL DEFENCE Military Intelligence Centre

The Estonian Defence Forces is a unique organisation which aside from the use of lethal power fulfils many other duties which support the goal of national defence which are distributed among various civil institutions.

Therefore, the Estonian Defence Forces also perform law enforcement through Military Police, counter-intelligence operations in the protection of state secrets and classified foreign information, investigation and surveillance to discover crimes, reconnaissance to collect information on the enemy and to ensure security in the area of a military operation, the duties of an administrative body in the management of excise warehouse, duties of a rescue service agency in mine clearance operations and duties of an educational institution to organise the provision of vocational education.

The latter includes the training of conscripts which is an integral part of national defence education. In addition, it is important to remember that the constitutional obligation to participate in national defence includes all citizens of Estonia. The existence of this constitutional function differentiates the Estonian Defence Forces from other military-civilian authorities performing the aforementioned duties – police, security authorities and the Tax and Customs Board. The diverse powers of the Estonian Defence Forces remind of us of the well-known truth — noblesse oblige. It obliges to cherish the reputation of the Estonian Defence Forces without which it is hard to speak of a nation-wide national defence.

Today, the military intelligence of NATO member states includes security intelligence as an important aspect which aside from other duties shall ensure that there are no unreliable persons among servicemen and ensure the security of the defence forces (including important assets: security of specific communications equipment, armament as well as classified information).

This function is shadowed by the so-called regular duties of the Defence Forces – preparation of military defence of the country and participation in collective defence and international military operations. However, this is not an unimportant aspect of national military security. If in the planning of a military operation, the commander cannot be certain of the motivation of the troops to be sent to perform the combat mission, in that whether they are more loyal to the Oath of Allegiance given to the country or to a fellowship with a suspicious background, the success of the operation is doubtful from the outset.

The Military Intelligence Centre performs security intelligence the aim of which is to ensure that the Leadership of the Estonian Defence Forces is aware of security threats and the existence of information to implement counter measures. The security providing side of the Military Intelligence Centre helps to ensure that the military intelligence could focus on their main target – collect necessary information for the military defence of the country outside the territory of the Republic of Estonia.

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At the same time, it should be kept in mind that the safety of operations is dependent on an effective preparation – the operation is performed by trustworthy and checked servicemen and the necessary information is accessible only to the persons with the need to know. All of the foregoing confirms that the Estonian Defence Forces shall be certain that the security of its personnel, information and operation is ensured in the performance of its duties.

BACKGROUND CHECK One important method to ensure security is to perform background checks.

This should not be confused with security checks of security authorities, which are focused on background checks of persons who are given access to state secrets. Security checks are according to the Security Authorities Act part of counter intelligence and thereby primarily directed towards the obstruction of enemy reconnaissance. The nature of background checks as a measure of internal control is different.

The duty of the Estonian Defence Forces is to perform checks, among others, on persons applying to service or employment in the Estonian Defence Forces, active servicemen, officials and employees of the Estonian Defence Forces to assess their suitability and to decide whether to allow persons related to a provision of services to the restricted area of the Estonian Defence Forces. Thereby persons who are not sought after by the Estonian Defence Forces are screened out with the background check. The background check always requires the signature of the person. The background check shall ascertain circumstances and personality traits that hinder employment or service of the person in the Estonian Defence Forces.

Both servicemen as well as employees of the Estonian Defence Forces gain an access to sensitive information, are in contact with weapons, ammunition and explosives and have access to the restricted area and information systems of the Estonian Defence Forces. In recruitment, the Estonian Defence Forces has to be convinced that the person is suitable and reliable for the institution to preclude risks to the personnel, sensitive information and security and assets.

With the background check, various security risks are identified: corruptive behaviour of the employee, regular violation of security rules or negligent attitude in the treatment of information meant for professional use.

An example of a security risk looked for with a background check is interaction with persons with a criminal background and unethical practices which preclude service in the Estonian Defence Forces. Ties between organised crime and armed forces is mentioned as a serious threat in a report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) which stresses that the members of these groups are primarily interested in specific weapons training which is an extremely serious and growing concern. In the Armed Forces of the United States, the “representation” of 53 different criminal groups are identified.1 The close relationship of Russian-speaking organised crime with Russian special services and other branches of power make it a unique phenomenon,

https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment#Gangs-and%20the%20Military

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which is why the EU’s and NATO’s security authorities cannot ignore this threat. In reality, organised crime and Russian security authorities are inseparable. If a service member is not aware of this threat, this may lead to an extremely unfortunate consequence. Understandably, each service member is a target of possible extortion.

This situation is from the perspective of security of the Estonian Defence Forces extremely condemnable and can be precluded only by an effective background check. As young people who are seeking a career as service members shall also go through a background check, they should take into account that thoughtless actions may hinder this possibility. Every action leaves a mark, even in cyber space.

PROTECTION OF STATE SECRET In addition to the Estonian Internal Security Service and Foreign Intelligence Service, the Estonian Defence Forces are the third authority mentioned in the State Secrets and Classified Information of Foreign States Act dealing with the protection of state secrets. All three authorities have a specific role to play. The Estonian Internal Security Service is primarily the authority to organise the protection of state secrets and handle the violations. The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service is primarily concerned with the protection of communication channels designed for the transmission of classified foreign information and classified information. The Estonian Defence Forces is primarily the authority to process the state secret needed for national defence.

By virtue of the function of the military intelligence which includes various intelligence disciplines such as signals intelligence, and Estonia being a member of NATO resulting in active communication with allies, the Estonian Defence Forces is one of the largest possessors of classified information in Estonia. This is why the potential enemy is very interested in the information possessed by the Estonian Defence Forces.

Paraphrasing a known saying: if you want to keep a secret, you have to keep it a secret that you have a secret to keep. In addition, the Estonian Defence Forces does not only possess the secrets of the Republic of Estonia. Therefore, the security of our allies is also dependent on us. Protection of state secrets is not only the supervision of the adherence to formal rules. Careless management of a state secret related to national defence may result in serious consequences, including loss of lives.

Considering that the Estonian Defence Forces shall protect state secrets also outside of the Republic of Estonia, this is a difficult task that involves great responsibility.

As mentioned above, the protection of state secrets is a task of counter intelligence, the performance of which includes close cooperation with partners in security authorities. As of 1 July 2018, the organisation of the protection of state secrets in the Estonian Defence Forces is the responsibility of the Military Intelligence Centre as it is an integral part of the security of the Estonian

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Defence Forces. The Military Intelligence Centre has also the role of the advisor and obligation to participate in the legislative drafting related to the field.

The field of protection of state secrets involves a broad spectrum of activities: from monitoring of adherence to the requirements of state secret processing to organisation of state secret protection trainings. The trainings increase awareness which prevents violations due to ignorance or carelessness which may facilitate unlawful access to a state secret. An important part of the protection of state secrets is the technical inspection to detect wiretapping.

INFORMATION SECURITY Forces hostile towards Estonia are not only interested in information that constitute a state secret. Information for internal use only is, as the name suggests, used to establish goals set for the institution. Although different protection measures have been established for this information compared with materials under state secret protection, this does not mean that this is “less valuable information”. Information for internal use only is likewise the possession of the institution and the personal use thereof is essentially theft.

Careless management of sensitive national defence related information may have serious consequences. Be it information related to personal data, training or budget, this may provide an insight into the military capacity of the country for a potential enemy. The social media posts of conscripts during exercises and on the grounds thereof may seem unimportant when seen as a separate piece of information, but at the same time, it could be used to profile a specific service member.

Aside the protection of state secrets, the duty of the Military Intelligence Centre is to manage information that is related to security and meant for internal use only.

PROTECTION OF RESTRICTED AREA One of the most important changes in the organisation of the protection of the restricted areas of the Estonian Defence Forces came with amendments to the law that became effective on 1 July 2018 and take into account both the changed security situation as well as the development of technology, especially related with unmanned aerial vehicles or drones. Nowadays drones in civilian use can threaten sensitive national defence related information by recording illegally what is going on in the restricted area of the Estonian Defence Forces as well as commit attacks against the restricted area and persons within it.

As the implementation of counter measures is very time critical activity, the parliament approved amendments to the Defence Forces Organisation Act according to which flying a drone above the restricted area is considered illegal trespassing of the restricted area. The Estonian Defence Forces may detain the person who has committed this act and impose a fine. As the illegal activity related to the restricted area may be part of a bigger threat than the specific case, the Estonian Defence Forces cooperates closely with partners from law enforcement and security authorities to protect the restricted areas.

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The protection of restricted areas also involves aspects of the safety requirements for the infrastructure of the Estonian Defence Forces. Well thought out physical safety measures - fences, cameras and well-organised physical surveillance help to protect the property of service members and the Estonian Defence Forces. Risk prevention is always less costly than dealing with the consequences.

