tHe Good Friday aGreement @ 25

March 2023 will mark the 25th anniversar y of the signing of the good Friday agreement (gFa). predic tably, this will be marked with hubristic fanfare from the british and irish governments, and at least some of the sec tarian par ties in the Nor th. this will be combined with the visit of uS president Joe biden to ireland, who will specifically visit belfast. current and former capitalist establishment figures associated with the agreement are using this event to bolster their status.

Eager to join these backslapping celebrations will be two former heads of the Irish and British governments, namely Ber tie Ahern and Tony Blair, in the hope that they can rehabilitate their tarnished reputations. The latter is widely hated as a war criminal who, alongside George W. Bush, launched the brutal invasion and war in Iraq resulting in the deaths of over one million Iraqis. Ahern, on the other hand, is despised as the disgraced and corrupt politician that help bring about the 2008 economic crash in the South

Celebrations around the GFA by establishment politicians of different hues will desperately attempt to overlook the fac t that the institutions of the Agreement are currently suspended due to the continuing deadlock around the Protocol. This is nothing new – for more than one -third of the last quar ter of a centur y, the Stormont Executive has been in suspension. Throughout the Nor th, there are still 100 peace wall barriers at different sec tarian inter faces. Ten years ago, a goal was set for the removal of such barriers. Its failure is a stark reminder of the fac t that the GFA has patently failed to break down sec tarian division.

Below we republish an abridged version of an ar ticle written by P E T E r H A d d E N in the immediate af termath of the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in May 1998, entitled ‘ Will the Agreement bring peace?’.

Peter was a leading member of the Socialist Par ty, and its predecessor Militant, until his sad and untimely death in 2010. He wrote ex tensively on the national question in Ireland and elsewhere including Divide and Rule – Labour and the Par tition of Ireland (1980), Beyond the Troubles? (1994), Troubled Times – the National Question in Ireland (1995), along with Common Histor y, Common Struggle, which was published posthumously in 2017.

His writings, including the full tex t of this ar ticle, can be found at w w w mar xists org

Around the world the Good Friday Agreement may have been trumpeted as an “historic compromise”, an “exercise in reconciliation” and a “step to a final solution” to decades of conflict.

Within Northern Ireland, and especially within the working class communities, there has been no such view Most people were relieved that there was agreement rather than disagreement but the mood was sceptical from the start and is increasingly so

The Socialist Party’s view on the referendum and the deal is in line with the approach of most working class people. We do not endorse this deal which is neither a solution, nor the basis of a solution, but we think it is preferable to vote Yes in order to continue with the peace process and in order to defeat the reactionary and backward looking forces who make up the No camp. Asked to choose between two roads to sectarian conflict we choose the longer, if only because it gives the working class movement more time to mount a challenge to the sectarians. Our position is clear and distinct

The real yardstick for socialists when considering the national question is what effect a particular stance will have in raising or lowering class awareness or consciousness as opposed to national consciousness and whether it will strengthen or weaken the working class movement.

In our view a No victory would be a victory for right wing sectarians, Orange and Green, would lower class consciousness and would quite drastically weaken the potential for unity between Catholic and Protestant workers.

The ultra-left shrug their shoulders as though this were of some passing significance The largest of these groups, the Socialist Workers Party, has this to say: “The alternative is not civil war or armed conflict ... In the unlikely event of the settlement being rejected that same pressure for peace would continue and socialists would give it every support.”

This unreal scenario is then the basis for the following conclusion: “It is time to break from all the sectarian agendas and put class politics to the fore Voting No to this deal will mark a start.”

The last thing a No vote would result in would be the coming to the fore of class politics and will be deaf to such “advice” It would be a victory for the camp of Paisley, McCartney, the LVF – and no-one else. There would be no Agreement, no Assembly elections and the idea of sending the political parties back to the table would have no credibility In short the peace process would be in tatters.

