Issuu

CONTENTS

Number Three 2001 September - October

Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of p ropagating the m ilitary way of t hinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

Volunteers are the essential core of the new Army, which is increasingly engaged in multinational missions for the defence of peace and international

Jaw.

FOUR-MONTHLY Supplem ent to numbers 5 a nd 6 of Rivist a Militare Italian Ed ition

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2001 © Copyright by Rivista Militare

ASSOCIATED TO USPI UNIONE STAMPA PERIODICA ITALIANA

The p rod uct ion of this magazine has been supervised by Omero Rampa

Politics, Economics and Strategy 2 The Stabilization of the Balkans The Role of the Military (Carlo Cabigiosu) 12 The Asian Continent. (Maurizio Coccia) 24 "Out-of-Area" Operations Concepts and Organization (Armando Novelli) 38 To Understand Bosnia (Giovanni Ridim'J) SO Disarmament and

International Security

(Gia11franco Tracci)

58 The "Force Generation" Process (Roberto D 'Alessandro) 66 The "Fduli" Ainnobile Bdgade Exercise "Challenge 2001" (Livia Ciancarella and Andrea Di SLasiuj 78 Ukraine. The New Army. Interview With the Deputy Defence Minister and Commander of the Land Troops (Enrico il-1agnani) 86 Finland. The New Army Interview With the Army Chief of Staff (Enrico /vlag11a11i)

92 The "Northern Dimension" of Europe (Omelia Rota)

Science, Technology and Training 98 SICRAL. A New Challenge For Satellite Telecommunications (Emanuela D'Alessio)

History 106 The Heroes of Masacla History and Legend (Paolo Feniello) 113 Sommaire - Jnhalt - Resumen Instructions for Contributors: Anyone may contribute. To guarantee the highest objectivity of information, Rivista Militare leaves contributors ample freedom , though it does not necessarily share their opinions. The Author is thlJS solely responsible for the articles which, published unedited and without editorial ties, exclusively reflect his personal ideas. Articles mlJst be original in thought and should not exceed ten typewritten pages. Once the Author receives his fee, he loses all exclusive rights. Rivista Militare may then pass the article on to other publications and EMPA (ElJropean Military Press Association) periodicals. Articles should be accompanied by suitable photographs, illustrations, explanatory tables, together with a photograph of the Author, a brief «curriculum vitae» and a ten-line typewritten summary. Rivista Militare reserves the right to change the title of articles and choose the typeface deemed most suitable. Rivista Militare is equipped with a computerized system for phototypesetting and videopaging. In order to make the production of the articles more expeditious, it is desirable that the Authors provide, besides the text on paper, also the diskette with the text files of the article. Any system and type of computer can be used.

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STAB-l llll= r101 OF THE B,AL_tANS Tltlli 1r1 i1 (t))f 11ml ailiftltJ by Carlo Cabigiosu -:,

The experience of the IFOR, SFOR arid KFOR multinational forces, in the Balkans since 1995, has shown the importance of the military in fostering a dialogue among the parties, contributing to the reconstruction. and the economic development of the region. FEW HISTORICAL REMARKS A mosaic of different national enti t ies, ethnic gro up s, languages, religions and cul tures makes up the Balkan peninsula which - since time imrnernor-.ial has been considered both as a bridge linking the West and tb e East and a sort of border between the Western and Islami c worl.ds. T he rationale behind rece nt conflicts in that ar·ea is deep ly rooted in its history. Over Lhe centuries, three national entities have left the ir· mark on Lb.at area, namely the Bulgarians, the Turks and th e Serbs. The influence of the Bulgarian domination has been practically forgotten , while the impact of the Ottoman domination can still be felt. The Serb presence deeply a ffects the whole area.

force by Armed or Police Forces was perceived as the on ly solution to a crisis by the local pop ulation. This feeling was coupled with increasing di srespe ct for law a nd order, which at times was only considered as the e n for·c ement of the oppressor's will. As every citizen was expected

unprecedented in Europe. Besides t he Bu lgar ia n , Ottoman and Serb occupations, the Balkan peninsu la came unde r· the ni le of Venice, the Austro-Hungarian empire, as well as Italy and Germany during World \Nar II. Even Albania, or b etter the Albanians, proud offspring of the Jlli rians, played a role in the area, but o nly for very s hort periods. Th e fac t Lh a t they had b een s ubdu e d for centuries and, ullima tely, artiCicial.ly divided by a series of international treaties over an ar·ea comprising five different countries, made them stand up for their rights as a rninorily group or even as the second largest ethnic community in Macedon ia.

to defend himself or take part in

his own ethnic group military actions, irrespective of his age , wea lll1 or even sex, an outright cu lture of violence was developed . The a bove mentioned histo r ical eve nt s and m enta l attitudes, to gether with the concept of the people's Ar·m y i mposed by Marshal Ti to, resulted in an unrestricted access to wea pons and fuelled interethnic hatred to an exten t

MARSHAL TITO PERIOD AND ITS AFTERMATHS Even in recent years the role of the military remained unchanged.

Tw lian servicem.en in a Bosnian school leach students how to mco{!,nize explosive devices.

Over time, the area has come under the rule of d ifferent military powers . The long lasting presence of each new military and administrative regime in the conqu ered areas resulted in the c reatio n of niches and e nclaves or .non native et hnic groups, w hich continued to stay in Lhe area even after a ne,-v military takeover. At the same time, due to political or military reasons, the free or forced m igration o f local peoples to different ethnic areas produced th e same r es ult s . O·wing t o this si tuation of continued tunno il , th e use or 3

At the end of World War II, Marshal Tito unified 6 republics and two aulonomous provinces into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As leader of Yugoslavia for almost [ifly years, he availed himself of the support of police and armed forces to quell any kind of opposition and repress all nationalistic claims with the use of force. His dictatoria l regime allowed for keeping the Yugoslavian Federation united, but cou ld not rule out the internal tensions fuelled by different national cultures. From a psychological point of view, Tilo exploited the idea of a possible external military threat as an elemenl to enhance internal cohesion and the political concept of nonalignment as anolher effective means to build Yugoslavia national identity. Af ter his death , unsettled nationalistic contrasts burst out again, also due to a serious economic crisis and inequalities among the various regions in the country. The leaders of some republics of the Yugoslavian Federation used the armed and police forces to achieve a long cherished but never reached autonomy. Following the chaindisintegration of the country, the military changed their role and shovved the overwhelming presence of the Serb component within their forces. The collapse of Yugoslavia started in 1991 with the declarations of independence made by Slovenia and Croatia, which obtained Âˇ their independence in a relatively short time, resorting to locally recruited police forces almost exclusively. Another important event in the collapse of the Yugoslavian Federation took plac e in 1992, when also Bosnia started fighting for its independence. He 1Âˇe the situation was even 4

more difficult due to the heterogeneity of coexisting ethnic groups. This year marked the beginning of a period of new violent tensions and ethnic hatred. Nev.,r territorial disputes concurrently arose; namely, those between Croatia and Serbia on East Slavonia and on the Prevlaka peninsula, both followed by the intervention of the UN forces. The UNPROFOR mission, tasked with operating on the entire territory of the Yugoslavian Federation, was however authorized to resorl Lo a use of force commensurate to the threat and for self-defense purposes only; thus, its mandate turned out to be too limited and unfit to cope with the situation. To solve this issue, a debate was

launched on the difference between the concept of neutrality and impartiality. The internal conflict in Bosnia \vent on for almost two years with terrible consequences; UN forces were not able to eHectively counter the different factions, enforce peace and start the expected stabi,l ization process in the region. When the arrogant and provocative attitude of the Bosnian-Serb commanders translated into a direct attack on some UN elements of the French and British forces, Great Britain and France set up a Reaction Force, which rapidly and effectively marked a turning point in military operations. In the meantime, NATO, which had already taken

where Milosevich represented lhe Bosnian-Serbs, Izetbegovich the Bosnian-J\llusUms and Tujiman the Bosnian-Croats. This way, a Peace Treaty was reached among fighting parties and NATO was tasked with guaranteeing its implementation on December 21, 1995. NATO IN THE BALKANS

The Dayton Treaty aimed al finding a solution to guarantee the unity of the Bosnia Herzegovina region, but included a series of trade -off measures which arc still heavily

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Left. "Bersa.glieri'' of Lhe Garil?aldi Brigade pa.trolling a road in Kosovo. Below.

/\n Ttalian soldier on surveillance duly.

part in some mili lary operalions in support of UN forces over the Balkans and on the Aclr"iat ic sea, started an air campaign againsl lhe strongholds of the Serb military structure in Bosnia. Thus, NATO succeeded in persuading the Bosnian-Serbs to s i L at the negotiating table at Dayton,

impacting on the present situation. In fact, during this Lransition period a series of obstacles had to be overcome, slernming from the exchange of territories among differenl elhnic groups, the r ig id cease-fire line which marked the boundar ies among the three Bosnian ethnic

entities, the prese nce of an ethnically divided police force and of two Armies, lhe first represent ing the new Federation unifying Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian-Croats, and the second representing the Serbska Republic. As a consequence, cli.plomats always had to firmly remind all parties involved to comply with the Day ton Treaty. Within such a difficult framework, the NATO military machinery, called upon by the UN to inLervene, was started successfully. It can be said that, from this moment on, the international military presence in the Balkans becomes pivotal in the stabilization process of the area. In December 1995, the IFOR mission launched the most important military operation in Emope since lhe e ncl of World War II , where NATO played a central role. For the first time, NATO was tasked with carrying out an "out of area" land operation, in a "joint and comb in ed "environment with other PfP countries and non-NATO nations (Russia included), with a total strength of 55,000 troops. For the first time in the history of the Balkans, a military intervention was carded out, not being the result of a territoria l or economic expansionis t policy. Moreover, the force dep l oyed did not simply carry out an interposition role with limited rules of engagement and capabiliLies. Under Chapter VJl of the UN Charter, NATO entered the Balkans wilh a robust force, capab le of conducting all kinds of military operations and determined to enforce the articles of the Treaty, which the parties involved had pledged to abide by, but had violated in the past under similar circumstances. 5

A "Bersaglieri" co17mral in Kosovo.

contributed to solving the crisis in Bosnia.

Said intervention was successful and all the arLicles of the Treaty \Vere complied wi th, including the mosl crilica.l and sensitive ones . The Treaty has been gradually implemented and, Loday, NATO's presence is contributing to exerting a dcterrenL funct ion; in fact, the Alliance is committed to guaranteeing Lh al the ongoing implementation process be not hindered by interna l r easons even though the soft points in the Dayton Treaty are still heavily impacting on the situation. While lhe peace process \vent 6

on in Bosnia, the situation in Kosovo progress ively worsened . Since the beginning of lhe '90s, Milosevic had drastically reduced all access lo public life to the ethnic Albanians, considering the strong pressure exerted by this majority e thnic group. He had also ru led out all. rights and grants , which are usually bestowed on rn inodties in any democratic system. As early as 1995, the international cornmu.nily was fully aware of this critical situation . However, this issue was papered up, due to a diffused feeling of gratitude for .lVI i losevic, who had

Milosevic's tyrannical attitude was counterbalanced by the paci fie resistance staged by the moderate Kosovar leader Rugova, who set up a s hadow cabinet and structures parallel to those imposed by Belgrade, as well as by lhe military reaction of the UCK, a clandestine military movement which aimed at freeing Kosovo from Belgrade's lyranny by resorting to guerrilla warfare. In 1998, Lhe situation worsened irreversib ly when some Serb policemen were killed by the UCK and Serbia's special police units sta.rled ethnic cleansing operations with the support of the armed rorces . Thu s , the notorious p aramili t ary rorn1ations known as "Arkan's tigers" or the nationalistic group inspired by Seselj ,vere g iven the green light to intervene. At this point, the need for an intervention by the international community was increasingly felt. The unsuccessful p eace Conference at RambouUlet and the in tern a tional ap p ea ls to Milosevic Âˇwere followed by atrocities committed by Serb paramilitary troops. The massive exodus of Kosovars to Albania and Macedonia , NATO air campaign, the entry of NATO ]an d forces into K osovo were preceded by retaliatory actions carr ied o u t by the KosovarÂˇ militia against Serb military and paramilitary units, wl1ich forced at least 100,000 Serbs to flee Kosovo. NATO intervention in Kosovo, as in Bosnia, was ainted at enforcing a decision of the international commun ity, Lhe UN Resolution no.1244, in support or the human rights of the ethn ic Albanian minority.

The UN Resolulio.n no. 1244 was far less detailed than the Dayton TrÂˇeaty, but established cond ilions for the intervention of NATO troops in Kosovo sirnilar-Lo those set for the mission in Bosnia. Also in this case, their intervention has been of paramount importance to enforce their mandate and effectively start the stabilization process. Similar to what had happened in Bosnia, a robust military force of about 45,000 men belonging to 39 nalions was deployed in Kosovo . This force, capable of concl u cli ng traditional war operations, was credible enough to enforce Lhe accords and keep peace. Also in this case, it \vas clear that there ,vcre no other viable options and that the only way to guarantee the success of the operation was the deployment of a NATO land force . In fact, all diplomatic and humanitarian efforts had proved to be uns uccessful , lil~e the operation carried out by the OSCE monitoring force dep loyed lo Kosovo right ahead of the air campaign . Unlike past experiences, the possibi l ity of empl oy ing UN forces in Kosovo was not even taken into cons iderat ion . NATO immediately assigned l an d force corn man cl to the, ARRC, the ra pid reaction corps which had operated extreme ly well in Bosnia. Whal has been the key to the success of IFO R , SFOR and, later on, KFOR? One or the main elements of success ha been the effectiveness of the pol i tical and military conce p ts upon which the intervent ion was based. As al ready said, bolti Lhe Dayton Treaty and the UN Reso lution no . .12 44 have been valuable reference documents for

commanders in the field . In Kosovo, it was necessary to integrale the UN Resolution with the Mi litary Technical Agreernent, as regards the military aspects of the mandate. The force Commander \Vas directly called upon to d raw up lhe above mentioned Agreement; it was p ossible, therefore, to specify its terms, in line with the requirements of the situation on the ground . Another important e lement is the very strncture of NATO, which is not only an effect ive .m ili tary, but also a political organization

ltal-ian servicemen socia.liz.ing wi1h civilians.

w here all major Western countries are re p resented. Within t his organ i zation, the m iliL ary is effectively supported by the political arm . NATO member nations have strong in terests in the area and are directly committed to solving regional problems, in order to avoid repercussions on their own territory. Il shou ld be noted thal NATO is the only organization capable of

conducting operations aimed at reaching large sea.le humanitarian and military goals. It is also the on ly organi z ation capable of sustaining a robust effort in the long term. It is also for these reasons that the effec ti veness or a poss ible UN intervention in this context wou ld be very limited. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MILITARY OPTION

From a m ilitary point of view, NATO provided a wide range of optio n s, proving to be high ly

flexi b le and capable of be ing corn bat ready in a short time, in order to carry out a w ide range of multifaceted tasks. NATO u nils were assigned ma n y combat ro les, both in Bosnia and Kosovo, and were ready to face threats posed by lrad itional mi litary units and to perform peace enforcing, peace keeping, territorial control and stabilization tasks. So ldi ers were called upon to make up for the lac k o r administrative and institutional structures in the country whe rÂˇe they were deployed. This meant 7

that they had to compensate for a shortage of police forces and, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, for a lack of basic infrastructure. As regards this specific issue, NATO presence \Vas aimed at controlling the territory, in coord ination with local and internatjonal polic e forces. Excellent results were obtained in enforcing law and order in an area affected by a very high crime rate, as often happens in the aftermath of a war. To this aim, il is worth mentioning the precious support of a Carabinieri conligent, the so-called Multinational Security Unit

Ita lian soldiers has been particularly valuable. The Italian Air Force is responsible for air t raffic control in the whole pro vin ce. The new airport at Giakova will allow for easing off the military air traffic at the Pristina airport, thus enhancing civilian air traffic and speeding up the economic development of the country. As regards the lines of communication, our engineers reopened the en t 1re railway network in Kosovo, a lmost

An Italian patrol con1rolling a street in Sarajevo.

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(MSU) which, in coordination with newly established international and Kosovar police forces, was capable of providing a remarkable contribution to the fight against cr ime, deeply affecting the political and economic I ife or the area in that particular phase. The contribution of the military to the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, to speed the return to norn1ality, is or paramount importance: they reopen rnads, build and manage railway netvvorks and airports . To this aim, the contribution of 8

completely demolished by the bomb attacks and acts of vanda l ism carried out by the Serbs in their retreat. Moreover, they manage the railway traffic and at the same Li me train local personnel. As for the composition of the force, mult inationality has contributed to enhancing effectiveness rather than limiting it. There is always something to learn from other nations' representatives and mutual re lations allow for ruling out mistakes or making up [or them . Not,viths Landing differen t

national approaches both at training and cullural level, the results obtained are always remarkable. Division or Brigade level command and control activities are assigned to pre-existing HQs, which often adapt to the need of integrating into their staff or Command groups some officers be longing to nations which contribute their forces to that particular large unit. Tbis way, the action of command is given appropriate cohesion and also gathers consensus from lower level contingents. So far, the command of a force is an issue which has been partially solved. The ARRC, some NATO Subregional Con1mands and the . EUROCORPS, on one occasion, were the right answer for short time contingencies, but this issue should be given new solutions in the medium and long term , by establishing a second ARRC and other multinational HQs at Corps level. Communica t ion systems, however, together with tested procedures and highly trai necl personnel, have always allowed for reach 1ng results generally considered as posjli ve. As already said, the interven tion of modern and effective forces provides for making a wide range of operational and techn ical choices, ranging from air missions - as those carried out in Bosnia and even more massively in Kosovo - to attacks with armed helicopters - ,vhich were only planned but never performed in the case of Albania - and Lo the operations carded out by armored/light armored or light infantry units. Another important elemen t is intelligence. ln fact, NATO, which concurrently conducts intelligence operations, is capable of contro ll ing the

situation on the ground much better than international police forces, mainly in the first phases of operations, thanks• to its more efficient organization and greater availability of means and infrastrncture. INSTABILITY AREAS

Present instability areas can be easily detected. The situation is still uncertain in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the three national entities ar·e not apparently following the path leading to a full and deeply accepted cooperation. The same applies to Croatia, where all territorial disputes with neighboring countries a r e st ill unsettled, even i f recent politica l changes could positively and substantially modify the internal situation. To this aim , t he irnportance o f Croatia's participation in the NATO PfP project in not to be undervalued . Serbia, too, is living a period of gradual internal transformation, follo\ving its 5 October revolution. Aher Kostunica cam e to po\ver and the victory of the DOS at the 23 Decemb e r elections was confirmed, several changes within the establishment are expected, which will deeply affect the armed and police forces, as regards their top level positions. The new President had to immediately address the issue of ethnic Albanian minorities in the south of Serbia. Ethn ic Albanians living in the Presevo valley had long been treated by Milosevic as third or fourth class citizens, under a sort of apartheid r egime with no medical and school structuces, no support to local economy and no representatives even in local administrative bod ies . To react against this situation, armed groups were created which

aimed at establishing a separate local entity, launching attacks on Yugoslavian police forces and trying to draw the aLLention of the international community on theic plight. Their area of operations coincided with the Security Zone, as defined by the Military Technical Agree m e nt signed at t he end of t he air campaign. Consequently, KFOR \1>,ras accused by Belgrade of being

Italian servicemen during Lhe !FOR operation in Bosnia.

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without being authorized by NATO, it vvoulcl have seriously violated an international agreement. If massivel y attacked, guerrilla grnups would have asked and obtained support from their Albanian brothers in Kosovo and Macedonia, thus rekindling an ethnic conflict simi lar to the one in Kosovo, which opposed UCK guerrilla troops, Yugoslavian police forces and Army units . The rapid intervention of KFOR, in the rnle of facili tator, allowed for reaching a cease fire between the opposing parties in t\..vo days

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indirectly responsible for granting the guerrilla groups a sort o( immunity; in fact, Yugoslavian authorities could intecvene within an established 5 km strip, employing local police units equipped \.Vith light arms only, and not special police forces or arm y units. In particular, on November 21, 2000, when 4 Serb policemen were killed in the security zone of the Presevo valley, a serious crisis was abou L to be stirred up, with possible unpredictable repercussions . I( Belgrade governrnen t had entered th e security zon e

and starling negotiations, satisfactorily concluded at the encl of May 2001, both for the ethnic Albanian minority and the new Belgrade government. Now, the security zone is again under Serbia's sovereignty and a gen e ral amnesty has been granted lo guerrilla groups. Th us, a pacific solution was found for a conflict which could ]1ave triggered a chain reaction, threatening the stability of the area. As regards the other regions of the Balkans, Serbia sti ll considers its precarious relations w ith 9

A "Cenrauro" heavy armoured car protecting a roadblock.

Albanian component; the latter, in fact, can no longer be considered as a minority group but, given its strength , s hould be regarded as a real community. Albania is th e last country plagued by continuous crises. It is difficult to make any forecast on the future of this nation where, as in Montenegro, a frag ile and corrupt politica l system gives crimina l organ izations the freed om of movement necessary to develop unlawful lucrative activities. There is nol a single solution to the problems of this area, which is kept under c lose scrutiny by Euro pean count ries, the USA and, obviously, Russ ia. providing these countries with economic support and integrating them into international political and assistance organizations is certainly necessary and rewarding, but also a robust international military presence could effectivel y con tr i bu Le Lo giving a long term solution to these problems.

Montenegro as a furlher e lernenl of inslabi lily. The existence of the Federation is presently at risk and tl1e difficult relations between the governments of the two countries might end up in a large sca le crisis. Moreov er, the situation in Montenegro is un certain, as dozens of thousands of ethnic Albanian citizens are still living north of Scutari and could resort to extremist actions. A high number of ethnic Albanians live also in Macedonia, another country witha fragile political stability. So fa1~ the risk of a final collapse of J\ilacedonian centra l 10

government has been avoided, thanks to the participation in the govern.m ent of a political party representing the e thni c Albanians. Thus , the t hrea t posed by clandestine Albanian extre mists, who had been carrying on paramilitary attacks on govern mental forces since March 2001, has been defused. The question is how long Macedonian Au Lhoriti es will successfully control the sit u ation, turning down all provocative and revanchist actions and impl ernent ing a number of internal reforms, aimed at supporting the ethnic

According to the m indset of these countries, those who have the upper hand arc worthy of respect and succeed in obliging even the most dcstahil i z i ng e lements to take part in negotiations and discussions. There is still a long Âˇway to go, thougl1, and the presence of the military will be required for quite a long tim e. However, in most cases gaining time to carry on a negotiat ion may even be considered as a success. Moreover~ no one can guarantee that the phase of instability in the Balkans is coming to an e nd . lL is an area where disputes are ethnically based and new Kosovo-type conflicts are likely to be triggered, as the problem of

ethnic intermingling is far from being solved. Being present in all possible crisis areas to ant icipa te all contingencies is to be prefe1Ted to intervening at the onset of a crisis. Therefore, a balanced presence of forces connected to NATO, or, if necessary, to the UN, is lo be maintained in the area. The presence of logistic and rear I ine assels in Croatia, at Zagreb, Split and Ploce, is to be menl ioned, togelher with the new US large base in Hungary, and Italian and other co untries' forces in Albania. Moreover, Italy has been present in Albania since 1990 with Operations Pellicano 1 and 2 and, later on, with Operation Alba, in 1997. There is the feeling that some of these cou nlr ies are strongly asking for an international military presence. They are fully aware that if they acce p l a limitation in t heir a b solute national sovereignty, good results will be attained in the long term.

prolonged military presence in the area have already been dealt w i th, making parl icular reference t o the fact that the p resence of inlernat ional mili tary forces could slow down the ass u n1pl ion of fu ll responsi b ility by local governments. The aim is to gain time in order to allow national political structures to settle all internal disputes and b uild democracy. I t must a lso be stressed that all the problems of the area are s t rictly interconnected and cannot be easily solved separately. Conversely, solutions to ethnic, economic or territorial disputes can only slem from rn ullilate ,路al accord s, ,vi t h t he support of supranalional or inlernational organizations. The financial commitment required to keep NATO or othe r路 countries' military forces in the area must be considered as a kind of insurance policy, far less expensive than the effort made by NATO on the occasion of the a ir campaign carried out from

CONCLUSIONS An Army AB-205 helicopter on flight

The

d i sadvantages

overBosnia.

March to J u ne 1999. Operations in the Balkans have proved that the only way to enforce the agreements reached after a crisis or a conflict is to inlervene u nder a strong mandate, employ a robust force and be determined to use it . Th e mu ltina t ional nature of military conti ngenls has been key to the success of these operations . With thei r路 presence, th e in ternational community, Russia i nc lud ed, h as sent a clear message to all op p osing parlies, th u s effec t ive ly contributing to the stabilization of the area . Tbe success of mi litary operations has always anticipate d and con tributed to the civil implementation of peace ag ,路eements . IFOR, S F OR and KF OR have remarkably supported the rehabilitation of civil and economic activities, also in strict cooperation with many international non governmental organizations. The role of the n1ilitary in the Balkans has t h erefore b een of paramount importance , to fos ter dialogue between o pp osing parties, su pporl t he rehabi litation and economic developmenl process an d consequently strengthen democracy in the area. There is still a .long way to go, b u t important steps forward have already been taken. l t should be acknowled ged that the goals achieved are the result of the self-sacrifice of h undreds of thousands o[ so ld iers belonging to many different countries, who effecti\;ely and enthusiastically co nt ributed to restori ng normality and democracy in this troubled area. D ''' Lieu.tenant General, Co1nmander, Joint Operational Com.mand

Not even the most superficial observer can miss the alarming variety and complexity of the Asian scenery, a crossroads of infinite political and economic conflicts. A context of precarious security looms on everything, in the absence of fixed rules and stable de1nocracies. The strategies deriving from the bipolar conception of world order are now obsolete because of the delicate intertwining of the political, diplomatic and economic relations of the present time.

he Asian Co. nLinent, if considered from a geographical point of view, can be divided into three main regions , exLended horizon tally in the northern, central and southern areas.

In this last region, comprising the continental shelves of Arabia and peninsular India , Arab countries - rife with oil and problems - are noL marginalized as European observers may think. In fact, their resources, authoritarian regimes , ethical and religious tenets put them fully in line with other equally hard -line Asian countries. Consequently, as regards security al large, it can be said that Asia is the cradle of a cultural , conceptual and deep -rooted opposition against the democraLic values of the \Vest, especially the USA.

Above.

View of M1. Fujiyama, Japan.

Left. The famous clay warriors of Xi'an, China.

Therefore the attention is increasingly Cocused on that region and its inspiring principles. A previous article on fhe Arab world, the Mediterranean and the conflict between Israel and Palestine has recognized that these countries are governed by mindsets difficult to reconcile, as regards both internal and external matters; this situat ion can not be overcome by makeshift and goodwi 11 solutions, being the result of different v 1s1ons i nspi ring opposing Ii [e styles. In Asia there have been other cases whe r-e the actors involved have played an even more extreme role. Charismatic leaders and their people may still be called upon lo make choices considered as bloodcurdling from a European political and social point of view. During the Vietnam war, the Vietnamese proved that they could stand a ll kinds of sufferings, a fact which discouraged the Western \Nodd from resorting to the use of force in settling a crisis. Saddam Hussein belongs to Asia. In Nepal the recent tragic events involving the royal family, although immediately covered up, showed that fe udal -type regimes are still in force, only mitigated by centuries of British education to democracy, It should not come as a surprise if the foreign policy adopted by the USA, to restore the power balance disrupted by regional strives, is often opposed by some countries in the area, giving rise Lo ethical resistance and suspicion fee lings and to sometirnes dangerous defensive actions. A shor-t description of the main Asian players now follows. Today Turkey is the most dynamic country in the Middle East. It is undergoing a rapid development process based on its new geo-slrategic function. In

Lhe regional scenario Turkey, placed at the center of three crisis areas (Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus) , can guard Russia and China's access points to the Caucasus. Tt is placed in a sensitive area bordering on three of the major Arab-Islamic countries in the Middle East (Iran. Iraq, Syria). Being n ex L Lo regions rich in energy resources, Turkey is th e owner of ,,vater supplies coming from the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, which flow towards Syria and Iraq. Turkey's potentialities are further enhanced by its being a member of the Atlantic Alliance, while sharing the same religious background as that of most bordering countries.

UH-I "Super helicop1ers.

