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Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Army personnel. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest. Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

The Management of Logistics by Antonio Monaco

Fortifications in Counterguerrilla Warfare b y Giorgio Battisti p . 85

Armed Conf icts

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The Future of Strategic Transport

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l:nergy Kesources and errorism

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The Evolution of the Army by Giuseppe Maggi p . 67

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ARMED CONFLICTS A CHANCE OF PROSPECTS OR A CHANCE OF CONTENT? The new international scenarios and the new technological capabilities require a redefinition of the military instrument's employment policy. The units of the future will have to operate with full tactical and logistic autonomy, in order to obtain the necessary flexibility that permits to achieve the effects and t he strategic objectives expected.

During these last years a chain of events have mation, marring databases, tryin g to disable the changed our way of perceiving the int ernatio nal communication systems considering the vulnerarelations. A prospect that is no more resolved only bility of the information architecture of the adverwithin balance logics, but is develop ing in a consary, in a war defined "network-ce ntric" by many frontatio n of strength and power, which not always analysts. A war t hat wi ll be waged by a military are an expression of the sole military force . The instrument redefined in its reg ulating and orgaworld community is w itness to a deep change in nizational terms, envisag in g and employing mu lt ithe pol itical and social confrontation. In this sense, pu rpose units , organ ized in combat formations changes in the strateg ic scenario and new technoformed according to the ir mission and not establogical capabil ities have demanded t he re- exami lished in advance . Such a transformation will bring nation of the terms of engageabout a new ph ilosophy in the ment of the military resources. C41SR procedures t hemse lves. For this reason, i n such complex ' ... the century that has jus A change of perspective that times, t he techno logical capabil oegun and the events tha tends t o modi fy the mi litary ity becomes a real power factor. have characterized its firs instrument's employment po li It is a high-tech power originat cy, providing it with flexibility ed at t he end of the Cold War, years have reversed the tra- and higher quality, ensuring a which shows itself in the pos- ditional conception of con better training for the so ldier session and use of a technologfrontation and political use: and t he ab il ity to p lan in ical knowledge t hat mod ifies the 0f violence , , advance the missions and t he customs and life mode ls of a units capab le of carryi ng them community, thus becoming a out, with fu ll t actical and logisfundamental element for cond itioning other peot ic autonomy, fo r mi litary objectives of lim ited ple's w ill. The very interconnection of networks d imen sion but strateg ically sig nificant. and management procedures confers to the information systems a fundamental role in t he conduct of military operations, for ac hieving the objective DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF THE ARMED CONFLICTS and for identifying the methods for pursuing it. Today we are faced by a multid imensional At present, in these yea rs , in d iffere nt theatres, approach of m ilitary operat ions. A mode l of we have observed that the mi litary co ndu ct of a thought where space and time change their conflict is not per se an event caused by rat ional dimensio n and become relative magnitudes of a logic. In its development, one can certainly f ind new hypertechnological enviro nment. An operace rtain regularities that help to manage resources t ional environment w here t he emp loyment of and capabilities as best as possib le. Nevertheless, forces that have speed and hig h f ire concentration the position of the actors on the field changes as transforms t he soldier in an operator with many the nationa l interests of the States change, or, as skills. A techno log ical environment that requ ires a regards communities, it changes in accordance conduct attit ude aimed at acq uiring critical inforwith the alterations of the internal social organi -

R1visla Mililare Eng/lsll Edition n. 2/2007

zations. Actually, apart from a novelty- derived excess ive emphas is , which defi nes our t imes as the era of t he asymmetry of con flicts , certai nly t he ce ntury that has just begu n and the events that have characterized its first years have revers ed the traditional conceptio n of confron tation and political use of violence. Our epoch , which survives t he "nuclear the rmoregulation" of intern ational relat ions, ex per iences t he results of t he disintegration of the polar models typical of t he Cold War, i.e. t he dissolution of a proposal of world orde r strictly anc hored to a balan ce of force that has now ended in a diffusi on of power as far as the most d istant pe riphe ries of the old syste m. Today anything can be decided anywhe re. The poss ible strateg ies themselves, w orked out in connect ion with t he interests to be safeguarded, appear as an express ion of a part icular perce ptio n of their credibility, in so far as, nationa l State o r not , they m ust deal with an adversary t hat so met imes is not of an equal size , not o nly m il it arily but also from the econom ic o r po lit ical viewpo int. Nevert heless, the end of t he reg ular it ies found on the batt lefie ld, paradoxica lly show s how t he asymmetry of the co nduct sti ll reside s in the planning capabi lity, and not on ly in t he actor's informa lity . T he latte r is ex pressed on ly in relation t o its non -ident ification with a natio nal co m munity, such as a State is. If one cons iders t he

Title pages. Afghanistan. Personnel o f the "Nibbio" Conting ent on surveillance d uty.

Above. Iraq. "Lagunari" patrolling the Euphrates.

terms of th e conflicts of t he second postwar period, one can not ice that th e self- dete rmi nation w ars from the colonial regi mes w ere not hing but asymmetric wars. Wars w aged by fron t s or movements of nat io na l l iberatio n ag ai nst reg ul ar arm ies . Conflicts of this t ype of asy mmet ry certa inly presented irreg ularities, t hat were nevert heless include d in the regula r concept ion of a confrontati on between actors of t he sam e size (l ) . With a f irst interesting result th at has becom e est ab lished in t im e: the capab il ity of ex pand ing one' s own action, ove rco ming t he phys ical front iers and f ilte ring throu gh different com mu niti es. A result, whi ch , in a time very far from th e even ts of t he begi nning of th is century, had already outlined t he irreg u lar te rm s of t he fu t ure confl ict, sin ce .. . almost all the presen t conflicts (future from a contem porary's point of view) are ... asym metrical, since they oppose subjects non- equiva lent by nat ure and cannot be compared as regards the m eans that each subject can employ. A consideration so im porta nt that, in this connection,

already in the seventies, it was indicated that ... the most asymmetrical conflict known is the terrorist one, where an appar ently weaker indi vid ual goes to wa r against society, deciding to pun ish it by exploiting its vulne ra bility...(2 ). Form t his po int of view, cl ear ly t he changes in t he geopol it ical struct ures of the international community as a who le has produced a re-o rie nt at io n of t he m odalities of figh t and conduct . Modalities of co nduct, wh ich, exp loiti ng the too ls offered by tec hnology and commun icatio n, can achieve dehuman ising effects greater than an actual war' s (a typical exam ple : the co ll apse on the Twin Towers and the number of victims obtained with a si ngle attack, lim ited as far as men and means were concerned . Today, the homogene ity of the actors is no more cons idered a postulate . And a confl ict can spring from t he incompatibilit y of diffe rent interests carr ied by equal ly heteroge neous subjects , but w hich compete on gro unds be lieved congenial, chosen each time in relation to the objective to be achieved or the m essage that one wa nts to transmit . Only in this way, for example, to call "g lobal war" t he respo nse to the pres ent -day terrorist attack ca n have a meaning.

AN INTRICATE STRATEGIC PICTURE Considering t he contemporary world , no analysi s can avo id evaluating som e particularly important aspects, in order to define in a coherent manner the strategic picture , where the act o rs and t he com munit ies that they represent are go ing to move. The very use of v iole nce is out of t he t rad itional schemes. Clandestine v iolence does not exist anymore. There is a vio lence that is born in side a g ro up, whi ch refuse s sec recy because it is sy nonymous w it h weakn ess and fragility. The antagon ist movem ents of A rabIslam ic derivation have never pursued sec recy, except fo r the phases of organ izatio n and cond uct of t heir actions . Certainly not abo ut the result, o nce achi eved . Fer th is reaso n, viole nce th us expressed, and spread around t he world , has represented a means of attack , but is also c:. veh icle of commun ication and, owing to this, actions and methods of execution cou ld not but look for a "h igh-s hare" sce nario that cou ld only be provided by the international community and the use of t he med ia. Thus the techni cal - operational procedures for o rg ani z ing one ' s own fo rces , i n the terrorist experience could not but go beyo nd the si m ple

co ncept of a formal project. Tec hn ical access i bil ity, estimate of force, intelligence, sharing of obj ectives , have had a pri mary ro le in Al-Qaeda's capability of physically destroying not only th e Twin Towe rs, but also the system of ana lys is and understandi ng of i nternat ional dynamics that has dom inated the Western w orld for years. Wit h a first res ult: the game power has become comp licat ed . There has bee n a swift change in t he very factors t hat could bring about possible balances due to the weake n ing of th e former big powers. And the result depends more and more on pos sib le reg ion al balances rathe r th an on system balances. Not on ly that. The change has occurred also in the pe rcept ion of t he conflicts of a postnuclear era, whe re the conventionality of wa r is more an d more a direct functio n of the capac ity to manage the effort in spaces culturally and socia lly scarcely inclined to cap itu late for mere reasons of force . In this game , quality and technol ogical multipl iers are playing a decis ive role in the conduct of a crisis. A co ndu ct that goes together, and he re is the risk for the adversary, w it h the mastery of tec hno logica l knowledge that perm its to utll ize also the strategic know-how of the enemy, not o nly for wh at concerns the m ili tary, but also economy and communication. Afte r such cons id erat ions, it is d ifficu lt to make a d is t inction between m eans and met hods typica l of a direct strategy and mean s and methods fu nct ion al to a strat egic conduct that develops indi rectly, i.e. w here the subjects mak e i nstrumental use of pos sibi lit ies, o pportu nities , spaces and times, to co ndition the wi ll of the adversary, without go ing t hro ugh a direct involveme nt beyond their phys ica l or in st itutional dim ens ion. Moreover, there is a seco nd apprecia ble geopo litical result, a co nsequence of the first. It co ns ists of the strateg ic picture derivi ng from it, re presented by a si:ena rio , cha ngeable in time, where de - facto balances regulate the relat ions between Stat es. A dynam ic scenario where th e ax io m "neith er peace nor wa r" rep resents the on ly poss ib le condition for a position of inte rloc utory st ab ility. A re lat ive stability, for which w hat changes in th e relation betwee n strategy and pol itics i s t he objective: t ry not t o win in ord er not to lose. In view of this, the mi litary force itse lf is st ill on e of the instru me nts for det ermin ing the course of i nternational relations. Nevertheless, it w ill not be decisive in itse lf. Th e use of force, not necessarily m ilitary, but also econom ic or linked to commu ni cation , becomes a key elem en t with in a different offe r of a political ki nd, that could be proposed to

Riv,sta M1litare Fnql1SI) /::(/1(1011

the international, or only regional, community. Thus the transition from "hard" to "soft" power, observed in these last years, has made the employment of war one of the possible conditioning factors, but not necessarily the most effective one. On the other hand, not even the redefinition of a sustainab le military engagement. in the conduct of a low- intensit y war, can ass ure low- cost results.

A REALITY WAR GAME As we see, th e mod ification of the internat ion al scenar io re m ains t he main facto r of the t ransformation of t he mil itary instrume nts and the conduct of operations . Operati ons, which, on the other hand, are expressed in a diffe rent conceptio n of the bat tlefie ld , which is more and more l imited an d conditio ned by non - m i litary variables . Actually, this percept ion of expansion or reduction of spaces and times in a confrontation, mak es sure that the pos si bil it ies of action depen d on the techn olog ical capacity to domi nate both d i mens ions a nd the resources employed . The very d igitisation of the conduct an d control phases t r ies to shorte n times and l imit spaces and modifies, if necessary, the di mens ions of the battlefie ld, compelling the actors to re-modulate their condition ing capabil -

212007

Afghanistan. NBC personnel controlling a road.

ities , loo kin g at the m ilitary space from a fully technologica l viewpoint. In this phase of reorgani zation of the procedures of control of the batt lefield, an operational sy~tem is realized, ow in g to which the best result is reached only by w homever can obtain the best info rmat ion on the enemy. From this point of view , the "Information Warfare" will present itse lf in two flows with apparent ly contrasting trends but, in reality, w ith an interesting point of contact: the leve l of coordination of the information in the conduct phase. In this sense , co nce ption , orga nization and action turn respectively into identificat ion, deci sion and conduct of a military operation, where t he supe riority of knowledge will make the diffe rence as regards the probability of success. Also in this case , the "p lug and play" war is not a discovery of "Network Centric Warfare". It w<1s already employed by international terrorism in the seventies. The reductio n into cells, i.e. ele mentary units that can perform multi - ro le tasks, tends to introduce regu larities into changing bat t lefie lds , progressively diminishing the level of asymmetry of the conflict, emp loying smaller un its and greater penetration capabilities in the adversary's model of life. This is what the terrorist experience has matured.

This wi ll result in conflicts l imited in space and time, which , neverthe less, dete rmi ne the ba lances of the w o r ld syst em, countin g , for example, on t he objectives of energy and economic survival of the enemy. The ab ility to h it the deci sion -making and log ist ic sup port centres of the adversary, in order to achieve an appreciable strateg ic sup rem acy , rep resents therefore a "power" factor.

the information needed for ru nn ing the enemy 's life system, affect ing the process of managemen t of uti lit ies and services, with the end resul t of be ing unab le to contro l the following phase (victory). Bes ides , the system rema ins more vu lne rabl e at its periphe ry t hen at its centre, althoug h the "perip heryzat ion " of the networks is not th e on ly reaso n fo r a crisis . In any case, th e ma in crit icality w ill sti ll depend on the level of contro l of th e capabilities of informatio n and assessment of space and time.

A NEW MILITARY T HOUGHT

Th e war transformed by the network s presents COM MUN ICATION AND STRATEGY its elf i n a co nceptua lly new techno logic and strategic dimension. The "swarm" prog ramme, for Today's analysts, before the Iraqi war and the example, in the logic of the swarms - i.e. of forces use of its effects by the media, had m issed two reduced and dimension ed each tim e in accorim portant and not neg lig ib le aspects of the new dance wit h the aim to be ac hi eved - tries to era. The f irst was t he abol it ion of the space-time reduce the accumulation of power, d ist ribut ing its va riabl es . The second was the speed of getting use among sm all un its . Nevert hele ss, the the information and t he abilit y to use the news "Netwo rk Centric Warfare" is not goi ng to repre sooner tha n the enemy, spreading its mea ni ng sent a linear model, beyond the phi losophy that is diffusely by exploiting the world netwo rks. T hes e at t he fo undatio n of the conception of t he regu lar t w o aspects we re not ig nored by Osama bin m anagement of a co nflict. The ve ry log ic of Lad en and t he Is lam ic f undamentalists, and per"swarm ing " actually cons ists in approac hi ng the m itted them to approac h their world, very far for capab il ity and level of effectiveness of the reg ular us , much more than a ti m e machine cou ld manunits to those of an irregular th reat , wh ich, in th is age to do. d imension, borrows from t he adve rsary many For this reaso n, our real problem today comes methods of analys is and deci from t he contro l of comm un ision-mak i ng. On the othe r cation. That is, from manag ing hand , t he asym metry of a con' ...the asymmetry of a information, especial ly managfl ict develops within operaconflict develops within oping t he unpred ictabi li ty of the tional d imensio ns where the complex systems ; from grasp=rational dimensions, where ing two antagon ists do not perthe variations of the social ce ive space and time in t he .he two antagonists do not behavio ur at t he r ight moment; same way. Di m ens io ns that ".)erceive space and time i from determ in ing t he level of widen and shrink in re lation to .he same way , , influence compared with t he the informat ion advantage resu lt t o be obtained; from the ga ined by the parties. Whe re abi lity to conceive and conduct, eac h opponent tries to f ind its own regularities in and not only organize, a mi li ta ry operation also conceiving a com paris on throug h a het erogene ity oriented t owa rds non- mat er ial results, given by of the ways of orga niz ing and carryi ng out t he t he possibility, if not of co nque ring , of at least of m ilitary effort vis- a-vis the adversary, wh ich, in cond ition in g (soft power) t he coll ective imagery. A its t urn, will try t o take advant age of the ot he r's war that, w it h a common fact o r on both sides, wi ll irregu larit ies wit h reg ularities of its own. Th is is develop between both oppone nts , in order to so beca use no possibi li ty of exploiting asymmetachieve - in the era of integrated comm un icat ion ri c pote nt ials, ex pressed in term s of availability of the most immedi ately paying obj ective: one's d iversified weapon syst ems , w ill eve r ju stif y the assertion and the conditioni ng of the wo rld's pubconduct of a traditionally symmetric war. lic opinion. However, v is-a- vis a t echno lo gic revo luti o n of Communication , i.e. the capacity to co mm unithe military tho ught, both t he d igitisation of t he cate and involve d ialectica lly publ ic opi nio n , weapon systems and network communication expands the self-referentia l capabi lity and repre suffer from two vulnera bilities. T he first is re presents a further and indis pensable strat eg ic factor sented by the singleness of the chai n of employed by t he parties concerned. Comma nd , Coord inatio n and Contro l, wh ich, if Only in t hi s perspect ive the terrorist attacks of i nvaded by induced informat ion, risks a paralysis New York, Beslan , Madrid, Taba, Londo n, Sharm (netstrike) . The second is the r isk of paralysing el-She ik can have a meani ng. T hey are namely the

Rivista Mililare Eng/1s/J Edition n. 212007

dramatic example of how freque ncy, intensity, quantity and qual ity of the vio lence expressed are the essential facto rs of a conflict based most of all 0 :, commu nication instrwments.

