Post-Qadhafi Libya: interactive dynamics and the political future

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Post-Qadhafi Libya: Interactive dynamics and the political future Article in Contemporary Arab Affairs · March 2012 DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2012.650007

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Contemporary Arab Affairs

ISSN: 1755-0912 (Print) 1755-0920 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcaa20

Post-Qadhafi Libya: interactive dynamics and the political future Youssef Mohammad Sawani To cite this article: Youssef Mohammad Sawani (2012) Post-Qadhafi Libya: interactive dynamics and the political future, Contemporary Arab Affairs, 5:1, 1-26, DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2012.650007 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2012.650007

Published online: 30 Jan 2012.

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Contemporary Arab Affairs Vol. 5, No. 1, January–March 2012, 1–26

Post-Qadhafi Libya: interactive dynamics and the political future Youssef Mohammad Sawani*

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Professor of Political Science, Libyan University, Tripoli, Libya; former Director of the Gaddafi Foundation (resigned in February 2011 to join the uprising) Libya’s contemporary history has been dominated by the interplay of the perpetual dynamics of religion, tribalism, oil and ideology. After 42 years in power Qadhafi was killed at the hands of revolutionaries and the final chapter of his dictatorial reign was terminated. With direct and powerful support from NATO and some Arab governments the revolution, led by the National Transitional Council and military councils in many Libyan cities, was another reflection of the supremacy of the perpetual dynamics. The purpose of this article is to examine the interaction of these dynamics and how they are echoed in post-Qadhafi Libya.

An assessment is made of the manifestations related to these dynamics by providing a sketch of existing social and political features. This will help determine the fundamentals that shape the foreseeable future of the country and predict the role of the various political forces interacting in the field. The article is a product of direct research, analysis, eye-witness accounts and interviews in Libya with important personages and representatives of powerful currents now currently competing on the scene and vying for influence in the determination of the future of the country after Qadhafi.

Keywords: Libya; post-Qadhafi; perpetual dynamics; tribalism; religion; National Transitional Council; transitional phase; constitutional proclamation; political parties; civil society; February 17th coalitions; military councils; Islamists; liberals; UN plan

Foreword An assessment of the future of post-Qadhafi Libya must address questions and challenges relating to the war that led to Muʾammar Qadhafi’s fall, in which forces of various orientations were involved and in which foreign forces played a highly influential and decisive role. Of equal concern is the fact that Libya today lacks an effective political authority, just as it lacks a political experience that might aid in contemplating the future of the country, though one can discern something about the future by examining the orientations of the prevailing, de facto forces and their political and social topography. The course of events that have unfolded in Libya since 17 February 2011 was unexpected. At the time of writing, military operations have ended, while the edifices of a state or government are missing, in the civil sense at least. Libya has witnessed a massive influx, if not to say a scramble, by various international powers, keen from the inception of the revolt in February 2011 to play a role in shaping the outcome of the fighting and controlling the dynamics of the combatants as well as limiting and defining the form of political society or the future state in Libya. There had been no common cause that brought together the Libyan political or armed *Correponding Address: Email: youssef.sawani@gmail.com ISSN 1755-0912 print/ISSN 1755-0920 online © 2012 The Centre for Arab Unity Studies http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/17550912.2012.650007 http://www.tandfonline.com

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forces except the goal of completely overthrowing Qadhafi’s regime. This unifying factor appears to have waned after the killing of Qadhafi and by virtue of the conclusion of military action. The ensuing situation will open up new unlimited frontiers of possibility for the future of Libya at the levels of identity, national integration, democratic transformation and the determinants of the whole new political order.

An attempt will be made here to sketch the features of society and politics in Libya from political, economic and social perspectives. The aim is to bring into focus the dynamics that constitute the fundamentals shaping the foreseeable future of the country. After this, the analysis will proceed to present a map of the various political forces and currents now interacting in the field. This will serve, to the degree that such is possible, to predict their future trajectories, on the basis of the elements and referents from which they have emerged. Lastly, analysis of the transitional phase and its various components appears necessary in order to formulate and hazard a preliminary response – by no means conclusive – to the question of where Libya is headed. However, this subject will be delayed until the end of the discussion.

This study derives, in the main, from observation of the developments ongoing since the spark of revolution was ignited, as well as what has been written about these.

It also takes into account first-hand information about the activities of the various political forces, in addition to interviews and personal meetings with their representatives, and discussions the author undertook with persons of numerous orientations and views.

Libya and the political–economic dynamics of society: the constraints of the future The relation between society and state in Libya has remained subject to constraints to do with ideology, the tribes and oil. These were the primary factors that defined the relations of the structure of political authority with the social structure over the past four decades. It is highly likely that these dynamics will play a similar role in the future of the country after the fall of Qadhafi (Mislmāni 1999, pp. 66–75).

In order to grasp these dynamics, it is necessary to deal with the matter in some detail in order to sketch a panoramic view of contemporary Libya. This should be helpful in anticipating the foreseeable future in terms of the influence of these dynamics. The paper will begin with the factor of religion that has a clear and fundamental relevance in Libya’s history and culture. Religion also has a palpable influence given its association to the expressions that have become abundantly familiar in all the news about the revolution of the Libyan people.

Religion and politics Libya has been a Muslim community ever since the advent of Islam in North Africa.

Islam became the religion of all its inhabitants. The vast majority of Libyans are Sunnis who adhere to the Maliki madhab (school of fiqh). Attempts at spreading Shiʿism during the period of the Fātị mid state failed completely, as did attempts to spread other madhabs aimed at changing this predominant orientation. The only exception is the existence of a small minority of Libyans (the Amazigh) who follow the Ibāḍi madhab, which has remained restricted to the region of the Western Mountain.

Tentative efforts on behalf of the Sanusiyah movement proved unfruitful in altering Libyan Islam to the benefit of salafism or Sufism to any significant degree. Failure was also the fate of attempts by Qadhafi’s regime to reformulate the Islam of Libya in accordance with its political or religious theses, especially those pertaining to the

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sunnah (i.e. the normative practice of the Prophet Muhammad as reported in the ḥadith literature) and its status with regard to law and legislation. Despite Qadhafi’s suppression of Islamist orientations and the injustice of his regime, fundamentalists (uṣūliyin) and jihadists, especially in the region of the Green Mountain, have appeared, but this has not obscured Libyan Islam’s tolerant and moderate nature.

Undoubtedly, religion has remained a central component of the cultural composition and the definition of Libyan identity. Despite the attempt of Qadhafi to substitute the ideology of the Green Book in its place, Islam remained basic and essential to the value structure of Libyan society and the primary formative element of the social system itself. This matter has special significance after the fall of Qadhafi’s regime. The fall of the regime unleashed ideological currents deriving from particular and contrasting views of Islam, life and politics.

Thus, the ability of Libyans to hold on to their moderate Islam will be subject to a serious test as they contemplate the positions to take towards extremist trends.

Tribalism and political authority It may be said that Libya is rich with tribes scattered across the country with numerous small tribal enclaves. The proliferation of tribes leads to complexities that render differentiation between them anything but a simple task. Both the regimes of King Idriss and Qadhafi relied on tribal alliances in the administration of power and this recourse always had a role in stirring up tribal and regional sensitivities. While the monarchy had greater need of tribal alliances to give it legitimacy, Qadhafi’s regime worked at reinvigorating the effectiveness of tribal alliances at the same time as it endeavoured to activate the role of ideology in shaping not only political structures, but also the tribal structure. Qadhafi’s regime went to great lengths to reinforce its tribal alliances through the use of the military establishment.

It is important to take note of the amorphous nature and fluidity of tribal alliances in Libya along with the rapacious desires of many tribes to ally themselves with the political authority. This helped Qadhafi to implement a strategy that inflicted severe damage on the tribes and destroying their power structures, such that they ceased to be an effective force in the political and economic sphere. Qahdafi’s regime, its various policies and the repeated abolition and undermining of the various administrative institutions, bodies and formations deepened the crisis of state and, in many instances, paved the way for regime domination of tribal alliances, thereby exacerbating factionalism. This raises questions pertaining to the state and its very existence. It also highlights the possibility of reverting to a federal system in Libya, such as existed before 1963 (Mislmāni 1999, pp. 72–82).

The tribe did not transform into an institution that works in parallel with modern institutions of state and its central bureaucracy. Researchers suggest that this failure has contributed to diminishing the chances of building a strong civil society.

However, it can probably safely be deduced that tribalism in culture and the tribe as an institution will continue to exert influence on socio-political interactions and on individual and group identities in Libyan society. This will be the case so long as Libyans do not perceive the existence of alternative institutions and civil society organizations.

