Mapping the Most Dangerous Spots on Earth—the BSL-4 Labs

By Mason Goad

The now-infamous Wuhan lab is only one of many around the world, but where are these other facilities? What are they working on? And most importantly, what security procedures are in place to keep future pandemics from happening?

A new study released by Schar School Director of Biodefense Programs Gregory Koblentz and Filippa Lentzos of King’s College London has attracted global media attention because it answers precisely those questions. labs in operation, under construction, or planned in 23 different countries. The greatest concentration of these labs is in Europe with 25, followed by North America with 14, Asia with 13, Australia with 4, and Africa with 3 labs.

“By collating publicly available information in a systemic way, we’ve been able to provide insights into the distribution and capabilities of these labs.”

In addition to their interactive map, Koblentz and Lentzos co-authored a policy brief addressing weaknesses and raising the alarm for policymakers.

To help the public and policy makers understand where the most important labs are, Koblentz and Lentzos developed an interactive map of all the known Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories. They were assisted by students Joseph Rodgers, PhD in Biodefense, and Minh Ly, Master’s in Biodefense, at the Schar School.

“This map provides the most comprehensive accounting of where maximum containment laboratories are located around the world,” said Koblentz. “Our research identified nearly 60 BSL-4 Of the approximate 60 labs worldwide, more than 75 percent are located in urban centers where a virus could spread with ease. The focus of these labs, Koblentz suggested, addresses human health more than biodefense. “There is a misperception that BSL-4 labs are mostly top-secret military sites—this is simply not the case,” he said. “The majority of these labs are run by public health agencies and are engaged in life-saving research to develop diagnostic tests, vaccines, and treatments that can be used to detect and contain outbreaks.”

Gregory Koblentz: “[W]e’ve been able to provide insights into the distribution and capabilities of these labs.” The labs range in sizes but many are quite small. “Of the 44 labs that we have data on, half are under 200 square meters in size,” Koblentz said. “That is less than half the size of a professional basketball court or about threequarters of the size of a tennis court.”

But even small labs are complicated: “[A lab that size] may include auxiliary spaces and equipment like chemical showers, animal rooms, and autoclaves in addition to the ‘hot zone’ where work with the live agent is actually conducted,” he said.

Alarmingly, according to the report, not all BSL-4 labs or their local authorities maintain best practices when it comes to biosafety procedures.

“Only one-quarter of countries with BSL-4 labs score well on best practice indicators for biosafety and biosecurity,” the authors write in their policy brief. “Moreover, few have dual-use policies, and none have yet signed up to a new international bio-risk management standard.”

Dual-use research refers to work that can be used for scientific purposes or misused for hostile purposes, Koblentz explained. “One type of dual-use research is called ‘gain of function’ research which involves intentionally modifying a pathogen to give it new characteristics—such as enhanced lethality or transmissibility.”

There are only 3 of 23 countries that have national policies on dual-use biological research and development activities. These activities are significant because of their potential to be reused by other states, or non-state actors, to cause harm.

“We expect more countries to seek these types of labs in the wake of COVID as part of a renewed emphasis on pandemic preparedness and response,” Koblentz said. “Dual-use research, including gain of function research, is also expected to increase as governments and labs seek to identify future pandemic risks.

“So, the gaps we’ve identified in national and international bio-risk management are quite worrisome. This is part of the reason why we think it’s important to put in place higher national and international standards for biosafety and biosecurity now.”

One type of dual-use research is called ‘gain of function’ research which involves intentionally modifying a pathogen to give it new characteristics—such as enhanced lethality or transmissibility.