Cobra"

combat

T here is a long-standing dispute w ith Iran: democratic versus Islamic regimes, envisaging different government systems. Turkey has succeeded in gaining \,Vestern countries' support, also thanks to its geographical position, critical in countering the spiraling growth of illegal activities mainly linked lo international drug trafficking. Heroin produced in Ce ntral Asia, chemical drugs developed in Russian labs and cocaine travelling Crom South America to the markets in Eastern Europe move a long the routes 13

A typical street in Katmandu, Nepal.

crossing Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. The country follows a double track policy. Islamic Turkey interprets its relation \Nith Europe as an occasiqn to enhance its modernization, democratization and secularization process, wh ile the Arab world labels it as a symbol of colonization. Therefore, Turkey has established different relations with Europe/USA and the Arab world, which are completely separate, but can be e xploited to fulfil national interests. In practice, Turkey has always kept a balanced position, trying not to interfere in the relations between the two sides and always willing to gain general consensus over its foreign policy. Most of its past, present and future problems may therefore derive from this double -track foreign policy wh ich cannot be easily coordinated. The Middle East is a sub system comprising the Countries of the Persian Gulf as well, where historical factors are st il l limiting all kinds of free development. 14

First of all, the ternptation to adopt - even forcefully or sporadically - Western democratic and economic values is strongly opposed by religious, nationalist and sectarian interests, as well as by an ingrained resistance to change. Then, the influence of the Israel i life-style has not succeeded in promoting peace in these coun t 1Âˇies, but on the contrary has stirred up rage and escalated the confl ict. Lastly, the supervising role played by the USA in the area, as the only referee (or all regional players, has led America to be progressively involved in local events and find makeshift d iplomatic solutions to all possible contingencies, to the detriment of their original commitment. Russia, presently engaged in a difficult process of transition towards a form of government similar to that of the West, is and \Vill still be in the futu 1Âˇe the cradle of nevv destabilizing factors . It is an example not to be fol lowed by neigh boring countries and China as well. There are powe rÂˇ circles linked

to drug and weapons trafficking, wh ich includes weapons of rnass destruction as well. People take to the streets to ask for betLer Ii fe conditions, more independence, cost -effective management or resources and a wider say in public affairs. Against this internal framework, Russia follows an international policy mainly aimed at playing an important role within the Western security organization and the European political and economic establishment, not Lo lose its past supremacy. In Asia, Russia focuses its attention on controlling the resources of Central Asia and on keeping its relation with China. All in all, Russia's internal development will have wide repercussions on the future o( Asia and its security system. In this transitional phase, there is little scope for optimism considering that Russia's foreign policy ambitions are as great as in tl1e past and its more conciliating attitude is only due to the present difficult internal situation. The d isruption of the old regin:ie has strengthened organized crime, instead of reinforc ing the slate organization. The latter seems to be increasingly underm ined by a new and widespread profitoriented mentality. Russia's historical and cultural heritage has been swept away by such a radical change, showing the negative repercussions of globalization. Caucasus and Central Asia Armenia, Azerbabaijan and Georgia belong to the first area, while Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan belong to the second. All these countr ies are subject to the external influence of China, Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran . Their precarious security situation is due to the fact that they are Russia's a llies in the "near abroad'', while they

are fu lfilling about 25% of oi l requirements o( the USA, which is bilaterally engaged 路with all the countries of the r路egic,n. This area has always路 been a traditional route linking Asia and the Paci fie to E urope, Russia and the Persian Gulf. The region encompasses different ethnic groups and religions. Despite th is heterogeneity, the above-mentioned nations are unified b y the feeling of being encirded by superpowers and by the awareness of occupying a strategically relevant ar路ea. T\velve years after the encl of Lhe cold war, this region still suffers from internal divisions and contradictions, preventing it from becoming a cohesive area system. Four main problems are still to be faced, i.e. the relations with powerful neighboring

conflicts and serious problems as well. They stem from ethnic groups, road networks, boundary disputes, a trou bled past, a vvidespread habit to compromise, diffused corruption and almost officially authorized local abuses. This region is likely to become the .M.i ddle East of the future; in fact, it is equally rich in natural resources, which had a negative impact on the environment, where serious disast e rs occurred. A case in point is Lake Arai , where fishing and tourisrn activities were greatly impaired and cau sed a massive exodus from the countrys ide Lo the city. The economic repercussion of globalization has had one positive s ide-effect at least. Major multinational oil companies are investing in the region, which is progressively becom ing part of

countries, the sustainable and cost-effective development of natural resources, the transition to democracy and the difficult cohabitation of so many ethn ic groups and re li gions.

an international network \.Vith possible s tabilizing effects . Th is way, all critical issues should be defused , thanks to constant external monitor ing and crisis settlement activities.

This area, tbough r ich in energy resources, is also plagued by wide interest

India and Pakistan. During the cold war, regional powers reached an interna l balance. Beijing

Above. Israeli soldiers on patrol.

Left. !Vlonks of the Jokhan g temple rn Lhasa, Tibet.

helped Pakistan militarily, while Moscow supported New Delhi. The demise of the former USSR brought about the collapse of the pillar on which India had based i ts strategic and dip lomatic architecture, in li ne with the Peace and Friendship Bilateral Treaty signed in 197.l, against possible American or Chinese interventions. India feels discriminated against by the USA and criticizes it fol" being more accommodating tO\.vards Pakistan and Israel. Thus Ind ia's nuclear po\.ver plays a unifying role both at national and regional levels and is considered as a tool to counterbalance the Chinese and Pakistani military might. Pakistan is a monolithic bloc k rel yi ng on i ts nationalism reinforced b y strong religious tenets. These Countri es' forms of government cannot be 15

conside1Âˇed as fully democratic. They are mixed regimes where den:10cracy must come to terms with deep and often contrnsting traditions of religious and ethnic nature. Poverty is rife. People's fear and pride feelings play a unifying role in lhe region . There are the prerequisites for the oulburst of conflicts of all kinds. Religious beliefs and huge socioeconomic disparities rule out all possible efforts to directly involve the population in the development process. Foreign countrÂˇies are focusing their attention on the area, being attracted by the low cost of labor. The result is a forceful imposition o( Westernlype open market rules which may have negative repercussions on the area. China and Japan. The collapse of the Soviet Empire has taken China aback. In the bipolar era, the USA controlled the internal development of China from a distance only, ready Lo prevent it from expanding in the region or elsewhere. China, meanwhi le, had already broken ils ideological links wilh Russia and was willing to present itself as the supporter of a ne\.v non expansionist and non threatening communism . China's new stance allowed it to face its urgent internal problems in depth, in line with iL s international policy. This internal development required a limited number of resources only, as a political eff01i had not to be concurrently carried out at global or even regional level. With the demise of the blockto-block system, China found itself isolated and obliged lo play the role of a superpower, almost openly considered as a possible enemy of democracy. In fac t, in the post bipolar em, China has both stirred attention and fear, due to its leading role 16

as a superpower and its ideological development model, completely different from that of the West. It is one of the major actors on the international stage being a standing member of the UN Security Council. China is developing relations with Japan while avoidinl2'. to be directlv involved with~ the USA; thi; testifies lo the effectiveness of its government's policy, aimed at establishing good economic relations with all countries and fostering development and peace to avoid new criticism. In short, China has ruled out all isolationist attitudes lo establish good neighborly relations, while keeping an authoritative and detached stance. Its authoritative role is widely recognized at a worldwide and regional level as well. In fact, China has not mollified or mitigated its positions by j oining new Alliances, but has kept its autonomous and authoritative stance. It is one of the few countries which have not taken sides but have slood firm on their convictions, totally accepted by the Easl, much less by lbe West. The situation is very different in Japan, a country which has established synergic relations with the USA, thus creating a positive balance between the tvvo nations. Japan, however, is s till one of the major Asian players capable of understanding the situation in the region and of making itself understood more than any other \,Vestern country. It has capitalized on the bipolar confrontation, which is al lbe origin of Asia's economic growth and deepest crisis as wet.I. Actually, Japan's economy has had a great impact on its people's lifestyles and has become key much more than in the West. China's foreseeable grO\vth may

well obfuscate lhe economic leadership of Japan, whose po litical role has ga in ed an increased importance. In fact, Lhe latter is the only country the USA can rely on to counterbalance the ideological and socio-c ultural development of China. Tts military role has been rethought as well, to be in line wilh new international standards. China and Japan have established relations that arc pivotal to the de,;elopment and the security of the region and ,vill hopefully be further enhanced. REGIONAL PROBLEMS Asia is the hub of both the ambitions and fears of China, Japan, Russia, the European Community and the USA. In fact, it is the place where most of the nuclear peace and war insta.l lations of China, Russia, India, Pakistan , North Korea, Soulb Korea, Japan and Indonesia are established. Some countries are not nuclear powers yet, but .h ave nuclear capabilities. In sum, in Asia the willingness to achieve a Âˇwestern-type welfare goes side by side with the ideological principles inspiring many authoritarian regimes. There are many players in the area which stand out for many reasons: China and Russia for their inherent power; Japan for its economy; Russia, Indonesia, the nations in Central Asia and in the Persian Gulf for their oil and raw materials ; India, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia for their religion; Afghanistan and Iraq for their security lhreats, and so on. Also the USA should be added to the list, as it has been keeping its military forces in the region since 1951, to safeguard its military a.11.iance with Japan and

Partial view of Seoul, capital of South Korea.

South Korea and monitor all activities carried out to protect its national security. As it can be noted, a wide range of problems affect the region. The first issue is the democratization process, Âˇwhich is generally lacking behind in the area, Âˇwhere hierarchy -based societies and authoritative regimes are willingly accepted by a commonly shared mindset clashing with the globalization of commerce and a national outreach policy. The lessons learned from last century's wars have validated pre -war government systems based on a strict internal and ex tern al control. The area is concurrently characterized by a modern economy and a high level of tolerance. The presence of different ethnic groups, religions and cultures does not escalate confronta t.io n, but

fosters a sp1nt o f peace ful cohabitation, thanks to Asian peoples' Hair for commerce and trnditional fle xibi lity in their trading activities. Reference model under crisis . Twelve years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the former communist countries have los t their ideological compass. The Chinese model, mainly focused on internal problems, cannot be easily exported . Economic growth greatly varies from one country to another, as regards its depth, pattern of development and volume of productioi1.

There is competition over markets and resources. The USA carries out both i mport and export activities \-Vith Asia. The same is true for Japan and Europe, while Russia tries to make up for its losses. The overall framework is both complex and multifaceted. There is the risk that the economy, the

only driving force in the region, may not rely on a background of common interests, a clear d efinitio n of powers and th e media ting role played by area international organizations. ln fact, international organizations have not been able to perform th e same reference and mediating role played in Europe. Their limited presence testifies to the ex te nt of the problems still unsolved. The Asean, \Nhose members are China, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei and, since 1995, Vietnam, is not an eligible forum for dialogue, not being the gua rantor of a common will in the field of security. Certainly, it cannot be compared to NATO. The same concept applies to the Ap ec (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation) whose members, bes ides the above mentioned countries, are the USA, Canada, South Korea, Australia and Nevv 17

Zealand \Vilh different membership status. The history of Asia in an underlying element, which has allovved peoples to establish strong ethical and moral ties at regional, but not at international level. As a consequence, they have neither developed feelings of respect towards their neighbours, nor a sense of

The fact that Russia, suffering from a similar obsess ion, was invaded by the media, and not by tanks, has not produced visible results yet. Old conflicts are still ongoing and have not found a commonly agreed solution to-date, as in lhe case of Cambodia and Thailand, South China Sea, and the territorial disp u tes in China,

hosts its holy cities. The Tranian area is not of Arab origin and has a language of its own, whi le Arabic is spoken only .in cultural environ rnents. The history of the Persian Empire set Lhe political background of Islam. Therefore , the Persian historical and ideological heritage has become the common foundation of the ArabIslamic Âˇworld. Iran \Vas the gateway to Islam for Asian peoples, as in the case of the Turks coming from Eastern Asia. They first entered into contact with lhe Islamic world thanks to Iran and then became the polit ical guide of Islam in the year 1000 AC, spreading it eastward to Central Asia regions and India and westward to Anato li a and some parts of Eastern Europe. The Islamic culture links up several fragmented authoritarian regimes in a multifaceted

Japan, Taiwan and Tibet. The Islamic culture is widespread and deeply rooted, but not homogeneous even at its source. Asia encompasses a ll three areas which .Islarn draw its origin from: lhe Arabian, Iranian and Turkish regions, which exert their unifying or dividing power whenever a conflict arises. The Arab ian area, the most important one as regards both its extension and political role, has been the cradl e of Is lam and

framevvork and has also established a network of relations between Asia and Europe, which has never been put to the test in recent times. Th is system, allowing for free movement, connections and mutual recognition among peoples, is not less important than Lhe geographic path crossing Central Asia . In this perspective, it can be said that Turkey's gateway has already been opened , but the path

.4bove. A typical market in ShigaLse, Nepal. Right. Istanbul. The Blue Mosque.

be longing to a same regional entity. Within a mostly au thor.itarian environment, deeply rooted terr itorial disputes are still ongoing, which do not simply stern from curcent political maneuvers. The integration of the region was delayed by the historical events which took place in former colonies . They had to struggle for their independence and ,vere often opposed by hostile neighbors; thus, a confrontational attitude ruled out all cooperation efforts. These countries, Âˇwhich have long endured several invasions and fought to extend their boundaries, a rÂˇe still obsessively focusing their attention on territorial issues, an attitude which can be greatly destabilizing. 18

behind it has to be traced yet. The imbalance of J?OwerÂˇs in the recrion the lonu-lastin" b ,. b repercussions o[ the communist advance and America's influence have heav il y impacted on security, which is the most pressing and w ide ly recognized problem. The majority of future security problems will stern from Central and Eastern Asia. This situation is worsened by the fact that the USA is a lready deployed in the thea ter, which will prevent reliable external mediators from intervening, in the case of a regional conflict. The sLralegic concepts behind all US choices are based on the assumption lhat national security profits from geographical isolat ion; therefore geopolitical relations are to be kept under strict control, as in the case of the Asia-Pacific area. The US pragmatic stance and reluctance to adopt a rnore flexible approach in the region are thus explained. Amer ica's present policy towards Asia is therefore in Ii ne with its international role as a guarantor of world -w ide stability. There is the will lo forge a strong and stable corn1nunity in the Asia-Pacifi.c area, vvhich will act alongside a peacefi,1.l, united and dernocratic Europe. The aim is to establish an international open market system for the XXJ century, to rhe benefit of the world at large and the USA, which will keep its leading role as a global peace guarantor, fostering cooperation to face all security Lhreais against its national interests. As iL can be noted, priority is given to national interests. T he Asian community, established in the Pacific after World War Tv.,ro, gave origin to a series of bilateral lrea Lies assigning a subordinate role to all Asian signatory countries. ,b

- Âˇ -

-. _

L ____::~ ~:...:=========:.-.:.....::...:...=.:::!::.:==..:.;.;::::.:;::=... The nature of the :M utual Security Treaty between Lhe USA and Japan, imposed in return for ending the military occupation, has changed over time giving birth to a new transoceanic, political , economic and military entity including many oth er countries as well, where the role played by l}ie USA and Japan has been reinforced. Therefore, the situation explained above may disrupt regional ba lances and compel non-allied countries, such as China, to establish counterbalancing relations with other local actorÂˇs in a climate of tension and insecurity. Simi lar American security deployments to support South Korea and monitor the situation in Taiwan have greatly impacted on the policy adopted by North Korea and China and testify to the extent of America's direct involvement in the Asian region, which may trigger conflict and crisis situations. Those envisaging a best case scenario do nol rule out the possibility that North Korea may be gradually incorporated by South Korea and that China and th e USA may ri nd a peaceful, long lasting and

Tokio. Sumo wres!lers during a match of Japan's naLional sport.

mutually profitab.l e agreement, w i thin the framework of a reasonable freedom or action, where territorial issues play a less pivot a l role than in the past. To this airn, a pro longed cooperative and goodwill effort is required, rnore than a bilateral re lationship based on mutual respect. Some steps have already been taken, lo the point that the latest American political initiat ives toward China seem to range from a policy of restraint lo a peac efu l and cooperative involvement. So far, the coexistence of these two different strategies has on ly made matters worse, by opposing the represenLalives of two clashing mentalities and raising the Lbres hold or mutual suspicion. Suffice it lo say that in the Mutual Security Treaty between the USA and Japan, China is regarded as the reference enemy. Moreover, the American public strongly condemns some choices made by the Chinese government 19

The main gale of Lhe Kiymnizudera te1nple in Kyoto.

and reacts accordingly, as in the case of human rights violations, the occupation of Tibet and Xinjiang, the sales of weapons and dual use technologies or the unilateral extension of territorial waters. China's reaction, in turn, deepens ingrained hosti Ii ty feelings and rules out all possible cooperation efforts. To better understand the re.laLions between the USA and China, as well as the disappointment of the Chinese, it must be recalled that in the '90s Lhe USA sold high - tech equipment to Taiwan, including 150 F -16 combat aircraft, to counterbalance the Chinese acquisition of 50 Su-27 aircraft from Russia. Concurrently, Taiwan purchased 60 Mirage combat aircra[t from France and was engaged in the production of a national combat aircraft mai n.ly made up of American parts . It is also worth recalling tbat the USA is planning the development of a theater missile defense system together with Japan and Taiwan. This selective transfer of military power, raising concern among all the actors in the region, China included, has also 20

had a destabilizing effect in the Asia-Pacific area. Moreover, the rationale behind such a huge security mobilization effort is still unclear; in fact, over the last tvventy years China has registered an economic growth not followed by a similar increase in its military power, which has been on the decline since the 70's. fn 1978, When Deng Xiaoping came to power and a rapid inLernaJ reorganization process was launched to shifl from a soc iaJ is t-type centralized economy to a market oriented sysLe .m , testifying China's priorities and the secondary role p.layed by its military apparatus. China's military stockpiles are still full o( pre-1978 equipment, as part of the count,Âˇy's effort to become one of the main producers of conventional weapons, mainly based on Soviet projects of the S0's. Jn the 90's,the production of major armament systems was practically stalled. China has a limited capability o f autonon,ously developing its military arsenal, even if there is

fear that it could militarily exploit dual use technologies. But these concerns are groundless; its few modernization efforts have recently been carried out through the procurement of foreign equipment only. China's nuclear posture is very limited as compared to America's, to the point Lhat the possib.ihty of a new Warsaw Pact- type escalation is to be completely ruled out. The potential threat against the USA is based on 20 ICBivls (intercontinental bal.listic missiles), armed with a single warhead and one nuclear submarine which has been kept inactive over the last few years. The armed (orces still enroll an exceedingly high number of personnel, whose costs have a negative impact on the defense budget, are detrimental to all modernization efforts and also prove that no offensive strategies are being developed. Notwithstanding a 17 . 7% budgetary increase in 200 .l, China's overall capabilities are still strongly limited vis-a-vis its peacetime commitments over such a wide territory. China can defend its homeland only, a legitimate requirement given the number, capabilities, potentialities, claims and behaviors of its neighbors . The level of arms sales b.as dropped s ignificantly compared to the past, owing to the development of better trading relations in the region and the low standard of Chinese military equipment. In 1995, China's military sales were only 1/6, as compared to its exports in 1987/88 (lran - Traq war, large procurements by Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Thailand). In short, China neither at

View o( the lvfasmak forLress in Saudi Arabia.

present nor in the fufure will pose a military threat to the West similar to that waged by Soviet bloc countries in the bipolar era. Therefore , it cannot be considered as an aggressive and threatening nations like Iraq or North Korea, being also engaged in establishing regular commercial and pol itical relations with the USA, its neighboring countries and the Western world. Moreove1~ it has shown a clear resolve to settle all problems stemming from its relations with Tai.wan, India or Vietnam, in such a way as not to hinder progress and development in Asia. This same peaceful and cooperative attitude has raised concern among American strategists. In fact, China is following an iron-fist policy internall y, which is strongly condemned by the Western world, while is projecting its large shadow externa ll y over the Continent and the entire world, thanks to its people's migration flows and the control of third countries' economies. The most worrying aspect is that the Chinese model, still based on the concepts of national unity and territorial extension, together with a strnng internal contro l, may be projected abroad. The Chinese strongly support their choices and sovereignty, trying to defuse all possible tensions. Concuffently, there is not much leeway for mutual comprehension, as Western countries cannot interfere in the int ernal affa irs of a nation governed by laws and habits very different from those of the West, especially in the case of a country as powerful as China. Western nations have never expressed in -depth criticism, as in the case of Taiwan and its

right to independence. Objectio ns are only made in principle, not to hu r t China's feelings and break all relations Âˇwith it, as demonstrated by Tienna1T1en events an d human rights violations, \Nhen China's internal issues and deve lopment problems were never directly addressed; other exarnples were the handing over of Hong Kong to China, which was considered as a defeat of democracy, and laslly Tibet and the Dalai Lama. Once again, the economic factor is looked upon as a usefu l means to reconcile both values and behaviors. Many analysts think that a new global conflict is taking place in the Far East, as the USA/USSR confrontation has been replaced by the economic, Âˇbut equally generalized clash between the \Vestern (the USA, Europe and their connections with Russia) and the Eastern \..vorld (Asia and Russia as well) . As a consequence, the role played by Russia is gaining new momentum. The ideological gap between China and the con1munisl model has already been dealt with. Over the last five years, many important bilateral

cooperation agreements have been signed, bu t China is stil l on the alert; in fact, like many other countries in the world, it fears that a nevv imperialist drive may underrn i ne all agreements and mutual relations. As a matter of fact , there are many Russias at the moment, i.e . Moscow's decisions do not always overlap with those taken by other CIS countries . Today China has a fresh chance to pla y a crucial role and impose its power-. In the 60's, all projects and cooperation efforts between China and Russia, which had already been endorsed and partially launched, were scrapped. As a consequence, the decision taken by Russia brought abou l long years of stagnation. On the contrary, today it is Russia which offers its cooperation and China which sets both pr.ices and conditions. Once the ideological primacy of communism has been ruled out , relat ion s have been established on an equal footing for the first tirne, at least in principle, on the occasion of Eltsin's visit to Beijing in 1992. Russia and China are novv aware that they belong to the 21

same Eun1sian area and are e nvisaging a possible strategic cooperation, which will simply trnnslate into the 1·esumplion of normal relations. China wants an orficial recognition of its borders, minorities and trading r·eJations. Russia on t he contrary is eager to establish partnership ties o;ly and take part in major Chinese projects concerning technology and armaments sales. Under the presen L circumstances, an anti-\1\!estern alliance is unlike ly to be set up for many reasons . In fact, the internal situatio n of both countries is very critical and time is not ripe yet for jointly drawing up such a far-reaching plan. The USA still does not give rn uch leevvay to these countries and has a h.ands-on attitude as 1·egards their in Lernal developmen l. Toda y, both nations are unwilling Lo play a primary role al worldwide level, which would be the only reason to openly counter America's policy. As things stand, Russia may hopefully cooperate in promoting better relations and enhancing mutual understanding between Europe and Asia, t he Eastern and the Western world, to gather consensus on \:Vestern values and support the Ame1·ican pragma tic attitude, constantly aimed at peacefully enhancing development at global level. T he relations between Russia and Ja pan have nol changed over time and are still based on territorial disputes concerning four islands in the Ohorsk sea. This si tua ti on is strongly conditioned by the fact that Japan is not only considered as a faithful partner of the USA, but a lso as a far-off part of the American rn a inland, not only from a logistic po int of view, as stated by some American government sources. Europe and Asia have establ ished econom ic Lies 1

mainly, while a mutua l consensus has not been reached yet on internal and foreign policy rnaLLers. The most re\.varding aspect of this long-lasting and unilateral commitment is that the Western Europe's outreach to Eastern European count1·ies is aimed at opening a land corridor up Lo Middle East Asia and the Caucasus. Commercial ties connecting countries with different scenarios and problerns progressively translate into wider and deeper good neighhody relations.

FUTURE TRENDS

All s trategic choices made by Asia are critical, being a Lheater where any possible mistake may have worldwide repercussions, so much so if we consider thaL Asia belongs to the Asi a -Pacific strategic system, encompassing Lh e majority of the human popula tion , together with its aspirations and capabilities. Today, a widespread feeling of fear and suspicion has brought about a silent mobilization on both sides. Jn the near future, a common effort should be made

to modify internal mindsets, leveraging on the power of lhe media and the use of technologies which fulfil both private and public users requirements. The aim is to unify different peoples' needs and expectations. This article has highlighted many different options ·which need to be put in practice only. China has adopted a questionable position; in fact, its democratizaLion p rocess, not based on reliable foundations, \.Vill take a long time to be con1pleted, as in the case of Lhe Middle East. Concurrently, the USA still exerts a general and rela tively legitimized control, over Asia mainly, thanks to its time-tested pol ilical, financial and m ili tary too ls, aimed al discriminating those countries . and areas which refuse to align with its concepts. The democratization process in Asia should be stimulated and speeded up by revising the strict and obsolete strategies linked to the old world balance, large ly based on bipolar concepts. To this aim, the Mutual Secu rity Treaty be tween the USA and Japan shou ld be replaced by a much larger forum founded on

Facing page. Tel Aviv, Israel. A v iew of the beach. Right. The C:real 1\!losque· in Ka rachi, Pa/cislan.

the common security of different regiona l actors, Ch ina and Russia mainly. As a consequence, m il itary forces and Lheir bases should be only employed within the framework of a new NATOtype alliance, and not to implement bi lateral \,v ar agreements. The establ ishment of a multilateral Asia-Pacific security system, the availability of a standing forum and a dedicated organization could play down present problems and allow for the development of mutual confidence-building measures, inspired hy common goals and decisions. Regular consultations wou ld reasonably lead to drawing down all mi litary apparatuses autonomously set up by nations to defend themselves. This effort could curb nuclear proliferation and armaments sales and al.low fo r· finding commonly agreed solutions to territorial disputes. American's hegemonic role is questioned once again, in Asia, Europe and elsewhere, due to its policy more focused on national than international problems. As a matter of fact, in a world where everyone pursue their particula r· in terests, America would b e ill -adviced if it neglected its surviva l or subsistence needs to meet worldwide requirements . On the contrary, the USA should set up a nevv attractive reference model, capable of gathering the consensus of all the other peoples of the world . This system should be also tailored to adjust to regional requirements. The groundwork would be thus set for the deve lopment of mutual confidence initiatives,

stemming from a clear resolve to find new types of cooperation also in the military sector. A development effort, which is first priority in the present global scenario, is ca r ded out in an unstable security framework, where threats arc fuelled hy suspicion and ignorance. Within this scenario, the USA may well decide noL to pursue its national interests only and establish common cohabitation rules to reduce present cases of uncertainty and ambiguity. The role to be played by America in the future has not been identified yet and nations stil( act on the spur o [ the moment trying not to cause irreversible damage. As it has already been said, the USA still reacLs to Lhe instab iltty of the Asia -Pacific theatre by adopting past containment systems, which stoke strong reactions against the dernocrat ic model and stir up nationalistic fee lings . At the same time, America's_proactive attitude has already gained an exceptiona l flexibility. The success of a ll detente policies is dependent on the development of US interna l affairs, both in China and .in the

USA. Another Tiennamen or a poss ible crisis of American industrial lobbies could heavily impact on the present, unstable political, dipJomaLic and economic balance. To prevent those risks from occu n·ing and establish a common security framework, the USA should not consider most of the actions carried out by China as autonomously decided hostile choices, but as a response to the initiatives commonly agreed by the USA , Japan, Taiwan and South Korea in Asia. To dispel all suspicions, the need is felt for clear, simple ideas, plans and lines of action. The difficult compromise reached in the region should not be considered as an end in itself, given the high number of actors involved, the extent of interests at stake and the accelerated rhythm of global relations . To conclude, in dealing with Asia and the M idd ]e East, the USA shou ld ask the Western world Lo join in and not act as a single p layer. This cooperation may yield unexpected dividends . D ,·, !vlajor General (ret.)

CHARACTERISTICS OF CROs (CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS)

The evolution described above has involved all the Western Countries. NATO, in its Washington meeting of April 23, 1999, approved a new strategic concept, introducing the "non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations" as an integral part of the Alliance's "Crises Management", describing those operations as one of the three military missions envisaged, in addition to: • collective defence, described in Art. 5 of the Treaty; · • consultation and cooperation (PfP, Membership Action Plan , NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO-Russia Military Cooperation). These new concepts are dealt with in two documents of the Alliance: • MC 400/2 - "MC GUIDANCE FOR THE MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY"; • MC 327/2 - "NATO MILITARY POLICY FOR NON ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS". In these documents, CROs are described as multifunctional operations which include political, military and civil activities,

• sharing of the risks of hurnan losses, which are very possible in the con d uc t of CROs. These r isks if shared with other Nations, are more easily accepted by lhe public opinion of each Country. In addi tion, multinational Commands, bes ides establishing an aclive spirit of collaborat ion among the contributing Countries, as a matter of fact guarantee a form of mutual control and prevent the adoption of lines of actions nol in accordance with the pu i-pose or the mandate of the mission. CROs POLITICO-STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

conducted in order to guarantee the observance of international laws or the achievemen t of the Alliance's stated objectives, aimed at averLing or solving conflicts and at managing all possible crises. They can vary from support operations , , carried out in connection with organizations, to peace support operations, and can also envisage combat actions . In particular, those which envisage the use of force for self-defence only, can take the shape of: • exfiltration; • aid to the population, such as interventions in case of disaster or for humanitarian pmvoses; • Search And Rescue; • non -combatant evacuation. operations (NE Os) . Evacuatio n of nationals remains a national responsibility. On the contrary, Lhe operations which imply the use of military force or the threat to use it vary from the application of sanctions or embargoes Lo actual military combat operations. Con trary to what occurs for Art.5 operations, in case of CROs contributions and m iii ta ry partic ipation are always subject to

the d e cision of the nationa l authorities. It is wort h mentioning that , rneanwhile , NATO had already carried out its mvn structural r·ev1s10n, acquiring rapidly projecLable Commands, capable of becoming multinational and of integrating elements from nonNATO Countries . Suffice it to menti on , in particular, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) or the ACE Mobile Force-Land (AMF-L) . As a matter of fact, the coalitions based on a large "international" partici pation appear to be more legitimated (as was the case for the operations in Bos nia and Kosovo). The main reasons which advise even a great Power aga inst operating by i lself, desp ite its capability of doing il, a 1·e connected with the follow ing considerations: • legitimation of the intervention in the eyes of the internat ional community; • saving of "valuable'' assets (helicopters, specialized units, logistic support, hospitals, special forces) and limitation of organizational costs (I );

Political control and strategic direction of these operations are within the provi nce of the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsi bility for lhe maintenance of peace and international security. At European regional level, these respo ns ibi lities ca n also be assumed by OSCE - th e most .importa nt E u ropean secu.r i ly organization, to which also the US and Canada belong - that plays an essential role in promoting peace, slab il ity, security in cooperation, as well as in furthering democracy and human rights in Europe. ll mu s t be underlined t hat, according lo UN procedures, when a regional or international crisis breaks oul, the intervention of a m ilitary force is considered the final act of an unsuccessful process of mediation.

Throu gh the UN, th e international community can in fact take s everal initiatives (politico-diplomatic, economic, etc.) aimed at finding - first of all a pain.Jess solution to the disputes among the Parties involved. Only if these actions fail, the UN can decide that a military intervention

is necessary as a last and often decisive resource, in order to bring the crisjs Lo an end. In t}iese circumstances, · tbe UN Security Council acts and decides accord ing lo the provisos of chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. In particular, Chapter VI assigns to tbe Security Counci l a conciliatory function (art.33) in order to contribute to th e peaceful solution of international disputes, pron-10ting, through recommendations, the agreement of the Parties. The power of issuing "recommendations" is regulated by art. 36 and must take into account the procedures already adopted by the Parties. Furthermore, art. 34 of chapter VI invests the Security Council with a generic power of investigation, which can lead Lo the decision of sending obser-vation teams on the [ield, with the possible employment of military obser-ver·s. This chapter or the UN Charter includes some important initiatives listed as: • conflict prevention; • peacemaking; • humanitarian aid. Considering that each operation often requires the planning and

execution of all the activities mentioned above, the list is only indicative, and essentially points out the priority-activities performed within each operation. Tn particular: • conf1ict prevention includes many activities, from diplomatic initiatives to the preventive deployment of forces and its aim is to avoid that disputes degenerate into armed conflicts or that they spread out. Prevention. needs a global strategy, defined and conducted at political level and is based, in particular, on the activity of anticipation, recognition and

contrnl of the crises (the UNPREDEP in FYROM, 199599, is an example); • peacemaking is a series of diplomatic actions, conducted after the beginning of a conflict, aimed at permitting a peaceful selllement of relations among the Parties. They can take the form of an offer of "good offices", mediation and conciliation, as ·well as that of diplomatic isolation or olher forms of sanctions (an example is the WEU/Danube mission, 1993-96); • humanitarian aid includes the activities can-ied out in order to relieve hurnan suffe i-ings, particularly in circumstances where Lhe local Authorities are unable or umvilling to support and assist the population in an adequate manner. They can be conducted w ithin a wider operation or as an independent und erta king. Although the humanitarian opera.Lions env isage, as a priority, the employment of civilian resources, their conduct can be entmsted to military organi:c,ations when the intervention takes place in A sniper observes his sector, ready to reac1 to hostile fire.

