(MOUT) Military Operations in "Urban Terrain"

MAS

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN "URBAN TERRAIN"

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN "URBAN TERRAIN" A Critical Geographic Investigation of Synthetic Training Environments

Ryan L. Thomas

(MOUT) Military Operations in "Urban Terrain"

Contents 01 INTRODUCTION 06 02 URBAN TERRAIN 10 03 “DARPA” FICATION

26

04 SYNTHETIC SOVEREIGNTIES 38 05 CONFLICT SIMULACRA 44 06 BIBLIOGRAPHY 55

“If war is about politics, it’s going to be fought, in general, where people are and it’ll be fought, in my opinion, in urban areas”.

— General Mark A. Milley, 39th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army

General Mark A. Milley, 39th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

2017. Quote transcribed from video proceedings of think tank, New America[’s] Future of War Conference. https://www. newamerica.org/conference/futureofwarconference/.

acknowledgements: My sincerest thanks to the community of the Graduate School of Design, for the critical shaping of my graduate experience. I am fully indebted to the incredible instruction, inspiration, discourse, and expansive insights fostered by my amazing mentors, peers, and friends along the way.

I would like to especially thank my thesis advisor Bobby Pietrusko, for keeping me grounded, trusting my judgements, and giving me the prudent feedback needed to convey such an initially nebulous topic. I would like to extend additional thanks to Neil Brenner, for relentless enthusiasm and astute insight in the various depths of literatures that informed my scholarly trajectories. I am grateful for the time and careful attention from my Design Studies Area Heads, Charles Waldheim and Alex Wall. I would also like to offer my sincere thanks to Pierre Belanger for the advice through the years at a distance, including on my initial application to the GSD in the Urbanism, Landscape, Ecology concentration. Thanks to all of you for the support and reminders of responsibility to draw truth to power.

Of course, my deepest thanks to my loved ones — My parents for always being too worried about me, and relentlessly proud. & my partner Carolina, for being the fire in my hearth.

Statements and views expressed in this document are solely those of the author and do not imply endorsement by Harvard University, the Harvard University Graduate School of Design, the U.S. government, Department of Defense, the Army, the U.S. Army Reserve, or the U.S. Army National Guard. The contents of this document were derived from open sources and contain no classified material.

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Scott, “State Space.”

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Fig 2. Patterns in FM 90-10 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), 1979

16

Fig 4. Seizure of a Key Objective (FM 90-10-1, 1982, 3-25)

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Ellefsen, “Urban Terrain Zone Characteristics,” 11.

19

Publication

Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico VA, “A Concept for Future Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain.”

20

Glenn et al., “The City’s Many Faces,” 461.

Fig 5. Building Types (FM 90-10-1, 1982, 2-9)

Fig 6. Typical Urban Area (FM 90-10-1, 1993, 2-1)

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21

Markantonatou, “State Sovereignty and Biopolitics in 20002011 Urban Warfare,” 1–21.

22

ibid. 12.

Fig 7. “Characteristics of Urban Areas” (FM 90-10-1, 1982, 2-3—2-5)

Outlying Industrial Areas

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Fig 8. “Movement to Contact Along a Highway Through a City (commercial ribbon)” (FM 90-10-1, 1982, 3-37)

Fig 9. “Route Reconnaissance for a Movement to Contact Along a Highway Through a City (commercial ribbon)” (FM 90-10-1, 1993, 2-9)

It is worth noting that in a rather brief moment that for the manual that is intended to be all-encompassing and universal of typological considerations for all

things urban, that its next revision has such stark revisions to the built environment renderings, appearing to suit architectures of a more temperate climate, including multistory housing buildings, fabric awnings, and a character more remniscent of developing territories. To abscond from German architectural forms implies that this doctrine is not universal, but instead it is culturally interchangable in a moment’s notice, to reflect the built conditions the Army deems ‘austere’ and in need of stability.

