Ex BADGER SCHOLAR: Arming the soldiers of today with the lessons of the past

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR NATO’S ENHANCED FORWARD PRESENCE

Lieutenant Jason Birtle

WHAT IS THE NATO EFP?

The eFP consists of four Battlegroups deployed in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. These Battlegroups, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States respectively as shown in figure 1, are multinational, and combat-ready, demonstrating the strength of the transatlantic bond.

WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE UK-LED EFP BATTLEGROUP?

The UK’s contribution to the eFP in Estonia, named Operation CABRIT, consists of one Armoured/Armoured Infantry Battlegroup based in Tapa, Estonia. There are also smaller additions from the Danish and French Armies to the NATO mission in Estonia. On Op CABRIT 8, the French contingent is from our paired Unit, the 501 Chars de Combat. Alongside this, the UK contributes to the US-led Battlegroup in Poland and Operation AZOTIZE, an Air Policing mission based in Estonia and Lithuania.

WHY IS RUSSIA INTERESTED IN THE REGION?

Russia maintained a buffer zone around its border by occupying some of their neighbouring states post-World War 2. They formed a defensive alliance called the Warsaw Pact in 1955 and sought to distance themselves from western European countries. Since the breakup of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, countries who gained independence, including Estonia, have been trying to bolster security in the region which places Estonia at risk of Russian destabilisation attempts or annexation. Also, around 25% of the Estonian population is ethnically Russian and speak Russian as their first language (SOE, 2011). This provides Russia with an opportunity to develop a narrative of returning ethnic Russians to their homeland, whilst satisfying Russia’s desire to destabilise western-leaning states on Russia’s border.

WHAT IS THE THREAT?

The perceived threat causing the creation and deployment of the eFP, is a limited Russian incursion to seize terrain in the Baltic states. The origins of this perceived threat are Russian actions in Georgia in 2008 and more recently, in Ukraine during 2014. The Ukraine conflict has focussed around Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk, but has had far-reaching impacts throughout Ukraine. Russian backed separatists in the border regions of Ukraine have annexed land or severely destabilised it to a point where the host nation can no longer enforce sovereignty over that region. This is an example of hybrid warfare which is less visible and easy to attribute than a conventional conflict, but potentially just as problematic to the Baltic states. This is because they have multiple options in terms of the level of conflict, whether direct or indirect, ranging from propaganda to a conventional war (IISS, 2015). Furthermore, there is a lingering conventional threat from the combat power in the Russian Western Military District. With minimal warning, it is assessed that Russia could deploy 27 Battlegroup sized formations, in contrast to the 12 Battlegroups that NATO can deploy with one week of warning (Radin, 2017). This does not however consider the defensive advantage for NATO forces and their air superiority.

Russian aggression would most likely have one of two aims: firstly, a political gain of testing NATO’s commitment to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Article 5 states that an attack on one NATO member is treated as an attack on all NATO members. Secondly, Russia may aim to gain a strategically important piece of land or a small bordering region inhabited by ethnic Russians (Radin, 2017).

Figure 1. Enhanced Forward Presence Map of Deployed NATO Members (NATO, 2021).

WHAT IS HYBRID WARFARE AND WHY IS IT DEEMED TO BE A THREAT IN THIS REGION?

Hybrid warfare is the implementation of conventional and cyberwarfare, as well as leveraging politics and irregular forces which is designed to destabilize a functioning state and polarize its society (Moore, 2018). This is a tactic favoured by states who do not wish to engage in a full-scale war but instead use a variety of pressures to annex land or destabilise neighbours through political subversion amongst other tactics. Hybrid warfare is well suited to an area where propaganda and political messaging could be effective but, where a full-scale conflict would be overly detrimental to the aggressor state. As there are concentrations of ethnic Russians in Estonia, 25% in 2011 (SOE, 2011), Russia may deem that it poses an easy target for information warfare and propaganda. Many ethnic Russians in the bordering Region of Estonia did not receive full citizenship status until Estonia joined the European Union (EU) as when Estonia broke away from the Soviet Union, only citizens from before their occupation had their citizenship acknowledged by the state (Koort, 2014; Radin, 2017). This lingering discontent makes it a region that may be susceptible to Russian subversion in a similar way to certain Ukrainian regions as they may associate themselves more with Russia than Estonia based on their heritage.

WHAT IS THE NATO MISSION IN THE REGION?