Conciliatory function : accord between the parties through diplomatic initiatives

conflict areas requ1nng the adoption of security measures to protect the civilians assisted and/or the personnel engaged in the operation (examp les: "Airone" / Kurdistan , Iraq, J 991 and "Pe!Ucano"/Albania, 1991-93). The adoption of actual coercive actions, including international police operations, against o~· within a State, .is regul ated by chapter VII of the Charter.

In particular: • article 40, in order to prevent a worsening of the situation, envisages that Lhe Security Council can invite the pa1ties to implement Lhe temporary measures it considers necessary or desirable for the restoration of the normal situation. Ceasefires area cases in point; • article 41 considers measures which do not imply the use of force and that the UN members should adopt towards the Nation

(or Nations) responsible for the crisis. They can include a total or parti al br-eak of economic relations, the interruption of railway, mant1me, postal, telegraphic and radio communications, etc., and even the breaking-off of diplomatic ,·elations; • finally, article 42 says that if the Security Council deems the measures established by article 41 to be inadequate, it can undertake with air, naval or land forces, any action considered necessary to keep or reestahlish. peace and international security (the se actions can include "demonstrations, blockades and other operations employing air, naval or land forces of the United Nations"). In other words, the matter concerns the ligitimation of the intervention by a military force. Unlike the sanctions envisaged by art. 41, which must be concretely adopted by member States upon request by the Security Council, the internationalpolice actions included in art. 42 are clearly conceived, in the first place at least, as actions directly undertaken by the Security Council, employing armed contingents put at its disposal by the UN rnembers. The fonns of intervention going under the general heading of peace enforcement are connected to this chapter, while peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities must be discussed separately. Let's analvze them startino from " b the last two: • peacekeeping: a Lthe begi.m1ing it ·was considered, in general terms, as the intervention of an impartial third Party, operating under the gu.iclance of an international body and aimed at containing, controlling and/or ending hostile activities between Nations or \.Vithin them, where the use of force was not excluded

jf necessary, in a context characterized by the agreement of Lhe Parties concerned.

Today p eacekeeping has assumed the characteristics of a low-in te nsity intervention, still ·with the agreement of the parties involved, wl1ere the use of force is not envisaged to achieve the objective of the mission, but rather to guarantee the self-defence of the units in the field. It is therefore an intervention involving both Chapter VI and Cha pter VII of the UN Charter, and there is the idea of includi ng it in a new "Chapter VI+". According to this interpretation, the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo must be considered peace enforcemeni operations; • peacebuilding is a type of .in tervention that can take place both after Chapter V1 and peace enforcement operations. The definition applies to posr-conflict activities aim.eel at detecting and supporting s tructures able to strengthen and make concrete political solutions that can pcevent a return to the conflict. They imply measures that can build con fidence and wel fare and contribute to the economic reconstruction. Both military and civilians can be involved in these operations; • peace enforcement operations aim at imposing a ·will , and envisage the employment o f military formations based on a mandate authorizing the coercive use of force in order to restore peace and observance of international law. These missions can take place in an e nvironment normally characterized by the lack of a general consensus by the Parties involved. In thes e cases the impartiality of the intervention is very important. The use of force, considered possible, has to be contained and not a imed at destroying the opposing forces but only at achieving the objectives fixed by the Auth01ity holding the

m anda te. (The intervention in Corea/1950-53, the operation "Joint Endeavour"/Bosnia started in 1995 and "Joint Guardian "/Kosovo, started in 1999, are examples of peace enforcement). We have seen how t he CROs decision-making process develops at politico-strategic level, and how Lhe Secucity Council legitirnates, with an ad-hoe resolution, the use of military force. This formal act is very important, in that it contains all the elements of the intervention, namely: • mandate; • extent of the engagement; • tasks; • Rules of Engagement (RoE); • type of subordination to the UN. The latter is an interesting and significant aspect, ·which permits to divide the operations into three groups: • operations under UN aegis, where the United Nations only endorses the objectives of the operati on, as in the case of Operation "Desert Storm" in the Gulf and the UNITAF mission in Somalia (1st phase, 1992-93); • operations under UN mandate, where the United Na tions asks a

Nation or a regional Organization to plan and conduct a mission. The UN, in this case, establishes the objectives and keeps the political direction of the operation. This was the case of operation "Alba" (Albania, 1997), where Ita ly was leader-Nation; INTERFET (East Timm~ 19992000) w ith Australia as leaderNation; IFOR-SFOR in Bosnia (started in 1995) and KFOR in Kosovo, FYROM and Albania (started in 1999), where NATO assumed the military leadership; • operations under UN command, where the UN assumes the direct command of the operation, realizi ng on its own, on a multinational basis, the necessary command structu res , as in UNIFIL (Southern Lebanon, started in I 978); UNPROFOR (Bosnia, 1992-95) ; UNOSOM (Somalia, 2nd phase, 1993-94 ), UNOMOZ (Mozambique, 199394 ), UNAlVISIL (Sierra Leone, started in 1999). COMMAND AND CONTROL INCROs

Military operations always derive fi·om national or international political po1;ver, which recognizes

in them the most suitable way to real ize ils purposes (po.lilical objectives). T he Political Au Lhorily formulates a mandate and entrusts it to a Force Com.rnander, who is tasked with planning and conducting the rnilitary operations necessary to implement the mandate through the employment of a mililary instnunent. The Operation Commander is granted a Comrnand Authority adequate to the task. The Comrnand Authorily, in its turn, is variously distributed, llH"ough the military strncture, in the manner considered most appropriate for the effect ive operation of the command-andcontrol function. The distribution scheme of the command authority represents the Organization of Command and Control, \Vh ich in multinational operations is of fundamental importance. In CROs, the political and mi Ii tary au lho ,-i lies of the participating Nations tend, in an open or dissembled manner, to keep a certain control over their Contingents, and to intervene in their conduct, particulary at critical moments. Mainly concerned about the loss of human lives, and often pressed by emotional public opinions, these Authorities - having no detailed knowledge of the situation in the field and ignoring the altilute of the other Nations start issuing orders suited to their own objectives, at a moment when, according to the principle of singleness of command, the unifying action of the multinational Force's Conunander ,vould be extremely important. As a matter of fact, the national leade,-s detail their forces, but have a tendency to attribute to the Commander a limited authority over them. The Command function is reali ze d by entrusting the 30

Commanders with the organizational respons ibilities which normally take the fom1s of Fu ll Command, Operationa l Command, Operational Control, Tactical Command and Tactical Control, with the following levels of authority: • Full Command (FULLCOM). The authority and responsibility conferred lo a Command er as regards training, preparation and employment o[ the units or organizations under his orders. Jt refers to all operational and logistic aspects and, as a rule, is only applied within the national Armed Forces. In the international envirnnment, the term "Command" refers to a lower level of authority. As a consequence, in NATO and in other organizations/coalitions, no Commander has Full Command over the forces assigned to him. • Operational Command (OPCOM). ll corresponds to the authority granted to a Con1mander to: •• assign missions or tasks to subordinate Commanders; •• deploy units; •• reassign rorces; •• keep or delegate OPCOM according lo needs. Per se, it does not include authority in the administrative and logistic sector.

• Operational Control (OPCON). Il is the authority, e.n lrusted to a Commande1~ to: •• empl oy Lh e forc es allocated for the accomplishment of spec ific missions or tasks, normally limited as regards runctions, time and space; •• deploy the units concerned; •• keep or delegate TACON of these units. lt docs not include the authority to change the tasks for which the units have been assigned. It docs not involve logistic and administrative actions. • Tactical Command (TACOM). It corresponds to the authority to give tasks to the forces under his command in order to carry out the rnission assigned by a higher:..level Authority. • Tactical Control (TACON). IL is the authority, delegated to a Com mancler, lo cl i recL and control in detail, generally at local level, the actions and manoeuvres necessary to carry ouL the assigned m issions or tasks. It does not include the authority to assign new tasks or change the original ones. In Peace Operations, OPCON

"Cenlauro" heavy armoured-car patrolling a Bosnia road.

is the highest authority which is normally delegated.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The rules of engagement, in the speciUc context of peace-support operations, are directives or orders issued by the Force Commander (after approval by a qualified politico-military Authority). The ROEs define the circumstances and the limits within which the forces can/ rnust use their weapons. In particular, w ithin NATO they are defined as "directives, issued by the militar·y Authorities, specifying the circumstances and limits within which the forces can start and/or continue fighting against the opposing forces" (Pub AAP-6). The ru les of engagement assigned to a Contingent depend on: • legal frame-work w ithin which the intervention takes place (e.g. UN Resolution which o r·iginated the mission); • specific politico-military situation in which the Force operates. ROEs must be made known to all personnel of every category and rank and, in particulai~ they must be: • clear, simple, understandable and univocal; • aimed at containing the use of force (in other words they must a void , as far as possible, escalations in the recourse to force), be absolutely impartial and adhere to the principle of sel f-clefence; • be drawn taking into account the principles of "limitation in the use of force", "self-defence" and "credibility"". The n1les of engagement, at any rate, must clearly envisage: • when and how lo use weapons; • ·what weapons can he used in different situations; • what is the Authority empowered to decide, in case of need, the opening or fire or the movement

of the unit away from the assigned place (abandonment of a threatened position). It is possible (and even advisable, when the situation is very uncertain) to consider several "conceivable rnles of engagement" (envisaging, fo r· instance, different levels of a u thori ty for deciding when to open [ire), in order to face, with the necessary nexibility, dynamic and changing situations. In this case, it is indispensable to define very clearly: • the rules of engagement in force at all times; • the Autho rity ent itl ed to authorize changing the rules (or possibly the speci fic racts that ~an d e termine the automatic transition Fron, one set of rules to another). DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY ACTIVITY

Jn parallel with the initiatives of the international communi ly, ai meet at finding a political solution, the General Staffs, both nat ional and international, start planning the military operation and , relying on the available elements, hegi n to study the

possible options, d efining the command and control chain, the leader Nations and all that is necessary to start the operation. Thus, as soon as the Security Council issues its resolution, the military contingents arc practic;:llly ready to go into action. In fact, the timeliness of the inter·vention is indispensable to show to the Parties the international resolve and Lhe readiness of the units, wi th positive effects both for deterTence and for preventing the crisis from deteriorating. As a r·u le, considering th e uncertainty of the situation, especially in the initial phases, the contingents are prepared and equipped to face the worst case (high operational intensity), considering tl1e possible need of having to impose peace on elements 0 1· factions unwilling to accept it. On the other· hand, considering the typical context of these operations, usually characterized by th e lack of a credible government and _international bodies capable of filling the pO\vergap resulting from the crisis, the tasks the military units are called to perform arc often different 31

Controlling ivlt Tub e vic T\I relay Slatio11..

em phasize, and often amplify, every incident along the way. THE PHASES OF A MISSION

from the traditional ones and every operator must possess, besides his fighting capability, the skills necessary to play different and at times very delicate roles, such as those of diplomat, police officer, peace-maker, nurse or, generically, dispenser- of aid. Commanders have a particularly hard task, since they are required to operate taking into account a growing number of social, political, cultural, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors. In fact, they are called to make

autonomous decisions which are not within their institutional province, and often have to work in contrast with local personages unduly trying to appropriate prerogatives not attributed to them by lmv. Fo r- instance, in Kosovo the Brigade Comrnander played, among others the role of judicial authority when offences were committed, with the ensuing legal and personal problems. And all this occu rs in an environment that is under the attention of t he media, which

Although every Theatre has its characteristics, its own logic of action and its constraints, it seems nevertheless possible to single out three distinctive phases, in the development of every CRO. The fi.rst one, purely military, is aimed at achieving a rapid control of the maritime, air and land space. Dming this phase, usually short, the units are heavily engaged in the execution o'r military tasks. The second is a transition phase, longer and very unstable, \.vhich imposes the restoration of order and public safety. Military actions arc still necessary, but other skills are also required . Nevertheless this period is not free from risks deriving, mainly, from a possible resumption of local tensions. Stabilization is the third phase. It is characteri 7.ed by a lesser level of tensions; its goal is to reconstruct a constitutional state and to gradually reestablish the State's sovereignty. This phase can last several years. Little by little, the responsibilities assigned to the Armed Forces are transferred to the local Autho1ities. It is important to note that after the initial phase of contact with an armed enemy, either militar-y or paramilitary, the successive phases frequently lead to a permanent contact Âˇwith helpless populations (who are often refugees returning to their territor ies and their homes) ,md to the gradual transfer The "Alpini" from the "Taurinense" Brigade are among the guardians of the peace in Sarajevo.

"Alpini'' pa.tro ll ing a highway.

Bosnian

of res ponsi bili ties to the local Authorities. Tn these s ituations, CIMIC activities are particularly important, and ad-hoe cells are es tablished within t he Brigade Staffs.

PREPARATION OF THE FORCES

The preparation of the forces is of fundamental importance for the successfu l performance of a mission . It must be meant as the complex of training activities indispensable for enabling Lhe units to carry out their operational tasks (2j . These activities, which go on without interruption w ithin an operational cycle (which r shall describe later), start before the employment (one of the cycle's phases) and continue throughout the mission, until the forces are withdrawn from the Theatre for their reconditioning (last phase of the operational cycle), in anticipation of a new engagement. The training, in general, must reach three closely interrelated operational levels: • the first level concerns all units, irrespective of their type, and envisages the achievement of the capability of conducting classic war operations, in defence of the national and the Allied Nations' terri tory (art . 5 of th e North Atlantic Treaty); • the second level is clifferent.iated according to the "package" to ,.v hich the units belong an d refers to t he activities necessary to give the forces the capability of conducting the operations envisaged - and envisageable for carrying out the other two strategic missions, "presence

and surveillance" and "defence of the external interests and contrib u tion to international security". The objectives are then pursued in accordance with the specific "capability package": from the defence of sensitive targets to the conduct of CROs; • the third level orients the preparation of the units tm.vards a specific operational plan (OPLAN) and concerns only the form a tions earmarked : for intervention in a spedfic operation whose elements are well-known (mission, task, C2 organization, composiLio1i and

organization of the forces, area of responsibility, logistic support, ... ).

OPERATIONAL CYCLE

The operational cycle (3) of a unit is divided into four phases: • general preparation: the "normal" situa tion and, therefore, the beginning of the operational cycle. During this period, the units reach their pt_ and 2 nd -level preparation, and acquire the capabilities estimated for their force

Control o( the territory by th e "Taurinense'' alpine units assigned LO the SFOR. peace-mission.

A 661 6 Fia1 -lvecu light arnwured car o{Lhe 'Ta11ri11ense" Brigade in Bosnia.

category (projeclion, rcaclion, presence and surveillance); • preparation following an Ord er of Operation: the s ituation of t he un i ts des igna ted for a spec ific missio n, which rn ust undergo a special preparation (3r<l level) which ena bles lhem to carry out the task ass ign ed . As regards out-of-area operat ions, thi s phase las ts ab ou t 4 months, d uring which the task force is completed w ith personnel, vehicles and weapon systems, and goes through the

necessary vaccina tion cycle. The form ation also carries out a malgam a tion and trainin g ac tivi ti es, re adyin g itself for projection into the Theat,~e. It is not always possibl e to prepare the first Con tingen t according to these Lime fram es, but thi s must certainly be done as regards the forces designed for the successive rotations; • e mployment: the d uration of a unit's engagement in operations depends o n the type of activity actually performed on the field (Level of operational stress) and

on the availability of resources (oth er co mmitm e nts , availability of equivalent units). In principle, the interventions outside the nalional territories don't last longer than 4 months, considering the need/advantage of acqu iring an adequate familia1ity with the Theatre. The non-sim ultaneous introduc tion of units at d ifferent levels, m ust also permit a suitable period of o ve.-lapping between the Comman d of t he Contin gent. and the HQ of th e main manoeuvre-unit, in order Lo have always one of the fundamental e lements w ith suffi c ien t exp e rie n ce, Lhus avoiding critical interruptions in the conduct of the operations. • reconditioning after employment: involves the development of activities aimed at bringing the unit back LO its full opera tional effectiveness, and is connected with: •• psycho-physical recovery of personnel; •• special mai ntenance of systems, mate ri a ls and equipment, replacement or materials damaged, dete1iorated or delivered Lo other units in the Theatre; •• verification of the operational capabilities, if necessary through an adequate training pc i-io d aimed at reacq uiring the expected standard. The durati on the of reconditioning phase is not rigid, since it depends on the activities the unit must carry out in order lo go back to i ls operational standard. In general, it lasts 4 or 5 months. As a whole, al present t he o perational. cycle of a Brigade HQ or Regim ent lasts abou t 16 months (4 in the Theatre and 12 in the home-country) .

"Alpini" in a training exercise.

THE TASK ORGA.NIZATION SYSTEM The contingents engaged in CROs are normally organized according to the task organization concepl, which envisages the incorporation of the higher-level uni Ls i nLo the b asic module (company) depending on the operational requirement, rather than on th e basis of the organizalion adopted, in Lim.es of operational "non-employment" for preem i nent adminislrative or training reasons. They are modular and balanced units, where each component is capable of perform ing spec ific functions . Thus, the contingent can intervene in every mission envisaged by CROs, including those charnclerized by a high operational intensity (e .g. interposition). This guarantees a remarka ble flexibility of employment, in terms of both deterrence and reaction. This criterion has been followed in the organization of contingents since 1995, and has permitted the Service to carry o ut important and simultaneous tasks during the t rans 1t1on phase of "professionalization "of the units. At t he present time, t he availability of "ready forces " permi ts to app ly the "task organization" criterion ,.vi.th higher flexibility, and to proceed gradually to the alignrnenl of the Brigade HQs with their Regiments. This meas ure wi ll allow a uni tary development of the various phases of the operational cycle, since il permits Lo realize a homogeneous series of activities and to pursue the sarne objectives, especially during the fundamental phase or "readying ror employment". This will also enab le lhe cont ingent

Commanders lo ascertain, with an overall vision, the implementation of the trni ning directives and Lhe coffect application/diffusion of the instructions issued by the higher Commands and, if necessary, to intervene in time w ith Lhe necessary co1Tections. Also important are the directing, inciting and controlling actions that the Brigade Commanders will be able to carry out, more i n cisive ly, in the garrison, especially as regards personnel. As a matter of fact, it will be possible to ernp.loy them "out-of-areaÂť.

together with the same units over which, on the national territory, Lhey exercise their [ull command.

THE "MOUNTING HEADQUARTERS" FUNCTION ln case of operations outside the national territory or, on some occasions, even within the Country itself, the units designed for the interventions s hould be rÂˇelieved of all the exacting and complex

•

TASK ORGANIZATION

Incorporation of units according to operational requirements Modular structures able to carry out specific functions

•

HIGH FLEXIBILITY OF EMPLOYMENT resp onsi biliti es wh ich almos t always require the involvement and coordination of several higherlevel Bodi es/Organizations, thus enabli ng them lo concentrate, in a conti n uat ive manner, o n the strictly operational aspects of the preparation (4). Thi s was sol ved throu gh the institution o f the "M ounting Headquarters"(5), an appropriate Comm a nd tas ked with. monitoring, for each contingent: • preparation and amalgamation;

• projection to the ope rations zone; • s upport during the miss ion.

The m ost important aspects of these phases are listed below. Preparation and amalgamation

Prep aration includes the alert phase and the successive conditionin g in vi e w of the employment. During t he warning phase, the

Task Force Comm and an d the n ecessary units are designated, according to t he m ission (Task Organization principle). This phase is fo ll owed by the con di Lio ning fo r e mploy me nt, which incl udes several, sometimes complex, activities, that must usually be carried out in very short periods of time. In fact, it is a matter of: • completing the equipment o f Comands a nd units; •assi g ning e xt rn personn e l, sys tems and ma te ri als no t normal ly attached to the Comma n ds/u nits d est ined to organi :;.e the Task Fo rce , but which will be employed in the specific mission envisaged; • carrying out a specia l mainte nance of the equiprn e nt and, if necessary, complete the prescribed vaccinations; • conducti n g a preventive reconnaissance of the operations zone a nd es ta blishin g the n ecessary contacts with the higher Commands; • proceed ing with th e miss io n's amalga mation a nd trni n ing activit ies (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian aid,... ); • working out a movement pla n.

Projection to the Operations Zone

The projection into the Theatre includes the movements LO the loading points and the successive embarkation and transfer to the operations zone. l n this phase, the Mounting H Q sets going and manages, possibly with the contribu tion of the other Servi ces, the naval, aer ia l a nd rai lway points or em barkat ion (POEs) on the national territory, and coordinates the movements of Lhe units from the ir garrisons 01rnounling areas to the PO E s. Support to the forces

Duri ng this phase, the Mounting HQ carries out all the activities

connecled with manning and logistic support of the in Theatre contingent, taking care, moreover, of the pr eparation of all personnel or units that could possibly be projected as reinforcemenls. CONCLUSIONS

Clearly, the out-of-area operations are complex and

Above.

A "Centauro '' heavy armoured-car at an Italian checkpoint in Bosnia.

Left. Italian serviceman in a firing exercise.

NOTES

composite activities invo lving several levels of responsibility. The emphasis laid on the conceptual and organizational elements is me a nt as a guidance to the professionals, especia lly the younger ones, in order to enable them to have a clearer piclure of the interrelations between all the parties concerned and the activities to be carried out. This type of opera tions will involve and engage the Armed Forces of all lhe most advanced Count1ies for many years to come. This, nevertheless, should not give rise to the conviction that they are the final objectives of the modern military instruments. The "War" operations pointed oul by NATO at A1t.S of the Treaty remain the Alliance's ma in m ission, and must continue to be a precise reference for t he preparation of our units. The reference to operational

cycles made in the preceding paragraphs, underlines the point of view of our Service, accord ing to which the first level of prepara t ion of the units, irrespective of their type, must be the achievement of the capability of conducting classic waroperations. The Army, today, allocates to this objective the most conspic uo us parl of its training budget and, precisely with a view to this, . has developed a series of international agreements for the use of large ranges in Poland, Sweden, Lithuania, Hu ngary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Egypt and Tunisia. All the Brigades of our Army have al ready been training there by turns during the last two years. 0 1 'Major General, Chief; Force Employrn.e nt Division, Army General Staff'

(1) Tn particular, in the logistic sector Lhe mulLinaLionality concepL is widely put into practice with no serious problems, relying on the full cooperation of all contingents. The concept of "mutual aid" is remarkable in this regard, wh ich does not mean LhaL one confers all his available resources , but rather shares in the successfu l outcome of a given undertaking. (2) Training of personnel and units, rned.ical meas u res, acquis ition, distribution, rnainlenance and replacement of systems, equipment and materials. (3) "P lann i ng directive for the preparation of the land forces and for the operational readiness of some components thereof". Army General Staff, Plans Office, November 24, 1998. (4) With in NATO, the concept of "mounling'' is de fi ned as fo ll ows in AAP-6: ''1he whole of the preparaLion

activities carried out in an appointed area before an operation". lt includes the assembly, preparation and stay in Lhe mou n t ing area, transfer to the loadin!! areas and t h e success ive embarkation on ships, aircra[t or motor vehicles, to reach the redeployment zones. (5) "Directive for the preparatio n , redeployment and support of a Task Force .in Op e rations". Arm y General Staff, Plans Office, AugusL 11, 1999 .

by Giovanni Ridino -:~

osnia appears today as a melting-pot of government and administrat ive stru ct ures, whose functioning and interconnections are difficu lL to undersland for those vvho are nol particu larly interested in il for professional or study .reasons or for mere cul tu.ral research. I have therefo i-e deemed convenient to outline a picture of t h e State of BosniaHenegovina, through its administrati ve, institutional and

political aspects to allow the reade i- Lo un derstand the essential problems that face lhe Country and the international Community. I am going to deal with Bosnia -Herzegovina's political and administra t ive s tructures, mention the complexity of its various parties and foc us on its po l ilical, economic and mi litary situation, before concluding with some comments on tl1e various more topical problems .

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES

Let's start, first of all, with Âˇt he introduction of the different flags that wave in Bosn ia -Herzegovina. There are three of thern(Fig. l): â€˘ lhe flag of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), which was imposed (as the currency - the convertible mark KM - the passport and the license plates) by the Civilian High Representative in BiH. The stars represent Europe, the tri,mgle the

three e thnic groups and the yellow colour represents the sun.; • the flag of the Srpska Republic (RS): the cross in the middle is

marked by four letters of the Cyrillic alphabet wich sum up the motto:Orzly Serbia ·will Save the Serbs; • Lb e flag of the BosniaHerzegovina Federation: the sbie ld repr·esents the Bosnian fleur-de-lys, the Croatian draughtboard and the E uropean flag. The administrative structures are rather com plex and derive from the Accords of Dayton, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, which have pu t an end to the ·wa 1~ BiH is a single State, its capital is Sarajevo. Its organizat ion is formed by two distinct parts called "entities": the S11Jska Republic and the BiH Federation (Fig.2). The Bil-I Fed eration assembles essentially two ethnic groups: The

council of the city, elected with a proportional system, led by a mayor and a deputy-mayor, who stay in office for two years and belong to the two ethnic groups. Each year, the two representatives exchange their positions. The Srpska Republic is more simple because it does not include cantons and is administratively made up by 63 municipalities (Fig.6). Pale, the fief of Karadzic and the radical Serbs, was the old capital, sadly famous during the civil wa1: The moderate government of Mrs. Plavsic has transfeffed the capital in the fief of the moderates, Lo Banja Luka, in the western part of the Srpska Republic. Bosnian-Moslems and the Bosnian-Croatians. Its capital is also Sarajevo. The Srpska Republic is a very homogeneous enli ty from the ethnic viewpoint., almost exclusively peopled by BosnianSerbs. Its capital is Banja-Luka. As regards religion: the Bosnians are Moslem, the BosnianCroatians are Roman Catholic and the Bosnian-Serbs are Christian Orthodox. On the local plane, the two en tities of Bosnia have the same strnclures they had before the war: The Country is divided into 155 municipalities or opstinas: 92 in the Federation and 63 in the SR. Each opstina is distinguished by a number and a name, generally that of the most important locality (Fig.3). The size of an opstina is variable. The Dayton Accords, in J995, have drawn a line of separation bet\vecn the t,vo entities of BiH. This line, Lhe lEBL (Inter-Entity Boundary Line), crosses some opstinas and cuts them in two. Thus we have witnessed, in 1995, the creation of new opstinas derived from that layout (Fig.3). Within BiH , the FederaLion is divided into ten administrative cantons, each of which comprises 40

IThe Cantons of FBiH I :.

MOS'fAR

Fig. 4 several opstinas (Fig.4) . A particular case is represented by MostcU", which is the second city ofBiH. seven includes This municipalities: a "mixed" central zone, composed by both Bosnian-Moslems and BosnianCroatians, and six municipalities: three of Bosnian-Croatians and three of Bosnians (Fig.5). These are directed by a mayor and a councj I like any classic municipality. The whole is headed by the Mosrar City Council, the old

A particular attention must be given to the strategic position of Brcko. This city, which was under Sei-bian administration, has constituted itself, in March 2000, a neutral district connected with BiH. Such decis ion has for a long time fucled the present political crisis in the SR, because the Entity is now cut in two.

THE LEGISLATIVE BODIES.

T he legislative and executive

powers of BiH are similarly varied (Fig.7). ln the SR, the people elect the legis la tive organs of eve ry opstina and also, directly and with a proport ion al system, t·he 83 depulies of the "RSNA", the NationaJ Assembly of the SR. The voters elect also the President of the SR and the ir ethnic representati ve at th e tripartite presidency of Bill. In the Bi H Federation the p eo ple e lec L directly the legislative organs of each opstina and of each canton, and the 140 d ep uti es of the "Chamber of Representatives of t h e BiH Federation" . Those elected at cantonal level, in their turn , elect 74 deputies (senators) to the "Chamber of Peoples". These two Chambers designate the Pres id en t. The ethnic representatives of the tripartite Presidency are elected directly by the people. At national level, the peoples of the SR and the BiH Federation el ec t th eir deputies to tbe "Chamber of Representatives of BiH" ; 28 seats For the BiH Federati o n and 14 seats for the SR. T he s e nato rs elecLed to the "Chamber of Peoples" of the BiH Fecle raLion and, the BosnianSerb ian deputies of t.he RSNA (National Assembly of SR) elect 5 deputies fo r each ethn ic group (senators of BiH) to the "Chamber of the Peoples of BiH". The electors were called to vote in November 2000 to designate the representatives to: • the Chan,ber o( Representatives of the Federation and to the canton,d assemblies; • the Chamber of the Representatives of Bill; • the Presidency and the National Assembly of the SR l n 2002 they will be called again to vote for the tripartite Pres id ency. IL should not be forgotten that, in April 2000, the same voters had been called to elecl the m unicipal assem blies.

f7"...!::"Y

Fig. 5

- MOSTAR in detail -

PEnY5nrtKA CPnCKA Republic of Srpska

' Fig. 6

THE EXECUTIVE POWER

The govern ments of Bosnia, i.e. of the Federation (including the ca ntons and the m unicipaliti es) and o f th e SR, im plement the principle of tri parti Lion of responsibilities between the national governme nt and the Entities (Fig.8) . Th e nati o nal government is responsible for foreign affairs, curre ncy and finance, citizenship and em igraUon, com munications and transports and also for the e nforce ment of the international

laws on crime. The governments of the Entities are responsible for Defence (there are in fact different Armed Forces), for the Interior and Justice, for Refugees, for Education, Health, Agriculture and Trade. lL should be observed that the national government h as no auLhorily over the En Li ties. The wide autonomy granted to the Enlities permits to avoid conlrapositions but, a l the same Lime, fosters the separatist te mptatio ns of each s ide, 41

particularly as regards the SR. This division of responsibilities among the governments risks to be jeopardized by the implementation of the nevv organization of the Cabinet of BiH voted in mid-April 2000 by the Chm11ber of Representatives. The tripartite Presidency, which is al the head of the executive power of Bosnia, is being redefined after the elections of November 2000, the resignation of Izetbegovic and the ousting of the Bosnian -Croatian Ante Jelavic, ordered by the High Representative of the United Nations. Also the Cabinet is tripartite (Fig.9).

r1part1te

BiH

M - A. JELAVIC

ChtJmber of Representatives i...-+si-. 42 seats : 28 Fed + 14 SR

Foreign Policy

92 Municipo/itie

t Federation

~ ~ b&fence

Interior

Citizenship,

Refugees & beportees Justice Education ...

