Amiens Day, Op CABRIT 8 in Estonia

IF A TANK FIRES IN THE BALTICS AND NO ONE IS AROUND TO HEAR IT, DOES IT MAKE A SOUND?

Captain Rob Hornblower

As I write this article I sit in Tapa, Estonia entering my final seven days on Op CABRIT 8 having deployed as BADGER 2IC alongside the 1 MERCIAN BG. On reflection of the events of the past six months, the biggest frustration I have is that barely anyone, in the big scheme of things, knew that we were here, what we were doing, and why. Whilst this may seem like a pathetically vain frustration to have, it is not quite as it seems.

Information Activity & Outreach (IA&O) is seen as key to achieving the Enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroup (eFP BG) mission in Estonia. To deter aggression, reassure the Estonian people, and demonstrate NATO strength and unity. On Op CABRIT 8, IA&O has taken many forms, from Victory Day Parades and participation on multi-national exercises, to Veterans Day rock concerts and attending the World Rally Championships. This variety is great for not only offering deployed soldiers some variety, but also in engaging with the Estonian public first-hand. It is without dispute that these activities are valuable in seeking to achieve the mission, but there are several ways in which IA&O can be streamlined and improved to achieve better effect.

One of the most highly used messaging tools in IA&O is social media, with Facebook and Instagram in use by the eFP BG in Estonia. The difficulty which arises in effectively using these platforms is linked not only to the process involved in gaining approval for a post – a long winded and complex process – but also in understanding the strategy involved. Whilst there are undoubtedly people involved in Op CABRIT who understand this strategy, it does not seem to permeate down, meaning that there is a lack of understanding of who the target audience is, and what kind of content is required. Without this information, the result at battlegroup level is an often-directionless social media presence. Although it is easy to identify issues at the lowest level, it is arguable that as a wider Army we have fallen behind our adversaries, and the curve in general, in the social media space. This is partly due to a series of self-imposed restrictions, but also due to an insistence that “we know what is best” when producing output. The British Army boasts 330,000 Twitter followers, yet it is dwarfed by the 476,800 followers of Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen, whose followership grew by 20,000 as I was writing. This hints towards a systemic failing in Army strategy but holds little relevance to the issue of Battlegroup level IA&O execution. To narrow the focus, at time of writing the NATO eFP BG Estonia Instagram page had 2,387 followers compared to 15,900 for ‘cossackgundi’, a 27-year-old British Man, and self-titled warzone photographer, fighting in the Ukrainian Marines. In contrast to Suhail Shaheen, cossackgundi fights for an ally of Britain. His profile, as an informal, immediate, and unfiltered account of his experiences gives a sense of realism, which is tempered by memes, Q&A sessions, and infographics. With Op CABRIT representing the largest ongoing overseas deployment the British Army has, with a dedicated IA&O function at Command and Battlegroup level, there is potential to surpass the kind of success seen by such informal pages. Instrumental in achieving this is the elevation of IA&O on the list of priorities for Op CABRIT, shifting to IA&O driven activity to achieve a strategic and operational output through a coherent and consistent narrative, rather than IA&O capturing content at a tactical level and seeking to create a narrative on a week by week basis. Having seen on the eFP BG Estonia Facebook page, one video of Challenger 2 live firing in Latvia achieve 6,300 views, an Estonian language video by 77X championing interoperability stutter to 2,400 views, and a well-produced Challenger 2 vs Leclerc video hit only 2000 views, the realisation that the eFP message is not reaching a particularly broad target audience was stark. Rudimentary analysis of eFP BG social media account followership shows that in April 2021, 0.46% of Estonian Facebook users followed the eFP BG page – equating to 0.3% of all Estonians. If efforts to reassure the local population are a vital part of the mission, the statistics indicate that social media is currently not achieving this on a broad scale. Limitations of the existing IA&O strategy in theatre were illuminated further when the unauthorised release of a Challenger 2 vs Leclerc drag race reached 160,000 views across Facebook and Instagram in less than 48 hours. A low production quality, immediate and raw piece of footage proved to be significantly more popular than the targeted efforts otherwise throughout the deployment, critically due to it reaching a more engaged and wide-ranging – albeit not Estonian – target audience. This is evidence that we are doing the right things to pique the interest of social media users, but we are not packaging and publishing them in the right way for social media success. If IA&O is considered a weapon, our insistence as an army to control and develop our own strategy is perhaps misplaced – as such the answer at an Army level may be to employ specialists in branding, marketing and advertising to revolutionise the approach. At unit level this is, in my opinion, not necessary. In an age of social media, where IA&O can be significant in achieving the mission in a sub threshold conflict, the legitimacy of a message has its foundations in immediacy and authenticity. The ability to capture real and engaging material is something which the army already has – over 70,000 would be photographers of varying experience and skill all looking to capture images and videos for their own social media presence. Given the likelihood that the Army will continue to control its own output, the solution certainly lies outside of the most senior ranks of the Officer Corps. The intimate knowledge of social media held by some of our most junior Officers and Soldiers is the key to developing our understanding and delivering immediate and authentic content, and they should be trusted to be part of IA&O strategy development, image capture, and publication. It is reasonable to suggest that the Army should practice what it preaches by issuing broad IA&O intent for missions or periods of time, before affording mission command to those best placed to achieve success.