17 minute read
Wild Fire Rescue “Middle Fire”
By LCDR Derek Schramel, USCG
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It had started as a normal quiet duty night at Coast Guard Sector/Air Station Humboldt Bay, located in McKinleyville, CA. We had just landed from our night duty trainer when we were piped to the Command Center. We were notified that the Forest Service (USFS) had requested assistance with extraction of two wildland firefighters from a steep forested area within an active wildfire zone in the Trinity Alps wilderness area in northern California. Two firefighters had sustained serious injuries after being struck by a falling boulder and were being stabilized by the members of their fire crew. The first injured firefighter had head, neck and shoulder injuries while the second firefighter had a displaced femur fracture with leg deformation and was drifting in and out of consciousness with signs of shock. The Incident Commander (IC) had determined a hike out of the steep terrain was not possible without further injury or death of the injured firefighters, bedding down for the night was extremely high risk for the fire team due to the changing fire conditions and possible burn-over, and medical consensus agreed there was high likelihood the sustained injuries would cause death before sunrise. The only other nearby agency with a hoist capable helicopter had declined the high risk night time mission.
Having just returned from a two hour training sortie, we assembled in the Command Center to begin planning the mission. The steep terrain made it difficult to know the elevation of the injured firefighters but we predicted the rescue would take place at approximately 4,500 feet of elevation. We queried the IC if there was a potential LZ since we knew power margins for an OGE hover would be an issue for our MH65D helicopter at that altitude, but the steep mountainous terrain was heavily wooded with 200’ trees that prevented any possibility of a landing. The IC stated the firefighters had used chain saws to clear enough trees in order to attempt a high altitude hoist. At this point we discussed ORM and assessed the mission as high risk/high gain. This would be our CP and FM’s first SAR case in the USCG. Prior to launching, the RS and FM ensured additional trail lines, weight bags, and the RS’s inland SAR gear were loaded; decisions that proved to be vital during the mission.
Launching at 2300L we navigating through mountainous terrain on NVGs with zero percent illumination, we then found ourselves entering a canyon obscured with smoke, no visual horizon, steep terrain, and portions of the canyon rendering the NVGs unusable due to the intensity of the wildfire flames. As we proceeded up the narrow canyon towards the steep ridgeline engulfed in flames I experienced multiple bouts of vertigo due to the onslaught of visual illusions. I relied upon my CP to call out angles of bank off by up to 15 degrees, 500’ altitude deviations due to steep terrain and fire updrafts, with airspeed fluctuations from 40-90 knots. Once we located the fire team dug into their self-made clearing on the edge of the wildfire we began the process of doing high/low recon passes to analyze the hoisting area and environmental factors to get an idea of the power requirements for hovering. During this process I reverted to the training I received earlier in my career at the Colorado Army National Guard High-Altitude Aviation Training Site (HAATS), but trying to predict the best approach path and wind zone model was significantly complicated due to the ineffectiveness of the NVGs, steep ridges, and severe up/down drafts fueled by the fire. We made what seemed like 10 attempts to approach the clearing resulting in wave-offs due to insufficient power. After multiple attempts to hover, we were eventually able to have a sufficient power margin to establish a tree top hover over a 20x30 ft hoisting area cut into a 45 degree slope by the fire crew. Upslope of the hoisting area, the fire extended down from the ridgeline to within 30 yards of the firefighters’ position.
At this point, we only had 15 minutes of on scene time and minimal power margin, the RS suggested he could remain on scene if we needed to depart to permit rescue of both injured firefighters instead of just one once we returned from refueling. However, I had serious concerns for his safety as well as my ability to get back over the hoisting area. I determined the risk too high without the proper wildfire protective gear/training and possible burn-over if the RS stayed on-scene. As the RS was hoisted down, the FM recognized the “candy-stripe” on the hoist cable indicating he had used all 240’ of hoist cable but the RS was still 50’ from the slope. With quick and calm thinking, he conned us further down below tree-top level into the confined area to smoothly deliver the RS to the near vertical surface. The RS disconnected and began to assess the patients while the FM readied the rescue litter in the cabin. Due to the additional time it took to hoist at 250’ and careful fuel calculations, our CP stated he didn’t think there would be enough time to hoist even one survivor and still recover the RS. I told the FM to abort the hoist, bring the litter back up, and deploy the bare hook in order to retrieve the RS to ensure sufficient fuel to recover and reassess the mission in Redding, CA.