CONCLUSIONS

The terrorist logic is certainly not a novelty . It has no li mits of pol itical ideo logy, especially today in the face of a manipu lation of consciences realized through t he reference to religious st ructu res that can agg regate t he masses. Fo r an antagonist perspective, w hi ch is violen tly agai nst establish ed order, to comm unicat e through actions on politically payin g obj ectives creates a "bandwago ning" effect, throug h wh ich fear and insecurity rapidly spread among t he comm un iti es that we re victims of the actions . A diffusion of mass- m ed ia power that is obtain ed thanks to the popu lar networks, difficu lt to control, t hat no censo rship, press silence or denial of images can stop in a network society. On the other hand, t he abse nce of middleclass societies and the imposs ibili ty of establis hing a dialogue with the marginal classes, have placed the West at a disadvantage in comparison with those that make a strategic use of communi cation. The mistake made by the West in belated ly eval uating t he strategic signi ficance of the management of informatio n, th us avoiding dangerous second t houg hts - as happened in connect ion with Saddam Husse in 's possess ion of w eapons of mass destruction - is that one cannot thin k of qualifying himse lf in a situation of cris is and open contraposition and the n entrust success o nly to the military confron tation. In t hi s case , t here is a dangerous overlapping between two mo ments of making strat egic information, where po litical communication is fo llowed in parallel by military information. This is a moment when m ilitary force does not renounce being a political inst rument , but must also be perceived as a form of co m mun icat io n. Due to th is reason, it is an instrument that can strengthen or weaken any effort t o affirm a will over t he other, especially if th is is t he exp ress ion of an infri nged right and a claim of leg itimate defence . Act ually, today th e winne r is not only he who fights, but also he who comm unicates best. The ab ility to communicate become s more and more influential in the choice of the objective, forming a synergy betwee n the expectati on and th e ach ieveme nt of the resu lt . An expectation of victory, given also by the correct ratio between objective-symbol / co mm un ication- effect. Giuseppe Romeo Expert in geostrategy

Afghanistan. An Italian patrol controlling a sensitive centre.

NOTES ( l) Actually, du r in g the years of the Co ld War, b oth

superpowers, the United States and the Sovi et Uni on , were, directly or indirectly, period ica lly involved in phenomena o f destabi lization d uring local crises. As a matter o f fact, co nsider ing the Middle East events , Indoch ina , Palestin ian te rror ism and the i ncide nts of A lgeria and Northern Ireland, w ithout forge tting the progress ive destabi lizations of the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa as well as western Maghreb and today' s Balkans, we never observed confl icts between forma l actors, apart from very l im ited cases, such as th e Greek- Turk ish crisis for Cyprus, the Middle East war unti l l(ippur and the war s bet ween Iran and Ir aq. Apart fro m that, there have been situat ions of crisis born ins ide politically and economically fragile commun ities, divided by eth nic or rel ig iou s reasons, suffi cien t to an chor to the destabi lization of the r eg ion, opportun it ies useful for the great powers . The int erna lisation of confl icts is not a novelty due on ly to Septembe r l l . Perh aps it represents the most evident characteristic that the West has missed in its strategic pe rception of the new te rm s of t he confro ntation, even before t he fall of the Berl in Wall and before the pulverization of the Bal kans. (2) F. Casadio, "Conflittual ita mond iale e re lazioni internaz ionali".

ENERGY RESOURCES AND TERRORISM The war against terrorism and the problems about the security of energy resources outline a «Regional Security Complex», which is wider than the same geographic borders of the NATO member countries . The efficient handling of the conflicts that could arise in this new wide area calls for a real cu ltural revolution, which takes the strategic importance of cultural intelligence and critical security studies into consideration.

Thomas Friedman concl udes his latest book fall of the Soviet communism would lead to a new «The wor ld is flat» comparing two dates which world order based on political- economic liberalism. represent two important and conflicting stages of How ever, the terrorist attacks of New York, Bali, the process of globalization that is taki ng place in Istanbul, Madrid and London have undermined the our planet: November 9 th 1989 and September candid narcissistic ahistorical opti mism . 11 th 2001. Whereas the first Gu lf War and the co nfl ict in The fi rst date represents the fall of t he Be rl in Wall Bosnia histor iog raph ically led to a «new world when all the efforts were chan nelled into build ing a secu rity disorder» in t hi s context, wh ich was different w orld based on a «credefined by Marc Ferro as feaative imaginat ion». This date is at tu red by a «ban kruptcy of idethe opposite pole from ' ... bin Laden's «fatwa» an ology», bin Laden's «fatwa» September 11 th, w hich has he threat of post moderr and the threat of post -modern shown the power of a different errorism called for ne'A terrorism called for new playki nd of imag ination : a «destrucand r ules in the wo rld :>layers and rules in the ers tive imagi nation» . scene f ill ing the vacuum left by No rid scene , , However, if we drew a line the «threat deficit». link ing t he first date, that of creWe will analyse each of these ative imag inatio n, to the most contexts, whi ch have been recent one of the NATO Su mm it (Riga, November structured in order according to their fu nction and 27th - 29th 2006) , a careful analysis of inte rnathe real geo-po litical narration by different tional relation s could show cont inuity of constants «authors- actors», such as the speeches of the «US and variab les in this histor ical and genealogical National Intelligence Council», the «Long War», the map. oi l company Chevron and bin Laden. The man of Fu kuyama, despite t he astrolog ical In order to set a genealogy in the continuity of predictions by Huntington, thought candid ly that the inte rests, conflicts and poss ible tensions, these fo rm s of geo-po li t ics w ill be su perim po sed to draw the borde rs of a «Reg ional Security Complex» (defined by Barry Buzan as a reg ional co mp lex cons isting in a group of States that have to face t he same problems of security) where conflicts co uld arise. T he perimeter of th is «Reg ional

Left. An oil tanker in flames.

Title pages. Iraqi oil wells in flames. In the box : an American soldier of the 101" "Airborne Division".

Rivisla Mililare English Edition n. 212007

Security Complex» w ill coincide with t he strategic interests of t he Atlantic Alliance (consequently, a strategic reg ion whose perim eter is w ider than t he region t hat has been «created» by t he union of the geographical borders of its m embers and by the application of t he Art icle S of the Atlantic Pact) and, in case of threat s to its stabil ity , the It alian intervention w ill be very li kely. Linking t he need for a strateg ic- ope rational reform (wh ich refers to the experimental concept of «rh izome») with t he eleme nt of «human intelligencecultural intelligence» leads us to consider the main evolutive factors to face efficie nt ly new m il itary missions and international crises . To conclude this research, we will focus on a new mu ltidisciplinary and «nomadic» approach to the problem of security.

THE THESES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

The first gee-po litical representatio ns are produced by three studies conducted by the A merican government: «G lobal Trends 201 O» (November 1997); • «G lobal Trends 201 S» (December 2000) ; • «Mappi ng the Global Future» (Decembe r 2004). The «Global Trends 20 10», wh ich was published in November 1997 by the «National Intell igence Council» (N IC), before September 11th 2001, stressed that the international scene wou ld change in the short term. In particular, it stressed that the structure of t he international re lat ions, wh ich was based on the balance of power between the States, was becom ing less stable. This was due to three changes that, according to t he NIC, would happen in the following fiftee n years: lots of conflicts w ould occur within the States, and not between the States; lots of States would not be able to meet t he basic requirements lin kin g the citize ns wit h t heir government (fai ling States); the governments of the States that declared themselves exempt from poverty and political instabil ity would realize that they were losing control of sign ificant parts of their political programm es, because of g lobali zati on, econo mic development and the constant revolut ion of t ech nological information. As a co nsequence: the end of the sovereignty of t he politician . Acco rding to the NIC, the western States (and, in particular, the United States) will face three «g lobal trends» on which they will have t o fo rm ulate their policy of security: · population increase: «t he world population will be 7 billion by 2010 and t his increase will occur especially in the deve loping countries» · per capita income increase: «the majority of the winners will be in the Far East and in the West; the lose rs in Africa and in the Middle East» ;

• the problem regarding food sources: «genetic engineering will bring about a forth agricultural revolution. But, as in t he past, it w il l be human beings t hat wi ll lead to penu ry»; • comm un ications: «dig ital data and the revolution of communications will reduce distances an d the barriers to the flow of information»; • energy resources: «populations and per capita income increase will be the motor power of an increasing demand for energy; especially in the Chinese and Indian econom ies that are growing . The world will need more oi l production than today»; • mi litary technology and deterrents: «the pote nt ial enemies, of the United States and the West, wi ll try to face the mil itary superiority by using technical and organ izational devices, that are unconventional and asymmetric, such as terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction». The second gee- political view is conveyed by the «G loba l trends 20 1 5: A Dialogue Abo ut the Future Wit h No ngovern ment Exerts» which was not pu b-

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lis hed in December 2000 and fo ll ows t he line of t he previo us study developing the trends that were detected in 1997. «The w0rid popu lation will be 7,2 bi llions wit hin 201 S (po pulation increase); the constant econom ic development, together with the population increase, will lead to an increase in the de mand for energy of SO% in the next 1 S years. The demand for oil will ri se from 75 m ill ion barrels each day in 2000 to 100 m illion barrels by 20 l 5 (natural and energy resou rces); the development of information technology and of biotechnology will assume more and more importance at a global level (science and technology) ; China and India will be characterized by high ly dynamic economies (global economy); in 201 5 the State wi ll remain the most important organ izational unit of political, econom ic and security affairs, but it will have to deal with fundamental tests of effective government (national and international governance);

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in 2015, the interstate conflicts will represent the biggest threats to stabi lity in the world. The wars between States, alt hough less frequent, will be very let hal because of more destructive military technologies. In addition, the internat ional community wil l have to face up to the m ilitary, polit ical and economic consequences of the fact that t he lndochinese area is in const ant development and the Russ ian economy is in decl ine (future scenerios and conflicts)». In the chapter about the poss ible «future scenerios and confl icts» the authors stress that a good part of terrorism will be directed against the US and its overseas interests. A good part of anti-US terrorism will be based on the possible manipu lation of ethnic, rel igious and cultural hatred, and terrorist groups will be able to devise new systems to attack t he army

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and diplomatic infrastructure abroad. Not only wil l th ese attacks spread ac ros s American cities and com panies but the terrorists in th e Midd le East and in the So uth- East Asia w ill be the biggest t hreat. The latest publ ication (December 2004) by the NIC «Mapping the Global Future» updates the socalled «key global trends» . Lots of experts com ing from every part of the world worked on t hi s study and some «scenari os» we re co nstructed to unde rstand how different «key trends» interact. The iss ues raised in 2004 (afte r September 11t h 200 1 and the beg in ning of the war against terrorism) refle ct the Ameri can wo rries w hich are ex pressed in previous studies (1997 and 2000): new world powers, new t hreats to governab ili ty and a widespread sense of global uncert ainty. Even the geopolitical aspect of the world is chang ing because of «a grad ual devel opm ent of emergent co untrie s suc h as Chi na, India, Braz il ,

R1v1sta Militare £ngl1s1> Ed1t1on

Indones ia, Russia and South Africa»; because of a gradual decline of the dom inant countries and continents (Europe, Russia and Japan); because of an increasing demand fpr energy resources and the incipient crisis of the American supremacy. With regard to the global uncertainty, we should consider the following trends: . The rise of «global and protean te rrorism»: alQuaeda is expected to be replaced by Islam ic extremist groups whic h will be inspired in the same way but will be more w id espread; . «an intensification of internal confl icts», the deve lopi ng economies, ethnic divisions, extreme religious convictions , popu lation explosions will intens ify the interstate confl icts; • «an intensification of interstate conflicts», which is due to the development of modern arms, will lead to the preventive use of the m ili tary force, especially in the eme rge nt countries; • «the spread of weapons of mass destruction»: the countries that do not have nuclear weapons w ill be able to obtain them for the si mple reason that their neighbouring and rival countries are bui lding them. To sum up, the rise of new powers (As ia), the constant world population increase (and the popu lation ageing in some areas), the increase in demands of ene rgy resources and the t hreats to security (new possible conflicts and te rrorism) are constan t sources of worry for the government and the US. We can also find these worries in two editions of the «US National Security Strategy» (2002 and 2006), after the beginni ng of the «g lobal war on terrorism».

FROM THE «WAR ON TERROR» TO THE «LONG WAR» At the 42nd Conference on Security Policy, which took place in Munich in February 2006, the then American Secretary of Defence, Ronald Rumsf eld, explained the new defence policy of his country. The plan was defined as «The Long War». It cons ists in complex and lo ng- lasting m ilitary operations that will be conducted in different countries at the same t ime and involve the American Armed Forces and their international partners. It replaces the previous plan , which was defined as «War on terror». This review, which is also ling ui stic, witnesses the evolution of the American strategic thought that has developed during the recent confl ict in Iraq. The «Quadrenn ial Defence Review» (which replaces that of 200 l) involves, according to the Ame rican Generals, fights that could develop, at the same

11.

