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Mitja Sardoč Editor

The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration

ThePalgraveHandbookofToleration

MitjaSardoč Editor

ThePalgraveHandbookof Toleration

Editor MitjaSardoč EducationalResearchInstitute Ljubljana,Slovenia

ISBN978-3-030-42120-5ISBN978-3-030-42121-2(eBook)

ISBN978-3-030-42122-9(printandelectronicbundle) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42121-2

©SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2022

Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartofthe materialisconcerned,speciﬁcallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation, broadcasting,reproductiononmicroﬁlmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionorinformation storageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodology nowknownorhereafterdeveloped.

Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,servicemarks,etc.inthispublication doesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspeciﬁcstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfromtherelevant protectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse.

Thepublisher,theauthors,andtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthisbook arebelievedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication.Neitherthepublishernortheauthorsorthe editorsgiveawarranty,expressedorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinorforanyerrors oromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade.Thepublisherremainsneutralwithregardtojurisdictionalclaims inpublishedmapsandinstitutionalafﬁliations.

ThisPalgraveMacmillanimprintispublishedbytheregisteredcompanySpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG. Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Gewerbestrasse11,6330Cham,Switzerland

Preface

“ThesafestgeneralcharacterizationoftheEuropeanphilosophicaltradition,” as AlfredNorthWhiteheadaccentuatedin ProcessandReality (basedonhis Gifford LecturesDeliveredintheUniversityofEdinburghDuringtheSession1927–28) “is thatitconsistsofaseriesoffootnotestoPlato” (1978,p.39).Ifonewouldfollow Whitehead’sfootsteps,contemporarydiscussionsoftolerationmightbestbe depictedasdidaskaliatothewritingsofJohnLocke.Seminalintellectual ﬁgures suchasPlatoandLockealongsideotherluminariesfromthephilosophicaltradition provideuswitha(giant’s)shoulderonwhichtostandon,whilegrapplingwith whateverthetaskofscholarlyresearchoneisfocusingon.

Asarepositoryofknowledgeonaparticulartopic,referenceworksincluding encyclopedias,handbooks,andcompanionsprovideanothersuchshoulderonwhich tostandupon.Yet,themaingoalofthispublishingprojectisnotonlyoneof customarypurposereferenceworkhasbeenusuallyassociatedwith.Ultimately, anyauthororeditorhasitsownoverallplanonhowthevolumeoneiseitherwriting oreditingshouldturnoutattheend.Forexample,IanFlemingsupposedlywrote CasinoRoyale,the ﬁrstofaseriesofnovelsonwhatturnedouttobetheglobal franchiseofJamesBond,toendallspystories.Thisreferenceworkobviouslydoes notpointinthisdirection.

Theoverallaimofthishandbookhasbeentobringtogetherasetofcontributions presentingsomeofthemostdistinctive,complex,andcontroversialaspectsassociatedwiththeideaoftoleration.Interestinglyenough,thereareplentyoftheseissues around,makingthenavigationinthisareaofscholarlyresearchparticularly distressing.Itsambivalentcharacteranditsenigmaticnaturetogetherwithits allegedlyexoticoriginsandcomplexlegacyarejustsomeofthecharactertraits tolerationhasbeenassociatedwith.Theimmediateimpulseoneencounterswhen facedwiththescholarlyliteratureontolerationwouldmostprobablyresemble WinstonChurchill’spuzzlingobservationsummedupintheparableof “ariddle wrappedinamysteryinsideanenigma.” Thishandbookthereforeaimstoprovidea conceptualcartographythatwouldenableanyonemakinguseofitasafejourney throughthemanytumultuousissuesthisareaofscholarlyresearchisrepletewith. Incontrasttosomeoftheotherconceptsfromthepantheonofpoliticalideas, tolerationhasbeengracedwithanumberofmonographs,articles,journalspecial issues,andeditedcollectionsthathavepoppeduparoundtheglobe.Nevertheless,

despiteasteadysupplyofscholarlyoutput,noreferenceworkontolerationhasbeen availabletothisdate.Thispublishingprojectaimsto ﬁllthisgapintheacademic marketbybringingtogethermorethan50chaptersbyleadingacademicsinthisarea ofscholarlyresearchonsomeofthemostpressingandtimelyissuestolerationhas beenassociatedwith.

Likeanyscholarlypublication,thisreferenceworkhasitsfairshareoflost opportunities.Theywouldhavebeenmuchmorenumerousifitwouldn’tbefor theeditorialteamatPalgrave.Inparticular,IwouldliketothankAmbraFinotello, seniorcommissioningeditorinpoliticsatPalgrave,andMichaelHermann,chief editoroftheMRWseriesatSpringer,forsupportingtheideaofthishandbookand forhelpingoutinthetransitionfrom “bookproposal” to “bookcontract” forthis publishingproject(usuallyadistressingperiodforanyauthororvolumeeditor).My mostprofoundthanksgotoEleanorGaffney,editoratPalgrave,forhersuperb editorialskills,patience,care,anddedicationtothishandbook.Anyauthoror volumeeditorcouldnot ﬁndbettereditorialcooperationthanEleanorhasprovided bothtomeasvolumeeditorand,Ibelieve,toeachofthecontributorstothis handbook.

Lastbutnotleast,IwouldliketodedicatethishandbooktomywifeMojcaand ourtwosons, ŽigaandJakob.Itisintheircompanythattheideaforthishandbook aroseduringasummerholidaybackin2018ontheislandofMljetinCroatia. Perhapsmorethananyoneelse,theyexemplifyaformof “liberalexpectancy” the ideaoftolerationhasbeenassociatedwith.Describingthemanynuancesoftheir toleration(alongsidetheirunfailingsupportandencouragement)wouldtakeanother volumetostraightout.

September2021MitjaSardoč

References

WhiteheadN(1978[1929])Processandreality(Giffordlecturesdeliveredinthe UniversityofEdinburghduringthesession1927–28).FreePress,NewYork

Volume1

1TheTroublewithToleration ..............................1 MitjaSardoč

2Toleration:ConceptandConceptions .......................11 RainerForst

3DeﬁningToleration .....................................23 AndrewJasonCohen

4WhatTolerationIsNot ..................................53 DavidHeyd

5Toleration ............................................71 AnnaElisabettaGaleotti

6ParadoxesofToleration .................................93 PeterKönigs

7TheEpistemicJustiﬁcationforTolerance

JoshuaC.Thurow

8PoliticalTolerationExplained .............................129 PeterBalint

9Toleration,RespectforPersons,andtheFreeSpeech RighttoDoMoralWrong ................................149 KristianSkagenEkeli

10TolerationandPoliticalChange ...........................173 LuciaM.Rafanelli

StijnSmet

12TolerationandDomination

MonicaMookherjee

13StateResponsestoIncongruence:Tolerationand Transformation ........................................229 PaulBillingham

14TolerationandStateNeutrality:TheCaseofSymbolicFGM ....249 FedericoZuolo

15TolerationofMoralOffense ..............................263 ThomasE.HillJr

16MoralismandAnti-MoralisminTheoriesofToleration ........277 JohnChristianLaursenandZacharyDorson

17TolerationandNeutrality ................................299 PeterJones

18PoliticalTolerationasSubstantiveNeutrality

BryanT.McGraw

19ConscientiousExemptions:BetweenToleration,Neutrality,and Respect ..............................................341 YossiNehushtan

20TolerationandItsPossibilities:Relativism,Skepticism,and Pluralism .............................................363 JohnWilliamTate

21Toleration,Reasonableness,andPower

ThomasM.BeschandJung-SookLee

22TolerationandReasonableness

RobertaSala

23InternationalToleration

PietroMaffettone 24TolerationandToleranceinaGlobalContext

VickiA.Spencer 25TwoModelsofToleration

WillKymlicka 26ModusVivendiToleration

ManonWestphal

SuneLægaard

CillianMcBride

29TolerationandDignity

ColinBird

30TolerationandRespect ..................................583 JohnWilliamTate Volume2

31TolerationandJustice ...................................615 FabioMacioce

32TheLogicofIntolerance .................................635 RichardDees

33IntoleranceandPopulism ................................653 NenadMiščević

34FearandToleration .....................................673 RobertPaulChurchill

35Toleration, “Mindsight” andtheEpistemicVirtues ............699 ColinFarrelly

36ToughonTolerance:TheViceofVirtue

ThomasNysandBartEngelen

37TolerationandClosePersonalRelationships .................737 MichaelKühler

38HospitalityandToleration ...............................757 AndrewFiala

39TolerationandCompassion:AConceptualComparison ........777 YossiNehushtanandEmilyPrince

40TolerationandReligion ..................................797 JohnWilliamTate

41TolerationandReligiousDiscrimination

AndrewShorten

42ReligiousTolerationandSocialContractTheoriesofJustice

PhillipJ.Donnelly

43TolerationandtheProtestantTradition

ManfredSvensson

44AtheistToleration ......................................887 CharlesDevellennes

45TolerationandtheRighttoFreedomofReligioninEducation ...905 ZdenkoKodelja

46EducationandToleration ................................925 JohannesDrerup

47Toleration,LiberalEducation,andtheAccommodation ofDiversity ...........................................951

OleHenrikBorchgrevinkHansen

48TolerationBeforeToleration ..............................969

CaryJ.Nederman

49EarlyModernArgumentsforToleration ....................993

AndrewR.Murphy

50ThomasHobbesandtheConditionalityofToleration .......... 1009 J.JuddOwen

51JohnLockeandReligiousToleration

JohnWilliamTate

52 “StopBeingSoJudgmental!”:ASpinozistModelofPersonal Tolerance

JustinSteinberg

53TolerationandLibertyofConscience ....................... 1095

JonMahoney

54ToleratingRacismandHateSpeech:ACritiqueof C.E.Baker ’s “Almost” Absolutism .........................1115