Would the working class then step onto the scene to offer another way out? Of course we cannot entirely dismiss this as a theoretical possibility but it would be extremely unlikely. The working class movement would be stunned and demoralised by the No victory The present right wing leadership would most likely signal a retreat The socialist left is not powerful enough at this moment to offer an alternative. Much more likely it would be the most confrontational sectarian forces which would step into the political vacuum left by the collapse of the Agreement

The effect of a No vote on the consciousness of the Catholic population would be immediate, dramatic and enduring It would be seen that Protestants had said no to even a minimal equality agenda This time it would not be just the unionist politicians who would be held responsible, it would be the broad mass of the Protestant population

As when the demand for civil rights was blocked by unionists in the late 1960s, Catholics would conclude that there is no possibility of respite within the Northern state Nationalism, of the most virulent and sectarian variety, would be reinforced Far from putting “class politics to the fore” it would mean that among Catholics, North and South, the idea of building class unity with Protestants would seem less than credible Those, like the Socialist Party, who would continue to advocate this would risk isolation

Origins Of The Agreement

Th current juncture, and with it this deal, has been arrived at through stalemate, war weariness and not through reconciliation. When the IRA campaign began in the early 1970s we argued that this method of struggle would not succeed, that its net effect would be to divide the working class, the real agency for progressive change in society.

When the Republican movement developed the armalite/ballot box strategy in the early 80s we argued that these two methods of struggle were mutually exclusive. While circumstances might allow the secretive methods of individual terrorism to run alongside the public mass electoral work for a period, ultimately they were bound to lead in opposite directions.

Sinn Fein’s peace strategy was born out of the exhaustion of the military tactic and the realisation of this by a decisive section of the northern leadership The electoral successes remained partial and the twin objectives of overtaking the SDLP and of making a breakthrough in the South remained out of reach Ongoing military activity came to be seen by the leadership as a barrier to these goals.

Meanwhile the theoretical basis of republicanism received a shock with the signing of the 1985 AngloIrish Agreement The real truth is that, from as early as the 1960s, the British ruling class would have preferred to withdraw from Northern Ireland Partition had outlived its historic usefulness and they would have preferred a single independent capitalist state in Ireland which they would have striven to dominate by economic, rather than by military or political means

The fact that the million strong Protestant community would not accept this, and that withdrawal would have led to civil war – with huge repercussions in Britain and internationally – made them hold their hand When the IRA campaign began in earnest in the early 70s, their stated target was the British military presence, and the objective was to force withdrawal. In fact the campaign was based on a false premise: – that the British stayed out of an on-going imperialist interest rather than because the threat of civil war gave them no choice

The Anglo-Irish Agreement was drawn up as a part of the then British strategy of concessions to win over the Catholic middle class and isolate Sinn Fein and the IRA Its main agenda was a security one – to leave the republican movement without the cover of broad popular support and therefore easier dealt with by military means That Agreement – which it should be remembered was also proclaimed to be an historic breakthrough – failed in this

But it caused the republican leadership to question whether their basic premise – that Britain retained an imperialist interest in maintaining partition – was correct

Signals from the republican leadership that there might be a way forward through dialogue were picked up by British intelligence By the end of the decade the ruling class were embarking on a new strategy. Instead of attempting “solutions” which would isolate and undermine the “violent extremes” the new objective became an “all embracing process” which could bring all but the most recalcitrant of the republicans and loyalists in from the cold

The statement by Secretary of State Peter Brooke that Britain had no “selfish, strategic or economic interest” in Ireland was at one and the same time a signal to the republican leadership that the door of negotiation was open and a hook to entrap them on a peace strategy from which they would not be able to turn back.

These processes were reinforced by the collapse of Stalinism, the apparent supremacy of the market and apparent demise of socialism, the strengthening of the position of US imperialism as the “one world power” with an increased ability to intervene and exert leverage in conflict situations As with the ANC and PLO, the republican movement was thrown off-course by these developments and began to shift to the right. So this “anti-imperialist” movement ended by leaning on the representatives of US imperialism and looking to agencies of world capitalism such as the UN to help find a way forward.