It goes without saying that the existence of a civil society that enjoys independence and effectiveness relies on the existence of civic culture and citizenship, wherein individuals find modern expressions of their orientations and demands (Obeidi 2008, p. 16).

Although 80% of the inhabitants of Libya ‘live in urban areas’, as Libyan sociologist Musṭafā al-Tir asserts, ‘the vast majority of Libyans still speak of tribal

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belonging’. Al-Tir (2011) attributes these orientations to what he has termed the ‘ruralization’ of cities where:

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the major urban areas developed as a result of emigration from the countryside and not as a result of natural increase [in population] … thus, the tribe is still present today in the memory of a large number of urban dwellers. This is especially true since instead of those coming from the countryside integrating into the life of the city and adopting the ways and modes of urban life, they entered the cities, over the last forty years, as though they were conquerors and they imposed on the city and its inhabitants various particulars of rural life.

This persistence of tribal loyalty impinged on the entire process of modernization, and the power of tribal loyalty factored ‘in obstructing the transition of society to the stage of modernity’. Though al-Tir considers modernity a precondition for political modernization, he exclaims that ‘when loyalty encroaches upon necessary qualifications, then discussing modern institutions becomes meaningless!’.

It should be indicated that the revolt against Qadhafi’s regime was not based on tribalism and did not witness tribal battles in any palpable or significant sense. However, the war against Qadhafi was undertaken via means that did employ tribalism. Qadhafi, however, endeavoured to represent the revolution as though it were limited to particular regions or tribes in an attempt to foment schism and contention so as to gain control. It is also interesting to note that the National Transitional Council (NTC) that led the revolt also utilized tribes in order to win advocates – as vividly demonstrated in the Council’s co-option of members of Qadhafi’s tribe itself in order to undermine his attempts and deprive him of tribal legitimacy at any level. Such tactics serve as a reminder of the role tribalism played during the Italian occupation of Libya when the war of resistance was waged with tribes as its focus. Thus, tribal loyalty or identity has proven a suitable instrument to generate tribal consensus for the purpose of affirming the legitimacy to rule the country, and there is no doubt that it will retain a weighty influence in the future (Chersstich 2011).

Oil and the challenges of modernization Oil was and will remain an essential ingredient in the process of political, economic and social transformation in Libya. Al-Tir has noticed, with a degree of anxiety, that the approach of modernization did not establish itself completely in the case of Libya when the oil boom did not generate a change in economic, social and political structures. Qadhafi’s regime attempted to restrict oil-related transformations and contain their impact. The regime was keen on combating forces of political, social and economic modernization. The outcome of this was effectively to place obstacles in the path of the modernization of Libyan society and state (Al-Tir 2011).

Oil raises challenges for the future of Libya other than those connected to modernization. It was the primary driving force that fuelled Qadhafi’s internal and external adventures. Yet, the most dangerous repercussion of oil wealth was that it accorded the regime the material power necessary to achieve two ends simultaneously. The first pertained to providing the state with favourable conditions to penetrate society and create a system of local compradors. The abundance of petro-dollars enabled the state to practise subjugation in all its forms without the need to impose taxes. Secondly, oil wealth liberated the government from any need to conciliate the people politically or to accommodate democratically their demands. Huge oil revenues were behind the conviction of the political authority that excluded any social contract. Since the

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government had all the means derived from this resource at its disposal, any notion of democratic credentials was not seen necessary, so long as it had the backing of a rentier economy to impose its control.

It should be kept in mind that oil also played a crucial role in determining the position of Libya in the strategies of international and global powers. Often and ever since the oil revolution of the 1970s the policies of foreign powers were tied to Libyan sources of oil and natural gas. The primacy and influence of energy resources was in clear evidence in the policy of imposing United Nations sanctions on Qadhafi’s regime. It was also prominent in the hectic international effort to rehabilitate him and to ‘bring him in from the cold’ so Libya might become a partner with which the world community could do business. In any case, it is not possible for any analyst to ignore the capabilities and potential of Libyan energy resources as a determinant of the country’s future. The contemporary history of Libya and developments since February, in conjunction with the position that major powers adopted against Qadhafi, has only intensified the strategic role of this factor (Sawani 2006, pp. 33–38).

As far as tribe and oil are concerned, their dual influence on the past, present and future of Libya should not be overlooked. The most important example that can be used to clarify this relation pertains to the administrative system or the form of the state, whether federal or decentralized or other. It is useful here to summarize what one Libyan intellectual wrote over five years ago on the negative impact of decentralization on Libyan reality over the two previous epochs of the monarchy and that of Qadhafi: The disintegration of the centre has limited the possibility of creating civil centrism as a driving force within a unified strategic vision … to become instead a sphere for competition between dispersed regions over resources … Experiments of decentralization always ended in the distortion of democracy. Decentralization strengthens local reactionary forces and weakens general political consciousness … from another angle, the tribal structure for the formation of Libyan society, which was revitalized through decentralization, imposed its traditional culture on the instruments for executing development and modernization projects in a society in need of employing the greatest measure of scientific and technical qualifications and capabilities. (al-ʿAwkali 2007, p. 95)

The interaction of perpetual dynamics and their political manifestations From the foregoing presentation and analysis it appears abundantly clear that pre-existing dynamics have figured prominently both politically and socially since the start of the revolt against Qadhafi. By utilizing such information as is available, in conjunction with direct observation and experience, it is possible to define and analyse the manifestations of these dynamics.

The most prominent manifestations are those associated with religion and its expected political role in the new Libya. Domestic Islamist movements today share a commitment to an Islamist project and the goal of realizing an Islamic state. None of the political trends that has come into prominence has rejected democracy, though the salafist current underlines the contradiction between democracy and the historical course of the pious ancestors (salaf). Salafists stress the historical precedents of shūrā (consultation) and the role of the ahl al-ḥall wa al-ʿaqd (those charged with the authority to conclude and dissolve agreements).

The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwān al-Muslimin) are better organized and they share the positions that the Islamist current in general adopts despite their reservations about democracy, such as those expressed by ʿAli Ṣ alābi in his book on shūrā, where he

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considers shūrā to be legally binding (al-Ṣ alābi 2010, pp. 6–21). They view democracy as an instrument or technique to be utilized. They attempt to project a modern character by voicing no objection to a civil state so long as that does not clash with the primacy of Islamic shariʿah in legislation. However, they vociferously denigrate and disavow any call for secularism. It is clear that the Islamist forces are the best organized. They proclaim their adherence to the Islamic religion and its value system, and politically they exploit the hold Islam has on the minds of people. Islamists are eager to multiply the force of their political presence and reinforce a desire to replace the ancien regime that they criticize in every way as a source for augmenting their popular support.

Based on the foregoing it appears that what sheikh Sālim al-Shaykhi said regarding the political programme of the Muslim Brotherhood is the most explicit and comprehensive version of what has yet been said about them, when he decreed: Libya [sic] is a Muslim people, and the religion of Libya is Islam. The Islamist movement is the movement that desires to preserve the Islamic nature of the state through: reinforcing the Islamic character of the state in the sense that people say: ‘We are Muslims and it is incumbent to rule and judge according to our religion in our political, economic and social issues.

Religion is not [simply a matter of] prayers and ritual worship alone; religion is economics … [and] the political dimension: Islam is a religion that is based upon shūrā and multiplicity/pluralism (taʿaddudiyah). The ruler does not have any absolute power/authority.’ (al-Dāli 2011, pp. 6–7)

Al-Shaykhi specifies a number of foundations or principles that he sees the new Libya must adopt and be based upon: respect for national sovereignty and the impermissibility of foreign intervention as well as the impermissibility of gambling with the sovereignty of the ummah (nation) and isolating Libya from other Islamic societies as well as the impermissibility of making Libya into a pawn of external conflicts and war in addition to specifying that Libya is a Muslim state concerned with Arab- and Islamic affairs. (al-Dāli 2011, pp. 6–7)

As for liberal, nationalist and leftist currents – despite the existence of those speaking in their names – they do not constitute a clearly organized entity. Their representatives advocate a civil state and warn that the danger to democracy is not only its being divested of any social or economic content, but also in its potential to be hijacked under an Islamic rubric. They criticize the use of religion to control the public and accuse Islamists of camouflaging their real intentions by employing democratic facades, where the appearance of democracy is only maintained until their arrival in power, at which time the democratic system will be overturned completely. These currents suffer from lack of organization and in particular at the grass roots’ levels. Their leaderships have not yet paid attention to conceptual and organizational questions and seem content to wager on the traditional moderation of Libyans.

