The organisation is enhanced, 1997–2007

Up until 1995/96, Group Managing Director Kjell Storeide and the organisation around him achieved the main objectives that were set when the group hold was consolidated in 1990: Vågå Møbler was sold, Vatne Lenestolfabrikk was consolidated with the new version of Møremøbler, the properties at Moa were demerged from Stokke Industri into a separate corporate structure and financial management was improved. Nevertheless, there was still some way to go before Stokke Industri AS emerged as a unified group with positive synergies and a clear structure.

New roles

In 1997 a generation shift occurred in the Stokke group when Rune Stokke purchased the remaining 8 % A shares in the company from his father, Kåre. At the same time Rune sold most of his 23 % stake in the Moa property to his siblings in return for a settlement in industrial shares. After this he became the owner of 58 % of the holding company in the industrial part of the company, including all the company's A shares. He thus controlled the company (the Stokke group) which owned 91 % of Stokke Industri AS. It was important for Rune that his siblings Geir, Knut and Kristin should also be owners of the industrial part of the company. They each owned 14 % of the B shares in the holding company. Their shares carry the same financial entitlements as those owned by Rune. The remaining 9 % of the Stokke group was owned by Kjell Storeide.

During the same year Rune Stokke took over from his father as Chairman of the Board of Stokke Industri AS. Kjell Storeide had enjoyed close cooperation with Kåre Stokke right from the time he joined the group in 1977. Now Junior was to become his employer and boss. He had lost his mainstay within the owner family and would have to get used to a new one. In the first instance, the challenges presented did not consist of professional disagreement, but rather adjustment to new roles. After a few demanding challenges during the transition phase, things settled down. Rune, who had taken over as Chairman of the Board, soon handed over that position to Even Wahr-Hansen and instead accepted the challenge to manage Movement, which in 1998 was in a difficult situation. Rune continued as a member of the Board and these changes helped to ease cooperation within the organisation.

The Stokke group was ready for a generation shift in 1997. Kåre Stokke, who had managed the company since 1964, felt that the time was ripe to allow the next generation to take over responsibility and ownership. The family still wanted to retain its single-owner model. It was clear very early on that it was Kåre's oldest son, Rune Stokke, who would take over main responsibility for the family company during the forthcoming years.

Rune Stokke had worked his way up through the ranks in the group, mainly under the professional mentorship of Kjell Storeide. Unlike his father, Rune possessed international economic and administrative qualifications. His education and experience had given him, in his capacity as Stokke's new owner, a different approach to modern industrial operations to that of the company's founders. Rune's main contribution to the group would be his strong focus on markets and customers, something that the Board started to apply with effect from 1997 when the Swedish economics professor, Jan Erik Vahlne, joined the Board. Vahlne had been one of the Stokke group's regular advisors since the middle of the 1980s. In 1996, he was once again involved as a discussion partner

for the group management. Vahlne advocated the development of a more compact organisation with a clearer focus and closer ties between its head office and sales apparatus. Division of the company was, as he saw it, the best way to clarify its image and strengthen customer focus. The reason why the group management once again called on Vahlne for advice was that they felt that the potential of Stokke's best sales product, Tripp Trapp, was not being adequately exploited.

This may be related to discussions held with the former Managing Director of' Stokke Fabrikker, Roar Hauge-Nilsen, who was not interested in cultivating individual products. He viewed individual models as parts of a comprehensive chair and furniture philosophy which was Stokke's unique contribution to a global population forced into adopting a sedentary lifestyle. Vahlne supported the group management's assessment. The reason why Tripp Trapp had not been fully exploited was that insufficient focus had been devoted to marketing. Stokke's furniture was not targeted at distinct target groups, but at different target groups with different areas of application. This meant that it was difficult to find just one distribution channel that TrippTrapp could be channelled through. Vahlne concluded that Stokke Fabrikker should be divided into four divisions. The result was two divisions: one for children's furniture – the Children's Division, and one for variation furniture for adults – the Movement Division. This split was accomplished, resulting in powerful revitalisation of the Children's Division. However, from an organisational point of view, some cleaning up still needed to be

carried out in order to achieve the group's objectives. Mini groups were formed at both Stokke Fabrikker and Westnofa by splitting up the different business areas. The group management was not satisfied with financial developments after 1998, and Group Managing Director Kjell Storeide perceived the reasons for this to be as follows: “Profits had definitely been lower since 1998, and as far as Stokke Fabrikker was concerned the reasons for this had been apparent for some time: poor cost control, low product profitability in respect of products not related to Tripp Trapp and some nonprofitable financial decisions.”196 These developments were used to explain the more in-depth division that took place in 1999/2000.197 New organisational plans were approved at a Board meeting of the Stokke group held on 16 December 1999. The company moved from a management structure with a holding company at the top to

It was important for Rune Stokke, right, and Kjell Storeide, middle, to find good cooperation models quickly after Rune became the owner of the group in 1997. Kjell Storeide had enjoyed long and close co-operation with Kåre Stokke, who after 1997 started to focus more on business developments at the company's property at Moa. Even after Kåre withdrew from daily management of the group, he was involved in some activities and he was pleased to see that his favourite product, Tripp Trapp, still featured strongly on the market. He is depicted here with Peter Opsvik on a visit to a kindergarten in Ålesund.

a management team structure with clear top coordination. The purpose of this reorganisation was to achieve more efficient exploitation of personnel resources, to eliminate double functions and to relieve group management. The Children's and Movement divisions were retained in the new organisation. In addition, Westnofa and Contract became separate divisions. The production divisions at Håhjem, Tennfjord, Vatne, Stranda and Ørsta were merged into one division. All these five divisions were given their own Divisional Directors who joined the Director of Finance and Managing Director to form a new group management team which would play a key role in the new organisation.

For the first time in the group's history a representative body

had been set up which met regularly to discuss common challenges for the group as a whole. It was not until 2000 that the group finally achieved the objectives that had been set in 1983 with the establishment of a group superstructure in Stokke Industri AS. The new Chairman of the Board, Even Wahr Hansen, who had been appointed in 1998, maintained that it was during the 1990s that Stokke had been turned round from being a product-governed founder company to being a group.198

The ambitions publicised by the group management following the completion of its reorganisation in 2000 were that the new management structure should result in increased growth, better profitability and thus more secure jobs. Furthermore, this reorganisation could have been justified purely by normal rationalisation considerations. There were without doubt many double functions in the group, and communications between the various business areas were inadequate. Kjell Storeide felt that the transfer of his office to the plant at Håhjem was a useful move because he came into direct contact with the pulsating life in the sales and production departments. He also achieved direct contact with other areas of activity when he was appointed as Chairman of the Board for all the company's subsidiaries in Norway.

Geir Løseth was the Director of Finance at Stokke Fabrikker AS up until December 1999. During the reorganisation he was given responsibility for establishing a common finance department within the group. Before he took up this post there were six financial/ commercial divisions in the group and 25 people working on the

group's finances and accounts. The group's specialist areas were small and there was little interaction between them on a group basis. With a common finance department it was possible to develop broader financial and IT expertise. As Director of Finance, Geir Løseth experienced rapid developments in data processing after he joined the group as Director of Finance at Stokke Industri AS in 1996, when there just three computers in the whole group. Prior to 1999 the company had invested in, and implemented, an order processing system called Movex, and data processing then also became part of the everyday lives of the employees involved in production at Stokke. With effect from 1999/2000 Stokke started to emerge as a more closely integrated company, with an organisational model that created productive dynamism within the fields that were to be coordinated:

Kjell Storeide spent much of the 1990s on developing a more suitable group platform under which all parts of the group could work towards achieving common objectives. Some of the key partners involved in this development work were Steinar Loe, Westnofa, Jørn Nes, Wonderland and Steinar Gjertsen, Fora Form. In 1998 Stokke introduced the Movex order processing system which considerably facilitated ordering and invoicing tasks. This photo shows a demonstration of how the system was used in practice. From the left: Norveig Alvestad, Oddvar Skytterholm, Lars Hjelle, Leif Blindheim and Gunn Hellevik.

Kristine Landmark took a bold step when she changed the distribution channels for Stokke's Children's products from ordinary furniture businesses to children's equipment businesses. This change proved to be successful. Former Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, had a family connection with the Stokke group. For several years his brother, Audun, was a prime mover in the sales work undertaken by Stokke and Blindheim Møbelfabrikk. Here the Prime Minister and other politicians are being provided with information about Stokke's products by Kristine Landmark.

■ New production strategy was developed in cooperation with

SINTEF in Trondheim. This had an impact on all production areas in the group, resulting in improved efficiency. ■ IT and logistics were boosted. ■ A new branding/brand name strategy was drawn up in cooperation with the Interbrand company. ■ The value chain all the way to the shops was rationalised. ■ Greater focus was placed on organisational and managerial development.

In the latter instance, the new structure also benefited customers as a result of more efficient order follow-up. This reorganisation thus also constituted one aspect of the company's increased focus on markets and customers.

But there were also counter-forces in the new group structure which emerged in the discussions which took place at group management meetings. The managers of companies that had previously experienced a considerable degree of freedom in respect of decision-making and the prioritisation of local resources were forced to realise that local resources were now defined as common resources. Technical discussions about certain business areas were not always regarded as being particularly relevant by group colleagues.199 There is nevertheless reason to believe that the commitment made in respect of management and organisational developments during the 1990s made it easier to survive this demanding reorganisation processes. A common conceptual system was established and communication between the various managers was based on common perceptions of reality, even though their priorities could be different.

The only things that were not coordinated under the new management model were product development, marketing and sales. The various divisions had their own products and distribution channels and there were limited options available for being able to gain common synergies from such varying areas as mattresses and furniture for movement and variation, for example. Otherwise the production processes of Westnofa Industrier AS and Wonderland AS were separated from other production processes and were not integrated to any extent. These challenges illustrated both to the Board and to the Group Director a strategic problem associated with the new model. They were included in the next round to promote further improvement of the group profile.

Tripp Trapp, first and foremost

As already mentioned, the Children's Division was made into a separate division at Stokke Fabrikker AS in 1997. The manager of the new Children's Division was Kristine Landmark. She joined Stokke in 1989 and since 1994 she had been an Assistant Director at Stokke Fabrikker AS with responsibility for product development, marketing, customer service and production.

In 1997, the products in the Children's Division at Stokke were not very well organised. Tripp Trapp was indisputably the dominant product. In addition, there was another children's chair, Sitti, which was launched in 1994. The Tripp Trapp chair had been part of Stokke's collection ever since 1972, contributing favourably to the group's profits year after year. The growth in production and sales of Tripp Trapp chairs was particularly marked during the period 1989 to 1997200 when Stokke's sales network in Europe was developed and helped to boost awareness of this Norwegian child-friendly chair among new customers groups. After 1997 sales

The Tripp Trapp chair has been one of the most resilient products in the history of Norwegian furniture, but in 1997 sales started to stagnate slightly. This stagnation would prove to be just temporary.

The new back that was designed in response to new regulations relating to infants. It can be removed when the child reaches the age of 2, or thereabouts.

Peter Opsvik's Tripp Trapp and Date designed by Olav Eldøy.

stagnated a little and it appeared as though the market was about to be saturated with this resilient product which was also available on the second-hand furniture market. In a group context it was not the Children's Division that featured highest on the wish-list of those seeking challenges in the group.

This may have been due to the fact that the development and sale of furniture for children was not as prestigious as the development of furniture for the adult market, and that furniture for movement and variation actually symbolised Stokke's position as a furniture producer.

New distribution channel

The group management, under the leadership of Kjell Storeide, nevertheless gave the new division the latitude and support that it thought was necessary in order to achieve maximum product potential, and expected in return the development of new products which could provide the division with more legs to stand – or lie – on.

Kristine Landmark says that one of the first things she did as the manager of the Children's Division was to sit down with the new management team and analyse the Tripp Trapp chair's position and future prospects on the market. They undertook a thorough and unbiased analysis. One of the most important questions asked during this phase was: what sort of shops do people wanting children's products go to? Prior to that time the children's Tripp Trapp chair had mainly been sold in furniture shops. 80 % of Tripp Trapp's overall turnover in 1997 came from furniture outlets. When sold in furniture shops, it was displayed next to large lounge suites, wall units and coffee tables with varying styles. The answer to the question did not correspond to the distribution outlets that Stokke had been using. Consumers seeking equipment for children do not usually visit furniture shops – they visit children's equipment shops.

Nevertheless, switching from furniture to baby equipment sales outlets appeared to be a very bold move. Stokke's self-image and traditions indicated that it should stick to furniture outlets. Stokke had always been a furniture company and understood the furniture market. The company's sales network had been cultivating relationships with the employees of furniture shops for many decades. Switching over to a different distribution network would mean breaking away from the identity that the company had cultivated and it would entail a step into unknown territory. It would challenge the expertise of key personnel and it would be conditional on having the will to start from square, once again.

Despite all objections, a bold choice was made during the summer of 1998. In future, the children's collection would be sold through children's equipment shops both at home and abroad. By making this move, Stokke had partly changed its associations with the industry. A key part of this traditional furniture group was no longer involved in producing furniture – it was producing baby equipment.

The process leading up to this change in distribution outlets took place during the spring of 1998. The initial strategy work involved the management team at Stokke Fabrikker, where Tor Norbye was then Managing Director, and the managers of the various sales companies. This resulted in this part of the Stokke group releasing its grip in other central areas as well. Previously, Stokke had defined woodwork and laminated wood materials as core values. Now the Children's Division released its grip on woodwork and said that function and style should decide which materials should be used. Furthermore, this new strategy indicated that the Children's Division should not be defined as a furniture producer, but as a supplier of children's equipment with collection development and brandbuilding as key aspects. These were bold measures for a company which was just one part of a larger furniture group. However, one of the things that was apparent during this phase was the fact that few limitations were placed on creativity and freedom of action by the group management and owner. The company's policy of dividing responsibility and encouraging bold, alternative thinking has been one of Stokke's distinguishing features throughout its history. It is probably this “hidden hand” that has given the company the necessary capabilities to adapt during decisive phases.

Before the Division finished clarifying the strategy outlined above, it had been through a search process during which previous successes were experienced as being obstacles to further development. For several years the company had been seeking new products which could supplement its children's collection, but the idea that new products should not be allowed to detract from Tripp Trapp had been a self-imposed limitation. They were preferably supposed to be just as unique and innovative, and bearing in mind the company's existing expertise it was natural to think that new products had to be chair models. This attitude is reflected in a memo sent to the group's Board by the Children's Division: “... what we understand is sitting, ergonomics, woodwork, furniture.”201

The collection of the Children's Division consisted basically of the Tripp Trapp and Sitti chairs. The Sitti chair (1994) has good functional features and is still in production.

The best for your child

After the summer of 1998 the division had thus divested itself of something that had been experienced as being a straightjacket. It was free to develop new products in the baby equipment segment. A greater range of collections emerged as the company made its way into this market. Tripp Trapp sales were actually stagnating as parts of the market became saturated and there were therefore slim growth prospects for retailers involved with Stokke unless the company could offer more products. And Stokke realised that good retailers wanted growth. Good retailers wanted fewer suppliers with more comprehensive collections, and Stokke could be a more attractive supplier if it had a larger collection. As far as Stokke was concerned, its sales and administrative work would be easier if the company could market several units at the same time during just one shop visit. An expanded collection would also give Stokke more shop space and consequently build up Stokke's position with end users. This was completely in accordance with the objectives of the group management and Board in 1977 which called for improved customer focus which could then be allowed to govern how the company conducted its product development and marketing work.

At that time the question was: which new products should be included in Stokke's new children's collection? The concept group also devoted a considerable amount of work to this question. The company based itself on the equipment requirements of children and parents during a baby's first year. The new products were to cover different basic requirements/functions such as sleeping, resting, sitting, eating and transport, in a unique and carefully considered manner. Such an approach gave free rein to ideas and opened up for exciting concepts which could defend Stokke's position as a quality-oriented and creative finished goods producer. The success of Tripp Trapp carried obligations, but by loosening a few ties and releasing some mental and technical blocks, it was possible to move further along the path that had been staked out.

