OPINIONS

pany’s charter and (2) an agreement that instead simply constrains the manner in which the shareholder exercises that power.

Here, the voting agreement does the latter rather than the former. Although the voting agreement—which was signed by all shareholders, including Cycle Holdings— binds Cycle Holdings to vote its shares in accordance with the provisions contained therein regarding the election of Cycle Labs’ third common director, it does not impermissibly conflict with the certificate. Instead, as in Westech and Klaassen, the voting agreement serves as “a contractual overlay that constrains the manner in which [Cycle Holdings] can exercise [its] rights” under the certificate.

Therefore, the court concludes that the voting agreement is valid under Delaware law. As a result, Cycle Holdings does not have the power to elect, appoint, or designate a majority of Cycle Labs’ board of directors for purposes of § 55- 16-02(h).

Motion granted.

Downing v. Cycle Holdings, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 020-010-23, 23 pp.) (Mark Davis, J.) Benton Sawrey for plaintiff; Steven Scoggan and James Weiss for defendants.

2023 NCBC 10

Domestic Relations

Equitable Distribution – Marital Home – Separate Property – Debt Distribution

Even if the trial court erroneously distributed $5,000 of debt on the marital home –found to be the defendant-Wife’s separate property – to the plaintiff-Husband, this did not prejudice him since it effectively lowered the distributive award to Wife.

We affirm the trial court’s equitable distribution order.

Wife owned real property prior to the parties’ marriage, a home was built thereon during the marriage, and the property was encumbered by a loan in Wife’s name. The trial court classified the home as separate property but mistakenly identified “Plaintiff” (i.e., Husband) as the owner. The trial court found the home to be worth $135,000 with a debt of $140,000.

The trial court distributed (-$5,000) to Husband, apparently distributing a portion of the debt on the home to Husband. Even if this “distribution” were error, Husband has not shown how it prejudiced him. If this negative $5,000 distribution to Husband had not been included in the order, the trial court would have found the value of marital assets being distributed to Husband to be $5,000 greater, which would have required the trial court to order a larger distributive award to Wife.

McLeod v. McLeod (Lawyers Weekly No. 012-565-22, 5 pp.) (Chris Dillon, J.) Appealed from Iredell County District Court (Dale Graham, J.) Patricia Riddick for plaintiff; no brief for defendant. 2022-NCCOA-867

Insurance

Life – Labor & Employment – ERISA – Policy Conversion Deadline –Equitable Tolling

Even though plaintiff’s decedent, an ERISA plan participant, was incapacitated by illness during the period when he could have converted his employer-provided life insurance policy to an individual policy, and even though the participant tried to make the conversion 26 days after the conversion period ended, the defendant-plan administrator did not abuse its discretion in refusing to pay life insurance benefits to plaintiff.

We affirm judgment for defendant.

Both in the district court and in this court, plaintiff has maintained that she seeks relief only pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), which provides in relevant part, “A civil action may be brought . . . by a . . . beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due . . . under the terms of [the] plan. . . .” Section 1132(a)(1)(B) does not allow this court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to alter the terms of an Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and the plan administrator did not abuse its discretion by enforcing the terms of the plan. A conversion deadline is not akin to a statute of limitations, i.e., a deadline for converting benefits is not triggered by the violation giving rise to the action.

As the district court pointed out, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) does allow a court to grant “other appropriate equitable relief,” but plaintiff did not sue under that provision, never sought leave to amend her complaint to add such a claim, and continues to disclaim reliance on any such a theory before this court.

We note that plaintiff errs in asserting she could not have sought relief under subsection (a)(3). True, a plaintiff who prevails in a claim for benefits under subsection (a) (1)(B) may not also obtain other relief under subsection (a)(3). But Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3) specifically permits pleading “in the alternative,” so nothing would have prevented plaintiff from suing under both provisions.

Affirmed.

Hayes v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America (Lawyers Weekly No. 001-028-23, 11 pp.) (Toby Heytens, J.) No. 21-2406. Appealed from USDC at Greenville, S.C. (Joseph Dawson, J.) Leila Louzri and Nathaniel Bax for appellant; Ian Morrison for appellee. 4th Cir.