The 1994 IRA cease-fire was the product of all this Most fundamentally it came about because the theoretical basis of the IRA campaign was eroded and when the campaign itself reached a point of exhaustion

By this stage the war weariness felt by the mass of the population had turned into open opposition to what had come to be seen as vicious and pointless military attacks carried out by both loyalist paramilitaries and by republicans. The working class began to take to the streets demanding a halt to all killings.

This had an effect on the UDA and the UVF, just as it had on the IRA It strengthened the case for a loyalist cease-fire which was being put forward by some of the 70s generation of loyalist prisoners who were emerging from the prisons with a more sophisticated view Sensitive to the growing revulsion at loyalist atrocities and also aware that the IRA campaign had been effectively contained, they were able to gain support for the view that loyalist violence should end

By any reckoning the years since the cease-fires have seen the division within society, especially the division between working class people, deepen quite dramatically During this time the events which have had the most dramatic impact have not taken place in the Castle Buildings talks complex. They have occurred in the few acres of land in and around the Drumcree churchyard and along the Garvaghy Road The fall-out from these confrontations and from the manner in which the route was cleared for the Orange marchers has vastly increased the sectarian polarisation

Paradoxically the very fact of the cease-fires and the talks has also added to the division By the end of the 80s the Troubles had ground into a stalemate out of which a certain stability had been created The violence had reached the “acceptable level” which, during the explosive events of the early 70s, the ruling class could only faintly hope would one day arrive. The “peace process” disturbed this relative equilibrium The prospect of talks in which all issues would be on the agenda created new uncertainties

These were added to by the efforts of the main parties to marshal their respective communities behind their narrow sectarian agenda on every issue that came up through the negotiations. Even the Yes campaign in the referendum has been a further exercise in polarisation – one side rousing Protestants to vote Yes for the union, the other urging Catholics to vote Yes to help bring a United Ireland closer.

When the parties emerged in self-congratulatory mood from Castle Buildings on Good Friday the unpleasant truth was that their efforts had moved the two communities further apart. And when the votes in the referendum are counted, the real truth, obscured by the euphoric cacophony of the world’s press, will be that the net result of the victorious Yes campaign will have been to widen the sectarian divide even further.

A real solution can only be based on unity of working people and the integration of the communities It means not just a coming together on social issues but a coming together also on the difficult and currently divisive issues which arise from the national conflict An agreement which has widened all these divisions and which sees no way of overcoming them is no solution.

An Undemocratic And Sec Tarian Fudge

What resulted is a fudge on most issues, albeit a cleverly concocted fudge which allows different sides to read what they want to read into it The Agreement is not some new vision, creating new sets of relationships to take society beyond the conflict It does just the opposite. It takes the existence of the sectarian divide as permanent and, rather than diminish it, effectively casts it in concrete

Assembly members must declare themselves either unionist, nationalist or “other”. That unionists and nationalists each have a veto on key issues indicates the underlying assumption that the “other” category will always be an irrelevance In other words it reflects the view that there can be no solution, no reconciliation, but that sectarian politics will forever dominate

Those who constructed the deal might counter that the system of enforced power sharing overcomes this and forces everyone to work together. This was the premise in Cyprus and Lebanon where power sharing was adopted as the means to balance the interests of different national and religious communities The effect was to institutionalise the divisions and hinder the development of class unity from below In both cases the end result was civil war and effective repartition If it gets off the ground, the institutionalised sectarianism of this Agreement would ultimately have no better result

As to the debate over North/South bodies, the proposals of the SDLP and Sinn Fein would actually disenfranchise rather than empower the Catholic working class and Protestant workers also They called for North/South bodies to be “fire-walled” from control either by the Assembly or the Dail Unable to achieve reunification they were reduced to arguing for tokens, paltry symbols which could be presented to Catholics as the “all Ireland dimension”

To have institutions “firewalled” from democratic control means handing executive authority over to a tiny cabal of senior government ministers, unionist and nationalist, to do what they like with the services under their control For working people the existing parliaments, the new Assembly included, are sufficiently distant and unaccountable, without adding a further, even more remote tier, “fire-walled” from the day to day demands, needs and pressures of the working class.