It became clear early on that it would be necessary to do away with the limitations imposed by the company's chairs in order to move on. If new chairs were to be developed on a par with Tripp Trapp this would result in erosion of the company's own market shares. One alternative would have been to make cheaper, lower quality chairs, but that would have undermined Stokke's image and Tripp Trapp's brand value as top-quality furniture.

Instead, efforts were directed towards new product groups which could build on the same values incorporated in Tripp Trapp: ■ A fundamental respect for children and their changing needs as individuals – active, learning and contact-seeking. ■ The requirements of children and parents for flexible products which could easily be adapted to suit the changing daily requirements and phases that children pass through from birth until the age of five. The products should therefore grow with the children, exactly like the Tripp Trapp chair. Stokke chose to direct its attention towards children in the age group ranging from birth to the age of five, because the requirements of this age group were traditionally met by one distribution outlet, the baby equipment outlet.202

Stokke had ambitious goals for its product development work over the next few years. The aim was for individual units in the children's collection to become the preferred products for expectant and new parents the world over because they would be convinced that Stokke had the best products for their children, and because Stokke, like the parents themselves, thought that only the best was good enough for their children.

The big leap

Stokke's Children's Division took a bold leap into the unknown when the decision was made to concentrate on sales through children's equipment shops. The company's sales and marketing network knew very little about these new activities when they landed after taking the leap, and what they found could easily have caused a beginner to lose heart. There was an increasing number of Tripp Trapp copies and Tripp Trapp-inspired chairs in all price ranges. The large children's equipment chains developed their own products, and were primarily interested in marketing their chain names. There were fewer independent children's equipment shops and there was increasing integration between producers and retailers. In addition, the customer groups in Stokke's most important markets were stagnating. Birth statistics showed that people in the western world were having fewer children. The positive thing about this was that when they did have children, the parents were both well-educated and had good income prospects, so Stokke's products and product philosophy would have a good chance of winning through. Stokke did not allow their first experiences with these new distribution outlets to frighten them, and Stokke was not a beginner either. In 1998 the company's leading product, the Tripp Trapp chair, was already a market leader in key international markets. The problem was not getting Tripp Trapp into the shops, but getting shop employees and owners to dedicate their attention to the chair and market it more aggressively. In order to achieve this, Stokke needed to have a somewhat larger range in its portfolio.

Copy threats

Since the 1980s Stokke had focused on producing innovative, unique products with user benefits that were not available from other furniture producers. The Stokke management at that time, under the leadership of Roar Hauge-Nilsen, were confident that retailers and furniture buyers would prefer the company's unique, original products if they were made aware of their beneficial effects for the human body. In the US, where Stokke had experienced explosive interest in the Balans concept in 1984, this assumption proved to be incorrect. Retailers who were offered cheaper copies of the Balans products allowed themselves to be tempted by the prospect of greater profits for themselves and turned their backs on the original products. The management of Stokke responded relatively quickly to the disappointment they felt when their hopes for the promising American market were unfulfilled, and to their indignation about the theft of their creative furniture concept. The company contacted the Norwegian authorities for legal assistance in stopping these copies. The costs involved in pursuing such cases through the American legal system were so high as to be prohibitive for a medium-sized Norwegian furniture business.203

Despite attempts to stop what in Stokke's opinion were dishonest competitors in the US, this market was evaluated as being so problematic over the next few years that Stokke chose to cut it out completely. The company turned instead to Europe and built up a network of dedicated retailers in many of the large cities, in the first instance in Germany and the Benelux countries, then in Denmark, France, Switzerland, Italy and Spain. At that time Roar Hauge-Nilsen was the Managing Director of Stokke Fabrikker AS. He had recently learned an expensive lesson from the American market which was ruined by disloyal retailers and poor copies. In the opinion of Hauge-Nilsen, the best way to prevent the same thing happening in Europe was to establish stronger ties with each retailer by paying considerable attention to each individual through a conscious selection process. The aim was that such attention should include the provision of detailed information about the special characteristics of Stokke's furniture, and that the enthusiasm and insight communicated by individual retailers to their customers would be the best guarantee against copycats and copies.

It was not long before Stokke started experiencing similar problems in Europe. Herleif Ulstein joined Stokke as an export manager in 1990. One of his first challenges was to build up a new distribution network for Stokke in Denmark. At that time Stokke was represented by an independent, sole Tripp Trapp importer – Finn O. Møller, and a group of retailers importing Balans products. After working for just one month, Ulstein came across a copy of the Tripp Trapp chair in Denmark. He reacted spontaneously to something that he regarded as being dishonest competition. He contacted the management of Stokke Fabrikker, who had initially been rather lukewarm about taking legal steps against producers who had been tempted to copy Stokke's unique furniture. Hauge-Nilsen still thought that Stokke's best protection against plagiarists was to cultivate the original products and present their advantages to the customers. Ulstein argued that Stokke had to do both: build stronger branded products and fight against copies. He won support for his views from the owners, Kåre Stokke and Kjell Storeide. The necessary steps were taken to try the case in question before the law courts. Stokke's lawyers at BAHR evaluated Denmark as being a favourable country in which to explore legal remedies in respect of products. Denmark had legislation favouring holders of intellectual property rights – especially copyright. In addition, Denmark was a member of the EU, and a positive judgement handed down there would

Roar Hauge-Nilsen, on the left, was convinced that Stokke's distinctive furniture could win through on the global market by undertaking patient marketing work. He doubted that there were any benefits to be gained from engaging in legal battle against the large number of copies of Stokke's furniture. He is depicted here with Group Managing Director Kjell Storeide and the Managing Director of Stokke Fabrikker, Tor Norbye, at a meeting with Stokke's Swiss sales company in 1994. Herleif Ulstein, left, made great efforts in the 1990s to remove copies of the Tripp Trapp chair. He is depicted here with Karsten Larsen and Torben Guldhammer Nielsen at Stokke's Danish office in Copenhagen during the furniture exhibition in Copenhagen in 1997. Larsen, who in 2007 was the Stokke's Scandinavian Area Manager, is enthroned on a Garden chair.

have a positive effect on any similar cases in other EU/EEA countries.204 Stokke won a complete victory in its first court case.

Finn O. Møller AS represented Stokke on a three-year contractual basis. Herleif Ulstein thought that Stokke should take over control of all distribution in Danmark. “I emphasised that all distribution should be based on selective distribution contracts with each retailer and should include conditions relating to intellectual property rights. The retailers should also help Stokke by hunting for copies. I received support for this, and was given the task of establishing and managing the subsidiary Stokke Danmark ApS.”

This enabled Stokke to build up an efficient distribution network for its Tripp Trapp and Balans products and to simultaneously enforce its intellectual property rights. With effect from 1 January 1993, Stokke Danmark ApS was in such a position, and a series of cases against copies were brought before the courts in Denmark and Sweden that same year.

The Tripp Trapp chair had patent protection for 20 years. When this patent expired in 1992, there were many producers who were ready to launch copies. Many thought that the chair was only protected by patent legislation. But in the cases heard in Denmark and Sweden, Stokke's lawyers had maintained that Tripp Trapp had artistic qualities connected to the chair's main design which meant that it was protected under intellectual property legislation. It was further pointed out that the chair was also protected by marketing legislation, which amongst other things was designed to prevent anyone from taking advantage of someone else's marketing efforts for a period of several years.

There was also a case in Norway where the children's pram producer Simo launched a copy of the Tripp Trapp chair. In the case against Simo, Stokke called Arne Brenna as a witness. Brenna was a professor of art history at the University of Oslo and he explained that the main design of the Tripp Trapp chair was unique in a global context when it was launched in 1972. Brenna was of the opinion that Simo had copied the overall characteristics of the chair. The court found for Stokke and Brenna, and Simo lost the case on all points. This judgement was not appealed by Simo and it was thereby enforceable. This meant that the Tripp Trapp chair was entitled to protection under intellectual property legislation in Norway for 70 years after the death of the copyright holder. The same arguments were subsequently used in all copycat cases. A chair of the same type as in the Simo case turned up a few years later in Sweden and Denmark. Stokke once again contested the copy chair. In Sweden Stokke won the case in two courts before judgement became final. In Denmark a case against the large Danish furniture group Tvillum was taken all the way to the Supreme Court. Stokke won the case, thus providing the company and Brenna with weighty legal support for their evaluations.

After the victory against Simo, Herleif Ulstein began to cast his gaze outside Scandinavia during the autumn of 1993. He discovered that there were copies on the market in Germany, Holland and Switzerland. The Hauck family business had been particularly aggressive when selling their copycat chair which Stokke thought was an almost slavish copy of the Tripp Trapp chair. It came to light that Hauck had been selling this chair since 1987 without anyone at Stokke's head office being aware of it. Through the BAHR firm of lawyers, Ulstein obtained a legal opinion from German lawyers about Stokke's legal position in this respect and Stokke's chances of winning a case against Hauck. In their memorandum they concluded that the Tripp Trapp chair would in all probability also be protected by copyright under German law, and that Hauck's chair would be judged to be an illegal copy. However, there was a danger that Hauck could win by pleading passivity because Stokke had not reacted earlier. Herleif Ulstein says: “I remember well the day I sat in Roar Hauge-Nilsen's office and Kåre Stokke was presented with this memorandum. He reported that very cautious German lawyers had indicated that we had an approximately 40 % chance of winning a legal action against Hauck. I argued that our chances were better. Then Kåre said something that has always helped me when the fight against copies has been difficult: 'If we do not try this case our chances of winning are zero – we shall try this one – I think we will win!' The company then embarked on extensive preparatory work for this case.”

The first case against Hauck lasted for several years, and was heard by all the courts, all the way up to the German Supreme Court which found in favour of Stokke and ordered Hauck to pay compensation. Stokke was then able to bring a new action in order to determine the amount of compensation to be paid. It turned out that German courts have far stricter formalities than their Scandinavian equivalents.

Formal documentation relating to the company's reorganisations and personnel changes had not been highly prioritised by the Stokke family business. Georg Stokke had an obvious explanation about his role in the matter: “When generation shifts occurred on fjord farms in Storfjorden, the old people moved into the farm workers' house. Everything was then sorted and no further formalities were required.” But the German legal system was not satisfied with the procedures relating to generation shifts at Storfjorden in Sunnmøre. They wanted written documentation showing that Kåre Stokke had the authority to sign the Tripp Trapp production contract in 1972. They also wanted written proof that Peter Opsvik, the person, had actually transferred the intellectual property rights relating to the chair to the company of Peter Opsvik AS.

It came to light that the Stokke group did not have any papers documenting that Kåre had taken over responsibility from Georg in 1964. In order to try and get to the bottom of the matter, Herleif Ulstein contacted an acquaintance at Sunnmørsposten and asked him to search through the newspaper archives relating to a certain defined period of time for something that could document the

Kåre Stokke with Tripp Trapp chair no. 2.5 million in 1997. Sales received a tremendous boost when Stokke succeeded, over a period of time, in removing a large number of Tripp Trapp copies. In November 2007 Tripp Trapp no. 6 million was produced.

Original Stokke products over three generations. Georg Stokke with model 5 B, a best-seller during the post-war years, Kåre Stokke with Tripp Trapp and Geir Stokke with Gravity.

change in management. This important piece of the puzzle fell into place when a small notice was found in the newspaper announcing the change in management. In cooperation with the BAHR firm of lawyers, who for many years had been Stokke's legal advisors, Ulstein was finally able to present a comprehensive “Group CV” that documented in detail all the organisational and personnel changes that had taken place during the history of the company and all the production contracts that had been entered into with those who had intellectual property rights to the company's products. With this documentation in its briefcase, Stokke won the case against Hauck. The case relating to the determination of compensation is to be heard by the German Supreme Court in the autumn of 2007 and a final judgement is expected some around the end of 2007/beginning of 2008.

In 1997, the same year that the company was divided, Stokke Fabrikker established its own legal department under the management of Herleif Ulstein. This move represented a clear acknowledgement of the work that Ulstein had accomplished during much of the 1990s, supported by the owners and the Group Managing Director. They had started to realise that idealism did not always prevail on the market, i.e. furniture customers did not always seek out original products and manufacturers who had acquired the right to manufacture products under legally binding contracts. Those who play by the rules and pay the costs involved in developing unique products, are dependent on legal protection, otherwise those who take shortcuts could easily win by offering goods at lower prices. The company also realised that its US experience could not be transferred directly to circumstances in Europe. In summary Kjell Storeide states that the European courts have clearer powers to enforce judgements that create a precedence.

The employees in Stokke's legal department have had their hands full with many tasks. This department deals with everything relating to the protection of intellectual property rights such as establishments, the maintenance and enforcement of designs, and patent and trademark registration. It also handles cases connected to product liability, and the drawing up of licensing agreements with designers and distribution contracts which Stokke enters into all over the world. These distribution contracts also contain conditions specifying that importers and retailers shall assist Stokke in monitoring the global market in order to track down illegal copies. A high percentage of the cases dealt with by the legal department have concerned copies of the Tripp Trapp chair. Hundreds of cases have been handled and a large number of these have been processed through the law courts in a number of countries, especially Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. Two examples of major enterprises that have been adversaries are the Swiss grocery chain Migros and the American toy giant Toys “R” Us. This indicates just how attractive and commercially viable this product has been and continues to be, and how important the Tripp Trapp chair has been for Stokke in a business context. Tripp Trapp was far too valuable to Stokke for the group to deal lightly with those who were trying to cream off the profits brought in by this hugely successful children's chair.

For Stokke it has not just been the rights connected to commercial utilisation of the Tripp Trapp chair that have been so important. This children's chair has been marketed under the brand name of Tripp Trapp ever since it was launched in 1972. Stokke had made huge marketing efforts to establish this brand name which has recently been associated with considerable status and assets. This has also resulted in the brand name being copied and used illegally. Herleif Ulstein says that there have been many minor cases, but in 1999/2000 and with the support of Kjell Storeide, Steinar Loe, Kristine Landmark, the Board and Rune Stokke initiated an extensive case against the Danish company Trip Trap Denmark A/S which had started to actively market its products, mainly garden furniture, on the international market under the brand name of Trip Trap. Stokke possessed the sole rights to this brand name by virtue of registration and the cultivation of markets all over the world. Legal remedies were quickly sought in a number of countries, with cases being heard simultaneously by the courts in New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Holland, England and the US. Stokke was ready to take legal action in any country where its rights were being violated. Apart from the Hauck case, this was the most extensive case brought by Stokke. A lot of work was carried out on documenting rights in cooperation with the BAHR firm of lawyers. Stokke won the first case in New Zealand, then cases in Sweden, Norway and Switzerland. Trip Trap Denmark soon started to realise that the case was going in Stokke's favour, and they called for a settlement which was made on 2 December 2004. It was agreed that Stokke would retain its rights and that Trip Trap Denmark would change its name. The company would not be permitted to use the name Trip Trap as a brand name outside Denmark. It changed its name to Skagerak Denmark A/S on 1 January 2005.

The Balans concept was also exposed to copycats during the 1990s. Stokke itself did not take legal action, but participated in paying the costs incurred by one of its Balans manufacturers – HÅG – when Balans copycats were brought before the courts.

Stokke's Balans products were also exposed to copying. These cases were pursued by HÅG, with the support of Stokke. Here is a Balans Duo, designed by Peter Opsvik.

For a while at the end of the 1990s Stokke collaborated with the producer of Voksi-posen, Bodil Korshamn. Depicted here is Kristine on a visit to Rindal to see the bag being manufactured. This venture did not last long. Kristine Landmark and Karsten Larsen, who were responsible for Children in Denmark, ensuring that Sleepi is presented in the best possible way. Here they can be seen with shop owner Søren Lyager at BabySam in Svenstrup in Denmark in 2000.