Labor & Employment

Railroad Worker – Race Discrimination Claim –Insubordination

Before a train trip, Amy Sine, a person unknown to plaintiff, who was not wearing Amtrak garb, informed plaintiff that he would be on the team uncoupling a car from the train on which plaintiff was working. Plaintiff initially refused, saying he did not know Sine. However, even after plaintiff’s supervisor told him who Sine was and instructed him to comply, plaintiff refused to participate in the preparations to uncouple the car. Then, while the uncoupling was taking place, plaintiff attempted to interfere and yelled at the conductor in the presence of passengers and others. Given defendant’s evidence of insubordination, plaintiff cannot show that he was performing his job in accordance with his employer’s legitimate expectations.

We affirm summary judgment for defen-

See Page 23

Continued dant on plaintiff’s claim of race discrimination.

Plaintiff’s evidence of a white comparator who was not disciplined came in the form of hearsay, which the district properly declined to consider. In any event, the comparator’s asserted insubordination arose in the context of scheduling, which does not pose the same safety risks as plaintiff’s behavior.

Though a collective bargaining agreement might be relevant to understanding how defendant defines and punishes insubordination, the gravamen of plaintiff’s race discrimination claim is that defendant engaged in disparate disciplinary actions in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, not that defendant violated the CBA or improperly applied it to him. Since we need not interpret the CBA to resolve this case, the Railway Labor Act does not preclude us from considering plaintiff’s discrimination claim.

Giles v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Lawyers Weekly No. 001-015-23, 12 pp.) (Henry Floyd, J.) No. 21-1887. Appealed from USDC at Charlotte, N.C. (David Keesler, USMJ) Geraldine Sumter and Chandler Bryant for appellant; Stephen Douglas Dellinger for appellees. 4th Cir.

Real Property – Condominium Declaration – Repairs – Out-ofPocket Expenses

Where the parties’ condominium declaration says the defendant-homeowners’ association (HOA) will “repair” any incidental damage that is caused to a condo unit during common area repairs, this promise to “repair” does not encompass out-ofpocket expenses caused by common area repairs. Although the common area repairs at issue required plaintiff to vacate her condo unit for two years, the HOA is not responsible for the out-of-pocket moving, storage, and living expenses she incurred while forced out of her unit.

We affirm summary judgment for the HOA.

Gehrke v. The Gates at Quail Hollow Homeowners’ Association, Ltd. (Lawyers Weekly No. 012-575-22, 6 pp.) (Richard Dietz,

J.) Appealed from Mecklenburg County Superior Court (George Bell, J.) James Galvin for plaintiff; Brett Dressler for defendant. 2022-NCCOA-921

Tort/Negligence

Misappropriation of Trade Secrets –Unfair Trade Practices – Intellectual Property – Patent Ownership –Domestic Relations

Plaintiff claims that its scientist’s notes are trade secrets. However, the scientist left her notebook on her desk at home, where her ex-husband/competitor came to drop off their children. Plaintiff did not take reasonable steps to guard the scientist’s notes, so they do not qualify as trade secrets.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to plaintiff’s claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and trespass to chattels; the motion is granted in part and denied in part as to plaintiff’s claims of unfair trade practices and unfair competition; otherwise, the motion is denied. The court also denies defendants’ motion to stay this action while the couple’s equitable distribution and related causes of action are litigated in district court.

Facts

Plaintiff BIOMILQ’s scientist, Dr. Strickland, was married to defendant Guiliano. The couple formed defendant 108Labs, LLC. Dr. Strickland was interested in synthesizing cell-cultured human milk outside the body. Guiliano reviewed scientific literature at Dr. Strickland’s request; however, the couple did not proceed with the project.

Dr. Strickland met Michelle Eggers in August 2019. In January 2020, Dr. Strickland and Eggers founded and incorporated plaintiff to further Dr. Strickland’s human milk project.

In March 2020, Dr. Strickland and Guiliano separated. Because of his review of scientific literature, Guiliano’s name was included on one of plaintiff’s subsequent patent applications. Plaintiff submitted several more patent applications and received two patents, but Guiliano’s name was not includ- ed on the latter applications and patents. While dropping the couple’s children off at Dr. Strickland’s home (the former marital home, of which Guiliano was part owner) on 18 February 2022, Guiliano allegedly photographed pages of a BIOMILQ-issued notebook containing trade secret and confidential information. Defendants contend that they have contributed to the development of BIOMILQ’s technology, patents, and alleged trade secrets, and that defendants have rights in them.