Transport, Communications

The national Government does not wield its • uthority over the Governments of the Entities

At national level there arc six ministries. All posts are triple. The Prime M.inister is also in charge o[ a ministry with portfolio. The function of Pri m.e Minister is assumed in turn by a Minister of each ethnic group. The rotation occurs every eight months, together with the Presidency's. The present government has been approved by the Chamber of the Representatives of Bosnia on 22 Febrnary 200 l. In detail, the di v ision of the executive power in the Federation 42

Fig. 8

Currency. Finance

Immigration

Presidency

* I

SAROVIC

National Assembly 83 seats

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG GOVERNMENTS

~ ~~tional Governm?~t~

15 seats

Presidency

GANIC I Lli'ZANSKI

? c

Chamber of the Peoples

can be sumrned up as follows (Fig. I 0): • the Federation assembles two ethnic groups. The government posts are double, with the exception of two ministries "without portfolio", which have been c 1·eated to guarantee a balance between BosnianCroatians and Bosnia nM.oslems; • all posts change the 1·egular holder at the beginning of the year, according to the principle thaL governs the operation of the powers of Bosnia's central

I6J

Municpalitiul

Srpska Republic government. The present Cabinet has been appointed on 1 January 2001; • four ministries arc officially located in Mostar. This transfer is really only theoretical because only the Ministry of Education has recently started to settle in that city. In practice the contacts between the Minister and his deputy with the Institu tions are cacried out by phone, because the Institutions arc often completely separate, both physically and ethnically. At cantonal level, of the ten cantons of the Federation, four· are governed by the Bosnians , three by the Bosnian-Croatians and three by m.ixed governments. Among these, canton 9 (Sarajevo) has witnessed the overwhelming victory of a Moslem majority, but the government is mixed . There are two reasons for this: • the cap ital of Bosnia cannot be controlled by a single ethnic group; • the plurality of canton 9 prevents the Moslems from con trolling completely the cantons of the Federation, for lack of m1 absolute majolity. Each canton has its own government, wi Lh a Governor, a

I COVNC7L OF MINISTERS i,l, -F-0-IIE _IG _N_ A _ F_FA _ I_IIS _

Muharem 11':IAMOV IC (SDP) J~finism-

_[::: :..::- - - - - - - r - - : : : : : : : : :::::F:: O:: IIG = IG j N :::: Tll:: A:: O_ E -_ - _- _- _- ~- - - - - - - , . - G-o,-dan- . -K-OV-IC_(D _Sl'_) -

& Ea:JNOM.IC RELATIONS Zla1ko LAGUMDZIJA (SDP)

ftlinlsltir

lvicaMISIC (HSS) Vic .. Mini.swr

Ja<lra.,ko PRLIC (NH!) Vice-/.finft.ttr

l.£lovo,, JJLAGOJEVIC (PDP)

N",kola KRAGULJ(SNSD)

Vict>- MutisUr

IIEFV6EES & HVMAN RIGHTS

--.

Vic~ l.1in;.s:er

Am HADZIAHMETOVIC (SBiH)

Minister

FINANCE

Boi!dar MAT C (SDP) Prime Mlnimr and Minlskr of Finance

Vic e- Minister

Krcsimir ZUBAK (NHl) Muusur

KacriJ• H ARACIC·SABIC (BPS) Vic q-MiJ:ist.tr

Vla<li davVLADI CIC (SHSD) V'K 4'-Min.isu.r

CIVIL AFFAill!I • LAIIOVII & COM.

EVIIOPEAN INTEI.HUTION

I I

Dr,ga., MIKEREVIC (PDP) AUniswr

Rasim KAD!C (LDS) f'ict1-M inisttr

I I I I

Zora MARIJANOVIC (SDP) Vit:4--l.{rnisttr

Sveior at Mil{AJl OVIC (SNS) J.fiidsl#r

Ju,ufHALILAGIC (SNS) Vt,<:q, Minist11r

Milan LOVRIC (SOP)

V':c•Miniot4'r

Fig. 9

Prime Minisler and six Ministers. If the canton is a mixed one, all the posls, including the Governor's and the Prime Minister's, are doubled by a Deputy-Minister's post held by a memb er of the other- ethnic group. Every year the regular holder smTenders his post to his deputy. The government of a canton has a large autonomy, except for defence. The mixed cantons are liable to fonns of instability, caused by the incessant switching of posts. At opstina level there is the same structure with a Mayo r, a PresidenL of lhe Town Council and a President of the Council of ".Minislers". As regards the Bosnian-Serbian execulive power~ the President of the Srpska Republic is supported by a Vice-President (Fig.11). The government is ]e el by a

P r ime Minister and by four Deputy-Prime Ministers, who have also a specific function within the government. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President and confirmed by the National Assembly of the SR, to which he must submil his government plan.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

To synthesize the situaLion of the political parties in Bosnia is not an easy task.I shall try Lo review just a very small number of the 250 parties thal have been inventoried up to now, without counting the alliances Lhal form and dissolve at will in the municipal, canlonal, federal or national elections, but also bet\.veen moderate a ncl radicals, within this or that ethnic group, within an E ntity or with

the neighbouring one (Fig.12). There are four formations which dominate Bosnia's political environment: • Izetbegovic's Bosnian SDA, within the KCDBiH coalition (or SCDBiH, according to which election) : it is the powerful nationalisl and religious par1y in power. Supported by the local Moslem notables, it preaches a unified and "multiethn ic" Bosnia. It has only one leader, whose exit from the political scene could lead, in the short term, to forms of instability wilhin the party itself. • the Social Democratic Party of BiH (SDP BiH): it was born from the union, in February 1999, of the SDP of Lagumdzjia with the SD BiH of Beslagic. This new party preaches the unity and multiethnicity of Bosnia. The SDP considers itself 43

Fig. 10

GOVERNMENT OF THE BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA FEDERATION President of the FcdeNibon Karlo }'ll..IPOVIC (SDP)

Revision: Fob 23, 2001 Vt-ce-Ptes1der.l SafotHALD..OVIC

Prime Minist.er of the Fedc!'ali0;~ ?

Deputy Prime Minister and MinistCi" of Finance, Vice-Minist.er

Dragan COVIC

Mehmed ALIJAGIC OS

M,111ster of Interior Mehmed ZILlC

Minirte, o( Defence M1roslav PRCF.

a.r

· os ar

M!nisteroi1'rade Branko!VKOVlC

Mil')isle:- of Justice Brisa COLAK

Minister ofTran~ort &

Communkatlou$ Besin MELIMEDAGIC

v ice--Minist.et iit-:e-Mi;)ister

Vjce- Minister Sal:ib MAllM:Ul.JIN

Sohbaz DZIHANOVIC

Vice-Minister

Vice-Ministet Pavo BOBAN

· os ar Minister of Energy, Mines & Industry Mitsad S/\LKIC

Minister of Agriculture Water and Forests FtankMEKIC

Minister of City Planning & Environment Razim MEHMEDAG!C

V1ce-Mm1ster Augustin MESTROVIC

V t(-C-Minirt.er Josip TOM!C

Vice-Mu1i~er Z,eijko OBRADOVIC

Minister of Veterans and War Victims F,ud PURJSEVIC

Vice-Mini~er Marko ARAPOVJC

Mostar Minister of Social Atta.irs :md DPRES. Sulejman GARIB

Minister of Healtll BozoLJUBIC

Minist..er of Education, Stience, Culture and Spon faorudin RIZVANBEGOV!C

Minister w/o Portfolio Nedeliko DESPOTOVJC

Vete-Minist,r: Fati, GAVRANKAPETANOV!C V !ee..M.inist.Er Davor CORDAS

the successor of the Social Democratic Party founded in 1909. Before the war, it had 70,000 supporters. The fusion gave birth to the second party in the BiH's House of representatives, the only real opposition to SDA. Kalinic's SDS (Serbian Democratic Party of the SR) is Karadzic's and Krajisnik's former party. ll has been holding a substantial majority for the past two years although it has been do,.vnsizecl after the victory of Plavsic and the SLOGA moderate formation. The SLOGA is a nationalist and conservative party and is very much present in the Pale, Rogatica, Visegrad regions. It favours tl1e "frontality" of the IEBL; however its radical image has faded, although in the last 44

Vlce-Min,~r l•o Mito lOVIC

election it got encouraging results, and is no,v showing an at least apparent inclination to cooperate with the international Community.. In any case, it remains the first Bosnian-Serbian pmi.y. Jelavic's HDZ (Croatian Democratic Community) is the first Bosnian-Croatian party (there is an HDZ in Croatia as well). Omnipresent in the old HercegBosna, it is now controlled by its Croatian counterpart, which has been headed by Tudjman until his death. The HDZ was founded in 1909 and, like the SDA and the SDS, is nationalist and conservative. ILs influence is clccreasi ng and it seems to be hesitating between the promotion of the third Entity and federnlism. A few notes seem to be appropriate in order to clarify some important bonds with

Minister w lo Portfolio Mikola ANTUNOV!C

parties and coal itions of othe r neighbouring nations: • almost all parties are ethnically homogeneous, even those which preach "multiethnicity"; • as regards Bosnians and Bosnian-Croarians, the first party is predominant and is often a radical formation. Only the SR has a strong opposition, even if it is very young. • apparently the smaller parties are willing to join forces in order to oppose the large Bosnian and Bosnian-Croatian parties. THE POLITICAL SITUATION

Bosnia Herzegovina has entered the nevv millennium, but there are no indications of a rapid progression towards a moderate

Fig. 11

IGOVERNMENT OF THE ~RPSKA REPUBLIC Revision: Feb 21, 2001

President Mirko SAROVIC (SOS)

Vi&tt l'rtr$id1111t Dragan CAVIC (SDS) ~

9.1.inister

Mladen IVANIC

(PDP) 'I

11rd111try & Tt1cl,1rt1lt1gy

111fttl'it1r

l>t1/t111&tl

Pero VUKEJLOVIC

Perica BUNDALO(PDP)

Slobodan BILIC

(SOS)

Ft1rt1i81r Eu1rt1mi& RttltmtJ#I Fuad TURALI C (B/Jv1)

Edu&atitlll

Gojko SAVANO VIC

Ellt1rgy & Mi11t11

Bosko LEMEZ (SOS)

H-1Ht & S.dol Al/oir1

Milorad BALABAN (PDP)

V11fttro111 Olld W•~- a11d War- Victim,

Dragan SO LAJA

Administmtion & Decentrali:a.ion Petra1· KRUNIC (PDP)

J111fi&t1

Lol»ur

Biljana MARIC

Dragan SO LAJA (PDP)

5t:it11'&tl & Culturtt

C-,,,111ttr&t1 & Ttlllri!1111

R11/11gttt11 & l>t,ptJrfttt11

Mitar NOVAKOVIC (PDP)

Zeljko TADIC (SO S)

Mico MI CIC (SOS)

Agric-,furtt, Wofttr & Ftll"ll1f1

Urbanism, Housing, (Ammunity Affairs Environm,nt

Rajko LATINOVIC (PDP)

Nedjo DJURIC (SPRS)

TrOIIIJ#rl & c-,,,,,,,,,,;&ffitllll

Branko DOKIC (PDP)

Rttlig/tlu Al/tlir1

5µrt1 & Yt111f/,

Fi11t111&t1

Dusan ANTELJ

Zoran TESANOVIC (PDP)

Milenko VRACAR

goven1ment. On the contrary, the same key-characters who took power afLer the \var are still present in government positions, although sometimes in concealed forms. In the S1vska Republic, the attempl made by the moderates, brought to p ower by the internalional community, has miserably failed because of the ruinous results of their economic and social policy. The activation of the Institutions after the elections, has given the observers a pessimistic image of both the BiH and its future, instead of giving rise to [avourable hopes. In BiH, the Alliance for Change (AC) could, for the first time, represent an allernative to the monol ithic wartime parties; however it must be noted that the AC is made up by many small parties and its capability of

keeping together its various allies while facing the most critical and difficult problems is going to be a very problematic and hard challenge. In this Country, the poli ticians have still to demonstrate clearly that their absolute prority is the interest of the people. Four months after the eleclions, nearly all the institutions of both Bosnia Herzegovina and the Federation are installed, but their structu r e is questioned by the proposals of some political figures. Two main tendencies are being discussed : strengthening of the central power or "decentralization" in favour of the constituting elemenls which \vould enjoy a significant. autonomy. The sp irit of the Dayton Agreements, with the organization of BiH in two entities, clearly

favours the latter. The rediscussion of this inilial decision has been causing, for several months, the instability of the fragile political balance. Infringing the Dayton Agreements, the Bosnian Croatian National Congress (HNS) wants to impose lhe constitutional equality of the three "peoples" of BiH, to whom the constitution guarantees their o\vn space within the Federation. The large majori ty of the Bosnian-Croatian political parties, representing 90% of the electoral vote, participated in the last congress, held on March 3rd· The public platform prm,i des for a selfproclaimed Croatian government with executive, legislative and judicial powers. Furthermore, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) 45

demands compliance with the follO\ving platform: • reinstatement of the BosnianCroatian Deputies excluded by OSCE after the November 2000 election; • annulment of all decisions made in the meantime by the Chambers of the Peoples of both the Federation and of BiH; • respect by the internationa l Cornmunit·y (High Representative in particular) of the BosnianCroatian people:5 will W. Petritsch, the High Rept·esentative in Bosnia, stated that the HDZ' attempt will bring about the ghelloization, isolation and ruin of the Croatian community. Illegality, violations of the Bil~l's Constitution and infringements of the Dayton Agreements are facts. Nevenheless, the idea of another BiH including several smaller components with equal rights and responsibilities does not look as a completely incoherent basis for negotiations. In BiH, the Bosnian-Croatians are juridically one of the three constituents of the Bosnian nation, hut their living space, little by lit tle , is more and more compromised.

opinion, \.Vas deeper than could be perceived on the eve of the civil wa1~ ln the Srpska Republic, Dragan Kalinic's SOS found its pmver base among the people, while Prime Minister Mi.lorad Dodik was held responsible for the economic collapse of the SR. Some hope can be perceived in the appointment of Mladen Ivanic as Chief of the future Government. Despite the heavy financial burden, Ivanic must succeed in satisfying the international Community without deceiving the expectations of the Bosnian-Serbs, whose main concern is their Ii ving-standard. As regards the international Community, the various organizations (OHR, UNMB iH, UNHCR, OSCE, plus several government- and non-government organizations) often operate in an uncoordinate manner, giving the impression that ea.eh one of them pursues its own objectives. This, on some occasions, has led to great mistakes in the employment of .resources. Coordination of efforts and ideas is not a trifling matte1: According to the best traditions, the rnilitary organizations present in Bosnia under SFOR's command appear to be the only wellstmctured ,rnd flexible instrument, capable of meeting the different challenges. The SFOR servicemen often promote initiatives and projects aimed at achieving agreed-upon objectives and are, more and more, a valid and irreplaceable element of connect ion among th e numerous institutions concerned.

To avoid rediscussing the Dayton Agreements, some provisos of which, after five years, do not seem to meet the present needs, it would be suitable to proceed to an agreed adaptation of some application modalities. This would permit to find a way-out from the present crisis. W. Petritsch reacted the hard way, relieving Jalevic of his post as Deputy President o[ BiH, together with several other representatives of the HDZ. This rough action could tum the Bosnian-Croatian deputies into martyrs and symbols of the Croatian cause, legitimizing the demands expressed on behalf of the Croatian people, uniting and mobilizing the Bosnian-Croatians and strengthening the radical e lements. Some statements by Gen. Jelic, Commander of the 1st Guard Corps, show that th.e plans and reactions capable of affecting the attitudes of the international THE ECONOMY Community have been studied by the civilian ,md military leaders. The economy is the only motor Here one should remember the ca pable of producing the appraisal made by Jadranko Palic, resources necessary to implement Foreign Minister of BiH, who the reforms, support the people, pointed out the Croatian rebuild the infrastructure, increase intellectuals' collective the employment, faci litate the dissatisfaction, which, in his return of the refugees and keep the

Facing page. Italian servicemen teaching voung Bosnians how to recogniz.e m.ines, traps and explosive devicr s. Right. An Italia n ch eckpoinl in Bosnia

Herzegovina.

young from leaving the Country. Bosnia needs help in order to attract foreign i11vestors and change the outlook of the Bosnian Institutions towards market economy. Many political parties do not function as they should. The power relations take money away fron1 the Institutions and deprive of resources the Government and the people. It is necessary to create a coordinated system of interventions, capable of transferring the resources invested by the numerous internationa l organizations, including NGOs, to the realization of a great infrastn.1cture and the development of communication systems, rathei- than di stribut ing generalized aid, with results that are certainly not exciting. The postwar emergency has been largely overcome but is far from resolved. Sometimes the many interventions of reconstruction have not reached a successful concl usion , in that the lawful ovvners have not been able to go back to th eir homes, owing to numerous factors, such as lack of work and of means of subsistence and fear of going back to an environment w here they would belong to a minority (in the most concre te sense of th e term), besides the [act that, after eight or nine years, the refugees may have acqui 1-ed new interests, nev,: friendships and new possibilities of facing everyday life. The families, frus trated by the lack of a min irnum of resources, must be given working and earning opportunities in order lo enable them to rebuild their homes in a place that w ill be

chosen by them and not imposed by need or desperation . The near fu tu.re will b e a troubled one. Growing groups of demonstrators a.re beginning to demand pay rises or sa lary arreai-s vis-a-vis a deteriorating economy. Many do not have a job and those who have one are not paid.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

Pressed as it is by poli tical and economic reasons, Bosnia Herzegovina cannot keep the present structure of the Entities' Armed Forces . The military balance between the BosnianSerbian Army (VRS) and that o[ the Bosnian Federation (VF), made up by the Bosnian and BosnianCroatian components , remains within the agreed proportions. Bolh Armed Forces are undergoing a decrease of financial resources with consequent diminished operational and combat capabililies. Despite an a pparent cooperation in a common defence policy, each Armed Force continues to see the other as a potential threat, owing to a mutual distrnst dating back to the brutal c ivil war of 1992- 1995 . Bosnia

relies strongly on the Stabilization Forces (SFOR) for its security and stability. The Bosnian-Croatians continue to hold out against a complete integration within the Federal Army, afraid that the Bosnians could be dominant in all the integrated structures. Furthermore, Croatia's continuous assistance in favour of the Bosnian-Croatian Entity in the Federal Army and tl1at of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in favour of the VRS, albeit declining, complicate all efforts of unification. The Bosnian-Serbs believe thal the integration could threaten the existence of the Srps.ka Republic and prefer a complete demilitari:r.ation (as proposed by GavTilo Antonic, a member of the National Assembly o( Lhe Srpska Republic) to any form of uni ficat ion. A rnpid and forced integration would, among other things, lead to the 1-ealization of a non-functional organization and to a kind of legitimation of the paramilita ry forces that ,.vould certainly sprout in order to provide security to the respective ethnic factions. In any case, the reduction of the Entiti es' Armed Forces is a real necessity and is connected with a

twofold order of factors: â€˘ realization of numerically reduced Armed Forces, in line with the Country's economic capabilities, in order to ensure, on the one hand, a better mutuaJ trust and , on the other, obtain savings that would be very useful for the economic recovery. â€˘ gradual reduction of the SFOR Forces without jeopardizing their deterrent povver: Nevertheless, it is necessary to solve some basic problems which obstruct the road to a greater muLual Lrust. BiH's defence and security policy

must be made clear, and a decision has to be made on the existence of Lhe Armed Forces in a Country a little larger than an average ltal.i an region. In short, the question is to decide if the two (buL they are actually three) Armed Forces and the three Ministries of BiH should be maintained (a lso with the international Cornrnunity's money) in order to defend Bosnia, or if they must be kepL ready Lo defend themselves from threatening 01Âˇ aggressjve actions that could come from an Entity within the Country iLself. The different components of the

Armed Forces show a certain inclination to dialogue, but are absolutely inflexible (especially on the Serbian side) when it comes to constitute unified Armed Forces. The establishment of a multiethnic central Command appears possible, taking for granted that the single structures be divided according Lo the ethnic differences. Still today there are political discussions on whether the three Ministers of Defence should act and decide as a team or if each Minister should care for the Armed Forces of his ethnic group. The recent 30% reduction, imposed by the international Community, was not received with great enthusiasm by the military, who wanted to keep the status quo in order to avoid the disbandment of several units. Despite the financial aid and support to concrete projects by the World Bank, the military tried to the last to avoid these cuts, hinting at possible social disorders as a consequence of a rise in the already high rate of unemployment deriving from the discharge of the regular servicemen. It must be stressed that although Bosnia is going tbrough a dramatic economic crisis and the destructions caused by the war arc a natural catastrophe of remarkab le proportions, the military maintain that they should not be einployecl Lo help the Country in the reconstruction which, they insist, should be carTied out by civilians. They also ,,vanl a special dai ly allowance of about 25 DM, besides an insurance against possible incidents in which they may incur while clearing the mines they themselves had laid all over the territory. At the same time, while complaining for the absolute lack Above . .4.n Italian soldier in Bosnia. Left. Bosnia. Italian patrol al a checkpoint.

,. . Right. Cooperation between Bosnian police and Italian troops.

of financial resources for the upkeep of men and materials, they go on lraining (especially the Serbs) on armoured vehicles, and immediately ask for fuel whenever lhey are called to intervene in favour of the civilian population. According lo the military's point of view, the reductions are a social problem tha.t.gught to be fought in every possible way, safeguarding the existence of all Uni.ls by making generalized cuts. Another shifty and unconvincing melhod is the transition of the Units to the "cadre" or "reserve" position . Nevertheless, it must be considered that the mobilization capability of Units and masses is well tested and very different from the \Vay we understand it. Furthermore, it will be necessary to discuss the number o f tl1e reserve "units" and the quantity of weapons stored in depots, in order to lovver the threshold of a possible violence that could receive unlimited supplies from the storehouses of ,.veapons , ammunition and explosives, whose number is out of proportion, compared to any reasonable defensive need. In short, it seem.s appropriate to proceed, in the short term, to a further cut in the number of regulars, in order to reach a number of soldiers on duty .in line with tl1e standards of the western Nations and the r eal capabilities of the Country. CONCLUSIONS

In Bosnia-Herzegovina there a1Âˇe not many architectural wounds that seem healed, while open and bleeding are all the wounds of unemployrnent, of an al most inexistent economy, of destroyed factories, of the po litical obtuseness of a greal part of the

old men-in-po,ver, who do not want to give up their nationalisl radicalism. A few external and inte rnal events offer some opportunities and increase the prospects of a possible greater stability in the region, but the very changes occurred in the FRY and in Croatia, not yet completel y consolidated, appear as a potential danger of further regional crises. Bosnia has reached a decisive stage. It has a series of opportunities that could make the diffe rence if it were to act promptly and appropriately. For a real change in BiH, the international Community should change its attitude and have an aggressive approach lo reconstruction, defining a common strategy of intervention and the concentration of efforts on certainly worthy objec1ives for the possible development o( lhe Country. If one continues to proceed in Lhe same ,.vay, this opportunity will be lost and BiH will seltle in a political status quo, with a worsening economy and with an international Community thal continues to lose interest in it. The moment could have come to reasses BiH's end slale. The constmction o( a rnodern Country,

,.vith the standards envisaged for the Nations of Western Europe seems now impossible . A more correct position could be that of considering BiH an emerging Country of Eastern Europe. This outlook vvould permit a more appropriate comparison for the assesment of the GNP, unemployment, government slructures, law and order, etc. This is a plan that could be carried out in the medium Lem,. Unfortunatelv BiH shows its incapacity to re;lize by itself lhe very urgent political, economic and social changes. A symptom of it is that the media, even more than the normal citizens, request a "proLectorate" for Bosnia Herzegovina. The optimists place their hopes in new elections, which could really evidence the real winners. In 2001, the goverm11ent of BiH has to show the internarional Community and its own people thaL it has achieved signihcanl results in the insli lutional, political, economic and social sectors . According lo many observers "it's now or never''. D Major General, lVlilitary Cmnmander of Sicily

THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF DISARl\llAMENT

Over the last 30 years, the intenu-ttional public has become aware that mass destruction weapons are pulting both rnankind and the environmenl at lisk. 50

Many countries have therefore decided to reduce such risks and iniLiate comp.lex and diverse negotiations aimed at drawing up ad hoe treaties and agreemen Ls providing for effective alternaLive solutions to a possible holocaust.

In the past, the lack of this type o f accords was deepl y p erceive d, but major results were obtained only after the end of th e cold \-V ar, which allowed nations to defuse tensions and overcome t heir mutua l distrust. The collapse of

THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

This Treaty, s igned in 1990 a~er long years of negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, entered into force on November 9, 1992. It was the first decisive step Lo drnstically reduce the opposing forces in Europe and an important milestone for all disarma1nenl lrealies. During the cold ,.var, Europe was at the centre of a bloc - to -bloc confrontation and stored a wide range of nuclear and conventional armaments . A poss i b le crisis, triggered b y wrong evaluations, could give rise Lo an armed conflict with unforeseeable consequences, also for the world at large. Many things have changed in Facing page. A Leopard I A5 on a Kosovo road. Above. A convoy of Leopard I AS tanks of the Italian contingent ofK.FOR in Kosovo.

Right. An i\ 129 "i\lfangusla" helicopter.

the Berlin wall opened fresh possibiliLies of modifying the confrontation between the East and lhe West, built upon a force balance among the superpowers. The nevv climate of detente establ ish.eel at inLernational level allowed nations to open a dialogue based on common political vie,,v s and economic inte1Âˇests, which enabled them to identify effective disarmament measures and enhance the global security framework. Important results have been recently obtained, while new ones are at hand. They include the Treary on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990, recently updated; the Chemical

Weapon s Convention. (CWC) in 1993; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, the Additional Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. These basic documents \Nill be the foundation upon which to build a credible disarmament and armaments control regime, tailored to guarantee a reliable security and peace framework for the future .

th is last decade; old enemies meet and exchange observers, tasked with verifying compliance with the agreements, to avoid possible errors of judgement. Some nations, perceiving that they are no longer threatening one another, have established new friendship ties and re discovered old historical links . The 1990 Treaty was updaLed in May 1997, in line with the new 51

po li tical s i tuation in Eastern European countries. To elate, more than 50,000 military assets have been destroyed, in cornpliance with the provisions of the Treaty, and 10,000 more will be scrapped in tbe near future. Today, the mi litary leaders of several European countries meet regularlv and exchange visits . It sh~uld ~ot come as a \urprise to see Russian officers shopping in Rome's via Condolli, or Italian generals strolling around Moscow's Red Square. The Paris Chernical Weapons Convention (C\:\TC) The Paris Chern 1cal Weapon Convention, signed in 1993, is one of those disarmament agreements which stemmed from better relations between tl1e East and the West and from a climate of international detente. Th is Convention is the first multilatera l Treaty which is global i n scope and verifiable through ad hoe international instrurnents. It was opende for signature on January 13, 1993 and became effective on April 29, 1997, i.e. 180 days after its 65 th rntification . So far, 174 countries have signed it and 141 states parties have directly ratified or acceded to it. Italy ratified the Convention by Law no. 496, dated Novemberl.8, 1997, further integrated by Law no. 93, dated April 4, 1997. It has not been ratified yet by the following Mediterranean and Middle East countries: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, L.ibya, Egypt and Israel; by North Korea in the Far East, as well as by the following nations in Equatoria l Africa : Chad, Congo, Ango la, Zamb ia, .M adagascar, Sierra Leone and some others . States parties arÂˇe engaged in enforcing the treaty worldwide. The Convention is a unique inlernalional instrument, given

An M 109-L self propelled ~un of' the

Italian contingent in Kosovo.

the complexity and scope of its implementation procedures. As a consequence, states parties have sometimes i n terpreLed .it differently and taken contrasting legislative measures at national level. This is why a constant diplomatic activ i ty is be ing carried out by states parties in the Hague to harmonize t he ir interpretation efforts and take common i mplementation measures. I. n compliance with the Convention obligations, states parties are required to submit to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Hague regular declarations on their internal situation, which will be

subsequently verified through onsite inspections carried out b y internatio n al inspectors belonging to the Organization. Moreover, if there are Âˇwell founded suspicions that the obligations set by the Convention have b een violated , the Organization , upon request by states parties, may order more detailed challenge inspections in the territory of the country suspected of violating t he Convention obligations . The Convention forbids nations from deveJoping, producing and employing c h emical weapons and requires then:i to completely destroy their chemica l weapon stockpiles by 2007. The same Convention a lso establishes that all civ il chemical plants be kep t under inlernalionaJ controJ ; in fact , chemicals usually produced to

fulfil commerc ia l requ irements may be improperly e mployed by states parties for mil itary purposes as well. Strict control is also exerted over the exports of che m icals to tho se countri es which have n ot r at i fie d t h e Convention yet; in fact, they are not obliged to comply w ith the Conve n t ion obli g atio ns a nd may emp l oy th e i mp orte d materials to produce chem ic al weapons. To enforc e the Conven ti on , a Prepa ra tory Co mm ission w a s established a t the Hague in 1993, which became the present Organization for the Pro hibition of Che m ica l Weapo ns (OPCW) in 1997. The OPC\A/ Secretariat is presently made up of about 500 peopl e, 2 00 of w h om are ins p ec to rs who p a y fre q u e n t visits to states parties to verify on the spot that local s i tuations

comply w i th the Conven t ion obliga tions . To implement the Conve ntion nationally, Italy passed a ratification law in 1995, which ass igned the Ministry of Foreig n Affa irs th e res pon s ib il ity o f acting as National Authority. lt should promote and coordinate the activities o f other Ministries, r ece i ve d ec la ra t ion s on t h e activities carried out by chemical industries, as established by the Jaw, and reg ul arly u pcla te the International Organizatio n at the Hague o n the situa tio n. The Nationa l Authority Office, establis hed a t the Mi nistry of Fo1Âˇe ig n Affa irs in 1997 , avail s itself of specia lize d perso nn el detached from other Ministries or externally co nt racted. Th ey adequately arrange inte rnationa l inspection visits, escort and assist inspection personnel, analyze the

tec h nical details of the decla rat ions s u b mitted b y c hemi ca l indu str ie s, t ac kle techn ical issues under the M inistry's cognizance and liaise with c h e mica l industri es and o Lhcr Minis tries. Ita ly possesses neithe r chemical weapons nor the plants to p rod uce th em . I t is however destroyin g, und er in terna ti o nal supe rv ision, a limited number o f obsolete pre-1946 chemical w e a pons, generally ,Âˇecovered fro m the battlefie lds o f Wo rld War 1; in fa c t , it is wor th recalling that chemical weapons were not employed in World War lI. Wb e never c he mical d evices a re foun d on t. he n at io n a l territory, the Ministry of the I n terior tasks the M in istry of Defen se to see to their cl e st ru c t i o n , w h i c h is u s u a 11 y carried out in had hoe plants at

-Left. Italian soldier on surveillance duty. Below. "Bersaglieri'' al a checkpoint on a. road in Kosovo. Facing page. The inlei-ior of the Lurrel ofan M 109-L selfpropelled gun.

chemical arsenal, rn any count r ies, I taly included, have p lann ed a support and cooperation effort, to provide the materials or funds necessary for buil ding the requ ired plant s . Repo rtedly, Rus sia should destroy 40,000 t . of chemica l weapons at an estimated cost of $6 billion at least. Early in 2000 , Italy signed a bilateral agreement with Russia, which was passed by the Senate the NBC .Mate1Âˇials Installation in Civitavecchia, T he OPCW started its inspection activities in Italy in 1997. To date, about 30 inspections ha,1e been carried out in military installations and civil chemical plants . Inspectors arc a lways escorted by an adequate number of nati onal personne l, comprising Pol ice and National Au thori ty representatives . N o violations to the Convention l1ave been reported so far; inspectors have ahvays been satisfied Âˇw ith the way they have been received in Italy and \Vith the cooperation offered by national personne l during their inspections. Ou r country is committed Lo fully implementing the Convention obligations and ensuring that the activities pe rfo 1Âˇ01e d on th e Italian territoi--y be as transparent as possible. Other countries, such as Russia and the USA, have declared that they own chemical weapons and have already started lo destroy t hem , a process which w il l be completed i n 2007, ten years since the entry in to fo rce of the Convention. 54

The USA has concretely initi ated this proces s, \Vh i le Russia is lagging behind due to its economic prob lems and the lack of weapon destruction plants capable of operating under safe conditions, to safeguard the local population and the e nvironment. To hel p Russia destroy i ts

and now is pending before the Chamber of Dep uties . It provides for the allocation of L. 15 billion to bui.ld a gasline necessary to power one Russian weapon destruction plant placed beyo nd the Ural Mountains . The same gasline will also be employed to provide a hea ting system to a

nearby bui l t-up area. Other countries too, like Germany, have funded major works to upgrade several plants. At international level; Italy is also engaged in convincing sorne Mediter-ranean countries, like Egypt, Libya and Lebanon, to ratif-y the Convention. Actually, if these nations join in, great progress will be made in ruling out the recourse Lo this kind of mass destruction weapons, to the advanLage o[ Lhe safety prospects of the region. In fact, the risk of a conflicl oulburst will be thus reduced. Moreover, the Convention implementation measures could also raise locaJ people's life standards, by allowing signatory countries lo apply a free trade regime to chemical agents used for farming purposes and some important pharmaceutical products pi-esently prohibited by the Convention. ln conclusion, though the use of chemical weapons in future armed conflicts has been banned by the entry in Lo force of the Convention, these weapons will be completely wiped out from the battlefield only when the Convention is universally ratified. Howeve1~ given the high number of countries which have voluntarily renounced the use of these weapons, there is reason to believe that the risks connected with their presence have been greatly reduced. Adequate preventive and protective measures should nevei-theless be adopted, also taking into account that the Convention alone ,Nill not be able to prevent terrorist groups or non states parties from using chemical weapons. In a long term perspective, the success of the Convention will depend on the degree of security and sa[ety reached by each state party, as well as on the development of chemical industry and internationa l cooperation .

THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC) The Convention , signed in London on April 10, 1972, and entered into force oi1 .March 26, 1975, has so far been signed by 162 nations and ratified by 144 states parties. The BWC has not set up a verÂˇification regime yet, similar to that of the CWC. For th is reason, the Disarmament Conference in Geneva has Lasked a special Ad Hoe Group with drawing up an Additional Protocol, prnvicling for mandatory declarations and adequaLe verificat ion measures,

in compliance with the guidelines set by the ewe. Many counlr.ies hope that this Protocol will be approved by November 2001, on the occasion of the IV Session of tbe BWC Review Con Ference. On the contrary, other nations, the USA included, think that the approval of this Protocol is premature, as some cr itical issues are still al stake, such as mandatory declarations of defense installations, the minimum threshold of biological agents to declare and lheir allowed quantities, together with past programs, yearly inspection 55

ceilings, inspection procedures in cases of alleged use, etc. Both Holland and Switzerland have stated Lheir willingness Lo host the Headq u arLers of the f·uture Organi1.ation in the Hague and Geneva respecLively. The Dulch proposal would allow for establish ing cooperation Lies with Lhe ORCW, wh ile Geneva is home to the lnLernational Red Cross (I R C) and the \:\1orld Heal rh Organization (WHO). THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT) The Treaty is the outcome of a long and complex negotiating effort launched in the '50s lo reduce Lhe risks of environmental pollution as a fallout of nuc lear tests. In 1954, al most 10 years afLer the fi rsl nuclear tesl, some nations had suggested to discontinue all surface nuclear Lesls, being loo polluting and hazardous for mankind . In 1963 the USSR, UK and US signed an agreemenl a ll owing for u nderground nuclear tests only. Later on, to rule o ut possible r isks stern m ing from the presence of an increased number of nuclear actors, a 150 kt limit \Vas establ ished as the maximum power allowed ror underground experirnenls. In 1994, new negotiations were tabled dur-i.ng the Disarmament Conference in Geneva to put a comprehensive ban on nuclear experiments. A Treaty was finally a pp roved by the UN General Assembly in 1996. The docurnent,open for signatu r·e on Septernber 10, 1996, was signed by 160 nations and ratified by 66 states parties, Russia and all EU countries included. Italy ntlified the Treaty by Law no.484, dated December 15, 1998. The US, in turn, has not ratified it yet, but President Clinton, after a NO vole by tl1e Congress in 1999, stated that the US would

abide by a unilateral moratorium and that th e Administration woul d make every effo1·t lo ratify the Treaty. This Treaty is a unique and pivotal instrument for exerting an effective and reliable control over nuclear tests; in fact, it forbids each state party Crom carrying out nuclear tests in any p lace under its jurisdiction or control. The Treaty w.ill enter into force only after being ratified by al.I 44 nuclear power nations, India and Pakistan included. Pending its entry into force, a Preparatory Commission ·was set up in Vienna at the end of 1996. It was tasked to take a ll necessary measures, includi ng those for establishing a global net\vork of sensors, capable of monitoring all events possibly triggered by nuclear tests, even if performed underground or unden,vater. The monitoring system w ill be made up of 321 seismic, radionuclide, infrasonic and hydrnacoustic monitoring stat ions placed all around the world, which will be able to discriminate between natural events, like earthquakes, and nuclear tests . The data collected will be sent to an Operation Ccn tre in Vienna ,

which \.Vill transmit them in real time to all states parties. They, in turn, will assess these data and eva lu ate the repercussions of nuclear tests. This system, being very complex , will require both time and money to be completed, bu t will b e fully operational before lhe Treaty enlers into force. Meanwhile, it acts as a det errenl against possible violations , which are easi ly detected by the sensors already available. In Italy, Lhe Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to perform the role of National Authority, as envisaged by the ratification law. The goal is to set up a nat ion-wide structure capab le of receiving data from seismic events, occurred both internally and in the rest o[ the world, to identify possible nuclear explosions. The Min istry of Foreign Affairs intends to ava il itself of the cooperat ion of na tional experts and of Agencies and Institutes which al r·eady carry out their activities in the above mentioned sectors, as the National Institule of Geophysics and Vu.lcanology, ENEA and ANPA. Th e National Aulhori ty's technical structure, which will be

Facing page. An operator al his radio-set during ihe mission in Eas i Timor. Right. "Opera1ion Joint Guardian": "Bersaglieri" on swveilla.nce dwy. Below.

Paratroopers on patrol in east Timor.

operational in 2001, will allow for coLlecli ng data and assessing possible violations of the Treaty, to b e evaluated a lso at international level. CONCLUSIONS

The wide rnnge of international Conventions and Treaties, already available or under completion, should allow open up more positive prospects for the futu re, as compared to some years ago. A new v, orld is dawning, where the survival of mankind is no longer threatened by mass destruction weapons. 0

But lh i ngs not al ways run smoo thly; in fac t, some events have recently occurred which have placed the very promising disarmament process a t risk. Actually, the above mentioned

process has b een delayed by several factors, such as the nuclear tests carried out by France at Mururoa, to verify new nuclear systems; the experiments pe rformed by India and

Pakistan, to show their respective nuclear capabilities; the missile programs of North Korea, which may revamp the arms race and the setting up of a missile defense systeni; the threats posed to th e ABM by Russia; the statements by some Middle East countries to resorl to the u se of chemical or biological agents to settle possible local conflicts, etc. In this framework, where inter-stale relations are newly put at risk an d a promising process of detente is delayed, in ter nat.ional t errorism has taken centre stage: It poses a treat to major superpowe 1Âˇs as well, obliging them to transfer large reso u rces from other sectors to finance necessary prevention programs.

D ''Brigadier General (ret.)

THEJ «FORCE GENERATION» PROCE,SS This expression is generally understood as "a staff process ain1ed at a detailed coordination in the selection of the multinational forces necessary for the mission". The increasingly frequent participation of NATO in these operations provides valid instruments for the comprehension of the characteristics and difficulties typical of the organization of a mission in support of peace. 1

FOREWORD

One of the main problems faced during the initial phases of

all Peace Support Missions or, according to a new definition adopted within NATO, non-a rt.5 Cris is Response Op erat ion s (CROs, figl ) is the availability of forces to deploy in operations. In fac t, as regards CROs, nations are not "obliged" to commit their units to these missions, but participate on a voluntary basis, as opposed to Art.V operations (l).The1·efore a process must be set up in order to define "who" (which nation or Alliance) shall c om mit the reso urces (Con:irnancls a nd units)necessary to carry out an operation. This article will illustrate the development of th e abovem en tioned o rganiza tional process, highlighting t he

dHfic ulti es inhere n t in thi s system and its co nnections with the planning pha se of an operation. THE "FORCE GENERATION" PROCESS

T h e "Force Generatio n" process, though not conceptually codi fie d , is a n a cl iv i ty very similar to th a t defin ed in MC 133/3 as "Force Activation" (2). \A/i Lho ut going into a detail ed description of the several phases which, at national and internationa l level, will lead to th e d e c is ion o f setLi ng up a military force for a CRO, it is nevertheless necessary to recal I t h e main "stag es" a lo ng t hi s course of action. At the onset of a crisb (3), in parallel with Lhe initi at ives taken a t intern ati onal .l evel to find a politi ca l so lution to the controversies among the Parties involved, a p la nning p rocess is also started in view of a military operation. National and int ernat ional St a ffs ma ke th e nece ss ary tcc hni ca l-mili tary evaluations, based on availab le situational da ta, start a nalyzi ng poss ib le inte r vention o ptio ns, p lan the mos t suitable cha in of Command and Control, identify the "lea d" n ation and p repare whatever is necessary to kickstart an operation. Th is way, o nce the Securi Ly Counc il h as issue d an intervention resolution , milita ,·y contingen ts are practicalJy ready to deploy. In fac t, th e tim e li n ess o f an action is cruc ial to s how the int ernational reso lve and t he unit s' read in es s leve ls to th e parti es i n volve d - w it h an inh e rent deterrent effect - a nd preve nt a crisis from escalating. This activity, though sometimes based on app roxima te information and situational data to be constantly updated, is ve ry important as it allows the

CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Tab.A

CROs are defined as multipurpose operations, including political, military and civil activities, carried out in line with international laws or ·with the objectives established by the Allian ce. They are aimed at preventing and settling conflicts and managing all possible crises as well. They may range from support operations performed in connection with civil organizations to Peace Support Operations (PSOs), and may also entail combat actions. In particular, CROs may envisage exfiltration and disaster rescue operations, as well as humanitarian, Search a nd Rescue (SAR) or non combatant evacuation interventions (the evacuation of nationals is to be carried out by each nation). Operations requiring the real or threatened use of military force include the imposition of sanctions, the enforcement of the embargo and real military operations as well. Taking into account that each theatre is characterized by different features, courses of action and limitations, it is however possible to identify three phases in the development of one CRO operation. • The first m ilitary phase is aimed at gaining control, as quickly as possible, over the sea, air and la nd space. During this stage, which usually does not last long, units are engaged in carrying out military tasks. • Th e second t ran s itio n al phase, which is longer and more unstable, requires troops to restore public order and security. In this phase, besides military actions which are still necessary, other skills arc also involved. At this time unexpected obstacles are represented by the possible risk that local tensions may suddenly be rekindled. • The third stabilization phase, in which a conflict has reached a lower level of violence, aims at restoring a state organization based on the rule of law and democratic governance. This phase may last several years. The tasks assigned lo the Armed Forces v.rill be progressively handed over to local authorities.

Comm and s co ncerne d to start t he force preparation phase in advance and gain time - a critical factor - in view of the decisi on to take part in a mission. In essence, several options are a na lyz ed at d i ffer e n t lev e ls (Bri ga de, Regim ent e tc.), based on the availability of forces a nd their lo n g-term commitment, takin g int o a ccou nt pos s ib le re str ic ti on s/] i mitations (fo r

i nsta nce , the sta tement o f the highest Command authority d elegated Lo the mu ltina t ional force Co mm ande r, th e emp loyment of va luable assets, national restrictions, etc) As a rule, given Lhe uncertainty of a situation, rnainly in its initial phases, contingents are prepa red and equipped to face worst-case sce nario s ( high intens ity o f operati ons) and ready to enforce 59

fln Al 29 "Mangusta" helicopter.

Fig.1

Force Generation Process peace on armed elements or factions unwilling to comply. In a typical environment, where an operation is usually carried out, often there are no reliable state organizations or international agencies capable of fil I ing the power gap which Âˇ usua ll y follows a cns1s . Therefore, military units are often called upon to cai:ry out non tracli lional tasks; commanders and their staffs, besides performing the "combat" function, must also be skilled enough to take on different and sometimes very sensitive roles and, in turn, act as diplomatic 60

FORCE 7 BALANCINGe

--11

co&~frrA

ACTOR0

Lcgenda: SOR: S1utl!l11e111 OfReq11iremc11ts: JFC: Joi111 F"rce Comm"nder; ACTWARN: Actil'{lti1111 /V{lr11i11g; ACTREQ: Ac1iv11tio11 Req11est; ACTORD: Al'tiv111io11 Order; FORCEPREP: Ft)rce PrepmÂˇa1io11.

Tab. B

«FORCE GENERATION» WITHIN NATO

The "force Generation" process encompasses 8 phases. 1s t phase: Once political authorities (NAC -North Atlantic Council) bave formalized the decision to intervene, the Operation Commander (SACEUR) issues a directive to the designated Force Commander (JFC-Joi nt Force Commander), which comprises the guidelines to define the Concept of Operations, together with a draft S9R (Statement of Requirements - see fig.4), listing the capabilities necessary to perform a specific mission. These data, after being analyzed, they are presented Lo the Operation Command (SH APE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe); 2 nd phase: upon authorization by NAC, SHAPE sends a Force Warning Message (ACTWARNActivation Warning), which is a first official document to inform both Allied Regional Commands (RC South and RC North for the ACE area) and nations of the need to set up a force. This message describes the m ission and its time schedule for the further development of the process (date of tbe "Force Generation" Conference, date of the SOR etc.); 3 rd phase: SHAPE distributes a first draft SOR and establis hes formal relations with nations (through their Senior National Representatives operating at the "Strategic Com m and" - SC). Nations may reply by making a preliminary proposal, as regards Lheir force contribut ion, so that the SC may gradually get a picture of the situation;

4th phase: SHAPE, being duly aut~orized by NAC, issues a Force Request (ACTREQ -Activation

Request), to inquire about nations' force availability, as established in the SOR; 5 th phase: SHAPE niay convene a "Force Generation Conference" (FGC), usually chaired by the

Deputy SACEUR, gathering the representatives of troop contributing countries, as well as those of the designated Force Command and of the subordinated "Component Commands". The FGC may be preceded by official stalements, aimed at ruling out possible inconsistencies in the SOR and by bilateral or multilateral meetings; 61h phase: based on the outcome of the FGC and in reply to the ACTORD, nations make their

formal force contribution proposals through a "FORCEPREP" (Force Preparation), a document which details the type and number of forces made available by each nation for the operation (with possible employment restrictions); 7 th phase: SHAPE may co n vene a "Force Balancing Conference" to m ake up for some shortcomings resulting from the FGC; At the end of said "adjustment", an amended version of the SOR is issued, detail ing nations' official force contribution levels;

8th phase: subject to NAC authorization, SHAPE issues an ACTORD.It is an official act which:

• starts the process of assigning national units to the Force Commander through the ToA (Transfer of Au thority); • authorizes ·unit deployment; • allov,1s for the allocaLion of NATO common funds. The responsibili ty of deploying transferring units from their home base usually lies with each nation. The Theatre Commander (JFC) initially exerts TACON (before the ToA and during the force redeployment p hase) to coordinate unit movements in Lhe theatre. Only a l a later stage - upon the conferment of the ToA which usually coincides with the assignment of the AoR to the units concerned - the JFC will be authorized bv nations to exert the established command authority (usually OPCON) over his forces . ..

A "Lagunare" in an1.phibious-vva1jc1re training.

representatives, policemen, mediators, nurses or more generally aid workers. This process, which starts at the onset of a crisis and lasts until a politica l decision to inte rvene is taken, requi res the full commitment o f the national Staffs and Operational Commands concerned, whi ch must u pdate/imp lement di fferent "options", based on the cha nges occu rring in the international scenario and on the consequent national policies. Once a document g uaranteeing the "international legitimacy" of a military intervention in a CRO ( which usua lly is a Secu r-i ty Council Resolution for the United Nations) has been issued and the Regional Orga nization tasked with "lead ing" a mission has been identified, national options are to be harmonized w i th the force 62

requirements established by the Force Commander (or Strategic Commander) at intenwtional level.. The "Force Generation" process is thus sta rted, w hi ch may be

defined as a "a process carried out at staff level to coordinate in detail, both q u antita t ively an d qualitatively, the composition of the mult in ational force s necessary to carrv out a mission based oi~ the cv:·duation of th ~ Force Commander". 1o clarify the development of this process, reference will be rnade to NATO, becau se it is a w ide ly known o rganization and has conducted the most 1·ecent CROs. F igure 2 and 3 illustrate th e "conceptua l" developrnent of this process . O wing Lo political and operational requirements , this process s e ldom follo \.vs th e phases as s ch e duled; s o me of them a rc often o verla pped o r scrapped , mainly when a crisis degenerates a nd th e pressure from the internatio nal p ublic increases. A ty pical case in point was N ATO intervention in Kosovo. Forces were a lready partia ll y deployed in FYROM for previous operations connected wi th the crisis in the region. This way, an ACTORD (Activation Order) was immediatel y issued, when a "Military Technical Agreemen t" wa s sii:med bv th.e Parties.

Statement Of Requirements (SOR) Version X

For<:c UQ

Statement Of Requirements for OPLAN XXXXX

fncludcs J1-J9 srnlT

ScpJ~•!e CE (Cris;s

XX Dec00

750

faiablishmcnr}

E\V:'SICitN'f ('oy

Mtin.:ivn: An

Ground H<1s,ed CW

Med, lnf{'.\ x nun coys}

NATO

MN (Mut1in:nior:al;

140

NATO

650

T bis table giv,~s a n exa mple of.:, SO R, emp loyed to lis t unitsicapabil ities necessa ry to carry out a m ission. In part icular, the column: "Requ ireme nt'" ident ifies the need; "'Spec ific Ca pabi li ty" idern ifics u ni ts'specific .:ispects (capabilities required and level); "S ugges ted S ou ,·cc" ind icates possible nat io ns/orga nizat ion s wb ic h arc req ues ted to cornr ih111e tbeil" forces; '" Number of personnel'' ind ic1Hes units· personne l nu mbc,·s; "Offers" s pecifi cs o ffers made by sorne coumrics ""Re ma r ks and cavea ts" identifies poss ible restrictions to the e mployment of asse ts. Fig.2

system's main problerns: nations' inadequacy to sustain their effort over time. This is obviously linked to the availability of units to be deployed in opera.Lions through "sustainable" shifts (4). As regards the Italian Army, its readiness level has been tailored to the "highesL engagen,.enl option" provided for by the "Army Operationa l ConcepL" (5). If these limits are exceeded, units are subject to a higher "operational stress" and, over time, there is the risk of a downturn in the number of those \vho voluntarily apply to join the Army, given the excessive burden of their tasks (this risk has already been nm by some countries with high level military forces). To rule out this risk, the Alliance has launched a study to regulate

Fig.3

Long Term.Sustainnient Concept for CRO Fasi Engagemen

ilitary Presenc

Phase

Phase Prosecuzione

Transizione •

lnstabllita, indeterminatezza del rischio

•

Crisis Response -

•

Gestlone delle crlsi Mantenimento dell'ordlne

,,, Coordinazione con le

Realizzazlone di programmi di

10/NGO (*) ,,, Abbassamento del

stablllzzazione sociaie di lungo termine

"r Stablllta precaria

-'r

livello di conflittualita

(*) !niernational Organi::a1ions I Non Govername111al Organizalion.

A "Regional Force Conference" was subsequentl y held in July 1999 (one month after the deployment in Kosovo) to harmonize the All iance engagement in the Balkans. In essence, this is an extremely flexible process, which does not end with Lhe identification of the units necessary to the JFC lo initially carry ouL a mission, hut continues over time, in parallel with the changes brought about by the development of a miss.ion (as was Lhe case for IFOR and SFOR) or by a nation's unilateral decision Lo withdraw its units. A most recent example of Lhis was given by Portugal, which after two years of engage rnen t, withdrew its Battalion, employed in Kosovo within the Ilalian-led MBNW, in order to face the operational requirernen Ls in EAST TIMOR, considered as more demanding frorn a national vicvvpoint. Unexpected events may also occur, wl1 ich will completely change the general framework on Lhe ground (opening of a new theatre). It goes withouL saying that, when force reductions are limited as in Lhe above mentioned case, a solution is found through bilateral

Long Term Sustainment Concept.for CRO Fig.4 Esigenze Military Pr.ese~c ~ Phase

ngagemen Phase

Transizione -J

-J

HRF a pieni organici supporti del HRF [es: ARRC, AMF(L)J

-,,, FLR a pieni organici con rinforzi limitati o: -J «CORE» di un HQ con rinforzi che tengano conto del contribute delle Nazioni - J FLR supporti

Prosecuzione -J -J

-J

Comandi «ad hoe» <<esternalizzazione» dei servizi e impiego di assetti commerciali Meno forze «protette», piu MSU

Lcgenda: J-IRF: High Readiness Force: FLR: Forces at Lower Readiness.: <<CORE»: nucleo base.

or multilateral agreements. In all other inslances, a mcire complex process must be envisaged, as in the case of a shift from one mission to anothe1~ resulling in a contxolled reductionibalance of forces, or of a "sudden" and significant shonage of units.

PRESENT DIFFICULTIES The examples ex.plained above have highlighted one of the

long term engagements in CROs (fig.5 and 6) . This sLudy, mainly centered on Theatre Commands, establishes that units should resort to "outsourcing", i.e. entrusting civil organizalions/agencies with Lhe responsibility of provid ing services previously carried out by military elements, vvhich can thus concentrate on operational tasks. Certain types of units, however, cannot be replaced, in particular Combat Support and Combat Service Support units, which do 63

undergo ad hoe t1-a ining to reach the same ope rational standards as NATO troops. At the end of ,,,:- v XFORJ •~o·r RA COR JOBTIT'I..J: XFORl RE..\IARK~ CE~O this activity, which requires long :"iK N:"i E training t imes, these units are Jll OF--1 SP lO-:ipr-05 l'I CHIEF A N 001 usually "certifi ed" by the nation. will ing to employ them . The ll7 $OOPS OF- 3 A N GR IT ooz integration however, is never com ple te; in fac t, th ere are KV\V m SO l'l ;\~S Of - l A N n' TBD IT oos limita t ions (access to hi ghly sensitive information ma inl v) which reduce the effectiveness ~f said cooperation. Allie d Au thoriti es consta ntly J3 AIR focu s th.e ir atte ntion on these COK . sv .'il XfOM l COT cum JOBTlTl[ XF'ORl Ar-'1 \MKS K'i. issues and there is hope that SK C (lf. \ OUEF J\AIM II JO-Ji~f-05 II · thes e difficu lties wi ll be 001 "" overcome in the near- future. n, JlA HEL OPS ori:1( lO-m.:,r-05 OF·l N l'l/ Th e r es trictions posed by ooz nations to th e e mployment of t h eir troops are another JlA lltLYCOPTER !O m:u-0 ~ TU OF-6 " TU 1'AS.KER impo rta nt ob stacle to th e effectiveness of the system. This issue, directly impacti ng on the Force Commander's capability to nol always meet forces ' a ll ocating lop-lev e l pos1t10n s carry out his mission, causes the requi re n1ents, at the e nd of eac h among nalions (from the rank of NA C to fre q u ent ly ca ll upon "process". co lo nel t o that of L ieu tenan t nati ons to lift these restri ctions To "oblige "natio ns to also General), established by bilateral and/or ask Cor more forces. commit their va luabl e assets ag1-eements e ndorsed at political (heli copters , Com m and and and mili tary level. Control facilities, Special Forces, Another c le ment reducing the THE "LESSONS LEARNED" Engineer units, intelligen ce and effect iveness of the abo velogisti c assets, e tc) , usually mentioned system is the level or The Allian ce's con sta nt employed for sati sfying n,ili onal integration of units belonging to parti c ipat ion in CR Os has con li nge n Ls' pri o rity support n on -N ATO nations. Although brou g ht about an inc reasing requ ire ments, nati o ns' there is a strong pol itical will to developmenl of this "process", partic ipation is evaluat ed by employ these forces (owing to the from w hich the foll owing SHAPE, both qua ntitatively and above -m en lionecl sho rtage o f conclusions may be drawn: qua lilat ive ly, in order to ass ign perso nnel a nd to a consequent • t h e importan ce of th e Lirne to p level positi ons w ith in the wider internationa l sup port lo factor. Ow ing to operational Force HQ, during the so-called the operation), ther e a re stil l requirements, generally forces "ivlanning Conrere nce" (fig .7 sorne critical issues ·which de lay should be immedi a tely shows a specimen of the "format" their employment, among which: avail able on th e ground, a ft e r· used for "Crisis Es ta blish me nt"). • the fundi ng o f th e in itiati ve : t h e adop ti on of a poli tica l On these occasions, besides the ge nerally non -NATO nations decis ion to intervene; a dopti o n of the "vertical s lice" have to bear the cos ts of the ir • the role played by politics is concept (assignment of a number troop deployments . To reduce always greater than expec ted. of positi ons commensurate with th ese costs, they increas ingly Thi s e lement is exploite d not the number o( the forces engaged resort lo signing bilateral only by NATO bodies, but also in operations), th e "quali ty" of agreements with some NATO by contributing coun trie s, th e u nits m ad e ava i Ia bl e to a nation s, to be logistica lly and which usually privil ege na tional Force a ll ov.;s na li ons to as k for so metim es a lso fin a ncial ly priorities rathe r than th ose or top ranking and very rewarding supported; the Coalition; positions . • the interopera bili ty of thes e • th e nee d to e va luate the B ut this instrument is o n ly units with NATO forces. To rule feasibility of a mi ssion over the partiall y effective; in fact i t out all poss ible "tro ubles", th e lon g, medi um term . The cannot replace the system or un its made a vailabl e have to availability of a sufficient Crisis Establishment (CE) HQ XP'OR

Fig.5

J 3/5/7

KV\\"

30-.:!pr,I).)

KV\',,'

[

KV\\'

KVW

KVW 1)/14

number of Commands and units for planning sustainable employment shifts is therefore of critical important e, to allow a force to keep its "initial effectiveness; • the lack of a standard solution, as regards "Force Generation", which should be considered as a very flexible process, capable of adapting to all contingencies; • the impor tance of a clear definition of "End State." (6) In sum, this a an extremely versatile and articulated process, whose effectiveness is limited by international criteria of military participation, which are subject to national decisions. The knowledge of t hese international mechanisms, which is of primary importance for professional personnel, is also critical for those who are increasingly called upon to operate in international stmctures. D ,., Lt. Col. Roberto D'Alessandro,

Chief, l " Section , Plans and Current Operations Office

NOTES (1) "Art.5 Operations" are those envisaged by ArL.5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for the mutual support of all Alliance nations, ·when a deliberate attack is waged against their territory ("The Parties agree that an armed a/lack agains1 u11.e or more o( 1hern in Eurupe or North America shall be considered an atlack against them all and consequenLly agree that, if such arm.ed attack occurs, each o( 1he111, in exercise of the right of individual or collective selfde/ense recugnized by Art.5 uf the Charter of the United Nations, wi:tl assist Lhe party or Parties so allacked hy taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties , such ac 1ion as ii deems necessary, including the use of armed force , lo restore and maintain the security of the Nurth Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a re su/1 thereof shall imm.edia1ely be repcmed to the Security Council. Such rneasures shall he termina.Led when the Security Council

has taken the 1neasures necessary LO resLore and maintain international peace and security. (2) The MC 133/3 (''Procedures, for Lbe approval, promulgaLiOO and implementation of operational p lanning documcnLs of Major Nato Commanders") establi shes the guidelines for developing NATO's operational planning and details the procedures for the activation and subsequent deployment of forces earmarked for operations . The document defined the concept of ''Force Activation" as the process by which the forces required by the OPLAN are activated and deployed. Le responsibili ty of such acLivarion rests wiLh the "NATO Strategic Command" concerned, after a "Force Activation Directive'' is issued bv the NAC . The "Force Activation " pr~ce.ss generally starts before the approval of the OPLAN and mav coinc ide with the validation of the CONO.l' (Concept Of Operations). (3) The term "crisis " does not have an officia l definition. Howe ver, according Lo the terminology currently in use, a crisis is defined as "a national or interna1ional situation in which the values, interests ur primary objectives o/ the

A patrol of raiders of 1he "Col ;\,Joschin" 9'1' Regimen/. Parties concerned are under threat" (4) As regards the Italian Army, its policy envisages that units s hould be d eployed Lo the theatre on a " 4 month shift" basis (a 4 month shift in the theatre and at lcasL 12 months at homc). (5) The ''Army Operational Concept" es ta b lishes that the Itali an Army should be ready to deploy: • one Division level contingent (2 Brigades plus support units), ,vhich is both flexible (employmen t on I or 2 theatres with different operational and environmental features) and sustainable over time (4 rnonth shifts); • another contingent to be engaged in a mission more lim ited both in sLrength (Battle Group) and time (Brigade engaged for not more than six months) (6) Conditions which determine the success of an operation and must guide all planning activities from the beg inning to the encl. They are usua1Jv illustrated bv the directives issuel at strategic/operational level. (Military glossary-Army, 1998).

by Livio Ciancarella ~·: and Andrea Di Stasio -::~-:

·1 JJ! ui iJJ JJ!Ju

armies of other countries ,,vhich were ahead of us. Training was another problem: "still today, concepts like air mobility and air mechanization, the opportunities they offer and even the "aeronautical" specifications of the equipment, don't seem to have been fully digested by the land com.m.anclers".