Products that grow with the child

After its experiences with the copycat cases during the 1990s, Stokke started being much more scrupulous about documenting all contracts and all product developments. This also concerned development work on new products in the Children's collection which started in earnest in 1998. The company had no desire to develop large numbers of new products. Based on its highly ambitious objectives relating to the fulfilment of basic needs, uniqueness and quality, the company realised that it would take a long time to realise these products and that it would have to take one step at a time. Objectives were set whereby the company would design products covering four to six basic needs for children in the 0–5 year age bracket within a few years. There was an important nuance which applied during the early stages of this product development work. No-one ever said that they would design a bed. Instead the aim was to develop a product which would satisfy children's needs for sleep and rest. The first product to supplement the company's limited Children's collection, Voksi-posen, came from outside the company in 1998. This grow bag/sleeping bag was developed by Bodil Korshamn from Rindal in Nordmøre in 1985. Like Stokke's Tripp Trapp chair, the bag grew with the child. It was an all-year-round bag which could be transformed very simply into a carrycot, and it could be used in a pram, a sledge and a bed from birth until the age of three or four. Voksi-posen had been awarded the Norwegian Design Council's Award for Good Design in 1996. When Stokke entered into this collaborative venture the bag was being produced by Ullkorga AS in Rindal, a company with 27 employees and an annual production of 20,000 bags. It was anticipated that production could be increased substantially after the contract with Stokke was signed.205 This collaborative venture with Ullkorga did not last long because it was difficult to coordinate two companies with different business cultures. Stokke's next product was developed by the company in collaboration with two external designers, Susanne Grønlund and Klaus Hviid-Knudsen, and was designed to meet a child's basic needs for sleep and rest. The result was a bed called Sleepi which was ready to be launched at the Kind & Jugend exhibition in Cologne in 1999. Sleepi was a bit more than a traditional bed. It was a mobile resting product that grew with the child. It also had wheels so that it could be moved from room to room. Stokke's product catalogue provided information about why one would want a bed that was easy to move: “During the first six months, children do not usually have a fixed sleeping pattern. During that time it is a good idea for the child to sleep in its parents' room so that it can experience light and sound and learn the difference between night and day.”

This echoes the Tripp Trapp philosophy: the chair moved the child up to the level of the adults sitting at the table, bringing the different generations closer together in an equal and harmonious relationship – and it grew with the child. Stokke was more successful than most other producers of children's equipment in reaching welleducated, resourceful parents with newly-acquired insight into children's emotional and intellectual needs. Psychologists have emphasised that a child's experience of security and closeness to its carers during its formative years is extremely important for the development of a harmonious personality. Stokke emerged as the best exponent of child-friendly home furniture. It thus looked as though one of the company's objectives, that of catching “the spirit of the times” before its competitors, had been achieved.

Value added

The Children's section was split off into a separate division in 1997. In 1999 the necessary steps were taken so that the whole group could be separated into divisions. One of the main reasons for

The Care changing table was launched in 2001.

Sleepi Campus play tent (2001).

undertaking these changes in the company's management structure was the desire to free up resources for investment in future growth.206 Previously, the local company management had been left relatively to their own devices as regards implementing measures that they themselves regarded as necessary. Now all measures were to be put before the new management team in the group in which Kristine Landmark was the representative for the Children's Division. Even though Children both then and previously had made substantial contributions to the company's liquidity, this did not necessarily mean that self-generated funds could automatically be fully used by the division. However, the excellent profits posted by the division and the creativity that emerged in its product development work were reflected in its relationship with the group's management team and contributed towards anchoring it as one of the group's supporting divisions. The figures spoke clearly: after the Children's Division had found new distribution outlets, sales of Tripp Trapp chairs reached new heights. After the downturn in sales in 1998, sales rose steadily until they passed the 326,000 mark in 2001. The Movement Division suffered a definite reduction in sales, from 76,842 in 1998 to 67,684 in 2001. The Children's Division contributed a total of NOK 25 million towards the group's overall profit of NOK 29 million in 2000. The Movement Division did not make any positive contributions to these figures, although Wonderland did. On the basis of this situation, the Children's Division obtained approval to pursue its ambitious development project.

The Tripp Trapp chair and Sleepi bed were the first couple of products to be incorporated in the company's children's collection. These were followed by the Care changing table and the Sleepi Campus play tent in 2001207 and the Keep storage system in 2004. Both Care and Keep could be adapted to suit the child as it grew and developed. The changing table had copied Tripp Trapp's attributes by enabling children and adults to be close to one another. The height of the table could be adjusted, and it could also be altered to accommodate other functions as the child grew. It could easily be changed into a desk, bookshelf, TV table, CD rack, etc.

The basic products Sleepi, Care and Keep not only had extra functions and adjustment capabilities. A set of accessory products was also developed which were designed to accommodate fashions, customer satisfaction and not least help to increase turnover per transaction. These were all motivating factors for developing a comprehensive collection, and it was obviously more cost-effective to achieve an increase in each customer sale, thus helping to boost sales output and simplify order processing and invoicing. As already mentioned, the retailers preferred suppliers with good, high-profile product ranges because this facilitated sales developments and helped to simplify their administrative procedures. One challenge that Stokke met in the market was that its children's furniture was more expensive than most of the alternatives. Stokke had to overcome this challenge by making consumers more aware of the added value of these products. If they purchased Sleepi they would no longer need to store their child's bed in a dark loft when the child was a couple of years old. The child's bed could be transformed into a junior bed, and later on perform other functions which actually incurred an additional investment. From an overall financial point of view, the purchase of an initially more expensive Stokke product would be beneficial in the long run. So Stokke was actually offering a complete collection for children's rooms, which also served to deepen and strengthen contact between parents and their children and promoted healthy child development, both mentally and physically.

Even stronger focus

Tripp Trapp had become a strong brand name. It was not expected that Sleepi or Keep would acquire the same position in the awareness of potential customers, and unlike Tripp Trapp, no attempts were made to develop equivalent brand knowledge relating to these new products. Since the company's objective was to develop a complete collection designed to fulfil certain basic needs during a child's first year, there was no particular point in doing so either. The main idea was to develop a brand name that could send the desired signals to the market, and it was the name of the producer, Stokke, that was to perform this function. The brand name of Stokke was intended to create positive associations and promote confidence among customers all over the world.

One problem with this brand name was that it was not exclusive to the Children's collection. Up until 2006, the Movement collection also went under this brand name. Stokke's 1980s logo was also linked strongly to furniture in this collection, since the slogan “Makes life worth sitting” appeared under the Stokke name. Like the Children's Division, the Movement Division had an international presence and profiling requirements, but its products were different – although its target group did not necessarily have to be very different. Parents with an eye for children's particular needs, would probably also be receptive to information about ergonomic and healthy furniture for adult bodies.

Nevertheless, this is an area that was highlighted during the company's in-house strategy debates. It was gradually acknowledged that a large product area like children's equipment for the global market would require maximum focus from a small Norwegian company like Stokke. This dawning acknowledgement became a pressing certainty during the process which resulted in the final product in the Childen's collection so far: the Xplory pram. This was an extremely resource-intensive project which extended over many years.

The Movement division goes new ways

Inflexible movement?

Stokke – “Makes life worth sitting” was the logo of Stokke Fabrikker when it was separated into two divisions in 1998 – Children and Movement. Ever since 1970, Stokke Fabrikker had been moving towards clarification of what was to become the company's image, and in 1986 the company management thought that they had found it. The company's main mission was to produce furniture that provided the body with movement and variation, as expressed in the motto in its logo.

The Managing Director of Stokke Fabrikker up until 1995, Roar Hauge-Nilsen, was the architect behind this company philosophy. He thought that it was essential that the company should remain as one unit and that its activities should be channelled towards Stokke Fabrikker's unique contribution to the global furniture industry, i.e. products with an ergonomic design. This is why Hauge-Nilsen was hesitant about proposals put forward by the group management and owners to split the company's output into different product areas. The actual division of Stokke Fabrikker into the Children's and Movement divisions in 1998 represented a move away from the overall company philosophy supported by Hauge-Nilsen and several others. It was also the first step towards the removal of the motto “Makes life worth sitting” from Stokke's logo.

Movement to the Netherlands

In 1997/98 it was not taken for granted that the Children's Division would form the basis of the new Stokke. Working with Movement products was still the most popular option, and the company management still wanted to focus on the unique characteristics of the company's movement and variation products because they thought that the company could make a decisive contribution towards the battle being waged by ordinary people against an enforced sedentary lifestyle. The Stokke group's 1998 annual report contains the following statement: “In our information society there are increasing numbers of people who are spending more time sitting down. The body cries out in longing to be able to move. People are forced to adjust to their chairs rather having their chairs adjust to them! A chair from Stokke Fabrikker welcomes people seeking variation and movement while sitting – in other words: everyone.”208

The Dutchman Wynand Mens was employed to run the Movement Division after the reorganisation. In order to achieve closer proximity to the Division's main markets, it was decided that the centre for marketing activities in the Movement Division would be moved to Tilburg in the Netherlands.

Wynand Mens made his debut at the large furniture exhibition in Cologne in 1998 where all attention was focused on the Movement collection. One measure implemented by Mens involved making drastic cuts in the number of retailers working for the company. He wanted to focus more heavily on the contract market since this market was easier to target. He narrowed down the company's product profiles and divided its products into different modules, earmarked for various market segments. One such module incorporated the Move chair, while another was called Activity and incorporated Balans Variable, Gravity and Thatsit. The former director of Stokke Fabrikker, Roar Hauge-Nilsen, was still keeping a close eye on the company and the industry and he was surprised about the changes implemented by Mens. Mens had previously been one of Hauge-Nilsen's strongest supporters in the European retailer network, and he had followed up by selecting and choosing dedicated retailers. Now he was turning everything upside down and making a pun out of his name Wynand – Why not? “Why not open things up?” asked Mens, “and let those who wanted to sell Stokke products do so”. However, important boundaries were nevertheless set for Stokke's retailers. In order to follow up the company's basic ideas relating to target groups, the retailers had to choose one of the modules. They were no longer allowed to present Stokke's entire product range.

It became clear that the sales network measures initiated by Mens were not entirely successful. The group management received many protests from frustrated retailers. The management and owners of Stokke realised that the reorganisation had resulted in competing products encroaching on Movement's position in many shops.209 Out of loyalty to each other, many more retailers left than originally planned. Sales nosedived. Managing Director Kjell Storeide and Rune Stokke, who had taken over as the owner of Stokke Industri AS in 1997, were keen to address the situation relating to Movement which was largely responsible for Stokke Fabrikker's reduced profits in 1998. That year, Rune Stokke himself took over as the Manager of Movement and the divisional management was moved back to Håhjem.210 At the same time, Tor Norbye resigned as the Director of Stokke Fabrikker and was replaced by the former Director of Westnofa Industrier, Steinar Loe. Loe used his personal skills to help stabilise the situation at Stokke Fabrikker. He also helped to smooth relations between the plant management and top executives within the organisation, the Group Managing Director and owner.

92 % of Stokke Fabrikker's income came from foreign markets. It was therefore imperative to address the disturbance that had been created in the company's international distribution network, following the changes that were implemented in 1997. One measure involved terminating the company's contract with its importer in the UK with immediate effect as of 1 January 1999. A new subsidiary, Stokke UK, was formed on the same date and this company took over responsibility for the marketing and sales of Stokke's products. Stokke GmbH in Germany acquired new management and Stokke increased its ownership stake in Stokke SRL in Italy from 52.5 % to 92 %. Stokke Movement's products were sold in 14 countries. Germany

For a few years, Stokke Fabrikker had a permanent exhibition of its furniture for movement and variation at the Bella Centre in Copenhagen. The Garden furniture sculpture occupied a central place in the exhibition premises and served as an attraction for young and adult visitors. 1995. Move. Design: Per Øie. Wynand Mens devoted considerable attention to Move after he took over as the manager of the Movement Division in 1997.

had been the company's largest market ever since the company's failure to enter the American market during the middle of the 1980s. There were many consumers in the Netherlands, the UK, Spain and Italy who were fascinated by the Movement philosophy.

Even though the company's children's and movement furniture had separate marketing and sales divisions, this did not necessarily mean that there was a watertight bulkhead between them. The stable income generated by the Tripp Trapp chair was still being used to maintain and develop the Movement collection. The two divisions also had common product development which was managed by Kjell Heggdal until Bjørn Refsum was appointed PD Manager. During the first few years after 1997 the Movement division received a generous proportion of the company's resources in order to develop new products which could maintain and hopefully increase market interest. This was demanding and timeconsuming work. Rune Stokke, who was responsible for Movement, realised that these products had considerable unexploited potential. The imbalance between the Children's and Movement divisions had become even more apparent. This situation was reflected in the company's 2001 annual report which showed an operating profit of NOK 260 million for the Children's Division compared to NOK 225 million the previous year, while the operating profit for the Movement Division fell from NOK 138 million in 2000 to NOK132 million in 2001.211 Rune Stokke had already been asking about the reasons for these developments in 1998. With the help of

the company's sales personnel and the management of Stokke Fabrikker he prepared some simple market analyses in an attempt to discover the cause of the problem. One of the answers they received was that the immediate sales appeal of many of the products in the Movement collection was not large enough – the visual design language was too specialised for many people. As a customer-oriented company owner, he realised that a shop's most important promotional sales, occurred during the first few seconds after a customer had entered the shop. If what the customer saw did not appeal to his/her senses, there was often no sale. Rune Stokke therefore concluded that as far as broad customer groups were concerned, it was important to have products with an aesthetic expression that created an immediate emotional impact. Rune Stokke had also observed something else: “At the same time

we observed that an increasing amount of shop space was being devoted to reclining chairs, that their prices were improving steadily and that the concepts were becoming increasingly more alike. So there should be plenty of scope for a separate Movement concept in this area.” This therefore paved the way for including furniture in the company's collection which not only, and primarily, had an ergonomic mission, but in which style also played a role. However, this did not mean that the company made a sudden U-turn from functional to aesthetic forms of expression. Market surveys had confirmed that the Division's basic concept was correct.212 All the Division wanted was to indulge in greater

freedom of expression, compared to the stylistic constraints previously imposed by the company's ergonomic furniture, e.g. its Balans products, where the stylistic options were actually limited by the chair's runners. Rune has the following comments about how he experienced these readjustments: “Reorganising the collection was a relatively lonely path to go down. There was a lot of scepticism and relatively little support to be had.”

Former PD Manager at Stokke Fabrikker, Kjell Heggdal, and Production Manager Egil Hanken in conversation with a customer at a furniture exhibition. For a number of years Kjell Heggdal had been responsible for creating Stokke's stands at furniture exhibitions. Turid Stokke has also had close contact with the furniture environment over the years. She is depicted here at a furniture collection in Oslo in 1997 with, from the left, Kåre, Steinar Loe, Kjell Storeide and Arne Seljeflot.

Rest and movement

In order to prepare for the development of furniture with good movement functions and innovative aesthetic appeal, two new fittings were created – a simple one for small chairs and a threestage one for larger chairs. The first product to feature the Movement collection's new aesthetic profile was the Peel chair, designed by Olav Eldøy. This chair was a bold “Kinder Egg” where an attempt had been made to combine several features in one product. Basically, the Peel is a reclining chair and there was definitely a market for reclining chairs with a high design profile. Consumers interested in design had indicated that they were not satisfied with the reclining chairs available on the market in the year 2000. Most of the reclining chairs, or recliners, were the same and had mainly been inspired by Ekornes' Stressless. Peel was also

designed to satisfy consumer requirements for movement and variation. Its movement was different to that provided by chairs with runners, i.e. a forward-tilting and active sitting position. Stokke's product developers and the management of Movement realised that the requirement for movement and variation also applied when the user was sitting in a relaxed position. Even when we are lying flat in bed, we are always moving as we try to find our next, and best, position!