Reassessing the risk versus gain in Redding, the RS reaffirmed the critical nature of the injuries of both firefighters and the unrealistic option for the fire crew to hike them out of the steep terrain to safety. The fire had continued to encroach around the hoist area. Although assessing the mission as high risk, we determined the mission still had a reasonable chance of success and would undoubtedly save the lives of both firefighters. To maximize our on-scene time, the RS suggested removing all unneeded items from the helicopter to reduce weight, increase fuel capacity and create room in the cabin to possibly hoist both firefighters with the litter. Additionally, we discussed and agreed to try the untrained & unofficial Litter Augmented Double Pickup (LADPU) procedure where the RS hooks up with the litter and we deploy both at the same time to expedite the hoists. The CP reassessed the aircraft configuration after removing personal gear, life raft, maintenance kit, rescue basket, and searchlight, which reduced our weight by approx. 200lbs, resulting in an additional 20 minutes of on-scene time. We also decided to “bingo” to a small, nearby airfield without fuel services to maximize on-scene time knowing this would cause the sortie to be our last chance to extract the firefighters.
Now launching on our 3rd sortie of our duty day at 0256L and fighting fatigue, the FM and RS assembled the litter enroute, linked multiple trail lines together, and prepared the cabin for hoisting to ensure no time was wasted once established in a hover. Arriving back on-scene, we quickly noticed the fire had advanced downslope around the hoisting area, flanking the clearing on three sides. While we had been refueling we had our command center inform the fire crew there was a good chance we’d only be able to rescue one of the fire fighters, the fire crew had started hiking one of the injured out of the area but had only made it 40 feet in the steep terrain during the hour we had refueled the aircraft. This information reaffirmed the dire need to extract both members via helicopter.
The fire had engulfed the area below my original approach path but I chose to still utilize it since it had worked on the first sortie (not the best reasoning, I know). Unfortunately, the fire below caused severe updrafts that buffeted the helicopter and resulted in a sudden increase in descent rate once past the fire line that couldn’t be arrested and forced me to fly the aircraft down the slope into the canyon to avoid impacting the trees. Smoke obscuration was heavier now with continued total darkness without NVGs and limited effectiveness of NVGs due to the brightness of the flames. I decided to use an alternative approach path that avoided the updrafts but created a much more challenging and risky approach straight into the rising terrain at tree trop level without a viable escape route. I was able to slowly approach the clearing and enter another high hover over the hoist area.
Established in a hover with the fire line now at the edge of the clearing, we quickly experienced first-hand the characteristics of the rotor-wash as it circulated smoke inside the cockpit and down around the aircraft reducing visibility and causing our eyes to burn, all while the fire actively burned directly underneath the tail of the aircraft. The FM calmly conned us over the fire crew and delivered the linked trail lines and additional weight bags. With our CP giving progressive trail line handling instructions over the radio to the fire crew we deployed the RS and litter via LADPU to the steep slope, again using nearly all of the hoist cable. Thinking quickly, the RS unhooked but retained and passed the rescue hook to a firefighter to avoid delays of hoisting the hook back up and then down once the first survivor was ready. Working on the steep terrain, the RS hauled the litter over fallen trees up the slope and wedged his legs underneath the litter to support it while loading the first fire fighter. Working incredibly quickly, the RS had the first firefighter loaded within minutes and had to call “ready for pickup” over his radio since the FM had difficulty seeing his hand signals through the circulating smoke. The FM then used what visuals he had as well as the angle of the hoist cable to get us plum and bring both the RS and survivor up via LADPU.