Air mobility gives the land troops engaged in combat an additional dimension. It should not be confused with air movement "tout court", since it is an integral part of the battle. This doctrinal assumption was concretely tested in "Challenge 2001 ", an exercise recently carried out at the Foce Reno range.

"The commanders of the airassault units fight exploiting every opportunity; they fly and march to the sound of arms, always ready to seize every occasion to deitroy the enemy". US ARMY, FM-71-100-3

he first airmobile unit of Lhe Italian Army was born on April 30, 2000. It was a simple transformation of the "Friuli" Mechanized Brigade into an Airmobile Brigade: much had still to be done in order to complete the metamorphosis. The Brigade existed, and so did the men, since many Light Aviation units had been disbanded; sure, there were problems, but the real concern was the "airmobile mentality", which was unexistent; il was necessary lo construct it, to create it little by little, making use of the knowledge of the

An operation is called "airmobile" when the fighting forces, with their equiprnenl, manoeuvre over the battlefield employing their aircraft, in order to engage in combat on the ground. If one goes into details, this defi n ition, simple and explanatory al first sight, infers functional implications deriving from important conceptual, organizational and executive problems, such as Command and Control (C2), requesLs, tasking, communications, air space control and, last bul not least, the activities concerning planning and joint coordination. An airmobile manoeuvre is in fact the result of the sinergy of intents expressed through the mix of the helicopter component and infantry ( often represented by elite units), which does not develop with the pure juxtaposition o( transport/fire and land units; this would actually be a simple transport by helicopter~ with results similar to those achievab le by employing trucks. Air mobility, on the contrary, is the effect of a constant and integrated interaction between land- manoeuvre and thirddimension rnanoeuvre, and is the outcome of a succession of experiences, procedures, command and mutual-knO\,vledge bonds which are not easily irnprovised. An airmobile infantryman must be used to fight al the rhythm marked by the helicopters . He must he able lo exploit the rapidity of the movemenls, the

Tab. 1

FIRST AX IO M O N AIR M OBILITY

SQUAD + HELICOPTER = AIR MOBILITY

Tab . 2 SECOND AXIOM ON AIR MOBILITY JOINT PLANNIN G EFFICIENT C2 PREVENTIVE INFO PREPARATION JOINT PRACTICAL TESTS EFFICIENT EQUIPMENT EFFECTIVE TRAINING CAPABILITY OF AIRSPACE CONT

= AIR MOBILITY

effectiveness of the aircraft's fire, the assured informative an d exploralive s upport. The axioms of air mo bility arc shown at tables 1 and 2. Innovati ons and their· process need time to be "digested at all levels". (Riccardo Niccoli). In o ur co untry we sta r t by studying Lhe th eo ry in a ll it s aspects and producing the firs t de fi n i Lion s of an. ai rmo bi lc o peration; the doc trine is the n adjusted to the new operational scenarios. Our Army lays much emphasis on the role of helicopters in the modern operational th eatres . T hi s show s th at, a t last, th e importance of an airmobile force has been understood, together with the fac t that it is a fundamental resource for an Army which wants to be credible in present-day scenarios. In the defe n ce of ex.ternal int ere sts a nd international security, it represents one of the most modern and effective land inslrnments for a s t rategy of active prevention. It is a strategy wh c ,·e the bi no mial "rapidity/power" counts, because a timely military presence can have a politico-str ategic effect mu c h hi g her than th at of a massive but tardy intervention . Consid er ing the sc enario s envisaged by the new defence model, major airmobile units can provi de the p os sibility of opera ling within a rnultinalional NATO acti on with remarkable rapidity and firepowe1~ The deterrent effect of a major unit capable of redeploying at le gs of 100- 200 kilo meter s, keeping a h igh tactica l and op e rationa l mobility on any theat ,· e of the Allian ce , is cert ai nly co nsid erabl e. It can provide the local armoured or motorized defence force s with a

Pilots of the Army Air Cavalry.

highly sop histicated fire -anclmanoeuvre element. Therefore, air mobility gives an additional dimension to the land troops directly engagecl in the battle, and must not be confused with the air movernent, ,,v hich does not require tactical integrity and immediate entrance into the battle. Air mobility is an integral part of the land battle, and provides the Commanders with a decisive instru ment for striki ng at the enerny's weak points (flanks, rear echelons, C2, logistic units, etc.), irrespective of the terrain . In other words , a FIN ABEL report defines it as "the use of the air space close to the ground, in order to achieve a decisive effect in operations, thanks lo the employment of forces capable of bei ng projected and of acting with.ou t being ha1npered by obstacles". T hus , it is certa inl y not convenient to emp loy the airmo bile formations as infantry units or equivalent troops; it is true that their e mployment can be ruthless, brutal and massive, but it is necessa r-ily limited to short periods at time (suffice i l to remem ber t h e fate of the British paratroopers a t Arnhe m during Op er ation "Market.Garden"). What, then, should a unit be able to do, in order to call itself "ai rmo bile"? I t must be capable of performing the following tasks: • information./counterinfonnation, information -search missions, through the infiltra tion of specific units; • armed actions against: •• enemy units, either autonomously or in support of land forces; •• poorly p rotected objectives deep into th e enemy deployment; .. e nemy air threat (airplanes, helicopters); • support and assistance, such as:

TRAINING THE AIRMOBILE UNITS Th.is subject co uld.be discussed o n a nother occasion, but it seems appropriate to g ive it a particular space here. Any unit can try to train in air mobility, but whal rnakes the di fference is the degree of specialization achieved and what .it i.s capable of expressing. Airmobile units cannot be improvised, and Lhe un its able do everything in every field are chimerical. But when a unit is called to conduct an operation which includes some of tl1e aspects we have described, and can cio it without great conceptual and organizational efforts, then it can be considered airmo bile in every respect. This means to have a know -how sufficient to express a massive capability, at short notice, in a complex environment and for a certainly lirnited-Lime task. The individual and unit capabilities needed for an airmobile operation cannot be developed immediately before the mission. If it is not possible to have p ermanen t airmobile units, there should be at least units earmarked for th is type of employment. To this end, a training process has been studied by the 7 th Regiment, wi th the coordination of the "Friuli" Airmobile Brigade, and special modules for the constitution of airmobile units have been tested. The testing proces was both theoretical and practical, and was jointly carried out by the 66 th Infantry Regimen.L, the 187 th Paratroop Regiment and Lhe 7th "Vega" Cavalry Regiment. In particular, the Lraining cycle inclu des the application of three modules, specifically studied and realized for: • infantry and paratroop units (I st m odule); • Air Cavalry pilots (2nd module); • Com manders of airmobile units (3rd module). Through this approach, the airmobile know-how and capabilities acquired by each component are integrated and implemented in the execution of the various tactical actions. The training programme lasts 14 weeks, and includes: • 560 classes, 336 of which practical; • 44 flight -hours on allack and mult irole h e licopters, considered sufficient in relation to the established objective; • 4 intermediate-verification exercises. Training is carrie d o ut taking for granted the technical/tactical capabilities of the infantry and paratroop units, and considering the airmobile capability as an additional capability to be achieved through: • theoretic activities directed towards : •• the acquisition of the basic concepts of airmobility and, in particular, the conceptio n, organization and conduct of the airmobi le missions; • • the knowledge of stanags and ATP~; • practical activities oriented towards : • • knowledge of the aircraft; • • organization of tl1e landing zone; _ •• planning, organization and conduct of the missions. The practical activity has permitted to verify the validity of the training modules. Considering th e lessons learned and the controls carried out, a critical review of th e approach has been made, in order lo work out a new programme, b etter suited to the requirements and fixed goals. Clearly, this training is still experimental, and represents the starting point for the creation of airmobile units and of a real a irmobile capability. We believe that a very high specialization of the units w ill give good r esul ts prov ided tha t we ensure sufficient r e sou rce s an d an environment of mutual cooperation to a team assembled for a clear purpose.

Tab.3

THE FUTURE OF AIR CAVALRY ACCORDING TO THE US ARMY

AVIATION VISION - Fort Rucker USA Air Cavalry will be the most importan t forc e of the 2 p t Century, providing combat, combat support and logistic support capabilities throughout the whole spectrum of 111.ultidimensional cooperation. Its in h eren t flexibility, superior manoeuvre a nd combat effectiveness will influence future battles in all their dimensions. The Air Cavabymen, highly motivated, equipped with. modern systems and trained to reach a firsL-class professionalism, will provide the Commanders at all levels with a tre,nendous in.crease in lethality, together with the necessa1y leadership to face the technologic revolution of the digitized battlefield and the capability of achieving ftnal vicLOry.

••

deliv ery o f fi r e a nd coordination o[ fire sour·ces; •• tact ical trans port of u nits and format ions w h ose m anoeuvr·e is hampered by th e terrain, o r log is tic and

medi cal transport; .. search a nd rescue of isola ted sold iers and crews, also in hostile areas; • co mmand , mean t eith er as capa bili ty o f m anaging t he

mission or as s upport to the command fu nction . Air n1.0bility will also be the winning a rm in the hypothetical digitized scenarios of Lhe next century (see table 3). The most serious disadvantage is represented by the fact that a unit of this kind cannot hold the gro und fo r a long time . Fu rtherm ore, it is sens iti ve to weather conditions and to the enemy capa bility of air clefence (a nliaircraft and self-defence). CHARACTERISTICS OF AN AIRMOBILE UNIT

Up to now, we have seen that a ir mobility im p li es the emp lo yme n t of hel icopter formations a nd land forces, put together fo r the performa nce of the same task. As we said, the simultaneous em ploy m e n t o f t h ese force s, whose com p lcx i ty increases in pro por t ion to the ir s ize an<l range of action, cannot µresci nd fr o m an a dequat e Cornm a nd and-Contr-ol organ ization. As a matte,- of fact, the success of a n ai rmobile opera tion depends on the unit Co mmander's possibil ity o f managing al l his assets in the valious p hases of the a c tion, re lying on a preci se and effic ient C2 s tructure, ca pable of monitoring all the forces, al the incessa n t pace i mpose d by an operation or this kind. The size and capab ilities of the instrumcnl is a nother problem to be tackled. In fact , the fo rce can vary, in both dimensions and operationa l capabilities , going from a s mall number of transport helicopte rs and com bat units acting together~ to an imposing form ati on, with tra nsport a nd comba t helicoptcr-s,

/\ Paratrooper patrolli ng a huilt-up area.

Two AB-4 I 2s flying al very low a11i1ude during a. la.11di11.g exercise.

operating with other forces at rnanoeuvre level. It is possible to have an idea of the dimension of an airmobile unit by considering what can be trnnsported with one wave ; therefore it is reasonable to assume that, at tactical level, the minimum size should be that of a battalion-level corn bat group (with no logistic support), Lo be employed in a low/medium intens ity environment, without the "a-priori" exclusion of a highintensity setting. As regards the aptitude and capacity of the units Lo perform this kind of Lasks, we can say Lhat. there is no problem; the only thing to keep in mind is that the forces must have a "light infantry" mentality.

Even the paratrooper units, which apparenLly arc the most suited to this employment, must undergo a speci fie training similar to that of any infantry unit; also in Lhe ir case it will be necessary to "demolish" the atavistic habit of employing the helicopter just as another means of transport. They must become convinced that this weapon system can contribute, better than any other, Lo the achievement of success . This said, another Âˇ diche must be refu Led. Some, when discussing air mobility, think that air cavalry has acquired a new component (airmobi le infantry), while others believe that the infantrymen have received new vehicles (helicopters). Both concepts arc ,.vrong: a unit, to be considered ainnobile, must be made up of infantry and hel icopters, on equivalent and equally important levels but

necessar ily d ifferent as regards specialization (let's think, paradoxical.ly, of pilots jurnp i ng Lo the ground and infantr)1men at the controls of a helicopter...); the un it must operate under the orders of an impart ial leader (infantryman or air-cavalryman; this, strangely enough, is not important), must act jointly and in a chaos of tactical. technical and procedural aspects. It is clear that, in such a unit (regardless of its level) the actors are not only the infantrymen and the air-cavalrymen, but fully and direcUy include a staff capable of expertly planning and managing that kind of operations. And this is not easy at al l. Those ,.vho want a concrete evidence of this, should take a look at the following aspects, which are all to be considered in airmobile operations: control of the air space; mission planning; mission control; coordination 71

Tab. 4

COMMAND RELATIONS

AIR MOBILE FORCE COMMANDER I I

LIFTED UNIT COMMANDER

AVIATION MIX CONTROLLER

COORD. LIA ISON I

LIFTED UNITS 1 1TRANSPORT

wilh the ant iaircraft defence, the Air Force, the land Maj or Units , the u nits flown o ve r; airmobile logistics, SAR/CSAR/.JCSAR procedures; employment of the air armament-syslems; calculation of t he air loading systems, fl ighl -secu ri ty procedures; conduct or information analyses wit h aeronautica l aspects ; E\.V, EPM ; flying crews' training, also in NBC env ironments; elusive manoeuvres; seHproteclion and surviva bili ty; establishment of bridgeheads; evacuation b y a ir; aircraft guidance from the gro und;

AVIATION UNIT

I I

ARMED

RECCE

nighL v1s1on, e tc .. . Is that enough ?

PROCEDURES The procedural aspecl can be discusse d covering three speci fie sectors on ly: cornmand relations, conlrol of the air space and plann in g o( an airmobile mission. Command relations ATP 41 (A) Airmobile Operations defines the main roles and the relations between

lhe responsible operntors: it is su ffi cien t to copy! The main authoriti es a re (table 4): • the Commander of the Air Force (AFC): he is responsible for· planning and execut ing the opera t ion, and is normally a land commander availing himself of an air cavalry staff, but the opposite could also be true. He is the connecting link of th e special branches , to which he sends orders and directi ves, while controll ing Lhem; • the Con troller of the mission (AMC) : he is responsible for the units, is su bordinate to the AFC, and plans and cooperates with the LUC; • Lhe Commander of Lhe lifted units (L UC) : he is respons ible (or the lift ed uni ts , is subordinate Lo the AFC, and p lans and cooperates wilh the AMC. Air space control

This very delicale and complex sector includes two aspects, both essential for the AFC: • air space control proper~ a imed at kno,,vi n g who, vvhere and how is flying and whether he is friend or foe, in order to authorize the flight over certain areas or possib ly order the destruction of the aircraft; • control of the flying units, in ord er to know what they are doing and where the helicopters in a given mission are engaged, to monitor their operation and obtain updated information. TL is important to point oul that , on this su bj e c t, there are often ff.1isunderstandings caused by the same word: for the Air Force and its 'p ilots, conlrol is what is describ ed in the firs l

A Leopard I AS and an. Air Cavalry helicopter in a training area. 72

IP'"

An A.-129 "Mangusw" (fo reground) and an AB-412 during an exercise.

case, while the land units refer Lo the second case. It is certainly very important to avoid this kind of misinterpretations.

in an order opposite to the actual conduct of the rnission (action on the objective, landing, air movement, embarkat ion, muster) . This is easy to say, but difficult to do . To achieve the re quired automaticity, it is necessary to try and try again, and this is mostly staff work.

OPERATION "CHALLENGE 200 1"

"Practice makes perfect" is and English expression that should be fully shared and, in fact, we have started to meet the cha ll e nge through the first airmobile exercises (Manta 2000 and Challenge 2001), and this is why

Planning a mission The planning of an airmobile operation involves all the authorities described above, and is carried out following the check-lists specified in ATP4 1 and ATP49. This enables all the specialists involved lo plan their activities without forgetting important details, as well as to make their difficulties t im ely known to others concerned. ln practice, the operators proceed by inverted phases, i .e.

An. A B-4 I 2 shortly before landing.

.situati o ns 01· to rein force threate ned or fi ght in g fri e ndly u nits . ll is n ecessary to use its firepower or its simple (so to say ) dete rre n ce c apa bi li ty, ensu red by the ve ry prese nce of the attack helicopters. The purpose of the exercise wa~ o bvi ous : to ascertain th e attainrnent of the capability of conce iv in g, organi zin g an d conducting an airmobik operation . It was necessary to ve r·ify th e training level of the !lying crews of the 7th Air Cavalry "Vega'' Regi ment and the p aratroop platoon of the 187 th Reg imen t, who were the real leading actors in the exercise. ft was necessary, quoting again that E nglish expression, lo look for "perfection" . "Cha ll enge 200 I" was a blank , two-sided exercise; its theme was the exec ution or a r aid by an airmobile reinforced platoon, wilh lhe task of neutralizing the base of the rebels' actions, in order to deprive of the necessary lead ing comm a nd the hos t il e fo r ces p re.sent at the embarkrnent and disembarkment (SPOD/SPOE ) port of Ravenna, thus increas ing the credibility of the peace force.

A volunleer armed wi1h a Bereua AR 70190 sul:miachine gu n.

the la tter was given that name . The exercise too k place on Febru a(·y 20 at the Foce Re no range. The presence of Lt.Gen. Ardito, Land Force s Comm a nder, confirmed the importance of the even t. T h e op e r a tio nal fram e perfectly fitt ed an ai rmobi le operation, the scenario was that of an ex tremely fle xible p eace operation (PSO). In Mi litary Operat ions Other 74

Than War (MOOT\Als), the time ly concentration in a particular area of a substantia l comba t power is o[Len necessary. The enemy forces or factions generall y h a ve in hand technologica lly modes t wea pons, fla nked, some times, by modern and effective systems, such as MAN-PAD. T he "Friuli " Bri ga de i.s a reserve of t he multi na tio na l .stabilizat ion fo1-ce'.s Comm.and: t his is t h e mo st ap pro pria te r ole for a n airmobile forc e o rie nte d t o intervene, eith e r autonomously to clear up crisis

As regards the operational concept, s u ffice it Lo th ink of Kosov o or Bo s ni a and or lhe stabili za tion fo 1·ce th e r e in, tra nslate the who le to E milia R omagna , Italy, c hange the n am es , for in s ta nce, or I.h e Srpska Republic a nd FBiH, a nd the picture is comp lete. T he particu lar situation stems Crom t he missi on a nalys is a nd the decision -rnakin g process of p lanning, \-V h ere one of the decisive points is the control of rbe port of Ravenna to .sec ur·e the flow of hu m ani ta rian aid a nd supplies to the Peace Force. But the Romagnese rebels attack and occupy the port, in order to: • favour and acce lerat e the poli tical process of independence of the Violet State in the South;

An AB-205 and an J\ - 129 "Mangus/a"

o{ the Air Cavalry flying over a river.

• stress their refusal of an intervention by the multinational Peace Force; • block, by controll ing the port of Ravenna, the flow of humanitat·ian aid and of supplies to the Peace Force. The base from which thei r

leader operates is .located at Foce Reno, near Casale Ronconi (centre of gravity). The negotiations conducted by the Peace Force responsible for the divisional sector (MND-NE) co.m e to nothing, and the Force Command, after more bloody actions against some units of the Division , decides to carry out an action of force, to show the resolution of the Alliance

and implement the UN resolution, engaging the reserve airmobile Brigade with the task of: • enjoi ning the implementation of the measures envisaged by the peace plan; • regaining the free u se of the port. FurLh ermore the Force Commander decides to employ an airmobile p latoon in a preventive action, in order to neutralize t he base from ,.vhich fhe terrorist actions are c·onducted and to d eprive the rebels present on the SPOD/SPOE of their leaders. The exercise itself was divided in three phases: • air movement; • raid; • exfiltrali on. The air movement was a tactical flight, in its three different forms:

An Italian servicerna11. in his position dui'ing an exercise.

A ParaLroop NCO on surveillance duty. ·

• low altitude (50ft/250ft); • over obstacles (5 m above the obstacles along the route); • among several obstacles, as the airmobile platoon approaches the objective. · During the movement, the formation adopted different configurations, accord ing to the tactical requirements or to better face possible threats by hostile forces. Owing to the i r specific characteristics, th e "left scalar" and the "left stagger column" formations were selected. The former, in fact, permits to fire on the left flank without safety restrictions, and easy changes of formations; the latter, more suitable in poor visibility, does not require

large landing areas and makes possible the preventive division of the unit into several groups. The second phase - the raid enhanced the role of the platoon leader as commander of the ai rmobile force and re.al "conductor" of the whole operation. Starting with th e planning phase he was the leading actor, whose task vvas the coordination of all the activities b etween the la nd and air com ponents , in order to establish logistic priorities, landing areas, limits of the aircraft and a ll that was necessary for the conduct of Lhe operation. In short, only i[ the airmobile commander succeeds in "harmonizing" and integrating

the two components, the miss ion can be successful. The third phase - exfiltr-ation was just the rounding off of the whole operation. The platoon's airrnobile action has shown: • extrerne mobility, whic h achieved the surprise effect by preve n ling the enemy forc es from moving away in tim e to avoid interception; • flexibility of employment , which permitted to adapt to any change in the situation in a very short time; • high firepower, through the employrnent of armed helicopters; • optimal stealthiness: the airmobile formalions attacked the objective in an u npredictable and discree t manner: Besides, its rapid -projection capa bility of the informationgathering and fire-support means (EA helicopters) gave the airmobiJe platoon the possibility of assuming the control of the area of interest in an extremely short time. The at tack was rapid, brutal and massive. The die is cast, and there we are at last! Obviously, there will be difficult ies: they are innate in the accomplishment of any project, but th ey n:rnst b e rationally tackled and solved, exalting the good results achieved. Air mobility is a precious resource for the credible and modern future of our Army. We must go forward, now that the static attrition has been removed. D

'Major,

711' « Vega» Regiment

,·,c.-captain, 7,;, « Vega» Regiment

ii"""

Above. An Air Cavalry A- 129 "Nlangus1a" helicopter. Left. A n 1\ B-412 '{lying over an helicopterparlcing area.

BIBLIOGRAPHY -FINABEL K. 18 R; -ATP41 A Airmobile operations; -ATP49B Us e of helicoplers in land

OPS; -SME - Le operazioni LerresLri; -SME - Le operazioni delle unita aeromobili; -US ARMY FM 1-100 Army aviation OPS; -BUNDESWEHR HA III 5 Concept o{ airmechanisationlairmobility ; -Tom Clancv & Fred Franks In s ide the Storm; â€¢ -WWW.CGSC .ARMY .MIL- Div. Air as sault OPS.

General, Ukraine has been an independent nation since 1991. The Army is go ing through a d e ve lop ment phase, and the readers of our magazine would like to kn ow the situation of the Land Tro ops and t h e prospects for their futu re development.

The Army is at the Nation's service at all ti mes .. T herefore, since the first daysÂˇ of its birth, the independent Ukrainian State has been c a r r ying o u t a very precise work , in order to

strengthen its Armed Forces, of which the Land Troops are the essential part. The Army's main tasks consist in ensuring the inviolability of the bord ers, the territor ial int egrity of the Country, t h e execution of the intern ational commitments for t he maintenan ce of peace and international security. In 1997, the P resi d ent of Uk r aine and the Supre m e Comman d er of t h e Armed Forces approved the "National Programm e of Train in g a nd

Deve l opment of the Armed Forces", which e n vis a ges the c reation of fo rces that, a lbeit not very numerous, m ust be, at the same time, poÂˇwerful and mobile. On the basis of this document the "Programme for the Development of the Ukrainian

Land Troops" has been worked out. This project has been studied considering, above all, the Nation's economic capabilities, and its main objective is the establishment of a mobile, multifunctional, wellsized, balanced, well-armed and well trained instrument, in line

with the directives of the parlamentarian assern blies. At the same time, the reform of the Army's completion system goes on, together with the improvement of the management system. At the start of this process, in 1992, the number of land soldiers inherited from the

Soviet Army decreased from 700,000 to 400,000, and now they are only 120,000. The course is long and complex, but I can already mention some good results. \Ve moved from the Military Districts (High Commands, often combined) to the operational 79

Above. A Mig29 of the Air Force.

Right. Two M/24V helicop1ers taking off.

Com ma nds , wh ic h arc the strategic Commands of our new Armed Forces. Anoth.er success is the beginning of the creation of a new operat ional Uni t, according to the principle of the "rapid reaction fo rces" . In the Course of this programm e, we are also introducing a military system of the B r igade/battalion type. Furth e rmore, a n im portant decisi on ha s been made as 1-egards the train ing of personnel. In thi s sense, the reform of the Military Academies is alrnost completed. A training school for jun ior specia l ists has been fo und ed , on the basis of the "Trnining Centre", also known as "Desna". In conformity with the Programme, a gradual trans ition to a contractual completion is under way. I sec our futu re Land Troops as a high ly professiona l, non-

numerous formation, equipped with mode rn wea pons . What is the role o f Troops within t h e co mmunity ? Ar e e lement of nationa l and solidarity?

the Land n ati onal they an c ohesi on

Hi sto ,-y Leach es us that the Slavic peoples settled in tbe best lands of the world following the routes o f m il itary campaigns, battl es and m ajor wars . For example, the second World War tormente d our lan d twice . Perhaps this is the price we have

to pay for the beautiful Country that was given to us by God . Probably, it was precisely our tragic and bloody liistory that convinced our people that the defence of the Motherland is the most honoured duty. The Army, since ancient times, has always been, for our society, an example of courage, loyalty and victory, an element of unity and national solidarity. Considering the number of our Land Troops, we can confidently say that they have a considerable influence on the education of our youth as well as on our society at large .

Ukraine is so important for NATO that the Alliance has established a special relationship with Kiev. What is the Army's perception of "Partnership for Peace"?

On February 8, 1994, Ukraine -

the first Country to do so ai11ong the Eastern Countries - signed the frame,vork Document of "ParLnership for Peace", and on May 25 submitted its introduction Document. On September 14, 1995, at the NATO HQ, in Brussels, the ceremony of official approval o[ the first individual Partnership Programme was held. On July 19, 1996, the Atlantic Council, with the participation of Ukraine according to the "16+1" formula, approved the i ndi victual Programme of Partnership between Ukraine and NATO for the period 1996-1998. · These new relat ions are developing in a very dynamic way, especially thanks to the fact that we consider the ·programme very important (or the general structure of stability and security in Europe . Tn fact, we arc convinced that it is a fundamental e lement for · the future development and practical improvement of NATO's relations with the Countries of the NorthAtlantic Cooperation Council and with other OSCE members, in the sector of defence, military cooperation and peace support

Artillerymen on training.

operations. Our Country cannot keep out of this process. The approval of the "Partnership for Peace" programme ,vas a correct and ti111ely step, which avoided new "lines of division" and favoured the strengthening of stability and security in Europe, and will become an important mechanism for cooperation towards peace. It is also very important lhat equal chances be given to all panicipants and, at the same time, that each partner be allowed to manage its relations with NATO according to its own interests and capabilities. The main priority-lines of cooperation between our Land Troops and NATO, within the "Individual ParLnership Programme", derive from the tasks we are preparing to tackle. ll is therefore necessary to know the terminology and procedures of the Alliance, to study the planning and organization methods of the exercises and lo prepare the Arrned Forces to participate in 81

A BTR70 amphibious vehicle of" Lhe Land Troops.

"Partnersh ip for Peace" . All these measures foster the development of stable relations with NATO members and partner Countries and directly strengthen the external g u arantees for Ukraine's national security. In this cooperat ion, the Land Troops Command sees the future possibility of enlarging the geography of our Armed Forces's participation in inter·national peace-operat ions as well as in Joint .Military Tactical Fo r·ces capable of conducting peace operations and of p r·eventing the occurrence of crisis situations. Furthermore, cooperation w ith NATO includes a joint activity of construction or prototypes of new weapons (assembled also in Ukraine) as well as maintenance and modernization of the existing systems. Besides, an active participation favours the formation of a certain experience in the conduct of joint operations with the UN peace contingents and under the NATO aegis . For us, the most important factor is the possibility of providing our servicemen with a preparat ion meeting all the necessary requ irements . As a matter of fact, from 1992 to 2000, about 9000 servicemen have served with the Ukrainian peace Contingent. Next to the PfP initia tives, Ukraine is very a ctive in regional cooperation projects, s uch as the constitution of a mixed battalion with Poland an d the establishment of military agreeme nts within the Black Sea Community. Are there any other regional initiatives? Our policy is oriented Lo the solution of the disputes among Nations th.rough peaceful

actions. This is why an important part of the national Programme for the development of the Armed Forces is devoted to cooperation issues. The Programme env isages cooperation not only with our neighbours, bu L also ,,vith all the other Countries in the world, in order to guarantee peace and secur·ity for al l. Our policy of regional cooperation with the Countries of the Black Sea region is very active. Moreover, since alrnost every year the Tyssa and Stryl r ivers cause a lot of problems, we had the idea of creating the Ukrainian - Rumanian - H ungarian "Tyssa" engineering Unit, which will shortly be capable of dealing vvith the damages caused by natural disasters in the area. Some months ago, Ukraine sent troops to the UN force in southern Lebanon and, at the sa.m e time, is conducting other peace operations. What lessons have you learned from these numerous interventions?