When the Peel was launched in 2002 Stokke's presentation showed that it was important for the company to link Peel to the basic values associated with its established Movement collection: “This chair has been designed by our designer Olav Eldøy, and it is a chair which offers more than just comfort. It complies with Stokke

Stokke Date. Design: Olav Eldøy. This chair provides maximum comfort on a small sitting surface. A built-in spring mechanism enables the chair to follow the user's movements.

Movement's basic values; inviting sitting solutions which satisfy everyone's need for movement and variation when sitting down. The movement and balance of the chair is maintained by a double spring system, developed by the designer Ole Petter Wullum.”213 Inventas AS in Trondheim developed the spring system further prior to the launch.

This chair was also presented at the exhibition in Cologne – in 2002. It was the unveiling of eight Peel chairs in different colours that was Stokke's main attraction in Cologne that year, as was the presentation of the Xplory pram in the same city the following year. A report about the event in Stokke's news magazine states that the chairs “revealed themselves to customers taken by surprise”. 214 The fact that Stokke's children's collection was no longer being sold through the furniture outlets was evident, because it had been relegated to a small 20 m2 corner, while the Movement collection occupied a spacious 210 m2 area at the exhibition. Peel not only received verbal praise – it also sold well during the first year. This chair was largely responsible for a 9 % increase in turnover for the Movement Division in 2002. Commenting in the company's in-house news magazine, Managing Director Kjell Storeide said that this just shows how important good products are for achieving success in the furniture industry.215 We might add that it is also important to have products that have immediate sales appeal. Peel attracted instantaneous interest and attention. This chair, shaped like unfolded orange peel, is like no other chair in the reclining chair segment. It invites customers to come closer, to study it and to try it. Because it attracted immediate attention, Stokke's retailers were able to tell a story and thus create the right setting for a sale. Rune Stokke's version of events is as follows: “The fact that Movement acquired its own PD Manager in 2001 – Tor Rønnestad – helped to ensure the development and success of Peel. During the three previous years, less priority was placed on Movement than on our Children's projects – understandably enough.”

Stokke Peel. Design: Olav Eldøy. After Rune Stokke took over as the Manager of the Movement Division in 1998, he started to expand the range of products that, in addition to their movement functions, could also create an immediate aesthetic impact. The Peel chair is perhaps the most successful result of this work. The design of the chair is inspired by unfolded orange peel.

Planet was designed by Sven Ivar Dysthe in 1965 and produced by Møre Lenestolfabrikk/Møremøbler. After Stokke took over the company, this model was re-launched and given an additional function in the form of a patented tilting mechanism.

Emphasis on aesthetics

Movement followed up with an exciting new launch at the furniture exhibition in Cologne in 2003 when the Date dining chair, designed by Olav Eldøy, was unveiled. The exterior features of this chair seemed to be an obvious departure from the core values of the Movement Division, but the tilt principle, which had previously been linked to runners at floor level, had instead been incorporated into its seat so that users could move the seat and back by adjusting their weight. Nevertheless, it was probably this chair's slim, aesthetic expression rather than its movement pattern which was most appealing. This applied to an even greater extent to the retro model Planet, designed by Sven Ivar Dysthe, which Stokke Movement included in its collection in 2004 under a joint venture with Fora Form. Planet also had a movable dimension because it had been equipped with a tilting mechanism. Sales of these new products, Peel, Date and Planet, developed in a positive direction during the next few years, while the classic Movement collection went into permanent decline. In 2003 this decline was so great that the Movement Division's overall sales developments were negative compared with the previous year.216 In hindsight, critics of Movement's new direction towards more design-oriented products could only say that that was how things were meant to be. As experienced previously by Stokke's management, the classical movement furniture in the Balans series and Move were sales-intensive. They required specialist expertise in the sales network, as well as a conviction that such furniture was the right furniture for people with active bodies. By focusing more on the aesthetic aspects, people could be forgiven for thinking that the company doubted the essence of its message. Perhaps the communication of the physical aspects of ergonomics and function requires different skills than the communication of visual values?

TOK was launched in 2004 and provided further proof of the fact that Stokke's Movement Division wanted to and were able to combine aesthetics and function. TOK was designed by the world-renowned Japanese designer Toshiyuki Kita.

Sale of Movement

However, right up until 2004, Stokke believed that Movement's negative trend could be turned around by concentrating on models, like Peel, that combined aesthetics and function. Further efforts were made with the launch of the reclining chair, TOK, in 2004. TOK had been designed by the Japanese designer Toshiuyki Kita, who was introduced with great enthusiasm at the furniture exhibition in Milan in April 2004. In its capacity as the only Norwegian exhibitor, Stokke received considerable attention at this exhibition.217 However, despite the retailers' favourable response to TOK, there was little improvement in Movement's overall profits in either 2004 or 2005. One of the problems was that Stokke did not have enough retailers who were able to sell products in this price range.

Stokke had tried to supplement its traditional collection with new models which it hoped there would be a demand for. When this failed to materialise, the Board came to the conclusion that it would be best to sell the Movement Division. Geir Løseth, who had been the Director of Finance at Stokke Gruppen AS and Stokke AS since 2000, took part in the discussions relating to the future of the Movement Division. He discovered that it was not going to be easy to dispose of the Movement Division due to the emotional/ existential and technical/financial aspects involved. The Movement furniture had been Stokke's flagship for the last twenty years and the company's identity had been built up around it. It was now being replaced with something new. The Chairman of the Board, Even Wahr-Hansen, noticed that Kåre Stokke was the least sentimental about it, saying that it would have to go if it could not make a profit. However, Geir Løseth remembers that there were also technical challenges that were equally demanding. He had previously participated in negotiations with potential buyers of Wonderland and Fora Form, and these had been relatively straightforward processes because the specialist operations of these

companies stood on their own feet and they had their own PD divisions and their own sales networks. Children and Movement had a history as two parts of the same company, Stokke Fabrikker AS, and they were fused into one another in a totally different manner. Not only were they under the same roof, but they also had common departments for product development, common sales networks in many countries and a common brand name. After 2000 the company had deliberately coordinated the activities of Children and Movement in order to achieve coordinated output where possible. When selling Movement appeared as the most likely option, this process had to be reversed, and this required a high degree of flexibility on the part of the management and employees. One thing that complicated the separation of Movement was that the company took in more than 50 % of the turnover of the Stokke-owned company, Tennfjord Laminering. If Movement was ultimately closed down there was a chance that Tennfjord Laminering would also have to be closed, and this would be a heavy loss for Stokke. In addition, Fora Form would lose its main supplier of laminates. This highlights just how difficult demergers can be in integrated groups, and it also explains why the Stokke management put so much effort into trying to sell Movement as an active and future-oriented company.

Variér and Credo Partners

Although the demerger process was demanding, it was successful, and a new Movement company, Variér, owned by Stokke and Credo Partners, was formed on 1 July 2006. This company thus acquired the opportunity to focus fully on its own segment, just like when the Children's Division acquired a similar opportunity in the new Stokke AS.

Variér has also maintained contact with Stokke after the demerger – not just by virtue of the companies' common location at Håhjem and the joint ownership of the Stokke family in Varièr. Stokke is still included in the brand name. Up until 1 July 2008, the Movement collection will be marketed by Stokke under the Variér brand name. It is undoubtedly an advantage for a new company such as Variér to receive help on the market by being connected to a wellestablished in brand name. For Stokke AS, which had just started to establish its image as a children's equipment producer, such a link could be slightly difficult since it could cause confusion about Stokke's position. On the other hand, the marketing of Stokke's name on a broader front in a market segment where Stokke felt at home was regarded as being beneficial. Both the children's equipment producer Stokke and the Movement producer Variér, were offering ingenious and unique products with a care dimension, i.e. care for newborn babies and infants, and care for fragile human bodies. In 2007 Variér was marketed as follows by the Sanz furniture chain: “Variér uses its experience to provide you with intelligent solutions that actually look after you while you are sitting down.”218 A bridge was thus built between the two companies which were nevertheless expected to develop independently.

Fora Form, a separate limited liability company

Rune Stokke left his job as the Sales and Marketing Manager of Fora Form during the autumn of 1997, the same year that he took over the controlling shares in the Stokke group from his father. Fora Form continued along the same lines as previously until the year 2000 when it was affected by the reorganisation of the company. Fora Form then became one of four different market divisions. At the same time, a separate Production Division was established, and this marked the commencement of a process designed to close down woodwork production at Fora Form in Ørsta. Stokke as a company stood to benefit considerably from coordinating the company's various types of production. In addition, the production plant at Fora Form was run down and its production flow was not good enough to satisfy the requirements being imposed on industrial manufacturers in Norway. These production conditions were no doubt partly responsible for the fact that Fora Form's 1998 and 1999 financial results were lower than expected. In 1999 the company's operating deficit amounted to NOK 6.1 million.219

Essential changes

The main motivation for refurbishing the company's factory facilities at Ørsta was the company's desire to improve physical production conditions. The building had been erected in two stages, the first in the 1930s and the second in the 1950s, and it had been adapted

In 1997 factory owner Bård Hemminghytt and Director Steinar Gjertsen at Fora Form decided that it was time to build a new production facility for the long-standing Ørsta company. They are depicted here in the oldest part of the factory, which dates back to 1938.

The Stokke companies were often visited by various delegations. The company was interesting both because of its successful design and export investments, and because its factories gradually became highly productive and rational. Here, Kjell Stordal is showing a delegation of politicians from the county of Møre and Romsdal around Tennfjord Møbelfabrikk in 1997. Taking part were, from the left, Petter Løvik, Margrethe Tennfjord, Aud Folkestad and Harald Tom Nesvik.

Since 1988, Ivar Sandnes has been the main architect behind the development of Stokke's new logistics system. Here he is discussing a technical feature with Ove Telseth at the Tennfjord branch.

Fora Form enjoyed a strong position in Norwegian design circles and this was a fortunate position to be in since professional designers were often key members on the procurement committees of public companies calling for tenders. Fora Form celebrated its 70th anniversary during Designers' Saturday in 1999 by holding an exhibition displaying the work of all the 56 designers who had worked for Fora Form. Thirty of the designers were present when the exhibition opened.

to accommodate completely different requirements to those that were being stipulated towards the end of the 1990s. The building consisted of 4 storeys, and in some parts of the factory the roof was too low for using suitable modern production equipment. Two alternatives were available; either significant modernisation of the existing premises, which would also include having to demolish the oldest part, or the construction of a new factory in a different location. Modernisation would solve the problems in the shortterm, but would not allow for future expansion.220 In the autumn of 1997 the factory management asked the municipality of Ørsta and the neighbouring municipality of Volda to present location proposals for a new factory building. Their approach was based on discussions held between the owners and the Board of the company. The Board had been unable to agree about a solution for Ørsta, but initially put its doubts to one aside pending the establishment of a dialogue with the municipality of Ørsta about terms for continued development and a potential new factory in the municipality.

It became apparent that the municipality of Ørsta was prepared to do its utmost to keep Fora Form. At one stage the neighbouring municipality of Volda was also involved in these discussions and offered a specific site for Fora Form's new building. At that time the municipality of Ørsta had no specific sites suitable for industrial purposes. Stokke gave the municipalities a deadline of March 1998 to make their offers. The municipality of Ørsta held an extraordinary meeting in January in an attempt to keep updated about its neighbouring municipality and competitor, Volda. At this meeting it was decided that a former agricultural area at Mosflatene would be regulated for industry and service purposes. There was broad political support for this decision from the members of the municipal council.221

Fora Form had no specific views about which municipality it should be based in. Ørsta and Volda shared a common labour market and there was only a 5-minute drive between the two most likely locations. However, it turned out that Fora Form really wanted to remain in Ørsta. When the regulation process was delayed, the company offered Ørsta a slightly longer deadline for its final location offer, initially until 2000.222 Another reason why Fora Form's building project at Ørsta did not progress as planned, was the above mentioned reorganisation of the Stokke group's production system. Five former production units were reduced to four – Ørsta, Tennfjord, Stranda and Håhjem. One of the consequences of this was that Fora Form's production of laminates and other woodwork at Ørsta was discontinued and moved to Stokke's factory in Tennfjorden. Vatne's previous upholstery and stitching operations were moved to Ørsta. These measures were based on operational and financial assessments. The group management deemed it irrational to have several functions at each factory. By concentrating production on various specialist areas, it was possible to maximise the volume in each area and thus achieve economies of scale.

It was not until 2004 that Fora Form was able to start using the new factory at Ørsta. Fora Form had by then been one of Stokke AS' business areas for four years. Tennfjord's specialist status as a pure laminates manufacturer, meant that the production of woodwork and visible solid wooden components previously manufactured by Tennfjord, was now outsourced to external subcontractors.

When the production of laminates at Fora Form was discontinued, Tennfjord invested in heat presses which, unlike ordinary highfrequency heat presses, utilised new technology. The use of heat presses was eminently suitable for compressing thin-shelled laminates which were incorporated in a number of items in Fora Form's product range.223

The restructuring of the Stokke group was, as the management saw it, a necessary response to the framework conditions offered to Norwegian industry. At the beginning of the new millennium, unemployment was low in Norway. There was still an unfulfilled demand for employees in the public sector, particularly the caring professions, and this helped to keep Norwegian wages at a relatively high level. In 2001/2002 pressure on the Norwegian economy was generally high due to high oil prices and a high dollar exchange rate. As a result the Governor of Norges Bank (the central bank of Norway), Svein Gjedrem, warned that some parts of Norwegian industry could experience problems if this pressure remained high. Competitive industries could face higher costs than they could handle due to competition from countries with lower costs and less pressurised economies. Gjedrem was particularly concerned about the furniture industry with its high level of processing and high wages and salaries.

Group Manager Kjell A. Storeide saw the same threats as Gjedrem, but felt that Norwegian industrial companies with active countermeasures could be proactive and competitive despite warnings to the contrary: “If Norwegian costs increase more than those of our competitors, we must compensate by becoming more rational than our competitors. This can be done by using the most modern

Spring. Design: Terje Hope. 1986. Producer: Møremøbler/Fora Form. This chair exquisitely combines ergonomic functions with an elegant, sculptured shape. It has the same design as the Prime Minister's chair which is to be found in the Ministry Chamber in the Prime Minister's office. Spring is used as a conference chair by the Arts Council Norway.

Fora Form was able to start using its new production premises at Mosflatene in Ørsta in December 2004.

The Manager of Fora Form, Gunnar Hareide, in a Loop. Design: Johan Verde.

Loyal workers at Fora Form's division at Stranda. In 1998 they received medals from the Royal Norwegian Society for Development for having worked for the company for 30 years. Front row, from the left; Hans Petter Ringstad, Magne Gjerde, Eilert Sundal and Arne Naustdal. Rear row, from the left; Inge Langlo, Leif Stokkeland, Steinar Gjertsen, Stranda's former Mayor Anne Lise Lunde, Gjermund Stokkeland and Kjell Storeide who all contributed to an important ceremony.

technological equipment, constantly improving planning and control systems, concentrating production in order to fully exploit installations and equipment, and boosting the expertise and specialist knowledge of our employees, etc. Our investment in a cutting edge laminates factory in Tennfjord will help to increase our competitive abilities, despite the fact that we are in a high-cost country. The same applies to our investment in a new factory at Ørsta.”224

In this area Stokke has shown more foresight than many other Norwegian furniture companies. Stokke's main product, the Tripp Trapp chair, had been produced in Eastern Europe ever since 1973. The production of Tripp Trapp components was not particularly demanding from a technological point of view, and there was a good chance that the financial returns from this high-volume production could be increased if the unit costs were kept low. This could probably be best achieved in a low-cost country like Yugoslavia.