RaphaelCohen-Almagor

55TolerationofFreeSpeech:ImposingLimitsonElected Of

AmosN.Guiora

AbouttheEditor

MitjaSardoč (PhD)isseniorresearchassociateatthe EducationalResearchInstituteinLjubljana(Slovenia). Hisresearchinterestsandexpertiseincludephilosophy ofeducation,politicalphilosophy,andeducationpolicy. Overthelasttwodecadeshehasbeenmemberof several(nationalandinternational)researchprojectson multiculturalism,diversity,equalityofopportunity, patriotism,citizenshipeducation,etc.Duringthelast fewyears,hisresearchinteresthasmovedtosomeof theconceptualandpolicy-orientedissuesassociated withradicalization,violentextremism,andconﬂicting diversity.Between2018and2021,hecarriedouta researchproject “RadicalisationandViolentExtremism: Philosophical,SociologicalandEducationalPerspective (s)” fundedbytheSlovenianResearchAgencyaspartof its “basicresearchprojects” program(themostselective researchfundingschemeforbasicresearchinSlovenia). Heisauthorofmorethan40scholarlyarticlesandeditor ofanumberofjournalspecialissuesonradicalization andviolentextremism,citizenshipeducation,multiculturalism,toleration,theAmericanDream,equalityof opportunity,andpatriotism.Heactedasanexpertfor variousresearchinitiativesincludingtheOrganization forSecurityandCo-operationinEurope(OSCE),the CouncilofEurope,andtheSloveneMinistryofForeign Affairs.Healsocarriedoutconsultancyworkforother internationalinstitutions(e.g.,CardiffUniversity, ODIHR).HeisManagingEditorof Theoryand ResearchinEducation (http://tre.sagepub.com/),Editorin-Chiefof TheHandbookofPatriotism ,andeditorof TheImpactsofNeoliberalDiscourseandLanguagein Education publishedbyRoutledge.BetweenSeptember andDecember2019,hewasavisitingfellowatthe RobertSchumanCentreforAdvancedStudiesatthe xi

EuropeanUniversityInstituteinFlorence(Italy).Additionalinformation(includingthelistofpublications)is availableatthewebsite: https://www.researchgate.net/ proﬁle/Mitja_Sardoc

Contributors

PeterBalint SchoolofHumanitiesandSocialSciences,UNSWCanberra,Canberra,ACT,Australia

ThomasM.Besch SchoolofPhilosophy,WuhanUniversity,Wuhan,Hubei,China DepartmentofPhilosophy,TheUniversityofSydney,Sydney,NSW,Australia

PaulBillingham DepartmentofPoliticsandInternationalRelationsandMagdalen College,UniversityofOxford,Oxford,UK

ColinBird DepartmentofPolitics,PrograminPoliticalPhilosophy,Policy,and Law,UniversityofVirginia,Charlottesville,VA,USA

RobertPaulChurchill DepartmentofPhilosophy,GeorgeWashingtonUniversity, Westminster,MD,USA

AndrewJasonCohen GeorgiaStateUniversity,Atlanta,GA,USA

RaphaelCohen-Almagor UniversityofHull,Hull,UK

RichardDees UniversityofRochester,Rochester,NY,USA

CharlesDevellennes UniversityofKent,Canterbury,UK

PhillipJ.Donnelly BaylorUniversity,Waco,TX,USA

ZacharyDorson UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside,Riverside,CA,USA

JohannesDrerup TechnischeUniversitätDortmund,Dortmund,Germany

KristianSkagenEkeli UniversityofStavanger,Stavanger,Norway

BartEngelen TilburgUniversity,Tilburg,TheNetherlands

ColinFarrelly Queen’sUniversity,Kingston,Canada

AndrewFiala DepartmentofPhilosophy,CaliforniaStateUniversity,Fresno,CA, USA

RainerForst GoetheUniversity,NormativeOrdersResearchCentre,Frankfurt/ Main,Germany

AnnaElisabettaGaleotti UniversitàdelPiemonteOrientale,Vercelli,Italy

AmosN.Guiora S.J.QuinneyCollegeofLaw,UniversityofUtah,SaltLakeCity, UT,USA

OleHenrikBorchgrevinkHansen OstfoldUniversityCollege,SchoolofEducation,Ostfold,Norway

DavidHeyd TheHebrewUniversityofJerusalem,Jerusalem,Israel

ThomasE.HillJr DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofNorthCarolina, ChapelHill,NC,USA

PeterJones NewcastleUniversity,NewcastleuponTyne,UK

ZdenkoKodelja EducationalResearchInstitute,Ljubljana,Slovenia

PeterKönigs HumanTechnologyCenter,AppliedEthics,RWTHAachenUniversity,Aachen,Germany

MichaelKühler DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofMünster,Münster,Germany

WillKymlicka DepartmentofPhilosophy,Queen’sUniversity,Kingston,ON, Canada

SuneLægaard DepartmentofCommunicationandArts,RoskildeUniversity, Roskilde,Denmark

JohnChristianLaursen UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside,Riverside,CA,USA

Jung-SookLee SchoolofSocialSciences,UNSWSydney,Sydney,NSW, Australia

FabioMacioce LawSchool,LumsaUniversity,Rome,Italy

PietroMaffettone PoliticalScienceDepartment,UniversityofNapoli,FedericoII, Naples,Italy

JonMahoney DepartmentofPhilosophy,KansasStateUniversity,Manhattan,KS, USA

CillianMcBride Queen’sUniversityBelfast,Belfast,UK

BryanT.McGraw WheatonCollege,Wheaton,IL,USA

NenadMiščević UniversityofMaribor,Maribor,Slovenia

MonicaMookherjee SchoolofSocial,PoliticalandGlobalStudies,KeeleUniversity,Stoke-on-Trent,Staffordshire,UK

AndrewR.Murphy DepartmentofPoliticalScience,VirginiaCommonwealth University,Richmond,VA,USA

CaryJ.Nederman DepartmentofPoliticalScience,TexasA&MUniversity, CollegeStation,TX,USA

YossiNehushtan KeeleUniversity,Newcastle-Under-Lyme,UK

ThomasNys UniversityofAmsterdam,Amsterdam,TheNetherlands

J.JuddOwen DepartmentofPoliticalScience,EmoryUniversity,Atlanta,GA, USA

EmilyPrince UniversityofShefﬁeld,Shefﬁeld,UK

LuciaM.Rafanelli TheGeorgeWashingtonUniversity,Washington,DC,USA

RobertaSala FacultyofPhilosophy,Vita-SaluteSanRaffaeleUniversity,Milan, Italy

MitjaSardoč EducationalResearchInstitute,Ljubljana,Slovenia

AndrewShorten DepartmentofPoliticsandPublicAdministration,Universityof Limerick,Limerick,Ireland

StijnSmet FacultyofLaw,HasseltUniversity,Hasselt,Belgium

VickiA.Spencer Politics,SchoolofSocialSciences,UniversityofOtago,Dunedin,NewZealand

JustinSteinberg BrooklynCollegeandCUNYGraduateCenter,NewYork,NY, USA

ManfredSvensson DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversidaddelosAndes,Santiago,Chile

JohnWilliamTate DisciplineofPoliticsandInternationalRelations,Newcastle BusinessSchool,CollegeofHumanandSocialFutures,UniversityofNewcastle, Newcastle,NSW,Australia

JoshuaC.Thurow UniversityofTexasatSanAntonio,SanAntonio,TX,USA

ManonWestphal InstituteofPoliticalScience,UniversityofMünster,Münster, Germany

FedericoZuolo DepartmentofClassics,PhilosophyandHistory,Universityof Genova,Genova,Italy

TheTroublewithToleration 1

MitjaSardoč

Contents

Introduction:TheLanguageofToleration .........................................................2 SummaryandFutureDirections ...................................................................7 References ..........................................................................................8

Abstract

Bothhistoricallyandconceptually,tolerationhasbeenoneofthefoundational characteristicsthatdeﬁ netheveryessenceofaplurallydiversepolityandthe basicvirtueassociatedwithaliberalconceptionofcitizenship.Despiteits centralroleincontemporarypoliticalth ought,tolerationremainssubjectto variouscontroversiesanddisagreementsstemmingfromthemanyparadoxes, dilemmas,andpuzzlesassociatedwithit.Thischapteridenti ﬁ essomeofthe distinguishingfeaturesof contemporarydiscussionsabouttolerationaswellas elucidatesthemostpressingandchallengingcontroversiesthesediscussions havebeenfocusingon.

Keywords Toleration·Diversity·Liberalism·Pluralism·Limitsoftoleration·Justiﬁcation oftoleration·Critiqueoftoleration

M.Sardoč (*)

EducationalResearchInstitute,Ljubljana,Slovenia e-mail: mitja.sardoc@guest.arnes.si

©TheAuthor(s),underexclusivelicencetoSpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2022 M.Sardoč (ed.), ThePalgraveHandbookofToleration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42121-2_17

Introduction:TheLanguageofToleration

Asacommunityofideas,thepantheonofpoliticalconceptshasbeenrepletewitha varietyofproblems,challenges,andotherconceptual “mishaps” thatmakethe analysisofalmostanyofitsmembersfarmoredeviousthanoriginallyenvisaged. Alongsideambiguityandconfusion,perhapsthemost “stable” companionsofany conceptualanalysis(andtheassociateddisputes),someofthemostwell-known politicalconceptsareplaguedbyverypeculiarproblemsandchallenges.Ifbeingan essentiallycontestedconceptisnowahouseholdchallengemostoftheconceptsare facedwith(Gallie 1955),othersarefarlessstraightforward.Forexample,the “traveling” ofaparticularconcepthasbeenidentiﬁedasaninterestingphenomenon inpoliticalscience(Sartori 1970).Equalityofopportunityandresponsibilityarejust twoofthemostrepresentativeexamplesofthisphenomenon.

Anotherfrequentconceptual “mishap” associatedwiththe “travellingproblem” (Sartori 1970)hastakenuptheformofconceptualstretching.Interestinglyenough, writingmorethanacenturyapart,theFrenchpoliticalscientistAlexisdeTocqueville andtheBritishhistorianofideasIsaiahBerlinpointedtothisinterestingphenomenonthatseemstodominateourcontemporarydiscussions.InBookIIof DemocracyinAmerica,AlexisdeTocquevilleemphasizedeloquentlythat “[a]nabstract wordislikeaboxwithafalsebottom:youcanputinanyideasyoupleaseandtake themoutagainwithoutanyonebeingthewiser” (deTocqueville 2000,p.553).Ina similarvein,IsaiahBerlin’sessay “TwoConceptsofLiberty ” pointstoavexing problemplaguingtheideaofliberty, “[l]ikehappinessandgoodness,likenatureand reality,themeaningofthistermissoporousthatthereislittleinterpretationthatit seemsabletoresist” (Berlin 2002,p.181).

Atthesametime,severalconceptsfacethechallengestemmingfromtheabsence ofa fixeddefinition.Interestinglyenough,thishashadimportantrepercussions outsidethe “ideal” worldofconceptualanalysis.Aleadingexampleofthischallenge hasbeenthelackofa fixeddefinitionofterrorismthathasbecomeasortof trademarkofthe “WaronTerror.” AsStephenNathansonemphasizes, “[c]larityis noteveryone’sgoal,however,becauseconfusioncanbepoliticallyuseful ” (Nathanson 2010,p.20).