PERSONNEL SAFETY Although the area of personnel safety overlaps partially with that of background checking, background checks identify the service members who either may intentionally or unintentionally threaten the security of the Estonian Defence Forces from within, whereas the aim of personnel safety is to identify and prevent risks from outside.

External risks include persons who are too interested in the service assignments of service members without the need to know. They also involve persons who try to enter the restricted area without permission and terrorists who plan to attack Estonian service members in an international conflict area. For obvious reasons, the details of implementing counter measures is not something that is appropriate to be discussed at lengths for intelligence agencies, although the powers to do so have been expanded in the area in recent years.

In conclusion, it ought to be stressed that security services are an important part of military intelligence. The use of covert measures for the performance of military intelligence duties is not a privilege but simply adherence to the requirements of the legislation. The insufficient performance of this difficult but honourable obligation may at worst result in a situation where the decision-makers have not enough information for the military protection of the country. If an owl has left his nest unprotected, he may not be successful in catching bats.

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A YEAR OF PROGRESS AND PARTNERSHIP Giles Harris Colonel, Commander of the eFP Command in Estonia

2018 has been the first full year of eFP in Estonia, after a period of integration and orientation in 2017.

In 2018 we said goodbye to the Royal Welsh Regiment (including their goat Fusilier Llewelyn) and their excellent Danish contingent, and hello to the Yorkshire Regiment and the first elements of the Belgian contingent. We also welcomed the first deployment of the British Army’s WILDCAT helicopters.

As well as new units, 2018 brought us new weather. We were very pleasantly surprised by the hot summer and a proper winter, both of which tested our soldiering skills to the full. In addition, the truly impressive Ex SIIL gave us the opportunity to exercise on private land at scale for the first time and test our ‘road to crisis’ plans. I remember very clearly watching from a WILDCAT the eFP armoured infantry entering the town of Valga along with our Challenger 2 main battle tanks. When I arrived on the final objective I was met by the RSM of the eFP BG who said it had been the best exercise of his career. High praise indeed. It is definitely true that soldiers’ morale is highest when things are toughest, and the happy faces after Winter Camp are further proof.

It is fair to say that eFP is still doing things for the first time. Even though we should be extremely proud of what we achieved in 2017, together with the EDF, we are still learning and pioneering new skills and concepts. The deployment of some of the UK’s WILDCAT helicopters is an excellent example of this.

Having self-deployed to Estonia across the European continent, they trained with the EDF and our multinational partners, including the United States Air Force. We were honoured to transport the Estonian President, Prime Minister, CHOD and several other VIPs around the country during the wonderful Centenary celebrations. One of my proudest moments was seeing them play such a prominent role in the EDL’s emotional 100th year celebration at the Saku Arena, and at the British Ambassador’s Queen’s Birthday Party. The success of the WILDCAT deployment has meant that in 2019 they will return and with Apache helicopters too.

It is noteworthy that at all times during 2018 the UK eFP Battlegroup was ready to fight – we have always been ready and always will be. The eFP BG is now a normalised unit within the 1st Est Bde, much to the credit of the Bde HQ, and we owe them huge thanks again. The Brigade Integration Team (the ‘BIT’) also came of age in 2018 and the recent WINTER CAMP was a show of force by a small team of UK and BEL officers embedded in the Bde HQ – another ‘first’. During 2018 we also conducted the first live-firing exercise in Latvia (EX AXE) that included a Bde level FTX too. The movement of a whole Battlegroup to Latvia tested the EDF-eFP logistics team, and the ALERTEX halfway through the exercise itself reminded us of our wartime role and the need to be ready at all times wherever we are.

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Ex SIIL was a unique and memorable exercise for many reasons, not least the exceptional weather and the chance to drive a main battle tank through someone’s village! However, as well as the obvious training and STRATCOM benefit to the battlegroup, the eFP Command team in Tallinn made its first move as a deployed HQ. 2018 was always meant to be the year that the UK began to put more flesh on the bones of our national plans for crisis, and how we would command it. The eFPC deployed to Võru as part of the EDF main command post, with LNOs spread across the exercise. We tested our ROE procedures, and TOA requests. We began to understand the CIS challenges of making national decisions alongside an Estonian force, whilst mobile and separated from the capital and our Embassy. It is these sorts of things that are easy to sweep under the carpet while admiring a plan, but Ex SIIL allowed us the chance to get to grips with them instead.

Over Christmas, the EFPC conducted a series of TTXs to also test our response to individual incidents such as fake news, a serious accident or deterioration in the security environment. Furthermore, we now have plans to test ourselves in a cyber threat too, with EX CYBER FOG planned for 2019. So, as well as improving our tactical skills in the forest, we have been improving our operational skills in the HQs too. There is still much to do however.

An article about 2018 would not be complete without stories from the Centenary of Estonian Independence and our trips into wider Estonia. I cannot overstate how proud we all felt at the 100th Anniversary parade in Freedom Square. From that day we continued to take part in celebrations across the country, including ‘pop-up’ British Embassy events in each county.

We have spent more time in the north east, especially in Narva, which has been very welcome and we look forward to many more good times there.

British Army battlefield tours have arrived from the UK in increasing numbers too, as the profile of Estonia in the UK military continues to rise. In addition, our soldiers have conducted an unprecedented amount of adventure training including sea kayaking, skiing, fat-biking and other sports that they could not readily do in the UK. 2019 will see a large British Army Iron Man team deploy off the back of a successful time in 2018. The intent to get out and see more of Estonia than we did in 2017 has therefore definitely been met, although we look forward to doing a lot more. Our initial projects with the EDL look promising; as an example – we are very excited about plans to transport Challenger 2 tanks around the counties of Estonia to conduct anti-tank training with the EDL forces there.

Looking ahead to 2019, I can say with absolute confidence that the eFP will grow from strength to strength. There will be more ‘firsts’: Apache helicopters, Royal Marines in the JEF(M) exercise, the deployment of two UK Armoured battlegroups fielding more than 20 tanks each, all under the command of the EDF at various stages. We will enjoy collaboration with a UK-led Baltic Air Policing mission and also see the first CYBER FOG exercise that tests the tactical level of eFP. eFP is feeling more and more Joint (and more and more busy…!) and more and more rewarding.

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Once again I salute the members of the R WELSH and YORKs battlegroups for their brilliant attitude and professionalism in some challenging and novel times, and the leadership shown by the EDF chain of command they have worked for.

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BACK IN DENMARK – WITH FRUITFUL EXPERIENCES Per B. Jørgensen Major, eFP/DANCON public affairs officer

Throughout the entire year of 2018, 200 Danish troops participated in NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence in Estonia. The troops have been on alert around the clock and have performed intensive drills. While being deployed in Estonia, the Danish troops did not waste their time and took advantage of the surrounding area in Tapa.

The diverse Estonian climate has given the Danish troops the chance to be in a battlefield environment in both the blazing heat and the freezing cold weather of Estonia. “This experience has assisted very much in furthering the cooperation with the Estonians and the British. The inter-relations have functioned well,” says Captain Mark Sorensen who is company commander of the Danish Armored Infantry Company, which is a part of the British-lead Battlegroup.

The Danish troops have been staying at the new military barracks in Tapa.

For the Danish troops, these physical surroundings have been of an entirely different standard of what they are used to at their barracks in Denmark. The troops have been organized into rooms according to their platoons and sections; officers, NCO’s and privates have all lived together and have been mixed across ranks, functions and gender – it is the soldier’s function and his/hers place in the platoon and section that matters. The troops have been together 24/7 and have used this opportunity for drills and education.

“Through their time in Estonia the platoon has achieved a lot of experience.

Personally, I have achieved a lot of good experience as a platoon leader through this intensive process we have had” Says Peter who is 1st lieutenant and platoon leader in the company.

“I have had the opportunity to get to know my fellow soldiers really well, through the good and the bad, through the sunny days as well as the rainy.

Through bad moods and when everything seems a little rough,” Says Peter.

The huge terrain north of Tapa has been used frequently by the Danish troops. Here, substantial parts of the drills have been performed in cooperation with the British and Estonian colleagues.

Especially the swampy areas and the forest-filled landscapes have been an eye-opener for the Danish troops. The Estonian troops have, as OPFOR, encouraged their Danish colleagues to show up to locations where the Danish troops would not have expected them. Even the infantry fighting vehicle, CV90, can come driving through a dense forest.

“This has made us put more emphasis on the ability to observe and react faster in a closed terrain, where the soldiers more often than not only have been able to move forward a few hundred meters an hour, due to the dense forests or swamp-areas”, tells staff sergeant Kristian, who has been in charge of a part of the education in the company.