Stokke had always kept an eye on production logistics, but it was not until the 1990s that this aspect was followed up in a more systematic way. In cooperation with SINTEF in Trondheim, the group undertook a critical evaluation of its production, its available and feasible production locations, its available technology and expertise, in the context of the general framework conditions relating to industrial production which existed in Norway and elsewhere. As a result of this evaluation, Stokke defined a few core areas which the company would focus on, where the conditions for optimising production flow were best, and where heavy investments could be defended even in the light of high Norwegian costs. The production of laminates became an area of investment which Stokke wanted to take in a new direction. Other components were thus outsourced to other producers both at home and abroad. Ivar Sandnes, the Production Manager at Stokke Fabrikker since 1998, had been the main architect behind Stokke's production and logistics concept during the previous few years. Since 2006, he has held the title of Production and Outsourcing Manager. The equal status given to the two elements, production and outsourcing, says something important about the conditions which apply to modern industrial production in Norway.

New factory?

As a result of the clarification that was obtained by moving the company's laminates production, Stokke and Fora Form were able to pursue their plans to replace the old factory premises in Strandgata with a new building. Throughout the planning process, Stokke experienced a great willingness on the part of the municipality of Ørsta to find a solution which would secure Fora Form's future. The Stokke management had put their cards on the table and presented various alternatives, including such scenarios as further downscaling and the possible discontinuation of production in Ørsta. Up until that time, Fora Form had been a loss-making project for its owners, but the company had a powerful market position for contract furniture in Norway, and its export efforts were starting to look promising. So if a site solution could be found, many people were very interested in pursuing this commitment in Ørsta, despite the scepticism of the Board of the Stokke group. The owner, Rune Stokke, was one of the sceptics because of Fora Form's profit developments over the past few years. The company's accounts had long been showing a loss. He doubted that a new factory would be enough to change these developments. Group Manager Kjell Storeide was the one who fought hardest for giving Fora Form another chance. In his view the only way to make Fora Form profitable was to build a new factory. According to Storeide, the Fora Form concept was far too good to suffer a silent death, and building a rational and modern factory would be an advantage, regardless of whether or not Stokke kept Fora Form or found someone to take over the business. The Stokke Board eventually agreed with his sentiments. The fact that reaching a decision took time was not really a disadvantage. In the end, what was realised was a sound project, both financially and risk-wise.225

Contributions from Ørsta municipality

Stokke and the municipality of Ørsta municipality reached agreement at a municipal meeting in March 2002. After the meeting everything was set for planning and building a 6,000 m2 factory at Mosflatene, which by then had been deregulated to an industrial and service area. The building work would be carried out by a property development company into which Stokke and the municipality of Ørsta would each inject NOK 4 million in share capital. The estimated cost of the building was NOK 30–35 million, which Stokke would pay off by paying fixed annual rent.

The final sum ended up being NOK 38 million, plus NOK 7 million which was invested in machinery and equipment. The Manager of the Fora Form Division since 1999, Gunnar Hareide, was full of praise for the municipality of Ørsta which had remained true to its best industrial traditions by participating in the joint effort to save Fora Form. This company is a continuation of Møre Lenestolfabrikk which started up in rented accommodation in Ørsta's former municipal building in 1931.

In September 2004, everything was set for the big move. Fora Form was the last industrial business to move from Strandgata where just a few years earlier there had been furniture, wood and hosiery factories. Sewing machine operator Åse Johanne Riise explained how she was both excited and nervous about leaving the

well-used factory premises: “The old stitching room had almost become a home to us. I was on 7 krone and 2 øre an hour when I started in January 1968, and the stitching rooms and I have moved several times since then. But never as far as this.”226

The new factory enabled Fora Form to double its production capacity, and everything had been organised with all activities on one floor so that operations would be much more efficient. When the factory opened, Production Manager Jan Emblemsvåg stated that it had been constructed to eliminate as many non-productive activities as possible, such as walking backwards and forwards, searching and transporting components from one place to another. The greatest investments made were on a new computer-operated transport system, a new warehouse system and a new, advanced forklift truck.227 Emblemsvåg also emphasised the future-orientated company layout during the formal factory opening in December 2004: “Because Fora Form has such an extensive product range, we need to be constantly changing our production solutions. For example, there are no permanent storage places in the new factory. It has a so-called flowing warehouse system. Without the product flow, warehouse and production solutions that we have introduced, the production area might have had to have been doubled.”228 This is how a modern furniture company was able to adapt in a highcost country like Norway in 2004.

During the planning stages it became apparent that extra space would be needed in order to accommodate the administrative section. Originally, most of the company's administrative work was supposed to have been carried out at the group administration office at Håhjem,229 but in 2004, Fora Form was separated out as an independent company with a new ownership structure as a result of Stokke AS' decision to focus mainly on equipment for the baby market. The owners of Stokke, Single Holding, were left with 51 % of the shares in Fora Form; Kjell Storeide took over 16 %, whereas Manager Gunnar Hareide and other company employees received 33 %.

Fora Form's capital requirement during the restructuring and building period was partly mitigated by Stokke's contribution of a NOK 22.5 million loan. As far as the table factory at Stranda was concerned, these organisational adjustments did not lead to any immediate changes, but in 2006 the manufacturing of tables ceased and Fora Form sold the factory to a neighbouring company on the Svemorka industrial estate; Norsk Sjømat.230

Stokke had thus restructured a commitment which had never been a financial success. Even in 2002 the group's annual report stated that Fora Form's operating profits had been weakened and that profitability was unsatisfactory. However, the relief felt after disposing of this commitment was different to that experienced, when a good buyer was found for Vågå Bruk. Fora Form had, and still has, world class design products, and was the leading player in the Norwegian contract market, which, to be fair, was limited, but nevertheless expected to develop well in the future. It was thought that more could be achieved on the export market, despite the logistics challenges involved in the transportation of heavy furniture. By retaining some ownership stakes in Fora Form, the Stokke family demonstrated their faith in its potential for development. However, Stokke was convinced that it would be best for both parties if it focused as much as possible on its remaining core activities while Fora Form devoted itself fully to its own activities.

Progress under new owners

One of the greatest challenges associated with Fora Form's future activities at Ørsta was what to do with the old factory building. The 2002 agreement stipulated that the municipality of Ørsta and Stokke would be joint owners of this building and it would be called Ørsta Storsenter AS. As the name indicates, the owners were hoping to develop the premises into a shopping centre. The municipality was probably not the right partner to help realise a project like this. Stokke started to realise that although the municipality was supposed to help trade and industry, it was also supposed to avoid direct involvement in specific development projects. It soon became apparent that many politicians wanted the municipality to pull out of its involvement in the property development company, even if this meant losing its share capital of NOK 5.1 million.

In November 2005, not long after the municipality pulled out of the project, Stokke sold the property to a local group of buyers who were planning to develop the building in order to accommodate businesses, offices and flats.231

With effect from the summer of 2005, Fora Form's results started to show a significant improvement, although it is not certain whether this could be attributed to its narrower focus after it was separated out, the loss of its “rich benefactor”, or the improved economic situation. The Board, management and employees pushed themselves to the limit during the early spring of that year, when it started to become obvious that the company was heading for another year of substantial losses. Since 2001, the company's annual accounts had been showing red figures, and this was not solely due to the somewhat clumsy production logistics at the old factory premises. It was an international trend which became apparent in the wake of the attack on New York and the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001. Investments in companies requiring contract furniture suffered a significant decline and there were fewer new buildings to tender for. Up until 2004 there had been an accumulation in demand from the market which had benefited the new owners of Fora Form. Manager Gunnar Hareide and his highly

City, design: Øyvind Iversen. This 1954 chair model was re-launched during the Stockholm International Fair in 2007 and has already been selling well for its new owners, Fora Form.

motivated team have turned Fora Form into a supplier of meeting room furniture with a very strong image. The business has focused less on individual products and more on complete, integrated room solutions. This conceptbuilding has yielded good results, and Fora Form has retained its prominent position on the Norwegian market for public interior design solutions, and its exports are increasing. In 2007, the Stokke family sold further shares in Fora Form AS. In June that year, the privately owned equity firm Credo Partners became the main shareholder of the company, leaving the Stokke family's Single Holding AS with an ownership stake of 19.3 %. Kjell Storeide owns a similar stake through Borgund Industri AS. The remaining 18 % is owned by the management and employees of the company.

Westnofa Industrier stands on its own feet

Order-controlled production

The generation change at Stokke in 1997 coincided with a difficult period for Westnofa in Åndalsnes which was struggling with financial problems. There was no direct correlation with the generation change, but it gave the group management the grounds and motivation it needed to become more active in Westnofa's general situation.

One of the main conclusions of Jan Erik Vahlne's strategy evaluation in 1996/97, which was supported by the group management and the Board, was that Stokke should concentrate on activities involving contact with end users. The production of industrial foam did not fit into these plans and the management of Stokke consequently intensified their search for potential buyers of the industrial foam unit. They simultaneously also considered transferring all or some of these activities to Åndalsnes. However, it was concluded that there was so much to be gained from restructuring the company's logistics and production operations at Åndalsnes that the safest option would be to remain and continue developments in the municipality of Rauma. Another deciding factor, apart from the municipality being an excellent joint venture partner, was the fact that a complete industrial environment with unique foam rubber and mattress production expertise had been developed there over a period of many years.

As regards mattress production, the greatest efficiency benefits would be realised by switching over to the production of items in response to orders, instead of manufacturing them and then storing them in a warehouse.

Pending the sale of the foam rubber division, production was rationalised as much as possible.

The entire warehouse was cut out and the company's machinery was upgraded to handle a higher degree of ordercontrolled production. Equipment technology was boosted and

Odd Slettaøyen has been with Westnofa/Wonderland right from the start, and his creativity and enthusiasm have made him a key figure in the success of this mattress manufacturer. He is depicted here promoting one of Wonderland's mattresses; “A good night's sleep starts here”. Foam rubber production in Åndalsnes, showing the production of Celtex, an environment-friendly material.

NOK 46 million was spent on the upgrade as well as on a general expansion of production capacity. The latter was mainly achieved by erecting a new 3,600 m2 factory in connection with the existing mattress factory. The new building was used for forwarding and storing raw materials, and the former finished goods warehouse was converted into production premises.

The local government in Rauma had been informed that Stokke was undertaking a critical evaluation of its involvement in Åndalsnes, and that a scaling down of production could be the result. They were therefore delighted when the acting Manager at Westnofa, Jørn Nes, was able to announce a positive decision. With 180 employees, this company was the largest privately owned employer in the municipality. In September 1998 the local newspaper, Romsdals Budstikke, reported that modernisation of the factory could provide extra jobs.232

Four people at Westnofa were responsible for planning and implementing the new order-controlled production model; Project Manager Tore Lillebstad, Manager Jørn Nes, Technical Manager Ove Sørvik and Production Manager Oddleif Østigård.

Troublesome industrial foam

The production of mattresses and industrial foam was subjected to scrutiny in connection with the above-mentioned project. The production of industrial foam was also affected by another problem: high wastage levels. By investing in new technology, wastage was reduced by 2–3 % prior to the summer of 1998. Marketing and Product Development Manager Terje Klauseth informed Stokke's in-house newspaper that this would mean saving more than NOK 1 million per year. While the company was trying to reduce wastage, attempts were also being made to develop foam types that could attract new customer groups. Its 1998 product range consisted of 10 different grades, ranging from very soft to very hard. More finely adjusted grades, combined with cheaper raw materials, provided Westnofa with new opportunities on the market, enabling the company to approach manufacturers of cheaper furniture.233

However, despite creative product developments and continued market adjustments, the industrial foam division remained a financial risk. It was immediately affected by fluctuations in the general furniture market, and the stagnation tendencies in this market continued into the beginning of the new millennium. During these years, the furniture industry struggled with unstable interest rates. Periodic increases in interest rates and a strong Norwegian krone against foreign currencies, put pressure on the margins of furniture companies, especially those exporting goods. Westnofa's accounts showed a drop in turnover in both 1998 and 1999. The group's annual report attributed the 1999 reduction to heavy fluctuations in orders, which thus resulted in inefficient operations.234

Out of industrial foam

The divisionalisation of the Stokke group in 2000 was based on a desire to promote unity and coordination in the company. As in 1997, the group management and Board's expressed goal had been to phase out the production of industrial foam. This was not because the group management was dissatisfied with developments in Åndalsnes and was unable to see any opportunities in this business area, but because they did not fit in with the

Important figures at Wonderland in the Scandinavian market in 2000. From the left: Kurt Arild Dahle; Carl-Erik Jarlesäther, Sweden; Jimmy Ramstrøm, Sweden; Pertuu Hietanen, Finland; Jørn Nes; Odd Slettaøyen and Keld Hansen, Denmark. The business was sold out of the Stokke group in 2004 and it has been doing well ever since. Showing the production of mattresses at Wonderland's facility in Åndalsnes. Here springs are being sewn into bags to provide maximum comfort.

consumer-orientated model that Stokke wished to cultivate. Throughout the 1990s, Stokke searched for potential allies with experience in the foam rubber sector. One of the companies approached was Ekornes. Both Stokke and Ekornes were involved in the production of foam rubber, involving both moulding and cutting blocks. In 1990, the two companies attempted to coordinate this production. The idea was that they could exploit a shared production facility in order to rationalise foam rubber production as much as possible. This was seen as desirable because the Norwegian market for foam rubber was very limited.

Neither this nor other advances made to Norwegian foam rubber manufacturers produced any specific results until 2000. The reorganisation in 1999/2000 made it easier to sell the foam rubber division.

It was Brekke Industri at Melhus near Trondheim who won the bid for Westnofa. Brekke had become one of the largest Norwegian suppliers of block foam and foam mattresses. In 2000, an agreement was reached between the Stokke group and Brekke Industri regarding the sale, although the Stokke group initially retained a 20 % stake in the new Westnofa Industrier AS. The transfer took effect on 1 January 2001.235 The profit from the sale of Westnofa was NOK 17 million, which was useful for Stokke during a period marked by high product development costs, continuous group efficiency and reorganisation measures and low profitability in respect of operations.

The foam rubber producer in Åndalsnes continued to retain strong ties with Stokke, even after the sale. In 2000, NOK 40 million of Westnofa's NOK 90 million turnover was derived from businesses in the Stokke group.236

Longing for transparency

The development of new products was also a prioritised area for the mattress producer Wonderland. It was expensive to stay ahead in a market area which around the year 2000 was characterised by bold product innovations. The most demanding task involved developing mattresses which could be adjusted so that consumers could move from a reclining to a sitting position in one continuous movement.

As far as the mattress producer Wonderland was concerned, it was in many ways beneficial that the company had been demerged out of Westnofa Industrier AS, to become a separate marketing division within the Stokke group. This contributed towards a greater degree of transparency in respect of its marketing work. It had always been difficult for the market to keep the two production areas separate – Westnofa and Wonderland blended into each other. When a company is attempting to develop a clear image, such ambiguity is unfortunate. The next Divisional Manager of Wonderland, Jørn Nes, used this as his main argument when trying to explain why a demerger would be a good move: “Building a brand requires a focused effort. We have been on the point of making this happen for a long time, but we have been slightly impeded. It is important for us to retain our position as one of the leading mattress suppliers in Norway and simultaneously increase our market shares in the Nordic countries. The new organisation will better equip us to deal with this task.”237

In 2001, Wonderland was thus one of Stokke's four main areas of operation. Children was the area which performed best, both in respect of profits and volumes, being responsible for 38 % of the group's operating income. However, for several years Wonderland

had also been a stable net contributor to the group and was responsible for 24 % of its operating income in 2001.238

Even so, at that time there was a certain amount of concern that mattress sales would continue to decline and that profits were not as high as they had been previously. In 2001, the accounts showed a deficit for the first time in many years. Discussing which measures to implement in order to turn around a downward spiralling trend was a recurrent topic for the group's board, and in 2002

Wonderland was consequently separated out as an independent, 100 %-owned subsidiary of Stokke AS.239

Positive attention

Wonderland placed great emphasis on having a good relationship with its sales network. The company was responsible for contact with its customers, and failure to nurture this part of the value chain could have an immediate impact on production. In 2002, Wonderland succeeded so well in this respect that the company scored top marks in a quality survey of the Norwegian furniture sector carried out by Sentor Gruppen AS. This survey evaluated how producers were perceived by the retailers in various areas. Wonderland scored particularly high for its service, its handling of complaints, its quality and its speedy deliveries. Wonderland also ranked highly in respect of its designs and product development. Only Slettvoll was ranked above Wonderland with regard to design quality in this 2002 survey. Wonderland's results did not arrive overnight. The company experienced, as many had before them, that it takes a long time to gain a secure foothold among retailers and in the market. Wonderland's management received a wake-up call four years prior to the above-mentioned survey. At that time, a consumer survey had shown that many people had heard about Wonderland, but few of them knew that it was a mattress. Contact was made with InterAction Gruppen in Oslo who specialised in brand building. A few key values were defined which Wonderland could be associated with, e.g. branding its mattresses as quality products both inside and out.240 The results achieved in 2002 show that this brand building had been successful over a relatively short period of time.