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t ime, in d ifferent countries in the next years. These fights could become conventional mi litary opera. tions, like the invas ion of Iraq (2003), and include the rapid deployment of counter- terrorist forces that are highly mobile and often under cover. As well as these measures, the plan calls for an increase of l 5% in personnel of special forces and the recruitment of further 3 700 units for «psychological operations and civil affairs units». The Pentagon does not mention any geographica l area, but surely these operations w ill take place in an area extending from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa, including North Africa, Central As ia, As ian South East and North Caucasus. As the Cold War dominated the world from 1946 to 1991, the «long war» w il l re-shape and narrate the world in the next decades. This new strategic doctri ne includes: · A new non - conventional approach t hat puts great emphas is on the mobility of troops and the structure of inte lligence as well as on lingui stic and cultural skill s and t he knowledge of different strateg ic geograph ical areas. In particular, an increase in personnel, who have a good knowled ge of Arabic, Chinese and Persian, is high on their li st; • Th e construction of «partnerships» to persuade potential «mi litary competitors», who could compete at a regional level, or pursue host il e policies towards the US and avail themselves of local forces; • A redefin ition of priorities: defeating the terrorist networks ; strengthening the secu rity of the national te rritory; influenc ing the political choices of those countries that are in t he «strateg ic crossroads»; preventing the enemy cou ntries and the «non- state actors» from using weapons of mass destruction (WMD); • T he pr~servation of Lawrence's legacy: the authors ce ll us in advance that the American Armed Forces will be emp loyed to fig ht «irregular warfare» in different parts of the world: not only w il l t hey have to adopt an indirect approach us ing local fo rces but they w ill have to «upset the enemy phys ically and psycho log ically, rather than attack him whe re he is stronger and where he knows he will be attacked». • To specify the objectives of «int ell igence» we can f ind in t his strategic doctrine, a few days after its publicat ion, the «U .S. Department of State» offered students of «critical languages» (Arab ic, Bengali, Hind i, Punj abi, Turkish and Urdu) grants on the Internet, as a part of the «Nat ional Security Language Initiative».

a passive receptive elem ent into an active f unctio n: t he repos itory of the codes that m ake the in tel ligi bi li ty of the text possible . As we have seen the greatest world power, In Ju ly 2005, Chevron put an adve rtisement in althoug h invo lved in d ifferent conflicts to defeat t he «Wall Street Jou rna l», «The Econom ist» and th e terrorism, narrates and re- shapes a geographi cal «Financial T im es», w hich acknow ledged «Peak area basing itse lf on the concept of «national Oil»: «it took us 125 years to consume the fir st security» and of «natio nal interests» and creating, t ri ll ion of oil barre ls. We w ill consume the rema inat t he same tim e, the Manichean perception of ing part in the next 30 years». «centre/ per iphery», «good / evil », «w orld of God / After a few mo nths , t he followi ng messages an d world of Devil» and «light / darkness». narrations we re pu blis hed in newspapers and in Th is «geopol itical imag i- nation», using an the airpo rts of t he world 's biggest cities : approach that is very similar to the «Crit ical • «The w orld consumes two barrels of oil for each Geopo litics», is fuelled even by other actors as yet unfil led barrel»; The aim is to show that th e «State- Nation, • «Russia, Iran and Qatar have 58% of the wor ld 's author- actor», in th is process of pe rception - internatural gas supplies. T he US have o nly 3%»; pretation (of real/ possible threat s, war again st • «Mo re than half of the w orld's oi l su pplies is siterrorism, energy resources and popu lation t uated in five co untries»; increase), is also he lped by other «non- State • «The re are 193 countries in t he world and none author- actors». of them is "ene rgy inde pend ent". So, who th reaFriedman himself wants to m ake t he wor ld flat tens the others for a barre l of oil?». through his discourse - narratio n and to create t wo If these advertising messages we re superimantithetical and opposing perceptions about how posed on the NIC's stud ies, on the theses of «2006 to read t he rece nt «History» (a creative im ag in ation Quadrennial Defence Review» and on the g rants of that is the exact opposite of a destructive imagithe «US Department of State» nation), extrapolating it from its what would come out is a w ide genealogy. However, we know very well that «the wo rld is not ' ... it took us 125 years tc, region, w hich extends from th e flat», t hat is to say it is not wit h- consume the first trillion of Aegean coasts to T urkey and to er with Ch ina. out meaning. Con seq uently, th is oil barrels. We will con theA bord region of «fi re» whe re peo«world» is tightly li nked to the Arabic , word that describes it: t hrough sume the remaining trillion p le speak T u rks, n the next 30 years,, Persian, Urd u, Punjabi , Be ngal i a process t hat is defined and Ch inese , and its common «Machiavellian mind», not only denominator are ene rgy ca n the word-language forestal l resources and t heir distributio n. the act ion s of its receivers but it can also manipu late them. So we have to draw on other narrations that, BIN LADEN 'S STRATEGIES through the «word», a world whose «image- imagination>> is built, which should be im itated , can be In his work , Friedman defines al-Qaeda as a sort «creative» or «destructive». The «popular geopoliof Islamic- Leninist and recently Pres iden t Bu sh tics» considers not only the messages of the mass himself has said: «th is nation is at war with Islamic media, films , the «CNN factor», cartoons and music fascists». but it also highlights advertising slogans that convey Th eir attitud e towards the masses is t he same as geopol itical messages- discourse- narration- myth. that we can find in the authoritarian and totalitarAllow me to make a digression: Elena was a ian ideologies of t he l gth and 20th centuries: beautiful woman but maybe t here are othe r reaMarxism and Lenin is m , Fascism and National sons behind t he war of Troy. Socialism . It shares with them the utop ian view of If we give credit to t he fact that this war against the construction of a «new man», who in t he fun terrorism has also been caused by the race for damentali st view coincid es with t he figure of th e energy resources, which is a recurrent t heme in «born agai n»: t he lsl amist who is born again. these analyses , the advert ising of an oil com pany, At the beginning of t he last century th is messag e like that of Chevron , shou ld be taken into considwas conveyed to the great European masses . Now, eration. Bin Laden's speech addresses to the young Arabs Throu gh his d iscourse- adve rt ising , the «autho r» and Muslims as an ideo logical answer to their loss participat es in the creation of a geopo litical imagof identity and sense of hu mi li ation. inary myth (and of a state of anxiety- fear) aimed at Although al- Qaeda, as a terrorist organization, is influencing the American audience; this is a narracharacte rized by ascetical and motivational pushes tive co ntext w here t he reade r is transformed from

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Rivista Milifaf'e English Edit1011 11, 2/ 2007

that are a disting uishing feature of religious terrorism (in fact, it claims responsibi lity for lots of terrorist attacks and justifies, narrates and mythologizes them as an act of <~i had» iJ_gainst the western countries, lots of terrorist attacks have had and have economic con notations. Consequently, we can say that the «holy war» that al-Qaeda has started fighting is also an economic war. In bi n Laden's «author - actor» geo-po litical speech (althoug h, according to a recent study, he is absent from the literature of jihad, together with al - Zawahiri, because they are considered ne ither as author ities of Islamic law nor an ideo logical force that supports the movement of salafi j ihad), we can f ind the following cartograp hical, real and imaginary narrations: • Dar al Islam; . The id ea of a caliphate exte nding from Morocco to Indonesia; Networks of a hypothetical cybercali phate; • Energy resources; • Territories incl ud ing the g hettoes that you can find in the West where t he Mus lim people feel a strong sense of hum ili ation/frustration . His speech is accurate : «it is an economic-religious war. The great powers think that the Gulf and t he State of the Persian Gulf, cons idering that there are the biggest energy resources reserves, are t he key to contro l the world. I implore the you ng Muslims to strengthen t he m ujahidin eve rywhere, espec ially in Palesti ne, Iraq, Kashmir, Chechnya and Afghanistan». In a v ideotape, which was sent to Al-Jazeera on the 1st November 2004, bin Laden addressed the American peop le ju st before the elections to narrate and exp lain the reasons (the fou r cornerstones) of his j ih ad: · Revenge : because in 1982 t he US allowed Israel to invade Le banon and t he 6 th Fleet helped t hem to do th at; · The aim is to «continue to fight th is war that is bleeding the US dry in order to throw them into bankruptcy»; · The targets are «the American peop le and their economy, the companies t hat work in the oi l industry, in t he weapons bus iness and in reconstruction , and the big companies that are linked with t he Bush administration, like Halli burton»; · The strategies are aimed at deplet ing the American resources through t he asymmetric war, for example «sending two mujahidin to the most extreme eastern cape and ordering them to wave a piece of cloth (on whic h there must be writt en al- Qaeda) so that the Generals rush up to t hem and infl ict heavy losses on the US in human, econom ic and po li tical terms». In order to make the Americans suffer the same fate as t he Russians, the terrorists aim to deplete the

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American «resou rces» so that they cannot mai ntain the ir economic and military hegemony any mo re . The economic war of al-Qaeda against American interests includ es three methods: • The destruction of «targets that are qualitatively expensive by using means that are qualitatively cheap: each dol lar of al- Qaeda has defeated mi llions of dollars, as wel l as causing huge job losses»; • Pu shing the American administration to overspend the defence budget and forcing it to cut domestic investments. «Recently the mujahidin have obliged Bush to draw on emergency f unding to continue to figh t in Afghan istan and Iraq»; • The last strategy concerns oil. In a declaration of l zth October 2002, bin Laden congratulated the mujahidin on the attacks against the marines in Kuwait and against the American tan ker Limburg: «I cong ratulate my sons mujahidin on their heroic and cou rageous operations of jihad against the A merican army of occupation in Kuwait. Through the attack agai nst the tanker in Yemen, the mujahidin hit the secret li ne, the line of procurement and the source of life for the nation of crusaders». Energy resources are t he Achil les' heel of the American and western economy and, in the case of a destruction or reduction of energy flow in ou r society, the consequences wo uld be devastating. Although Danie l Yerg in, «Chair of Cambridge Energy Research Associates», in his art icle w hi ch appeared in «Fo reign Affairs», said t hat the security of energy would be top of t he agenda at the G8 summit, which was held in St. Peters bu rg in July 2006 , this did not happe n in reality. Whereas the G8 countries stre nuously defended their nat ional inte rests and were not able to reach a suitab le compromise, with regard to geopo litics of energy the most popu lated countries (Ch ina and Ind ia) were moving their pawn s. Since al-Qaeda has t hreatened t o attack what bin

Laden has defined as the «cornersto nes» of the world eco nomy, the energy resources represent t he most crucial element. In future t he world will depend more and more on the energy supplies , which will come from geographical areas where the system of security is going through a ph ase of development: West Africa and the Caspian Sea. In any case , the barycentre of the system of supply is a constant in the geographical area extending from the Aegean coasts of Tu rkey to the Chinese border. ' •••the world

exhaustively d iscussed not only by Huntington, wh o was its «d evis er»); • Clash of ideocides or clash of civicides (where, as Arjun Appadurai has analysed, ideocides- civicides mean a new and serious problem concernin g the fact that lots of populaces and the custom s of some countries are considered as harmf ul and external to t he concept of humanity and, consequently, they become a target of «social death»): • «Near enemy»-«Far enemy» of the «Jihad Salafi» (whereas at the will depend beginning al - Qaeda tried to hit more and more on the ener the US through attacks that took abroad and in the US, now gy supplies, which will come place TH E GEOPOLITICAL «FAULTS» his enemy operates within the from geographical areas territory of action of the terrorist The risk of attacks against Nhere the system of securi group); «new- style target», that is to say ty is going through a phase • Market-Dominant minorities pipelines and gas pipe lines, has 'Jf development· West Africa (as Amy Chua says , ethnic m iincreased both in Caucasus and and the Caspian Sea ,, norit ies, w ho ho ld the eco no in Central Asia. mic- commercial power in som e T his vast area, w hi ch ha s countries , where they operate already defined as the «seismograp h of the wor ld but to which t hey ofte n do not belong); politics» , is the ground (and the poss ible «theatre Overlapping them with the zones of geopolitical of operations») where different interests and and theoretical fau lts: geopo litical talks tend to overlap and clash . • of Dar al Islam / Dar al Harp (the territory of Islam If we place in a paper the representations proithe territory of the Army and, consequently, of the conflict); duced by t he fo llowing theoretical models: • Market state/non- market state (Phi lip Bob bit, in · of van Clausewits's theories, wh ich clas h with those his «The Shied of Achilles», divides the world into of Sun Tzu or of the «War after the war» of General the democratic countries that follow and observe Fabio Mini; the rules of market to solve international problems • of «Crescent of Crisis» (the crescent of in stab il iand the countries that do not behave in this way); ty, consequently the subject of the Middl e East is • Pre-modern/modern/post-modern state; expand ing) · Jihad vs. McWorld (Benjam in Barber uses thi s • of dramatic population increases that we can term to signify t he resistance movements to glofind in this periphery wh ich produces and tranbalization w hich refer to the traditional bases of sports energy resources; the opposing society and, conseq uently, to the · the co ncept of marginal util ity that is applied to rise of McWorld) ; the geopolitics of the propens ity for conflict ; · Clash of Civilizations (which was developed and · we obta in , as resu lt, the Turkic ethnolingu isti c area where there are, as well as the «frozen co nflicts», potential zones of t ens ion: t he «fau lts», The chain of tra nsformation of crude. which have been caused by intersect ions, super impositions and contacts between the different Unhnl,t,"41 1nft representations of the geopolitical and geo-ecoC:Oi!1POl'\tf'lll lft'll>~t nomical interests mentioned above.

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TENSIONS IN THE «FAULTS» If terrorist attacks against so urces and systems of distrib ution of energy resources happened, the terror ist group (considered in its broadest se nse, that is to say in its relig ious, in dependence , separatist, autonomist and pol itical demands) could achieve the follow ing st rategic results: • causing severe econom ic damage to the government of the country it fights against, making it

R1visla Militare English Edi/lon 11. 2/2007

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easy for it t o reach its political goal ; • causi ng seve re dam age even to the fore ign countries that have invested and supported t he gove rn ment of the country; • managi ng t o self- f und , both by reselling the energy resources t hat it has been able to obtain and by threatening to mak e fu rt her at tacks in order to receive m oney that w ou ld pay fo r w eapons and the t rai nin g of t he compo nent s of the group. T he attack s could happe n: • making t he pipe lines ex plode; · making oil well s or other infrastructu re (like oi l r igs) ex plode; • attacking tankers; · at tacki ng or th reatening to attack t he maritime traffic in t he «check p oints»; • making t he offices of t he national or fore ig n oil company exp lod e; · kidnapping or kil ling t he person nel of t he oil company (as th e recent cas es in Nigeria and t he act ivity of MEND- Movemen t for t he Emancipat ion of the Niger De lt a show). However , if t errorist movements , which aim t o control t he te rritory, developed wit hin t hese «faults», which are crossed by pipelines, surely t here would be con flicts t hat, accord ing to Van Creveld, «w ould have m uch mo re in com mon with t ribal conflicts than conventional wars on a large scale». In a recent article, whi ch has appeared in the «Inte rnational Herald T ri bune», Tho mas Fr iedman says th is clearly: «energy is t he most important geostrategic and geo - eco nom ic challen ge of

t hese days». It is so im portant t hat he t alks about a «post - post-Cold War» where wh at revolves aro und t he «axes of oil (Russ ia, Venez uela, Iran) is more im portant and lasting than terro ris m». Obvious ly , Friedman want s to criticize that view of t errorism as a merely criminal phenomenon. He sees it as an instru me nt of asym metric war because it can be t ightly li nked with t he current wars t hat are foug ht on d iffere nt «oi l ro utes». It is no co incide nce that, with in a single A me rican strateg ic struct ure, t he integ ration of t he anti - terro rist policy with that of energy security is strong ly evident in t he Caucas ian Repub lic of Geo rg ia, where, because of a histori cal- mythological coinci dence, Mou nt Kaz begi is situated. In t hi s place, as t he Georg ian s say Promet heus was crucified. Accordin g to Professo r Klare, w ho is directo r of t he «Five Co ll ege Program in Peace and World Secur ity Stud ies» , th e ris k of disorde r and confl icts in th ese countr ies w il l be caused by t he dest ab ili zin g impact of oil prod uct ion . T he western press could describe th is dis put e as «et hnic», but it will be caused by the negative effects of oil product io n. T he iss ue of energy resou rces will cause lots of wars, which wi ll take place in the develop ing co untries. Probably , t errorism wil l becom e a com mon f eat ure of future w ars fo r energy resources. Even t he pre sence of t roops in reg io ns that are rich in oil fields could arouse bitter re sent ment among the local populat ion , especially if t hese resources are seen as a nat ural and i nalie nable right. A key role wi ll be played by privat e security com panies, which w ill have to guarantee protection for energy resou rces . Once t he pipel ines that come o ut of the Cas pian