Severalconceptsfaceanotherchallengingproblem.Althoughtheslogan “we recognizeviolencewhenweseeit” (Bufacchi 2009,p.293)unequivocallyillustrates allthebrutalityofitsconsequences,theconceptofviolenceisneithersimplenor unproblematic.Duetothesensitivenatureofphenomenaitmaybeassociatedwith thereisasortofurgencyinhavingitaddressedinacomprehensivemanner.Given thefactthatitmayrefertophenomenaasdiverseasphysicalviolence,cyber violence,mobbing,domesticviolence,bullying,sexualviolence,violent[political] extremism,aswellasstructuralviolence,symbolicviolence,culturalviolence,etc., theconceptofviolenceneedstobe flexibleenoughtoincorporateallitsaberrations. Nevertheless,havingitopentoaswideadefinitionaspossible,wemayultimately endupwithasortofconceptualinflation.Violenceaswellasracismarejusttwoof theexampleswherethisproblemisofparticularsalience(Bufacchi 2007;Milesand Brown 1989).

Amongthemostunlikelyoftheconceptual “mishaps” onemayencounterhas beentheone “identiﬁed” byAlasdairMacIntyreinhisbook AfterVirtue.Ashe accentuates, “rightsdonotexistassuchandtobelieveinthemissimilartobelieving inwitchesandunicorns” (MacIntyre 2007,p.69).Surprisinglyenough,thisisnot theonlysuchexampleofskeptical “denial” inscholarlyresearch.Radicalization leadingtoviolentextremismhasbeenanothersuchcasewhere “radicalization deniers” (Neumann 2003)haveexpressedskepticismovertheveryexistenceof thisphenomenon.

Atthesametime,thecomplexityandcontroversialityofaparticularconcept couldintuitivelyalsobeevaluatedbyeitheritsconvergencewithordistancefroman ordinarylanguagedefinitionofit.Infact,conceptsandtheideastheyareassociated withinhabitnotonlythepantheonofideasbuthavetheirexistencealsooutsidethe scholarlydiscussionsanditscodifiedlanguage.Therearedifferentwaysofdepicting therelationshipbetweenascholarlydefinitionofaparticularconceptanditsusagein ordinarylanguage.Forsomeoftheseconcepts,atleastonthesurface,movingfrom onelanguageregistertoanotherdoesnotrepresentanymajorproblem.Forexample, inthecaseofpatriotism[whereinbothcasespatriotismmeans loveofpatria],there isalmostnodifferencebetweenitsuseinordinarylanguageanditsdefinitioninthe scholarlycommunity[whateachoftheseelementsmaymeanisacompletely differentendeavorwithasetofseparateproblems].

Incontrast,thereisaconceptwheretheamplitudebetweenitsmeaninginthe registerofordinarylanguageanditsscholarlydeﬁnitionisfarfrombeingnegligible. Itisthatoftoleration.AsAndrewJasonCohenemphasizes, “[o]utsidetheacademic worldofphilosophy,theterm ‘toleration’ isoftenusedindifferentways” (Cohen 2004,p.70).Nevertheless,onthesideofordinarylanguage,tolerationisstraightforwardlyunequivocal.Beingtolerant,asWendyBrownsomehowsubsumesits ordinarylanguageusage, “conjuresseemliness,propriety,forbearance,magnanimity,cosmopolitanism,universality,andthelargeview,whilethoseforwhomtoleranceisrequiredtaketheirshapeasimproper,indecorous,urgent,narrow,particular, andoftenungenerousoratleastlackinginperspective” (Brown 2006,p.178).On thisinterpretation,tolerationisprimarilyassociatedwithopen-mindedness.AsPeter Jonesemphasizes, “‘[t]olerant’ , ‘tolerance’,and ‘toleration’ aregenerallyusedas termsofcommendation,while ‘intolerant’ and ‘intolerance’ aretypicallypejorative terms,butthatshouldnotmisleadus” (Jones 2013,p.629).

Incontrast,ascholarlydeﬁnitionoftolerationiscrammedwithparadoxes, puzzles,anddilemmas,withdifferentconditionsandcircumstancestornapartby thedifferentconceptionsoftolerationitself.Atthesametime,tolerationalsoneeds tobediscussedalongsideconceptsandideasthatarepartofitsgravitationalorbit, e.g.,civility,dignity,coercion,harm,conﬂict,disagreement,secularism,orthodoxy, dissent,knowledge,authority,power,domination,trust,restraint,non-interference, neutrality,fairness,reasonableness,pluralism,autonomy,(mutual)respect,recognition,andultimatelydiversityitself.Infact,oneofthemostimportantissuesin discussingaparticularconcepthasbeentocontextualizeitwithitsimmediate surroundingechoingFirth’sprincipleofco-occurrence[“Youshallknowaword bythecompanyitkeeps”](Firth 1957).Thisisanimportantsignalforwhatlies

aheadforanyoneundertakingeithertheanalysisofaparticularaspectoftoleration oracomprehensivecoverageofthisconcept.

Infact,theunderstandingoftolerationhasneverbeeneithersimpleorstraightforward.Thiscomesasnosurprisesincethehistoryoftoleration,onemightclaim withconsiderableconﬁdence,hasbeenahistoryofconﬂicts.Itslongandvenerable historyspansacrosssomeofthemosttumultuousperiodsofhumanexistencegoing allthewaybacktotheagesofdiscovery,empire,revolution,theextremes,etc. [topartlyparaphraseEricHobsbawm’schronologicaltimeline].AsRainerForst accentuates, “thehistoryandthepresentoftolerationarealwaysatthesametimea historyandapresentofsocialstruggles ” (Forst 2003,p.2).Furthermore,its “exotic” origins,itsenigmaticnature,andcomplexcharacter,aswellasacontentiouslegacy [atleastforitscritics]havebeenamajorfactorinasomehowpuzzlingresponseby almostanyonetryingtomakesenseofoutofit.

Atthesametime,theturnoflastdecadeofthetwentiethcenturyhaswitnesseda theoreticalseismicshiftofconsiderablemagnitudethathadimplicationsfordiscussionsabouttoleration.IfJohnLocke’s EpistoladeTolerantia [ALetteronToleration] ﬁrstpublishedin1689representssomesortofa “YearOne” onthecalendarof “standard” discussionsabouttoleration,severaloftheeventsin1989havehada galvanizingeffectondiscussionsabouttolerationinplurallydiversedemocracies.In Novemberofthatyear,followinglarge-scaledemonstrationsinEastGermany,the BerlinWallfell,leadingtothecollapseofcommunismthroughoutEasternEurope. Thiswasaccompaniedbytheriseofbothxenophobicnationalismandreligious fundamentalismthathavefueledseveralsubsequentconﬂicts.Interestinglyenough, precedingthefalloftheBerlinWallbyjustafewweeks,threeMuslimgirlswere suspendedinaFrenchpublicschoolforwearingthe hijab.Thiswasapreludetothe headscarfcontroversy[l’affairedufoulard]thatremainstothisdayalandmarkevent associatedwithcontemporarydiscussionsabouttoleration(Laborde 2008).

Fromthenon,tolerationremainedattheforefrontofpublicinterest.Casessuchas thebanningofminaretsinsomeEuropeancountries,thedisplayofreligious symbolsinclassrooms,thebanoffacecoveringinpublic(targetingprimarily Muslimwomenwearingtheburkaortheniqab),the “gaycake” controversy,cases ofculturalappropriation,thedisrespectfulportrayalofreligious ﬁgures,etc.,are someofthemostrecentexampleswherecontroversiesovertolerationareatthe centerofsocialandpoliticalattention.However,thesearejustsomeofthemost visiblecasesmakingiteitherallthewayuptothehighestlevelsofjudiciary authorityincludingtheUSSupremeCourtandtheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights ortofrontlinenews(insomecasesboth).

Furthermore,phenomenaasdiverseaspopulismonboththe “left” and “right ” of thepoliticalspectrum(Galston 2018;Müller 2016),theshrinkingcivicspace (Deželanetal. 2020),hatespeech(Waldron 2012),fakenews[includingitsvarious “alternatives,” e.g.,misinformation,distortedfacts,etc.],extremistpoliticalmovements, “moralpanic” andconﬂictingdiversityincludingradicalization(Sardoč etal. 2021)andviolentextremism(Cassam 2021)havealsohadanimportantinﬂuenceon theorizingabouttoleration.Theseilliberalformsofauthoritarianismarepartofthe “globalauthoritarianpushbackagainstdemocracyandhumanrights” thathasbeen associatedwithaglobalphenomenonof “reversetransitions ” (Buyse 2018).

Atthesametime,thedominanceofthestandardliberalconceptionofcivic equalityanditsuniformtreatmentapproachtowardsculturaldiversitywaschallengedinitiallybyahandfulofscholarsarguingthatthisconceptionofcivicequality failedtorecognizethelegitimateinterestofethno-culturalgroupsinastablecultural contextandlackedthemeanstocompensateadequatelyforindividuals’ unequal circumstances(e.g.,Kymlicka 1989;Spinner-Halev 1994;Taylor 1997 [1992]; Young 1990).Moreover,theyalsoarguedthatthestandardliberalconceptionof tolerationasnon-interferencedidnotsufﬁcientlyprotecttheinterestsofculturally disadvantagedgroups,includingnationalminorities,immigrants,andindigenous peoples.Onthisinterpretation,tolerationisinconsistentwithacommitmenttocivic equalityandarequirementoffairness.

Fromthenon,discussionsabouttoleration(andrelatedissues)havebeen allbutanemic.Itthereforecomesasnosurprisethattherehasbeenasteady supplyofresearchmonographs(e.g.,Balint 2017 ;Bejan 2017 ),editedcollections(e.g.,DrerupandSchweiger 2021 ;Först 2020 ),andscholarlyarticles (e.g.,Galeotti 2021 ;Konigs)addressingtheseandotherphenomenapreviouslythoughttobeeitheratthefringesofscholarlyinterestontolerationor settledforgood.Infact,timeandagain, tolerationcomestotheforefrontasa frameworkmostadequatetomakessenseoutofthevariouscon ﬂ icts,disputes, andotherpressingissues.

Theeventsandtheoreticaldevelopmentsexplicatedabovehavehadadecisive inﬂuenceonsubsequentdiscussionsabouttolerationandhaveactuallycontributed tosomesortofarenaissanceoftheorizingovertoleration.As “oneofthedeﬁning topicsinpoliticalphilosophy” (WilliamsandWaldron 2008,p.1),tolerationremains tothisdayoneoftheconceptswhosecomplexityandcontroversialitycanhardlybe matched.Infact,bothhistoricallyandconceptuallytolerationhasbeenrepletewith problems,challenges,andparadoxes,few,ifanyoftheotherconceptsfromthe pantheonofpoliticalideasareentrustedwith.