The company finds its shape

The release of Wonderland in 2002 was a step in the right direction for the group reorganisation that Stokke's management group had been involved in with renewed intensity since 1997. Their strategy discussions resulted in some new moves which shook the very foundations of the long-established furniture company. The transition from furniture to baby and children's equipment in the Children's Division was the boldest move. Fundamental changes were also on the cards for Wonderland. According to Odd Slettaøyen, key personnel at the factory's administration office in Åndalsnes were not entirely comfortable with the new divisionalisation: “Until the end of the 1990s we felt that the conditions for our own growth and development were good. We maintained a healthy focus and felt secure in the stable environment of a family company, particularly from a financial point of view. After 2000 there was a greater degree of coordination and joint management meetings were held for every business area. We had to attend meetings which addressed highly diverse problems and challenges. The manufacturers of children's equipment, contract furniture, mattresses and laminated wood do not have much in common. The company was evolving in too many directions. There was not a lot we could offer each other.”241

The owner and Group Manager held a somewhat different view. Divisionalisation resulted in far better opportunities for coordinated group control. One level of management was also eliminated within the organisation, with all operational threads being gathered by the CEO who also became the Chairman of the Board of the group's subsidiaries. New staff functions were developed in ICT, finances, personnel and information which resulted in improved teamwork and a better flow of information between the various group units. As previously mentioned, not all operational areas were coordinated. Product development, marketing and sales of various products ranging from mattresses to furniture for variation and children's furniture were not easily coordinated. According to Rune Stokke this affected the agenda at group management meetings: “The management group talked far too little about customers and the market – from my point of view that was our main weakness. We kept trying, but ended up with agendas containing items about management/management development, structure, production and a few products. These were also important topics, but I feel that, in our capacity as a management group,

we failed to get a good grasp on customer orientation. This was probably caused by the strong product-orientated culture we were all imbued with.”242

It was probably also caused by the diversified mixture that still made up the group. Customer-orientated products, which were the common denominator after 1997, were not sufficient to glue together the new organisation which was going to be built up. The group management eventually realised that a family-owned

company, which Stokke would continue to be, could not be a world class company in several areas at the same time. The demands that were placed on marketing, product development and profiling were so great for an internationally orientated company, that specialisation became a necessity.

These strategic deliberations resulted in the search for new owners for Wonderland. Ever since the late 1990s, various sales models for the bed division had been considered, i.e. merger with a larger unit, merger with others or the establishment of a different ownership structure. Actual negotiations were held with both Norwegian and foreign investors. This was not an easy choice for Stokke. It was obvious that Wonderland was a business with good potential for growth. Technologically and product-wise, the company was in the driving seat. It had a motivated and competent group of employees and enjoyed a solid position in the market among retailers and furniture buyers.

The Board as a whole, but two members in particular, Even Wahr-Hansen and Stein Verle, were key negotiators in a process that would lead to clarification with the main owner about the road ahead. However, the practical adjustments which formed the basis of a more cutting-edge Stokke were initially made during the interplay which took place between Kjell Storeide and Rune Stokke. The resulting concentration of products and markets was based on organisational processes which were commenced when Storeide returned to Stokke in 1989. He tightened up the group from day one, and the group also started receiving contributions from its subsidiaries during the 1990s. At times both Stokke Fabrikker and

Wonderland were in a position to do this, and they did so in order to strengthen joint functions and move the group forward. This coordination was furthered with greater consistency through the reorganisation that took place in 2000 when unified group management was introduced and more ambitious profit and payback objectives were set for the company's various divisions. The reorganisation process provided the tools that were necessary in order to achieve the desired focus which the new owner was hoping to achieve with effect from 2003/2004.

In 2004, Kjell Storeide was on his way out as the CEO of Stokke AS, but he was actively involved in the process of finding new owners for Wonderland. This resulted in the company Foinco taking over 80 % of the shares in the mattress production company in May 2004. Kjell Storeide, Steinar Loe and the Wonderland management acquired the remaining 20 %. In 2006, the investment company Ferd took over all the shares, and they have subsequently been running the company in Åndalsnes with great success.

Westnofa's Harmony Kontinental.

Stokke = Children

As Stokke celebrates its 75th anniversary in 2007 the company has become recognised as a focused and dedicated producer of equipment for children in the 1–5 age bracket. The company's demanding development projects have served to confirm that its high levels of international industrial activity, require the full application of all available assets and human resources, something that has been demonstrated by the process relating to the Xplory buggy.

Trade network

When the management and product development group of the Children's Division started visualising in 1999 what would end up as the Xplory buggy, they did not allow themselves to be limited by traditional buggy concepts. Their mandate was to design a mode of transport for children over both long and short distances, primarily in urban environments.

Their work started with a market survey carried out in Denmark, Germany and Italy in 1999. Stokke held in-depth interviews with mothers in maternity groups, customers in children's equipment stores and retailers, in order to obtain a general idea about actual supply and demand on the market. In May/June of 2001, this survey was followed up by another survey in Denmark, France and the UK. This time, people were presented with sketches of different products and concepts.

These surveys established a basis for Stokke's future work on the project. One of Stokke's strongest attributes during this period was its ability to create development networks with external specialists. As far as Stokke was concerned, these networks were decisive for the company's chances of success with its advanced product development projects. The company did not possess any specialist expertise in respect of materials technology, apart from laminates, and usually took advantage of external industrial design expertise when required.

However, as it turned out, Stokke's own core skills – and company traditions – proved to be the most important success factor in respect of the company's innovations. The project development work undertaken by the management of Stokke Fabrikker ever since the 1970s had been dominated by designs which were influenced by function, although high aesthetic requirements were also important. The primary focus of Stokke Fabrikker was not devoted to aesthetic expression, but to the development of product messages, as was the case with the Movement collection which delivered the following message: we have the chairs you need because you are a living, developing organism and you need movement and variation. Stokke incorporated this tradition of creating messages and its ability to provide customers with stories about messages/products into its product development work in the Children's Division.

The Explorer

The employees in Stokke's Product Development Department were involved in working on the Xplory for a considerable period of time. In 2001, several new prototypes were created in collaboration with the design group K8 and the plastic specialists Bård Eker Industrial Design in Fredrikstad. Thus far this project was definitely the most expensive development project that Stokke had ever been involved in. The owner Rune Stokke, CEO Kjell Storeide and the Board were nevertheless confident that their basic investments would eventually turn out to be profitable. This confidence is another characteristic feature displayed by the Stokke group over the last few decades, i.e. the will to patiently follow a chosen strategy and to give it the time required to justify its existence.

The first time the buggy was presented to the market was during the large Kind & Jugend exhibition in Cologne in 2003. Kjell Heggdal was responsible for building the Stokke stand which would be used in connection with the launch. The dominating features of tarmac and aluminium were used to underline the fact that the Xplory was a buggy designed primarily for urban environments. There was a staircase in the middle of the stand which was designed to demonstrate that the Xplory could also easily cope with demanding surfaces.

The Cologne exhibition opened every day at 0900 hrs. Normally things were quiet during the first hour, but on the first day the Stokke stand was inundated with visitors long before 9 am. People were pushing and shoving in order to obtain the best possible position in relation to the stage where the buggy was due to be revealed. Rumours had spread that Stokke was developing an extraordinary buggy. Although everyone involved had been told to keep quiet about it, enough information had leaked out to attract a huge amount of interest. In fact the interest was so great that

The Xplory buggy is a product in the best Stokke spirit. It lifts children up and allows them to interact with their surroundings and explore the world.

Xplory meets royalty. During a visit to Ålesund in 2004, Princess Märtha Louise showed a genuine interest in the buggy, accompanied by, from the left, the Portuguese first lady Maria José Ritta, HRH Queen Sonja and Stokke's Wenche Kjerstad.

Stokke's people had to set up barriers made of brown paper during the final stages of assembling the stand in order to keep inquisitive visitors at a distance.243

Xplory met everyone's high expectations. It elicited enthusiastic applause from both retailers and the press with its tilted, elegant aluminium frame, its high seat, its flexibility and its high-tech features.

Market innovators

Xplory was chosen as an exhibit for several exhibitions during the year of its launch, including the Vitra Design Museum's major exhibition tour and the “Scandinavian Design beyond the Myth” exhibition which visited 11 countries over a 3-year period. Xplory also won several design awards, indicating that it was an innovative buggy incorporating genuinely new functional features for the transport of children. The jury that selected the candidates for the “Award of Design Excellence 2003” also considered the Xplory to be a ground-breaking quality product. “The Stokke Xplory is based on an exciting concept in which Stokke once again is being innovative with regards to children and mobility. The buggy stands out. The Stokke Xplory design is based on an overall aesthetic expression combined with a sporty technological look and intelligent additional equipment. This is found to be genuinely innovative.” The jury also liked the multiple functionality of the seat which can be used in both directions, and mentioned that the product was exceptional because the child is seated high enough to interact with whoever is pushing the buggy.

Xplory was developed for transporting children in urban environments where there might also be rough surfaces.

Exhibition appearances, award presentations and media coverage all provide marketing exposure which can hardly be planned, but which is a very welcome bonus after years of targeted work. However, these apparently random marketing benefits are also the result of strategic discussions and desired developments. Stokke was fully aware of how important it was to make contact with so-called market innovators, i.e. people who are well informed about innovative products and are the first to make use of them. When such innovators are also people who are constantly in the media spotlight, their influence on the market is even greater. Stokke's sales machinery therefore took note every time a famous film star or model was depicted in a magazine with their little bundle of joy in a Stokke Xplory. Stokke has gradually collected quite a few articles of this type and they have proved to be highly effective in motivating the retailer network.

Stokke + Courtney Cox

Stokke Children displayed an intrepid attitude right from the start with the aim of becoming the leading global brand in their field. Their aspirations showed the faith that they had in their own collection and their ability to give the world what it wanted, and when they looked around, they realised that there was excellent justification for their belief in their mission. What they usually saw were products which to a large extent were variations on familiar themes. Blatant copies and imitations. There were few unique products to be found, and there was little interest in treading new paths when catering to the deeper needs of consumers. Once again, we would point to the inspiration that Stokke's employees were able to draw on from the history of their own company. The launch of furniture for movement and variation, furniture which was ergonomically motivated from the start, offered the market

Celebrities all over the world use Stokke's products, as shown in these magazine and newspaper articles.

something qualitatively new. The same applied to the children's collection, as fronted by the Tripp Trapp chair. Stokke entered the global market in 1998 with confidence in its own innovative abilities, although at that time the company was still a long way off having a global sales network.

In 1999, the company carried out a survey in order find out the size of Stokke Children's market shares on the various international markets, based on the number of Tripp Trapp chairs sold in relation to the number of newborn children in the countries concerned. At that time Stokke was mainly established in just the European market, and this market was divided into four areas according to their contribution margins. The highest margins were found in Denmark, Switzerland and Norway – 38 % for Denmark, 26 % for Switzerland and 25 % for Norway. The second group comprised the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Sweden with 14 %, 12 %, 11 % and 11 % respectively. Finland, Iceland and Austria followed closely with 8 %, while the areas with greatest potential were represented by Italy, France, Spain and the UK where Stokke's modest market shares ranged from 3 % to 1 %. In 1972, Japan was a new and uncharted market for Stokke, but business there was increasing steadily. In 1990 Stokke established a sales company in collaboration with the Japanese company Matsuya for the import and sale of Stokke's products. In 1999 30,000 Tripp Trapp chairs were sold to Japan The prospects for growth were good. The Japanese have small families and a high standard of living. Japanese parents were willing to spend relatively large sums on their children, and this suited Stokke whose image was based on function and quality rather than on low prices.

For many years Stokke has been marketing the Tripp Trapp chair in Japan as a Scandinavian quality product through high-profile furniture shops, but the company is now making a concerted effort to find Japanese partners who could become involved in distributing baby equipment. In other markets there are well-established sales outlets for baby equipment where parents can go to buy everything they need for their children. This was one reason why Stokke Children placed such heavy emphasis on expanding its collection after 1997/98, and as already mentioned, it would be important in helping Stokke to become the preferred partner of retailers and chains and in winning the battle for the minds of consumers. This latter point was also one of Stokke's strategic objectives. Being completely at the mercy of retailers and chains can be a risky business. Retailers and chains come and go, and producers are dependent on shop owners' priorities with respect to product ranges and sales campaigns. Stokke's experiences in the USA during the 1980s showed that some shops might even switch to competing products if such a move would bring in higher profits. The safest position involves being popular with the customers and being in control of a strong brand. If customers demand Stokke's products because they are convinced that they are the best, as well as being the original product and genuine article, shops cannot get away with selling copies if they want to keep their customers. However, becoming the customer's preferred choice in a global market is a challenging task, although since the year 2000 it has actually become easier to achieve this, than it was previously. Today, media coverage is global. Several magazines and newspapers are published globally, and market innovators are sought by the media in every country in the world. This applies, for example, to well-known actors and pop stars. When Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt walked out of a Stokke retail outlet in New York in 2006 carrying

Japan has been a growing market for Stokke ever since the late 1980s. Kåre Stokke still helps to cultivate important contacts. He is depicted here in 2002 with Katsuhiko Furuya, the President of the Japanese company Matsuya.

a Stokke Sleepi, pictures appeared shortly afterwards in celebrity media all over the world, including “Verdens Gang” (a Norwegian daily newspaper). The same article reported that celebrities such as Heidi Klum, Claudia Schiffer, Courtney Cox and Halle Berry were all happy owners of a Stokke Xplory.244 These living adverts are worth their weight in gold!

Xplory is a globally conceived product. It is also a global product in the most direct sense of the word, as it contains components from different countries. When producing Xplory, Stokke was able to draw on the experience it had acquired from over 30 years of being involved in international production logistics. Production and Outsourcing Manager Ivar Sandnes was responsible for sourcing components for the buggy from the right places. In 2003 its plastic components were cast at four different factories, three in Norway and one in China. The wheels were produced in China and the Netherlands, the aluminium frame in the Netherlands and all the textiles in China. The buggy was delivered to retailers as two units; one with all the solid parts which were available in grey, and one textile unit which was available in five different colours.245 Since 2003 the back wheels have been altered and improved and an agreement has been signed with a new supplier in Germany. In 2007 the wheels could therefore be either Chinese or German.

Xplory is a buggy that was already offering users considerable flexibility when it was launched. Additional products were subsequently created to make it even more user-friendly. In 2004 a new baby bag was developed which helped to extend the useful life of the product so that it could be used for babies whose mothers would previously have preferred a traditional pram. There is no doubt that Xplory did not initially fit the image that most consumers had of a buggy. However, a sleeping bag designed for babies turned Xplory into a buggy that could be used by babies from birth onwards, although it looked more like a pushchair!246

After a somewhat tentative start in most markets, sales reached satisfactory levels within two years thanks in part to new product adjustments, e.g. adaptors that were designed to attach different children's car seats sold by other manufacturers to the Xplory frame.