Our part1c1pation in peace operations started back in 1992 in the former Yugos lavia. In this period we have gained exper·ience in the conduct of international peace-operations. The rna i n events in which our military participated were aimed aL restoring the h.mctionaJity of the essential infrastructure in Yugoslavia and Angola. Therefore today we have a remarkab le experience in assist i ng the victims of conflicts. In recent years the Land Troops Command i ncreased its employment of the Av iation in peace operations in different parts of tl1e world. The number of these participations shows a remarkable increase in the tasks performed by our· pilots. Our Aviation was employed for the first time in a peace operation in July 1995, when tl1e 15th Helicopter Unit. with only three aircraft, was introduced in Yugoslavia. Our airmen proved to be highlevel professionals . Already the follO\,v ing year, in Eastern

Stowing a111m1,111i1ion he{ore Gn exercise.

Slavonia, two new squ&ldrons, 路wit h 12 helicopters, were assigned to the UN Peace Forces. Th e ir Lasks were : transporting the UN spec ia l Contingent a nd its loads ; reconnoitcring and patrolling the division area; medical evac ua tion and search/rescue activities. On the whole , [r-o rn the be g inn in g o r the mission, approximately 5000 flights have bee.rl ca1Tied Out, for a tote\] o r 5000 flight ours. In June 1999, Ukraine participated in t he peace opera ti on in Kosovo with the 14th Unit, equipped with four Mi-5 helicopters. Today the Unit is stationed at the USAF Bondstil Base, and continues Lo per{orm its tasks. The average flying time of Crew Command ers is 145 hours. Obviously, we cannot yet reach these results at o ur permanent bases. The pos itive results achieved with the employment of helicopters o r the Land Troops' Aviation led the UN admin istration to propose the participation of our helicopter Units in the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Lhe Congo. I n 1.h is way, the Army Aviation 's part i c i pation in p eace operations permits Lo keep the proper techn ical level and, besides, improves the training standards of the pilots engage d in day and nig h t missions in different weather conditions. Some years ago the Army constituted the "Steel" Division, a special formation from which it draws the Units to be employed in "out of area" peace operations. Could you tell us something about this Major Unit?

The question is not completely correct, probably because of the Unit's name. The "Steel" Division has a long and glorious history. lt received its honoured name in 19 18, during the c ivi l war. T he Division acted successfully also in W'WII. This Un it jealous ly keeps the mi li tary tra ditions of the previous generntions, but it is a normal mechan iz e d Division with a typi cal role and a typical organization. It is inc luded in the Arrny system, and enjoys a very high cons i deralion for its mili tary pr路eparation. It was nol specifically tra inee! for peace miss ions, but is located near l.he 路well-known Train ing Centre for In Len1ational Peace Forces, within the Yavoriv Range. Some uni ls of this Division partici pal.eel in peace exerc ises as well as in the "Peace Shield" internaL iona l ones. This cou ld be the reason ror the imprecise descrip tion of the "Steel " Di vis ion as a special Unit for peace operations. Next to the Armed Forces,

Ukraine has a National Guard and a Frontier Guard. What are the relations between these two organizations and the Army?

Th e National Guard, in compliance wit h a Presidential Decree, has been disbanded and partially in corporated into t.he .Arn1y. The Frontier Guard, on the contrary, continues to perforrn it functions . Together路 w ith the Army, it is responsible for the d efence of ou t.. borders. Furthermore, ,vc have joinl Lasks in tcrri to rial defence. ln case of problems, the Army and the Frontier Guard are ready to help each other. ln general, al the rnoment of the reduction of the 700 ,000strong Soviet Army located on the Ukrainian territo ry, many servicemen, moved to other mili tary structures of th e State . So, we o rLen meet forrner co ll eagues also among the frontier guards . Therefore, we ca n say that ours is not a ,vorking re lalion only. 83

Forces" will be a fact by the end of 2005. At the moment, the comple tion of th e Armed Fo rces takes place o n the basis of a mixed principle, wh ich envi s age s bo th consc ription and on -contract service. The number of on -contract personnel is now a bout 30% of the tota l force. In th is phase, the mos t appro priate s o lution is th e dev elopmen t o f t h e p re se n t co m plet ion syste m (the mixed one), with a successive trans ition to a professional Army with longterm contracts. In th e in it ial pha se, t he professio nal soldiers are used lo c omp le te the units whic h employ the most sophisticated weapon systems. In the future, accor d in g to ex perien ce a nd experi ments , as w ell as to fe a sibility studies , most Army Above. A T 80U D tank employ ed by the

Land Troops. Right. A Ukrai 1Zian serviceman during the peace-mission in Bosnia.

The Armies' professionalization favour s the creation of a new space for the deve lopment of a military structure in Euro pe: there is the on-contract military senrice, and at the same time the number of conscripts is decreasing. How is this problem tackled in Ukraine? Th ere is n o dou b t that everything mu s t be don e by profe s s io nals. The higher t he profes s io nal tra rnrng, the stronger the Ar m y. This fac tor has a r e markabl e influ en ce on the military structure and its optimization, not only in Europe but all over the world. I n th e years fo llowin g o ur in depende nce, our obj ectives wece re formed, in the direc tion of a be tte r fun ctional struct ure,

and the foundations were laid d ow n for Armed Forces c o rresponding Lo th e requirements of today. The realization of the o bjectives listed in the "Na tional P r og ramm e of Trai l1 ing and D eve lopm en t of t h e Arme d

Units will be manned by on contrac L personn e l. By th e end of 2005 , the Ar med For c es s hould ha v e ad opted t h e contra c tual syste m. It is a lo ng a nd di fricu lt process, hu L the majority of our c it izens is in fa vo ur or the cha nge.

-AJA "Strila JO" missile vehicle.

As a consequence of the . qualified - and relatively cheap disintegration of the Soviet labour force. Union, Ukraine has inherited a Besides, the defence industry strong defence industry. What has kept, and is develop ing, some is its present situation? sectors ,vhose products meet the international requirements. For With the end of the Soviet exarnple, the missile and satellite Union, Ukraine inherited about sector and the construction of one third of its defence industry: transport and military aircraft. 700 firms and 139 researchorganizations and groups, which deal exclusively with military productions. But our Country does not need such a large industry. The government, therefore, decided Lo convert .some of the plants. Today, with a skillful reform based on the scientific and tech11ical productive polential, it is st i II possible to organize a world-level competitive production. The elements of the reform were: the high level of the scienLi[ic knowledge, both fundamental and applied; scientific research and designing in the sector of weapon construction and military technique; high technology, both defence-oriented and dual; highly

Furthermore the T-80 UD and T84 tanks successfully compete on the internationa l market. Our Country is a world leader in the production of navigation systems, selr-align ing l1eads Cor surface-toair missiles, radio-technical control stations, anillery audiometric systems, sophisticated management systems, radio relays, radiotechnical and rndioelectrnnic warfare equipment, aircraft and missile alignment systems. The electronic and optical sectors are also well developed. In conclusion, I believe that at this moment our industry is capable of producing most modern and technical armaments, either autonomously or in cooperation with our partners. The existence of a powerful repair-base for the 1-enewal of the main types of weapons, together with a high military techniqu e, enables us not only to be well prepared, but also to carry out a thorough modernization.

D 1 '

.Journalist

by Enrico Magnani *

The Finnish Army is engaged in several peacekeeping operations, but its primary duty is to defend the national territory. Therefore, it is structured and organized to operate in the difficult arctic environment. In the following interview, Major General Ilkka Eemeli Kyla Harakka, Army Chief of Staff, discusses with us these and other subjects. General, could you summarize, for the readers of "Rivista Militare", the present situation of the Finnish Army and its future prospects?

The Finnish Armed Forces are oriented towards territorial defence, and their organizaUon takes many elements into account: geopolitical position, war experience, extension of the national territory, political support and, above all, availability of funds . The main objective of our defenc e is to ma.intain the control of the strategically important areas and, by taking advantage of the size of our territory, delay and wear out the aggressor in order to defeat him, with superior forces, at a place of our c hoice. For geographic and practical reasons, the Army has a primary responsibility for this kind of defence. The Army's strength amounts to about 380,000 men, i.e. 75% of the total manpower of the Armed Forces (500,000). The bulk of the Army is formed at the moment of mobilization, and is armed and equipped with materials stored in various parts of the Country. In peacetime its units work mostly as training centres, but are always ready to become operational on mobilization. The operational forces consist of two armoure d Brigades, three reinforced "J aeger" Brigades

Training wilh snow tracked-vehicles.

wilh some of its compon ents, has already participate d in operations in Kosovo. Could the creation of rapidreaction Units, the new doctrine of employment and the acquisition of last-generation weapon systems be seen as a Revolution in MiJitary Affairs (RMA) within the Finnish Anny?

(rapidly deployable, also called "2005" Brigades) and six "Jaeger" Brigades. Local defence is ensured by eleven light-infantry, defensivetype Brigades, and by a number of smaller units (battalions and "ranger" compani es) . On the whole, 路we have twenty- two Brigades. The Army is divided into several Branches whose units can organically belong to the Brigades or put together according to need. The Branches are: Infantry (which indudes the armoured troops), Field and A/A Artillery, Engineers, Communications and Logistics. After the Cold War many western Armies started important restructuring programmes, in order to adjust their organization to the changed politico -strategic international scenario. What measures have been taken by the Finnish Army in order to face the new challenges?

Our defen sive plans against a possible attack have been studied on the basis of three assumptions. The first takes into consideration pressures and threa ts with a limited use of force. The second considers a strategic attack by surpris e, a imed at paralyzing and occupying the

strategic objectives, subjugating the Country's political leadership. In the third case, our plans imagine a large-scale offensive, with the intention of occupying strategic areas or using our territory as a base against other Countries . The firsL two assumptions are the most likely, bul the third one cannot be ruled out. Therefore, keeping in mind that we must defend the whole of our territory, we must have a strong and numerous Army. This reflects on Commands and Forces, as well as on the principle of路general conscription. Despite all this, by 2008 the total strength of our Armed Forces will go down from 540,000 to 430,000. Most reductions will take place within the Army. This is why the number of our Brigades went clown from 27 to 22 . Fo r路 the moment, this must be considerd the lo\-vest limit. Considering the possib le materialization of unforeseeable threats, we are also working at the transforrnation of 3 Brigades into ready-deployment Units, capable of facing any kind of situation. Furthermore, we are improving our capabilities in crisis management within the international commitments and equipping and training a readyem pl oym en t Brigade which,

Finland is a small nation and, with its limited resources, cannot make any revolution in its Armed Forces, particularly if we consider the size of Lhe Army. Therefore we must rely on long-term planning, not necessarily aiming at "the best", but rather at the "good enough". The development of our Brigades did not start from nil: we have had an increase in firepowcr, mobility and protect ion of the existing Units. This, on the other hand, does not have a negative influence on the value of the other troops to be employed in the special conditions of terrain and climate of our Country. In short, those who want everything could very likely end up with nothing. This is a dilemma which does not concern the small countries alone. It 路wotdd be wrong to appraise Fin.land's military capabilit ies considering only its Army. Air Defence is a very important element, and the Finnish Air Force is probably one of the most modern in Europe. The Navy is welJ suited to the requirements of the Country. Our defensive capabili ty results from the collective wor k of the three Services, and must be evaluated as a whole. What are the most important programmes recently completed or about to be realized by the Army?

As I said, the cornerstone of tbc Army's development is the

strengthening of the three rapidreaction Brigades. The relative programmes are hinged on firepower, mobility and survivability of the units. Âˇon this basis, we are acquiring "smart" munitions, AMOS mortars, APC (PASJ) platforms and IFV CV-90s, and testing rned i um -range air defence systems. The infantry units have been provided with Finnish -made night -vision equipment, "SP IKE" antitank missiles, field radios and a UAV system have been acquired. Other prngrammes under way envisage the improvement of our C4TS sys tems . The "Nordic Support Helicopter Programme" (NSHP) falls within this picture. A final decision on this programme will be made next summer, with the probable acquisition of fifteen or twenty helicopters. To offset the reduction in the number of armoured Brigades, we think of acquiring a certain number of combat helicopters. A political debate is now in progress and a decision is expected soon. The structure of the Armed Forces is based on a relatively small number of professionals and an important component of

conscripts and reserves. Considering the general European trend towards fully professional forces, what is the attitude of the Finnish Government?

Conscription is essential for our defence. Each year about 27,000 elements (including a number of women volunteers) cany out their military duty. This is equal to 80% of the total male yield of each aru,ual contingent. The operational efficiency is assured through refresher courses held every five years for the most important jobs with a yearly attendance of approximately 30,000 servicemen. In this way we achieve the result of having the necessary high number of reservists at a reasonable cost. The conscription Army is highly regarded, due to our history and our war experience. Finland is a very large Country with a relatively small population, and can meet its military requirernents only in the way I have just described. It ,.vould be impossible lo defend ourselves only with professional forces. The Air Force and the Navy include a good number of professionals. As a matter of fact, as I said, there is not a single policy: we must decide what is best on the basis of resources and needs. Finland must be defended by the Finns. We have no obligations outside our borders, nor any guarante e of external aid in case of need. We must defend ourselves on land, in the sky and at sea, and can keep a credible force only with general conscription. Âˇ Finland has a vast and long experience in peacekeeping operations under the UN aegis,

Above. A Finnish infantryman !raining in snowy environmenl.

<1.

Left. 1\n infantryman training in a [ores/ area.

and participates in NATO-led multinational Forces in exYugoslavia. What lessons have been learned from these missions? \Ne have learned very useful lessons from the peacekeeping UN missions and our recent engagements in IFOR, SFOR and KFOR. Th e constitution of multinational forces offers to Countries like Finland, which don't belong to military alliances, the opportunity of participating in crisis-management operations, At present we have an infantry battalion in Lebanon, a mechanized battalion in Kosovo, a CIMIC company in Bosnia, and several groups of observers in different places. In the future our Armed Forces will be capable of undertaking greater responsibilities in crisis management. To this encl, in 1996 \Ne started the training of rapid deployment forces, in order to set up an operational unit to be employed in case of international crises. Its first elements are now \.Vorking with KFOR. In Bosnia and Kosovo we have seen that the problems caused by the differences in language an culture, as well as those der iving from different n:rnterials and procedures, can be overcome. It became also clear

ally. We slick to a uedib lc national defence on our own . In December 1999, in Helsinki, the European Council made an important step forward towards the institution of a European defence-architecture. What will be Finland's contribution to this structure?

Based on our population, th e Finnish share in a European Force could consist of about 800 men , i.e. the strength or our battalion in

Above.

Gunners in a training range.

Right. An AivlOS armoured car armed wilh a two-barrel gun. Facing page. An. arrnoured personal carrier and

som.e srnall warships.

that, by employing its men and e quipment in Peacek eep ing Operations, Finland not only does not lose anything but, on the contrary, its troops acquire a h igher value [or the defence of the Nation. What is Finland's evaluation and perception of the Partnership for Peace Prob>ramme?

We believe that Partnership for Peace is a very important programme. PARP (Planning And Revis.ion Programme) is a very effective guide for th,e forces earmarked for employment in crisis management operations. The participation in ptp improves our capability of rnilitary cooperation, strengthens our international status and enhances our operational readiness, ln PrP, Finland makes its technical know -how available to other· Countries and NATO, and participates in many seminars, 90

exercises, studies and working groups. Are there still good reasons to remain neutral, after the changes occurred on the politico-strategic international scene?

"Neutral" is not the right word. After· joining the European Union and the participation in many Peace Support operations, Finland can say that it is not neutral, but only against ,var and in favour of peace. \Ve belong to the Western community and share its work and hopes. And this has been trueror a long tirne. Probably your question refers to the possibility of our Country joining NATO. We are essential component of the Western community, but not a military

KFOR: this \Nill be better specified during the actual subdivision of the forces ·with in the EU . In practice, Finland's part icipation wil l be proportionate to our contribution Lo the UN and lo ?fP. This means, I believe, about 1500 men, I am sure that Finland will be ea pab le of f u .lfilling its obligations, Also the Nordic Cooperation is very important for u s . At present, it aims mostly at crisis rnanagemen 1., and I hope we sha ll be able to contribute a self-sufficient Brigade within "Nord ic Frame". Finland shares a very long border line with Russia. Does the Army cooperate \Nith the police forces and the Frontier Guard in order to keep safe and stable this

give a definitive answer. Those systems will probably be partially replaced by combat helicopters, at least at Brigade and Corps level. The results of the relevant studies will be known by the end of 2010. Your Army has a great tradition about operations on snowy and marshy terrain, with relatively small and highly trained units. What is the present situation and what is the future outlook for those special and elite forces?

border? Do you think this task, albeit not strictly military, could be one of the future missions of the Armed Forces?

The Police and the Frontier Guard a.re subo 1Âˇdinate to the Ministry of the In Leri or. In wartime, the Frontier Guardsmen can be incorporated within the Armed Forces . Cooperali.on between the Army and these organiz.aLions is constant, but in peacetime we work under differenL commands and w i Lh different tasks. As a matter of facl the Arn1y has a decidedly military role, even though it can carry out different Lypes of missions if necessary. What is the weight of the armoured and mechanized forces in your Army? The Finnish territory is full of forests and lakes: what role do armoured combat and transport vehicJes have in this kind of environment?

The armoured and mechanized forces cont inue to have an important role in Lhe Army and are the spearhead of our defence. In particular, as regards the mechan i1.ed troops, I have already mentioned the "2005" Brigades. As regards the second part of the question, it is still too early to

\Ne don't regard our arctic troops as "special forces", but only troops tra ined and equipped for operations in their normal environment. They can fight in the adverse conditions of weather and terrain which are typical of the whole Finnish territory.

In difficult scenarios like the northern one, logistics plays a fundamental role in guaranteeing a constant flow .o f supplies to the units. How '\\ill the new trends, such as extreme mobility in operations and growing sophistication of the systems, influence the logistic doctrine?

As a m.atter of fact, in the Arctic region logistics is mNe difficult than in other areas. Therefore our support units and the \.vhole logistic chain are trained and equipped for operations in Lapland and other difficult regions of our Country. I can say that the Finnish Arrny has an excellent logistic organization, capable of operating in all situations. D ~, .fournalist

Major General Ilkka Eemeli Kyla-Harakka was born in Loimaa on January 21, 1946. From 1966 to 1969 he attended the Military Academy, and after his commission was assigned to the Pohjanmaa Artille:pr Regiment. From 1974 to 1979 he attended the Artillery School and the War College and later served, until 1989, at the Army General Command. Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, he was appointed Director of the University Section of the Artillery School and of the Training Section fo the General Command. In 1992, with the rank of Colonel, he was appointed Principal Secretary of the Defence Council,and held this position until 1994, when, with the same rank, he assumed the command of a Brigade. Promoted to Brigadier General in 1998, he held - in that order - the positions of Chief of Staff, Western Command and Chief, War Materials, at the Defence General Staff. In. 2001 he has been appointed Chief of Staff of the Army. Maj.Gen. Ilkka Eemeli Kyla-Harakka is married and has two sons. 91

SWEDEN SWEDE N' is a constitutional monarchy with a unicameral Parliament. During the XVll centt1ry, Swede n succeeded in expanding its Le1Titories, Lhanks to its expansion isL policy towards the Baltic region; in the follo\.vi ng centmy, however, this trend came Lo an encl, as the Swedish territorial area was substantially reduced. In Lhe XIX centmy the counLry fought against Napoleon and Denmark, from which it took Norway in 1814; from then onward, Sweden has constantly fo llowed a policy of peace and neulrality. Also Norway's independence was reached peacefully in 1905. During the two World Wars, Sweden succeeded in keeping a neutral stance and safeguarding iLs independence. lts 9 million inhabitams live over an area of 449,964 sq km and have a per capita income of US $26,210. The naLion has a high urbanization rate, with a large number or elderly people. Âˇwooded areas cover abouL 60% or Lhe territory, which is poor in fuel products. Nuclear plants fu lfill aboul 50% or all power requirements. The economy, which relies on high-tech sectors and metal and steel industries applying cutting edge technologies, is governed by a special type of capitalism, where profits a1-e largely distributed by the government through an efficient levy mechanism and one of the bes1 welfare systems in Lhe world. This model was supported by the social democr-atic governments which were almost uninterruptedly in power from the late'30s to 1991. However, such model, increasingly opposed since the '80s, has undergone some changes to be in line with the systems adopted by other European countries governed by conservative parties.

P.S

FINLAND flNLAND is a Parliamentary republic with a unicameral Parliament. Shortly a(tcr the Russian Bolshevik Revolution, Finland declared its independence in 1919 and extended its boundaries towards Karelia and the Nor1h, with lhe support of German troops. In 1939, a ttacked by the Soviet Union, it succeeded in defending its national sovereignty, but lost the L territories conquered arter its declaration of independence. Since that time, Finland has been - - - _J militarily neutral and maintained good neighhorly relations with the rormer Soviet Union, as well as cons1ant cooperation ties with Scandinavia n nations and Western Europe. It has a population of about 5 mill ion inhabitants. extends over an area of 338,145 sq km, and has a per capita income of US S 24,790. lts economy is mainly based on logging industries and activities. Electronics and telecommunications are other sectors of interest. The nation was severe ly hit by the economic recession in the early 90's and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since 1995, after en1ering the EU, Finland has started to recover its economy and balance its budget. Its unemployment rate, however, is still high (11 % in l 999). Over 50% of its exports are towards EU countries and almost 60% of its impo i-1s come from the same area . Finland is one or 1he eleven Euro-zone countries. Accord ing to the organization "Transparency International", this nations ranks second among the least corrupted countries.

inland , Sw e de n and Denmark , together with Norway and Tce land lo a lesser extent, allowed ELwope to no longer perce ive them as far-away countdes pursuing their particular object ives. The European region has thus been 1Âˇeshapecl as follows: a Soulhern part cenlered on lhe Mediterranean Sea, a Northern part bordering on both the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean and a wide Central area comprising France, Germ any and Eastern European Countries. These lhree areas follow different bul equally coherent policies. Th e n ew ly estab lish ed cooperation between Northern

Countries a nd Europe had immediate pos itive repercussions, especially as regards the relatio ns with Mos co w, being mainly focussed on securily issues which could not be solved bilaterally. The "Northern Dimen~ion" initi a tive, officially presented in 1997, is mainly aimed at reinforcing EU's forei g n policy in the region and its relations with Russia, in view of integrating it inlo the democralic and free rnarkel system . The ulli.mate goal is lo play down all frictions in the area and wipe out dividing lines. To this end, ad hoe policies shou ld be adopted to bridge lhe gap be t ween diffe renl life

standards, bring clown all hurdles restricting fre e trade and inveslrnents, fosl e ,- economic cooperation, stability, safely and human rights, as well as dem ocracy and th e rule or law. Th e "Northern Dimen s ion" indudes national security issues as well. As stated in a document drawn up in 1999 by the Comrnittee for Fo re ign Affairs, Security and Defense Policies of the EU Parliament, "this concept has a very wide scope, which goes beyond military affairs only". The initiative takes into account issues such as narurnl resources, environment, contro l of boundary lines, development of lransporl

Finland. A view of Hels inki and its Cathedral.

and enhancement or 'energy infrastructu re. Due attention is also paid to the fight against organized crime , immigration and political asylum, coopernLion in scienti fie research and health sectors, development of human resources and educational systems, protection at work and measures to g ive cilizens an increas ingly \Vider say. In Finland, the Northern Dimension is largely supported by the press rnedia and mildly accepted by opposition parries. Positive reactions are recorded in other Northern countries as well, although with some 1Âˇeservations. A debate is still going on as regards the geographic extension. of the area. ln Finland's view, it comp.rises the five Northern nations, the Ba.ltic countries, Russ ia's North-\,Vest area with Lhe Kaliningrad exc.lave, Poland, Germany - Belarus and Northern Scotland included . To underline the ir A Llantic allegiance, Lhe Finns stress the irnportance of strengLhening their cooperation with the USA and Canada; in fact, these two countries arc ve17 active in Northern Europe at dip lomatic level. Helsinki no longer fears being auacked by Moscow, but still sees it as a

threat, in particular as regards its relaLions \.vith the Baltic countries. Therefore , the cornerstones of Finland ro reign policy arc the development of the EU -Russia relations on the one hand, an d EU enlargement, to include Baltic states, on the other. Since the end or the cold war, Denmark has shifted from a

marginal to a more central. role, vvithin the EU political scenario. It has therefore become more proactive and has taken part in rnany bilateral and multilateral projects. The Norlhern Dimension is not ahvays at the centre o( the debates on the EU and the interests o( Baltic Sea countries. Tn fact. many organi 1.ations and companies, b oth private and public, have a l ready sel up a coopcrntion network, similar to that envisaged by the Finns. Copenhagen seems mainly engaged in enhancing the relations between Russia and the West. It does not perceive .Moscow as a threat, as Lhese two countries have never been enemies, given their historÂˇical friendship ties. From the Swedish point or view. the No rÂˇthern Dimension, previously limited to five

Sw ed en . A pauiol view of' th e Stockhollll archipelago.

DENMARK

DENMARK is a constiLutional monarchy with a unicameral Parliament, which appoints a Committee for commercial affairs, to supervise EU-related governmental acLivities. This Committee is the only one in Emope to issue mandatory instructions to Danish ministers, in the perfornmnce of their funcLions within the EU Council. Dcmnark has a population of over 5 million inhabitants, an area of 43,095 sq km, a per capita income of US $34,890. It entered the EU in 1973 and became immediately aware of the importance of t11e Community as an outlet for its agricultural produce. In 1993, Denmark signed the l'v1aastricht Treaty, only after introducing some opt-ouL clauses, allowing it to back out from the Monetary and Economic Union and from other more advances integration initiatives. Jn fact, thanks to this opt-out option, in 2000 it refused to enter Lhe "Euro-zone", following an ad hoe referendum. Danish mistrustful feelings towards Europe stem from an ancestral fear of the Gennans and the awareness of the superiority of the Danish way of life. In fact, the country cannot forget thal in 1864 it had to give up the most ferti le part of its territory, amounting lo 1/3 of its homeland, to Prussia, and that it was invaded by the Nazis dwing \Nodd War II. In Denmark, there is an efficient welfare system, a dose cooperation among executive, legislative and judiciary powers, and a habit of carrying out crystal-dear affairs, vvllich make this cotmtry one of the least c01n1pted nations in the world, according to the organization "Transparency International".

NORWAY

NORWAY is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral Parliament. It is not a EU member, as this option was rejected by two referendums, held in 1972 and 1994. Norway's history was first connected with that of the Vikings, and then with the events which took place in Denmark and Sweden. These nations established several political partnerships with Norway, which almost always played a subordinate role. 1n the XIX century, a national cultural renaissance took place, allowing the country to definitively reach an independent status, together with a high level of democracy and welfare, in the XX Centmy. A population of about 4,5 million lives over an area of 323,758 sq km and has a per capita income of US $36, I 00. The economy relies on oil resources, whose price is unfortunately linked to the ups and downs of the world markets and whose supplies are limited.

ICELAND

ICELAND is a Parliamentary republic and is not a EU member. A population of about 300,000 inhabitants (82% of whom are connected through the Internet) lives over an area of 102,819 sq km and has a per capita income o[ US$ 28,010. The country was first occupied by the Norwegians, who, in 930, established there the oldest Legislative Assembly in Europe. Then, it came under the Danish power and became independent in 1918. The economy relics on fisheries, encompassing both export and industrial activities.

_JL_

7r-

Northern countries only, presently encompasses new cooperation initiatives with the Baltic region, the Bm-ents Sea included. The Swedish government is convinced that the area should not be considered as sealed off and adopt isolated initiaLives. In fact, security, an issue not to be dealt separately in Eurnpe, is to be reinforced everywhere. Under this perspective, Stockholm is convinced that putting off EU's outreach to the East would be dangerous, fully subscribes to the

socio-economic initiatives suggested by the Northern Dimension and ceinstates the need for trans(e1Ting both knowhow and resources to former Warsmv Pact countries, the Baltic nations especially. This area is likely to become one of the most developed regions in Europe, for the following reasons: lack of conflicts, wide range of initiatives jointly taken by international a nd supranational organizations and a growth rate which has been on

the increase since the encl of the Cold War. Russia is the focal point of both EU and Northern Dimension policies. In fact, it is a nation which need to be constantly updated on the progress of all initiatives, reassured that its interests are not under threat and urged to establish new relations and cooperation initiatives. Mosco\-\', however, considers the countries which share its borders or are pivotal to the control of the Baltic region as being more

strategically in:iportant than the \Nhole Northern area. Th is is why Russia does not fully endorse the concept of a Northern "bloc", as well as that of a Europe extended as far as its borders. On the contrary, the establishment of such a wide area is strongly supported by George W. Bush, who fos ters lhe idea of an enlarged EU under the NATO urnbrÂˇclla, encompassing Russia as well. This approach is also based on the fact that the EU is setting up a Rapid Reaction Army of its own (60,000 men), separable but not separate fTom NATO. The EU has pledged to enlarge lo alrnost all former USSR European countries, includ ing Poland, which is very close to the USA. Above. Finland. The Uspenski Cath edral in Helsinki.

Left. Denmark . Early Copenhagen.

morning

An issue of great concern is lhe setting up of a new missile clcfense system, considering that Iceland shou ld hosl one of its main connection centres. This system - initially designed to counter the so-called rogue countries, in order to avoid destroying the whole world , in the case one of them should use atomic warhead missiles - is opposed by lhe Northern stales. In fact, they evaluate th is risk as far-fetched and, in line with their past history, fear the resumption of an arms race. The Northern d iplomacy has always made every effort to play down all tensions, enforce human rights, promote dialogue and find compromise solutions. Olaf Palme and Ham marskjold, both UN Secretary generals and Swedi s h, were m u rdered beca use they believed in this policy.

"'.lo urnalis i, Contributor to "La Stampa"

uter space is an unquestionably important strategic secto r- for the economy and the sustainable development of society, where the mosl advanced and innovative technologies are experimented and applied; it is an infinite and precious resource, where international competition is measured and developed.

A compet1t1on based on the excellence of products and services (in terms of cost, easy operation and flexibi li ty) , on tl1e high specia.lization of technology and products, on the plurnlity of investors and on the interest of Lhe financ ial markets for- the enterprises operating in space .

THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF SPACE FOR DEFENCE The strategic consequence of space is even more evident when it comes to Defence. The experience made in the Gu lf, at the bcgi n ning of the '90s has shown , probably for the fi r-st time, that the space component

is essential in the conduct of land, naval and air operations, as well as in the politico-strategic management of a cris.is. On that occasion, satellites turned out to be dec isive not only for longdistance communications with the horne Country, but in the field as well; for reconnaissance, both e lectronic and visual, which

was necessary, among other things, for the effective application of precision fire from d istant air and naval platforms; for meteorology and cartography; for early warning about air/land operations and missile attacks; for positioning of land, air and naval units in practically unknmvn areas.