22

Doctrinal Evolution of Urban Terrain

PUNCHY IMAGE

Urban Terrain Doctrine

Fortified & Built-Up Area Doctrine

Grozny 1995-1999 Tirana (1997) Freetown (1997) Monrovia (1996)

Port-au-Prince 1994

Mogadishu 1993 Sarajevo 1992 Khafji (1991) Baghdad (1991) Kuwait City (1991) WWII

Korean War

Vietnam War

Khorramshar 1980

Army Field Manual 90-10 MOUT Berlin (1947-48) Manila (1945) Budapest (1945) Stalingrad (1942)

Suez City (1973) Hue (1968) Jerusalem (1967) Algiers (1957)

Army Field Manual 31-50 Attack on a Fortified Position And Combat in Towns 1941-1945

1950-1953

Beirut 1983

Belfast (1980s - Present)

map of site // context

Marine Corps Operational Handbook 8-7 MOUT

Army Field Manual 31-50 Combat in Fortified And Built-Up Areas 1963-1973 1979 1980

Panama City 1989

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-35.3 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain

Army Field Manual 90-10-1 An Infantryman’s Guide to Urban Combat

1982

Re-write Decision For Army FM 90-10 MOUT

Change in FM 90-10-1

1993

1995

1997 1998

Influential Evolution in synthetic environments

Synthetic Environment R&D Reports

Joint Urban Operations Doctrine Megacities & Dense Urban Terrain

RAND Reports on Urban Operations Creating a Full Spectrum Training Environment Army Field Manual 3-06 Urban Operations

Grozny 1995-1999 Port-au-Prince 1994 Mogadishu 1993 Sarajevo 1992

Joint Urban Working Group (UWG) “Big Five� post-Cold War examples of Urban Operations

Panama City 1989

1990

1995

Fallujah (2004)

Army/Marine Corps FM 3-06 / MCTP 12-10B Urban Operations

Lessoons Learned Handbooks from OIF/OEF Sadr City (2008)

Mosul (2016)

24 Asymmetric Warfare Group Established(2006)

2000

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Canguilhem and Savage, “The Living and Its Milieu,” 21.

Fig. 10 U.S. MILNET Geographical Map (Laquey 1990, 294)

Military NETworking [ MILNET ] In 1969, DARPA began a research project to advance computer networking. It was an experimental packet switching network, called ARPANET, that allowed diverse types of computers to communicate efficiently. By the early 80s the DoD followed suit with DARPA and created an offshoot called the Defense Data Network (DDN). By 1984, the network was split into two subsequent networks: ARPANET for research, and MILNET as an unclassified operational military network. ARPANET, in its 20 years of service, was phased out in 1989.25 It later merged with other national systems and became what was the precursor to an inter-network system, or “internet” as we know it today.

Fig. 11 “Distributed Interactive Simulation of Combat” (United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment 1995)

DISTRIBUTED INTERACTIVE SIMULATION [ DIS ] There is a distributed network hosted on the MILNET architecture, it was the inception of virtual reality systems as we’ve developed today, and is also responsible for a robust network of urban simulators across the country. The DoD invested hundreds of millions of dollars to create environments in which “humans may interact through simulation at multiple sites that are networked using compliant architecture, modeling, protocols, standards, and databases.26

25 Laquey, The User’s Directory of Computer Networks, 233.

26 Lenoir, “All but War Is Simulation”, 316.

28

ENEMY AGGRESSION DETECTED BY OVERHEAD SENSOR

PLANNING A RESPONSE USING THE HOLOGRAPHIC ELECTRONIC SAND TABLE

AIRCREWS REHEARSE THE PLAN AND PLANNERS ASSESS SUITABILITY

SIMulator NETworking [ SIMNET ] In 1978, then Air Force Captain Jack A. Thorpe, wrote a paper entitled Future Views: Aircrew Training 1980-2000. Thorpe hypothesized that “advances which are seen on the horizon are

29

not simple improvements in teaching techniques or higher fidelity simulators, but rather bold concepts which tightly align training systems with real combat readiness and make them MISSION EXECUTION WITH REAL TIME OBSERVATION

indistinguishable.”27 In 1981, Thorpe was assigned to DARPA and by 1983, he began to work on developing this futuristic technology called SIMNET. The goal was to develop networkable, microprocessor-based simulators that would cost orders of magnitude less than existing simulators.