Xplory's style and functions are innovative, but it is also a technologically advanced product made from components produced by manufacturers from all over the world which have been assembled to make this a safe product. During the summer of 2007, a fault was detected in a series of wheels supplied by one of the company's subcontractors. Stokke reported this fault immediately and customers who had purchased buggies with faulty wheels were informed that they could return them and have new wheels fitted free of charge. There have been no indications to suggest that this consignment of faulty wheels had a detrimental effect on the market's faith in the Xplory. Similar cases have actually served to strengthen the position of a brand on the market. If customers gained the impression that Stokke had intervened resolutely and displayed a “better safe than sorry” attitude to the problem, then the incident was probably to Stokke's advantage. It will also have helped to spread the word about the buggy and its manufacturer which did everything in its power to ensure that the product was 100 % safe for customers.

Danish Furniture Manager with a Tripp Trapp

The Danish market embraced the children's Tripp Trapp chair at a very early stage. This was partly due to the well-distributed sales network that Stokke had developed in Denmark, but it is probably not the full explanation because Stokke was present in the Swedish market at an even earlier stage without achieving high sales figures there. For many years it has been known that the Danish market is open to all sorts of furniture innovations, regardless of whether or not they are based on aesthetic expression or functionality. Proximity to Continental style trends may be one explanation for this tendency. In addition, the Danish media have always displayed a broad interest in the functionality of various consumer goods, e.g. children's furniture.

The Manager of the Danish manufacturing association, Keld Korsager, was attending a furniture seminar in Ålesund in October 2006 when he revealed that he was the happy owner of two essential Norwegian furniture products; a Stressless and a Tripp Trapp. He had owned the Tripp Trapp chairs while his children were able to use them. After that he had advertised them for sale in his local newspaper and had sold them for more than he had originally paid for them. Korsager explained that the Tripp Trapp chair is a clear leader in the market for children's chairs in Denmark. Danish parents had noticed that Tripp Trapp had scored top marks on several occasions in product surveys carried out by Danish consumer magazines.247

From 1973 onwards, the Tripp Trapp chair was produced by the LIK factory in the city of Kocevje in Slovenia. Milena Rozman was a pattern maker at LIK in 1973, and she completed her first test chair on her 21st birthday. She subsequently worked her way up to become a Departmental Manager, followed by Control Manager and Production Manager and finally the factory's CEO. She is depicted here with Production Manager Branko Lavric and the 3 millionth Tripp Trapp chair produced in Slovenia. Erik Hanken and Silvana Sivic inspecting the quality of Tripp Trapp units at Stolik in Kocevje. In 2003 there were 110 employees at this company, which at the time was the largest of Stokke's two Tripp Trapp producers in Slovenia.

Tripp Trapp still most important

Even though Stokke's new products received most attention in the company's Product Development Department from 1998 onwards, Tripp Trapp was a cutting-edge product that was responsible for the profits that enabled the company to devote considerable resources towards designing new products for the market. Up until 2006, when Stokke sold the Movement Division, Tripp Trapp helped to advance demanding production development projects, including those implemented by the Movement Division.

The success of the Tripp Trapp chair was based on excellent sales developments and highly rational low-cost production in Slovenia which yielded improved margins and better profits. The Tripp Trapp chair has been produced in Slovenia ever since 1973. Production costs in this former Yugoslavian province were, and continue to be, far lower than they would have been in Norway. At the same time, Stokke provided the technology and skills necessary for achieving good production flow of the Tripp Trapp units. These simple, logical components were also perfect for large-scale industrial production.

Silvana Sivic was Stokke's main contact in Slovenia for many years. Up until 1992 she was employed by the state-run export office Sloveniales. When Slovenia became an independent state, she started her own company, but maintained her connection with Stokke. The manufacturer of the Tripp Trapp chair, LIK, was located in the southern city of Kocevje. Stokke eventually succeeded in separating out LIK's Tripp Trapp production into an independent unit in order to demonstrate the profitability of the Tripp Trapp part and thus obtain higher production investments. The new unit was called Stolik (Stokke-LIK) and was managed by another female executive, Milena Rozman.

In May 2002, LIK Stolik passed the 3 million mark for total Tripp Trapp production, and this was celebrated by holding a festive event attended by many representatives of the Stokke management in Norway. As part of the event, a friendly competition was held between Stokke and Stolik, which Stokke won. According to the reports, victory was primarily secured by Kristine Landmark's energetic efforts in the dancing competition and Production Manager Egil Hanken's ability to quickly assemble a Tripp Trapp. Contrary to expectations, the members of the Norwegian delegation also turned out to be great singers. The CEO of the Stokke group, Kjell Storeide, who demonstrated his guitar skills, said that Slovenians must be very polite people, because their singing abilities were not the best!248 Such get-togethers are not only welcome breaks in everyone's hectic everyday lives, they help to strengthen friendships and motivate employees who work on a daily basis to secure the stability and quality of Stokke's key product.

On the 2002 trip to Slovenia, the Stokke delegation also visited the factory which was making components for the Sleepi bed. It was a huge factory and the visitors were able to follow production from the wooden logs that entered at one end to the ready-made products that exited at the other.

The management of Stokke showed themselves in a new light when they provided entertainment during a visit to the chair factory in Kocevje in 2002. From the left; Kjell Storeide, Egil Hanken, Ivar Sandnes, Kristine Landmark and Inger Lise Ødegård. Stokke's new textile collection was presented in 2002. From that point on, the various items in the Children's collection could be equipped with matching accessories.

New look

As a concept, the Tripp Trapp chair was fully developed in 1972. However, as new additions were made to the Children's collection, a textile program was created which also involved a new look for the Tripp Trapp. The new textile collection was launched in 2002. It enabled consumers to equip Stokke's Tripp Trapp, Sleepi and Care with matching accessories. Varnish in matching colours was also introduced. This enabled the products to be presented as a complete set of furniture for children's nurseries. One of the ideas behind the textile collection was that it would strengthen the links between the various items in the Children's collection, in order to boost recognition and thus spread the market's goodwill for individual items in the collection to other items.

Rules and regulations

After Stokke was split into four divisions in 1998, the joint production department for Movement and Children continued to exist for a few more years. Much of the product development work in the Children's Division was focused on adapting the Tripp Trapp chair to comply with international technical standards for children's furniture. The chair was exported to several European countries, including EU countries where detailed specification requirements had been drawn up relating to children's furniture. These regulations covered the diameter of drilled holes, the width between the curved back pieces and construction stability. Although these regulations appeared to be detailed and bureaucratic, they were based on experience and estimated risks relating to the use of children's furniture. They were designed to prevent children's fingers from being squashed, to prevent their heads from becoming stuck between different furniture parts, and to prevent furniture from falling over, even if it was kicked hard by a child! Stokke's Product Development Manager between 1991 and 2000, Kjell Heggdal, recalls that they spent a lot of time studying the safety standards for children's furniture, and on fine-tuning products in order to obtain clearance from the supervisory authorities in the various markets.

It was necessary to create different versions of the same product in order to comply with various national safety requirements. In 2002, the Tripp Trapp chair underwent some design modifications in order to accommodate amended standards. The aim of these modifications was to have one product version that could comply with as many standards as possible. After the Product Development Department had completed its work on the product in 2002, Stokke only needed 4 different versions for the international market.

The Sleepi bed was also redesigned in 2002 for the same reasons.249

The Tripp Trapp chair's strong position in the market was both a positive and a limiting factor. It was the Tripp Trapp that gave Stokke the confidence and strength to make progress in new markets and in its relations with new retailers. However, Tripp Trapp's position also meant that Stokke was restricted in its choice of suitable retailers. The EU's competition authorities had ruled that the Tripp Trapp chair was dominating the market and should consequently be available to anyone who could pay for it. Having exclusive agreements with selected retailers was deemed to be discriminatory, detrimental to fair competition and in breach of EU regulations. Nevertheless, in collaboration with the BAHR firm of lawyers, Stokke managed to secure a selection contract that was approved by the EU. Under the terms of this contract Stokke was able to exercise a certain amount of discretion when selecting retailers. Rune Stokke discovered that Stokke's efforts to obtain such a contract represented a groundbreaking move within the EU.

Up until 2000, the main geographical area for sales of the Tripp Trapp chair had been Northern Europe. In 2000 there was a breakthrough in the Mediterranean area when agreements were entered into with large baby equipment chains in Spain, France and Italy. These agreements were responsible for a considerable increase in Stokke's market shares in these countries during the following years. During the same year, Tripp Trapp was introduced in the US under the name of KinderZeat, and a sales company, Stokke LLC, was established in Atlanta, Georgia. This company was in charge of the Stokke group's activities in the American market.250 Kåre Stokke's second son, Geir Stokke, was responsible for setting up the American office. Geir had several years of sales and marketing experience from other industries before taking up this position. He had also lived in the US for a total of five years whilst studying for a degree in marketing. In order to obtain as much information as possible about consumer patterns and competition in the children's chair market in the US, Geir carried out a survey of the American market. Stokke had a challenging start “across the pond”. The idea of buying a chair which children could grow up in, was foreign to most Americans, and ergonomic considerations did not feature highly in the consciousness of furniture customers. It took longer than planned to increase sales in the US,251 but through diligent application to marketing work Stokke eventually made progress in promising market niches.

Since 2000, Stokke has gradually stepped up its activities in the US, and this has been a priority market for Stokke since 2006. It is estimated that the US will be responsible for 10 % of the company's turnover in Children products in 2007. Could the fact that Courtney Cox owns an Xplory buggy have a bearing on the sales statistics? However, the celebrity effect will be helped by Stokke's own market machinery and in 2007, 30 % of Stokke's marketing resources will be devoted to the American market. As of 2007, Geir Stokke is still managing the company's American operations, and Geir and his 20 employees have seen a rapid escalation in sales. Stokke has decided to focus on the larger cities on the east and west coasts until the company is more established. In relative terms the Sleepy and Xplory are both selling better than the Tripp Trapp chair in the US. The American market is a challenging one – most people get a chance to succeed, but they usually only get one shot at it.

Although Stokke was without representation in other overseas markets for some time, 2001 saw new sales agreements being entered into in both the Australian and Asian markets.

A more active board

In the 1990s, Stokke AS was characterised as an administratively run company. Up until 1997, it was the group management, CEO Kjell Storeide and the owner Kåre Stokke, who were primarily responsible for making decisions about group developments. The CEO made proposals to the Board in consultation with the owner, and the Board never opposed any suggestions or plans that were presented.

The relationship between the day-to-day management and the Board may be different in a family-owned company like Stokke compared to a larger limited company with many owners and an external leader. In Stokke's case the CEO and the owner were well matched during the 90s and held the same views about important matters. Opposing the CEO would in this case also mean opposing the owner, and such a situation was hard to imagine.

During the last few years before the new millennium, the Board gradually became a more active sparring partner for the administration. When Rune Stokke took over as owner in 1997, the outlines of a more demanding Board were starting to become more apparent. Evan Wahr-Hansen, the Chairman of the Board from 1998 onwards, played a more active role in the Stokke group in connection with the reorganisation which took place in December 1999, when coordination across the group was tightened up. At that time WahrHansen believed that it was absolutely essential to tighten up the company's poor budgetary procedures which, in his opinion, had resulted from the culture that had prevailed at the company right from the start, i.e. the company's various sectors had more or less been allowed to manage themselves. In the opinion of WahrHansen, Tripp Trapp profits were expected to cover any deficits resulting from the company's defective budgetary practices, and individual operational areas were thus not called to account for their failure to show good profit developments and exercise strict cost control.

When Rune Stokke took over as the majority shareholder of Stokke in 1997, a number of changes were made to the group's Board. One of the basic conditions for selecting new Board members was that they should be able to supplement the skills of other company officers. This picture shows the Stokke group's new Board in 1998. In front, from the left; Chairman of the Board Evan Wahr-Hansen and Group CEO Kjell Storeide. Behind, from the left; Stein Thor Verle, Jan Erik Vahlne, Rune Stokke, Helge Ove Larsen and Håvard Aannø.

In 2000, Stokke established a US sales office in Atlanta, Georgia. The opportunities were considered to be vast in a market with over 275 million people who share the same currency and which has the same spending power as the European market. Geir Stokke headed up the US office (on the left), accompanied by his team members Jeff Durkee (no. 2 from the left), Victor Harris and Patti Kopec.

Wilhelm Mohn has been a Board member for Stokke since 2005. He is Senior partner and the CEO of Credo Partners. Credo Partners became the majority shareholder of Variér Furniture AS in 2006 and of Fora Form in 2007.

Each year, one of the Board meetings of Stokke AS is usually held in one of the company's markets, where the Board meets important customers and visits stores. In October 2007, the Board met in New York. From the left; Sales Manager Jacob Østerhaab, Chairman of the Board Rune Stokke, Board members Barbara Thoralfsson, Kåre Erlandsen, Stein Thor Verle, Øyvind Eriksen and Ingegjerd Eidsvik. Board member Wilhelm Mohn was engaged in a phone conference when the picture was taken.

A native of Sykkylven, Geir Løseth was Stokke's Financial Manager from 2000 to 2007. He then became a personal advisor to Rune Stokke and CED of the holding Company. Løseth has assisted with all the demanding sales processes in which Stokke has been involved since 1998.

The Chairman of the Board felt that subsequent Board discussions were constructive. One of the contributors to these discussions was Stein Verle, the former Deputy CEO of Det norske Veritas, who became a Board member of the Stokke group in 1998 and had previously been a Board member of Stokke Fabrikker AS. Verle felt that the board members had two main tasks; to help Rune Stokke to settle into his new role in the group and to improve the accounts systems and the cost control in the group's various areas of operation. Verle called for analyses of growth potential, profits and sales for Stokke's four remaining key areas; Children, Movement, Fora Form and Wonderland. He felt that greater focus on profits was needed in order to ensure healthy developments in the future. Another board member, Håvard Aannø, who also joined the Board in 1998, pointed out the challenges facing Stokke due to its multi-faceted operations and lack of focus. He stressed that Stokke needed to intensify its development programme and ignore peripheral areas of production.

Wahr-Hansen, Verle and Aannø joined the Stokke Board in 1998 following the generation change and they were occupied with helping the new owner to settle into his role in the organisation. Rune Stokke was satisfied with Stokke's direction following the changes that occurred in 1997 and 2000 when the company's key areas were separated from each other and given clearer profiles, and group coordination was improved. Eventually, some of the Board members felt that the time had come for Rune to take on a more clearly defined ownership role. Wahr-Hansen remembers well a conversation that he and Stein Verle had with Rune Stokke in 2003 when they encouraged him to make a final decision about the road ahead for Stokke AS. Rune and the group management had been slowly deliberating about this decision over a period of several years, but Wahr-Hansen and Verle's well-intentioned “kick up the backside” was probably decisive for a decision being made and new plans for the company being drawn up in 2003.

At this time the Board was also heavily involved in a debate relating to new premises for Fora Form in Ørsta. Chairman of the Board Wahr-Hansen was critical about Fora Form's potential for growth in a tight and pressurised contract market. CEO Kjell Storeide, however, was fully convinced that a new building was needed in order to facilitate rational production. He argued that Stokke would benefit, regardless of whether or not they kept Fora Form or found someone else to take over the business. This was the only time that there was outspoken verbal disagreement between the Board and the administration of the Stokke group.

Another process in which the Board was heavily involved, and may have had a decisive influence on, was the development of Xplory. For several years, the Board had been calling for genuine innovations for Stokke. A long time has passed since 1972 when the group's main model, the Tripp Trapp chair, was put into production. Not even the Tripp Trapp chair could last forever, reiterated Chairman of the Board, Even Wahr-Hansen, in his impatience for something that could catch up with, and eventually perhaps even take over from the Tripp Trapp. Finally, in 2001, a prototype of the Xplory buggy was presented to the Board; a genuinely innovative product in the niche of child transportation. Kristine Landmark presented the product, and according to WahrHansen, no-one in the Stokke system has the ability to charm the Board like Kristine Landmark. “The board was very positive, no, not just positive. The administration was given clear instructions to realise the buggy.”