However, these assertions may not be relied upon to quell the Islamists. This is particularly the case given the readiness for adventure among some quarters known for extremism. The heated debates that went on over the last several months elucidated the sharpness of the differences between liberal and Islamist currents. This was abundantly evident in reported incidents of political assassination of the leadership of other currents on various grounds, and related statements, including even personal defamation and various accusations. This level of disagreement appears most clearly in the case of extremist Islamist forces, at the forefront of which is the Islamic Movement for Change (IMC, i.e. al-Ḥ arakah al-Islāmiyah li-l-Taghyir) led by ℵAbd al-Ḥ akim Bilḥāj,

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one of the leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG, i.e. al-Jamāʿah al-Libiyah al-Islāmiyah al-Muqātilah). Even though Bilḥāj has publicly affirmed his belief in democracy and a civil state, the IMC appears intent on plunging into the fray of the political battle, as well as being prepared to resort to violence and force.

What also commands attention is the emergence of particular factional orientations or narrow regionalism. This includes an advocacy for the establishment of a federal system in Libya. The revolt against Qadhafi’s regime generated types of local and tribal fanaticisms, especially in the regions or cities that had some prominence in undertaking the revolution. This is evident in the call for Benghazi to be the new capital, for example, or to accord Miṣrātah with a large share of the government positions, including that of prime minister. These divisions have a connection to the political or ideological polarization as well.

In the Eastern Province, where tribalism plays a conspicuous and influential role, the call for federalism or a particular position for Benghazi does not necessarily coincide with the interests of the Islamist trend. In fact, the tribal factor has more at stake here in many ways. This emerged clearly in the numerous tribal gatherings that have been convened, the last of which was called ‘The National Gathering for the Inhabitants (of Barqah/Cyrenaica), or the Eastern Province’ that was held in the city of al-Bayḍāʾ at the beginning of October. The communiqué of the Conference affirmed support for national conciliation and the national bond. However, the fact that a delegation from the Conference visited Qatar, where it consulted and discussed Libyan issues with the Qatari government, lends support to the view that regionalist sentiment predominates here. Moreover, the Conference called for Libya to be administered regionally and rejected any centralism. This led observers to perceive a strong indication of the predominance of a spirit of regionalism and tribalism and its ascendancy. Many commentators consider what was going on backstage at the gathering in marked contrast to what was announced publicly. There was an endeavour to endorse federalism and, thereby, threaten the unity of the country (Libya al-Youm Journal 2011b; Al-Mahir 2011).

In this context, one may understand the position of the al-ʿAbidāt tribe, which is one of the most powerful tribes of eastern Libya. The tribe issued an emotionally charged statement with regard to the killing of their member, Brigadier General ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Yūnis, who defected from Qadhafi’s forces to lead the army of the revolution. Yūnis was assassinated and his body mutilated by Islamists. This tribe expressed its resentment of the slowness of the course of justice and its readiness to seek vengeance by force. This may develop into action that could in turn lead to a far-reaching armed struggle in the eastern region (General Administration of Al-Shouraffa on-line 2011b).

The situation differs in the region of Miṣrātah where there appears to be a connection between the Islamist current and local sentiments. This was clear when calls came from both for the censure of some leading figures of the progressive and liberal current in the interim government and the NTC and to ban them from the political arena. Along with this development the local orientation appears to be very pronounced and strong so as to suggest that Miṣrātah currently, possibly for security reasons, is independent in its administration and decisions and external relations. Similarly, the position expressed by the leaders of Miṣrātah towards dark-complexioned inhabitants of the town of Tawergah went so far as to reject their continued co-existence in the border area contiguous with Miṣrātah and called for their displacement. Naturally, if practised, this will amount to setting a very risky precedent. The repercussions or the possibility for such a position to be imitated in other regions are greater than any have anticipated. Even though there is a near national consensus over what the Tawergahans have done to Miṣrātans, which

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range from killings, rape of women, assault and destruction to acts of theft and robbery, the call to displace them exceeded all expectations and preconceptions. This issue clashes with the concept of Libyan citizenship and imposes numerous questions about the future.

As for the Western Mountain region, the situation seems to be polarized into an Arab–Amazigh dichotomy. The early phases of the revolution saw increasing manifestations of this schism. Attempts at repairing the rupture succeeded in quashing any confrontations, particularly after Qadhafi’s attempts to play on the issue in order to abort the revolt against him. However, the fact that the Arab tribes of al-Zintān have acquired a huge cache of all types of weapons has led other Amazigh tribes to follow suit. This makes the situation subject to change. It is also connected to what may be characterized as the existence of sensitivities between some tribes in the Western coastal region and along the border with Tunisia. Some of these sensitivities fall along tribal lines, while others have a connection to the Arab–Amazigh dichotomy. Information points to al-Zintān’s engagement in alliance-building in an attempt to offset the ethnic dichotomy. It is important, however, to refer to the fate confronted by the Mashāshah and other tribes in the Western Mountain area for reasons similar to the case of the Tawergah. In a visit to the area during the third week of October, the author identified four towns and villages that were completely deserted. All inhabitants of these are now displaced and cannot go back to their homes for fear of persecution. They are labelled as Qadhafi loyalists and accused of supporting his killing machine during the revolt. The author’s discussions with leaders from the local council of al-Zintān reveal that the return of thousands of displaced people to their homes remains very problematic.

This clearly indicates the negative aspects of the issue that has become a problem in itself. However, this also highlights the prime importance and necessity of initiating a national reconciliation and implementing the processes of transitional justice.

Apparently, as Muḥammad Nūr al-Din Affāya states: The tribal-, clan-, madhab- or sectarian rootedness in the fabric of Arab societies has begun to reveal many of its symbols in a number of the theatres of protest manifesting a capacity to renew its components and reproduce its expressions according to the contexts and the type of struggles.

(Affāya 2011, p. 21)

In connection with this it is possible to categorize the Amazigh current that held a general conference in Tripoli on 26 September – in a move unprecedented in the history of contemporary Libya. The Conference was the platform for advocating and securing the rights of the Amazigh, the constitutionality of their language and its written script known as Tifināgh. Even though the general orientation does not betoken anything that threatens national unity, some of the leading figures of the Amazigh movement in Libya have gone farther than this. They have voiced a desire for a type of independence for or affiliation to the Amazigh of North Africa. A prominent leader expressed hostility towards Arabism. He proclaimed a readiness to cooperate with Israel while considering the Palestinian issue a concern of the Palestinians alone (General Administration of Al-Shouraffa on-line 2011a).1 There is no doubt that these various levels of polarization render economic or political matters, particularly those related to democratic transition, subject to the manoeuvres of multiple different tendencies. It is feared that the new governors will fail to resolve these questions democratically while maintaining the national goals.

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Thus, possibilities are various, especially given that the formation of a national army and security forces has been delayed while the armed brigades or phalanges with disparate goals emerge haphazardly. It should also be said that the number of armed phalanges in Tripoli is increasing almost weekly.

What is of grave concern, for example, is that even an attempt to discuss this matter publicly or to write about it in newspapers invites danger to the extent of threatening those who bring up such issues with physical liquidation. Along these lines the Editor-in-Chief of ʿArūs al-Baḥr newspaper was threatened with death if he continued criticizing Islamists. The Editor published the content of a threat he received in a phone call from a supporter of Islamists. He obviously had no protection other than to resort to addressing a plea to some particular authorities that observers doubt have the capacity to help (Bin ʿĪsā 2011, p. 3).

On the centrality of the transitional phase: defining rules of the game The National Transitional Council (NTC) that was established on 2 March 2011 assigned to itself the task of leadership during the entire transitional phase. It obtained international support and the recognition of various Libyan cities sufficient to enable it to impose its control and authority. It set out to carry its self-defined mandate until after the realization of liberation in order to supervise election of the founding assembly that will draft a constitution for popular referendum and form a transitional government to initiate free elections. Despite all this, the Council does not have, until now, any authority backed by force other than moral or ethical authority. It has proved difficult for the NTC to put in place the transitional programme and implement it on the ground, except through agreements. This has put the Islamists in a strong position with regard to refusing to acquiesce to these steps unless they get what they want. Thus, the NTC lacks what would enable it to impose its political will on the ground. It has been exposed to criticism and rejection as well as calls for its dissolution and the setting up of an alternative elected body, which have led to the protraction of the transitional phase.

Even though there has been an ongoing debate over the transitional phase and the democratic or revolutionary techniques for administering it, many analysts and activists pose questions such as whether Libya needs a constitution to define the rules of the political game, when the formulation of it would occur in the current context – influenced as it is by dynamics not necessarily bearing a relation or strong connection to constitutionality. Alternatively, does the country require a transitional phase in order to arrive at a stage suitable for the formation of a permanent constitution? In this connection it seems relevant to recollect what a Libyan intellectual expressed some years ago with regard to the constitution. What he argued has affinity to the flood of discussions now ongoing when he enquired, ‘Are we calling for a constitution, the origin of which is reality as it is, or a constitution in the form of a document that talks about a hypothetical reality that doesn’t actually exist?’ (al-Ruḥaybi 2006, pp. 88–89).