In the military employment of satellites for military purposes, the critical part is not represented so nlllch by the sate ll ite-p latfor ms themselves, but rather by their segments on the ground, the decoding of signals Crom space, their tirnely diffusion to the users and their integrat ion w ith the other information originating from land and air sensors. In other words, a satellite cannot guarantee, by itself, the efficacy and efficiency of a rnilitary mission, but must be integrated with an adequate segment on the ground . This is even more essential in open.11.ions conducted far from the national territory, where the re is no infrastructure on the ground and cartographic supports are not available. Therefore, artificial satellites, with their manifold uses in more and more different missions, are a very important resource for a ne\v military policy o[ de(ence and security. Satellites p erm it Lo de territorialize the observation and telecommunication means, ,vhich is a fundamental aspect, particularly 'vvben , in the area, there is no land infrastructure and territorial control (as in the Gulf War). Satellites therefore become primary instruments for the management of crises, for the command -and-Control systems of the inte rve n Lion forces, for the verifications of the accords for arms reduction and strategic stability, as Âˇwell as for the function of politico-strategic intelligence. Furthermore, they facilitate the preposi tioning and operation of telecommunication and sensing systems witho u t sovereignty problems \vith other countries. Bes ides , t hey are the onl y means capable o[ performing certain tasks, such as, for instance, early warning about enemy missiles, or support functions like meteorology, cartography, positioning and navigation.

The que s tion of th e use of space by Lhe Italian Armed Forces in ord er to effe cti vely meet the security requirements o[ our Country, was posed for the first time in the early '90s, when Lh e New Defence ivlo de l (prepared in 1991 and updated in 1993 and 1995) started to take shape. Among the various missions of Lhe Armed Forces, rene vved and reorga n ized according to the tasks emerging Crom the nevv politico-strategic international s i t ua tion , t he observation and control mission stood out a rnong a ll others, since it was necessary to control th e implementaLion of the d isarmament and cooperat ion treaties (reduction of weapon syste rn s , ascertainment of t h e absence of threats, ver.ification of removal and destruction of chemical arsenals, control of the downsi7,i ng to a half of strategic nuclear weapons) . At t he same t im e, the observation of the Earth from space was made indispensable by Lhe constitution of the civilprotection and environm ent security services (Law 225/1992) , w hich env isaged a functional coordin ation among the pub lic administrations entrusted with sectoria l respo nsibi liti es (sea, land and protected areas' defence). The Defence organization, with a remarka bl e planning and program min g effort, devised a Mi Ii Lary Spac e P lan w hich , already in the early '90s, envisaged a set of programmes, with particular reference to rernote sensing and telecommuni ca lions, capable of meeLing the various operational requirem ents. Suffice it to mention Helios I, an optical satelli te whose operational life will encl in 20032004. The "pos t-Helios" is now in th e finishing phase. Another satellite is STCRAL (Italian Satell i te for Classif ie d Communica tion and Wa rning), 100

pu t into orbit last February 8. We shall discuss it in detail later in this article. T he Military Space Plan, although representing a remarkable rationalization effort of the mi! i ta ry space sector, presented some weak points, which even today, ten years after i ts e laboration , have not been completely overcome. Essentially the Plan's critical aspects were: insufficient financi al resources for space (1 % of the Defence budget, equal to about 200 billion ITL a year, compared to France's 7 00 billion); sca r ce integration among the various Services, w hich, in case o f budget red u c lions, pe nal iz ed precisely the joint progrnmmes s uch as the space ones , not adequately supported by the contractual "w eight '' of the individual Se rvi ce S taffs ; the absence of .institutional coordination of the users, despit e the evident interde pendence b e tween th e spa c ecraft and their land segments, which can meet both ci v ilian and military requirements; poor evaluation of the use o f sate l li t es in anti m iss il e cle fence, early warning included. After mo re than ten years , some of those weak points have been e li m i nate d. The muchwanted reform of the H igh Rank s , confirmed by La w 25/1997, res tructured lhe command and decision-making chain, and tri e d t o overcome the fragmen tation of responsibilities, emp has iz ing the joint character of th e military instrument, made rnore and more indispensable by the present strategic and operational scenarios. The S I CRAL sa t e l I i te teleco mmuni calion system will b e fully operational short ly, and is a concrete exam ple of realization of a "joint" program m e, capable of meeting the requirements o f

the national Armed F orces as a whole. SICRAL

I t is essential to ha ve telecommunications capable of covering lhe reference o p erational scenario and of integrating the traditional systems, in order to permit bidirectional connections between comrnands and central organizations, as wel l as with the operational assets in any area of operations. SICRA L , a military te lecommunication sateJl i te , launche d from the Kourou (French Guyana) space station on February 8 with the Ariane IV carrier, has given th e A,-med Forces the possibility of making a fundamental leap forward in the telecommunication sector. In fact , the system guarantees th e transformation of military telecommunications - a comp lex and c r ucial element of Command and Control - from a traditional organization aimed at supporting the operational units in a static context within the naliona l borders, to a modern instrument, opernting in very larg e geogra p hical theatres where flex ibility, r eact io n , organ i 1.ati on , transmission speed , survivability and h igb i nternperabi.lity are essential. The realization of SlCRAL was an i rn port ant challenge for Defence and the nat ionaJ industry, bo th from the technological and the planning po int of view. As a matter of fact, it r epresents the first fully Italian experience of defence-industry collaboration for the realization of a highly s ophisticate d tool capable of providing our Armed Forces wit h an extremely advanced t elecomm u n ication system. Furthermol'e, SJCRAL is the first example of a turnkey closed

•

• The satellite in the anechoic chamber,

for compatibility, transm.ission and reception tests.

con lract. It included all the components (satellite, terminals, contrnl centre) produced for Defence by the national industry, within the SlTAB Consortium. The programm e starte d in 1980, with the approval of Lhe

research and development project by the Chiefs of Staff. In 1995 a turnkey contract for the complete system was signed with the SITAB Consortium (Alenia Spaz.io, Fial Avio and Telespazio). An additional documenl, signed in 1998 -1 999, envisaged the acqu isition of a second satellite (SICRAL 2) which, in view of the successful launching of

SICRAL 1, will be employed w ith a differen t payload, to meet further r·equirements of Defence and other Government administrations, including so me civilian ones . The addicLional act, furthermore, envi s ages: the study of the requirements for a GBS (Global Broadcasting System) in the second vehicle; the improvement of Lhe system's 101

SHF and El-JF ground antennas.

interoperability with Lhe NATO forces (in particular US, France and the United Kingdom); the acquisition of a telemetric station in S-band as a back up, to be installed at the Fuc ino (Telespazio) Space Centre, in order to improve the survivability of the system. The tota l amount of the contract , including the additional deed, is approximately 900 billion ITL.

THE SYSTEM'S FRAMEWORK The SICRAL satellite-system consists of a space segment and a land segment. The former is a 2500 k geostationary satellite, at an altitude of 36,000 km on the vertical of the Congo (16.2° East) . The satellite's plaLform is similar to Itals al's, with a payload of about 4 50 k; its transponders operate on EHF, SI-IF and UHF bands, and ensure an optimal coverage of the areas of interest (national territory, Europe, North Africa, Middle 102

East as far as the Persian Gu][) . Besides, a mobile spot-antenna, mechanically adjustable, ensures the coverage of a circular/elliptic area with a diam eter of about 2500 km in any part of the vis ibl e em isphere. With these characteristics, SICRA L can connect fixed and mobile users which could not be reached otherwise, both within the national territory and outside, establishing real communication neLs which, albeit completely autonomous, are ahvays under national control. Furthermore, another· orbit is envisaged for SJCRAL 2, which could also meet mixed requirements, i.e. military and civilian ones. The land segment consists of a managernent/control Centre of saLellite communications and a number of terminals (over 100 at present) assigned lo the Army, Air Force and Navy. The management/control Centre, located at Vigna di Valle (Bracciano) is the heart of the system, and gives the Ital.i an Armed Forces a full operational autonomy in the uli.lizalion and management of resources . Vigna di Valle, in fact, controls missions,

satellites and networks. T he Centre receives, through the Defence General Staff, the requests for the satellite connections necessary for supporting th e Armed Forces' operational activities. Then , st il.l based on DGS directives, and accor·ding to predefined p r· iori ties, the available resources are allotted to the users. Finally, the Vigna di Valle Centre monitors and manages the orbiting satellites. The termi nals adopted for SICRAL are of differenL types: fixed, transportable, vehicular, avionic and naval. This permits the optimal use of the satellite resources. One of the system's most significant characteristics is its capability of adapting the avai Iable resources Lo the needs of th e moment. The satellite's payload and t erm inals can therefore be adjusted according to tl1e type and number of connections required and to the different geographic areas. The t e lecommunication services provided by the systen1 are: voice, data transmission and slow video, while there ar·e three types of telecommunication networ·ks for specific requirements.

The FD MS-PAM.A (Frequency Division Multiple Access - P re Assigned M ul Lipl e Acc ess) network can provide a permanet connection belween lwo user areas (e.g. national and ou t-ofarea) by b u ndl i ng cl i r(eren t cornrnu nications on a single satellite-carTier wave . Each or the l,vo user-areas depends on a fixed or transportable station (SHF or El TF). The SCPC -DAMA (Singl e Channel Per Carrier - De.rnand Ass ignment Multiple Access) network provides a connect ion be tv.,ee n individual users through the sale lliLe transm ission/reception of a carrier-wave assigned upon request. Each user can have a terminal, either on his own or in common w i th others (SHF or EHF). The TDMA - DAMA (Time D i v is ion Multi p le Access Demand Assignmenl Mult i p le Access) network provides a connection between individual mob il e us ers and a fixed net, Lhrough the time -d i vision access to a saLeJlite-carrier wave assigned on request . The mobile user has an assigned terrninal (UHF) and the fixed net depends on a fi xe d or

trans portable station (SHF or EHF).

The STCRAL sa.lelliLe in c1 ~eostaliunwy orhit.

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

and some ground in stallations, Furthermore, it constructed the moto rs for the separat ion of th e stages o[ ll1e Ariane IV, which put the satellite into orbit. Final ly, Telespaz.io, with a 10% participation, is e nt rus ted with four funct ions, crucial for the Centre's full operation: controlling the salell ile, monitori ng/checking telecommunication nets, controlling possib le rndioe leclric interferences on the frequency bands, protecting channe ls and opti rn i /.ing land and sa te lli te assets . Extreme ly i mponan L, funhermore, was the role of Telespazio through its Fucino space centre , du ring LE OP (Launch and Ear l y Orbit Phas e ), the critical ran ge of command-and-control phases w h ich goes r,Âˇom th e release or the satellite by the launc her to the mornent of it s final a nd correct position into orbit.

As we mentioned, the SICRAL system was realized by t.h e S ITA B industrial consortium, formed b y the main national industries or t.he space sector. A.Zenia Spazio, the consorti u n,'s ma in contractor, with its 70% participation, coordinated lhe activ i ty of abou l l 50 firms engaged in the programme. It took care of lhe planning, realization and integration of the salel li le and its components (platform , payload , antennas) as wel l as o f t he telecommunicalions wi th Lb e radio stations of the mission 's and the saLe.llite's control Centres . Finally, being responsib le for the syste.rn as a whole , A.Zenia Spazio, through the Vigna di Valle management and control Centre, plans and manages al l satellite connections according to the requirements or the va r ious users. Fial Avio , whose p arti cipation is 20%, is responsib le for Lhe launching serv ice, lhe propelling system

SICRAL FOR THE ARMY We have already underlined the strategic importance, for the 103

Armed Forces as a whole, of an autonomous cornmun icat ions system. flexible and reliable , capable of assuring long-d istance connections. These characteristics are even more important for a Force such as the Army, which is continuously and directly e ngaged in operations outside the national borders, often in isolated and irnpervious areas, where satellite communications are very effective and efficient. Therefore SICRAL offers, to the Army in particular, a great opportunity for the fina l overcom ing of the land communication systems, which are particularly burd ensome as regards number of sets and personnel. SICRl\l.'.s services will permit the Army to carry out more effectively the numerous out-of-area missions ass igned lo our Service. In particular, the contingents deployed in th e Balkans with NATO , the UN or any other supernational or regiona l organization, will be better connected among themselves and with the mother country. Furthermore, the high level of integration \Vith similar systems wi ll permit to establish new 104

forces, suitably equipped, within the future European defenc e structures, as well as to develop training activities outside the national territory. SICRAL can also he employed within our borders by units on training or engaged in non strictly military operations (public order, civil protection), and Lo make up for possible failures in the landcommunication system .

POSSIBLE CIVILIAN USES OF SICRAL T he possible civilian applications of the system deserve a special mention. SICRAL came into being as a m ilitary system , to meet special requirements of Defence. However, its importance for the entire Country must be underlined, since financial resources, operational knovv-hm.v and administrative assets have been put to use for its realization, together with remarkable industrial resources, This led to seriously consider involving other b odies and institutions, in order to study

possible enlargements of th e system, capable of meeting further requirements, such as public order, ci vi l defence, navigation and telemedicine. In civil defence, for instance, the satellite platforn1 can be employed for emergency connections with rescue teams in case of disasters; it can contribute to the implementation of rnonitori ng nets (in floods, landslides, sismic phenomena, volcanic eruptions), gathering and distributing data; it can ensure the access to data banks and the diffusion of information on the territory. Furthermore , the system can perfom precision-location services. ln fact, the data of the national network can be broadcast in order to improve the GPS system's performance in a given area. This service can be applied in support of the management of land, naval and air units, through the location and positioning of assets and personne l equi pp ed with commercial GPS systems, to be used i n cases where the employment of military GPS receivers is not possible or necessary. SICRA L can also support the activities of cartograph ic survey. As regards the integrated services, the system can e nsure the remote management of logist ics, through the integration of the satellite communications m e ans; it can guarantee the remote control of vehicles transporting dangerous materials, and manage possible alarm situations; it can support the planning of interventions and terTitorial control , making use if its possibility of interconnection with the different data bases of the various Administrations (Police, Foresters Corps) sharing geographic, environmenta l and territorial information . Other a p plications are also possible in telemedicine, through the remote management o f normal prophylaxis and

Facing page and right. Details of the satellite in the anechoic chamber.

diagnosis activities, as well as medical emergencies. The system can also facilitate the diffusion of medical inforrnation, also in case of emergency operations, making remote diagnoses possible, thanks to the transmission of data and images. Finally, SICRAL could support the operations of drones, which a r e very effective in situations, both military and civilian, where the employment of other systems (piloted aircraft, satellites) is economically inconvenient , too dangerous or impossible. The need lo operate also outside the national territory and in large areas makes the space element all -important, since it can guarantee the continuity of the drone's operat ion, even beyond the line of sight. Thus, the dual employment of S I CRAL does not seem impossible or unthinkable. lt is also evident lhat further, non strictly military applications, will have to be considered only with reference to SICRAL 2, since the satellite now into orbit is fully engaged in rneeti ng purely military needs. SICRAL 2 is therefore a strategically important opportunity, which should not be underestimated by the Defence administration (\vhich could use the investments in a more profitable manner, thus obtaining a more flexible and secure system, with greater transmission capabilities), by the possible civi lian users (who could avai l themselves of an al ready tested and controlled system), by the industrial system (which could put to good use, and improve, the technological, managerial and economic capabilities developed in the realization of SICRAL 1). By do i ng so, the industries

would acquire an image of high knowledge and competitiveness. Indeed, Italy as a whole should be greatly interested in the project, since its development could give the Country great prestige and a substantia l economic return. These last considerations take us back to ten years ago, for a more general comment. It was already evident, at that time, that is was necessary Lo coordinate the public demand for a system of observation of the Earth based on the application o[ space and

satellite technology. A system capable of meeting, at Lhc same time, civilian and military requirements. The institutional coordination of users could avoid duplications, activate joint financial support by different Ministries , identify priorit ies in planning and in defining the technical/operational characteristics, for the realization of "dual-use" multifunction space programmes. D

,~ Expert on industrial Relations 105

The recruits of some special units of the Israeli Army ,pledge loyalty to their Country with the words:"Masada shall not fall again". The name of this natural fortress is the symbol of the Jewish resistance against the Roman occupation and remains a precise reference to the determination of today's Israel to defend its national identity. That stronghold in the Judean desert, in 73 A.D., witnessed the tragic end of the last action of the Zealots who, unwilling to renounce their freedom, pridefully preferred to kill themselves. he stronghold of Masada, stands solitary on the southwcst of the Dead Sea, on n.1gged ground. Three narrow valleys, to the east, south and so u thwesl, isolale Lhis natural element of limited extension. To the north the gro und is equally inaccessible. The summit, shaped like a rhombus with diagonals of d i ffe rÂˇent length, is almost flat and has only two accesses, to the cast an d west; two paths thal climb the slope from the bottom of the vall eys, wind ing along rocks and gorges. The diagonal in the meridian sense measures 630 m and the one .in the equatorial sense measures 260 m . The path of the eastern side, almost a serpenline, is particularly difficult, whi le that on the western slope is very steep, especially in the stretch adjacent to the rock wall. Within one century (30 B.C. 73 A.D .) Masada experiences lhree mornents of glory. In 36 B. C., Herod the Great, King of .Ju dea, chooses this secluded and inaccessible place to build his retreat, equipping it moreover with all the conveniences worthy of a roya l r-es idence. He fears aÂˇ rebe llio1{ of his people, opposed to the friendship established betvveen the Jewish King and the Romans,

who already in 63 B.C. had made those territories tributary to Rome. The fear is further increased by the possibility that the triumvir Mark Antony may agree lo Cleopatra'a proposals to expand her sovereignty over Palestine.

Herod builds on the rock a small royal palace near the vvestern access, a villa on the northern spur~ a thermal edifice, deposits for great quantities of victuals, supJ:>lies and weapons, a ritua l bath for purifications , completing everything with the construction of a casemale wall 5.5 rn. high, on the superior edge of the rock (two walls 4 tTl. apart and including 110 rooms) and equipped with 38 towers, for a total length of 1300 m. As is kno\vn, Antony did not hand over Judea to the Egyptian Queen and Herod avoided the clanger of a revolt. As time passes the Roman yoke becomes more and more oppressive, igniting the revolL Jed mainly by the Zealots. The Romans, perfectly aware o( the tactica l importance of the sl.rongholcl, occupy it and leave a garrison there.

One side of the special medal coined by the Government of Israel.

107

Aeria l vie w of Mas ada fro m th e s ou th. The whitish spur on the wesiern slope was used by th e X Legio for the attack against the rock. In the background, the Dead Sea.

The rebellion mounts like a lidal wave in a c res cend o of episodes that culminate in th e revol t of 66 A.D .. The Zealots, with the a im of making it a place o [ resista nc e to lhe death , anni hilate the Roman garrison throu gh d eceit a nd take possession of the stronghold. The ,-eaction of General Vespasian and the operalions led by his son Titus, who puts down the Jewish resistance on lhe whole territory, destroying t he Temple of Jerusalem and ens lavin g t housand s o f Jews , are \NeJl kJ.10\Nn. Th e indomitable pride of the Zealots , r e sol u le to keep the flame of anti-Rom an resistance alive , has by n ovv only one sanctu ary : the imp reg nable fo rtress of Masada, where 960 peo pl e, including women, old men and child ren , .li ve in the hope of rekindling, also in other centres of th e Cou ntry, the de te rmination to o ppose th e foreign occupation . T h e difficu lties of ta king possession of the en tire lerritory grant some respite to the Zealots 108

of Masada who, for three years ( 70- 7 3 A.D.) 1ive und isturb ed w hil e improving the resistance capabilities of their eagle's nest with reinforcement works a nd the constructi on of a defensive apparatus. Meanwhile, Procurator Bassu s passes away a nd is succeeded by Flavius Silva who, realizing that lVlasada is the sole centre of antiRoman resistance, gathers all his forces and decides to destroy that maniple of rebels, by laying siege to the fortress commanded by Eleazar Ben Yair (1). The enterprise is not easy, owing to the higher position o f the defenders and the difficulty of the accesses to the rock . The desert natural environment and the distance of victuals and water sources make it even worse. The s iege mus l d evelop in a r ather short stretch of time, because by .June it becomes im possible to live in the region. As already me ntioned, the access to the fortress is poss ible only by proceeding along a rock spur resembling a rather narrow all uvial con e, covered w it h

detritus, developing for a bout 300 m ., to gai n an altitude of 75 m .. T he slo p e, in itially ra ther slight, becomes prohibitive - as is natu ral - in the vi cin ity o[ the point of access to the summit o f the fortress, reaching a gradient of almost 50%. Gen. Si lva's concept of action is very si mple and has n o alternatives. Considering that the whole world knows Lhat Judea w a s conqu ered a lready t h re e years before; that the rebels must be p revented from escaping, to avoid their rekindling the hope of a revive d res istance; tha t the opera tions must be concluded before the m onth of June; and, last, that the only point of access t o conquer th e p os i Lion is the western one, he decides to: â€˘ bu ild a circumvalla tion wall, with observation towers every 100 m ., a ll around the rock, for a length of 3500 m ., in order to p revent the rebel s fro m escaping; â€˘ deploy the eight camps of the Legion, after due consideration, al ong the peri meter of th e circumvallation wall , to control the ways o[ escape (2); â€˘ attack the western access to the fo rtress v,/it h a ro bus t to\,ver equipped with a battering-ram for demoli shing the casemate w all, after s oft ening t he gradie nt o f Lhe rock sp u r where the we stern p ath is climbing - by means of gravel fill ings. Th e imposing siz e of th e construction of th e siege works and the modi fic atio n of the incline of the ramp of access lea ve no doubts a bou t the fa cl that also a few thou san ds of unwill ing prisoners were forced to participate in the enterprise. The technical problem relevan t

1'vfo.p uf Afosada and its surroundings, with the position o{ the various camps a,,d the circwnvallat ion wall.

to the modification of the incline of the embankm ent doubtlessly presents some inconveniences if Silva, once the filling is completed, must order a second phase of works in order to permit the movement of those who have to transport the materials for the construction of the tower a nd the launch machines. At last an embankment 25 m .wicle is realized, taking the material from a small hill in the vicinity(3). In order to prevent the filling material from subsiding und er Lhe pressure of the load, the sides of the rock spur are reinforced with big trunks fixed into the ground (4). The Roman engineers build - at a little distance from the walls - a ,vood en tower of about 25 m., completely lined on the outside with a metal sheet, in order to avoid that the incendiary darts of the defence may damage it. The tower- is equipped with a powerful battering -ram and machines for launching darts and stones. During the construction of the tower the besieged try, again and again , to launch stones (5), employing su itable machines, but the violence of the legionaries'attack, supported by an efficient covering fire, nullifies any defensive action (6). The batteringram repeatedly hits the casemate wall and finally opens a breach. T he clefenders, neverthe less, during the night hurriedly b uild a second wall inside the crumbled one, putting together big trunks fixed deep into the ground, securing them to other trunks placed horizontally, thinking that the bau.ering-ram could not overcome the elas ticity of the construct ion . The idea is good and, for a moment, successful.

But Silva, aware of the countermeasure of the besieged, orders to carry out a dense launching of incendiary darts. The burning of the wall at the beginning turns out to be sorrowfu l for the legionaries, because the \,vind that blows from the east prevents them from exploiting the success immediately. But within a short time the vv i nd changes its direction and burns the wooden structure to ashes, preventing the defenders from taking any further countermeasure (7) . The breach is now open, but the legionaries cannot continue their work because the night is falling. Anyway, fearing escapes from the fortress, they reinforce t h e survei llance along the entire perimeter of the circumvallation wall. Historian Flavius Josephus gives the following description of that drarnaLic moment : "... Nevertheless, Eleazar Ben Yair did not think to escape for a single moment, neither would he have perm.itted anyone to try Lo get away. When he saw that the wall

they had built was collapsing in fire , having no other ivay to give a clear proof of courage, explaining to his men what the conquerors would do to them, to their children and wives, he consulted with them about the project of a collective death before the arrival of Lhe legionaries (8).Albeit after some hesitations, all are agreed and the plan is carried out. The Romans expect a coumerattack by the defenders at da,vn. After some delay, they put on their armour and throw some b1Âˇidges from the summit of the tovver towards the breach and prepare for the assault, buL, when they enter the fortress, they see no living soul. The silence is broken only by the crackling of the fires started by the defenders b efore ki llin g themselves . During the reconnaissance of the place they run into some survivors, who tell them what has happened . The legionaries are not pleased to sec the dramatic end of the Zealots; on the contrary, they are filled with deep admiration for the men 109

Recons1ructio11 of a ram-equ ipped tower: (I and!! Century A.D.) .

large n umber of fin ds - which were well preserved owing to the d esert climate o f the site, rar from inhabi ted pla ces - leaves no doubts on the ve raci ty of th e narration. The news of Masacla's fall, addressed only to the Emperor, in Rom e had no ce lebrations and there is no me ntion o f it in the annal s of the time . Coins wi lb the inscription "JUDAE A CAP TA" h ad alre ad y been circulating for three yea rÂˇs. LJ "'' Lieutenant General (rel.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Flavius Josephus, "Judaic War". Yigae l Yadin, "Masa da. Herod' s fortress and the Zealols' last stand'', Steimatzky Ed. A. Li b era ti, F . Sil ve r io, "Legio . Storia clei solclati di Roma" , Ri vista MiliLan: Ed . A.Libera ti, F . Silverio , "Vita e costume dei Romani anlichi. Organizzazione m iIiI.arc: Escrcito'' Quasar Eel.

NOTES

who, in immovab le contempt. of death, hav e chosen such a dramatic e ncl and rema in perplexed lhi nking that, ,vhile their demanding effort has been unable to make a single victim, the pride and the high se nse of

liberty of the Zealols has caused a great nu.rn ber of deaths. The account of Flavius Josephus - as regards particularly the tragic encl o f the Zealo ts excites the reader's incredulity. But the examinations made on a

(I) F r om thi s m o ment we mu st fo ll ow the na r ralion made b y h istorian Flavius Josephus, a forme rÂˇ member of the .Juda ic resistance, who ha d gone over to t h e Rom a n s a s interpreter. "The Judaic.: Wa r" , h is most impor tant work, is not devoid o[ contradictions and i naccuracics; n everthele ss his acco un t of th e capture o f Masacla has bec n confirmed during Lhc archacological excavations carried o ut in I 963-1 964 and dire cte d by Yigacl Yad i n , professo r of arch aeo logy aL the University of Jerusalem. (2) The position, eccentric as regards Lhe normal travelli ng roads , has facilitated the preservatio n of the l

110

1\t!etal spearheads found llear a Zealo1 warrior.

eight encampments (two larg; and s ix small ones), so that, seen frorn the top of the rock, they look as if they h ad just been abandoned . The importance of these structures, remarka ble from the viewpoint of military history, has proved e q ua lly great from the archaeolog ical point. of view. T h e rernains found duri ng the excavations have permitted LO establish even the place of origin of the tradesmen that followed the troops and the place of production of the pottery used at that time . The enca m pmen t where the co mmand post of general Silva was located, to th e west of the [or'lress (one o f t h<;: two l arge ca mps) , r.neasured 118 m . by 145 m. and was d ivided in Fo u r sectors by the two roads (via praetoria an d via principalis ) which, inLer secting at a r ig h t angle at the ce ntre of th e encampment, led to the fo ur gates (praeloria, decum.ana, princ ipalis dextra and principalis s inistra), equ ipped w ith secu r ity a n d control dev ices (clav iculae). It h as b een possib le to s u rvey a ll the elem e n ts constit u t in g the camp (com m a nd post., mess, assembly sq uare, etc. ). The two la rge e ncarnpments h osted the X Legion (approx. 6000 men), the small o nes the a uxilia ry Lroops (a bout 3000 men). {3) Even at present the slo pe appears of a wh itish colou r, because the hill th at was levelled to use its mate rial consisted o f white rock. ( 4) S till visible. (5) O f t h e dimension of a large cluster of grapes. (6) At this poin t, i L is interesting to note Lhc d igressi on of hi storian Flavius Josephus, who remembers, as analogy, the crucial mo ment of the attack to the walls o f Jerusalem: the machines launched stones weighing one talent (about 30 kg) .. . the Judeans were able 10 observe their arriva l, because they were white and because

the noise of the mach ines a.1 the rnomenl of launching acted as forewarning. As a consequence, the sentinels silling on the towers warned their companions, shouting :"the stone is coming ", and those who were on ils trajecLory SIOoped down on the floor. But the Rom.ans, having no1iced that, blackened the swnes wh ich thus

beca me invisible and killed many defenders. (7) The su ddenness in wh ich in that d esert and moun tainous a rea the win d changes its direc tion was noticed also du ring the excavations cam paign of 1963. (8) F l avius Josephus co n t in u es : ... therefore he gathered the most

Romans soldie1s (Rorne, Palaz.zo d.ella Cancelleria.).

111

One o{ Lhe most stirring finds in the 1963- 1964 excavation campaign : the braids of a young woman , whose skeleton was found close to the remains o( a Âˇwa rrior and a child. courageous of his companions and inci1ed them to adopt the solution he had matured, saying:"... I cannot consider this situation other than a favour thaL the Lord has granted us, that is, to clie courageously and in a state of freedom, an opportunity that has not been given to Lhe other compatriots Lha t were captured unexpectedly. i t is certain that we will be taken within one day, but 1his is the right occasion to die gloriously. This is what our enemies cannot in any way prevent us fro m. doing, even if they very much want 10 take us alive . Neither can we think of resisting any longer, nor of beating them". Having some of those present manifested some perplexity about the extreme solution proposed, Eleazar 112

resumes his exhortation speaking of Lhe imnzor1ality of the soul and ernphasizing once more 1he sufferings to which Lheir relat-ives would be subjec1ed if they were captured. At the end, silence do111ina1es Lhe assembly. Then, all of a sudden, as if prompted by an irrepressihle impulse of 1he spiril, all agree and huny to join their fam.ilies. After a long farewell embrace LO their relatives, they estinguish wiLh the sword their innocent lives, fully convinced that death is better than the loss of' /iÂˇeedom and of the sufferings inf7icted to the slaves. Once this sad task is completed, the heads of' the fam.ilies gather all 1heir belongings in a heap and set them. afi,re. Ten of them, drawn by lot, are w kill all the others; one of' the Len is drawn to kill his nine cornpanions, with the pledge to inflict himself the same destiny . These are Flavius Josephus' words. To th is carnage , occurred on the

Roman arms (1 Century A.D.).

15th day of Lhc month of Nisan (the day after Passover - the rirst of April) of 73 A.D., survived only two women and five chi ld ren, who, a t t he beg in ning or Lhc dramatic conclusion, had fou nd refuge in a cave.