Assessments of Russian intentions and the threat posed in the region have concluded that the hybrid threat requires a strengthening of defences against propaganda, cyberwarfare, covert action, and conventional warfare (Moore, 2018). This has resulted in the NATO mission focussing around three key effects; deter, defend, and reassure. It is tasked to deter Russian aggression in the region which includes an ability and readiness to defend Estonian sovereign territory. This is the most obvious function of the eFP Battlegroup but it also, by virtue of their location, provides a guarantee to the Estonian people that Article 5 of the NATO treaty will be honoured. Furthermore, it reassures the Estonian government that support exists to counter Russian subversion campaigns. This is essential as these campaigns have been seen in Ukraine as a way to soften a region before covert or conventional forces are deployed. A land grab or a political subversion attempt can be negated by forward mounted NATO troops as it immediately necessitates NATO involvement in the conflict if NATO troops are attacked. The forward mounting of troops reduces the dilemma of whether to deploy troops after aggression is carried out by unmarked forces who cannot be attributed to a state (Radin, 2017). The eFP also multiplies the impact of NATO air power in the region by reducing Russia’s ability to disperse troops to mitigate the impact of NATO air power (Fredrick et al. 2020). NATO aims to defend Estonia whilst avoiding the excessive build-up of forces on Russia’s western border and in turn prevent the reinforcing of a familiar security dilemma; fearful of each other’s intentions, each side continues to increase forces in the region and with it the risk of conflict . Therefore, the UK eFP has the level of combat power where they can deter an invasion and defend against the vanguard elements of an invasion whilst not provoking Russia all whilst ensuring that Estonia is reassured of NATO’s commitment to its defence.

The combat power required has been calculated, partly based on the threat posed by Russian forces engaging in hybrid warfare as well as the larger conventional defence plan of the Baltics. Estonia assesses that two Battlegroups are required which is where NATO has assisted by proving the UK-led eFP Battlegroup. This level of combat power should enable Estonia to deal with Russian Special Forces tactical actions in the region until reinforcements can be mobilised (JWA, 2015). It also balances the conventional threat from the Western Military District whilst minimising the escalation of tensions by posing a lower offensive threat.

NATO has specifically decided to deploy an Armoured/Armoured Infantry Battlegroup to the region, as opposed to a Light Battlegroup or air or naval forces, due to the historical success seen with heavy armour in a deterrence role. For example, the Berlin crisis in 1961 and Op VIGILANT WARRIOR in 1994 which saw Soviet and Iraqi troop build-ups respectively being balanced and deterred by a deployment of heavy armour forces to the regions (Fredrick et al., 2020). In the latter example, the threat to Saddam’s regime posed by ground forces is perceived as more significant than exclusively using an aerial bombing campaign. This threat leads to a faster de-escalation of tensions and contrasts with the deployment of light ground forces who are often associated with an increase in low-intensity militarised conflicts, and so could actually escalate tensions (Fredrick et al., 2020). Additionally, armoured battle groups represent a larger and longerterm commitment to the region’s defence which is a more effective deterrent.

HOW HAS THE UK DEVELOPED AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE?

A deterrence can only be effective when a force is perceived by any potential adversary as credible. The UK has achieved this through the implementation of training cycles in the build up to deployments on Op CABRIT, the full suite of capabilities that are forward mounted in theatre, and by deploying an Armoured/Armoured Infantry capability which demonstrates commitment to the region. As part of the UK eFP pre-deployment training, the Battlegroups are tested and validated before they can deploy and then they continue mission specific training while deployed in Estonia. This improves their credibility as they are further improving their ability to operate effectively in the appropriate terrain. The Battlegroup subsequently becomes more of a credible deterrent when they are acclimatised and familiar with the environment that they could be defending. This develops a broader capability in the British Army as the majority of the UK’s combat power in an Armoured/ Armoured Infantry Battlegroup will have had exposure to operating in this environment. This capability improves the UK’s ability to deter due to its competency in operating in the specific region. Throughout their deployment, the UK eFP continuously exercises their readiness to ensure that any aggression from adversaries in the region is confronted quickly and effectively. This deters any adversaries from attempting to carry out a fast land grab before NATO can respond as the readiness timelines guarantee that NATO will respond and thereby escalate any potential conflict past a threshold that an adversary is likely to be willing to accept.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. Fredrick, B., Watts, S., Lane, M., Doll, A., Rhoades, A.L. and Smith, M.L (2020). Understanding the Deterrent

Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces, RAND. USA: Calif. 2. Herz, J.H. (1950). Political Ideas and Political Reality.