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The infantry and the crew on the CV90´s have had a good outcome by exchanging experiences with their Estonian brothers in arms – an educational teamwork regarding the CV90 have been well established, and this will surely be built on in the foreseeable future.

The Danish troops are now back in Denmark having been exchanged by a Belgium unit just prior to their return home. However, the plan going forward will involve Denmark sending another unit of 200 soldiers to Estonia already in 2020. Until then a smaller number of staff officers will represent Denmark in Estonia.

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NATO MULTINATIONAL DIVISION NORTH EAST – FACTA, NON VERBA Lieutenant Colonel Antti Viljaste Senior Staff Officer at NATO Multinational Division North East (MDN NE)

NATO has been forced to take some steps to strengthen its eastern arm in response to Russia’s activities in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. To achieve this, deterrence measures have been enhanced in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and other eastern member states.

The wider audience has seen this activity through new tasks established for the NATO Multinational Corps Northeast, the escalation of large-scale exercises and the formation of NATO Force Integration Units and enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle groups. One of the largest latest steps has been the formation of the NATO Multinational Division Northeast in Poland, Elblag.

The decision to establish the division was jointly made by the member states at the NATO Warsaw Summit in 2016. After this, administrative preparations immediately started and Poland as the host country has, from spring 2017, made considerable contributions to the establishment of the staff through the renewal of infrastructure, reorganisation of units and allocation of resources. All this has been done to achieve the battle readiness of the staff as soon as possible.

In addition to Polish officers and non-commissioned officers, the officers and non-commissioned officers of 13 allied countries are serving in the staff of the division. With the help of NATO upper structures and training support from the USA, the process of assessing the battle readiness of the staff of the division was completed in December 2018. On 6 December, the battle readiness was evaluated to be Excellent.

This step is special because the orientation of the division is both territorially as well as from the perspective of assignments focused on the implementation of collective defence operations in the North East corner of NATO according to Article 5, if necessary. In addition to the aforementioned, the peacetime task of the division is the coordination of training for the eFP battle groups and creating an awareness of the situation in the region.

In practice, the cooperation has been smooth. The biggest challenge has been the change of mentality and reorientation from planning counter terrorism operations, which took place in Iraq and Afghanistan to the planning of conventional warfare.

The year and a half went by quickly, as the focus was on continuous training. Training has been conducted at the individual as well as at the branch and department level, the most effective of which were certainly several staff operational trainings.

The staff of the division also participated in many international major exercises of which Allied Spirit and Sabre Strike 17 organised by the United States

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European Command should be mentioned. In addition, there was participation in many NATO alert readiness exercises and national exercises within the area of responsibility. The lessons learned in the last year and a half can be summed by three keywords: Good will – the establishment of an international staff from scratch in a year and a half is a very short period and the Staff of Multinational Division Northeast is a great example of NATO’s responsiveness and flexibility if there is enough will.

Flexibility – in the fast-paced world we are now faced with, it is necessary that the departments and branches of the staff remain aware and monitor developments within their function and area of responsibility on a daily basis during peacetime as well. The heads of departments and branches must not wait and even cannot wait until someone high above writes a new doctrine, regulation or other document. New developments and changes must be quickly integrated into the work routine independently.

The initiative and proactivity of heads of departments and branches are the keywords here. The aim of planning is not a fireproof plan but to go through the process in a detailed manner with readiness to make quick and accurate changes and if need be, to change the plan.

Cooperation – in the military, all efforts are joint efforts. Creating and maintaining an environment of cooperation is certainly one of the key factors. The importance of this when working with NATO allies in an international environment is increasing day by day. To succeed, every team member must contribute, managers and leaders are not enough. For this, every man and woman must be aware of the different military cultures, religious backgrounds, habits and customs of other countries. Cooperation is primarily put to test in the conduct of day-to-day activities.

Each member state is considerably stronger as an alliance than separately and we must remember that the unity of the alliance is the strategic centre of balance, which the opposing team is focused on unbalancing. In the light of the above, it is good to recognise the maturity and good sense of the Estonian Defence Forces not to abandon the conscript service and reserve army as well as keep the primary focus on training for conventional warfare.

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FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE CYBER COMMAND Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Kannel Second in Command of the Cyber Command

The youngest unit of the Estonian Defence Forces is six months old at the time of writing this article (established de jure on 1 July 2018). Regardless of its young age, the Cyber Command is not the nest egg of the family needing to be cared after, but rather one of the pillars of the Estonian Defence Forces on which the institutions and units within the area of government may rely without hesitation. The goal of the change in organisation was to enhance the efficiency of the service arm and consolidate the cyber expertise of the area of government of the Ministry of Defence under the Cyber Command. The largest part of today’s staff came from Headquarters Staff and the Signal Battalion, which celebrated its 100th year of operation last year.

The first months of the Cyber Command have been busy and active. The Cyber Command has both a peacetime as well as a wartime structure and the statutes includes the main tasks (Statutes of the EDF1 and Statutes of the Cyber Command2). The Cyber Command’s areas of operation are the following: conduct of cyber and information operations, training and research development of the service arm, securing the work environments of staff, including physical security, training and formation of reserve units, management of information and communication technology and public relations of the Estonian Defence Forces.

The preparation and training of reserve units is the responsibility of all Cyber Command’s sub-units and this is coordinated through the Schools of Communications within the Staff and Signal Battalion. The responsibility of the Staff and Signal Battalion is the establishment and security of a working environment for the staff to command. An entirely new unit the Cyber and Information Operations Centre (CIOC) has the task to develop and implement new cyber and information operations capabilities for the Defence Forces. The Information and Communication Technology Centre ensures the availability of daily IT services for the users and manages the development of the service arm with the primary focus on the improvement of tactical communications systems and regard for the developments in the technology, input from the user and practical experiences. Public relations is the responsibility of the Strategic Communications Centre and the daily support for the Cyber Command is provided by the Staff and Support Company (see figure).

During times of crisis or war, the Defence Forces shall maintain control on the country’s territory, use the defence capacity to withhold aggression and in the failure thereof, defend the integrity and sovereignty of the country with all existing military resources, including in the cyber domain. The rapid development of technology has created a rather unpredictable, volatile and complex environment for national defence which offers opportunities for defence while also creates new risks. During the last decades, social media and the cyber space has been repeatedly used as an effective weapon to mobilise people to overthrow governments (Tunisia, Egypt – 2011), to intervene with

Statutes of the Estonian Defence Forces (State Gazette 21 June 2018 no 45).

Statutes of the Cyber Command (order no. 149 of the Commander of the Defence Forces of 9 July 2018).

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CYBER COMMAND HQ

CC structure

Staff and the Signal Battalion

Staff and Support Company Cyber and Information Operations Centre

Information and Communication Technology Centre

Strategic Communications Centre

CYBER COMMAND Active Service

Joonis 2. Küberväejuhatuse isikkoosseis

National Voluntary Reserve

Volunteers from Public and Private Sector (Defence League, Cyber Defence Units, Educational Institutions, Etc.) Volunteers without EDF Service Duty

Units of Regular Readiness Conscripts Reservists Reserv Units (Wartime Units)

International Strategic Partnership

Institutions and Organizations Public and Private Sector Educational Institutions Partner Nations Interest Groups Private Citizens Etc.

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elections (USA, Italy – 2016, France – 2017), to disturb electrical power systems (Ukraine – 2015), to find exploitations to steal information about military plans and equipment of other countries. This is reality and the world we live in today together with opponents who are not afraid to use all available options.

Our digital way of life (dependency) and the benefits and opportunities drawn from it, including the use of ICT technology on the battlefield (digital fire control, positioning, live messaging, monitor of networks, etc.), aids us in achieving our main goal – safeguarding the Republic of Estonia. From history, we can learn from the mistakes of others and ourselves but it is also important to predict and be ready for the next battlefield. Influencing the existing forces in the kinetic world through the softer field of cyber and information operations has become an effective tool on both the strategic and the operational level of command.

In the cyber domain, our reaction time, constancy of awareness and its consistency with other domains is being tested. Future trends are in no means making our work easier. The use of artificial intelligence in warfare sounds like a scenario from a Hollywood science fiction but as time passes we are more and more likely to see automated cyber battles and drones in the kinetic world.

The “armoured unit” of the cyber operations of the Defence Forces is located in the CIOC where the prevention of the goals of enemies in cyber space is a daily activity with active attacks (deceit, disturbance, ambush, etc.) conducted as is necessary. Cyber space is active day and night and this poses high demands for the CIOC. This is a unit in perpetual readiness, which comprises service members, conscripts and volunteers from the public and private sector.