Misappropriation of Trade Secrets

In order to state a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets, a plaintiff must allege that the trade secret information is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. G.S. § 66-152(3)(b).

Although plaintiff alleges its security measures generally and as they pertain to notebooks that Dr. Strickland has already filled, it does not allege measures taken to maintain the secrecy of the trade secrets set out in any notebook that Dr. Strickland is currently using, including the one allegedly photographed by Guiliano. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Strickland kept her notebooks in secure locations such as (1) at BIOMILQ’s offices, (2) in a closed bag within her residence which, it alleges, she does not share with Mr. Guiliano, (3) in a closed bag together with her laptop when travelling between home and work, and (4) on her work surface at home. However, saying something is “secure” or “kept confidential” is not enough to survive a motion to dismiss without allegations of efforts to protect the misappropriated trade secrets.

The notebook at issue was protected only by a lock on the home to which Guiliano had access. Keeping the notebook in a closed bag at home, in a closed bag when travelling between work and home, or on a work surface at home, are not measures taken to maintain the secrecy of the trade secrets.

See Page 24

Continued From Page 23 least some occasions brought the children to Dr. Strickland’s residence, and that Dr. Strickland was keeping the notebook unlocked in a building at least partially owned by Guiliano and to which he had access, at least on the occasions he took the children to the home, the measures BIOMILQ took to maintain the secrecy of the notebook are unreasonable under the circumstances.

Plaintiff has failed to allege reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of the notebook and the alleged trade secrets contained therein.

Motions granted in part, denied in part.

BIOMILQ, Inc. v. Guiliano (Lawyers Weekly No. 020-013-23, 40 pp.) (Michael Robinson, J.) Dickson Phillips, Stephen Feldman and Rachel Walsh for plaintiff; Stephon Bowens, Tara Warwick and Jonathan Carnes for defendants. 2023 NCBC 13

Tort/Negligence

Defamation – Medical Malpractice –Surgeon’s Duty to Read Scan

The defendant-supervising surgeon told others that the plaintiff-surgical fellow had started a patient’s unnecessary heart surgery because plaintiff had “misread” an echocardiogram. Since plaintiff never read the echocardiogram, and since the issue of whether she had a duty to read the scan is hotly contested, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant’s statement was materially false.

We vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant.

Plaintiff’s Assertions

Defendant accepted “Patient M” as a surgical patient for aortic valve replacement. Defendant did not read the results of Patient M’s pre-operative transesophageal echocardiogram (TEE), yet he told plaintiff that he had done so and that the TEE showed severe aortic insufficiency (AI), neces- sitating the planned surgery. Defendant instructed plaintiff to start the surgery.

An anesthesiologist performed an intraoperative TEE, which showed only moderate AI. The anesthesiologist did not inform plaintiff of the results of the intraoperative TEE until after plaintiff had cut through Patient M’s breastbone. Minutes later, the anesthesiologist informed plaintiff of the results of the TEE, and plaintiff halted the surgery.

Defendant later told others that plaintiff had “misread” the TEE. Plaintiff filed this action for defamation. The district court found that, since plaintiff had proceeded to surgery based on an incomplete understanding of the anesthesiologist’s interpretation of the intraoperative TEE, defendant’s statement that plaintiff “misread” the TEE was not false.

Discussion

The issue of falsity focuses on substantial truth. Thus, a plaintiff must establish that “the sting,” the aspect causing injury to the plaintiff’s reputation, is materially false.

In making this assessment, we consider the allegedly defamatory statement and the facts implied by that statement within their full context. After reviewing the evidence and the parties’ arguments, we find a genuine dispute exists regarding the substantial truth of defendant’s assertion that plaintiff had “misread” Patient M’s TEE or “failed to recognize” from the TEE that the AI was moderate.

Plaintiff offers two alternative interpretations of these statements that a jury, believing her evidence, could reasonably draw and conclude were false.

First, the accusation that plaintiff misread or misapprehended the TEE results implies that she read those results in the first place, which she did not. Saying that a person has misread something communicates not only that she read it, but that she did so incorrectly—implying, in this case, that she lacks skill in applying her medical judgment.