Western Political Quarterly. 3 (2), pp.161-178. 3. IISS, (2015). The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies. p. 6. See also Michael Kofman and

Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer Look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid

War,’” Woodrow Wilson Center Kennan Cable No. 7,

April 2015. 4. JWA, (2015). Estonia, Jane’s World Armies. 5. Koort, K. (2014). The Russians of Estonia: Twenty Years

After, World Affairs. 117(2), pp. 66-73. 6. Moore, C. (2018). Assessment of NATO Forces in the

Baltic States: Credible Deterrent or Paper Tiger? Real

Clear Defense. Available at: www.realcleardefense.

com/articles/2018/12/10/assessment_of_nato_ forces_in_the_baltic_states_credible_deterrent_

or_paper_tiger_114015.html [Accessed on 24/01/2020]. 7. NATO, (2019). Enhanced Forward Presence - Estonia,

Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. NATO. Available at: https://shape.nato.int/efp. [Accessed on 24/01/2020]. 8. NATO, (2021). Boosting NATO’s presence in the east and southeast. NATO. Available at: www.nato.int/ nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/4/pdf/210407-

MAP-eFP-e.pdf [Accessed on 29/07/2021]. 9. RAF, (2019). RAF Fighters begin Estonian Air Policing

Mission. RAF. Available from: [Accessed on 30/07/2021]. 10. Radin, A. (2017). Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics, RAND.

USA: Calif.

11. SOE, (2015). 2011 Population and Housing Censuses in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Statistical Office of Estonia, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, and

Statistics Lithuania, pp. 12-24.

EX BADGER SCHOLAR: ARMING THE SOLDIERS OF TODAY WITH THE LESSONS OF THE PAST

Lieutenant Daniel Saville

During their recent deployment to Estonia on OP CABRIT 8, BADGER Squadron used a study of the Battle of Narva to learn the lessons on how to use armour in the Estonian Terrain.

A Tiger advances into the East Sack during the second Strachwitz operation.

It’s tempting to believe that in the 76 years since the end of the Second World War, technology, or innate human nature has significantly changed the character of war. Enough, maybe, to render the modern tank soldier somehow separate and immune from the challenges of that devastating past. However, as BADGER Squadron found on their battlefield study of Narva, in Eastern Estonia, their training and the experiences of tank crews in the Battle of Narva (1944) draw uncomfortable parallels, helping to form valuable lessons. The Battle of Narva, 1944 was a seven-month defensive battle fought between German and Estonian forces and the attacking Soviet forces of the Leningrad front. It can be broken down into two phases – the battle for the bridgeheads of Narva and the defence of the Tannenburg Line. As the German Army Group North withdrew from its failed siege of Leningrad, they identified the narrow isthmus formed in Eastern Estonia, jutting out between the natural barriers of the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipus in the South, as a natural defensive line. This wooded swampy terrain would prevent the movement of heavy weapons and equipment in all but two key movement corridors, the Rollbahn, or ‘key route’ (modern day Highway 1), and the Narva-Tallinn railway line, which still exists. The Germans sought to block the Soviet advance, holding onto the Baltic Sea for their flow of natural resources, to keep their ally Finland in the War, and to prevent this corridor of advance being used to gain access to western territory. The Soviets wanted to weaken their enemy by exploiting all of these as part of Stalin’s ‘broad front’ policy of attacking across the entire Eastern front.

The scene was set for a defensive battle, with the German Army, Dutch, Estonian and Flemish SS facing off against a numerically superior Soviet advance. German Army Group North occupied bunkers from the previous three years of fighting on the western bank of the River Narva as well as their own eastern bridgehead still inside ancient Russia. Over the course of a seven-month slogging match, commencing in February 1944, the Soviets desperately tried to secure a bridgehead on the western bank – crossing the thick ice on foot, with medium armour, and even at night with dog sleds. But to no avail. The armoured counter attacks of a single company of Tiger Heavy tanks were used to great effect. Eventually the infiltration of the Kirvasoo swamp on the South-Western edge of the Battlefield threatened to cut off the German forces left at the Narva Bridgehead and so in July the remaining SS units delayed back to a secondary defensive line, the Tannenburg line in the Sinimae Hills. These dominating hills became the scene of bitter fighting, turned into a hell-scape of craters and bunkers, but never fully leaving German hands. By the end of August 1944, the front had stagnated and both sides were worn down into a weary stalemate. In the end the Soviet Tartu offensive left flank around Lake Peipus in the South would necessitate the remaining forces be withdrawn into Latvia and the final stand of the Fatherland. However, a defence over seven months, in the space of 16km can be considered a significant strategic victory for the Germans.

All of this would have been foreign and unrelatable to the Squadron had we not been standing on the Western bank of the river Narva.

“It’s a bit of an anti-climax isn’t it” declared BADGER, looking out across the rather unimposing River Narva, 77 years later. Indeed, it reminded me of the River Trent.

It was hard to envisage this as the site of one of the most important battles on the eastern front, or the modern border with Russia. Across the water was not the chain-link fenced, guard-dog and search light festooned border