The entire personnel of the Cyber Command may be used when more human resources are needed for a cyber operation.

The number of employees and positions are laid down in the wartime table of organisation of the Defence Forces. We do not have to limit ourselves with numbers in tables and on paper to win the cyber war. There are people all over the world who wish to go against injustice and are ready to help us or have ceased to believe the endless promises of the aggressor. CIOC may be joined through the conscript service, as a volunteer or strategic partner, without being a citizen of the Republic of Estonia.

Strategic importance and selection of cooperation partners depends how our joint effort aids us in reaching the goal. This may be a formal or informal ally with whom resources are shared and each other’s cyber capabilities are enhanced and complemented. Taking into account the global nature of cyber space, owners of networks, pace of developments and so on, the involvement of a reliable and capable ally is unavoidable. The time spent to gather, process and analyse information can already be saved through the use of foreign resources.

It is more effective to use the developments and solutions of the private sector instead of building all of it from scratch.

Service members together with conscripts and international volunteers at the Cyber Command make up the core of the personnel, which is in perpetual readiness, as it conducts daily cyber operations with reserve units providing assistance during exercises and wartime. Domestic volunteers who have not

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gone through the conscript service but want to contribute to national defence with their knowledge and skills have a place within the Cyber Command. As a whole, the Defence Command has great potential and global scope (including on the physical territory of the enemy) the location and capabilities of units thereof are difficult to be discovered and stopped. Relatively cheap and easily accessible technological solutions, such as access to the internet and information shared within, add additional individual soldiers to the cyber battlefield who remain a constant threat to the opponent and work for our benefit. Each spine counts.

The command post of the Cyber Command may be a traditional command element located in one or many physical locations in the landscape, but looking forward into the future, it may be dispersed globally in the virtual world.

Our goal is to provide better command support regardless of our location in the kinetic or cyber world. The service members of the Cyber Command are identified by Staff and Signal Battalion emblem or the Cyber Command emblem approved by the Commander of the Defence Forces on 3 December. One of the more important elements of the emblem are the double-edged sword with the cyber domain symbol @ and crossed bolts of lightning that join and integrate the four battle grounds (land, air, sea, outer space) in each corner of the emblem.

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ACHIEVING INTEROPERABILITY IN MALI Major Kristjan Karist Commander of the Armoured Infantry Company C of the Scouts Battalion, Commander of the Estonian Contingent in Mali in 2018.

In the beginning of 2018 when I received a confirmation about deployment to Mali, I requested myself as the company commander to be sent with my platoon. I could foresee that our biggest challenge would be achieving interoperability because it rarely all works out exactly as laid out in the documents.

We were set to start our service within the 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment of the French Foreign Legion in Gao at the end of June. Before the deployment, we had discussed the differences in resources, procedures and language to better understand each other. The staffs of the Estonian Defence Forces and French Armed Forces knowingly agreed on technical nuances to ensure fluency.

Despite all of this, a lot of work was necessary to ensure cooperation and rise to the occasion. The following are some excerpts from my diary: 07.08, the Estonian contingent landed at the Gao airfield. I talk with the battalion commander, who has come to welcome us, about us being late since we promised to arrive by St John’s Day. I report that the equipment required to perform our duties has been scheduled on NATO flights and will be delayed.

The Legionnaire Colonel shakes his head and says that NATO allies will not land here; not because of the unsuitability of the airfield but due to political reasons, but he is glad that at least the personnel is here.

17.08, the last IL-26 landed. By evening, the trucks and magazines have been loaded – the familiar Scouts Battalion line of battle. We had relied on HAW C17 for the transport of our equipment but they finally still refused to land in Gao on the grounds that the airfield is not certified, although I have repeatedly seen RAF certified C17s land in Gao. The supplies were reloaded to Ukrainians, but we lost ten days. In the meantime, we spent the time to study the procedures from simple safety equipment to assisting helicopter landings.

18.08, the adjustment of electronic counter measure devices begins. There is a special area to test the IRIS jamming devices and you need to appoint a time. When we switched on our IRIS devices, it became clear that they did not harmonize with the communication equipment of allied forces and the headsets of armoured vehicle operators will buzz. We need additional time for tuning. I start explaining the situation in my line of command as well as with the French. The problem with IRIS devices initially persists.

19.08, adjustment and inspection of light weapons, first day in the field.

Time passes, pressure increases, the decision has to be made whether to head off without IRIS devices and means of communication or not. Weapons need to be inspected in order to be ready to act. The French add an armoured platoon from the armoured company on VBCIs (véhicule blindé de combat d’infanterie – infantry fighting vehicle) to us and we take the risk of heading out of the base to the firing range. Everything goes well. Firearms are adjusted.

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20.08, introduction to the capabilities of the unit. I give a presentation to the Battalion Commander of our capabilities: I talk of who we are, where we come from, what are we prepared for and what are our limits. We showcase our squad and equipment. I am surprised by the Battalion Commander’s detailed knowledge of medicine, for example, but also by the professional reaction by the medic when they discussed blood transfusion. Everybody is impressed by the firepower of Carl Gustaf’s fragmentation grenade and the engineering capabilities of the platoon in combating IEDs. I say that the theoretical part of integration exhausted itself and the only way forward is to try it out in practical assignments. The commander agrees and suggests moving forward step by step. We initially try out guarding the perimeter of the Gao base and see it from there. At the moment, the main problem is lack of tactical communication with the command post. The Colonel seeks authorisation from Paris for the delivery of French stations and installation thereof into our vehicles.

21.08, the Estonian contingent guards the perimeter of the Gao base for the first time. There is no authorisation from Paris to deliver French stations for us yet. The Battalion Commander allows us to guard the base regardless of there being no tactical communication capability. If the level of alert would have been raised and there had been the need to communicate with additional units, we would have been in trouble.

22.08, the French receive permission to share with us their frequency ranges to adjust the IRIS devices. In the morning, we go and inspect the posts with the Battalion Commander. The Colonel pointed out that our MG3 had been placed next to the Browning. When he asked the soldier about it, the reply was that the MG3 was more reliable since the Brownings had not been cleaned for a long time. This impressed the Colonel and he is pleased with the attitude and discipline.

24.08, the Estonian contingent guards the perimeter of the Gao base for the second time. The legionaries respond quickly and by this time, we are given French portable tactical stations. In the meanwhile, we had adjusted and attuned the IRIS devices to the French communication devices. One-step at a time. The Battalion Commander needs acknowledgement for achieving this in a large army. It is not exactly common that one country gives another classified battle material. The French also announce that they have an intermediary station to connect our stations and they requested it to be sent here – this is good news because this would eliminate the need for the new stations. It takes 77 days for the intermediary station to arrive and operate.

25.08, the Estonian contingent patrols the city of Gao for the first time. Together with the legionaries, we start our first patrol and communicate among ourselves with the French portable station. Regardless of the fact that we have not had the chance to test our mounted guns, the communication with the command post is not encrypted between our vehicle and the French staff, the patrol is over without incident.

26.08, adjustment of heavy weapons. The Platoon Commander could have thought his day through better, the spare weapon with the technician was left

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behind and as there are problems with the heavy machine guns, the firing day has to be repeated. The firing range is shared among many units and it is not easy to book a time. It takes yet another month before we get the heavy weapons to operate as needed.

30.08, the Estonian contingent patrols the city of Gao for the second time.

The patrol is in pairs again. There is an incident at the gate when the armoured vehicle’s armed mounted gun starts to fire spontaneously. It later turns out that the fault lies in the electrical trigger and synchronisation of the turret.

We sustained our first reputational damage. In the French Armed Forces, this kind of incident requires weapons training for the entire personnel, which we underwent.

01.09, first time acting as a quick reaction force (QRF). Cancelled from the Operations Headquarters in Chad, as we are not trusted with it. They are not sure of the validity of our procedures. I am a bit mad at myself because I should have foreseen it. We reach a deal that we organise some exercises to ensure the compliance of procedures.

03.09, the first QRF exercise. The exercise takes place during the first independent patrol. I join the platoon with one French officer. In the place of our choosing, the platoon had to report an incident of driving onto an IED, of treating the wounded in action and calling assistance. The assistance actually arrived and the place of where the units would link-up and how to recognise each other in the field had to be defined. The process was difficult since we communicate with the command post through an open channel of our station with the link-up communicated with the portable encrypted station. All goes well and confidence in us grows among the legionaries.

In the evening, we are visited by a three-star general, Commander of Operation BARKHANE. At the meeting, he is impressed by our confidence and morale – willingness to act until the target is met regardless of difficulties.

He hears the results of the first exercise and gives permission to use us as the QRF unit, if the legionaries are satisfied with the results.