The NTC, in affirmation of its determination to fulfil its perceived obligations, issued a Constitutional Proclamation on 3 August 2011 that defined the signposts towards establishing the new political system. The temporary Constitutional Proclamation contains 37 articles distributed across five sections dealing with defining the state and the values upon which it rests, just as it delimits the general principles of the political process. The second section is dedicated to rights and public liberties; whereas the third deals with the system of governance through the interim phase; and the fourth clarifies judicial/legal guarantees. The fifth section contains transitional regulations.

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It is worth noting that the Council relies on the legitimacy it derives from the revolution.

It also considers its undertakings to originate from its responsiveness to the desires of the Libyan people and their aspiration to:

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achieve democracy and anchor the principles of political pluralism and a state of institutions, aspiring to a society blessed with stability, reassurance and justice arising in knowledge/science (al-ʿilm) and culture and deserving of wellbeing and health care, working to bring up generations ascending upwards with an Islamic spirit and love of the good and the nation.

(Al-Majlis al-Waṭani al-Intiqāli 2011, pp. 2–3)2

This Constitution endeavours to address the hopes of the people and their aspirations by clarifying its orientation towards ‘a society of citizenship, justice, equality, renaissance, progress and comfort in which injustice, autocracy, tyrannical excess, exploitation and rule by a single individual are impossible’. To understand its political, economic and social content better it may be useful to cite specific articles and stipulations of the proclamation according to their published order (Al-Majlis al-Waṭani alIntiqāli 2011).

Article 13 Libya is an independent democratic state; its people are the source of authority; it’s capital is Tripoli; its religion is Islam; Islamic sharı̄ʿah is the primary source of legislation; the state guarantees non-Muslims the freedom to practice their religious observances; the official language is Arabic, with the guarantee of the linguistic and cultural rights of the Amazigh, Tabu, Tuareg and all the components of Libyan society.

Article 4 The state shall work to establish a democratic political system based on political pluralism for the purpose of peaceful, democratic rotation of power.

Article 6 Libyans are equal before the law and equal in their enjoyment of civil and political rights and in equal opportunities as well as what is incumbent upon them of public duties and responsibilities. There is to be no discrimination between them on the basis of religion, madhab (sect), language, wealth, gender, lineage, political views, social status, tribal or regional or familial affiliation.

Article 7 The state shall safeguard human rights and basic freedoms and endeavor to become party to international and regional declarations and accords, which protect these rights and freedoms; and it shall work to issue new charters, which dignify the human being as the khalifah (vicegerent) of Allah on earth.

Article 8 The state shall guarantee equal opportunity and shall work to provide [a?] decent standard of living, the right to employment, education, health care and social security for every citizen just as it guarantees the right of individual private property. The state guarantees a just distribution of national resources among the citizens and between the various cities and regions of the state.

Article 9 It is the duty of every citizen to defend the nation (al-waṭan); preserve the national unity, to not infringe upon the civil, democratic, constitutional system; to adhere to civic values; to combat regional-, clan-, racial- chauvinism and tribal group sentiments/solidarity (ʿaṣabiyah).

Contemporary Arab Affairs Article 14 The state shall guarantee the freedom of opinion and the freedom of individual- and group expression, the freedom of academic/scientific research; the freedom of communication; the freedom of the press and various forms of media as well as printing and distribution; the freedom of mobility; the freedom of assembly, demonstration and peaceful strikes/ picketing/sit-ins in what does not contravene the law.

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Article 15 The state shall guarantee the freedom to form political parties and associations and all other organizations of civil society and issue laws for their organization. It is not permissible to establish secret or armed societies/associations or in violation of the public order or public codes of conduct or harmful to the state and the unity of the national territory.

Article 17 The temporary National Transitional Council is the supreme authority in the Libyan state, and it initiates actions of supreme sovereignty including: legislation and promulgating public policy for the state. It is the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people and derives its legitimacy from the revolution of 17 February (2011). It is entrusted with insuring national unity; the integrity of the national lands; the embodiment of values and ethics and their dissemination; the safety of citizens and residents; the ratification of international treaties; and the establishment of the bases of the civil, constitutional, democratic state.

Article 18 The temporary Interim Transitional National Council is comprised of representatives from the local councils, taking into account, in the apportioning the representatives of each local council, population density, the geographic criteria of the city and region that it represents. Council has the right to add ten members for exigencies of national interests, who are proposed as candidates and selected by the Council. * The temporary Interim Transitional National Council elects its president and a first and second deputy. If any of these offices are vacated, the Council will choose a replacement. In all circumstances, the election will be by relative majority of those present. If more than one obtains a majority, the president of the council will choose the most fit.

Article 21 It is not permissible to hold membership simultaneously in both the temporary Interim Transitional National Council and public offices; and likewise, it is not permissible to hold membership simultaneously in the temporary Interim Transitional National Council and a local council. It is not permissible for a member to be appointed to an administrative board of a company, or to be party to contractual agreements concluded by the government or one of the public institutions. Similarly, it is not permissible for a member, his wife or sons – during his term of membership – to buy or rent anything among properties of the state or to rent or sell anything of his own properties or to trade such or to conclude a contract with the state wherein he is an agent, importer, supplier or contractor.

Article 22 It is impermissible to nullify the membership of a member of the temporary Interim Transitional National Council, except in the case where he forfeits one of the conditions of membership or where he is negligent in the obligations of membership. A decision to nullify membership must be enacted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the temporary Interim Transitional National Council. Membership is terminated by death or by the acceptance of resignation by the temporary Interim Transitional National Council, by loss of competence, or incapacity to perform duties. In the event of the nullification of membership or its termination, the relevant local council assumes responsibility for choosing a replacement of the representative whose membership has been nullified or terminated.

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Article 24 * The temporary Interim Transitional National Council appoints an Executive Office – or Interim Government – composed of a president and a sufficient number of members in order to administer the various sectors of the country. The temporary Interim Transitional National Council has the right to dismiss the president of the Executive Office – or Interim Government – or any of its members on the condition that the decision is passed by a twothirds majority of the Council. * The President of the Executive Office – or the Interim Government – and its members are responsible and liable before the temporary Interim Transitional National Council for carrying out the public policies of the state according to what the temporary Interim Transitional National Council outlines, just as each member is responsible for the works of the section that he heads, before the Executive Office – or Interim Government.

Article 26 The Executive Office – or the Interim Government – is delegated with the implementation of public policy of the state in accordance with what the temporary Interim Transitional National Council outlines, just as it is delegated with the issuance of executive orders and by-laws. The Executive Office – or the Interim Government – is delegated with presenting draft laws that are submitted to the temporary Interim Transitional National Council for consideration, and to take whatever action it deems necessary in their regard.

Article 30 * Before liberation the temporary Interim Transitional National Council will remain the supreme authority in the Libyan state and responsible for the administration of the country until the election of the General National Conference. * After the announcement of liberation, the temporary Interim Transitional National Council will transfer its headquarters to Tripoli and will form a transitional government within a period of no more than thirty days; and, in a period not to exceed ninety days, from the declaration of liberation, the Council will undertake the following:

1. Adopt a Special Election Law for the General National Conference.

2. Appoint a supreme national elections commission.

3. Call for elections of the General National Conference (GNC). * The election of the General National Conference will be completed within 240 days of the declaration of liberation. * The General National Conference will be composed of 200 elected members from among all the Libyan people, in accordance with the Special Election Law of the General National Conference * The temporary Interim Transitional National Council will be dissolved with the first convention of the General National Conference. The most senior member (in age) of the GNC will be delegated the leadership of the session, whereas the most junior member (in age) will be charged with determining the works of the session (i.e., the minutes and the agenda). During this session, the election of the President of the General National Conference will be completed as well as that of his two deputies by direct secret ballot of a relative majority; and the Transitional Government will continue to carry out its work until the formation of the Interim Government. * The General National Council will undertake, within a period not to exceed thirty days from the first convocation of it, the following: 1. The appointment of a Prime Minister, who will in turn recommend candidates for membership of his government with the provision that all enjoy the confidence of the General National Conference before beginning their work as an

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Interim Government; and, thus the Conference will undertake the appointment of heads of sovereign entities and public offices.