Sea are bu ilt and a great amount of oil starts to be transported, these routes will be cons idered t o be strateg ically important by the leaders of the countries they cross ; consequently, the enem ies of these regimes cou ld also see the attacks against these structures as a powerful instrumen t to weaken the gove rnme nt and harm its eco nomy. As a consequence, a permanent and low intensity confl ict could break out along th e itinerarie s of the pi pelines in the Caspian region . If the governments involved in this war we re not ab le to protect the pipelines, surely they would ask th eir allies for help and thi s could lead to more intense involvement by Was hi ngton and Moscow and, at th e worst, to the dep loyment of Ame rican and Russian troops. The future stability of the energy production in th e reg ion of th e Caspian Sea is t hreatened by widespread discontent in the new independ ent States. In addition, within the region the political

Nigerian guerrillas.

and social tens ion is he ighte ning and new movements of Islamic mil itants, who are inspired and often supported by their adversaries in the Pers ian Gulf and in the South East Asia are emerging. Consideri ng the «capricious» position of lots of Caspian borders and the ethnic and ideological links between d iffere nt rebellious factions, any possible clash could appear to be a threat to the governments and increase the participation of the two greatest powers . However, even witho ut Ru ssia and America's participation, in future the basin of the Caspian Sea could be theatre of recurrent uprisings and violence. Wars aimed at obtaining the control of energy resources could break out and they would involve the local governments and the groups of the rebels that are supported by a great power. T hese antagonisms could change into low intensity confl icts along the zones of border or in the besieged ethnic enclaves. T his kind of conflict can last for a long time

without producing any ch ange. However, it is po sible that suddenly an escalation of these conflicts occurs invo lvin g extern al powers , whose vital interests are put at risk. For them, the mil itary interve ntion would be the on ly solution. In this way the Caspi an reg ion could become the ideal place of a regional conflagration on a large scale. The shapes (which have already defined by Var Creve ld in his study o n the change of w ar) these conflicts could assume are the following: · Warre (or return to nature, Hobbes: «everyone against everyon e els e» ; consequ ently, it is not a w ar- bellum as di spute but it is a war- werra as a slaughter); • Low in tensity conflicts; · Proxy war (States or multinatio nals that finance t errorist grou ps or the sides t hat clash in a local conflict); · Netwar-Network War (in these phenomena, which have been studied by Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Duffield, t he confl icts are provoked by a terrori st network that is not hie rarchically organi zed and where the elements are linked with each other t hrough the Intern et networks); • Franchising terroris m (terrorist attacks that are im mort alized by local terrorist groups, who ideolog ically refer to a bigger organization an d sign their attacks us ing the «logo- mother» even though they often do not have any contact with it; al- Qaeda set s a pe rfect example); 4th Generation Warfare (a war where the State has lost its monopoly over the use of force and th e inte rested part ies use any networks at their d isposal - economic, pol itical , social and military- to thwart each other means it is also a war betwee n cu ltu re s) ; • Asymmetric Warfare (it is the asymmetric war that has been accurate ly described by th e Ch inese Co lonels Liang an d Xi angs ui) ; • «lraqizat ion» (in absence of a strong central governme nt the arm ed clashes/ te rrorist attacks are led by clans, whose «outlines» are not easy to identify). These conflicts will have a sign ificant influ ence on th e five sectors of security that have been pinpointed by Barry Buzan: military, political , economic, social and enviro nmental sectors. The prime target is the «Market State», wh ich has been theor ized by Philip Bobbit, but the economic sector is the most vu ln erable. An effective strategy would be hit its Achi lles' heel, that is «the economic target». In conc lusion, terrorism can be regarded as a strategy of war, an instrument rather than an actor, but also, as Bobe rt Cooper says, the possi ble return t o the privatisation of war, th at is th e pre- modern State with teeth. In fact, the conflict that will be closer to reality is

Riv1s1a Militare Englis /1 Ed,tion n. 212007

t his importance again and defin ed the Caucas ian similar t o the conflict that was narrated by Tol stoj area of «strategic interest» for ou r cou ntry. in «War and peace». · According to t he New Strategic Co ncept of NATO In the final pages of his work, he represents an (NATO NSC), wh ich was signed on 24th A pril 1999, hypothetical duel metaphorical ly. It introduces us to Italy com mits to suppo rting the all iance in the fol the concept of the «club» of popular war: «we shou ld lowing cases : imagine two me n who fight a d uel with sword • Art .20: «Eth nic and re li g ious rivalries, territorial according to t he rules of the fencing art; the bout d isputes, inadequate attempts to refo rm, abuse lasts for a long time; suddenly, one of the oppoof human rights and dissolution of States can lenents, since he is inju red and knows t hat it is not a ad to local o r regional instabil ity. As a consejoke, throws his sword to the ground, grabs t he first quence, this te nsion co uld cause crises that haclub he finds and starts to handle it. Despite the ve an impact on th e Euro- Atlantic stability» . French complaints about the violation of ru les (as if • Art.24: «Any armed attack on the Allies' territory there were rules to kill people), the cl ub of popu lar would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Treawar lifted with threat eni ng and majestic strength ty of Washington . However, t he security of the Aland , without taking the rules into consideration, with liance must take the g lobal confoolish simplicity. However, in an text into cons ideration. The ineffective way, it lifted and low terests of the security of the Alered itself, without any distincliance can include situations tions, to hit the French unt il all ' ' A key role w1 I be pi aye the Army died». y p ivate seturity compa whe re the level of ris k is higher, Then, as Pres ident Bush was at 1ies, which will have to such as te rrorist and cri m inal acts of sabotage and of o rthe G8 summit, which was host~uarantee protection fo1 acts, gan ized crime, as well as the ined by St. Petersburg , in the US, a he energy resources ,, terruption of the flow of vital refew days before the openi ng sources. The ungovernable moceremony of the pipe li ne Bakuvements of a great number of Tbilis i- Ceyhan (wh ich was people, in particular as a consequence of armed defined as the «Si lk Ro ute of the century» and even confl icts, can cause problems about security and «th e project of the ce ntury») the Turki sh Fo reign stability». Minister Abdullah Cu l met the Secretary of State This geographical area w e are studying is not Condo leeza Rice . t hreatening on ly because of ethnic and relig iou s They signed a common strateg ic agree ment, which was defined «Shared Vi sion» and was the rivalries, t errito rial disputes and possib le local and first in the US that was short of soldiers , and put reg ional instabil ity, but it is also crossed by the flow of vital resources th at is represe nted by the the strategic doctrine of t he <<Quadre nnial Defence Review» into practice. BTC pipe li ne (Baku - Tbilis i- Ceyhan). Not on ly d id t his document highlight the imporThe recent visit of the President of Azerbaijan to tance of Turkey as energy corridor, but it was NATO headquarters in Bru ssels has shown how the given a role as «con st ructive power i n the energy security NATO issue , which Pres ident Bush Caucasus region». raised in February 2006, is superimposed on the Therefore , th is wide area establishes itself as a strategic inte re sts of the author-actor countries of the Atlantic Alliance and incl udes a wider geographpossible centre of conflict between the greatest powers, so that it is compared to a new Midd le East. ical region .

A NEW FIRE WAR? Although this region is distant from our country, it has been included in the Italian geopolitical plans. According to the St rat egic Concept of the Chief of Staff of t he Italian Defence (i n 2001 ), «considering the r ichness in primary energy sou rces and the gee-strategic closeness», the area is defined «of national interest». In addition, the Strategic Concept tal ks about a possible involvement of t he Italian Armed Forces in that territory in case of «Operations of Reaction to Crisis». The New Strategic Concept of t he Chief of Staff of t he Itali an Defence in 2005 hig hlighted

Fuel tanks on fire .

llham Aliev has hig hlighted the richn ess in energy resou rces of his country and the importance of t he BTC for t he west ern suppl ies . He has clearly expressed an interest in st rengthe ning the relat ions wit h the Atlantic Alliance. This init iative has been positively wel comed by General Secretary of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, w ho has said t hat t he geopolitical and strat eg ic aspects of ene rgy sec urity are im portant for NATO an d Azerbaijan will play a domi na nt role as far as energy supplies are con cerned. Although the members of the All iance are discussing t he topic of ene rgy security, the agenda of t he recent «NATO summit», which was held in Riga (27th_29th November 2006), highlighted the importance of terrorism and security of energy resources. During the summ it entitled «Transforming NATO in a New Global A rea» President Bush said that NA TO is in transition from a static force to an expeditionary force. In addit ion, t he US are putting the «Lawrence' s legacy» into practice, using NATO's structu res (plann in g military train in g courses, which shou ld be he ld in Rome at th e «NATO Training Co llege» for Officials comi ng from North Africa, Middle East and Gulf) and the issue of «Gl obal Partnership» . «Partnership» is seen by so m e me m bers of t he A lliance as an oth er «label» for t he «coal ition of t he wi lling» from which the US could choose their partners , irres pective of whether t hey belongs to the All iance and acco rding to the m ilitary m is sion th ey have to accom plish. The sum of t he strat egic interests («the in t erests of security of t he Alliance») of NATO find s its cartograph ic narration in a w ider geographical reg ion than that given by the terr itor ial extent of its me mber countries and leads t o a «Regio nal Security Comp lex». In t hi s wide «reg ion» t he perim ete r of t he geo po litical construct ion (from T urkey to China

incl uding th e faults) is reconfirm ed. A lt ho ugh the figh t against terro rism and te rro rist threat is trying t o re p lace t he figh t agai nst the Sovi et Commu ni sm in the post - Co ld War anxiou s strateg ic mot ives of t he A lli ance, t he eleme nt «ene rgy» f in ds his «pivotal» role again . A possible Soviet attack could have been ai med at annexi ng new territories and, consequently, t he con fl ict would be fought within the geographical borders of NATO. In contrast, the new terrorist threats t ry to destroy or upset the functional capabilit ies of ow society. Conseq uently, the new conflicts will occur even outside t hese territories and see the NATO mem ber countries more and more engaged in operations that are defined as «societ al protection». This «cartog raph ic» narration, where «centrep er i p he r y - f a u I ts - energ y resources m erge into one» is perfectly exe mp lifi ed by Adm iral Di Pao la, Chief of Staff Of Defence, in his article, which was pu blis hed in th e <<NATO Review» (autu mn 200 6) . «A carefu l observatio n shows that instabi lity and current and future crises te nd to happen in t he zone includ ing the areas of contact between two oppos ing geopolit ical entities: a glo balized nucleus (characte ri zed by glo balizat ion and the access to technology) and t he area of disco nnected space (a di sconnected periphery that is made up of poor and , at t imes, frag ile St ates, w hose citizens have very f ew opport unit ies). T hi s zone crosses Euro pe and As ia, touch ing in some poi nts the Mediterran ean Sea and t he t erritory of the EU. It runs alon g strateg ically im portant areas for the presence of oil re serves and, especially in t he Pacific area, of vital com mun ication lines t hat are essential for t he w orld marit im e t rade». Up t o now we have answered th ree fundamental quest ions t hat any analysis of security should be able t o face. We can find the se answers in Articl es 20 and 24 of the NATO NSC. · What m ust be protected7 The «fire» and w e have answe red: «the interests of secu r ity of t he Alliance and t he fl ow of vi tal reso urces» (co nsequ ently t he constant t hat is represented by ene rgy resources). • Who/ what m ust it be protected from? From the «Water», and we have answered «from possi ble terrorist attacks and from possible instability t hat is cau sed by ethnic confl ict s» (the fl uid threat- fear).

Te rrorist organiza tions and groups of guerrillas keep under constanr threat the energ y supply routes and the centres of production and storage.

R1vtsla Mill/are Enghsh Ed1t1on 11 ?!?007

. Who provides us with secu rity? The «Earth» and we have tried to answer «NATO». What remains is the last q uest ion and the forth element: w hi ch met ho.ds / approaches must be used to guarantee security? T he «Air».

CONCLUSIONS If the current situation in the reg ion should worsen, it would be necessary to send NATO «peace keeping» or «peacebu i Id i ng» troops . Th is m ean s that Ital ian so ld iers cou ld be employed to keep the peace in the region and to act as policemen among the population w ho has been hit and divided by loca l conflicts . As General Fab io Mini says: «in t he Euro- Asian republics and in t he Caucasu s there are pockets of pure orienta li sm. These communities belo ng to the East of war». General Mini does not mean by «orientalism» a geograph ical concept, but a «cultu ral subdivision because of what culture g ives to t he concept of war. T he parameters the classificat ion are based on t he different concepti ons of Time , Space, Lif e and Death. Since T ime, Space, Life and Death are also the fundamental dimensions of war, the two sides d iffer from each other even in th e view of war». So, the future wars that wi 11 be faced «wi 11 be wars between differe nt cu ltures and, consequently, they wil l be asym m etric (and d iffere nt narrations of war that are not distant from the co ncept of the «clu b» of the popular w ar). It is not important to know w ho wi ll be the actors of these wars; what really matters is that t hey wi ll not f ight on equal terms and they will pursu e d iffe rent aim s». Metaphor ically speakin g, we refer to wars where the «pawns-e nemy/ water» and the ir relatio n to T ime, Space , Life and Death do not fo ll ow the rules of chess but probably the r ules that are closer to those of «Go» , where each pawn can destroy the other enem ies entire ly and sync hro nically, and where t he battle is not confined with in the lines, and so a game of pu re strategy. T he combi natorial analysis : a combination of four elem ents in class four (li k e the four elem ents: Earth, Fire , Air and Water confront each other in the four dimens ions: Ti me , Space, Life and Death) . Hence the need of experts in this wid e geograph ical area (which can turn into a «quag mi re»), where often: · the w arrior is barbaric (i n t he orig inal sense of the Greek term, «barbaros» wh ich means «foreign» that does not spea k /belong to our lan guage / cultu re/imaginatio n. Consequen t ly, he is «author- acto r» of a war and of a narration of war which has its own semiotics and is confined to an herme neutic circle t hat is understandab le to us ;

• war is ju stified by aspirat ions to «g lory» and so it is co nsidered as an answer to hum iliations that have been born e; • t he main military aims of the conflicts are the civi l pop ul ation and ethnic identities; • God is seen as the only guarantor of one's identity. Considering the comp lexity of these new confl icts , t he obsolete figure of the «sold ier Ryan» (with his forma mentis of the period of the Cold War) is about to be replaced not only by information and networks but by new figu res of consultants . They are qualified consultants who can be scientists, analysts, experts in cultural and econom ic inte lligence, hackers and experts in urban f ighting. They are ab le to pre-e mpt the enemy's moves and identify the actors of the conflicts because

A worke r checks the maintena nce of a pipeline in Azerbaijan.

t hese wars w ill be fought eve n by «non States)>, that is to say economic and social gro ups or non polit ical organ izations. So, as Appadu rai has highlighted, «ce ll ular organizations» versus «vertebrate organizations». «Vertebrate organizations» are seen not only as the State but also as its enti re structural and bureaucratic apparatus that has fal len behind with the process of t ransformation that has been stimulated by globalizat ion: it is slow and open to interpretation on possible threats t hat are made by «ce llular» structures. To face t hese «ce ll ular» threats , which are fluid , liquid and mu ltiform , t he m ili tary operational answer mu st adapt to a new «cultural» co ntext appeari ng in the guise of the enemy . Consequently a prompt and hierarchized answer and a camouflaged operat iveness, wh ich assumes the shape of the «rh izome» that has bee n studied by

De leuze and Guattari and applied, in a experimental way, to the <<Rhizome Warfare» by Jeff Vail: t hese units are made of individual and indepe ndent corps. They are self - su fficient units t hat include different «s pecializations», which are co m plementary and able to operate at t he sam e time collectively and ind ividually, fo llowing an operat ional model t hat is defined «reverse swarming», accordi ng to which you do not have to face the enemy di rectly but mingle wit h t he local population (and we add: in the local narration). Because of th is tactic of d ispers ion/camouflage in an unfamiliar and hostile co ntext, «becom in g an enemy», that is to say «moving unde r the gu ise of the locals», is overrid ing. Because of t his change from a «vertebrate» into a «cell ular» ope rativeness, t hat is to say «rh izome», which is more fl uid and intu itive , it is im portant to st art from «int elli ge nce», accordi ng to the meaning that Oxford Dictiona ry of Eng lish