Inparticular,thecomplexityofthefoundations,natureandvalueoftolerationand thecontroversialityofthestatus,thejustificationandthelimitsofwhatistobe tolerated,raiseanumberofquestionsoverthebasisoftolerationinaplurallydiverse polity.Astheexistingliteratureonthistopicclearlyexemplifies(e.g.,Brown 2014;McKinnonandCastiglione 2003a;Dees 2004;Deveaux 2000;Galeotti 2002;Heyd 1996;Kukathas 2003;McKinnon 2006;Mendus 1989;Newey 1999; Parekh 2000;Rawls 1993;Sardoč 2010;Sardoč 2013;Scanlon 2003;Spencer 2017;Taylor 1997 [1992];Walzer 1997;WilliamsandWaldron 2008),thepersistenceofmoralandconceptualobjectionsagainsttolerationconfirmthatanumberof issuesassociatedwiththetoleration-basedapproachtodiversityremaincontested.

Forexample,tolerationisnotauniversalstrategyforeachandeveryconflictwe mayencounter.Tolerationhasbeenastrategyformanagingonlypeculiarconflicts, asconceptualdiscussionsabouttheconditionsoftolerationmakeclear.AsRainer Forstemphasizeseloquently, “tolerationisanattitudeorpracticewhichisonly calledforwithinsocialconflictsofacertainkind” (2003,p.1).Itthereforeremainsa contestedissuewhatrepresentsagenuineobjectoftoleration.Inparticular,the “inflatoryuseoftoleration” (Ceva 2015,p.633)mayultimatelyendangeritsoverall coherence.

This,inturn,opensasetofchallengesassociatedwiththelimitsoftoleration. Thereisanimportantdistinctionthatneedstobemadebetweenthelogicalandthe moraldimensionofthelimitsoftoleration.Thelogicaldimensiondelineatesthe conditionsaparticularactneedstofulﬁllinordertoqualifyasanactoftoleration. Forexample,liberalandmulticulturalconceptionsofthelogicaldimensionofthe limitsoftolerationdifferprimarilyoverwhatcountsasarelevantobjectoftoleration.Ashasalreadybeenemphasized,tolerationtraditionallydealtwithreligious andmoralconﬂicts.Incontrast,amulticulturalconceptionoftolerationcanalsobe directedatidentitiesandnotonlyreligiousbeliefsorotherconscience-basedcommitmentsofindividuals.Thelogicaldimensionofthelimitsoftolerationistherefore linkedtothestatusaswellasthenatureoftheobjectoftoleration.

Incontrast,themoraldimensionofthelimitsoftolerationaddressestheproblem ofwhichdifferencesshouldbetoleratedandwhataretheprincipledbasesdelineatingthelimitsoftoleration.Themoraldimensiondeﬁnesthesituationwherethe reasonsfortherejectionofcertainbeliefs,practices,orconceptionsofthegoodare strongerthanthereasonsfortheiradoption.Themoraldimensiondetermineshow farthelimitsoftolerationaretobeextended.AsRainerFörstemphasizes,

Thedistinctivefeatureisthattolerancedoesnotresolve,butmerelycontainsanddefuses,the disputeinwhichitisinvoked;theclashofconvictions,interestsorpracticesremains,though certainconsiderationsmeanthatitlosesitsdestructiveness.(Först 2003,p.1)

Whilebothclassicalandcontemporaryproponentsoftolerationarguedsuccinctly foritsnecessityforthemaintenanceofastableandapeacefulpoliticalcommunity,its status,itsjustification,andthelimitsofwhatistobetoleratedremainlargelycontested. Attheheartofthesecontroversieslieanumberofconceptualandmoralproblems stemmingfromthemanyconceptsandideasthatarepartofitsgravitationalorbit, e.g.,civility,dignity,coercion,harm,power,conflict,disagreement,secularism, orthodoxy,dissent,knowledge,authority,domination,trust,restraint, non-interference,neutrality,fairness,pluralism,autonomy,(mutual)respect, recognition,etc.Moreover,theuseandapplicationoftolerationhasalsobeen questionedasitmightrepresentaformof “liberalexpectancy” (Rosenblum 1998, pp.53–57).Thisstrategyisbasedontheassumptionthattolerationwillgradually exertagravitationalinfluencebyattractingtowardsthetolerationthatwhatisbeing tolerated.AsSanfordLevinsonemphasized,tolerationofdiversityincludesthe expectancythat “exposuretodiversebeliefsandwaysoflifeovertimewillshift thetolerated ’sviewtowardsthoseofthetolerator” (Levinson 2003,pp.91–92). Liberalshopeandexpect,writesWillKymlicka, “thatethnic,religious,andcultural associationswill,overtime,voluntarilyadjusttheirpracticesandbeliefstobring themmoreinlinewiththepublicprinciplesofliberalism,whichwillreducethe ‘incongruence’ betweenassociationalnormsandliberalprinciples” (Kymlicka 2002,p.103).Similarly,asJürgenHabermasemphasizeseloquently,

[t]heliberalstateexpectsthatthereligiousconsciousnessofthefaithfulwillbecome modernizedbywayofacognitiveadaptationtotheindividualisticandegalitariannature ofthelawsofthesecularcommunity.(Habermas 2003,p.6)

Onthisinterpretation,tolerationwouldmostlikelyappearasanextensionofthe classical “formula” advancedbyvonClausewitzwherewarfunctionsas “the continuationofpoliticsbyothermeans.” Toextendtheinterpretationfurther,asan instrumentofliberalgovernance(Brown 2006),tolerationwouldappearasthe continuationofwarbyothermeansorassomesortofaliberal “Trojanhorse” aimedto “colonize” eitherilliberalornon-liberalcommunitiesassomeofitscritics mightargue(Žižek 2008).

Itthereforecomesasnosurprisethatdespiteitspoliticalrelevanceandtheoretical import,tolerationhasfounditselfincrossfirebetweenthedifferentpositionsfrom thepoliticalspectrumasitsuseandapplicationfounditswayalsoonthe “minefield” ofthe “WaronTerror.” Forexample,tolerationhasbeendefinedoneofthecentral valuesaimedtotackleradicalizationandviolentextremismina flagshipantiradicalizationprogramthatispartofthePreventstrategybytheUKgovernment. AsAwanetal.emphasize, “[t]heUKgovernmenthasdefinedextremismasthe ‘vocaloractiveoppositiontofundamentalBritishvalues,includingdemocracy,the ruleoflaw,individuallibertyandmutualrespectandtoleranceofdifferentfaithsand beliefs’” (Awanetal. 2019,p.10).Heretolerationfunctionsprimarilyasacivilizationaldiscourse(Brown 2006).Onthisinterpretation,tolerationappearsalsoasan ideologicalcategoryasissuesasdiverseasinequality,exploitation,domination,and discriminationhavebeenrecastasproblemsoftoleration. “Thelanguageoftolerationinliberaldemocracies,” writesGlenNewey, “isvulnerabletopoliticalmanipulationandthattheoriesthatignorethisfactriskbecoming,inthepejorativesense, ideological” (Newey 2013,p.3).

Interestinglyenough,thelanguageoftolerationhasalsofounditswayintothe moralizingrhetoricofzerotolerancebybecomingasloganusedbypublicauthoritiestotackleproblemsasdiverseasviolence,drugs,sexualharassment,corruption, etc.AsCatrionaMcKinnonandDarioCastiglioneaccentuate, “zerotolerance” standsasaslogan “foralessforgivingsociety” (2003,p.1).Forexample,the shiftofemphasishereisthatthefoundationalquestionoftoleration,i.e., “whatare thelimitsoftoleration” becomesredundantaszerotolerationmeansthatany phenomenonidentiﬁedastheonethatistobetackled,forexample,violenceor corruption,isequallyunacceptableasanyother.Thisopensarangeofseparate problemswithimportantconceptualandempiricalchallenges.AsGlenNewey emphasizes, “[t]hepoliticalrhetoricof ‘zerotolerance’ providesanexpression ofthiswayofthinking,whichsubvertstolerationbyappropriatingitsvocabulary ofcommendation” (2013,p.46).

SummaryandFutureDirections

Themainchallengediscussionsabouttolerationfaceisthereforenotoneofdirect criticismaddressedintheformofobjectionsbutprimarilyinarangeofmultitudeof shortcomingsthatmighthamperourunderstandingoftolerationinallitscomplexity. Ontheonehand,discussionsabouttolerationsomehowfailtoacknowledgethat thereisacontinuingimportofparadoxes,dilemmas,andotherconceptual

“mishaps.” Ontheotherhand,mostoftenwhentolerationisbeingdiscussed,its civilizationalimportisoftentimesneglected.AsMichaelWalzerrightlyemphasizes,

[t]olerationitselfisoftenunderestimated,asifitistheleastwecandoforourfellows,the mostminimaloftheirentitlements.Infact,[...]eventhemostgrudgingformsand precariousarrangements[oftoleration]areverygoodthings,sufﬁcientlyrareinhuman historythattheyrequirenotonlypracticalbutalsotheoreticalappreciation.(Walzer 1997, p.xi)

Lookingforalternativesforthoseinterestedingoingbeyondtolerationwould remainatitsmostproductivewhenitsacknowledgment – whateveritsfaultsmay be – willberightlyacknowledged.Itscontinuingrelevanceisultimatelyanimportantremindernotonlyofthebasiccivilizationalcommitmentto “liveandletlive” butoneperhapsmuchmorechallenging.Thetroublewithtoleration,asGlenNewey accentuatedinhisEpilogueto TolerationinPoliticalConﬂict, “isnotjustabout livingwithathreateningother,butaboutlivingwithourselves” (2013,p.209).

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Toleration:ConceptandConceptions 2

RainerForst

Contents

Introduction.......... .............................................................................11

TheConceptofTolerationandItsParadoxes ....................................................12 FourConceptionsofToleration ..................................................................16 SummaryandFutureDirections ..................................................................19 Cross-References .................................................................................19 References ........................................................................................20

Abstract

Inordertodojusticetothemultipleinterpretationsofthetermtoleration,itis usefultodistinguishacoreconceptoftolerationfromdifferentconceptionsofit. Foursuchconceptionscanbedeﬁned,eachinvolvingdifferentwaystorelateto otherswithwhomonedisagrees.Inaddition,tolerationshouldbeunderstoodasa normativelydependentconcept,i.e.,onewhichmustbecombinedwithjustiﬁcationsthatstemfromothernormativesources.