2. A founding body will be chosen to formulate a draft constitution for the country and will be called the Founding Body for the Drafting of the Constitution with the provision that it will have finished its presentation of the draft constitution to the Conference in a period not to exceed sixty days from the convocation of its first meeting.

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* The draft constitution will be approved by the General National Conference which will recommend submitting it to referendum with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote within thirty days from the date of its approval by the Conference. If the Libyan people approve the Constitution by a two-thirds majority of voters, the Founding Body will ratify it a Constitution of the country, and the General National Conference will adopt it. If the Libyan people do not approve the Constitution, the Founding Body will be charged with re-drafting it and resubmitting it again for referendum in a period not to exceed thirty days.

* The General National Conference adopts General Elections Law within thirty days. * General elections will be organized within 180 days after the adoption of laws regulating it. The General National Conference and the Interim government attend to all requirements for a democratic and transparent election process. * The Supreme Elections Commission (that will be formed by the General National Conference) will initiate general elections under the supervision of the national judiciary, the monitoring of the United Nations and international and regional organizations. * The General National Conference will ratify and announce the results of the elections and call the Legislative Authority to convene in a period not to exceed thirty days. At first session, the General National Conference will be dissolved and the Legislative Authority will assume its tasks. * With the convocation of the first session of the legislative authority, the Interim Government will be considered a care-taker government until such time as the Permanent Government is convened in accordance with the Constitution.

This Constitutional Proclamation met with contrasting reactions. While the Islamist currents were intent on voicing criticism, other forces, especially organizations and institutions of civil society, undertook to issue a communiqué on 16 August detailing their view. They particularly criticized Article 20 of the Proclamation that creates the General National Conference (GNC). This article was seen as an expression of intention to bring down the NTC itself. This they considered a replication of the viewpoint of the Muslim Brotherhood that initiated the call for the dissolution of the NTC on the pretext that it was not composed in accordance with the Islamic historical principle of the bayʿah (i.e. the pledge of allegiance) as ʿAli Ṣ alābi explained in an interview with Aljazeera (Libya al-Youm Journal 28 March 2011).

It is evident that this current took an early hostile position towards the temporary Constitutional Proclamation and this reflects dissatisfaction with the NTC itself.

In this context ʿAli Ṣ alābi, Sālim al-Shaykhi and Ismāʿil al-Quraytli – all of whom are presumed to be affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood – published on the Islamic website al-Manārah what they termed the ‘Draft Interim National Pact’ (al-Mithāq al-Waṭani al-Intiqāli). This initiative specified that:

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the Transitional National Council shall be responsible for the administration of the affairs of the country until elections for the National General Conference have been completed. The temporary National Transitional Council is obliged to call, within seven days of the announcement of liberation, for the convening of the General National Conference comprised of all the representatives of the local councils of the cities. Failure to establish it during the aforementioned timeframe, tasks local city councils with convening their gathering as a General National Conference in Tripoli no later than a week from the date of notice. With the convocation of the first session of the General National Conference the trusteeship of the temporary National Transitional Council will come to an end and all of its powers and areas of jurisdiction will be transferred to the General National Conference. (al-Ṣ alābi et al. 2011)

The most detailed of these proposals, however, was submitted by the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), which was established at the beginning of the 1980s in opposition to Qadhafi. Initially the NFSL had a large membership of diaspora opposition with various political orientations. Nevertheless, differences began to creep in leading to the defection of many members, leaving behind a small organization of limited influence led by elements affiliated to the Islamist current. They called for a temporary political authority with a democratic mandate. However, they are almost alone in emphasizing the need for international support. The fact that the NFSL made public its design long before the NTC issued the temporary Constitutional Proclamation may be interpreted as a pre-emptive move to impose a point of view or to undermine the legitimacy of the NTC and to pre-empt its plans (NFSL 2011).

Representatives of civil society considered such proposals contradicting those issued by the NTC an attempt to impose the will of a particular political faction upon the consensus of the rest. It amounted to acting against the will of the people who are abiding by the continuity of the NTC, until authority is turned over to a government elected on the basis of a permanent constitution.4 To opponents of the Islamist current undertaking elections during the interim phase, before the permanent constitution is ratified, is tantamount to embarking on a dangerous adventure that puts national security and citizenship in jeopardy. They saw this as highly dangerous since the overthrow of the NTC would inflict great damage to the fragile stability that characterizes the transitional phase (al-Mismāri 2011, p. 12).

However, the strongest expressions of reservation vis-à-vis the temporary Constitutional Proclamation were voiced by the Group of the ʿUlamāʾ (scholars) of Libya (hayʾat ʿulamāʾ libyā). This body was initially formed by a number of Islamists amongst those connected to the Muslim Brotherhood in Benghazi several months before the liberation of Tripoli. It is doubtful, given the circumstances, that it resulted from any widespread consultation, any government decision or the endorsement of theʿulamāʾ of the country. It may be noticed that this group was late in commenting on the Constitutional Proclamation. Its communiqué was not issued until 10 October.

It is possible to explain their delay in responding in a number of ways. However, it certainly is interesting to know the conditions that the self-appointed members of this group specified for the Constitution and imposed upon the Interim Council. Here a number of points from this communiqué can be cited directly: Necessity dictates that the National Transitional Council undertake to consult with the people knowledgeable in Islamic law (ahl al-ʿilm al-sharʿı̄) before it adopts the temporary Constitutional Proclamation, so that its provisions do not fall outside the dictates of the shariʿah or contravene any of its source principles (uṣūl). Therefore, the Group requests that the National Transitional Council form a committee among the ʿulamāʾ of Islamic

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shariʿah to review legislation before adoption. Furthermore, The Group demands that a scholarly committee of ʿulamāʾ be an integral part of the body which will undertake the formulation of the permanent constitution (i.e., the founding body for the drafting of the constitution). This is necessary to avoid a situation where constitutional provisions conflict with any of the foundations of the Islamic religion or clash with its fundamentals.

The temporary Constitutional Proclamation mentions that Islamic shariʿah ‘is the primary source of law’ and the Group sees that none among the people of Islam in the country – who are all proud to belong to it – would deny that shariʿah must necessarily be ‘the only source for laws and legislation’.

In view of the general nature on which basis the constitutional provisions are drafted, the Group deems it necessary to correct a number of phrases contained in the temporary Constitutional Proclamation. These include Article 1 to the effect that ‘the people are the source of authority’. This expression might be understood to suggest that the people may specify whatever they will of rules and legislation even if these are opposed to the legal rulings (aḥkām) of the pure shariʿah, and on the basis of that, they might forbid what is religiously permissible (ḥalāl) and permit what is religiously forbidden (ḥarām). It is possible for us to correct the wording by adding a restriction which is to say: ‘authority derives its legitimacy from the people in respect of what does not contravene the sharʿ (law) of Allah’.

Likewise, the Group has defined its position with regard to the provisions pertaining to public freedoms, demanding definition of the freedom of women, the freedom of opinion and expression, the freedom to form political parties and associations, and other human rights including the freedom to practise religion. Accordingly, these freedoms must be restricted so as to remain in conformity and not opposition with ‘Islamic shariʿah’.

The most dangerous item in the communiqué was an objection with regard to women. The Group objected to ‘equality between those two of different creation and nature and capability because this nullifies the justice that Allah the Most High has commanded’. Likewise, it objected to the quota specified by the Council for ‘inappropriately’ represented groups, such as women, by saying: To alter the will of the people by conferring on those whom they did not choose from within their strata or groups the task of representing them in the Council of Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwwāb) in a special quota destroys democracy and smashes its structures.

(The Board of Trustees of the Council of Ulema (Hayʾat al-ʿUlamāʾ) 2011)

Lastly, the Group wants to restrict the legislative jurisdiction of the future majlis or parliament by formal written specification of the condition that there be no contradiction of shariʿah. It forcefully demands a requirement to solicit the position of the ʿulamāʾ (scholars) of the shariʿah with regard to any initiative. Following the same logic the Group wants its inclusion and agreement in any work which the founding body (for drafting the Constitution) undertakes, by specifying that: the ʿulamāʾ of the shariʿah will have an influential representation in formulating the Constitution in order to avoid what occurred with the temporary Constitutional Proclamation and to insure that there is no possibility of its contravening the shariʿah’.

(The Board of Trustees of the Council of Ulema (Hayʾat al-ʿUlamāʾ) 2011)

The communiqué issued by the Group stressed that: there must be some paragraphs in the [future] constitution that are not subject to disputation or subject to amendment in the event the Constitution is amended. These include expressions such as: ‘Its [i.e., Libya’s] religion is Islam and Islamic shariʿah is the only

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(The Board of Trustees of the Council of Ulema (Hayʾat al-ʿUlamāʾ) 2011)

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It would appear that a position is being here confronted that rejects the principle of democracy and stridently refuses any viewpoint, legislation or legislative institution that does not enjoy the sanction of the ʿulamāʾ of the shariʿah who alone have the authority to decree what is in conformity with it.