Political Realignments

The main concessions made to Sinn Fein are on the “equality” agenda. These are not changes wrung from a reluctant British government in negotiations. Since the early days of direct rule it has been the policy of successive British administrations to eradicate the excesses of half a century of Unionist misrule. With or without the talks they would have proceeded with an “equality” agenda of sorts That past reforms of the old Orange State have had little impact on Catholic working class areas is largely down to the fact that any easing of discrimination has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in state repression, most of it directed at these areas

As with the moves made on “equality”, so the proposals made on “demilitarisation” amount to little more than a restatement of existing government policy There will be moves to close down military installations, reduce the army’s role, and review emergency legislation, but this return to what it calls “normal security arrangements” will be carried out “consistent with the level of threat”

There is nothing new in the promise that if the IRA go away the overt military presence will be cut back Whether security is lessened significantly; especially in border areas, will depend on whether the Agreement sticks and, if it does, on the effectiveness of the on-going military campaign by IRA dissidents Only on the prisoners issue has a firmer commitment been made Even this, the guarantee that all prisoners will be out within two years – is hedged with qualifications Releases, it states, will go ahead “if circumstances allow” From the government’s point of view the linking of releases to the ceasefires turns the prisoners into hostages and arm-locks the IRA and loyalist groups into a continuation of the peace strategy It also puts substantial pressure on the INLA to declare a cease-fire, if only to prevent their prisoners opting for early release and defecting to rival organisations

On the issue which Sinn Fein had made central –the independence of North/South bodies the Agreement awards game, set and match to the unionists The proposed cross border structures are clearly made answerable to the Assembly and Dail Within them there will be a unionist as well as a nationalist veto. In any case they will administer only minor functions, most of which are already areas of cooperation between the relevant public bodies, North and South

The rest of the Agreement – the repeal of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, the proposed Assembly, the British-Irish Council – is unionist territory In swallowing all this Sinn Fein have moved a huge distance, abandoning one central tenet of republicanism after another in the process In the sense that this represents an awareness that the old methods of struggle were counterproductive, and that the old republican ideology had no answer to the problem of a million Protestants, this could be a positive development – but not if the alternative strategy of the republican leadership leads only to another sectarian dead-end albeit by a different route.

Even before Sinn Fein entered the talks we predicted that the course they were taking would ultimately lead to a split A section of republican activists were bound to stand against Sinn Fein’s acceptance of the Agreement, against the Sinn Fein leadership entering a “partitionist” Assembly and against those who had led the “war” to destroy the state knocking on the door of ministerial office within it. Those who have broken, or are in the process of breaking away, will attempt to continue with a military campaign The most vociferous opposition has come from republicans in the South. The great bulk of the movement in the North is likely to be swung by the mood in the Catholic areas and go along with the leadership Many will do so without conviction, hesitant about the deal, but even more hesitant about the alternative. If a strong and united movement did not achieve its objectives in nearly thirty years of military struggle, what chance has a splinter group, especially when its on-going activities meet with hostility, even resistance, in the working class republican strongholds?

Socialism or repar tition

So long as the sectarian parties continue to dominate, and so long as politics is carried on in terms of unionism versus nationalism, working people will remain politically polarised and the divisions on the ground will remain.

Ultimately these divisions will force through to the political surface and undermine this deal This could happen in the short term or it might take some period of time. It could be the demographic changes or it could be some other trigger which would reignite the conflict

The road of sectarianism is ultimately the road to civil war. The unionist ambition to tie Catholics to a permanent acceptance of partition is unrealisable

Increases in the Catholic population and the growth of nationalist culture will add to nationalist confidence

The inability of capitalism to eradicate poverty from Catholic working class areas will mean an irrepressible desire for change

On the other hand, the nationalist idea that unionism will be driven back by the relative decline of the Protestant population to the point where they will have to raise their hands in surrender and accept Dublin rule is an even greater illusion

The present situation is like a tug of war with unionists trying to draw Catholics into the existing state and nationalists trying to pull Protestants into a united Ireland The peace deal is the product of a certain stalemate in the contest. Looking to the future, demographic change makes it impossible for unionism to win outright But if nationalism should become too strong to hold back the Protestant reaction would be simply to let go of the rope.