A jury might reasonably conclude that this accusation constitutes a distinct critique of plaintiff’s professional competence. A statement like plaintiff “did not read the TEE,” by contrast, says nothing about her ability to do so or about her judgment to proceed with a sternotomy despite supposedly having viewed the concerning TEE results. In other words, defendant’s assertion that plaintiff had misread the TEE—a statement that all concede is literally false— may be viewed as “materially false” as well.

Use of the term “misread,” in this context, could cause the statement to produce a different effect on the audience than would have been produced had the truth of the matter been spoken. Whether it did so is for a jury to decide.

Second, defendant’s statements that plaintiff “misread” and “failed to recognize” the findings of the intraoperative TEE before the sternotomy could be understood to imply that plaintiff had an obligation to read and understand the TEE before beginning the surgery, which she failed to fulfill. Whether such an obligation exists is hotly disputed in this case. If a jury believed plaintiff’s evidence, it could conclude that the sting of defendant’s implication—that plaintiff had a professional obligation she admittedly did not fulfill—is materially false.

The defamatory sting of defendant’s statements under this theory is not that plaintiff failed to recognize moderate AI on the intraoperative TEE but that she had a professional obligation to do so before beginning the surgery, implying that her failure to read and understand the TEE before making the first incision was malpractice. And a false accusation of malpractice may certainly be defamatory.

Vacated and remanded.

Robinson v. Williams (Lawyers Weekly No. 001-011-23, 15 pp.) (Allison Jones Rushing, J.) (William Traxler, S.J., concurring) No. 20-1636. Appealed from USDC at Greenville, N.C. (Louise Flanagan, J.) John West Gresham and Cheyenne Chambers for appellant; Laura Howard McHenry and Joshua Stein for appellee. 4th Cir.

$2.5 MILLION SETTLEMENT Collision with drunk driver results in $2.51M settlement

Type: Motor vehicle accident, dram shop claims

Verdict or settlement? Settlement

Amount: $2.51 Million

Injuries: Permanent scarring, fractured arm, abrasions

Case Name: Withheld

Court: Withheld

Date of settlement: Winter 2022

Attorneys for plaintiffs: Winston Kirby and Andrew Avram, Edwards Kirby, LLP

B y Haviland S tewart hstewart@nclawyersweekly.com

A Wake County mother and child were injured during a collision with a drunk driver. The plaintiffs have settled their claims against the driver and the establishments that served him for $2.51 million, the plaintiff’s attorneys, Winston Kirby and Andrew Avram reported.

“It was clear from the receipts from the bars that the drunk driver had consumed enough alcohol to the point where he would have been highly intoxicated,” Kirby said. “Our position was that the drunk driver had no memory of the events of the day because he had consumed enough alcohol that his brain was incapable of forming and retaining memories of the day’s events. When someone is that drunk, he would have appeared intoxicated to anyone, including the bartenders and servers who continued to serve him alcohol.” served in the first place and he certainly should not have been allowed to drive himself away from the bar.”

The plaintiff’s counsel reported that the defendants contended that the mother’s injuries were insufficient to warrant a large recovery, and that her child had suffered almost no harm. The driver plead guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol, plaintiff’s counsel reported.

According to the plaintiff’s attorneys, none of the bars he visited on the day of the collision received citations or warnings from the North Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission.

The defendants collectively paid $2.51 million to the plaintiffs at mediation.

$3 MILLION SETTLEMENT Fatal collision results in $3M settlement

Is this a verdict or settlement? Settlement

According to the plaintiff’s counsel, their clients were struck by a drunk driver who was traveling the wrong direction down the highway and struck the plaintiff’s vehicle headon. The accident resulted in permanent facial and arm scarring, a fractured arm, and abrasions to the mother, and minor injuries to the child in the back seat.

The establishment denied that there was any evidence that the defendant was visibly intoxicated at the time he was served. The defendants contended that because the driver had returned to his home after visiting several bars, the alcohol consumed at those bars was not a proximate cause of the collision. Additionally, the defendants contended that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the driver appeared visibly intoxicated at any of the bars.

Andrew Avram

According to Avram the plaintiff counsel discovered that the driver had consumed at least 10 drinks at the same bar over the course of two hours, and then stopped at another bar, less than a mile from the scene of the accident, where he had an additional three drinks less than an hour before the collision.

