POSITION REPORT FEBRUARY 2022

THE CRASH TWO YEARS AGO of ZS-CAR, the Civil Aviation Authority’s Cessna Citation, has in the inimitable way of inept governance, gone from tragedy to farce. But the now farcical accident investigation process must not cause us to lose sight that it is first and foremost a colossal tragedy.

Three people, who had succeeded against the odds, lost their lives on a cloudy mountain after 30 seconds of what must have been a terrifying plunge in an out of control jet. All three crew had families that were hugely proud of their accomplishment, and some leave behind children. The lawyers are baying for blood and money.But the human aspects of the tragedy must not be allowed to override the questions that this crash has raised.

The report of the Ethiopian Accident Investigation Board reveals a litany of failures by the South African regulator to apply its own regulations to its own operations. The SACAA commendably released the report with warts and all in full view. And then farcically decided to contradict the report.

Thus we see the fruits of the failure to separate the accident investigation division from the CAA mothership. For the past 12 years the CAA has been doing its best to gloss over a finding by ICAO that South Africa does not have the required independent Accident Investigation authority.

The CAA has for years argued that its Accident Investigation division doesn't report to its Director, but bypasses her and reports directly to the Ministry of Transport. That may technically be the case, but the CAA still pays the salaries and provides administration for the accident division, thus hardly making it independent.

Beyond going through a compliance box ticking exercise, the accident report is coy about the actual cause of the accident. The reality is that it was nothing more than the depressingly common failure of a pilot flying VFR into IMC. The failure of the regulator is that the safety management systems in its own flight department shouldhave prevented this tragedy. Yet they failed and three people died.

There were plenty of red flags which were ignored. The flight’s Captain, ‘TC’ Tolo, was reportedly dismissed from the SAAF and then SAA for vertigo and freezing under pressure. Like other airline ‘washouts’ he ended up in the CAA. Fortunately, a senior pilot took him on as a project. After almost three years of training, by 2015 anyone who had to fly with him said they were happy to do so. And TC went to on to prove them right with five years of safe flying – until his skills were tested beyond his capability.

Flying calibration flights demands top level piloting skills. The uncomfortable question must be asked: given his past history, should TC Tolo not have been weeded out by the CAA’s safety management system? The evidence of three fatalities shows a system, probably driven by political pressures, that pushed him far beyond his level of competence.

Guy Leitch