The topography of the institutionalized forces The National Transitional Council (NTC) This body represents the highest authority recognized internationally and possibly nationally. It has announced its abidance by commitment to democracy, the rule of law and constitutional legitimacy. The Council was not formed by design but by the incidental gathering of personalities from various regions. Some members are independent while others belong to multiple political trends. Subsequently these individuals opted to institutionalize their activities and the Council assumed the power of a parliament that also exercises some executive authority. However, the expansion of the scope of its executive activities will lead to a consolidation and centralization of power and authority. This has been a source for concern given the weakness of the leadership of the Council. This has been noted by numerous observers from the standpoint that members of the NTC were involved or complicit in contentious issues, thus exposing a weakness that cannot be ignored.

Clearly, the Council has become the target of many criticisms. This emphasizes the need to expand its representative base so as to encompass all the regions as well as thinking about a source of legitimacy other than ‘revolutionary legitimacy’. If the Council is not able to embark on this to strengthen its position, armed forces operating on the ground may be willing to topple it.

The local councils Local councils (majālis maḥaliyah) are entities that were mostly established through secret initiatives for the purpose of assuming the responsibility of administering cities and regions after their liberation from the control of the ancien regime. These councils are presently entrusted with the role of local administration of the various government and service sectors. Some of these have military wings subject to their authority, formally at least. The majority of military councils are independent and make their will effective by employing force, especially in major cities like Tripoli. Many councils are facing the problem of controlling armed formations while the legitimacy of these local councils, the capabilities of its members, their political orientation and their performance have come into doubt question. There have been calls to dissolve these councils and to initiate elections to select new councils in a manner that reflects the struggle between political or ideological currents as well as factional/regional and tribal struggles.

The February 17th Coalitions The February 17th Coalitions are associations comprising political and human rights activists who participated in the first wave of protests. It appears that city coalitions

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are closed organizations that do not allow outside membership. They draw their discourse and justification for their actions from ‘revolutionary legitimacy’ while exercising effective authority without recourse to any side. This has given rise to problems and contradictions that appeared early in Benghazi and subsequently spread to Tripoli where the Muslim Brotherhood controls the Coalition. The vast majority of the members of the Benghazi coalition have elected to dissolve it or to withdraw from it.

They explained this by their desire to submit to a single legitimate authority which the NTC represented. Muhammad Zāhi al-Mughayrbi, one of its founders, explained, in a phone conversation with the author, that they took this decision so that the Coalition would not assume a position similar to that of a ‘revolutionary command council’. This is a clear indication of fear on behalf of the Coalition over resort to ‘revolutionary legitimacy’, which threatens stability and democratic transformation.

Recently, the Coalition in Benghazi transformed into a civil society organization.5 In Tripoli the Coalition has not yet ceased to engage in a wide range of activities under the cover of ‘revolutionary legitimacy’. However, a number of its members with whom the author met expressed their anger and resentment over these practices that they attribute to the Muslim Brotherhood. This has led many Coalition members to desist from participating in its activities. One member characterized this sentiment in an article published recently. He expressed disdain for the Muslim Brotherhood because it had hijacked this Coalition and taken control of its leadership. The Brotherhood is criticized for using the Coalition as an instrument to serve their political goals.

They are also accused of using it as a means to extirpate and wage war on anyone who does not agree with them politically (Al-Mashriqi 2011, p. 2).

Islamist groups Despite their small size in terms of membership the Islamists are highly organized groups whose members have excellent self-discipline and respect for their leaderships.

The most prominent of these is the Muslim Brotherhood which has an organizational history in Libya dating back to the 1950s. They went through various ups and downs, until the group was reorganized a few years ago following the period of détente (infitāḥ) that Libya witnessed. They were engaged in a dialogue with Qadhafi’s regime that resulted in freeing many of their members. As soon as Libyan regions were free of Qadhafi’s control, the leadership emerged to occupy a prominent place, especially in the spheres of influential media such as Aljazeera satellite station, the internet and the Friday pulpits of mosques.

The Muslim Brotherhood group focuses on setting up new civil and religious organizations and infiltrating similar entities. It exerts great efforts to affirm its media presence through new satellite channels, mosques, charitable foundations (awqāf), the issue of fatwās, committees of ʿulamāʾ, public lectures, etc. Nevertheless, they do not ignore the importance of a military wing of their own. Historically, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood had an intellectual affinity and proximity with the Brotherhood in Egypt. There does not seem to be any considerable departure from this position. The Libyan Brotherhood has a manifest presence with members in all groups active in the revolution.

They have professed their intention to abide by a civil state and democracy or a ‘moderate’ Islamic state; and the encouragement of civil society.

The NFSL has historically been the largest of the Islamist movements and associations with an Islamists membership of multiple orientations. Its current leadership has Sanusi tendencies, but the NFSL has been subjected to dispersion and the desertion of

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many from its ranks. This fragmentation was related to many reasons including differences that characterized the Libyan opposition outside the country since the failure of what was known as the National Conference of the Libya Opposition. This was set up to unify and coordinate the efforts of opposition forces opposed to Qadhafi. However, despite the shrinking of its ranks, the NFSL constituted a pre-eminent media and political presence throughout the revolution and before the liberation of Tripoli though with very few spokesmen. What is worthy of mention is that the Salvation Front might be alone in having put forward a clearly defined political programme outlining the features of the new Libya.

Coexisting in the field are other movements, the most important of which are the Wahhābi and salafists affiliated with well-known salafist thought in their vigilance in following those ‘who have been delegated responsibility for affairs’ (i.e. the socalled ūli al-amr to use the Qurʾānic term in the sense understood by salafists).

Despite the ambiguous position of this current, many of its leaders took a position that might at least be described as negative towards the revolt against Qadhafi.

However, it has spread with rapidity among the ranks of the lesser educated groups of the population and youth. These are connected to the Arab salafist movement and especially with Saudi Arabia which exploits the presence of Libyan youth during the ḥajj season or off-season pilgrimages to Mecca (ʿumrah) in order to disseminate its doctrine and call (daʿwah).

The salafist movement that has begun to make its presence felt publicly has organizations and branches in many cities. They have not as yet expressed a political position vis-à-vis the struggle of forces. They, however, exploit the absence of a (governmental) authority in carving out what they desire of control over various spaces such as the mosques, or daʿwah efforts in the street. Some of its members are directly engaged in ‘commanding what is right and forbidding what is unjust’ (al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa alnahi ʿan al-munkar) in some neighbourhoods of Tripoli. This includes, for example, informing ladies’ hair stylists and beauty salons that they are no longer tolerated and will have to close once and for all. They have also struck public opinion hard by their destruction of conspicuous graves with prominent tomb markers; while political currents and parties are preoccupied with matters of public policy and competing over everything. It might be more than a bit ironic to note that while Libyans have been embattled in many regions and taking casualties, the salafist movement has been concerned, in the last circular which it distributed in the streets, with warning and admonishing Libyans, all of whom are Muslims in a Muslim society, against shirk (idolatry).6 Extremist Islamist orientations or jihadists, upon whom Qadhafi’s regime had inflicted the greatest damage, have yet to announce themselves clearly. Observers and analysts believe that these orientations are presently focusing on and preoccupied with acquiring weapons and finance. They are preparing for a strong entrance onto the scene once the military operations have ended and the process of restoring stability and reconstruction has begun. Historically the Libyan Fighting Group was most prominent.

After suppression and executions of its rank and file by Qadhafi’s regime, its imprisoned members entered into a dialogue with the authorities. This resulted in an avowal to undertake intellectual reviews, best known as ‘renunciations’ (murājaʿāt) through which they renounced violence and opted to undertake peaceful work (Bilḥāj et al. 2010, pp. 4–16).

The dialogue resulted in the release of its members from Qahdafi’s prisons in contingents, the last of which was set free only a few days before the 17 February revolt.

These were vital fuel for the revolution. Tripoli had barely been wrested from Qadhafi’s

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grip before one of its leaders, Bilḥāj, appeared as head of the Tripoli Military Council. It was not long before he began to play the role of the military governor of the city with thousands of armed supporters who have rallied to his banner.

It is not as yet possible to establish an organizational connection to the Fighting Group. Similarly it is not clear if this group yet abides by the ideas of the ‘renunciations’ and their disavowal of violence. Though Bilḥāj has stated on numerous political occasions and media appearances his commitment to the establishment of a democratic state, he has recently announced the establishment of the Islamic Movement for Change. This movement has been busy arming itself and forming loyal armed brigades.