Fig. 12 Future Views (Cosby, “SIMNET”, 1995, 2-5)

27 Cosby, “SIMNET,” 2.

The Army became a cosponsor of DARPA’s SIMNET in 1985 and began using the technology for training

Fig. 13 Distributed Interactive Simulation (University of Central Florida Institute for Simulation and Training 1994, 1)

and research and development. Meanwhile, DARPA founded the Advanced Distributed Simulation program to continue technology development on its own, and by 1989 DARPA stopped funding the SIMNET R&D projects, which would later became the Army’s Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT) project and Battlefield Distributed Simulation-Developmental project, respectively. The CATT project is a collection of several projects to develop interoperable distributed simulation equipment for several combat arms. Its Close Combat Tactical Trainer

1994

project, specifically for training armored units, and closely resembles the early SIMNET project. This distributed trainer, or at least a close variant of it is still the trainer of choice for integrating a virtual

Fig. 14 “Around the World in Eighty Seconds” From networking across the real to the synthetic (Cosby 1995, 16)

setting for soldiers to immerse themselves in, and engage in a live environment wherever that simulator is connected to. As quoted in an Applied Systems Simulation Report from the RAND Corporation in 2003, “We can now fire with virtual artillery-artillery in the simulation-at the live vehicles on the range at NTC [the Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin California]. We could fire artillery and have that vehicle killed by his instrumentation [as occurs in “live”training at the NTC].” 28 This shows a sort of hyper-remote warfare training. One that need not geography nor a ‘real’ enemy, just simulation.

28 Obaidat, Applied System Simulation, 423–24.

1995

Military Operations in Built-Up Areas [ MOBA ]

In 1994 the Under Secretary of Defense commissioned

the Defense Science Board (DSB) to conduct a study to determine the Department of Defense’s capabilities to conduct military operations, in built-up/urban terrain and to assess their future needs to perform this function. Much of the impetus for pursing this study stems from the battle of Mogadishu, Somalia the Fall prior. There was an emphasis on levraging technologies as these circumstances would become more likely in the future, given that Mogadishu was a Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Response mission, needless to say it surprized the Army and made a significant re-focusing in all things “Urban Terrain”. The Board’s recommendations in conclusion primarily involved merging working systems with nascent ones, cataloging major urban areas of interest into a database, and a strong emphasis on integrating live testing and simulated builtup environments.

Many tech leaders in virtual and simulations industries

were taking Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) seriously, and were fielding solutions in rapid pace for the defense enterprise. The Army’s lack of preparedness for operating in urban areas provided a window for the synthetic environment market to win over them with new ideas on how to prevent such a catastrophe again. At the Interservice/Industry Training Systems and

Education Conference (I/ITSEC), a real

who’s-who event, papers at this time were full of DIS ideas.

Fig.15 Technology Development Map & Functional Connectivities (Defense Science Board Washington DC 1994, App. E)

Synthetic Training Environment [ STE ] A program designed to construct synthetic environments for numerous defense functions is about as old as the internet.

There have been numerous advancements in the field of simulation, instrumentation, and applied science, and it is clear that the Army wanted every part of it. They stood up a command post for it, STRICOM, which has since been disbanded and restructured. The Army, and the Joint Force, broadly speaking had every intent to levrage the technology volunteered by the bourgeoning entertainment and gaming industry, to develop systems that increase connectivity on the battlefield and optimize lethality. If the primary objective was to integrate systems of Fig.16 U.S. Army Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command (STRICOM) Emblem

virtual simulation (troops in simulators fighting on a synthetic battlefield), with a constructive scenario (war games), and live maneuvers to provide a prime training environment for various levels of exercise, then the Army has definitely done so with its Synthetic Training Environment project, and it would not have been possible without Urban Terrain, as its basis for a standard environment. The Army has been steadilly building newer and more refined urban training facilities over the decades, albeit some are more refined than others, but this convergence of new virtual technology and MOUT is provoking “DARPA”fication.