Keywords

Coexistence·Conceptoftoleration·Justiﬁcation·Paradoxesoftoleration· Permission·Respect

Introduction

Theterm “toleration” isusedinmanywaysandwithverydifferentevaluations, rangingfromverypositivetoextremelynegativeones(Forst 2013;Newey 2013). Forsome,itmarksanidealofpluralistcooperationandmutualesteem,andfor

R.Forst(*)

GoetheUniversity,NormativeOrdersResearchCentre,Frankfurt/Main,Germany e-mail: forst@em.uni-frankfurt.de

©TheAuthor(s),underexclusivelicencetoSpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2022 M.Sardoč (ed.), ThePalgraveHandbookofToleration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42121-2_11

others,ahierarchicalformofdominationandstigmatization.Therefore,onemight beledtoassumethatthereisnotjustonebutmanyconflictingconceptsoftoleration, inthesensethatIsaiahBerlin(1969)spokeof “twoconceptsofliberty.” However, thisassumptionisproblematic.For,iftheseusagesaretocountasunderstandingsof toleration,theymustshareacoremeaning,andthiscoreisthe concept oftoleration. Importantdifferencesresideinhowthiscoregetselaborated,thusconstituting different conceptions oftoleration,which,furthermore,areassociatedwithdifferent justifications fortoleration.FollowingJohnRawls’s(1999,p.5)proposal(apropos theconceptofjustice),a “concept” includesthecentralsemanticcontentsofthe term,whereas “conceptions” arespecificinterpretationsoftheelementscontained withinthegeneralconcept.

TheConceptofTolerationandItsParadoxes

Thecoreconceptoftolerationisdeﬁnedbythreecomponents,eachofwhichis connectedwithaparticularparadox.

1.Ofprimaryimportancefortheconceptoftolerationisthefactthatthetolerated convictionsorpracticesareregardedasfalseorcondemnedasbad;following PrestonKing(1976,pp.44–51),thiscanbedescribedasthe objectioncomponent.Withoutthiscomponent,onewouldnotspeakoftolerationbutinstead eitherofindifference(theabsenceofanegativeorpositivevaluation)orof afﬁrmation(thepresenceofapositivevaluation).Althoughthesetwoattitudes areoftenconfusedwithtoleration,theyareinfactincompatiblewithit.

Althoughtodemandthatthereasonsforobjectionshouldbe “objective” or “capableofbeinggenerallyshared” seemsexcessive,neverthelesscertaincriteria foranacceptableobjectionareindispensable – atleastifweunderstandtolerance asavirtue(inthefollowing,theterm “tolerance” isusedprimarilytodenotea particularattitudeandtheterm “toleration” mainlytorefertoapractice,butthe conceptualargumentholdsforboth).Iftheobjectionrestedonmereprejudices, suchasbeliefintheinferiorityofcertain “races,” orevenonblindhatred,thenthe callfortolerancewouldacceptsuchobjectionsandprejudicesasvalidjudgementstoacertainextent.Thiscouldleadtothe paradoxofthe “tolerantracist” accordingtowhichsomeonewithextremeracistantipathieswouldbedescribed astolerantprovidedonlythatheorsheshowedrestraintinhisorheractions (withoutchanginghisorherwayofthinking).Andthemoresuchprejudicesthe racisthad,thegreaterwouldbehisorherscopefortolerance(Horton 1994, p.17f.;Newey 1999,p.107f.).Tocallonaracisttobetolerant,therefore,seems mistaken;whatweshoulddoinsteadiscalluponhimorhertorepudiate thisprejudiceandattempttoconvincehimorherofitsgroundlessness(Crick 1971).Otherwise,thedemandfortolerationwouldbeindangerofexerting repressiveeffectsbyperpetuatingsocialdiscriminationandmorallydemeaning condemnations.

Resolvingthisparadoxregardingthevirtueoftolerancerequirestheformulationofminimalconditionsforobjectionjudgements,which,toputitnegatively, excludegrosslyirrationalandimmoralprejudices.Reasonsforobjectionwill,of course,bedrawnfromparticularethicalbeliefsystems;butthekeypointisthat theymustnotfallbelowacertainmoralthresholdbeneathwhichonecannot speakoftoleranceasavirtue.

2.Inadditiontotheobjectioncomponent,tolerationalsohasan acceptancecomponent (King 1976,pp.51–54),whichspeciﬁesthatthetoleratedconvictionsand practicesarecondemnedasfalseorbad,yetnotsofalseorbadthatother,positive reasonsdonotspeakinfavoroftoleratingthem.Theimportantpointhereisthat thepositivereasonsdonotcanceloutthenegativeonesbutaresetagainstthemin suchawaythat,althoughtheytrumpthenegativereasons,theobjectionneverthelessretainsitsforce.Thepracticalreﬂectionofthosewhoexercisetolerance consistsinthisbalancingofreasons.

Thenatureofthereasonsforobjectionoracceptanceremainsopenatthe levelofthegeneralde fi nitionoftheconcept.Thus,anegativeaesthetic valuationcanbeoffsetbyapositiveethicalormoralevaluationorareligiously groundedobjectionbyotherreligiouslygroundedconsiderations.Ifthereasonsforobjectionaswellasthoseforacceptanceareidentifi edas “ moral, ” the paradoxariseshowitcanbemorallyright orevenobligatorytotoleratewhatis morallywrongorbad.Thisparadox,whichwecancallthe paradoxofmoral toleration ,hasbeenexhaustivelydiscussedi ntheliteratureontolerationand hasinspiredverydifferentproposals.AccordingtoJohnHorton(1994 ,p.13), theparadoxcanberesolvedifeitherpragmaticreasonsspeakfortolerationorit becomesclearthatlackoftolerationwouldjeopardizeahigher-levelvalue suchasfreedomorautonomy.AccordingtoSusanMendus( 1989 ,p.161f.),we mustgobeyondliberaljusti fi cationsandappealtotheideathattolerating somethingtowhichoneobjects,butwhichneverthelessispartofpeople’s identities,isimperativeifwearetocreateaninclusivesociety.GlenNewey ( 1999 ,p.73f.)arguesthattolerancemustberegardedasasupererogatory attitudeonthegroundsthatthereasonsforobjectionsaremorallysuf fi cientto repudiateaconvictionorpractice protanto ,andhencethattherecannotbean obligationtotolerate(seealsoBejan[ 2017 ]ontolerationoutofastanceof “ civility ” ).

Thisisnottheplacetoexaminethese(andother)proposalssincethatwould meanexaminingthefullspectrumofjustificationsfortoleration.Itbecomes apparent,however,thatresolvingtheparadoxofmoraltolerationdependson clarifyinghowthereasonsforobjectionmustbeconstitutedinordertoadmita morally(andnotjuststrategically)grounded,higher-levelacceptancecomponent withoutcontradiction;andthiscalls,forexample,foradistinctionbetween ethical and moral reasonsandthecorrespondingjudgementsconcerning “wrong” or “bad” convictionsandpractices.Thus,acasefortolerationarises whereonehasethicalobjectionsagainstcertainpracticesasbeingdetrimentalto thegoodlifebut findsnobasicmoralfaultwiththemsuchthattheyviolate essentialstandardsofmoralrespect.Forexample,onemay findacertainreligious

wayoflifewrongheadedbutacceptitbecauseitdoesnotdenyotherpeople’s basicrights.

Theparadoxinquestionisreﬂectedattheepistemologicallevel.For,ifthe objectionto “wrong” convictionsisunderstoodasafunctionofbeingconvinced ofthetruthofone’sownsystemofvalues,thenthe paradoxoftherelativization oftruth follows.Accordingtothis,thepersonwhoexercisestoleranceseemsto becompelledtoregardherconvictionsastrueinordertoarriveatanegative judgementandatthesametimetoassumethattheconvictionsobjectedtocould alsobetrueifsheistoarriveatajudgementofacceptance.Thisparadoxposesa seriousproblemfortheconceptoftoleration,foritamountstothedemandfora kindofrelativizationandrestrictionofone’sownconvictionswhichdoesnot fundamentallyplaceone’sbeliefintheirtruthinquestion – a relativization withoutrelativism,asitwere.Oneofthecentralissuesindiscussionsofreligious toleration,forexample,ishowtolerationispossiblewithoutrelativismorskepticism(Forst 2013;Rawls 2005).

3.Theconceptoftolerationimpliestheneedtospecifythe limitsoftoleration.This isaconceptualmatter,fortolerationinvolvesstrikingaprecariousbalance betweennegativeandpositivereasonsandpresupposesthewillingnesstosuspendtolerationwhenthetoleratedconvictionsandpracticesarejudgedinsuch negativetermsthatthepositivereasonsarenolongersufﬁcienttocounterbalance them.Thespaceoftolerationislimited.Towanttotolerate “everything” isan incoherentstance,forinthatcase,onewouldhavetotolerateapracticeandatthe sametimealsotolerateitnotbeingtolerated(seeForst 2020 vs.Kukathas 2020). Butunlimitedtolerationisalsoimpossibleforpracticalreasons,for,accordingto Popper(1994),itwouldentailtheparadoxthattolerationcoulddisappearaltogether:iftolerationextendstotheenemiesoftoleration,itleadstoitsown destruction(thiscouldbecalledthe paradoxofself-destruction).Thisparadox isovercomewhenweacknowledgethattolerationisjustiﬁablyrestrictedandwe understanditasinvolvingacertainformofreciprocity,sothatextremeintolerancedoesnothavetobetolerated(andundercertainconditionsshouldnotbe toleratedeither).

Howshouldthelimitsoftolerationbedrawn?Hereitisimportanttorecognize that,inadditiontothereasonsforobjectionandreasonsforacceptance,weneeda thirdcategoryofreasons,namely,thoseforrejectingconvictionsandpractices, wheretherejectioncannolongerbeoffsetbyreasonsforacceptance.Hencehere wecanspeakofa rejectioncomponent.Thenatureofthereasonsforrejectionis notpredetermined:theycanbeofthesamekindasthereasonsforobjectionorthe reasonsforacceptance,buttheycanalsobeofadifferentkind.