Its leadership has orchestrated media and political appearances with the aim of defining the national political agenda and imposing some control. Newspaper reports suggest that this movement enjoys outside support, particularly from Qatar. Thus despite his acceptance of democracy and a civil state in numerous interviews, the reality of Bilḥāj leading armed brigades that receive outside support is cause for resentment among others (Beaumont 2011).

This concern is related to the fact that the process of rehabilitating elements of the Fighting Group was not completed or entirely successful. Qadhafi’s regime did not implement a full programme with enduring results. Therefore, the effectiveness of the revisions was limited to the threshold of the prison doorstep. In addition, hundreds of prisoners who were not part of negotiations between the regime and the Islamists were released in the first days of the revolt in a desperate attempt by the regime to conciliate the street. Hundreds and perhaps even thousands more prisoners were released from prisons in Benghazi and then in Tripoli after the liberation of the two cities.

Liberal, nationalist and secularist (i.e. non-Islamist) currents, and party projects Here there is an array of political factions of various dispensations. They are not Islamist and range from the leftist and the liberal to the popular and Arab nationalist forces, etc. They express loyalty to liberal democracy. Some of the leaderships of these orientations belonged to old political parties or were intellectuals active politically and in the field of human rights during Qadhafi’s reign. Others were members of the opposition in exile. They generally lack organization at the popular level and it appears that their leaders did not pay attention to this except recently when they discovered the effectiveness of the Islamist trends’ activities.

Only lately have some of these elements begun to set up political parties or organizations of civil society that generally echo their views. However, these have yet to crystallize into any clear form with distinct features. This comes at a time when many of those involved find themselves drawn to political side-battles imposed upon them by the Islamists to dissipate their forces. It is difficult to produce a detailed outline of the political parties that have been publicly announced or that are undertaking preparations to emerge. Benghazi witnessed the birth of the first political parties just as Libyan opposition members formed a political association in a meeting in Tunis, while some individuals have been reticent to announce parties revolving around personalities.

In addition to these may be added a sizeable number of small movements and organizations that comprise limited membership or which are controlled by families.

These organizations emerged from the womb of opposition to Qadhafi abroad since the early 1980s but which still cling to existence today.

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Another organization that surfaced is the Libyan Democratic Gathering, which is a front association for activists, politicos and human rights activists comprising organizations of civil society with liberal and progressive tendencies. It issued a founding communiqué in Tripoli on 17 September 2011 and attacked the position of the Muslim Brotherhood and their stand vis-à-vis the NTC and the Executive Office. They considered such positions to be merely attempts to impose the will of the Brotherhood and dominate, while contending that there is no guardianship (wiṣāyah) for any party over the people (The Founding Committee of the Libyan Democratic Forum 2011). The leadership of the National Democratic Alliance that was established by Libyan opposition member Manṣūr al-Kikhiyā in 1987 is preparing to launch a political party based on ideas and objectives similar to those of the Alliance itself. Similarly the Libyan lawyer al-Hādi Shallūf has announced the establishment of a national democratic party; and expatriate Libyans in the United Arab Emirates announced the formation of a New Libyan Party last July.

Zāhi al-Mghayrbi has noted that the political party movement in Libya does not reflect, up until now, the primary political currents where: none of the primary currents have announced the formation of political parties to represent them. However, it is only a matter of time before these currents do announce the formation of political parties through which they will endeavor to compete for power and to implement their political programs. (al-Mghayrbi 2011)

Observers of activities connected to the founding of political parties can attest to the vagueness or lack of clarity in the many attempts and the inability to formulate clearly defined political programmes. They also lack clear-cut political identity and positions towards current issues. Apparently, an increase in political parties with no ability to play any effective role in political life in the short-term will be witnessed. It is important, however, to stress the warning issued by the newly set up Libyan Democratic Association regarding the campaign by forces that use the mosques as well as billboards and posters in public places to wage war on the work of political parties. There is no doubt that such antipathy to political parties may constitute a threat to democratic life and limit the scope of freedom of opinion and expression (Al-Manara Media 2011).

Civil society The process of incepting organizations of civil society almost daily bears fruit in all major cities in Libya. These organizations revolve around issues centred for the most part on human rights, women’s rights or humanitarian issues. While it is apparent that there is an active presence of Islamist currents in a large number of these organizations, it is also clear that other currents find them to be a suitable forum for representation. The internet is brimming with many Libyan websites and social networks host growing numbers of web groups and communities. The fact that there is an absence of organization and effective political authority in the country renders this phenomenon more related to what is happening on the ground and less an expression of a phenomenon connected to a culture supportive of civil society.

Despite the announcement of the formation of a union of civil society organizations, it is doubtful if this genuinely reflects what its name implies. Given the small number of associations that constitute this union, it does not have a presence in all Libyan regions.

This reflects a practice and mode of political control through the initiation of organizations, associations and unions. In fact most of these entities lack popular manifestations

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in all the reaches of the country. This also applies to unions and religious associations such as the Society or Union of Libyan ʿUlamāʾ, the Student Union and others. There is a feeling that Islamist forces figure decisively in the inception of these organizations as a means for taking greater control of them. This has also become apparent in the prominence of Islamists in establishing charitable or humanitarian associations.

The role of the Civil Society Commission of the NTC has been restricted to establishing a fund for the support of civil society. The fund is financed by what is known as the Temporary Fiscal Instrumentalism of the Interim Government. However, the danger of political currents and political parties exploiting the institutions of civil society to their own ends has come into prominence. As a result, these new and nascent institutions are cast into the unknown. Tribalism will likely predominate and become the axis for political work; and, therefore, factionalism/regionalism will dangerously impinge upon identity, integration, national unity and the democratic process. The challenge before the Islamist currents lies in the extent of their ability to facilitate the process of democratic transition through their commitment to liberating the sentiments and attitudes of individuals from the dominance of the state. This, in turn, will lead to the creation of a wider sphere for democracy without hindering the realization of democracy itself (Obeidi 2008, p. 16).

The Amazigh: a cultural or ethnic challenge?

After long decades of suppression by Qadhafi of the Amazigh (Berbers, Tuareg and Tabu), the current state of political fluidity and the absence of any strong political authority has opened the doors to all forms of expression among the Amazigh of Libya. The revolt against Qadhafi in the region of Jabal Nafūsah was characterized by clear expressions of its Amazigh components. Recently, Tripoli witnessed the convening of the Amazigh Conference. This conference is an indication of the commonalities of demands with Amazigh of North Africa in general. Despite the fact it was the first Libyan Conference, its organizers were keen on linking it to non-Libyan Amazigh conferences. This connection has been a cause for resentment of many non-Amazigh commentators.

The demands expressed by Libya’s Amazigh range from enforcing identity and culture to upgrading the Amazigh language to the position of an official or at least a national language. Though questions about the script for writing the Amazigh language (whether this should be Tifnāgh, Arabic or European/Latin) remain unanswered, the fact that the Conference was connected to foreign conferences raises ambiguities.

There are also questions as to the suitability of this with respect to non-Berbers like the Tuareg who use a language different from the Berber tongue. This in turn opens up questions about ethnicity in the widest possible sense.

The new Libya and future challenges Libyan territories have been liberated from the control of Qadhafi. Battles for control of the important cities of Sirte and Bani Walid have ended with the al-Qadhādhifah and Warfallah tribes deserting their hometowns and homes. Qadhafi was killed to mark a symbolic closure of his chapter in the history Libya. Libyans have affirmed that they are a people who deserve to live freely and have expressed their yearning for freedom through the thousands of victims who have fallen since the dawn of the February Revolution. The revolution is not yet complete, despite Qadhafi’s death at the hands of the February Revolutionaries. The revolution needs to be completed by

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embarking on the process of building the new Libya. This highlights the challenges and problems related to dealing with the legacy of 42 years of Qadhafi’s rule.

The death of Qadhafi and other prominent members of his regime have a symbolic value that should not be ignored. Their deaths will help liberate the psyche of Libyans in general and the revolutionaries in particular from feelings of imminent danger. This may find explanation in the way Qadhafi ruled Libya and how his image was constructed in the minds of the populace, which fomented a belief that he possessed supra-natural qualities, which transcend human norms and thereby rendered him capable of upsetting any sort of balanced status quo. It was for this reason that ordinary Libyans as well as the NTC leaders expressed fears that a living Qadhafi would pose a grave risk, which might delay the triumph of the revolution.

Libyans are in need of a long period in order to deal with the consequences of Qadhafi’s rule and the negative impact of his policies. Qadhafi destroyed the concept of state and institutions and made war on society and its political and civil organizations.