An American soldier keeps watch on a burning well.

attributes to it: «the int ellect, t he understand in g». In th is «understanding», whic h is a m ental force t hat is free to fly into space, t he «intellige nce» becomes our forth element: t he «Air» , the astuteness of Ulysses. A good example is given by the «Mars and Minerva» that are depicted in the badge of the headgear of t he 2 1st regiment of the Anglo- Saxon SAS, whose first components we re painters, write rs, actors, m usicians and academics. The badge highlights the nature of t heir interests: war and creativeness. As, t he British Gene ral, Bob Fulton , says, the «Hu man Inte llige nce» (HUMIND «plays a vital role in establishing the ide ntities and t he purposes of t he adversaries and in understandi ng the enemy rather than limiting it se lf to counter them». Howeve r, it is necessary «to put the "I'' of Intelligence in invert ed commas» , as Robert Stee le says defin ing t he t hree principal element s of t he «I nformat ion Operations»: messages, real ity, tech nology. These new wars will be cha racterized by fou r protago nists: com pute r scientists and strategic

co nsu ltants , infantryme n, civil ians and terrorists . To face effective ly these new operatio ns, which are defined as miss io ns with «th ree com ponents» (acti ng as policem en, pe rformin g hum anita rian functions and do in g the ir mil itary duties - «warfighting role»), the «infant ryme n» will need further com petence and specialist know ledge . For this reason the activity of HUMINT wi ll have to be su pported by a strong act ivity of «cu ltu ral int ell igence>> (CULTINT). Since t hey wil l operate with in «barbaric» and seg mented societi es, whi ch must be stabilized , the study of the local languag e, histo ry, g ro und, cu stoms and cu lture of the areas t hat are involved in t he con fl icts will be fu ndamental in o rder to be ab le t o orient oneself and not to suffer negative consequences. T he «Orientation» (which is the way of interacting with the su rround ing envi ronme nt- narration) represents the central plank of what is defined by Am er ica n Co lo nel Jo h n Boyd «OODA Loo p: Obse rve- Or ient- Decide - Act» to face the chang es of the «4th Generation Warfares» . The CULTI NT m ust be able to pinpoint and express t he anth ropological ele ments , t he motivations, the be haviour, the languages, the sig ns, the myths, t he emot ions and t he fury t hat can t ransform, in acertai n moment, a peaceful and «non-combatant» «mass» into a contagious «war machine» : the involution al and creative process , wh ich has been descri bed by Deleuze and Guatt ari, of «becoming an animal and a war machine». We are talking about o peratio nal conte xts where t he vis ible is invis ible t o us and the game of parts cou ld change sudden ly and in a d ramat ic way. In t his case we, who are «disoriented characte rs», could becom e t he prey alth oug h t he booklet about the training of t he Austral ian Army re peats t hat «the enemy is t he game, w e t he hun ters». As General Mi ni suggests , it is t his intelligence «that divides legality and abuse of power and it is essent ial that we should be t he master of it» because «what we know w ith in ou rselves is worthless unless it co rresponds wit h what w e have to know». T he fact that t he new w ars will develo p al ong the current and , above all, the future energy r id ges is not a new one. Conseq uent ly, it is necessa ry to be ready and not to be taken by surp ri se. Current ly, the constant and increas ing demand for resou rces is putt ing t he energy netwo rks un der press ure and si nce suoplies do not meet demand any m ore, the tensio n wi ll increase. • Every drop of oil is so important that t he fou r elements : Earth (NATO); Fire (ene rgy reso urces) ; Ai r (intel ligence); Wat er (t errorism as flu id t hreat);

Rivista Mi/ilarc Eng/is/> Edition n. 2/2007

have been recently reconfirmed in the formulat ion of two in itiatives that witness the «mimesis» between energy resources , war against terrorism and the role of t he Alliance: . the first initiative, wh ich was launched by the American senator Richard Lugar, «Chairman of t he Senate Foreign Relations Committee», who examined, during the NATO Summit in Riga, the possibil ity of invoking the Art icle 5 of the At lantic Pact in case the energy resources of a member country are threatening. T his threat would be considered as a m il itary attack; . the second initiative, which was deve loped by Jamie Shea, «Director of NATO Policy Plann ing», who proposed that the Atlan t ic Council should create a Cell that is designed for the analys is of the intelligence and the security of energy. According to Shea: «a unit like this was creat ed in t he past and currently it deals w it h terrorism successfu lly. However, it should be ass igned a specific task concerni ng t he intelli gence of t he security of energy. The information that has been collected by the allies, partn ers, oil companies and d ifferent governments would be handled by a Specia l Committee in order to make its flow and its use by different entities that deal with t he security of energy easier» . These constant and unpredictable changes of the strategic contexts and t he arrival of new authors- actors- rules- non ru les on the internatio nal scene, which im pose a qualitat ive and epistemo logical passage on t he analyses of crises and conflicts, make a «nomadism of thoug ht», wh ich is able to cover all different academic and non-academ ic subjects, necessary.

T his is a metamorphos is, w hose framework must be extended beyond the rig id perimeter of the ·st rategic stud ies to t he wider and more fl exible, or even bette r «nomadic», perimeter of the «crit ical security studies>,, which were und ertaken by Barry Suzan and by t he School of Copenaghen. T he aim is t o give adequat e and real answers to th e «bu ilt» threats, using t he «intellect- understanding» of intelligence. Consequently, it is necessary to pass from a «logocent ri sm » based on a «National defencesecurity strategy» to a po ly-codified, hermeneutic an d comp lex «logoce ntrism» based on the «Reg ional Security Complex Strategy». «A real cul tural and conceptual revol ution», as Adm iral Di Paola has said rece ntly, «where the human element is t he cen tral element of the transformation and has a dual function, both as d rive r of t he process and as subject, on which the transformation will exert a signi ficant impact». To concl ud e, w ith Robert Kaplan, this jou rney along the «New Silk road of oil», it is essential that we should look at his suggestion: «the battles that are fo:..;~nt in order to gain contro l of t he pipe li nes in the Caucasus , the possib le conflicts betw een Iran and Aze rbaijan and the chaos in Georgia cou ld hit the headl ines. Facing these problems will involve the ab il ity of the we stern politica l leaders to use t he ir own power and to know how and whe n they have to intervene witho ut de luding themse lves» .

Oil wells.

Crude oil in flames near Basra, Iraq.

Giovanni Ercolani Professor of «Global Terrorism» and «Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution»

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ASTRA VEICOLI INDUSTRIALI S.P.A. j~ VIA CAORSANA. 79 - 29100 PIACENZA ;ljTA... ,~.,.r. PHONE++ 39.0523.54311 1 - FAX ++39.0523,5917731

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA A vast wild area where climate, geography, poverty and tribal conflicts are still today the impediments to its economic, social and cultural growth. An area where the contrast between the riches of the subsoil and t he poverty of its inhabitants grows ever more striking. An area where today the international community finds ever more fresh hope for the process of democratisation.

"Africa isn't a continent. It is more continents that a large part of the pop ul ation feeling part of their geography has amused itself keeping together; that nation, of their un ity, the ir independence and con anthropology has intended to vivisect; that history sider it fundamental in their daily political life. ''. has continually redesigned; that politics has systemIn sub-Saharan Africa the concept of the state is in atical ly reinvented. It's a mosaic of lang uages, culcontinual debate, because of new forms of colonial tures, peoples with thousands of intertwining ism, of democratic purposes , of confl icts still contin t hreads. Threads which mix together al ignment and ui ng, that don't take account of the local realities antagon ism, sim ilarities and differences". that are det erm ined by an ethno-cultural-h istorical Already this brief premise shows the difficu lty in character. Such factors of instabi lity are exploited by being to define the frame of refere nce for the the states who stir it up at regional or g lobal level , African sub- Sahara in order to through warlords, faction s, establish its geopolit ica l trends. armed groups in the name of The diffe rent rea lities, the his'The presence of more 'ac liberty, self- determination, idetorical events , the log ics of the Âˇors' in the area of Africa to ological claims, or even worse in ethnic nations as we ll as the he south of the Sahara, tha the name of rel ig ion. condition ing and the poss ib ility The instabi lity of the African jon't always tally witb of si ngle larg e geograph ical continent accentuate s the ountries, makes it even process of marginalization zo nes control ling an internal that scenario of diverse local and more difficult to understand separates African states from regional areas characterised by he individual realities .. ,, those of the west and Asia. The particular social and po lit ical estimat ed population growth situation s. rates in the last years by the The presence of more 'actors' in t he area of World Ban k of the African sub- Sahara (between 4.1 % Africa to the south of the Sahara, that don't always in 2004 to 6% in 2006), the increase in the productally with countries, makes it even more difficu lt to tion of petroleum (above all in the Gulf of Guinea), understand the singula r reality which is not always the direct foreign investment, the various forms of defi nable into western terms but rather to its own partnersh ip programmes and economic developindividual culture, that of conti nental Africa. ment programmes by international organizations, On the other hand, the concept of nationa l the international aid (do nations and subs idised states, 'the achievements of a long history are not loans), the situation regarding em ig rants, the inforas irreve rsible as once t hought some time ago . In mal local economy, they are all factors wh ich are fact it is possible to talk about national states with bringing an improveme nt to the conditions of the lives of the Africans to the south of the Sahara. In fact accord ing to Human Development Index t he countries of the African sub- Sahara register a score of 0.464, in comparison with 0.920 for the richest countries. Which indicates that the cou ntries of the African sub- Sahara are developing at a rate of approx imately half that of the most advanced counLeft Darfur refugees .

Title pages. Lake Edward in Uganda

Rivista Milita re English Edition " Âˇ 2/2007

An Ethiopian villag e.

tries in the world. However the risk is that the gap between the African sub-Sahara and the 'rich' countries of the world is increasing and not decreas ing . In such a situation, without the conti nual and stable reinvestment of t he su rplus gained it is difficu lt to believe that it will be possible to break the vicious cycle of underdevelopment. To t his regard , sti ll today, in the African su bSahara; 44% of t he population live on less than one dollar a day, a t hird of t he po pulation don't have access to drink ing water, two t hirds lack basic sanitary provisions. Accord ing to the UN Index of Development 30 of t he bottom 32 cou ntries are African . To which it can be added the scourges of HIV (it killed 2.4 mi llion in 2005), malaria which is still one of the principal reasons for death for t he under fives (20%), tube rculosis and the wars of the l 990's both in the region of the 'Great Lakes' (the 'African World War' 1996- 97 and 1998- 2003) and in eastern Africa with effects in t he first years of t he 21 st century in western Africa and in the south of t he Sahara with the effects of the ref ugees inside and outside the borde rs of the ir countries of orig in. An increas ing problem as ind icated by the UNCHR. In addition to t he fai lure of repeated programmes aimed at structural ly repairing t he economic systems, establis hing the process of democratisation wh ich are either unfinished or perhaps never really st arted, he lping ease the intensity of conflicts (such as in the north of Uganda, weste rn Congo, the south of Sudan, Somalia amongst others), the re must also be the consideration of the political- bureaucratic class that too often are corrupt and more ded icated to prot ecting their own power than to t he serving of the state (when there is the abse nce of a function ing and efficient ad min istration apparatus in respect to the rules), and wit h all this, the population. This continual instabil ity stops the African soci ety from being one who le, and the society is cont inually becoming further frag m ent ed (the concept of vi llage has been lost, so too that of t he exte nded fam ily, of respect to trad itions and for the 'old') and above all in the young who live in t he cities (formed into militia groups of the style 'outside

the clan' or ' post- ethnic'). To such a dangerously disjointed society it can be added the spreading of international terrorism t hat co uld recruit into its ranks bot h armed or ethnic gro ups or desperate individuals - giving to both t he dangerous new 'creed' of socio- historic reveng e, that allows , am ongst other things, the infi lt ration and t he expansion of j ihadiste ce ll s from Saud i Arabia and Ye men to enter Sudan, Chad and north Nigeria. If today the USA and the West in general gave greater attention to this part of the conti nent, not only because of a sense of guilt, or for the geopolitical logic of petroleum and raw materials, but also from the fear that splits the western world and the thi rd world, the Islamic majority, it cou ld allow t he change of international relations points of reference. A greater attention from the USA and Europe towards the affairs of the African sub- Sahara as well as the starting of a sustai nable development programme by the GS such as NEPAD (l) and renewable works and projects from t he international commu nity (M illenni um Development Goals - MDGs) in order t o defeat poverty before 201 5 and for relau nchi ng new forms of 'partnerships' would help create this. In general the foreign policy of western cou ntries is not to give 'cred its' to African countries unless t hey adopt free competition, laws of the market and the integration of the internat ional economy as well as giving at t he same time ful l scale attention to social and political issues through the following of objectives such as the f ight agai nst poverty, t he launching of the democratic process and the recognition of the human rights. However th is denial of automatic economic- financial aid to Africari cou ntries tends on one side to aggravate the social cond it ions in those coun tries who need it the most, and on the other side facilitates new regional powers (Nigeria, South Africa and the same Uganda) and permits the economic and commercial penet ration of Ch ina into the area. This last activity in the African contine nt is without ideolog ical impositions (as in t he past) or of recognitions of hu man rights but is driven by the pragmatic objectives and strateg ies of initiating advantageous j oint ventures and of acqu iring concessions to the immense natural resources, above all of energy and mine rals (platinum , cobalt, chrome, bauxite, titanium, gold, etc) further to which t he diamond mines which are under the custody of the African subSaharan countries. The instability, th e widespread and multi- directional confl icts in the African sub-Sahara that have characte ri zed the last 1 5 years, thanks to regio nal mu lti - po lemic elements among which the diffe rent 'actors' (eme rg ing states, powe r entrenching stat es , internatio nal criminal organisat ions, fundam entali st relig ious movements) have all found unoccup ied territory, wh ich had seemed to be in decline but not always so.

Soldiers in Darfur.

The errors committed in the 1990's that allowed the proliferation of cross- border confl ict in western Africa (Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia), the Great Lakes area (Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burund i and Uganda) and the southern side of the Sahe[ (Sudan, Chad, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia) has resulted in a major involvement of the internat ional community in the African question. The process of democratisation (presidential elections, parli aments, constitutional referen dums) recently undergone, the new forms of financing based on the concept of African Ownership (2) , the strengthening and improved dynamism of some regional organizations (African Union) and sub-regional as well as some 'strong' states (Nigeria and South Africa), the rate of growth recorded in the last few years for some countr ies have all made the 'afro - optimists' believe that the worst is past. The tendency for on ly mino r outbreaks of con flicts in many of the sub-Saharan countries is resulting in a rush of investments, business and extraction of pri mary resources and energy not on ly from the western world but also from the big develo ping countries of Asia. If before such access to these resources was the domain of the ex- colonial powers and then the multi-nat ional companies today they are being coveted by the new dynamic actors that have to keep happy the ever increasing hunger for peace of m ind for access to future necessary energy reso urces that wo ul d be able to supply their expected economic growth . In short t he interpret ation of the latest political , social and economic indicators show an overall contrasting picture but that can be jud ged as the African sub- Sahara as being in the process of a more or less positive development.

THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISATION AND REGIONAL AND CROSS- REGIONAL CONFLICTS In recent years many of the conflicts that started in the 1990's have, if not finished, faded away in many of the African states and conversely transitional phases of pol itical openness have started thanks above all

to the support of the UN, the regional (African Union - UA) and sub- regional African organ izations and military-diplomatic action of the regional powers (N igeria, South Africa) and European Countries (Great Britain and France in particular) and the United St ates as well as the European Union. Recently new slogans have started to emerge such as 'African RenaissanceÂˇ. Which highlights nearly a rebirth of culture or at least a new spring that 'would sprout' throughout the cont inent. Al l this within a context of ever more attention from the International commun ity to Africa. At the same t ime there has been a real and true spate of elections in many countries where the pop ulation themselves have elected their own pres idents, remaking parliaments, voting on referendums, at times post war and at other times these actions have reinforced democracies which had already started. To which can be added various political activity and accords - happened in the course of 2005-2006 t hat give great hope for the future, for example, the meeting and eventual accord between the government of Khartoum and the factions present in the south and south- west of Sudan (declaration of the principles for the resolution of the conflict in the east of Sudan and then for peace talks); the electoral elect ions between July and October 2006 in t he Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for Joseph Kabila (which happened in almost a dynastic way after the assassination of his father Laurent Desire Kabila in 2001, who had dethroned Mobuto Sese Seko with the help of neighbouring countries and internal military and factions assistance) even if thanks to t he constant mediation from South Africa. Certainly such events provide a 'foundation' for the stabilization of a 'platform' for sub- Saharan Africa in the region of t he Somalian refugees.

Rivista Militare English Edition n. 212007

Great Lakes. Leaving aside the final destination of the various mi litia, factions that have always been in existence, but above all in the last 1 5 years, in the reg ions more eastern, to the south and east of Congo (the regions of the ltrui, Kivu, Shaba and Kasai) that have resulted in being also the richest in primary materials and diamond mines and therefore under pressure from those countries around (Rwanda, Burund i and Uganda) amongst others. We mu st also appreciate that the electoral results of the ballots strongly reflect the ethnic and linguistic origins of the area of the two political actors; from the west of the country comes Bemba and from the east Kabil ia. The local, parliamentary and preside ntial elections as well as the referendum for the accept ance of the new constitution in neig hbouring Burund i have represented another factor in stabilizing the entire reg ion. For Burundi and its president, Pierre Nkurunziza, (an ex leader moderate hutu leader) th is event has represented a great opportun ity to put to a close a th irteen year conflict that has claimed 300,000 victims. Only once all the different mil itary factions and sides had laid down their weapons and moved forward into the political phase will Buru ndi and the enti re region have finally left 'danger return ing', as has unfortunate ly been seen from the past. At the same time Paul Kegame, in Rwanda, has reinforced his own political position with the elections of Augu st 2006 further distancing the memory of the period of genocide that occurred in the middle of the l 990's and of the subsequent war in the region. Even the self same Uganda had given out an important political goal. On the 23rd February 2006 there were the first multi- party elections for twenty- six years. Which resulted in a new five year mandat e to President Yowei Museveni, already in power for about twenty years and 'acting' principal of the region . Above all the new victory of President Museveni puts not a little doubt on the real capacity of Uganda to reform itself politically. In fact the distribution of votes showed that there could be a possible problem 'north'. Recent agreements between Sudan and Uganda and the consequent improvement to political- diplomatic relations have redefined t he activity of the mi litia of Joseph Kony, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) enough to force him to enter peace talks with President Museveni and then to proclaim the "cessat ion uni laterale des hostilities" after 18 years of guerrilla warfare and terror. Such events can't not be read in a positive way, adding another important piece to the puzzle of the whole region. However there is still the difficult reading of the situation in Sudan. There have been attempts to bring stability and peace to the area, like

Militiamen in Darfur.

the historic agreement in January 2005 between the Khart oum Govern ment and t he Sudan Peop le's Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A). Anyway the situation stays critical because of the amount of interest at stake for the exploitation of the oil fields, the regional tribalism and the dramatic situation in which thousands of refugees (about 200,000) as well as the fragile democracy around the country. Certainly, even in this case the suffering of the population, the high number of victims and the around 1.8 million people 'deplacees' around the various refugee camps put the Darfur question among the problems that are sti ll unresolved. Fear of the fact of a potential Rwanda of the twenty first century that could drag in those countries around (Chad and t he Cent ral African Republic) was expressed by the Pres ident of the African Union, Oumar Konare, stating 'a risk of a regional conflict' that would include Chad and the Central African Repu blic 'is t he consequence of Darf ur'. With regards to the UN High Comm ission on Refugees (UN HCR) urges 'the international community to rapidly mobil ize a multitask presence in Chad for the protection of the thousands of Chad civilians and the Sudanese refugees'. The political accord of the 20th Aug ust 2006 in Lome is also sign ificant. In fact after 12 years of tension, t he pl ight of about 40,000 people from Togo t o Ghana and Benin, and the interruption of international aid there has been the reopening of talks and retu rned hope for democracy in the African country and so EU international aid has also returned. In particular, but not especially so, is the case of Zimbabwe who has been led since 1980 by President Mugabe (evidence that 'political longevity' is not new to the African Sub- Sahara) who recently won the elections in 2005 . Other countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya have been significantly changed by the responses in their elections. The situation is also stable in Angola after the events of 2002-2003 (the death of the Savimbi leader,

Demonstration outside the White House in fa vour of peacekeepers in Darfur.

the election of Samakuva UNITA leader and the UNITA armed strugg le against the Movimento Popular de Libertac;:ao de Angola - MPLA) and the important possibil ity offered by the potent ial exploitation of oil, contributes to give an optimistic picture of a future to be characterized by economic and social growth for much of the sub- Saharan reg ion. Other important political events occurred at t he start of 2007, such as the elections in Senegal , where t he exiting president Abdoulaye Wade was confirmed as t he winner of t he first rounds of presidential elections suggesting a stability in the country. Other events are due to happen in this period, such as elections in Sierra Leone (28t h July 2007) after l Oyears of civi l and regional fighting (l 991-200 1) that requ ired the intervention of a m ilitary conti ngent of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and of the UN Mission (UNAMSIL), the sign ing of the Lame accord between the governments of Sierra Leone and the Revolution United Front (RUF), the constitution of the National Committee and finally the elect ions of the 14th May 2002 (won by President Kabbah). Thanks to the help of the international community the central government has retaken control of various diamond producing regions in the north. Also Liberia, on a par with Sierra Leone, seemed to have 'switched' to t he democratic way with its elections of 11 th October 2005 . It even had the election of Ellen Johanson Sirleaf, the first woman to become Head of State in a country that for decades had endured dictators, armed milit ia, mass slaughters , illegal trafficking of arms and diamonds, regional conflicts and the military action of Taylor. But it is pe rhaps the elections in Nigeria (Apri l 2007) that could constitute one of the most import ant political events of the year regarding the stability of the region. The way it is carried out and the acceptance of the electoral results wi ll confirm the level of democratic socio- polit ical maturity of the country (which has 140 mill ion inhabitants) after Obasanjo (president for two te rms) notwithstanding

t he eth nic, tribal and religious t ensio ns and the tensions connected to the extraction of crude oil (an issue over the Niger Delta). But not only here, in Ivory Coast and Somalia there lack the possible moves to democracy. In the first, in the zone of the western coast of the African subSahara it wasn't able to go to elect ion in October 2005 even with the mediation of Nigeria and South Africa in t he widest sense of being the international community. In Somalia there has n't been success in ending a period of internal confl ict even though there has been a fairly long process of democratisation t hat started in 2002 (3). The constitution on one side of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace against Te rrorism (February 2006) and from the other side t he Union of the Islamic Court (UCI) have pus hed the possibilities of peace further away in the Horn of Africa. The direct entry of troops from Addis- Abeba into the Somalian conflict alongside the those of t he transitory Somalian government of Baidoa against the Islam ic Court, and the mi litary actions on the part of the United States has risked to incentivize and increase, as a reaction, the extent of global Islamic terroris m in the entire region of the Horn of Africa as felt in recent times. The hope of the accord of June 2006 (under t he aegis of t he Arab League) between the Somali government and the UCI for reciprocal recognition that could allow the future political dialogue between the parties has vanished with t ime. The direct intervention of the African Union with the sending of a peace force (African Mission in Somalia - AM ISOM) under t he aegis of t he UN (resolution 1744) "... for the purposes of supporting the talks and reconciliat ion in Somalia for the creation of security and protection in the zone" of whom that have taken part in t he congress of reconciliation have tempered the tens ions that have hit the whole region of the Horn of Africa even because of the intervention of Ethiopia in the Somalian conflict. There is the risk of reawakening the rivalry in the region between Et hiopia and Eritrea that was subdued in the peace of Algiers in May 2000. The difficult diplomatic relations between the two count ries of the Horn of Africa is also reflected in their diverse political choices. In fact on the one side is Ethiopia, the only country with a large Christian presence amongst the Islamic countries and has been increasingly worried about defending itself against polit ico- military st rikes from Somalia, and tries to contain any eventual irredentism in the Ogaden region , and a corridor of commerce and a toe hold in the Red Sea, while on the other hand Eritrea is after t he expansion of its own influence in the region, trying to take advantage of its geographical posit ion, openi ng its ports to China and so indirectly weakeni ng Ethiopia's stance. In addit ion to problems at the macro

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level there is also an incompatibility between the two types of people in the two countries, both are afflicted with a weak managing class, that risks to aggravate the situation. In such a scenar.io the employment of the African Union in Somalia with its own contingent clearly signals an important moment in the dream of progressive stabilization and pacification of t he region and showing at the same t ime the wi llingness of Africans to take part in the resolution of their own crisis and tendencies wh ich afflict themselves in Africa. On the who le it is eviden t that the last few years have seen an increase in t he peace process, agreements, pres idential and parliamenta ry elections that have occurred in the African sub- Sahara: ""Africa does not suffer a democracy deficit. More than two-thirds of sub- Saharan African countries have had democratic elections since 2000" (US Department of State - Bureau of African Affairs). Undoubtedly in respect to t he l 990's and from 2000 the confl icts and the wars have left ample space for a great expectation of democratic processes and a political rebirth in the African sub-Sahara. Which is indepe ndent of the fact of doubt over the longevity of the polit icians it is nevertheless, whe n taking into account time necessary for change, a process of democratisation that is becoming more widespread and perhaps also stronger. Cert ainly there are stil l ce rtain important political issues that could destabilise the area, including risks of explosions of violence or instability as for example in Darfur or in t he Horn of Africa.

izations has wit h time been reinforced (there are sixmonthly meetings between the 'troika countries' and Âˇannually between the EU and African Union mem ber cou ntries). In July 2003 the African Union summit in Maputo requested in particular for the necessarily EU support for t he commencement of the 'peacekeeping' and 'build ing' operations . The response in relation to security issues was for the EU to adopt a global strategy (A Secure Europe Better) and a strategy specific for Africa (The African Peace Facility - APF) which pledges about 2S0 million euros until the end of 2007 from the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) for the peace in Africa. But the commitment of the EU is also a commitment direct into the field with the start of Operation Artemis (4) in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the scope of the MON UC mission, started in June 2003 and concluded in the September of the same year, in accordance with the UN resolution l 484 and in the rem it of European Policy of Security and Defence (EPSD). Such an operation was constituted by a t hree

STRATEGIES AND IN ITIATIVES FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR AFRICA, IN PARTICULAR CONCERNING THE HORN OF AFRICA

May 2005, UNMIL.A ceremony of the Chinese contingen t in Monrovia, Liberia.

The process of democratisation in sub- Saharan Africa fi nds fresh air and hope in the large attention given to it by t he international commu nity, by the international organizations (the UN), by regional organizations (the African Un ion - UA) and subregional, by t hose of Europe (the European Union), and countries attached to the G8, as wel l as the increased strateg ic activity by the USA and Ch ina. It can be seen in t he dive rse initiat ives of 'partnership' (NEPAD, Millennium Development Goals - MDGs) and 'strategy' (National Secu rity Strategy of the United States of Amer ica - 2002 , Ch ina's Africa Policy) that are related to the Africa of today. In such a cont ext the European Union have started a series of important initiatives and defined strategies. The EU- Africa talks (Cairo- process) were launched in 2000 with the understanding that the security of the region depends on the development of these countries. In the African Union the EU found natural intermediaries for t he initiatives and programmes that came out of Brussels. T his link between t he two organ-

part objective and viewpoint mIssIon in addition to international intervention; the first operation of the "reestabl ishment" of peace by the EU, conducted without the support of NATO and the first operation 'hors zone' (S). With th is regard the EU supported in 2006 t he electoral process in t he DR of Congo (Operation EUFOR RD Congo) as per the UN resolution nu mber 1671. The military operation, in accordance with t he government of the RDC and in close alignment with MONUC, confirmed once again the willingness of Europe to put into practice all the necessary actions to bring about the dialogue between the various African countries and political components. In particular "the EU has busied itself in t he training of the security forces , has sent 300 observers into al l the territory and has supplied l 50 million euros to finance the elections, to which should be added l 00 million euros of bilateral aid supplied by member states." This renewed attention by Europe to t he African Problem also broug ht in 2005 the European Commission to define t he 'EU Strategy for Africa:

Darfur guerrillas.

A guerrifla of Darfur.

towards a Euro-African pact to Accelerate Africa's development' implemented in the same year as the European Council with its 'EU Strategy for Africa' . More recently during 2006 the European Commission launched a new EU African partnership dedicated to the internal infrastructures of land transport, energy, water, information technology in order to achieve the objectives as set out by the African Union and the NEPAD programme, funded by the l oth European Development Fund (2008- 2013). This is in the conviction that 'the creation of the infrastructure in Africa represents an essential requirement for economic and commercial growth, regional integration and the fight against poverty'. In this respect the European Council has renewed its pledge for the next three years (2008 201 l) in the APF for the amount of 300 million euros. Following the worsening of the situation in Somalia during 2006 the European Commission, some months before the Ethiopian troops entered Mogadishu, had also defined a specific community strategy for the Horn of Africa (EU partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa - 20 October 2006) that includes in its operating other relevant regional and sub regional organizations (see graphic). But why has the EU got to give so much attention to Africa and in particular the Horn of Africa? Why not limit itself to eastern Europe or the Mediterranean basin? What is pushing Europe to look so far and so south? The EU Is looking at Africa, and in particular at the Horn of Africa simply because it is an important strategic area. In fact the interests are as follows; strategic security, considerin g the geographic, cultural and economic proximity to the Middle East, as well as the fact that any regional conflict could increase international terrorism, banditry, the illegal trafficking of arms and people, the number of safe havens for criminality, uncon trolled migration and refugees and a proliferation of arms (Small Arms and Light Weapons - SALW) ; economics, tied to the extraction and trans portation of crude oil, taking into account the vicinity of Saudi Arabia and the proximity to

important transport rou tes already in use, such as the Red Sea to the Suez Canal, or the future Iou e of the Red Sea to the Centre of Africa ; gene ral geostrategic, taking account of the interest shown in recent years by countries such as Chir and India to the African sub- Sahara. In such regard the Horn of Africa today constitutes the closest place of entry into sub-Saharan Africa from Asia. The actions of the UN were born out of considera tions for peace, security, migration, interaction and the management of relief projects in li ne with its principals that cannot solely be sub regional in orde to be successful, but must face problems interregionally or internationally to have any success. For this motive the EU operates with all the principa, organizations reg ionally and sub- regional ly. Yet it is aware of the need for developing a globa strategy of prevention against conflict through politics and through the sector of security, economic development and the construction of democratic govern ments. The strategy of the EU in Africa comes from, in essence, concerning the consideration according to what would be safe and secure with the eradication of poverty and only then allows a development that is sustainable and long lasting. Such a strategy must be applied to the African sub-Sahara and especially the Horn of Africa, where there is a concentration of the poorest countries of the world. And there is no space for initiatives that were characterised in recent years that were driven by single countries such as France, United Kingdom and the United States (6).