Againstthisbackground,weshouldmakeadistinctionbetweentwoboundaries:the ﬁrstboundaryisthatbetween(a)thenormativedomainofwhatone agreeswithcompletely,inwhichthereisafﬁrmationandnoobjection – the domainofwhatistruly “one’sown,” asitwere – and(b)thedomainofwhatcan betoleratedinwhichthereisnormativeobjectionandyetalsoanacceptance whichleadstotoleration;thesecondboundary,thetruelimitoftoleration,runs betweenthelatterdomainand(c)thedomainofwhatcannotbetolerated,ofwhat

isstrictlyrejectedandrepudiated.Whenitcomestotoleration,therefore,wemust distinguishthreenormativedomains,notjusttwo.

Inlightoftheforegoing,however,theresolutionoftheparadoxofselfdestructionseemstogiverisetoanewparadox.Iftheconceptoftoleration impliesthenecessityofdrawingaboundary,theneveryconcretizationofthe conceptleadstothedrawingofaboundarywhichplacesthetolerantonthe “good” sideincontrasttothosewhoarelabelledas “intolerable” or “intolerant” asaconsequence.Butthenthereisnogenuinetolerationbecausethisone-sided actseemstobeitselfanactofintoleranceandofarbitraryexclusion.Whatlays claimtothenameoftolerationmerelyservestoprotectandstrengthenone’sown evaluativeconvictionsandpracticesandtoclaimahigherformoflegitimacyfor them.Neithersidecanfallbackonsuchaclaimtolegitimacy,however.Therefore,the paradoxofdrawingthelimits statesthattolerationmustalways ﬂipover intoitsopposite,intolerance,onceittracestheinevitableboundarybetweenwhat canandcannotbetolerated(Fish 1997;Minow 1990).

Thisparadoxpointstocentraldifﬁcultieswiththeconceptoftoleration.Forit canindeedbeshownhistoricallythatwherethemaxim “Notolerationtowards theintolerant!” was ﬁlledwithcontent,intolerancealltoooftencreptinandmade itspresencefelt,forexample,whentheadherentsofaparticularreligion(or atheists)were – andare – distrustedandcondemnedasagroup.Therearegood reasonsformistrustingthewayinwhichtheboundariesseparatingthe “tolerant” fromthe “intolerant” weredrawnhistoricallyandcontinuetobedrawntoday. Hereweshouldnotforgetthattolerationisalwaysamatterofsocialpower (BrownandForst 2014).

However,thedeconstructivist-skepticalargumentthatpurportstodemonstrate theincoherenceoftolerationmustbetreatedwithsomeskepticismbecauseit conflatestwomeaningsof “intolerance” whichshouldbekeptapart.Forto describeboththeattitudeandbehaviorofthosewhoroundlyrejectthenormof tolerationandtheattitudeandconductofthosewhodonottoleratethisalikeas “intolerant” presupposesarelativismconcerningvalueswhichfundamentally doubtsthepossibilityofdrawingthelimitsoftolerationinanonarbitraryand justifiableway.Thisanswerdoesnotresolvetheparadoxinquestion,however. Rather,itpresupposesthepossibilityofanonarbitraryjustificationofthelimitsof toleration,sothattheidentificationandcritiqueofintolerancecannotitselfbe describedassimilarly “intolerant.” Noteveryrejectioncouldthenbecriticizedas abadformofintolerance,butonlyarejectionwhichlacksgoodreasons.The normativemeaningoftheconceptoftolerationcanberescuedonlyifone succeedsinplacingitonahigher-level,generallyjustifiablefoundationwhich cannotbedeconstructedasone-sidedandarbitrary.

4.Theconceptoftolerationisfurthercharacterizedbythefactthattolerancemustbe exercised ofone’sownfreewill andmaynotbecoerced.Forinthatcase,one wouldspeakinsteadof “puttingupwith” or “bearing” practicesagainstwhichone ispowerless(GarcónValdéz 1995,p.471).However,toconcludefromthisthat thetoleratingpartymustactuallybeinapositionofpowerfromwhichtheycould effectivelypreventthepracticesinquestionseemsunfounded(Williams 1996). 2Toleration:ConceptandConceptions15

Foraminoritywhoarenotequippedwithsuchpowercanalsoadoptanattitudeof toleranceandbeofthe(uncoerced)convictionthat,iftheyhadsufﬁcientmeansof powerattheirdisposal,theywouldnotusethemtothedisadvantageofothers.

5.Finally,itisimportanttokeepinmindthattheconceptitselfleavesopenthe questionofwhich justification oftolerationisthecorrectormostappropriateone. Hence,inordertoacquireanormativecontentandtoleadtoajustifiedconception,theconceptmustbe filledoutwithotherprinciplesorvalues – andonlyin thiswaydoesitbecomeavirtueoraparticularpractice.Theconceptoftoleration itselfremainsa normativelydependentconcept whichisindeterminatewithout othernormativevaluesorprinciples.Thehistoryoftoleration(Forst 2013)can thenalsobeunderstoodasthehistoryofthejustificationsthathavebeenusedto fillthethreecomponentsofobjection,acceptance,andrejectionwithcontent.

FourConceptionsofToleration

Inlightofthischaracterizationofthecentralelementsoftheconceptoftoleration, wecandistinguishfourconceptionswhichprovidespeciﬁcinterpretationsofthese elements.Allofthemrefertothepoliticalcontextofastateinwhichthesubjects (whoarealsomembersofparticularcommunities)exhibitimportant,profound differences.Theseconceptionsoftolerationarenotconstruedasdifferentregimes oftoleration,whetherinthesenseofahistoricalseriesorinMichaelWalzer ’s(1997) senseofdistinctsocialarrangements.For,ascurrentdiscussionsoftheproblemof tolerationshow,theseconceptionsexist simultaneously inpresent-daysocieties. Moreover,manyoftheheateddiscussionsaboutwhattolerationmeansinconcrete termscanbeunderstoodasconﬂictsbetweenadvocatesoftheseconceptions.

1.Onthe ﬁrstconception,whichwecancallthe permissionconception,toleration designatestherelationbetweenanauthorityormajorityandaminoritywhich doesnotsubscribetothedominantsystemofvalues.Tolerationheremeansthat theauthority(ormajority)grantstheminoritythepermissiontoliveinaccordancewithitsconvictionsaslongasitdoesnotquestionthepredominanceofthe authority(ormajority).TheEdictofNantesof1598,whichwassupposedtoput anendtotheconﬂictsbetweenCatholicsandHuguenotsinFrance,canserveasa historicalexample.InitHenryIVdeclared: “[N]ottoleaveanyoccasionof troubleanddifferenceamongourSubjects,wehavepermittedanddopermitto thoseoftheReformedReligion,toliveanddwellinalltheCitiesandplacesof thisourKingdomandCountreysunderourobedience,withoutbeinginquired after,vexed,molested,orcompelledtodoanythinginReligion,contrarytotheir Conscience,norbyreasonofthesamebesearchedafterinhousesorplaceswhere theylive” (seeMousnier 1973,pp.316–347).Themorethanfourcenturiesthat separateusfromthisedict(whichwasrevokedin1685)shouldnotmisleadus intothinkingthatthisformoftolerationhaslostitsrelevance;onthecontrary,itis oftenraisedasaminimaldemandbyoppressedminoritiesandplaysanimportant roleintheinterestcalculationsofstatesandmajoritypopulationswithinstates.

Aslongasthedifferencebetweentheminorityandthemajorityremains withinlimitsanda “privatematter,” sothatnodemandismadeforapublic politicalstatusbasedonequalrights,onthisconceptiontheminoritycanbe toleratedprimarilyonpragmaticgrounds,althoughalsoforreasonsofprinciple. Accordingtothepermissionconception,therefore,tolerationmeansthatthe authorityormajoritywhichhasthepowerandopportunitytointerveneandto coercetheminorityinto(atleastexternal)conformity, “putsupwith” their differenceandrefrainsfromintervening,whiletheminorityisforcedtoaccept theauthority’spositionofpower.Therefore,thetolerationsituationisnotreciprocal:onesidepermitstheothercertaindeviationsfromthedominantpracticesor beliefsprovidedthatthepoliticaldominanceofthepermission-grantingsideis notinfringedupon.Tolerationisaccordinglyunderstoodas permissiomali,as puttingupwithaconvictionorpracticewhichisregardedasneitherworthynor deservingofequaltreatment,eventhoughitdoesnotexceedthe “limitsofthe bearable.” ItisthisconceptionwhichGoethehadinmindinhisdictum concerningtolerationasaninsult: “Toleranceshouldbeatemporaryattitude only;itmustleadtorecognition.Totoleratemeanstoinsult” (Goethe 1998, p.116;translationamended).

2.Thesecondconceptionoftoleration,the coexistenceconception,resemblesthe firstinassertingthattolerancecountsasanappropriatemeansofavoidingconflict andpursuingone’sownendsanddoesnotitselfrepresentavalueorrestonstrong values.Tolerationisjustifiedprimarilyinpragmaticandinstrumentalterms.What isdifferent,however,istheconstellationformedbythesubjectsandobjectsof toleration.Fornow,itisnotanauthorityormajorityandaminorityorminorities whichconfrontoneanotherbutgroupsofapproximatelyequalstrengthswho recognizethattheymustexercisetoleranceforthesakeofsocialpeace.They preferpeacefulcoexistencetoconflictandconsenttotherulesofamodusvivendi intheguiseofamutualcompromise.Thetolerationrelationisthusnolongera verticalone,asinthepermissionconception,butahorizontalone:thosewho exercisetoleranceareatthesametimealsotolerated.Theinsightintothe preferabilityofaconditionoftolerationdoesnothaveastrongnormativecharacterbutisratheraninsightintopracticalnecessities.