The worst of his deeds were not those connected to repression and killing and squandering the national resources in comparison with his role in shaking the value system of society and upsetting the components of its political culture. This places Libya before many challenges that demand patience and the employment of all energies to ensure the shortest possible interval of time necessary to embark confidently on a process of building.

The February Revolution in its initial stages had no leadership and did not express any political or ideological orientations. This conferred on the revolution a capability to liberate itself from the impediments and sources of weakness associated with ideology and partisanship and the shackles they impose (Ulrichsen et al. 2011). It is possible that these initial strengths may transform into elements of weakness if such factors impede the development of political organizations and an effective and genuine civil society.

Obviously these latter can militate against the potential danger of exploitation of the revolution and the blood of its martyrs for whatever political agendas. Similarly they may safeguard against forces desiring to preserve the status quo in order to exercise influence and any foreign desire to play a dishonest role by intervening in defining the form of the new Libyan political society.

The Libyan revolution was popular in origin and orientations. Libyans ventured into the midst of the revolution without any political experience or political culture or mass movements that would lend support to strengthen their ability always to maintain their revolution as they desired. Libyans were compelled to accept the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in face of the savagery of Qadhafi and his brigades. The moral and political instigation of the politicians and opposition figures and the highly influential role and media blitz of satellite channels, at the forefront of which was Qatar’s Aljazeera, played a decisive role in charging their emotions.

While Qadhafi’s killing machine was committing barbaric acts, Libyans sensed that their country was susceptible to a war of extermination without mercy, and that there was no choice but to resort to world conscience.

Doubtless, the world responded to various calls, and it cannot be denied that one of these was the plea for humanitarian intervention. The world was not prepared to repeat the tragedy of Rwanda in Libya or to see another Srebrenica in Benghazi. Libyans did not find any way out of the situation. The most the Arabs could do was to provide a measure of cover necessary for the legitimacy of NATO operations. And while Libyans joined forces with the West, they did so with the determination that they would not accept the presence of foreign forces on their soil.

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There is a fear that foreign intervention may corrupt everything, especially since the West and the United Nations have begun to advocate and market plans for the longerterm and beyond the task of bringing down Qadhafi and protecting civilians. There are ideas and plans that have been laid down and prepared without revealing the extent of Libyan participation in their process. It is not yet clear the degree of the involvement of the leadership of the revolution either in preparing such plans or whether they have been consulted. These plans transfer the task in Libya to the locus of building the state or the nation (ummah). Therefore, these plans are not divorced from the liberal peace project laid out according to the assumptions of the Washington Consensus and the principles of free market economy and neo-liberalism (Heleta 2011).

This appears clearly in the plan announced by the United Nations that appointed a special mission to Libya. This plan proposed by British diplomat Ian Martin endeavours to guarantee a direct presence for civil and military groups of the United Nations on Libyan territory for an unspecified term. The plan contains the following provisions: . Re-imposition of security and the rule of law. . Leading a comprehensive political dialogue, stimulating national reconciliation, and defining the requirements for the formulation of a constitution and elections. . The expansion of the powers of the state including strengthening the emerging institutions and restoring effective public services. . Protecting human rights particularly for vulnerable and fragile groups and supporting transitional justice. . Undertaking rapid steps to launch economic revitalization. . Coordinating support and assistance of various international entities. . Securing supportive relations between Libya and its neighbours.7

The real danger is that this is transpiring without a clear role for Libyans who have yet to purify their country completely of Qadhafi’s regime and who have not had an opportunity or the time even to express their opinion in accordance with democratic mechanisms such as elections or referenda. There is genuine anxiety that foreign intervention in Libya may corrupt the entire process. Hope remains, however, that the Libyan people will not easily rest content that their country should become merely a petrol station for Europe or that it should be run by Western embassies.

Libyans who fought Fascist Italy for decades put on record testaments to the heroics of an unarmed people who will not be deceived.

The challenges related to the outcomes of the transitional phase are strongly connected to what may be described as the institutional weakness from which the NTC suffers. Experience and conventional wisdom suggest that the opportunity for the success of the process of transition and democratization lies in the existence of individuals or leaderships and politicians who adopt democracy as a strategic choice, a commitment and national pledge. Yet there are clearly distinguishable negative repercussions of this weakness. It is unclear if the leadership is capable of providing the elements of success necessary to make democracy a reality as the ‘Founding Fathers’ in the United States were able to do. In light of the close connection between all that happens in Libya and the active involvement of foreign powers, lack of strong leadership opens the door to yet more foreign influence. Foreign powers may choose support or patronage of one side or another among the competing Libyan factions. Though all foreign forces have expressed respect for the will of the Libyan people, their choices

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and the process of democracy-building in Libya, the matter of the extent of their support, no doubt, invites legitimate question.

There are, however, other questions that have arisen in the present circumstances.

They are related to possibilities resultant from the rising influence of the fundamentalists or to what arbitrary ad-hoc institutions of violence that Qadhafi could have left behind might do – possibly as sleeper cells – in terms of engaging in operations to undermine any stability or undertake assassinations. The worst of these possibilities, however, is that political competition should turn into a struggle for power between armed groups. Such struggle might become catastrophic in ferocity, and hence fuel the desires of foreign actors to intervene to the advantage of one side at the expense of others.

The failure of Libya to achieve stability or transcend the negative impact of any foreign attempts to decide upon hasty arrangements for rehabilitation, reconstruction, democratization and liberalization of the economy may only multiply the dangers of schism and protract the period of instability. Foreign forces will move to impose a peaceful transition. If such a goal cannot be completed through the use of military force, given the dangers and costs that this entails, then opportunities to resort to arrangements for peace-keeping may appear more favourable (van Veen 2011).

Similarly, if Islamists increase the use of techniques of elimination and exclusion or resort to liquidating opponents stigmatized as secularists or affiliated to Qadhafi’s regime, this will open up the possibility of a war that will transcend politics.

An even more horrifying prospect would be the possibility that large groups of individuals and specific regions or tribes might be banned from the right to participate on the pretext that they were Qadhafi supporters or on grounds that they took a position against the revolution or were not affiliated to it.

These possibilities are in play while principles of transitional justice have yet to be implemented. There is no agreement on any regulations or restrictions to be imposed on the practice of political activities. In addition to the direct dangers related to these challenges, inaction opens up possibilities of resort to tribal, regional or factional protectionism and, hence, the potential corruption of the climate of political competition.

The transitional phase will be decisive and the policies the NTC adopts will define the form and rules of the game. The guarantees of success rest on the transitional phase just as they rest on the extent of the ability of Libyans – and particularly the youth – to comprehend the prevailing contexts and to initiate action at all levels related to modern democratic society.

Notes 1. See also Anonymous (2011).

2. Editor’s note: For the text of the Constitution, see http://www.freemisurata.com/vbnow/ content.php?r=2318-%C7%E1%C5%DA%E1%C7%E4-%C7%E1%CF%D3%CA%E6% D1%ED-%C7%E1%E3%C4%DE%CA-(%C7%E1%E4%D5-%C7%E1%DF%C7%E3% E1)/ [Accessed 20 October 2011].

3. All translations here are made on the basis of the original Arabic-language document issued by the National Transitional Council.

4. Statement of Civil Society Organizations on Libya’s draft interim constitution, mentioned by al-Mismāri (2011), p. 12.

5. Muḥammad Zāhi al-Mghayrbi, telephone conversation with the author, 13 October 2011.

6. Editor’s note: Al-Ḥ arakah al-Salafiyah [the Salafist Movement] 2011. ‘Iḥtharū al-Shirk’, document distributed by the movement in Tripoli on 2 October. Salafists, especially those influenced by Wahhābi thought, are extremely vigilant about anything that might give an

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appearance of idolatry – or shirk – taking partners in the worship of Allah. In particular, Wahhābis in Saudi Arabia undertook to demolish or otherwise completely level ancient tomb structures and markers (replacing them with simple stones) of even prominent Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad in the city of Medina. This was for the reason that they believed that tomb visitations – especially as in the cases of Shiʿite and Sufi praxis – had taken on particular dimensions of religious and spiritual significance, where people were making ‘pilgrimages’ to and seeking blessings at tombs of deceased ‘saints’ or prominent persons. According to narrow readings and interpretations in fiqh, such as those advanced

by Ibn Taymiyah (d. 1328 CE) in this regard, such practices can be potentially construed to connote a kind of shirk. This severe approach towards graves and cenotaphs is generally uncommon in the Muslim world.

7. For the Plan, see http://www.innercitypress.com/martin1unlibya1icp.pdf/.

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