Were demographic changes to bring about a majority vote in favour of a united Ireland the result would be civil war and the outcome of a sectarian civil war would not be reunification but repartition. It is important to understand this because it is not uncommon today to hear workers who back the deal say that if it doesn’t work the only other option is civil war. There is even an illusion that civil war would lead to a victory by one side and sort the problem out

In Bosnia there was a horrific conflict followed by a UN inspired deal which has solved nothing. There is now the potential for events in Kosovo to ignite an even more bloody conflict in the region

A series of wars in the Middle East have merely created new antagonisms and the latest impasse in what is left of the peace process could end with a declaration of independence by Palestinians and a new war

The complete breakdown of the Agreement and a movement towards civil war and repartition might leave the ruling class with no option but to recognise the reality being implemented on the ground and draw up lines of separation Bosnia style. Should this happen it would be the working class, Catholic and Protestant, North and South, who would be the main losers It would not bring stability but new accumulated grievances which, in the absence of any alternative, would weigh on future generations in the way that partition, unionist misrule in the north and nationalist misrule in the south, have come to weigh on the current generation.

There is only one way out for the working class. It is not to imitate the leaders of the trade unions and sit back and applaud the Agreement and the politicians who produced it. Rather it is to begin to build an alternative to sectarian politics, to unite working people, Catholic and Protestant, around common class interests and in opposition to all who attempt to maintain sectarian division. The urgency with which this is done can only come from an understanding that ultimately the choice facing the working class in Ireland is a choice of either socialism or repartition

A more drawn out perspective for the Agreement, together with a new impulse to the class struggle, might also throw the tendencies to separation which have been dominant in recent years into reverse The sectarian parties will seek to obstruct and prevent any real coming together of the working class communities but the instinct to unity from below can be extremely powerful It is this instinct which has preserved shop floor unity and allowed workplaces to remain integrated, despite being repeatedly put under strain.

But the most important factor in shaping the future will be the direction taken by the new generation of youth. It was the wave of youth who took to the streets after 1968 who changed the course of history and turned Northern Ireland politics upside down Whether the next generation will get caught up in a new spiral of sectarian violence or whether they will be the engine of socialist change is not yet determined.

Whatever way society moves, whether towards sectarian conflict or towards a socialist solution, it will be through tumultuous events that the path of history will be plotted. Huge and dramatic events will shape and reshape the consciousness of the new generation Forces and obstacles which today appear unshakeable, the various sectarian forces included, can be melted down in the furnace of struggle. The building of a socialist organisation which can influence and effect events can be a crucial factor in determining whether the coming political and social upheaval leads towards a “carnival of reaction” or towards united class action to bring about socialist change

A Socialist Programme

The Socialist Party is the only group on the left whose position on the national question has been updated to take account of present day reality Most other left groups have what is in reality a left republican position By holding to this at a time when all but the most backward sections of the republican movement have moved on will leave them standing with these people in an historical time warp

Socialist Party members, on the other hand, can have great confidence that our analysis offers the only explanation and that our programme offers the only way forward If we now go on the offensive against the outmoded and, at bottom, sectarian ideas which abound on the left and convincingly put our alternative forward we can make important gains on this issue

The national problem is not a problem of a single sectarian state in the North which must be destroyed. Partition resulted in the setting up of two sectarian states, one in the North and the other in the South This description is no longer entirely accurate given the changes introduced to both states over the last quarter century More accurately the problem is now of two poverty ridden states each with features unacceptable to one or other section of the working class.