3.Bycontrast,the respectconception oftolerationproceedsfromamorally groundedformofmutualrespectonthepartoftheindividualsorgroupswho exercisetoleration.Thetoleratingpartiesrespectoneanotherasautonomous personsorasequallyentitledmembersofapoliticalcommunityconstituted undertheruleoflaw(Scanlon 1996;Yovel 1998).Althoughtheirethicalconvictionsaboutthegoodandworthwhilelifeandtheirculturalpracticesdiffer profoundlyandareinimportantrespectsincompatible,theyrecognizeoneanother – andhereanalternativewithfar-reachingconsequencespresentsitself – as ethicallyautonomousauthorsoftheirownlives(Raz 1988;Weale 1985) or as moralandlegalequalsinthesensethat,astheyseeit,thebasicstructureof politicalandsociallifecommontoall,whichconcernsthebasicquestionsofthe ascriptionofrightsandtheallocationofsocialresources(Rawls 2005,lec.7), shouldbegovernedbynormswhichcanbeacceptedbyallcitizensalikewithout

privileginganysingle “ethicalcommunity” (e.g.,areligiouscommunity)(Forst 2013;Habermas 2004).Thismaybebasedonrespectforthemoralautonomyof theindividualandher “righttojustification” ofnormswhichclaimtobereciprocallyandgenerallyvalid(Forst 2012).Notwithstandingthealternativebetween justificationsbaseduponatheorythat – followingclassicalliberalism – treatsthe righttobetheautonomousauthorofone’slifeascentralandjustificationsbased uponanapproachwhichemphasizestheprincipleoftheimpartialjustificationof universalnormsofjustice,therespectconceptiondoesnotrequirethatthe toleratingpartiesmustregardandvalueeachothers’ conceptionsofthegoodas equally(orinpart)trueandethicallygood;rather,theyshouldbeabletoviewthem (andherethealternativeagaincomesintoplay)astheresultsofautonomous choicesorasnotimmoral.Thepersonoftheotheris respected;herconvictions andactionsare tolerated

Twomodelsoftherespectconceptioncanbedistinguished,thatof formal equality andthatof qualitativeequality.Theformerassumesastrictseparation betweentheprivateandpublicdomainsaccordingtowhichethicaldifferences betweencitizensshouldbeconﬁnedtotheprivatedomainandmustnotleadto conﬂictswithinthepublicpoliticalsphere.Allcitizensareequaland,asequals, theystand “outside” or “above” theirprivateconvictions.Thismodelcanbe foundinliberalandrepublicanversionsdependingonwhetherindividual,private libertyorthepoliticalequalityofthe citoyens isaccordedcentralimportance;an exampleofthelatteristheviewoftheFrenchauthoritiesthatheadscarvesasa religioussymbolhavenoplaceinapublicschool(Galeotti 1993).Themodelof formalequality,therefore,turnsessentiallyondefendingclassicallibertyrightsof citizensandavoidingdiscriminationonethicalgrounds.

Themodelofqualitativeequality,bycontrast,isareactiontothefactthat certainstrictregulationsofformalequalityareindangerofgivingpreferenceto ethical-culturalformsoflifewhoseconvictionsandpracticescanbemoreeasily reconciledwithsuchaseparationbetween “private” and “public” orcorrespond tothereceivedunderstandingofthisseparation.Viewedinthislight,themodelof formalequalityisitselfpotentiallyintolerantanddiscriminatorytowardsformsof lifewhichlayclaimtoakindofpublicpresencethatcontradictscustomary practiceandconventionalinstitutions.Accordingtothealternativemodel,personsrespectoneanotheraslegalandpoliticalequalswhoneverthelesshave different,politicallyrelevantethicalandculturalidentitieswithaspecialclaimto considerationandtoleration,becausethevaluesandconvictionsconstitutiveof theseidentitieshaveaspecialexistentialmeaningforpersons.Thisdemandfor respectinthesenseoffairnesscalls, ﬁnally,forparticularexceptionstoor changesintraditionalrulesandstructures(LadenandOwen 2007;Waldronand Williams 2008).

4.Indiscussionsoftherelationbetweenmulticulturalismandtoleration,afourth conceptionisoccasionallyencounteredwhichcanbecalledthe esteemconception. Itinvolvesamoredemandingformofrecognitionthantherespectconceptionfor, accordingtoit,tolerationmeansnotonlyrespectingthemembersofotherculturalor religiouscommunitiesaslegalandpoliticalequalsbutalsoesteemingtheir

convictionsandpracticesasethicallyvaluable(Apel 1997;Bauman 1991;Kristeva 1991).However,ifthisistoremainaconceptionoftolerationandtheobjection componentisnottobelost,theesteeminquestionmustbelimitedor “with reservations,” sothattheotherformoflifedoesnotcountasequallyasgoodas, orevenbetterthan,one’sown.Onevaluescertainaspectsofthisformoflifewhile objectingtoothers;however,thedomainofwhatcanbetoleratedisdeﬁnedbythe valueswhichoneafﬁrmsinanethicalsense.Thus,thisconceptionoftoleration corresponds,fromaliberalperspective,toaversionofvaluepluralismwhichholds thatarivalryexistswithinasocietybetweenintrinsicallyworthwhileyetincompatibleformsoflife(Raz 1988)and,fromthecommunitarianperspective,totheview thatthereareparticular,sociallysharednotionsofthegoodlifewhosepartial variationscanbetolerated(Sandel 1989).

SummaryandFutureDirections

Theconceptualanalysisoftolerationprovidesaframeworkfor fleshingoutdifferent conceptionsoftoleration,butgiventhenormativedependencyoftheconcept,the sourcesoftheprinciplesandvaluesusedtodeterminethegroundsofobjection, acceptance,orrejectionarenotpredeterminedbythisanalysis.WithinWesternhistory, onemajorsourceforallofthethreesetsofreasonswasreligiousfaith,whetherJewish, Christian,orMuslim.Inthecourseofhistory,manyotherfoundationswereadded,and apartfromstrategicorinstrumentalconsiderations,valuessuchaspeace,truth,reason, autonomy,community,identity,democracy,humandignity,andthelikewereusedto justifyastanceorpoliciesoftoleration.Someofthesefoundationslendthemselves moretooneratherthananotherconception,buttherangeofpossiblecombinationsis broad.Atthispoint,normativereflectionthatisconnectedbutnotbasedonthe foregoinganalysisbecomesnecessary.Itmaybehelpfultoconsiderthequestionof tolerationtobeaquestionof justice andofthemutualjustifiabilityofacommonlegal andpoliticalnormativeorder,butthatquestioncannotbefurtherexploredhere(Forst 2013).Itremainsamatterforfurtherresearchtodiscusstheadvantagesandproblems ofvariousjustificationsfortoleration.

Anotherimportantdirectionforfurtherresearchistotranscendtheboundariesof Westerntraditionsanddiscoursesandinquireintothewayinwhichothertraditions andreﬂectionsdealtwiththequestionoftoleration,especiallywhetherthereisa particular,similarconceptforitornotandhowtolerationwasjustiﬁed(Chan 2014; Dhouib 2020;Flanagan 2013).

TranslatedbyCiaranCronin

Cross-References

▶ ParadoxesofToleration ▶ TolerationandJustice ▶ TolerationandLibertyofConscience

▶ TolerationandNeutrality

▶ TolerationandReasonableness

References

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GaleottiAE(1993)Citizenshipandequality.Theplacefortoleration.PoliticalTheory21(4):585–605 GarcónValdézE(1995)NimmdeinedreckigenPfotenvonmeinemMozart!’ Überlegungenzum BegriffderToleranz.In:GarcónValdézE,ZimmerlingR(eds)FacettenderWahrheit.Alber, Freiburg

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DefiningToleration

AndrewJasonCohen

A.Indifference,SimpleNoninterference,Resignation .......................................25 B.A Principle ofToleration ..................................................................28

C.Pluralism,Multiculturalism,Diversity ....................................................28

1. Agent(“ an agent tolerateswhenshe ... ”). ...............................................35

2. Intentional(“anagenttolerateswhenshe intentionally ... ”) ............................36

3. Value(“anagenttolerateswhensheintentionally andonprinciple ... ”). ...............36

4. Noninterference(“anagenttolerateswhensheintentionallyandonprinciple refrains frominterfering ”) .........................................................................41

5. Opposition(“anagenttolerateswhensheintentionallyandonprinciplerefrainsfrom interferingwithan opposed ”). ............................................................43

6. Object(“anagenttolerateswhensheintentionallyandonprinciplerefrainsfrom interferingwithanopposed other(ortheirbehavior,etc.) ”). ............................46

7. BelievedPower(“anagenttolerateswhensheintentionallyandonprinciplerefrains frominterferingwithanopposedother(ortheirbehavior,etc.),though shebelievesshehas thepowertointerfere”). ......................................................................47

SummaryandFutureDirections ..................................................................49

References ........................................................................................51

Abstract

Thetaskofthischapteristoprovidewhatisnecessaryforaconceptualanalysis oftolerationsuchthatonewouldhaveacleardeﬁnitionofthiscentralliberal tenet.First,notionsrelatedtobutdifferentfromtolerationarediscussed;this

A.J.Cohen

GeorgiaStateUniversity,Atlanta,GA,USA

e-mail: cohenaj@gsu.edu

©TheAuthor(s),underexclusivelicencetoSpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2022 M.Sardoĉ (ed.), ThePalgraveHandbookofToleration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42121-2_20

providesguidancebyintroducingthelikelydefinitionalconditionsoftoleration. Next,thoseconditionsareexplicatedanddefended.Puttingtheconditions together,wecansay anagenttolerateswhensheintentionallyandonprinciple refrainsfrominterferingwithanopposedother(ortheirbehavior, etc.),though shebelievesshehasthepowertointerfere.Thisdefinitionisneithernormatively loadednorsufficientformoralorpoliticaltheory.Readersmayalsoprefera definitionmadewithsomesubsetoftheconditionsratherthanall.

Keywords

Toleration·Tolerance·Interference·Neutrality·Diversity·Pluralism·Power

Introduction

Tolerationhasbeencalled “thesubstantiveheartofliberalism” (Hampton 1989:802). Thisshouldbeunderstoodaspreciselyaspossible.Thetaskofthischapteristhusto providewhatisnecessaryforaconceptualanalysisoftolerationsuchthatonewould haveacleardefinitionofthiscentralliberaltenet.First,notionsrelatedto,butdifferent from,tolerationarediscussed;thisprovidesguidancebyintroducingthelikely definitionalconditionsoftoleration.Next,thoseconditionsareexplicatedand defended.Puttingtheconditionstogether,wecansay anagenttolerateswhenshe intentionallyandonprinciplerefrainsfrominterferingwithanopposedother(ortheir behavior, etc.),thoughshebelievesshehasthepowertointerfere1.Thisdefinitionis neithernormativelyloadednorsufficientformoralorpoliticaltheory.Readersmay alsopreferadefinitionmadewithsomesubsetoftheconditionsratherthanall.