Type of case: Motor vehicle wreck

Amount: Single limit policy limits paid property damage and personal injury settlement totaled $3 million

Injuries alleged: Death

Case name: Confidential

Court: Mecklenburg County

Case No.: Confidential

Date of settlement: Sept. 1, 2022

Demand: Policy limits

Insurance carrier: Confidential

Receipts from multiple bars where the driver was served the day of the accident indicated that the driver would have been extremely intoxicated, the plaintiff attorneys reported.

According to Kirby, the driver had no memory of the events of the day after the second bar he visited, nearly five hours before the wreck.

“Importantly, the last bar that the drunk driver visited had clear policies in place that prohibited bartenders from serving alcohol to intoxicated patrons,” Avram said. “In the event that a bartender acknowledged or observed that a patron was intoxicated, the bar had a policy requiring that a taxi or ride be called for that person. We know that based on the receipts obtained in this case, this individual was severely intoxicated, and pursuant to the policies and procedures of the final bar, he should have never been

Attorney(s) for plaintiff and their firm(s): Ronard C. Dixon, Jr. of Hall & Dixon, PLLC and Mark S. Jetton Jr. of Jetton & Meredith, PLLC

Attorney(s) for defendant and their firm(s): Confidential

Was the opposing represented by counsel? Yes

Were liability and/or damages contested? Yes

Has the judgment been successfully collected? Yes

B y Haviland S tewart hstewart@nclawyersweekly.com

On Aug. 4, 2021, the defendant was driving a commercial dump truck on Moores Chapel Road in Mecklenburg

County. According to the plaintiff counsel, Ronard Dixon, the defendant’s dump truck veered off the right side of the road and then made an abrupt over correction from the right shoulder into the opposing lane, colliding into the 26-yearold plaintiff’s vehicle head on.

Case name: Alvin Spencer and Frederick Avery v. Capital Chevrolet Inc.

Court: Wake County Superior

Case No.: 20-CVS-661

Mediator: Asa L. Bell

Date of settlement: Sept. 8, 2022

Special damages: Punitive damages ronment rose to a level of wanton disregard for the safety of others,” Sparkman Larcade said.

Spencer and Avery both experienced severe burns and were sent to the burn center in Chapel Hill where they received months of treatment.

Ronard Dixon

At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was on the job also driving a company dump truck. The head-on collision between the two dump trucks caused the plaintiff’s vehicle to catch fire. Plaintiff and defendant were both pronounced dead on scene. According to an autopsy report, the plaintiff’s cause of death was found to be thermal injuries, with a time of death proximately 18 minutes after the collision, information which Dixon reported to be a very important piece of evidence in this case.

The plaintiff’s estate settled for $3 million on Sept. 1, 2022.

“Being able to help the family through their grief process, as well as bring them some closure on this matter was very important to our firm,” Dixon said. “Even though it will never be enough to fully compensate for their loss, we still provided the necessary representation to adequately serve their needs.”

Many details of this case have been withheld due to a confidentiality agreement.

$5 MILLION SETTLEMENT

Injuries from solvent explosion leads to $5M settlement

Is this a verdict or a settlement? Settlement

Type of case: Fire explosion

Amount: 5 million

Injuries alleged: Severe burns, disfigurement, scarring, PTSD, closed head injury, permanent neurological deficits, lost income, and future earning capacity

Insurance carrier: Zurich American Insurance Company Attorney(s) for plaintiff and their firm(s): Jodee Sparkman Larcade and Wade E. Byrd Attorney(s) for defendant and their firm(s): Rodney E. Pettey

Was the opposing represented by counsel? Yes Were liability and/or damages contested? Yes

By Haviland Stewart hstewart@nclawyersweekly com

In the late night of Jan. 7, 2019, a fire explosion caused significant injury to two employees of an independently contracted janitorial team, Alvin Spencer and Frederick Avery, after being directed to clean grout with a flammable solvent by their client, Capital Chevrolet Inc.

Prior to the incident, the general manager of Capital Chevrolet was unhappy with the grout results so far and provided Avery with an unidentified canister of solvent to use, plaintiff attorney Jodee Sparkman Larcade reported. After Avery “tried out” the solvent and it seemed to work, the manager then showed him where to find more solvent while cleaning that evening.

The solvent was later identified as “brake wash,” a highly flammable chemical that is used to degrease metal car parts.