20 years of Live/virtual/constructive Hybridization

Fig. 17 Image adapted from USC Institute for Creative Technologies — in partnership with US Army Research Lab (ARL)

32

Combined Arms Collective Training Facilities [ CACTF ]

Fig. 18 Phases of training in the Live, Virtual, and Costructive Training Strategy (TC 90-1, 2002)

To best accompany the synthetic training environment, the Army needed a host for ‘Live’ training events. So it created Training Circular (TC) 90-1 Training for Urban Operations in 2002, and Training Circular 25-8 Training Ranges in 2004, where it defines all of its standardized training ranges, to include The Combined Arms Collective Training Facility (CACTF). A CACTF is essentially a combat town, much like any other MOUT site, as they’re commonly known in military circles.However, the CACTF includes aspects of virtual and constructive training, along with precursory installations to practice combat in close quarters, e.g. a ‘shoot house’ or a ‘breach facility’, which are typically just walls with some openings where the training is meant to be drilled repetitiously, to become instinctive. The culminating focus, however, in the Combined Arms Collective Training Facility is rehearsing for urban conflict in a standardized schematic. (See Fig. 19) The CACTF schematic projects future areas of development in its diagram, beyond any hypothetical circumstance in which it rests in context. It attempts to be an urban environment, roughly 2.25 square kilometers of urban terrain with about 25 buildings, parking lots, roads, alleys, underground sewers, parks, recreational fields, and a command and control building to oversee its work. This facility is the Army’s standard urban scalar unit and settlement type, a small town with limitless training potential.

map of site // context

Shoot House

Fig. 19 Live Trainers (TC 90-1, 2002)

URBAN OFFENSE/DEFENSE BUILDING, TASK/TECHNIQUE TRAINER

Example CACTF Schematic

This standardized schematic reminds of Ebenezer Howard’s radial schematic for the Garden City, not in morphological form but in its anecdotal quality. The idea that the schematic is a “diagram only”, and not a plan until a site is selected, but still conveys a broader utopian vision. The CACTF however, is both a diagram and plan, as their concreteness defines the vision for training in mind. A totalizing path towards an end. The training plan is as follows; learn to shoot, simulate it, learn to breach and clear buildings, simulate it on a CACTF, learn how to operate for deployment at a Combat Training Center (CTC), realize it live.

35

Fig. 20 “The Multi-Domain Operations Capable Platoon� Image adapted from Focus Vision Media in contract with U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command

MEGACITY PROPHECIES The proliferation of training facilities, or MOUT sites, that multiplied across the U.S. after simulation and urban training joined hands, made for what can only be described as absurd. As geographer Stephen Graham has put, “Rather than monuments to dynamism and growth, these ‘cities’ are theme parks for practicing urban destruction, erasure, and colonial violence”. He describes MOUT sites as a sort of “Theme Park Archipelago” of the remote American frontier.

He continues, “constructed by US military specialists with the help of military corporations, theme-park designers, video game companies, Hollywood set designers and special-effects experts, they are training grounds for the targeting of real, far off cities”.29 I would continue to say they have hardly targeted any cities effectively, by reducing them in

Fig 21. Posters for U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conferences on megacities in New York (top) and Tokyo (bottom)

virtuality to mere urban terrain. This reduction is by design.

Such reduction has not ceased in the Army, as it transitions to new futuristic doctrine, called Multi-Domain Operations where it states that “dramatically increasing rates of urbanization and the strategic importance of cities also ensure that operations will take place within dense urban terrain.”30 Multiple Domains refers to warfare in Sea, Land, Air, Space, Cyber and Electronic capacities. Cities are made a scapegoat to validate all future military operations. Recently, several conferences have been held on the topic of megacities in multiple domains, one of which I have attended, and the presumed inevitability of future major conflict and warfare to happen in the densest urban environments is truly mind-boggling.

29Graham, “Theme Park Archipelago”, 187

30 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

36

37

SYNTHETIC SOVEREIGNTIES

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT [ DATE ] As the Global War on Terror waged, post Surge in Iraq, until the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2011, the Army had a many hard lessons learned, as their foreign policy through the Gulf War did no justice in preparing for operations at scale in a Middle-East context for a Counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. The U.S. was ill-prepared and sought new training models for soldiers to “Win in a Complex World”, i.e. broaden one’s geographic and geostrategic sensibilities, as this was soon becoming an era of persistent conflict with the war in Afghanistan in full swing under NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) needed to conceive of a model for training that was as flexible and indeterminate as its actual foreign policy. In 2011, TRADOC published guidance on the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE); a composite model of real-world current and probable future operational environments for use across all the Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTCs), Homestation Training (HST), and Professional Military Education (PME). All conditions and actors are real; fictitious names used in compliance with Army regulations. Each DATE is focused on a geographic region and includes political and humanistic conditions with embedded real-world actors for replicating relevant threat capabilities.

