Operation TANGHAM – Somalia

RESILIENCE AND THE EVOLVING THREAT FROM CBRN WEAPONS

Captain Nick Warren-Miller

During homeland resilience or on operations, the fear of any form of Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attack cripples our ability to plan due to the suffering such weapons are believed to cause. Small to large scale CBRN attacks form some of the highest likelihood and impact threats on the National Risk Register.1

Moreover, the ongoing pandemic highlights the need to have robust planning and resources for resilience. In the past, we have relied on a small group of specialists to arrive, takeover and solve our problems. This approach has dominated the procedures of those inside and out of the CBRN world. It has been tested in significant events twice in the last twenty years. Each time, the limitations have become obvious. A small group of specialists cannot solve a problem which demands mass and resources. It is vital that, to strengthen the resilience of the country and armed forces, the reliance on specialists must shift to confident generalists with only the most demanding roles completed by specialists. It is likely that CBRN specialists ‘would be quickly overwhelmed’ if they were the only personnel deemed qualified to respond to CBRN incidents.2 The advancement of generalist knowledge across Defence would allow commanders to better understand the risk and avoid specialists becoming fixed by jobs which could be completed by those with basic CBRN training. Notwithstanding the fact that, within the hot zone, individuals must have the knowledge (and experience) to handle some of the most toxic substances humans have created, the majority of jobs and those completed in recent years by Defence providing Military Aid to the Civilian Authority (MACA) have been entirely generalist. The movement of supplies, maintenance of cordons and the establishment of accommodation to name a few. It is clear then that, with the role of the Army in MACA, and the shift from last resort to first response, a cultural and political change in approach is due.3 Not just to avoid teams of specialists being kept on high readiness for long periods, or the immense burden of advanced training but to show that the majority of support for MACA, even in the case of a large scale CBRN attack, can and should be provided by welltrained generalists.

To understand the importance of generalists within resilience, we must understand the threat and how, since the early 2000s it has changed. Both Russia and China have been accused of running secret chemical and biological weapons research programs despite the international restrictions imposed. The series of Bellingcat articles exposing the work of the GRU’s Unit 29155 and the use of nerve agent on

British Army support to Op MORLOP in Salisbury