05.09, a French field radio is installed into the Estonian armoured vehicle.

Prerequisites for a unified operational overview has been established.

06.09, routine patrol. The station is not operating as necessary; there is reception but no transmission further than a kilometre.

07.09, first official QRF. We had to perform another exercise but this was intervened by a real incident outside the perimeter. The platoon rushes out faster than is required. The situation resolves and we transmit the exercised scenario via the station, which is resolved professionally. Communication between different units in the field is successful. The station is still malfunctioning. The Deputy Battalion Commander expresses recognition of the compliance of our procedures, which makes me very happy.

09.09, routine patrol. Finally, the French field radio is operational and communication in the command network is good even beyond 20 km. We have proved ourselves and can start the service as scheduled.

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Prior to deployment, I asked the Battalion Adjutant of the 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment out of politeness about the soldier’s mood when France won the 2018 football World Cup, and he said: “We would be happier over an Estonian platoon in Gao.” In addition to the political focus, the French were motivated to integrate the Estonian contingent out of operational necessity. The battle group’s area of responsibility in Northern Mali was the size of Estonia and the success of this operation may decide the participation of other allied countries in the operation.

A month of aching for interoperability may seem like a long time but in reality, it is not. Friction and confusion is integral to all processes. Previously, I had experience with similar challenges in many international exercises. This gave me confidence that with enough openness, everything can be resolved. Looking back, the French regard this as a success. In the first month, we established the prerequisites to start the service. The finer details are being figured out to this day. These prerequisites could not have been established if the risks had not been taken and the comfort zone not been stepped out of. At the end of the day, our goal was the same.

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ESTPLA-25 CONCLUDED THE LEBANON MISSION Major Kristjan Leimann Chief of Staff of the Air Defence Battalion of the 1st Infantry Brigade, Commander of the Estonian Contingent in Lebanon in 2018

On 17 December 2018, the last infantry platoon of the Estonian Defence Forces that served in the UN Lebanon peacekeeping mission UNIFIL arrived in Tallinn. With breaks, Estonia has participated in the Lebanon missions since 1996 with over 400 Estonian service members having been stationed there. Participation in smaller missions will continue.

The mission has given us experience in peacekeeping as a tactical unit in situations which differ significantly from that of Iraq or Afghanistan.

Estonia participated in the last rotation of the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon with a mechanised infantry platoon including a logistics element and staff officers, which formed the Estonian contingent, ESTCON-8. The tasks of the platoon ESTPLA-25 were observation, patrols and manning of checkpoints.

Excluding ESTCON-1 that had a company-sized unit in the country during 1996–97, seven Estonian platoons with leaderships have rotated in Lebanon.

The nature of the work is largely the same for all. These are the notes from the mission of the commander of the last contingent.

We guarded the blue line (border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel).

We guarded that nobody would unintentionally step on the notional line nor cross it in the open terrain.

One of the most common “incidents” that the Estonian platoon was confronted with was related to Lebanon citizens who, probably to check the alertness of Israeli and UNIFIL soldiers or to just provoke, stood in the middle of the blue line or crossed it by a up to a meter. Mostly the same people also took pictures of the Israeli side and shouted “greetings” to that side.

There was always some reaction. It usually resulted in Israeli soldiers coming near the demarcation line separated by a fence and barbed wire. The distance was usually three to ten metres with “greetings” sometimes exchanged, but there were situations where the Lebanese provokers were warned with machine gun bursts above their heads.

It should be reminded that de facto Lebanon and Israel are at war with each other and the blue line with a total length of 120 km is not a interstate border. It indicates the line the Israeli troops had withdrawn to by 25 May 2000. In 2007, both sides agreed with UNIFIL that the blue line shall be made clearly visible on the terrain. To this end, UNIFIL placed blue barrels along the blue line that are clearly visible at a distance and it was agreed that nobody may cross this line.

IN THE CROSSFIRE The job of the Estonian soldier was to record the conflict situation in the area or on the blue line, report this to the staff above and de-escalate the situation, if

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necessary. Estonian soldiers were the ones who had to put themselves between the sides at odds to ensure that a small incident between Israel and Lebanon would not escalate into something bigger.

As I too found myself in a situation like this once, I can assure that it is very uncomfortable to stand in front of a soldier who is shouting something in a foreign language to a machine gun position at the opposite side five meters away. Common sense told me that they could not possibly shoot a blue helmet and so I stepped between the Lebanese soldier and Israel’s border and politely indicated that it is time to return to the vehicles at the distance. And so we walked on the one meter wide track in the middle of a mine field that led from the UNIFIL demarcation line back to the vehicles parked further away with an uncomfortable feeling in the back of my neck.

What are the insights and experiences we can take from this that help our soldiers, Defence Forces and Estonia?

Starting from the staff officers and non-commissioned officers who served here, the first and foremost is the experience to work in the multinational IRISHFINBATT staff. Furthermore, since 41 countries were represented in UNIFIL, it was an unforgettable experience to meet and communicate with soldiers from many different countries. In total, there were 10 500 servicemen and 815 civilians working in UNIFIL at the time.

Due to the different equipment that the Finnish and Irish units used, the battalion had two independent support units. Both were concerned with the equipment, supplies and logistics of their country. In addition, a Fiji infantry company was subordinated under the IRISHFINBATT by the higher staff. The Staff of the Battalion was common and positions within various sections were distributed among Irish and Finnish officers and non-commissioned officers.

The second and certainly not less important benefit or rather lesson was organising low intensity operations in the conflict area. Post-war peacekeeping assignments are quite different from war at the front line which is what Estonia is training its defence forces for. There was no clear enemy or front line. There were friendly and unfriendly faces alike throughout the area of responsibility.

The work of the Contingent Commander was divided into three. The first and most obvious was communication between the Estonian platoon, contingent and the Estonian Defence Forces. This was supplemented by the preparation of weekly reports and transmission thereof to the situation centre of the Estonian Defence Forces. As the presence of an Estonian intelligence officers was not justified, this part and analysis was also on the shoulders of the Contingent Commander. The second task which filled most of the time was working as the officer of the operational planning section. And last but not least, the Contingent Commander had to represent ESTCON and Estonia at official events of the UNIFIL.

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LOCALS

Inhabitants of Southern Lebanon are so used to the presence of UNIFIL that they generally let the UNIFIL soldiers patrol the area without disturbance.

This cooperative attitude has been facilitated by the numerous UNIFIL support programmes in its area of responsibility the total volume of which has been over 40 million US dollars since 2006.

The recent history of Lebanon has shown, however, that this appearance of peace may change at any time. The strategy of some of the locals and Hezbollah is to “lull” the vigilance of UNIFIL units for the peacekeeping units to dispatch. There have been several armed conflicts and 313 UN soldiers have lost their lives in Southern Lebanon over 40 years.

What upsets and even angers the locals so much that it is taken out on the UNIFIL soldiers, is photographing and filming — two of the most dangerous activities here. The situation will worsen even more when the locals discover that photos are taken in secret. To this, the locals have generally reacted with blocking the road and confiscating the entire recording equipment, although there have been instances of physical attacks as well.

A portion of the Lebanese people are still of the opinion that UNIFIL and Israel together spy on them. This cannot be entirely regarded as paranoia because indeed it was a daily sight to see an Israeli drone circling the UNIFIL area, observing everything in the area.

END RESULT How to assess the impact of the Estonian contingents to the region? In the perspective of UNIFIL and its 40 years of operation, we were just a drop of water in the sea with our 3.5 years and one platoon.

The people in the area of responsibility of the battalion will certainly remember Estonians for some time because we were distinguished by our polite and restrained manners and very high military professionalism. The same is probably valid for what our Finnish and Irish colleagues remember of us.

The best result is certainly the ongoing peace between Lebanon and Israel.

Although officially at war, thanks to UNIFIL, including the Estonian soldiers who skilfully resolved misunderstandings at and near the blue line, the hostilities have ceased for 12 years and the local population has been able to live a peaceful life.

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FREE MARKET WEAPONS PROCUREMENTS INCREASE COMPETITION AND STRINGENCY Ingrid Mühling Estonian Centre for Defence Investment, Head of Communications

Last year, many major procurements important to the Defence Forces came to conclusion: in June, the contract to purchase self-propelled howitzers from South-Korea was concluded, an inter-agency commission selected a successful tenderer for the assault rifle procurement and the long range antitank weapons, which will take our antitank capability to a new level, was announced.