In hindsight he realises that the Board's handling of this demanding development project, was not managed exactly in accordance with procedures. The Board said “go for it” without demanding detailed cost estimates of the development work, without knowing if the prototype would be suitable for mass production, without knowing which margins could realistically be expected and without any apprehensions whatsoever about Stokke's transition from children's chairs and beds to transportation equipment.

The Board learned from its error and has now implemented project management and accounts reporting procedures which will follow each product from cradle to grave.

A more active board like the one that Stokke AS has had during the last decade, requires board members with wide and varied skills in the group's specialist areas. The recruitment of board members is therefore dependent on the company's situation at the time. In order to improve customer focus, during the spring of 2005, Rune Stokke brought in Barbara Thoralfsson, who had previously been working for Netcom and Midelfart. Over the last few years there has also been a need to improve the company's commitment in respect of asset developments, strategy and leadership, and Wilhelm Mohn, a Board member since the spring of 2005, has made a substantial contribution in this field. He possesses extensive international business experience and has previously headed the consultancy business McKinsey in Norway. In 2007, he is currently the CEO of Credo Partners, the majority shareholder of Variér and Fora Form. Wilhelm Mohn and Rune Stoke have been good friends since 1981 when they both started studying at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in Bergen.

Another asset to the board since 2007 is Øyvind Eriksen. Since 1998, Eriksen has been Stokke's main contact at the BAHR firm of lawyers. His work has provided him with considerable experience relating to board and reorganisation work at a number of major companies. The Board Secretary over the past 10 years, Geir Løseth, says that Stokke devotes a great deal of time to board work compared to similar-sized companies. The Board usually has six meetings a year.

Consumer focus

A recurrent theme in the development of Stokke over the past 10 years is the term consumer focus. Companies with consumer focus are concerned with the consumer's needs and do not start product development until these needs have been thoroughly analysed. This has been Stokke's goal with regards to product development since 1997 when the Board, based on advice given by the Swedish economist and Board member Jan Erik Vahlne, started the process of discontinuing all production which did not focus on the end user.

Consumer focus is the opposite of product and production focus, at least in theory. A production-focused company has an idea which it turns into a product, and it is then up to the company to make consumers interested in the idea by engaging in various forms of consumer contact. This was how Stokke operated prior to 1997.

This description, however, requires some modification. It was consumer and market orientation which caused Georg Stokke to latch on to the growing interest in and need for adjustable reclining chairs in 1958. No formal market surveys were carried out prior to production of the company's Star recliners. However, both Georg and Kåre Stokke were aware that people had more leisure time and new media habits and were placing greater priority on home comfort. They thus realised that reclining chairs probably had commercial potential and their assumptions proved to be correct.

So when, in the mid-1980s, Stokke provided the market with furniture that could be adjusted to alternative reclining positions, many customers in those parts of the world, where chairs are commonly used, were very keen to try out the new chair. Peter Opsvik and Stokke knew that back ailments constituted health problem number one in the Western world and that sitting was becoming a threat to public health. The company's major investment in furniture for movement and variation was the result of the fact that it had listened to the customers' needs. The Assistant Managing Director of Stokke in 1983, Kjell Storeide, also pointed out the need for market and customer orientated company development.

Nevertheless, the above-mentioned successes of Stokke before 1990 can hardly be said to be the result of consistent, systematic consumer focus. In a customer-focused company, every function should be directed towards the customer, and every product should be based on the consumer's analysed needs. With this model in mind, not even the company's investment in its Balans products was consistently customer-based. Stokke's more consistent customer focus since 1997, resulted in considerable attention being paid to distribution channels and the opportunities offered to consumers by such channels. Stokke found that consumer channels were undergoing major reorganisation prior to 2000. Large, partly international chains were becoming larger. Considerable resources were required in order to make contact with the various retailers. The large chains were also demanding a lot from their producers. They expected the producers to invest a lot of money on direct consumer contact through various media. Stokke Children was and still is largely based on sales made through smaller chains and independent retailers. In 2004, the formation of chains helped to further the focus on one particular product area, Children, which Stokke finally ended up with in 2006. This reorganisation was necessary to enable Stokke to move quickly enough in relation to the market and distribution.

Barbara Thoralfsson joined Stokke's Board in 2005. She was chosen to strengthen the Board's collective level of expertise with regard to consumer focus. In an interview published in Stokke's 2005 annual rapport, Thoralfsson mentions another important aspect which helped Stokke to settle on one final narrower focus: the vast resources that consumer-orientated product development, marketing and sales require, particularly for an international company. When Stokke launches a finished product on the market, the company has probably invested many millions of Norwegian kroner on product development. The company therefore needs to be fairly certain that the product will meet the needs of customers in the actual focus group. It would be hard for a family-owned company of Stokke's size to carry out such product development, mapping, marketing and sales work in several different product areas. The children's furniture field is extensive and demanding enough as it is, without also having to engage in satisfactory preparation and market follow-up, and according to Thoralffson, Stokke had a potential for improvement in 2005: “… I think we can improve our consumer focus in a very early phase of the product development process. We must be more thorough in the analysis stage.”252

Rune Stokke and Kristine Landmark have made use of Barbara Thoralfsson as a sparring partner and consultant over the last couple of years. Thoralfsson has made important contributions to the strong marketing campaign that Stokke is about to launch in the US.

Company and society in transformation

For many decades, the Stokke group was an important part of society in Sunnmøre and several other regions. Stokke created companies that provided good, safe workplaces, often in areas where such jobs were hard to find. The relationship between the company and local communities was close-knit. Even if creating new jobs was not a goal in itself, it certainly gave Stokke's owners extra satisfaction knowing that the company was making a positive contribution to the development of the municipality.

Ekstrem. Design: Terje Ekstrøm. The Ekstrem chair was one of the models in Stokke's furniture for movement and variation range. It is presented here by Widar Halén, Senior Curator at The National Museum, and the designer himself.

Barbara Thoralfsson joined Stokke's Board in 2005. She has been a spokesperson for systematic consumer focus.

Today, Stokke no longer has any extensive production activities in Sunnmøre. The only remaining functions, apart from laminates production in Tennfjord, are administrative and commercial functions. A high percentage of the company's production of finished goods and components is carried out in other countries where costs are lower than in Norway. Does this mean that 2007 will see a company which exercises less social responsibility than it used to? Has its passionate community spirit, which made company leaders and mayors stand together and rejoice at the positive results of their “own” companies, disappeared?

Firstly, modern companies operate in a different competitive climate compared to the one which existed in the 1940s, 50s and 60s, even in Sunnmøre. What enabled Stokke to continue producing chairs and armchairs in different materials and with different designs well into the 1980s, was the fact that they produced furniture for a local market that was relatively unexposed to competition from low-cost companies. However, the emergence of large furniture chains in the 80s forced prices down, including the prices charged for high-volume products in the furniture market, and this was partly due to more systematic imports from low-cost countries.

In the 80s, Stokke turned increasingly towards international niche markets and eventually became a pure export company. The company therefore became fully exposed to international competition in the niche areas in which it had invested. A familyowned company the size of Stokke is dependant on constantly making relatively high profits in order to supply the market with products that are in demand in its chosen niche. Consumerorientated product development on a global scale is expensive, and it is also expensive to establish and maintain a company in a market. International industrialists, especially those in high-cost countries like Norway, therefore need to ensure higher levels of cost-efficiency and cost-control than previously. For Stokke, this has meant reducing local production of finished goods and components in Norway. This trend also applies to social developments. Stokke still has a significant number of employees based at its head office in Norway, at Håhjem in the municipality of Skodje, where there are 40 employees responsible for key functions relating to product development, information and communications technology, logistics, marketing, law and administration. These positions are filled by people with high qualifications; jobs which the company has not wanted to move abroad.

Rune Stokke admits that it is difficult to predict the future in this respect: “There is no guarantee that Stokke's head office will remain in Norway if the political situation indicates that it would be wise to move it abroad. We are constantly having to evaluate market proximity and external conditions against the importance of our Norwegian/Scandinavian origins. However, we currently have no plans to move any other departments, apart from our Sales Department, out of Norway.”

Kåre Stokke and his father Georg were traditionalists. They enjoyed being able to create companies that provided workplaces in small communities in North-West Norway. Unlike their predecessors, members of the third generation involved in the family company have been forced to focus more heavily on profits.

The owners of Stokke have always placed great emphasis on making working conditions as good as possible for their employees. Modern suction equipment eventually helped to make the air in the company's production premises as clean as the air in its offices. This photo shows part of the production process at Stokke Fabrikker, with Harald Brevik operating a polishing machine.

Even Wahr-Hansen has followed Stokke closely over the last 20 years, and believes that he has witnessed an unusual sense of community spirit at the company, even in recent years. Since the year 2000, the company has severed its ties with several companies which over the course of the years have enjoyed the security provided by the Stokke family. While trying to find new owners for these companies, both Kåre and Rune sought managers who would defend their ideas and employees by running the businesses in a proper manner. They both agreed that they would be prepared to accept a lower price for a business if this would ensure that the new owners would do their best to preserve what they had created. Even Wahr Hansen believes that this attitude is not common in the world of business today. Either way, Stokke in 2007 is completely different to the business that it was in, for example, 1957. If things had been different, we would not have been writing a book about its 75-year long history.

Today

Dynamics rather than control

Today there is not one single family-owned business left of the furniture companies that were established in Sunnmøre during the 1930s. These businesses have either been closed down, merged with other companies or now have different owners. The exception is Stokke AS. Georg Stokke started this business with Bjarne Møller. Today his grandson Rune is taking the family business to new heights. The big question is therefore, what is it about Stokke that has given it the ability to survive and adapt. One thing which has characterised Stokke throughout the history of the company, is its ability to attract talented and creative employees who have been given responsibility and allowed the freedom to develop. For example, Stokke was the first furniture factory in Sunnmøre to have its own full-time designer, Arnt Lande. Later on it was the company's contact with the highly innovative designer Peter Opsvik that provided the company with the right product advantages during its crucial stages of transformation. The testimony of key associates of Stokke, both nationally and internationally, confirms the liberating – and commercial – power of

Stokke's principles relating to the delegation of responsibility. The driving force behind building Stokke's team of retailers in Germany, Wolfgang Krüssmann, was convinced that the trust and freedom he was given served to fuel his long-term loyalty to the company. Stokke's face in Sweden for a number of years, Ingmar Almgren, is another example of the value of passionate and independent key employees.

New phases in a company's development demand new solutions. Flexibility issues will often arise in companies which traditionally have not sought new external impulses. Stokke has managed to avoid stagnation and recession by being willing to bring in the most up-to-date skills in various areas at the relevant times. This was the situation in 1985 when Board member Nils Høegh-Krohn attended a marketing conference in Barcelona, where he met the Swedish economists Kjell Nordstrøm and Jan Erik Vahlne. Roar Hauge-Nilsen was the administrator who applied the company's new strategy to employees at different levels.

Kjell Storeide, who has been primarily responsible for strategy, leadership and development work at Stokke since 1977, believes that the main explanation for Stokke's success has been its ability to adapt. “Not only has thinking in new and different ways been allowed, it has been encouraged”, says Kjell Storeide, adding that this became the norm for the staff development programme that he developed when he returned and became Group Managing Director in 1990. “We want to create an open environment within the company. We brought in the best people from their various fields and also recruited Board members with specialist knowledge. The family has never been interested in having majority control of the Board. Dynamics and creative development have always been more important to the family than having personal control.”

One group

The ability to utilise the knowledge and enthusiasm of the company's employees has released a lot of positive energy, but it has also demanded a high degree of loyalty to common guidelines. One basic guideline involves having balanced and healthy financial development. Stokke had two major advantages over many other companies in the furniture industry: two products and production areas which over the years have provided a stable income and solid profits – the children's Tripp Trapp chair and mattress production at Westnofa. The cash flow from these products provided Stokke with the opportunity to experiment and be creative on a different scale to that permitted at many other companies. However, there was a limit to these experiments, and the road to stricter group management began in 1990 with the return of Kjell Storeide who became responsible for the group's operations. He believed that the group should not be controlled by its subdivisions, and that what was best for the company as a whole had to form the basis for running and managing the values of the various subdivisions and production areas. Different ideas about what was best for the group as a whole were behind the conflict that arose between the CEO of Stokke Fabrikker AS, Roar Hauge-Nilsen, on the one hand, and the Group Manager and owner, Kåre Stokke, on the other. This disagreement revolved around opinions about the added value that was derived from Stokke Fabrikker's different product areas. In order to supply the market with products that were in demand, Storeide and Stokke believed that it was necessary to disclose market and profit developments right down to production level. And this is what happened.

This discussion concerned more than just technical accounting principles. Basically it concerned having the opportunity to introduce corporate governance in order to ensure healthy business developments. The organisational overhaul was initiated in 1990, and first became manifest in 1998. Jan Erik Vahlne was back in an advisory capacity and once again he maintained that consumer focus should be decisive for the organisation of the company. He thought that Stokke should only concentrate on products that were consumer-orientated and that it should be split up into divisions based on production areas. In 1998, only Stokke Fabrikker AS became divisionalised. In 2000, the whole group was organised in line with this model and the management group, which consisted of the leaders of each division and key group personnel, became a new driving force, capable of achieving synergic effects in a completely different way than previously. As already mentioned, this coordination also revealed the difficulties and challenges involved in running a group like Stokke. Stokke had not been designed to conform to a unified plan with effect from day 1. Very few companies develop in such a manner. Things evolve as time goes by, and new areas are added. In 2000, Stokke was a diversified group. Its various fields of mattress production, contract work, children's furniture and furniture for movement and variation required separate expertise and distribution channels in order to stay ahead in a global market. At one time running such a diverse family business seemed to be an impossible task. The owner felt the need for reorganisation and clarification. In Stokke's case this occurred in 2004. It was not a dramatic split. Some of the restructuring that was undertaken in order to commence the process of turning Stokke into a dedicated producer of children's equipment, had already been started back in 1990 when Kjell Storeide, and the former owner, Kåre Stokke, commenced the laborious task of fusing all parts of the conglomerate into a fully cooperative organisation.

The new management group in the Stokke group following reorganisation in 2000. From the left; Kristine Landmark, Geir O. Løseth (in front), Gunnar Hareide, Kjell Storeide, Jørn Nes, Ivar Sandnes, Rune Stokke and Steinar Loe. Thanks to the Xplory buggy, Stokke has established itself as a world class innovative producer of children's equipment.

Children come first

The third generation of Stokke, Rune, took over as the owner of the family business in 1997. Back then, Stokke was in the middle of a reorganisation process that was supported by a proactive board, which included Jan Erik Vahlne and Even Wahr-Hansen among its members. Rune Stokke himself had a consumer-orientated attitude and was pleased that the Board and the CEO were supporting increased consumer focus. In 2003/2004, Rune Stokke started to realise that the company's focus on having fewer areas of commitment which had been initiated during the 1980s, needed to be completed. Rune Stokke, who himself had participated in and had faith in Stokke's commitment to its furniture for movement and variation, decided with the support of the Board to stake everything on one card; furniture and equipment for the parents of toddlers and older children. This solution was fairly easy to implement because of the way in which the company was organised. A decision was made to proceed with one division and work towards disposing of the others. Once this had been clarified, Kjell Storeide felt that his days as the company CEO were numbered. He had paved the way for the new owner to realise his vision of developing a tailored brand.

The work on defining the family's role in the companies that were released from the group, continued right up until the company's 75th anniversary. However, Stokke's image as an innovative supplier of children's products has provided the group with the focus, drive, profitability and growth that are required in order to succeed in a competitive international market.