The Army’s Synthetic Sovereignties, as I call them, are the test bed for projecting and simulating its future foes.

map of site // context

Islamic Republic of Ariana Iran

Republic of Atropia Azerbaijan

South Atropian

Built Combat Training Centers in the U.S. — superimposed in a fictional environment

People’s Army ISIS - DAESH

Insurgent group

United Republics of Donovia Russia

Democratic Republic of Gorgas Georgia

40

Democratic Republic of Limaria Armenia

Fig 22. Training Aids from the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE)

USEUCOM USNORTHCOM

E E E Grozny 1995-1999

Sarajevo 1992 E

E

EE E

E E

E

USCENTCOM

E

EE

E E

E E E

Port-au-Prince 1994

E E

E

E E

EE

E E E

Prominent Post-Cold War Urban Battles

E

E

E

E

E E

Panama City 1989 E

E Mogadishu 1993

E World Megacities > 10M population E (Megacities in the Indo-Pacific/East Asian Region)

E E

TRADOC’s area of ‘inevitable’ urban operations (2017)

E

E

E E

Barnett’s “Non-Integrating Gap” (2004) Brzezinski’s Global Zone of Percolating Violence (1997) Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command Commander’s Areas of Responsibility

E E

USSOUTHCOM

USPACOM

E

Predicting Actual Foreign Policy “More people in the world live inside that circle, than outside of [it]”...“By 2050, seven out of every ten people in the world will live in that circle.” — GEN Robert Brown Commander of the United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) at Army Megacities Conference 2018

USAFRICOM

The above Map was inspired by “Cartographies of the post-Cold War World” by Stuart Elden in Terror and Territory:The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty, pp. 9 Rather than further adequate analysis into the failed conflicts of the previous generations of urban warfare, the Army has gone off the demographic deep end, to suggest that its future domains of battle will be geostrategically centered in the Indo-Pacific. This is to say that the far east presents conventional state threats like China or Russia, but I would bet the materialist argument underlying this cause is the need for persistent conflict to validate exploiting trade routes through the South China Sea, or along the Belt and Road Initiative. The U.S. is now scrambling to make sense of its new operating environment, and it is using megacities to do so.

Sarajevo 1992

Grozny 1995-1999

Decisive Action Training Environment [DATE]

MOUT Sites Combat Training Centers

Port-au-Prince 1994 Panama City 1989 Mogadishu 1993

Projecting Synthetic Foreign Policy

With new assistance from expanding the Decisive Action Training Environment beyond the Caucasus region it was so deeply fixed on in the Post-Cold War and

Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana

Post-9-11 period, it seems we will see a renewal in the years ahead towards oper-

National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California

ations in regions near the horn of Africa, Southeast Asia, and possibly a collective

Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels-Grafen-

defense of a NATO member, known as the ‘Skolkan Scenario’ for which the Europe

woehr training complex, Germany.

DATE region is based. This model is by no means soundly predictive, as that is not its intent. However, one can make the case that the emphasis on training for these scenarios, by exporting their cultures and environments to the US Combat Training Centers is inherently projective, and can promote hostilities if other nations saw their likenesses being slated for potential warfare. As the Army adage goes, “Train Like You Fight”.

43

CONFLICT SIMULACRA

Conflict Simulacra [ A MOUT Site APPENDIX ] URBAN TERRAIN

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

In discussing the history and conception of “Urban Terrain”, its evolution across theaters, technologies, domains and training areas, this final section is meant to catalog some influential sites of training that were pivotal in the expanse

historic context

of this synthetic training environment. It is quite important to consider that these MOUT sites are representative of the whole, and though there may be hundreds of them scattered

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

8

8

8

8

7

7

7

7

6

6

6

6

6

6

5

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5

5

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

across bases and military installations in the greater United States, these examples serve as a primer for anyone new to

budgetary impact

exploring the world of urban terrain and conflict simulacra.