According to Sparkman Larcade, after Avery spread solvent was spread on the floor, Spencer turned on the floor buffer, which ignited a fire explosion.

“Quite frankly, introducing a flammable solvent into that kind of work envi-

According to Sparkman Larcade, the defense disputed liability, arguing that the plaintiffs should have known not to use the solvent and had a responsibility familiarize themselves with the product prior to using it.

“They were familiar with the chemical components of the solvents that they normally use and have used for years and years,” Sparkman Larcade said. “But that night they were unfamiliar with it. And quite frankly, for my clients, when the boss tells you to do something, they’re gonna do it.”

According to Sparkman Larcade, following the explosion Spencer and Avery suffered severe burns, PTSD, closed head injuries, and permanent neurological deficits, that they continue to receive treatment for.

On Sept. 8, 2022, the plaintiffs settled for a total of $5 million

The defense attorney did not respond for comment.

$12 MILLION SETTLEMENT Family of man fatally crushed at warehouse settles for $12M

Is this a verdict or a settlement? Settlement

Type of case: Premises liability and products liability. Plaintiff ’s decedent died because of being crushed by materials stored in warehouse.

Amount: $12 million

Injuries alleged: Wrongful death of husband; negligent infliction of emotional distress of wife

Case name: Estate of Behzad Abedi-Asl and Angela AbediAsl v. Confidential

Court: Mecklenburg County

Case No.: Confidential

Mediator: Thomas Duncan

Date of settlement: Oct. 11, 2022

Special damages: We had a $3.3 million-dollar economic loss report

Most helpful experts: Artemis Malekpour & David Ball, focus group and jury consultants. Gary Albrecht, economist. Martin Davis, OSHA safety expert. Rodney Turk, forensic mechanical engineer. Mark Nelson, Rimkus Consulting Group, forensic mechanical engineer. Jonathan Mitnick, warehouse and stone handling safety expert. Kathryn Sain, grief counselor psychologist. Dr. Craig Mallak, forensic pathologist consultant. Insurance carrier: Confidential

Attorney(s) for plaintiff and their firm(s): Michael A. DeMayo and Adrienne Blocker; DeMayo Law Offices LLP Attorney(s) for defendant and their firm(s): Confidential

Was the opposing represented by counsel? Yes

Were liability and/or damages contested? Yes

Has the judgment been successfully collected? No judgment was entered as the case was resolved pre-trial. The settlement has been paid in full by the defendants.

By Haviland Stewart hstewart@nclawyersweekly.com

The family of a man fatally injured from falling material at a warehouse has settled for $12 million.

In September 2019, Behzad

Adrienne S. Blocker

Abedi (“Al”) and his wife Angela

Abedi were at a warehouse to select building materials for homes that they constructed, when stored materials in the warehouse fell onto Al, causing him to sustain catastrophic and fatal injuries.

According to the plaintiff’s counsel, Adrienne Blocker, the couple built homes as a hobby since Al was fully employed as a vice president of a manufacturing company in Gastonia. They frequently went to warehouses to pick the materials for homes they constructed. On this day, Al had pointed out a particular material that he liked to Angela, and then the pair separated in the warehouse. Shortly after, Angela heard a loud crashing sound and came running back to find her husband trapped under the materials.

Al was pronounced dead approximately 15 minutes after the materials fell on him.

Al left behind his wife of 23 years, a son and a daughter.

Plaintiffs alleged premises liability and products liability claims. The premises liability claims against the lessee of the warehouse related to the manner of storage of the materials. Plaintiffs also alleged a products liability claim as to the manufacturer of the rack used at the premises to store the building materials.

A settlement was reached at mediation with the frame manufacturer, but deadlocked regarding the liability of the warehouse lessee. After several depositions counsel for both parties were able to reach a final resolution.

On Oct. 11, 2022, the Abedi family settled for $12 million.

Michael DeMayo

The lawsuit included claims for Al’s pain and suffering as well as his wrongful death, and for negligent infliction of emotional distress to Angela.

“...Angela and the children are now able to obtain some level of closure regarding the legal aspects of this tragic occurrence,” Blocker said. “Their road to personal recovery has been challenging and ongoing. They still face constant struggles daily with the memory of a truly amazing and phenomenal husband and father.”