Survivor with splint for broken femur
Once inside the aircraft the FM and RS began the arduous task of extracting the 280lb man from the litter and loading him into the baggage compartment area/tail cone to allow room for the 2nd survivor. During this process, my CP and I could hear the loud screams of pain from the survivor and the labored yelling from the FM and RS as they transferred the survivor from the litter to the baggage compartment of the aircraft. The RS injured his back during this process but willingly re-rigged the litter for another LADPU. The second deployment was as smooth as the first despite the increasing smoke and reduced visibility of the hoisting area.
By this time, the prolonged hover and rotor wash had drastically intensified the fire as flames began to climb the surrounding trees and the RS could feel the heat of the fire as the embers blew into him. Despite this danger, the RS again unhooked from the hoist and wedged his legs underneath the litter to stabilize it to allow the second survivor to be safely packaged. The FM was now having even more trouble clearly seeing the hoist area or RS due to the increased smoke but kept the helicopter directly overhead by focusing on the hoist cable and trees. The CP could faintly hear the RS call for pick-up on the radio and the FM conned the aircraft into the best vertical position he could detect and began to hoist the RS and firefighter through the darkness and smoke. The RS emerged from the smoke and the 2nd survivor was safely recovered in the cabin. At this point I was pulling 100% MGB torque to prevent settling into the trees while the CP provided essential backup of our power, position, and altitude. Once ready for forward flight, we flew out of the hoist area and I passed controls to my CP after total exhaustion from the totality of the night’s events. Our CP then flew us through the unfamiliar canyons in total darkness to the nearby helibase in order to transfer the firefighters to two awaiting EMS helicopters at 0357L.
Once shutdown, we debriefed and agreed that it was certainly the most challenging rescue any of us had ever prosecuted. There had been countless critical decision points in the mission that could have led to failure, injury, or a major aircraft mishap. Looking back on the case we had to do several non-standard evolutions in conditions far removed from our normal operating environment; but, as a result of our robust training program we conduct on a daily basis we were able to adapt and still work together seamlessly in order to safely complete the mission. I can’t overstate how impressed I was by the performance of my crew. It was my Co-Pilot’s first SAR case since qualifying in the MH-65D and he was forced to execute virtually all of the mission management duties normally conducted by the AC since it took all of my focus to just fly the aircraft. It was also our Flight Mech’s first case and he had to give constant non-standard conning commands, complete two un-trained for LADPU deployment/recoveries all from over 200’ with little visual references due to the fire and smoke. Lastly, we owe a huge amount of the success of the mission to our Rescue Swimmer. His out of the box thinking, superior leadership coaching the fire crew to quickly load the survivors into the litter, and his overall bravery to deploy three times into the middle of a wildfire with no firefighting training or protective gear was truly heroic.
“Middle Fire” Rescue An Ops Officer’s Perspective
As you just read, Derek & his crew prosecuted a pretty amazing inland rescue case, saving two firefighters from near certain death, pushing themselves and their aircraft to their absolute limits. But, what would a good article be without some lessons learned (from an OPS officer’s perspective, in this case) and a little more about the rest of the story?
Sector Humboldt Bay, as a combined Air Station and Sector, has direct launch authority for both maritime SAR and inland Agency Assist cases. The Operations Officer, or Response Chief, is also generally the SAR Mission Coordinator for cases and supervises the Sector’s Command Center in addition to managing the unit’s aviation operations. Humboldt Bay’s AOR is a fairly rugged landscape with sparse fuel stops and very few other air rescue resources. For those reasons, Humboldt puts a strong emphasis on vertical surface, mountain flying, surf rescue and interagency training programs.
Lessons Learned
1. Go to the Source: The initial information on this case was pretty sketchy and we didn’t really have enough to do a good assessment of the expected gain. After my initial discussion with the crew and the acting Sector Commander, it looked like we were going to decline the case. I ended up calling three different EOCs and there was some initial confusion on my part because our partners were treating the injury as an “Incident Within an Incident” (IWI), and there were separate Incident Commanders (ICs) for the firefighting and rescue events. But, once we were able to get some better medical information from the correct IC, we realized that this case was clearly high-gain and we started discussing how to make the mission work. Take away – be persistent in seeking the info you need and get it from as close to the scene as you can.