5

5

4

4

4

4

4

4

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

2

2

2

hud satellite image - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

authorship 45

N

training -

11m.

162m.

1

1

1

1

1

1

8

8

6

6

5

5

3

3

1

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

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-

-

-

-

-

-

E CONUS MOUT SITES AND COMBINED ARMS COLLECTIVE TRAINING FACILITIES (CACTF)

1:16,000,000 0

LEDGEND DoD URBAN TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS STATE & TERRITORY BOUNDARIES BASE COMPOSITE: NIGHTTIME LIGHTS GRIDDED POPULATIONS OF THE WORLD v.4

130

260

520

780

1,040

Miles

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

“YODAVILLE” URBAN TARGET COMPLEX [ yuma, az ] R-2301-West — Barry M. Goldwater Range

The ‘town’ of Yodaville is a MOUT site bred from a bombing range and “some twenty-three thousand cluster-bomb containers discarded during the Vietnam War” and has taken on a pseudo-urban sprawl of its own since its inception as a bombing test site in the nineties. The site having existed for just over two decades now, has grown to host its own network of roads, streetlights, ‘buildings’ and character, all while having a population of zero.

Satellite imagery courtesy of DigitalGlobe (Top: left to right) 1996, 2003, 2007

This site I would argue is also the inspiration for so many other MOUT sites “urbanizing” by using containers to grow dynamically.

46

Bottom: left: Aerial photos by Cpl. James Marchetti / right: 2017

Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center — [ 29 Palms ] Allied Container Systems, Inc. in Pleasant Hill, CA won a ceiling price $461.6 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract to produce the Combined Arms Military Operations on Urban Terrain CAMOUT training system in 2007. It was completed in 2011 and now hosts: • 7 districts, each of different urban form and training value • 81 “spider holes” concealed by floor hatches • 38 basements • 88 multi-story concrete buildings in the city • 216 faux power poles • 274 acres of ‘cityscape’ / 997 acres total • 1,560 buildings in Range 220 (CAMOUT) and

Role-Playing Riots at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) Photo by Lance Cpl. Hailey Clay

Range 630 (Afghani village) • 1,250 of these are multi-story cargo-container ‘buildings’ • 1,800 feet of tunnels • 5,000 feet of chain-link fencing and 9,000 feet of courtyard walls • 10,700 feet of faux conduit to simulate above-ground power lines (live wires are underground) Roughly equivalent in size to downtown San Diego.

Photo by Silver Creek Industries

Guardian CENTERs [ GC ] Founded in Perry, Georgia in 2011, privately owned.

350-acre secure operating environment built to train DoD community on Urban Terrain.

Purpose-Built Metroplex: Over 16 city blocks with 80 - 1 to 3 story buildings (hotels, hospital, restaurant, courthouse, etc.)

• Full electrical and water supply • Exercise Operations Center (Embassy/Government building) • Football field (staging area) • Trailer park • Multiple Helicopter Landing Zones and Drop Zones • Training munition / Live Fire (Unit specific) capable Photo by Guardian Centers

1.1 mile, 4-lane simulated highway • Built to Department of Transportation specifications 8 Passenger Car Simulated Commuter Rail • 1/3 -mile, dual track subway

48

simulator 600 feet of linear enclosed tunnel • Complete with multiple types of vehicles and debris • Controlled environmental effects such as lighting and smoke.

Photo by Guardian Centers

ZUSSMAN VILLAGE [ Fort knox, ky ] Zussman Village officially opened May 25, 2000.

Cost to complete, $15 million to and this includes: • 30 acre site • 20 concrete-block buildings with varying levels of damage, • junkyard • extensive sewer system • a mock Embassy building • a large school • soccer field • houses and apartments • an open air market • church/mosque • cemetery

19th Engineers conduct Platoon Certification Exercise Photo by Sgt. Michael Behlin

• gas station • electrical substation • train tracks and bridge • push-button pyrotechnics and explosive effects • a water tower that doubles as an operations control center.

Battlefield Effects Interface Photo by military.technomad.

Photo by U.S. Army Fort Knox

Joint Readiness TRAINING CENTER [ JRTC ] MOUT facility in Fort Polk, Louisiana, constructed in 1993

• 85,000 acre training area, known as “The Box” • 20 villages scattered across the Combat Training Center • Shugart-Gordon village is main urban environment in the Box, named after two fallen soldiers and medal of honor recipients from the Battle of Mogadishu.