The selection of weapons and weapons systems that shape the nature of the Defence Forces for the coming decades is a hard challenge, the preparation for which begins years before the procurement is announced. After the political decision, the Defence Forces establishes which weapon systems are needed for which unit. It is clear that firearms for the first and second infantry brigade shall be suitable in both durability and ease of use for reservist and not live up to the specific demands of special forces, and with regard to the assessment of antitank weapons requirements, the Defence Forces has the specific 1st Infantry Brigade unit in mind that will be using them.

The preparation also includes market research to get an insight into the weapons available on the market, the level of development of manufacturers and what are the products we are able to choose from them. This together allows the Defence Forces to prepare and put together requirements for weapons or weapon systems and give a preliminary assessment on the cost. Only then the work of the procurement commission led by the Centre of Defence Investments begins which includes the representatives of the Defence Forces, Ministry of Defence, Centre of Defence Investments and other agencies, if necessary, and the procurement conditions will be laid down.

The Finns with meticulous care, characteristic of them, did the preparation for the procurement of self-propelled howitzers that was concluded last year for us.

Finland procured 48 K9 self-propelled howitzers from South Korea and their expectations to the weapons were the same as ours – conscripts are the users, environmental conditions akin to ours. The howitzers procured by Estonia are little used but in good condition. It is important to note that this is still a transaction between states. There were not many options to choose from and in any case they would have brought about negotiations with the manufacturer as well as some country.

The most important development of last year were two large-scale open market procurements, which reached important milestones. The inter-agency procurement commission declared as the successful tenderer of the assault rifle procurement, the USA weapons manufacturer Lewis Machine and Tool Company, whereas in the antitank weapons procurement, the sole tenderer was EuroSpike GmbH, whose

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weapon systems are used by the armed forces of 31 nations.

Free market procurement of weapons meant for the Centre of Defence Investments and the whole Estonian defence sphere to operate in a new situation and a principal decision to transfer from country-to-country purchases to the free market based system in large-scale defence procurements. For example, the procurement of self-propelled howitzers from Korea is a country-to-country purchase. This pattern has been the basis for Estonia’s procurement of the antitank weapon Javelin in recent years and firearms, howitzers and other equipment in years before that.

In the procurement of assault rifles and antitank weapons, an open procurement procedure was used where all interested parties were allowed to submit tenders. On the one hand, this increases transparency and competition, and opens up opportunities for the Estonian defence industry, but on the other hand, this results in weapons manufacturers actively (and sometimes aggressively) competing about a market share or contract which involves the use of law and communication offices, politicians and sometimes even members of the Defence Forces and Defence League.

The contest of competing companies points to a new challenge – the procurements of assault rifles and antitank weapons are affirming that the need for legislation on lobbying is yet again relevant. At the moment, the legislation of Estonia does not for example, regulate whom and on what conditions they may lobby in political circles and whether and how they should be identified.

It is appropriate to note that in may countries the law prohibits servicemen from working for weapons companies for some time after military service. This may not be applicable one-to-one in Estonia, but it is certainly condemnable when the representatives of competing weapons manufactures praise their products in the public or lobbies as members of the Defence League or former servicemen and do not reveal their actual employer. In a small society where people are closely related, clarity and understanding who is, currently paying respected members of society is important. Laws would certainly help make the situation less ambivalent and more concrete but critical thinking is also needed from politicians and the media.

Despite the elevated public interest towards the procedures of recent major procurements, the figures show that in reality, there are few differences of opinion between tenderers and contracting authorities. In 2017, eight of the 698 procurements of the Centre of Defence Investments were disputed and the centre had to revise its decision only for two of these. In 2018, nine of more than 1,000 procurement projects were disputed, in seven cases the centre was declared right.

For the Centre of Defence Investments as well as all other parties related to procurements, operating in free market conditions requires more preciseness and higher expectations for oneself and well-preparedness and patience in explaining ones actions. From now on, we have to become accustomed to free market procurements because ultimately this gives the Estonian defence industry more opportunities to compete and enhances the prospect of procuring the best weapons and weapon systems for the Estonian Defence Forces.

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SIIL DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE SYSTEM WORKS Major General Indrek Sirel Deputy Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces Siil was a truly large-scale exercise. How many participated in it?

The total amount of people who were, in one way or another, connected to Siil exceeds 18,000 people. Aside from service members, members of the Defence League and allies, including police, officials of the rescue service, prison officers, medical professionals — everybody who were directly involved with the scenario of the exercise. According to our calculation, there were 16,300 armed people during the most important stage of the exercise on the three days when the entire territorial defence structure was formed and performed the tasks assigned.

How was the Defence Forces pleased with the results of Siil?

The Commander and the leadership of the Estonian Defence Forces primarily assess this on the basis of how well the objectives of the exercise were achieved.

The main objective of Siil was to verify and evaluate the battle readiness and the capacity of territorial defence to perform tasks of military national defence.

This was verified. Therefore, the main objective of Siil was achieved.

In addition, during the exercise, we evaluated the activity of two battalion-sized units, practiced performance of combat assignments by the Defence League, cooperation with allies and comprehensive national defence. All of these goals were reached at least at an acceptable level. It is clear that we are capable of preparing, organising and managing an operation of that size but we also gained a lot of information for analysis.

The exercise was divided into four areas of activity. First, verifying the functioning of territorial defence. We were assured that territorial defence based on the Defence League is directly contributing to the military capabilities of the Estonian Defence Forces and at the same time, is able to support internal security locally and is a perfectly functioning institution. In order to verify this separately, there was an assessment group lead by the Inspector General of the Defence Forces. The system works but the analysis on how to improve it lies ahead.

The other area that distinguishes Siil from the standard Spring Storm, is comprehensive national defence. Siil became an exercise of comprehensive national defence during planning, on the initiative of the Defence League. In addition to the structures of the Ministry of Interior, Police, Border Guard and Rescue Board, some structures of the Prison Service were also included. We observed how hospitals operated during the exercise TervEx. Local governments were also involved and everything worked out.

The third area was cooperation with allies. Especially important was planning. As a new element, we organised a planning event in which the planning and coordination element of NATO Multinational Corps Northeast was based

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in Estonia and planned the arrival of additional forces according to the scenario of the exercise. NATO High Readiness Force ARRC (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps) also participated in the planning. We were greatly benefitted by the command element of the eFP battle group (eFPC) and NATO Force Integration Units joining us to the terrain and communicating with us directly.

The way we coordinated our activity with Latvia was completely novel. Essentially, Siil simultaneously took place in Estonia as well as Latvia (under the name Ezis 18). The Latvian operational level staff element was involved in planning which concerned the Corps Northeast. We have reached a stage where we can also coordinate cross-border activity. There is a lot of room for development, but this is the first step.

The fourth area was our capability to organise a two-sided tactical exercise at the brigade level and the capability was indeed confirmed. It was pride inducing to talk to commanders of units about the routine activity which at the time meant assignments which involved around 9000 people, 2000 vehicles and lots of battle equipment from all over Estonia. It must be asked, however, is the way we conduct the exercise, for example the referee system, justified. I have already given instructions how the next Spring Storm should differ from this.

Is it overly simplistic to say that the second Siil had more to do with examining the 2nd Infantry Brigade?

The aim of the second Siil (2018) was primarily to examine territorial defence.

According to the development plan of the Estonian Defence Forces, Siil for the 2nd Infantry Brigade is set to come in the future, once the brigade is fully trained and equipped by 2022. Although the 2nd Infantry Brigade was the main unit trained in the 3rd stage (main operations) of the exercise and the 2 battalions under examination were operating within the organisation of the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

There has been criticism in the media of the so-called slacking, i.e. not all participants of Siil knew what was their task. Has this been dealt with in the planning of Siil?

I think this is a normal discussion that arises after every major exercise. The aim of organising the exercises of this scale is certainly not giving every last one of the soldiers a chance to fire the ammunition handed to them in the general direction of the imaginary opponent.

Already by being on their positions, every unit performed their duty. This eventually made the opponent to change their plans. Thereby, the aim of deterrence was achieved. This is why we have organised two-sided exercises, for the opposing side to have actual scale in either defence or attack. Every solider understand their role in an actual manoeuvre.

As the general manager of the exercise, I certainly do not assess the success of the exercise on the basis of whether every soldier had the chance to fire at the enemy. Rather, the important thing was that, for example, the infantry battalion that operated within the 2nd Infantry Brigade was able to successfully retreat and start performing the next assignment. Even if this was a defence as-

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signment and the enemy did not actually reach them (although it was planned), this shows that the operation plan of higher command was successful.

There were over 4000 people under the command of the Commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade and this unit was very similar to its actual wartime structure. All elements were represented, and we assessed whether the commander and staff are capable of battle command. As the general manager of the exercise, I can assure that this was confirmed.

Do we want more people to participate in the next Siil?