THE AFRICAN SUB-SAHARA: A NEW OPPORTUNITY? BUT FOR WHOM? Greater stability in the politics of sub-Saharan Africa, the easing off of many internal conflicts in many coun tries, the ending of some regional and inter-regional wars, greater weight from the African Un ion to reinvigorate duty, pos itive influence by the international community and the action by certain African countries (South Africa and Nigeria above all) - not without

Rivis ta Mili/Dro English Edit1011 ri.

interests - they are concomitant to a greater economic political and commercial presence by external c~untries (external players) to the African continent. The energetic need and th~ search for new commercial markets make important countries put them in their sights for development (China above all) and in competition with European countries and the United States for the util ization of the area, in the dividing out of influential sectors and the spreading of investment. This new push towards a new 'Eldorado' is perhaps attributed by the perceived increase of instability and unpredictableness of the entire Middle East. The growth of tension in the Persian Gulf has, once again, underlined the extreme dependence of the energy consumers of the big countries on th is area. The development or the growth of t he petroleum sector in the African sub- Sahara takes on a whole new particu lar, shall we say strategic, importance. The cu rrent petroleum reserves of Africa only represent about 9% of the world 's resources (the equ ivalent to how much Kuwait offers) and an overall production of about l 0% of the global production. But they are betting heavily on the potent ial reserves that t hey have yet to explore. Black Africa, with more t han 4 mil lion barrels of petroleum a day, has finally reached a level of interest at the world level. Its production has increased 36% in l 0 years, in respect to 16% in other areas. In fact the entry of the African sub- Sahara in the world crude oil market is an event fairly recent (l 96070's). And above all from t he l 980 's when the Gulf of Gu inea became a favourite for international investment in petroleum. The production of crude oi l has registered an increasing value in respect to crude oil prices , due to t he new technology that allows deeper extraction, the discovery of new oil fields, the exploitation of offshore fields, the strategic importance in diversifying energy suppliers, the possibility of new pipelines that cross wide areas of the African sub- Sahara. And so the region finds itself in an excellent pos1t1on for t he European and American markets. The African sub- Sahara therefore is not only territory reserved for the exclu sive use of t he main world multinationals of western countries, but also areas of expansion and of economic and political influence of other nations. Now there are many who are talking of a real and significant activity, in particu lar the Chinese, of the extraction of subsoi l commodities. It is always more and more African governments and sub- Saharan governments that give in to the offers of business by the Chinese for the exploitation of their mineral resources and energy, where previously there had been Europe and the United States as per t he post- colonial divisions. The geopolitical situation of petroleum is changing rapidly and t he panic started about its pres-

212007

REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

AU: African Union:

IGAO: cornposed of Djibouti, Kenya, Erhiopia. Eritrea, Somalia and Uganda. NBI: Nile Basin IMialive; COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; LAS: League ofArob States; EAC: Eastern Africa Community. Fonlo: Srrorogyfor Africa: A Europeurr Union n,g,onnl polit>CBI pMr,,ership for~ . socurlty ood devtJ(opmont in Ille Hom of Alrica, COM (2006) 601 ffnOI - 20.10.2006

ence has forced a more compet it ive market and more diverse rules. It seemed t hat at the beg inning of t he century there was a real race for the black oil. The US National Intelligence Council projected t hat before 20 1 5 America would have to import 25% of its petroleum requirements as opposed to the then current 16%. But sub- Saharan Africa is no longer a 'game reserve' for t he exclusive use of the large western m ultinational oil companies, in particular to those of France and the USA. Now in developing countries the competition is strong. China, the second largest consumer of crude oil in the planet, imports more than 25% of its needs from the Gulf of Gu inea and the Sudanese hinterland . Considering the dependence on energy of the country and the rate of growth and development it wi ll be forced to import about 60% of its requirements from here in 2020. This particular activism by China can be seen as part of a much wider and more attacking economic and political strategy. Even 2007 began with a strong desire by President Hu Jintao to reinforce relat ions with the African sub- Sahara as was demonstrated by his third trip since 2003 to the African continent, during which he visited 8 countries including Sudan and South Africa. This pragmatic action by Peking is inspired by the 'win- win' strategy not inli ne with that of the Internat ional Monetary Fund and the attempts for pressure by the World Bank. China, in fact chooses to not try and interfere with the internal affairs of any of the states with which it deals. In effect the cooperation takes place without any set of conditions in regards to the absolute sovereignty of the states, but looks ata the supplying of services, infrastructures, systems and capacities at competitive prices. The West,

or others, then such instability cannot be a surprise, irrespective of recent progress. In fact the intrins c ECCAS: Economic Community of Central Africa States; difficulty related to the birth of the modern state in t he SADC: Southern African Development Community; African sub-Sahara, perhaps, is connected to the fac COMESA: Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa; that it has never known a sovereignty of state in the IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority for Development; I ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States; modern sense, which is 'an unquestioned physical EAC: East Afric;Jn Community; control of a certain territory, that also has a adminisCEDEAO: Communaute Economique des Etats de /'Afrique de l'Ouest; trative presence in the whole region and a trust of t1, CEEAC: Communaute Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centra/e; population in the idea of the state itself. ECOMOG: Economic Community of West Afric;Jn States Monitoring. The same confl icts always follow the logic of 'poland especially the European Union, gives conditions itics of identity' (a movement and leader that come and parameters, not only economic ones, based on the from the same ethnic, racial or religious backthree principals of equal ity (recognising and respecting ground) instead of those from t he 'politics of ideas of the institutions and the defin itions of the collective that has characterised the twentieth ce ntury. interest), partnerships (development of relations based The process of political, economic and social on commercial and political partnerships) and codisgregration is, above all, the obstacle that s involvement (participation in the strategies and poli keeping the international community and interna ties, their development, which cannot be imposed tional, regional and sub-reg ional organizat ions externally but must come from within the relevant busy, foreseeing the involvement of the African countries) and for the following of countries themselves in th l the three objectives of developresolution of the conflicts or ment (OMS): peace, security and ' African sub Sahara 1s nc the their own continent . Such good government. This inevitably anger a domain purely for thf. renewed efforts are confirmed leaves some states under the influ- Nestern multmat1onals.. , , with time in the process o ence of the new partners with the democratisation started or risk that some will have their olireinforced in many coun tries. garchic regimes strengthened, enriched and so disable In such a situat ion the employment of military un its any sustainable long term development within the in the area (contingents for the most part constitut country. ed by light infantry aimed for fast and rapid deploy ment into crisis areas) owned by countries, above all African, but not only, contribute to create the condiCONCLUSIONS tions of stability and security necessary and indis pensable for the initiating of peace processes. The The recent political - military and socio- economeducation of a managing African class that is always ic events in sub- Saharan Africa are somewhat con more knowledgeable of its own duty and role, the trad1ctory. The process of marginalization of the development and the spreading of democratisation, African sub-Sahara continues, and it's finding it the fight against the principal diseases and sicknesshard to leave the role given to it, above all in the es (HIV and malaria in particular), the development of past, the vast reserves of primary materials, of an local sustainable economy as wel l as the structure energy resources and labou r forces under the and public work related to the environment in generpush of the new technologies, financial markets, al. The eradication of every form of corruption and of access and the taking advantage of the energy violence, the social and economic development is resources by the more indu strialized countries or found in part in response to the work by the internathose with the new strong economies. The instability of many regions, above all closely connected The Vice Presiden t of the Government of South Sudan. to the geopolitical map of petroleum and of the Riek Macher (centre). To his left and to his right respecextraction of primary resources, is synth es ised in t ively Joseph Kon y, leader of the LRA and his number the expressio n "malediction des ressources". For two, Vincent Ottii. the confirmation of this it's sufficient just to pass an eye over a map of the area where there are oil fields and diamond mi nes and the water of Africa. Furthermore the territories of ethnicity and cou ntries don't tally, and there are 'missing states', or states with a weak or non existent central gover nance, helps the natural pus h towards disjointing and instability. If the state can't perform its pri nciple func tions of 'protecting property rights, personal security of its citizens from other citizens and other countries'

ACRONYMS

Rivista Mili/arc English Ed1/1on n. 212007

tional community (01, EU, regional and sub-regional organizations) and by the Africans themselves. Above all t here remains areas of fierce conflict . If in the l 990's the area of inte nse activity was the Great Lakes reg ion, today the area immediately to the south of the Sahara together with the Horn of Africa is the 'hottest'. The danger, irrespective of the forces put into the frame, that the process of marginalization could produce in the fo ll owing years, together with the dangers of lega lity, is still very possible. The activity to now cou ld well have given the African sub-Sahara a 'push' but that is not to say it guarantees w it h certainty a reversal of the trends of the l 990' s. (7) Massimo Biagini Lieutenant Colonel, Army General Staff NOTES NEPAD: new partnership for the developme nt of Africa. In short an initial agreement by the international community that predicts an increase in the f inances for the d evelopment of countries that manage to put into practice good government and economic recovery. ?trategy_ that ~ends to push the countries targ eted for in~ernat1onal aid to prod uce their own development plans orientated towards the donor countries g iving finances directly to the public balance Cessation of hostilities by 22 leaders - Eldoret, Kenya, on 27 I 10/ 02: adopted by the Federal Constitution Charter of Transition - Nairobi (Kenya) the 15/9/03 and subsequently approved by the Delegates to the National Conference of National Reconciliat ion, the Federal Parliament of Transition - Nairobi, on 29/ 8 /04, the election of the President of the Republic (Yusuf Ahmed) nominated the Prime Minister of the Federal Government of Transition - Nairobi 3/11 /04, transferred fro m the Somalian Federal Inst itutions of Transition by Kenya in June 2005 firstJowar and t hen Badoa the 26/02/06 C~EM;-CEREMS 20_0 5: dossier d'etude ' La gestion des crises . The operation was an urgent resp o nse to t he crisis - m_ilitary clashes and humanit arian catastrophe - in the reg ion of ltu ri and in particu lar in the city of Bu nia in the north east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where the mission of UN MO~UC was already operating. Of particu lar note, on the 3ot May 2003 t he UN Security Council a_uth?rized with resolution 1484 the deployment of_ a m ultinational force at Bunia. Subsequently the operation became a peace keeping m ission fo r the EU (12 June

Somalian refugees.

Elections held in RDC in 2006. 2003, Cou ncil of Europe) In summary the objectives of the m ission consisted of sta bilising_ the condit_ions in Bun1a, t he improving of the humanitari an sItuatIon, the protecting of the airport and the people 'deplacees' from the fi elds near Bunia and in assisting the national civil and security forces and the personnel of the UN and other international organizations under the command of France in its position as 'nation cadre' it articu_lated a command joint and combined in Paris, an operation in Entebbe in Uganda and about I ,800 soldiers deployed in the theatre of operations. Fr~~ce and the Unit ed Kingdom have operated with their own InItIatIves, they have been in Africa for a long time. Initiatives that perhaps could find greater 'force' if placed with in the framework of a common European effort, taking account of the number of points in common that the there are for the prevention and resolution of conflict. In particular France had sta11:ed in the midd le of 1990 the 'Reforcement des capacites de maintein de la paIx (RECAMP) dealing with the formation, the training, the equipping of African units. The United Kingdom had started the beginning of the 21 st century with the African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACCP) of 2001 , the British Peace Support Team (BPSD who are to train before 201 0 about l 7,000 African soldiers from English speaking countries in th_e skills t_yp1cal of peacekeeping (training for support operations), while at the same time promoting activity in other areas such as Building African Institutions (supportin g and developing of the West African Standby Brigade - WASBRIG and of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade EAS BRIG) and the Security Sector Reform. As for the activity of the United States, in 1997 the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was started_ and lasted five years before being replaced by African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), together with many other initiatives, geared towards the improving of military competence in Africa strengthening the training of personnel, the capacity of military units and the Chief of Staffs (standardisation interoperability, creation of structures, etc). However the greatest interest in Africa was present already by 2002 when the Gulf of Guinea was declared an 'area of vital interest ' for the USA and in the dangerous modern day scenario of infiltration and growth of international terrorism. T he USA had started a seri es of initiatives concerning the growth of the potential of development and the growth itself of countries which had demonstrated the capacity to effectively show democratic reform and development. For example, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). "Can Africa claim the 21 st Century7", by the World Bank. In the African sub Sahara 40% of the population, more than 259 million persons, live under the poverty level. wh ich is fixed at a world leve l at one dollar per day. The report states that 'the number of poor is constantly growing, for which the African percentage in terms of the world grew from 2 5 t o 30% in the course of the nineties' .

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THE ALGERIAN ARMY Today Algeria plays a key- role in t he Mediterranean area. An in- depth analysis of its history and Armed Forces helps to understand the Country's policy and strategy.

In the summer of 1830 the French t roops of the powerful Armee d'Afrique victoriously entered Algiers. Certainly General de Bourmont could not have seen that amongst the d unes of the Sahara a group of guerrillas led by Emir Abd el - Qadar were being organized into an elusive and bloody paramilitary resistance force, that for over a century would put to the test the great and glorious France, hitting at the very jewel of the ir colonial crown. And amongst those dunes and the sons of the Berber kingdom never really dominated - was born the Algerian Army.

Above. The national flag.

Title page. THE LONG AND BLOODY STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

A military ceremony.

In 1834 the 'Regime du Sabre' (the Government of the Sword) began a long season of attacks, of rapes, of defilement of mosques and the indiscriminate pillaging of the artistic treasures of the Algerian territory by the French Monarch Luigi Fillippo's 34,000 men . A military presence that was necessarily increased to 100,000 as soon as the French colonizers arrived (the so called 'pieds noir' attracted by the low cost of labour they came to set up plants and small factories), all in order to control only a small part of the vast Algerian territory. And between 1839 and 1847 even these l 00,000 of the Armee d'Afrique (a third of the French army) were at full stretch to handle the soldiers of Abdel- Qadar in a long and d ifficult campaign for the conquest of southern Algeria. Finally the French Second Republic declared the "Algerian Colony" part of the integrated France and with Napoleon Ill - driven by the personal ambition to become t he 'Roi des Arabes' (King of the Arabs) - the military presence became even stronger. The immediate defeat of France at the hands of the Prussians in 187 1 led to a massive emigration from Alsace and Lorraine to the colony, raising the presence of colonials in the area which in turn led to increased ill- feeling from the indigenous people which resulted in increased guerrilla and anti- colonial activity. And again the predictable response by Paris was increased policing: two

mi llion French colonials had to be defended from the four million Algerian Muslims. T he application of a new Penal Code - it introduced the crime of 'insolence' and suspects could be held in prison for up to five years before trial - continued t o mai ntain the two 'communities' always separate and always opposed. By this time the French control had extended to include all of Maghreb and the possibility of ousting it, militarily and politically, from the area was becoming ever more d ifficult. In 1942 during the Second World War Algeria was the location of the headquarters of the "Provisional Governme nt of the Free French" and two years later there was also the "French Committee for National Liberatio n" headed up by Ge neral De Gaulle. And the winds of hope for liberty and independence that breathed during the resistance and conflict also reached the local Alge rian nationalist Ferhat Abbas, giving him the necessary inspiration for his "Manifesto for the Algerian People", a clear refutal of t he privileges reserved for the 'wh ite' minority t hat was at the detriment to the 'Arab' majority who were kept in the hu miliating position of being margi nalized. Even though the first and bloody riots in eastern Algeria broke out in 1945 the historic date for the start of actual insu rrection agai nst the French 'mother country' is November 1st 1954.