• hosts roads • power lines • homes/townhomes/hotel • a large school/ hospital / bank • a post office/ police station/ city hall • a long tunnel system • church / mosque “Peaceful Protests in Dara Lam” Photo by Spc. L’Erin Wynn

50

Photo by CPT Charles R. Webster, Jr., JRTC Center for Army Lessons Learned Chief

Aerial view of Shugart-Gordon MOUT Facility c. 1996 from the National Archives

NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER [ NTC ] In Fort Irwin, California, the National Training Center (NTC) is The DoD’s largest Combat Training Center (CTC), and the prime training area for Army soldiers in CONUS getting ready for deployment in the last four decades. The $12 Million upgrade to the historic training center includes 12 “villages” with some 500 “buildings” overall. An evolution from its previous years with less villages, consisting mostly of shipping container proxies. It hosts:

• religious sites • compounds • Embassies

Medina Wasl VIllage AKA Ujen — extracted Google place image by Opposing Force (OPFOR) Role-Player, Doug Jacobs

• hotels • traffic circles • outdoor markets • all the special effects one could need.

• linkages to simulator networks across the country.

• Role players foreign ‘locals’ are typically contracted arabic speaking roleplaying actors, playing government officials, local militias, police, military, residents, vendors and insurgents.

This is the closest environment to a megacity the Army has.

Soldiers move forward to search a building during training at the National Training Center. Photo by Beth Reece

52

Medina Wasl VIllage AKA Ujen — extracted Google Street View panorama by Pat Ripton

Razish VIllage — extracted Google Street View panorama by Naif Alshehri

Bibliography Army Advanced Materiel Concepts Agency Alexandria VA. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Future Warfare in Urban Areas,â&#x20AC;? 1968. http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citatioQV $' Benedikt, M. L. â&#x20AC;&#x153;To Take Hold of Space: Isovists and Isovist Fields.â&#x20AC;? Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design QR â&#x20AC;&#x201C; KWWSV GRL RUJ E %UHQQHU 1HLO New Urban Spaces: Urban Theory and the Scale Question 1HZ <RUN 1< 8QLWHG 6WDWHV RI $PHULFD 2[IRUG 8QLYHUVLW\ 3UHVV Canguilhem, Georges, and John Savage. â&#x20AC;&#x153;The Living and Its Milieu.â&#x20AC;? Grey Room â&#x20AC;&#x201C; KWWSV GRL RUJ Cosby, L. Neale. â&#x20AC;&#x153;SIMNET: An Insiderâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Perspective,â&#x20AC;? 10280:1028006â&#x20AC;&#x201C; â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 63,( KWWSV GRL RUJ Elden, Stuart. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Land, Terrain, Territory.â&#x20AC;? Progress in Human Geography QR â&#x20AC;&#x201C; KWWSV GRL RUJ Ellefsen, Richard A. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Urban Terrain Zone Characteristics,â&#x20AC;? 1987. http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA185640.

(OOHIVHQ 5LFKDUG 'DKOJUHQ /DERUDWRU\ DQG 1DYDO 6XUIDFH :HDSRQV &HQWHU Urban Building Characteristics: Setting and Structure of Building Types in Selected World Cities 'DKOJUHQ 9D 1DYDO 6XUIDFH :HDSRQV &HQWHU 'DKOJUHQ /DERUDWRU\ Ellefsen, Richard, Thomas Kuhn, Gary Spring, and L. E. Wicks. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Characteristics of Urban Terrain,â&#x20AC;? 1979. http://www.dtic.mil/dRFV FLWDWLRQV $'$ Glenn, Russell W., Geri Cherry, Lois M. Davis, Sean J. Edwards, and Ernst Isensee. â&#x20AC;&#x153;The Cityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Many Faces: Proceedings of the 5$1' $UUR\R 0&:/ - 8:* 8UEDQ 2SHUDWLRQV &RQIHUHQFH $SULO 14 55

1999.â&#x20AC;?