I would be cautious of this. During peacetime, our primary focus is training and creating a structure that supports the entire exercise. Size is not a goal in itself. In this year’s exercise, the participation of the entire structure of the Defence League as the territorial defence carpet was the factor that increased the number of participants.

With regard to the development of Spring Storm throughout the years, we were very close to a two-sided exercise with 8,000 participants last year. This year, at the third stage of Siil when the territorial defence structure was already deactivated, the volume of the exercise was still well over 8,000 people. It is not our aim to have more people participate in the next Siil or Spring Storm.

Instead, it is important that the next Siil as well as Spring Storm take place in an environment that enables to prepare the national defence of Estonia. The results and experiences of Siil shall be used in the next National Defence Development Plan.

Interviewer Heiki Suurkask / magazine “Sõdur”

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SIIL SET NEW TARGETS FOR THE DEFENCE LEAGUE Major General Meelis Kiili Commander of the Defence League

2018 was pivotal for Estonia — 100 years have passed since the declaration of the Republic of Estonia. As the oldest state institution, the Defence League also celebrated its 100th birthday.

The most ambitious event that coincided with the jubilee was certainly the biggest military exercise in the Estonian history — Siil 2018. The Defence League’s main objective at the major exercise was to practice the battle readiness of territorial defence units and their staffs and perform comprehensive national defence. In a wider view, the aim of the exercise was even higher and directed at three target groups. Siil 2018 had to and did indeed demonstrate both to Estonian society and our allies as well as to possible opponents that the DL is a force that includes all social strata and can be implemented quickly and on a large scale. This applies to almost all kinds of emergency situations, that society and the state may be encounter.

It can be said that Siil 2018 was a test of the maturity of the Defence League, which involved the entire organisation. The exercise gave an overview of the current situation and pointed out that which must be changed in the future.

How did the exercise go in view of the challenges of comprehensive defence that the DL faces and is expected to overcome?

All active members were expected to participate in the major exercise. One objective was to tidy up the ranks of active members and ascertain the people who can be counted on. To this end, communication with the entire personnel was key. About 83 percent responded immediately. In total, 10,383 active members of DL participated in the large-scale exercise. The participation of the Defence League’s preparatory wartime units was 81% of those invited.

The participation of the personnel of DL’s task forces was 71% of those invited. These are the active members that the DL can count on in exercises. Now, the units of the DL have got far more accurate lists of its members and therefore the overview of battle-ready volunteers has improved. At the same time, participation in Siil 2018 was the basis for modernisation of the DL’s peacetime structure.

During Siil 2018, the battle readiness of territorial defence staffs, regional command staffs and territorial defence units, and their cooperation with both the units of the Defence Forces (DF), Police and Boarder Guard Board (PBGB), local governments (LG) as well as with allies and other state institutions was evaluated. According to the summary of the exercise, the staffs are command capable and DL’s battle groups are battle ready (see “Final summary of exercise Siil 2018 07.02.2019”). In other words, for the DL, this means the achievement of targets stipulated in the National Defence Development Plan before deadlines or two years before the schedule. Although it is true that being on schedule with procurements requires certain inventiveness from the units, the level achieved shall be maintained.

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The joint exercise of the DL and PBGB indicated three main areas which need prompt development in the near future: establishment of regional joint staffs and standardisation of staff procedures, specification of the administration areas of DL and PBGB, and review of the topic of the DL’s law enforcement units. Of course, the cooperation takes place in a wider spectrum, but to make it more efficient, the three aforementioned topics should be provided primary focus.

The need to establish joint staffs and standardise staff procedures arises from the fact that in the initial stage of a crisis, it is managed by the PBGB, and the number of DL units subordinated under the command of the PBGB by the decision of the Government of the Republic may be rather large. During Siil 2018, for example, the Southern Prefecture commanded almost 800 members of the Defence League, and the standard practice cuts short to plan and manage a force like this. To simplify, the standardisation of staff procedures means that the DL units under the command of the PBGB need to be given orders in the preparation of which the use of military decision making and staff processes becomes useful. The Commander of the DL and the Director General of the PBGB have agreed that the specialists of the DL and PBGB develop joint staff procedures and organise a pilot programme for planning and management in 2019 after which further courses of action are decided.

The borders of many counties changed with the administrative reform, providing theoretical grounds for changing both the administrative areas of the districts of the DL as well as police departments of the PBGB. In addition, there are historic specificities developed in the administration area borders in Central Estonia. These specificities complicate the coordination of an emergency situation.

Compared to 2013, the tasks of the DL are clearer and the performance thereof has been repeatedly verified during exercises. Thus the law enforcement tasks of the DL to support the PBGB are also clearer. The build-up of the DL’s law enforcement units has been inconsistent. The main problems are different demands to the preparation of the units and uneven manning of the units. To make the preparation of the units more standardised, the activities and performed duties of the DL’s law enforcement units is analysed together with the PBGB. The basis for the development ideas is the principle that the DL units which support the PBGB are formed according to the nature of the tasks and in consideration of the volunteers’ motivation.

The involvement of the Women’s Voluntary Defence Organisation (WVDO) during the exercise Siil 2018 is noteworthy. Over 1,700 active members or about 72% participated in the major exercise. Over 700 members who have specific positions in the DL units participated as part of their units (of these a little more than 100 in the wartime units prepared for the DF).

As a separate task, an extensive evacuation of the families of the Defence League’s members and the population was played out. The Districts of the WVDO opened 18 evacuation points all over Estonia. The evacuation exercise had three objectives. First, the emphasis was on the practice of specific procedures in the evacuation point. The second objective was to provide organised

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activity to the family of the members of the DL so that parents could perform national defence duties.

The third objective was that each member shall perform a suitable training exercise at the evacuation point. Therefore, various trainings were provided in the evacuation points (e.g. first aid, domestic security, water and fire safety, moving through nature, etc.). In addition to members of the WVDO, cooperation partners from the Rescue Board, PBGB, Road Administration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and elsewhere gave lectures and guided practical exercises.

As a result of the exercise, cooperation in the establishment of the evacuation plan developed by the PBGB continues with the WVDO seen as responsible for the evacuation points. The application “Be prepared!” (“Ole valmis!”) has been created for the safety of the population and it includes directions for emergency situations, useful phone numbers with a direct calling option and a list of home and evacuation stocks to evaluate the family’s preparedness.

Some notes in relation to the information technology which is ingrained into every field of life nowadays. Due to its specificity, the DL cannot rely on the Cyber Command of the Estonian Defence Forces. The IT services directed at volunteers are only based on the Defence League and this is why the ICT Department of the DL is focused on the provision of these services.

The major exercise Siil 2018 confirmed that to achieve the objectives of the DL, the ICT area needs training and coordination throughout the country and in cooperation with government offices.

The major exercise of the last Spring showed convincingly that each spine counts. The objective of the Defence League is to effectively stiffen these spines as part of the comprehensive national defence, if it becomes necessary.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF BATTLEFIELD MEDICAL TRAINING Major Indrek Olveti Doctor-Lecturer at the Centre for War and Disaster Medicine of the Estonian National Defence College

In all recent larger conflicts, the role of battle casualty management has been decisive in the attainment of strategic goals.

The survival of injured soldiers is largely dependent on speed, quality and consistency of medical care. A casualty that has not received proper medical care in the pre-hospitalisation stage does not benefit from a well-equipped and manned higher medical institution. In a tactical situation, the care provided depends largely on the training of the caregiver and existing medical equipment.

The first caregiver is either the wounded individual themselves (Self Aid) or a battle buddy (Buddy Aid). As the main avoidable cause of death in a tactical situation is catastrophic external bleeding, quickly stopping this with a tourniquet is of critical importance. Essentially, it can be said that saving the life of any service member on the battlefield costs about 30 euros or the price of a CAT tourniquet. In case of a large catastrophic external bleeding, tactical equipment worth thousands of euros is of no use if it does not include the relatively cheap CAT tourniquet.

In 1993, US marines participated in the largest land battle since the Vietnam War in Muqdisho, Somalia. In the battle, 18 soldiers were killed and 73 wounded. To a large degree, such a result was the inability to manage a large amount of wounded in a tactical situation. As a result of this harsh lesson, the principles of Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) were developed in 1996.

One of the principles of TCCC is the integration of tactical and medical activity, which has received little attention before now.

The integration of tactical and medical activity is important to prevent new casualties. A second important principle of TCCC is “The right action at the right time and in the right amount”. For this, the casualty care has been divided into three stages: Care Under Fire (CUF), Tactical Field Care (TFC) and Tactical Evacuation (TACEVAC).