Neither can the problem be reduced to the issue of a discriminated against Catholic minority in the North There are now two minorities, each with a dual element in their consciousness. The Catholic minority retain the sense of being an oppressed group who have suffered discrimination and repression But they also have a growing sense of being a force on the up, and of being part of an overall nationalist majority in Ireland, a majority which has the wind of world opinion at its back

Protestants in part inherit their present consciousness from the days when they were the undisputed ruling majority within the north But increasingly they have a sense of being a minority in the face of this international pressure and with aspects of politics now undisputedly on an all-Ireland basis. Awareness of democratic changes and of the obvious territorial retreat gives an increasingly beleaguered edge to this minority consciousness. Socialists who recognise only the rights of one community and ignore the other will fall flat on their face on this issue

The Socialist Party position is to weigh equally the rights of both communities and to expose a solution which guarantees no coercion of either. This cannot be done on a capitalist basis Only on a socialist basis can basic democratic and national rights be guaranteed Socialism means the common ownership of the big industries and finance houses. By taking this wealth out of the hands of the profiteers and speculators and placing it under the democratic control of the working class it would be possible to create wealth and direct resources so as to end exploitation and for the first time in history to eradicate poverty Guaranteeing to every citizen the right to a decent life free from need is the only way to create the necessary social stability and security to allow the national question to be peacefully and democratically resolved. Under socialism the administration of society would also be transferred downwards, into the hands of the people Socialism is the antithesis of power removed to distant parliaments or “fire-walled” political institutions over which ordinary people have no real control It means the maximum devolution of control to democratically established and representative institutions at regional and local level. It means the right of people to change their representatives at any time, through the right of recall, not once every four or five years Crucially it means cutting the working week so that working people have both the energy and the time to take part in the running of society, and don’t have to leave this to the “professional” politicians

A socialist government would guarantee the rights of all minorities, including their cultural and linguistic rights This goes not only for Protestants and Catholics but for all the other racial, national and religious minorities in Ireland. It would uphold every individual’s right to free expression of his or her national culture, but not their right to impose that culture on others

Socialists are opposed to the idea that a state or a nation must have a single “national” culture to which all its citizens are expected to comply In the same way we oppose the reactionary idea of any nation having an established religion.

A Real Solution

The way to solve the national question is to build unity between the working class in common struggle against the present rotten system and for such a socialist society In reply to those who say “first solve the national problem, the class struggle must wait” we say “there is no solution to the national problem other than through the class struggle”. We stand for the unity of the working class to achieve a socialist Ireland as part of a democratic and voluntary socialist federation of England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland

We think that this idea could answer the fears and concerns of both Catholic and Protestant workers, but we underline this with the idea of no coercion of either community Guaranteeing the rights of the two minorities means opposing equally the coercion of either into a political arrangement to which they are clearly opposed. So we would oppose the continued incorporation of the Catholic minority into a separate northern state if their wish is to leave Likewise and in equal measure we are opposed to any attempt to coerce the Protestants into a united Ireland against their will.

It is impossible to guarantee both these rights on a capitalist basis This is why the problem cannot be solved without getting rid of this system On the basis of socialism, which could only come about through the building of unity between workers north and south, and which therefore presupposes a degree of reconciliation, the precise administrative arrangements within Ireland could be agreed peacefully through negotiation.

The Socialist Party believes that the simplest and best solution would be a single socialist state, with maximum devolution. However, should a majority of Protestants remain visibly opposed, the guarantee of no coercion means their right to opt for a state of their own and the building of a socialist federation which would include two states in Ireland.

Those in Catholic areas would in turn be guaranteed the right to opt for either state This would not be the best outcome since a division of this nature would inevitably draw Catholic and Protestant apart. But it would be up to the people to decide free from intimidation or coercive pressure

Surrounded by the warring drumbeats of nationalism and unionism and mired in the poverty of a failed economic system this alternative and solution offers a unique way forward for the working class The Socialist Party is proud of the forces we have built and work we have carried out in advancing our cause North and South Our greatest force, however, is the power of correct ideas Our ideas and programme on the national question can now be a powerful lever in the building and development of our party n