Presented

at

the

MOUT

Doctrine

Panel

Discussion,

KWWS ZZZ GWLF PLO GRFV FLWDWLRQV $'$ *OHQQ 5XVVHOO : 5DQG &RUSRUDWLRQ DQG 1DWLRQDO 'HIHQVH 5HVHDUFK ,QVWLWXWH Preparing for the Proven Inevitable: An Urban Operations Training Strategy for Americaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Joint Force 6DQWD 0RQLFD &$ 5DQG Graham, Stephen. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Theme Park Archipelago.â&#x20AC;? In Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism â&#x20AC;&#x201C;225. Londonâ&#x20AC;Ż; New York: Verso, 2010.

Hilberseimer, Ludwig. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Cities and Defense.â&#x20AC;? In In the Shadow of Mies: Ludwig Hilberseimer, Architect, Educator, and Urban Planner HGLWHG E\ 5LFKDUG 3RPPHU â&#x20AC;&#x201C; &KLFDJR ,/ 3XEOLVKHG E\ WKH $UW ,QVWLWXWH RI &KLFDJR LQ DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK 5L]]ROL ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 3XEOLFDWLRQV /DTXH\ 7UDF\ The Userâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Directory of Computer Networks. 6DLQW /RXLV (OVHYLHU 6FLHQFH 7HFKQRORJ\

Lenoir, Timothy. â&#x20AC;&#x153;All but War Is Simulation: The Military Entertainment Complex.â&#x20AC;? Configurations QR â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico VA. â&#x20AC;&#x153;A Concept for Future Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain,â&#x20AC;? 1999.

KWWS ZZZ GWLF PLO GRFV FLWDWLRQV $'$ Markantonatou, Maria. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Potestas and Violentia Power in the Doctrine of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Military Operations in Urban Terrainâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (MOUT): State SRYHUHLJQW\ DQG %LRSROLWLFV LQ 2011 Urban Warfare.â&#x20AC;? Edited by Neovi KaraNDWVDQLV DQG -RQDWKDQ 6ZDUWV Political and Military Sociology: An Annual Review

â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Marshall, S. L. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Notes on Urban Warfare,â&#x20AC;? 1973. http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD0758841.

2EDLGDW 0RKDPPDG 6 Applied System Simulation: Methodologies and Applications. Boston, MA: Springer USâ&#x20AC;Ż: Imprint: Springer, 2003.

KWWS QUV KDUYDUG HGX XUQ KXO HERRNEDWFK 635*5BEDWFK Scott,

James

C.

â&#x20AC;&#x153;State

Space::

Zones

of

Governance

and

Appropriation.â&#x20AC;?

1HZ +DYHQ /RQGRQ <DOH 8QLYHUVLW\ 3UHVV

KWWSV ZZZ MVWRU RUJ VWDEOH M FWW QMNN[ Sunzi, active 6th century B. C. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Chapter Eight: The Nine Variations.â&#x20AC;? In The Art of War; Military Manual Written about B.C. 510 6XQ 7]X $FWLYH WK &HQWXU\ % & $QFLHQW &KLQHVH &ODVVLFV 6HULHV 6KDQJKDL 3ULQWHG E\ 7KH :RUOG %RRN &R Thein, Brenda K., and David R. Coltharp. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Interim Standards for the Construction of MOBA Structures for Weapons Effects Tests,â&#x20AC;? 1978.

KWWS ZZZ GWLF PLO GRFV FLWDWLRQV $'% 9LULOLR 3DXO Speed and Politics 6HPLRWH[W H )RUHLJQ $JHQWV 6HULHV /RV $QJHOHV &$ 6HPLRWH[WH

56

Referenced Doctrine

Field Manual 31-50 Attack Fortified Position Combat in Towns, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 31 January 1944.

Field Manual 31-50 Combat in Fortified and Built-up Areas, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 22 April 1970.

Field Manual 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 15 August 1979.

Field Manual 90-10-1, An Infantrymanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Guide to Combat to Urban Combat, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 30 September 1982.

Field Manual 100-5, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 5 May 1986.

57 Field Manual 90-10-1, An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas,

Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 12 May 1993.

Joint Publication 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations. Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., September 2002.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, (December 2018), VI.

58

THOM

A Critical Geographic Investigation of Synthetic Training Environments