Each phase included specific activities and the care focuses on aggressive search and resolution of life-threatening conditions according to TCCC algorithms. In addition to medical activities, emphasis is put on maintaining situational awareness in a tactical situation — what is good for the unit is good for the wounded. In conclusion, the following can be said about TCCC care stages: “Simple things kill and simple things save.”

In the Estonian Defence Forces, TCCC training for medics at the Estonian National Defence College began in 2007. TCCC principles were approved with NATO STANAG in 2010. Currently, passing a 5 day TCCC training course is mandatory for all medics joining the active service and reserve medics during basic training. TCCC training is also mandatory for paramedics of different ranks in the Support Command Medical Training Centre. A thorough TCCC training is also received by cadets of the Estonian National Defence College

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who also receive basic knowledge of how to conduct TCCC training for conscripts.

As of 2018, the Centre for War and Disaster Medicine of the Estonian National Defence College has an international licence issued by the National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians to conduct certified TCCC courses. A successful completion of these courses can get a person an internationally valid certificate. Each year, three open courses with limited number of participants are arranged where all who are interested may register. In addition, special courses are organised mainly on the request of task forces of Estonian military-civilian authorities.

The principles of TCCC are more and more taught to conscripts as well.

However, it must be said that the intensity and efficiency of the training is largely dependent on the will and motivation of the instructors. As a rule, instructors with battle experience put more emphasis on continuous (that is not only during basic training) TCCC training and drills. Therefore, despite of considerable improvement of the TCCC training level in the Defence Forces, there is plenty of room for development to enhance the continuous training of conscripts and service members.

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IN CONSCRIPT SERVICE WITH A DISABILITY Corporal Raiko Jäärats Specialist at the Publication Group of the Cyber Command

The first conscript with special needs started his service in the Estonian Defence Forces in July 2018. Despite muscle tone disorder which makes normal movement more difficult, Private Rait Seppel is characterised by immense willpower.

This willpower includes the will to defend the country. Having received a negative response from the Defence Resources Agency in 2016, he did not leave it be and tried again several times. The Medical Committee of the Estonian Defence Forces also doubted in his mental capability because a doctor had made a remark on his medical history without having seen him.

Finally, he was allowed to join the conscript service but both the Commander of Headquarters Staff and Signal Battalion as well as the unit’s medical centre had to give permission for this. In addition, he had to pass the ICT test in basic training on the basis of which the conscripts who specialise in information technology get selected. Had he failed the test, he would have had to leave the service.

“When I found out that I had just missed the needed result to pass the ICT test, I was mortified,” recalls Private Seppel. Despite this, the battalion decided to allow him to receive specialised training in the Strategic Communication Centre.

The basic training did not pass without problems either. The medical centre had prescribed him not to wear equipment. “But when I found out that this meant that others had to wear my equipment, I tried to do it on my own,” says Private Seppel. He says that this felt like punishment for the others.

Because of this, he was overburdened. He elaborates: “I was unable to walk after that.” This meant two months of rehabilitation for him. During the last two weeks, he underwent a lot of physiotherapy so as to not use crutches.

At the moment, Private Seppel is contributing to the preparation of Spring Storm 2019 by collecting information necessary for planning. He does not regret coming to conscript service and says his service has been diverse.

The only thing he would do differently would be to undergo an exercise electrocardiogram to find out how much he can handle. “Everyone is different.

Maybe people with special needs need a more personal approach and to not be demanded more than they can physically handle,” he says.

However, he quickly adds: “Of course, the Defence Forces is not a social welfare institution and I am aware that exceptions have been made for me when possible.” Also, it is hard to imagine the service of a person in a wheelchair.

“I am actually fine, since I can move by myself,” Private Seppel concludes.

“I have no regrets and I urge others to give it a try, even if you’re not successful on the first attempt.”

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NATIONAL DEFENCE INDUSTRY IS PART OF THE DEFENCE CAPACITY OF ESTONIA Taavi Veskimägi Chairman of the Council of the Estonian Defence Industry Association

The Estonian defence industry is part of our comprehensive national defence.

Effective national defence cannot be built without the powers of a defence industry, which supports the military and internal security agencies in performing their duties. Today, during peacetime, private companies provide maintenance of armoured vehicles and other kinds of equipment of the Defence Forces. It is clear that in a time of crisis or war, the capabilities of these companies must be used in the defence of Estonia.

The defence industry is not a regular business. Throughout the developed world, it operates in an environment of close cooperation between the state and the companies. In order for the systematic development of the defence industry, in the winter of 2009, we founded the Estonian Defence Industry Association to advance Estonian defence capacity, economy and create new jobs.

Ten years of systematic development of the defence industry has brought us from a few companies that offered defence products and services to a situation in which we can speak of an industry that is modern, privately funded and offers globally attractive products and includes more than 100 Estonian companies.

However, there are still a lot more opportunities hidden within the defence industry for Estonia than we have realised. For example, a modular unmanned battlefield which integrates the products of many companies into a single whole.

The Ministry of Defence has developed the Estonian defence industry more systematically that any other ministry has done so with any other industry. This is worthy of recognition. The companies in the Estonian defence industry are seeing more and more opportunities on the European Union market as more members open their markets of defence and security related products and services to competition. Estonian companies are already well able to compete. However, although our small home market is completely opened to competition, the markets of most member states are protectionist, closed to external competition and controlled by state-owned large corporations. The lack of competition is paid by the tax payers of these countries with very high prices.

In a situation where the independent defence capacity of the European Union more at focus than ever after the Second World War, it is important to raise defence expenditure as well as improve competition so more money could convert into more defence capacity for Europe. Opening the defence sector to competition in Europe gives our small, progressive companies with a low cost base the opportunity to enter the value chain of the international defence industry. Therefore, our interest in shaping the European single defence industry policy is to stimulate the cooperation between large defence industry conglomerates and small companies.

Getting a foot in the door is only possible if our companies, politicians, of-

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ficials and service members work closely together and support the cause. Other countries will not trust our companies to build their defence capacity if we do not use these products ourselves.

The growing understanding of the need for an independent defence capacity for Europe gives companies a chance at the European market because this independent defence capacity cannot be based on the technology supplied by USA companies as much as it has now. The European Defence Industrial Development Programme has been established, which in turn opens new opportunities for Estonian companies to develop their products together with the giants of the European defence industry.

To exploit the new opportunities, defence industry innovation is needed. There is not point for us to enter the manufacturing of tanks and aircrafts. We have to do things differently – enable the client to reach the required capacity faster, cheaper and with less risk to human lives.

This gives Estonian companies the opportunity to implement proved civil or dual-use technologies in the defence sector. The Ministry of Defence has been organising development contests for new defence industry products since 2013.

This contest with a small support fund has given the needed first push to many most innovative products in the portfolio of the Estonian defence industry – from the cyber defence training platform to unmanned aerial systems.

The contribution of the Estonian defence industry to the defence capacity of the country can only improve through innovation. We cannot deter the enemy with more underwear or ammunition. The defence sector needs its own Tiger’s Leap programme. For example, to develop a fully functional unmanned battlefield capacity. The prerequisite of this is bringing the financing of the research and development activities of the defence industry to the level of national defence budget of 2% prescribed by the EU and NATO. As the first step, we could try to reach the 1% target by 2021.

This would allow to achieve the goal of the National Defence Development Plan that at least one product or service would be developed in Estonia each year to support the Estonian defence capacity. Together with financing, a platform for innovation of the defence industry must be created which makes the cooperation of the academia, defence industry and country continuous, systematic and consistent. There is a fear in Estonia to create organisation that expands across sectors. I am convinced that the state should and must not participate in entrepreneurship. However, no principal breakthrough will occur in the development of the defence industry if these three parties do not create a joint cooperation platform.

The aim of the Estonian defence industry is not to sell something to the Estonian Defence Forces no matter what. The Estonian Defence Industry Association and our companies understand that the Estonian defence industry and considerable defence companies cannot be based on the demand of the Estonian Defence Forces. The Estonian defence industry is an export industry which offers additional defence capacity to our society as an added bonus. In 10 years, the defence industry could be an export sector with a turnover of 150 million which enhances defence capacity, economic growth as well as creates jobs.

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Issued by Strategic Communications Department, Headquarters of Estonian Defence Forces Editors: Maj Ülo Isberg, cpl Raiko Jäärats, Heiki Suurkask Design and implementation: Ragne Rikkonen-Tähnas Strategic Communication Centre, Cyber Command Photos: Estonian Defence Forces, Ardi Hallismaa, Siim Verner Teder, Kevin Valkenklau, Indrek Kaik, Defence League, MND NE, UNIFIL, scanpix.ee Translation: Tiido ja Partnerid Keeleagentuur OÜ, www.neontranslations.com ISSN 2613-4934

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