2. Know Your Crews: This one seems obvious, but I mention it because I would not have recommended accepting this case if I didn’t know and trust the crew, particularly the PIC, the way I did. I felt confident that I could trust Derek to go out, assess the situation and make a good call on scene on whether the rescue was even possible. That’s a lot to ask of a PIC, especially when they know that if they decline the case it’s very likely that two men will die. So, why did I trust Derek’s skill and judgment? Because I had personally seen how he trained hard & exercised restraint in alignment with the Command’s intent during past cases. Take away – maybe this lesson is as much for duty-standers as it is for OPS officers; if you want to be trusted by your command to go out on the most challenging cases, you’ve got to earn their confidence by training hard, being a professional, and demonstrating that you understand your CO’s operational intent and risk tolerance.
3. Don’t Overthink It: This rescue happened in a wilderness area about midway between our homefield in McKinleyville and an inland airport in Redding, CA – the only two airports with fuel available near this scene. The flight time to Redding was a little shorter, but still about 20-25 minutes from the hoisting area. As I mentioned, Sector Humboldt trains frequently with fire service partners and has an MOU to call out CALFIRE’s heli-tender engines for fuel at unimproved sites if needed. I knew that the crew’s time in a hover was going to be limited by the relatively long transit to the nearest fuel stop, so I called the EOC and asked if we could get CALFIRE’s helitender. After several calls, the dispatchers informed me that they weren’t on status for that fire, so we were committed to the 20-25 minute flight to Redding for fuel. What I didn’t know, and what the dispatcher didn’t mention, was that the National Forest Service had established a temporary heli-base with a few thousand gallons of jet-fuel about 4 minutes from the hoist site. Take away: don’t request a specific resource unless you are absolutely sure that’s the only thing that will meet your needs, it would have been better for me to take an extra minute to describe what I needed (jet fuel, as close to the scene as safely possible) and why I needed it, and then let the dispatcher or incident commander provide us options.
4. Back-Up Your Crew: Another obvious one, but a lesson that was reinforced by a couple things I saw on this case. First, during the crew’s initial risk assessment of the mission, Derek briefed that they expected this to be a medium risk mission. I remember saying something like, “Okay, as long as you guys are having a good discussion we can call it whatever you want, but just so you know, I’m considering this high risk and I’m going to brief it up that way.” In my mind, that was a small but important distinction to make so that the crew knew that the command wasn’t going to balk at calling this mission what it was – very risky, and that if things didn’t go well we were going to stand by the decision to make an attempt. The second time I remember backing up Derek was after the crew landed for fuel after the first shot at a rescue. In that conversation, we talked about how they were feeling, what it really looked like on scene, whether he could get two litter hoists done with the endurance they had, the probability of a MGB overtorque, and the condition of the firefighters. We discussed using a non-standard LADPU, again making sure he knew that the command would support his crew’s decision to deviate in order to save a life. And I think I finished up the call with something like, “Go talk to the crew one more time, make sure you all are still willing to accept the mission and, if you are, the command approves another attempt.” Again, I wanted to make sure that it was clear to Derek that they weren’t under an obligation to make another attempt, but the command would support them if they were willing to go. Take away: being a PIC is never easy, it’s even harder at 2:00 AM when you and your crew are physically fatigued, emotionally drained and operating at the limits of your skill & the aircraft’s performance – if you’re taking OPS calls, back up that PIC on their plan and on their risk decisions, do everything you can to take tasks off their plate & make sure they know you’ve got them covered if things go south or change on scene.
A Little More on the Rest of the Story
In the days following this mission we learned about a similar incident in 2008 where a firefighter on the Dutch Creek incident, a few miles from the 2019 Middle Fire, was struck by a falling tree and fractured his femur. A Sector Humboldt Bay H-65 eventually hoisted the injured firefighter, but due to delays in developing and executing an evacuation plan by the firefighters on scene, that firefighter died before he was able to get to medical care. The tragic outcome of that case only reinforced my belief that if Derek’s crew hadn’t successfully hoisted the two firefighters when they did, they wouldn’t have made it through the night.
Search and rescue team asks people to prepare for anything when headed outdoors, Korey Morgan, Office of Communication, USDA Forest Service