RelatedConcepts

Whilewealllikelyhavesomeinchoateideasabouttoleration,itisalsolikelythat theseideasaresomewhatconfused.Outsidetheworldofacademicphilosophy,the term “toleration” isoftenusedindifferentways.Sincemuchofthatvariation ﬁnds itswayintoscholarlythought,itisworthdistinguishingtolerationfromother conceptswithwhichitisoftenconfusedbeforeengagingdirectlyinconceptual

1ThisisarevisionofworkinChaps.1and2ofCohen(2018),whichwasitselfrevisedfromCohen (2004a).ThedefinitiondefendedhereisthusamodificationofthatinCohen(2004a):thatanactof tolerationisanagent’sintentionalandprincipledrefrainingfrominterferingwithanopposedother (ortheirbehavior,etc.)insituationsofdiversity,wheretheagentbelievesshehasthepowerto interfere.Thecurrentversionismeanttobesubstantivelyequivalenttothe2004athoughwiththe removaloftherequirementof “situationsofdiversity,” whichnowseemstometoaddnothingto thedefinitionforreasonsImakeclear.IamgratefultoTaylorandFrancis(Routledge)for permissiontousethematerialfromCohen(2018)and Ethics fortheearlierpermissiontousethe materialfromCohen(2004a).

analysis.Thiswillalsoprovideguidancefordeterminingwhatthecoreideaof tolerationisaswebegintoseeconditionsnecessaryfortoleration.These,indeed, willappearquitequicklyinthisdiscussion;itwillnonethelessbeworthlookingata numberofotherconceptsthatareoftenconfusedwithtoleration.Thefollowinglist owesmuchtoRobertPaulChurchill 1997 (esp.193–198).Inparticular,indifference, resignation,permissiveness,andneutralityareallsuggestedinhisdiscussion, thoughtheyarediscusseddifferentlyhere.Ofcourse,alloftheseconcepts – and theothersdiscussedhere – are related totoleration.Iftheywerenot,therewouldbe noconfusion.Somemaybeonacontinuumwithtoleration,butweneednotbe concernedwiththathere.

A.Indifference,SimpleNoninterference,Resignation

Tolerationisnotindifferenceorsimplenoninterference.Ifyouseesomeoneplaying baseballandhavenointerestinthatAmericangame,youwouldlikelywalkpast withoutinterfering;whenyoudo,itdoesnotseemrighttosayyoutoleratethe behavior.Thereasonforthisseemsstraightforward:wethinkofourselvesas toleratingonlywhenwerecognizesomethinganddisapproveor,atleast,dislikeit. Ifsomeoneisthrowingaballagainstyourwall,youmaytolerateit(ornot) – inpart becausethebehaviorannoys.Somenegativeresponseisnecessaryforourlackof interferencetocountastoleration.Putanotherway,wemust care (seeChurchill 1997:193;DavidHeyd 1996:4;andEdwardLangerak 1997:111).Absentcaring aboutthatwithwhichwerefrainfrominterfering,wearenottoleratingit.Itmaybe thatweareindifferenttoitorthatwesimplydonotnoticeit.

Fromthisbriefdiscussion,wealreadyseethatwearethesortsofbeingsthatcan tolerate,thattolerationrequiresnoninterference,andthatbehaviorissomethingthat canbetolerated.Thesethreefactsseemuncontroversial;theywillbeconditionsone (agent),four(noninterference),andsix(object).Alsointerestingisthattoleration requiresthatthetoleratorhavesomenegativeresponse;asBernardWilliams explains, “Ifyoudonotcareallthatmuchwhatanyonebelieves,youdonotneed toleration Indeed,ifIandothersintheneighborhoodsaidwewere tolerating thehomosexualrelationsofthecouplenextdoor,ourattitudewouldbethoughtless thanliberal” (Williams 1996:20).Interestingly,then,aworldpopulatedbyindividualsindifferenttothosetheydonotknowandlikemightbebetterthanaworld populatedbyindividualswhoknowandtoleratethoseothers.Onewaypeoplecan toleratemoreoften,afterall,istohavemorenegativereactions.Hortonnotes somethingsimilar(1996:34)whichhepointsoutmaybethoughtparadoxical(see Horton 1994).Newey’sdiscussionofthe “censorioustolerator ” (1999:107ffand elsewhere)ishelpfulindispellingtheparadox,butitcanalsobedispelledbynoting thatthoughtheagentwhohasmorenegativereactionsisless tolerant,hemay tolerate more(seethediscussionabout tolerance below).Indeed,Williams’spoint (above)issimplythat “beingliberal” (inthecolloquialsense)requiresbeingtolerant, nottolerating.Theneedforanegativereaction – fortoleration,nottolerance – will becondition ﬁve(opposition).

Havinganegativereactiontosomethingisnotenoughtomakenoninterference withittoleration.Onemayrefrainfrominterferingwithit,afterall,becauseone recognizesthatonehasnopowertostopthedislikedbehavior,becausethe opposedotherisphysicallystrongeror,differently,becauseothershaverights “ eveniftheyexercisethoserightsinunattractiveways” (Walzer 1997 :11;seealso 59).Noninterferenceweresignourselvestobecausewecannotdootherwiseisnot tolerationbutamatterenduringwhatonedoesnotlike – asortofresignation, “ mererestraint ” (Heyd 1996:14),or “ akindofmoralstoicism ” (Walzer 1997 :11). Thepersonengaginginthisformofnoninterferenceresignsherselftolivingwith othersforthesakeofpeace,asifinasortofmodusvivendi(seeJohnRawls 1999a , esp.430 – 433)or “ pragmaticcompromise ” (Heyd 1996 :4;seealsoWalzer 1997 :10).

Ifthesedescriptionsareaccurate,whydon’tweconsidertheseactivitiestoleration?Why,thatis,doesone’sresignationtoone’sinabilitytopreventsomebehavior notcountastoleration?Simplyput,itisbecausewethinktolerationissomethingwe do fortherightreasons.Thepresenceofthosereasonsmatters.Wemightsaythat one endures whatone(believesone) hasto;one tolerates whatone(believesone) should

Tobeclear,etymologically,theLatinrootoftoleration, “tolerantia,” is “broadly intendedtolabel ... thegeneralnotionofenduring,” asPrestonKingpointsout (King 1976:12;seealsoCreppell 2002:5).Kingalsonotesthis,though,asadistinct use.Whatisherecalled “resignation,” Kingcalls “‘acquiescence ’ or ‘sufferance’ or ‘endurance’”; “toleration” isdifferentandlikelyrequireswhatisbelowcalledthe believedpower condition(King 1976:21).GeorgeFletchersimilarlypointsoutthat inGerman,Hebrew,andRussian,the “samerootgeneratesbothtoleranceand patience” (Fletcher 1996:237note12)butaddsthat “people[haveto] care enough tobetolerantratherthanindifferent” (237;emphasisadded).Thereareoftentimes whentheconceptsseemtooverlap,atleastinordinarylanguage.Wesay,for example,thatoneenduresapainandthatonetoleratesit(orbuildsone’stolerance towardit).Ifsomethingcouldbedoneaboutthatpain – takingananalgesic,for example – butoneintentionallyandonprinciplerefrainsfromdoingso,itmaybe tolerationaswell.

Importantlyatthispoint,noninterferencemustbe valued orproperly principled forittocountastoleration.Thiswillbeconditionthree(value).Itisobvious,but worthpointingout,thatforacaseofnoninterferencetobeprincipled,itmustalsobe intentional – onedoesnotactonone’sprinciplesbyaccident.Thiswillbecondition two.(Whileanactioncouldbeintentionalandunprincipled,itcannotbeprincipled andunintentional.Hence,wecouldconsidertheintentionalityrequirementasubconditionofthevaluecondition.)

Onemustrefrainfrominterferingforgoodreasonforone’snoninterferencetobe toleration.Thatonemustactforgoodreasonmeansthatone’sbeliefstatesmatter whendeterminingifoneistoleratingormerelynotinterfering.Beliefstatesmatterin asecondway.Consideranewexample.SayAlberttriestopersuadehissisternotto haveanabortionbutthenstandsasidewhensheleavestogotothefamilyplanning clinic.Surely,Alexmaybetoleratingheraction.Hisattemptatrationalpersuasion

which,aswillbemadeclearerinbelow,shouldnotbeconsideredinterference –failedandhedoesnotinterferewithheractions,whichhenonethelessopposes.Now itmaybethatAlbertismerelyenduringhissister ’sactions – thatbecausehehasno (legal)righttointerfere,hecoulddonothingandsomusthaveresignedhimselfto heraction.This may bethecase,butitneednotbe.PerhapsAlexmistakenlythinks hedoeshavea(legal)righttointerfere.Ifso,hemaynotbemerelyresigninghimself toheraction.Hemaybestandingasidebecause,thoughhebelieveshe can interfere, healsobelieveshe should not – thatis,hemaywellvaluehisnon-interferingorher righttoproceedsothathisnoninterferenceisbasedonaprincipledreason,as indicatedisneededinconditionthree.Whatwealsoshouldnoticenowisthatthis caseclearlysuggeststhat believingonehasthepowertointerfere isrelevantto toleration.Itwillbeconditionseven(believedpower).

Thepreviousparagraphassumedthatwhatwasatissuewasthelackofalegal right(ofAlbert’s)tointerferewithhissister.Somemaythinkitisamoralrightthatis atissue;thatis,theymayclaimthatAlberthasnomoralrighttointerferewithhis sister ’saction.Forthattomakeitsuchthatthecaseisnotoneoftolerationbutoneof mereresignationtowhathecannotchange,themoralprohibitionindicatedbythe absenceofarightmustbeaccompaniedbyaninternalcompulsiontoabideby morality.Iftherewerenone,hewouldbeabletointerferebydisregardingmorality. Delvingfurtherintothisrequireslookingtotheinternalism-externalismdebate. Ifsomeone(athirdpartytotheabovedebate)weretothinkthatAlberthad,inthe example,amoralright(perhapsaccompaniedbyalegalright)tointerfere,thenitis indeedpossiblethatthecaseisoneoftoleration.

Twocaveatsshouldberecognizedatthispoint.First,asmotivationsandbelief statesgenerallyareoftenmixedand/orconfused,theremaybecaseswheredeterminingwhetheranactisoneofmereresignationoroneoftolerationisnear impossible;indeed,itmaybethatthereisnosharplinebetweenthetwo.Second, complicatingthe ﬁrst,thereisacommonuseoftheword “tolerance” (itself discussedbelow)whichisequivalenttoendurance – one “buildsone’slevelof tolerance/endurance.” Giventhatandtheoftconﬂationoftoleranceandtoleration, confusionsarenotinfrequent.

Wehavenow(brieﬂy)elucidatedthesevenlikelyconditionsoftoleration.They are:

1.thepresenceofan agent

2.who intentionally

3.and onprinciple

4. refrainsfrominterfering with 5.an opposed

6. other (ortheirbehavior,etc.)though 7.she believesshehasthepowertointerfere.

Eachofthesewillbeexaminedbelow.First,though,wecontinueourexaminationofconceptsthataredistinctthoughrelatedto – andsometimesconﬂatedwith –toleration.