Riv,sla Milital'e Englis/1 ÂŁdi/Ion n. 212007

The Algerian guerril las by now well organized both in military terms and politically. To the famous FLN 'Front de Liberation Nationale' was given t he task of the political-strategic struggle, to the ALN 'Arme de Liberation, its military wing, was given the duty of strikes against mi litary objectives, and to the MNA 'Mouvement Algerien Nationale' was assigned the task of recruiting those Algerians resident in France to support the cause of independence from within France. The first call by the FLN was over the radio from Cairo, to the people to rise up for the "restoration of Algeria's sovereignty, democracy and society with in the principles of Islam" but what really constit uted the effective movement towards liberation was t he widespread activity on the ground. It's really on t his type of 'presence' that will be discussed at length with particular regard to the systems and to the politics adopted. Even though the large influence of the professional associations, the feminist organisations, the A lgerian student institutions is historically true it remains still an object of study and interpretation how much the influence of 'programme ofvilence' in its various guises had on t he struggle for libe ration. Even if, in complete hindsight, we are able to accept as an hypothet ically 'proportional' response to the declarat ion of hostilities by the Minister of Internal Affairs Francois Mitterand 'The only available path open to us is one of war" it remains difficult to understand the motivation that pushed the FLN to put into action - after previously on ly exclusively attacking French military and governmental targets - the massacre of civilians in Philippeville in August 1955. The 'com mander' of the Constantine region had decided, and it's not known how autonomous various individuals were within the st ructure, to up the stakes ; 123 people were ki lled including women, children and the old. But the reaction by the French was objectively disproportionate. In the following bloody reprisals another 1,200 'maquisard ' (g uerrillas) lost their lives, but however according to t he FLN t he actual figure killed by t he police and the army exceed

12,000. We must howeve r t ake into account what happened prior to t he Algerian War (l 954- 62) to understand completely the bloody spiral of events that characterized t he years of struggle for independence. The first armed insurrections against the French colonial government broke out in the region of Aures and Cabilia after which the Prime Minister in Paris, Pierre Mendes- France, del iberated on the me rits of conceding ful l internal independence to Tunisia (l 954, which Tunisia actually received two years later). With the new French Premier Edgard Faure - at the head of a radical coal ition between the right wing and the ex- Gaul lists - the situation became even

The President of the Algerian Republic, Abdel Aziz Bouteflika.

more difficult and during t he initial talks in the UN headquarters regarding the 'Algerian Question' the French position was quite categorical : 'France refuses al l and every form of United Nations intervention'. In 1956, afte r France had conceded independence to Morocco, a plane t hat was transporting, actually travel ling between Morocco and Algeria, some of t he leading figures of the FLN was rerouted by French fighter planes and the A lgerian nationalist leaders including one of its foundi ng fathers, Ahmed 8en Bella, were arrested. The idea was to head off the danger and the continually more experienced 'Maghreb Libe~2tion Army' as well as placate the opinion of coloriials dnd the 'colonial right' - already put to the test over the independence of Tunisia and Morocco. To complicate the already difficult sit uation with in France there was the failure of t he French- British intervention in Egypt (l 956, concerning the reprisals against the nationalisation of the Suez Canal) and the then current consti t utional situation for Algerians concern ing 'The Public Health Committee', which was composed of French citizens who were allied to the extreme of the right wing and able to organize even clandestine associations for their 'Ratonnades', which even if literally means 'rat catchers' it meant in reality 'kill the Arab'. Even the officers based in Algeria, under the leadership of the General of t he Parachutists Jacques Massu - a veteran of World War Two, who had fought side by side with Charles de Gaul le - had aligned themselves in favour of more marked mil itary action against the rebels, in open contrast to the Paris Government who were trying in vain to find a tiring compromise with the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), even if only a few months earlier Mendes-France had announced to the National Assembly of Paris that 'The Algerian divisions are part of the French Republic. They have been French for a long time and they will irrevocably continue to stay French ... between those

A unit of the Algerian Navy.

divisions and France there can be no imaginable separation'. But the situation became extremely critical when news spread in France that (May 1958) some divisions of French parachutists had landed in Corsica with the precise intent to set off for the continent and 'take in hand the situation'. President Coty - strengthened by the support of the people and a large parliamentary consensus - decided to call back into power De Gaulle, nominating him Prime Minister (with excep tional procedures) on the 1st June 1958. On the desk of the General there were two big problem s: the Algerian Question and the reform of the Constitution. The new Constitution (October 1958) sealed the birth of the Fifth Republic - with a presidential regime and a notable reinforcement of the executive power to dissolve parliament - and defined the free 'French community', clearly inspired by the tried and tested 'British Commonwealth'. On the 21 st December 1958 De Gaulle was elected President of the Republ ic and the Fre nch Community, an area that in total comprised of l 0,000,000 sq. km.(about the size of Europe around 1950) and a total population of 80,000,000 subjects. The old 'French Imperial Colony' was transformed into a 'federal state' within which the colonies and the ex-colonies could benefit, as well as being considered to have internal autonomy it could count on the support of France in matters of security, economy and foreign affairs. But the new 'French Union' didn't settle the 'Algerian question'; 'The Algerian and Sahara Departments are part of the integrated Mother country', or in other words France, and as so it was described in all official docu ments of that era. And then comes the real problem: Algeria. At this point there is question, what was happening within the paramilitary forces that were working towards

liberation? What was its collective capacity and its ability to ach ieve its objectives? In effect FLN had ere ated a military- political structure that was able to contrast well with the repressive activities of Paris and was able to cond ition - in the years to come - the formation of the foundational elements of the future Islamic State, Al Jazz'ir'. It was certainly Ben Bella who ordered the systematic use of violence in order to take over the territory, in which the psychiatrist Frantz Fanon (from Martinique) had already provided the suitable 'intellectual ' justification to the people. Taking advantage of the fact that many 'pieds nors' in the interior had sold their property to leave and take refuge and find protection from the Algerians (where there was a 'State of Emergency' in force to help the colony) the FLN had gained control of the rural areas, namely the area stretching out between the areas of Aures, of Cabilia, the mountains around Costantine and to the immediate south of the strategic cities of Algiers and Orano. And it was precisely in this zone that the 'National Liberation Army' established an effective military ad ministrative system which was able to gather the necessary funds for the strugg le, t o organize the logistics, to ensure food supplies and, obviously, to recruit more men. And as we have alluded to, even in the case of political-military action by FLN/ ANL there was the typical use of 'planned violence' in order to increase territories conquered. Even if the original command had exclusively taken Muslim officers from the regular army the acts of violence against their cou ntrymen - suspected of col laboration, if not exactly treason - we re particularly atrocious. And it was like this for the captured French soldiers, expecting typical punishment ranging from mutilation to 'ritual ki llin gs', all practised with extreme cruelty. Even refusals of help to the sold iers of the revolutionary forces (refusal to collaborate or to hide them) were later pu nished by death: during the

Riv,sta M1/tturc Englts/1 Edition n. 212007

first two years of the struggle it was estimated that the guerrillas ki lled over 6,000 Musl ims and another 1 000 of diverse ethnic races, all Algerians in any case, a~d all without concern for age or sex. Hence a climate of fear and violence, justified only by the fact that it was an Islamic 'mission' to convert the Musli ms against the French western invaders, and it had turned itself into a characteristic religious 'Holy War'. It was continually the Muslim leaders of the struggle for liberation who organized - stead ily but with ever increasing efficiency - underground civil activity, that ranged from the celebration of marriage to a basic constitutional structure for justice. As a political organization it was becoming more mature. In September 1956 the FLN had decided to strengthen and consolidate its military- pol itical project with the creation of the 'National Co unci l for Algerian Independence' (CNRA - Conseil National de la Revolution Algerienne) composed of 34 members, and the 'Committee of Co- Ordination and Execution' (CCE - Comite de Coordination et d'Execution) with 5 members who represented the executive and had the responsibi lity of diplomatic lobbying not only to the French Government but also to 'Arab and communist' members of the United Nations. According to the considerations here developed it is feasi ble to imagine the level of mi litary activity of the Liberation Army, the military wing of this sophisticated and complex political organization. Armed with French weapons (but also with light arms from America and Germany) the 40,000 men of the ANL had become a well organized and disciplined fighting force. There was even the fine tuni ng training of guerrilla warfare that wou ld allow ambushes and night raid s - consistently avoiding a direct confrontation with the French forces - against such targets as military camps, Gendarmerie stations, post offices, agricultu ral agencies and transport and communication systems. The training and quartering camps were in general abandoned (or requisitioned) convents and sanctuaries along the borders with Morocco and Tunisia and they contributed to the growth of 'casual recruitment', or in other words the 'part- time' participation of guerrillas for single military operations, hence the variance in estimates of the number of 'irregular troops' is between 10,000 and 25,000 men. And th is was the reason why Paris was obliged to send over 400,000 men to Algeria (among them the famous French Foreign Legion) and to enlist about 170,000 Algerian Muslims - almost all voluntary who remained faithful to the mother country. Even air- transport troops were sent (divisions best suited to greater mobility and hence intervention in the mountainous regions) and various naval un its were deployed along the coast to intercept any rebe l supply lines com ing from 'abroad'. It is interesti ng here to note the activity of the 'Special Administration Services' (SAS, Section Administrative Specialisee)

Algiers: the Monument to the Martyrs .

created in 1955 to help stabi lise the area by creating a direct contact with the local 'loyal' Algerian population. Known as the 'Kepis Blus' (The Blue Berets), the officers of this Special Section mari::iged to recruit about 150,000 Algerian Muslim volunteers (' Harkis') that were to become an important anti- insurrection instrument, until when they were 'forgotten' uy France at the moment of Algerian Independence. From the start of the 'Battle of Algiers ' on 30th Septembe r 1956 until the feared ' coup d'etat ' of 24 th May 1958 (General De Gaulle had only been elected by Parliamentl 5 hours before 'Operat ion Resurrection') the events were bloody and dram atic: from th e bombardment of suspect village s, to the use of to rture and of imprisonment of 2,000,000 Algerians in concentration camps. In Jan uary 1960 and in April 196 1 the re were two dangero us attempts at a military coup against De Gaulle (the mi li tary fe lt betrayed by the new Constitution) only the charisma of the General and t he divid ed attitudes of the army avoided the worst, m eanwh ile the powerful and w ell trained OAS (O rganisation de l'Armee Secrete) conti nued to kill and destroy in its aims of 'counter-terror ism '. It needed to wait unti l 3rd July 1962 to see the white and g ree n flag w ith the red half moon fluttering from the old fort of Kasba in Al giers .

THE DRAMATIC CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE HARDLINERS The government was for a long time controlled by the Armed Forces, as is usual in cou ntries that had to achieve independence through military means. The initial impression was of 'socialist and non- aligned', with the characteristics of a intransigent anti- imperi-

The port of Algiers.

alistic political stance (Ben Bella, Boumedienne and Bandjed id were those 'chosen ' by the Popular National Army, and who had to nationalize the indus tries from scratch, create cooperative farms and develop the links with Eastern Europe), wh ich was substantially modified in 1989 with the new Constitution which decreed that it was the end of the one party socialist system. This new constitutional Order - made necessary after t he 'piazza revolt' of 1988, known by its name as 'Cous Cous' - delim ited new powers for the army, confining them withi n the democratic institutional functions, in other words the defence of the national sovereignty and the territory of Algeria, which was a marked difference from Article 82 of the 1976 Constitution that stated "The National Army, an instrument of the Revolution , should participate in the general development of the country and in the construction of a socialist system". But during the first election rounds, on the 25th December 1991, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) obtained such a large victory that meant it had abruptly brought the army back into the limelight: the sec ond round was suspended, the FIS was officially closed down and its leaders arrested. Even if this wasn't real ly a true military dictatorship it is undeniable that in the subsequent bloody internal struggle t hat the polit ical decision making power remained firmly in the hands of the Armed Forces, namely the ANP (Popular National Army) who were the product of the Liberation Army straight after liberation. The intervention by the army in such a delicate phase for the country finds a justification for its actions in that already by June l 991 t here had been dramatic and bloody clas hes between the Islamic hardliners and the police (the FIS had proclaimed a 'Holy War' against the Algerian Army!) forcing the Prime Minister Ahmed Ghozali to announce a 'State of Siege', and when the FIS obtained 47.5% of the votes in the first round of elections governmental power was taken over by a 'High State Committee' (1 5th January 1992, pres ided by Mohamed Boudiaf, who was later assassinated after only five months) who then later arrested the FIS leader, Abdelkader

Anch iani, and declared a 'State of Emergency' (9th February 1992) and made illegal the Islamic Salvation Front: the bloody civil war, which wou ld result in 100,000 deaths, had just broken out. The GIA (Islamic Army Group), an extreme hardline group was responsible for the bloody 'executions' of Algerian intellectuals, 'western' women, journalists and foreigners. In 1994, after the security forces had managed to kill the head of the GIA, Djaafar el- Afghani, and General Zeroual was nominated President of the Republic It began a move towards a 'peace project' with the prospective of new elections. In the following year t he elections took place and Zeroual was elected President with a vote of 61 %. Deemed to have been carried out correctly by UN observers it had been boycotted by the FIS in protest against the massive attacks by the army on the Islamic fundamentalist bases in March. Even 1f the Pres ident was employed in attempts for national reconciliation (his RND, 'National Democratic Group' also won the legislative elections) the civil war contin ued with a series of appalling massacres perpetrated by the GIA against the civil populations of entire vii !ages, with the macabre death toll of nearly l ,000 jusl in the summer of 1997. It had to wait unti l 1999 with the dismissal of Zeroual and the election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika as President who was supported by the mil itary (achieving a vote of 73 .8% with the usual suspicions of cheating) for the 'renouncement' of the armed struggle by the Islamic Salvation Army, the military wing of the FIS - who was still illegal. The assurances by the president were important: amnesty for those who were not murderers or rapists (later approved by popular referendum) and a series of projects for national pacification. But the new millennium still started with the same political and social uncertainty: in January t he Government announced that about 80% of the Islamic fighters had handed in their weapons and surrendered, but in December (during Ramadan) there were numerous assaults on small villages in the south of Algeria and 250 people were killed , provoking what has since been termed 'casual terrorism' that still t oday bloodily mars the tormented Republic of Algeria.

THE ARMED FORCES With its forces 'orientated' toward s the borders with Morocco (western border) and Libya (eastern border) the National Popu lar Army (as we have seen the 'daughter' of the Liberation Army that fought against the French colonial occupation) it is considered to be organized along western army structures. The Armed Forces - divided into Army, Navy (MRA), Aeronautic (QU) and Air Defence - consists of an estimated 119,000 to 127,500 servicemen, with a Reserve of about l 00- 1 50,000 men and being a country of a little more than 32 mil lion inhabitants the call-up 'avail-

Rivista M,htare Engltsh f.clition n 212007

was requested that the Corps Commander was to be ability' of men in 2005 (men of the ages 1 5- 49) was of Colonel rank. With regard to heavy armour, about estimated at above 8 mi llion. The terms of duty 1,000 Soviet made tanks, over 600 T -62 models and there is obligatory national service once the person over 200 T-72 models. Even the Armoured Personnel reaches 19 - has recently .been reduced from 24 Carriers (APC) are of Russian origin , with the first months to 18 (October 2005). Even if we cannot be models BTR 50/ 60 and the subsequently more modcertain of the accuracy of the 'operational responses' ern BMP-1 and BMP-2 that are mounted with 73mm of the troop numbers it can be compared qu ite eas ily can nons and 'Sagger' antitank missiles, as wel l as against two other Islamic countries, namely that it is a the French donation of 'M ilan', by President Mitterand larger force than Syria but smaller than Pakistan. following French will. With to the above mentioned The last major restructuring of the Armed Forces 'Security Forces' we must remember the 'Presidential came in the early l 990's, or to precise when the Guard' (about 1,000 men), the 'National Gendarme' responsibility of the Chief of Staff was given to (clearly inspired by the French system, which contains General Khelifa Rahim in the spri ng of 1992. Even about 30,000 men employed in the rural regions) and though the territory had been divided into mil itary the most important 'Surete Nationale' that with about regions straight after Independence the new organi10,000 operatives, is concerned with intell igence zation structured the corps in and around the larger operations, in the widest sense of the terms, under cities, and not just regionally, as a measure against the control of the Minister for Internal Affairs. The the continued antigovernment insurrection. In addioriginal structure of t he DGDS 'Delegation General de tion to the first four mechanized d ivisions (founded in Documentation et Surete' was dissolved in 1990 to be 1966, with a large influence from the soviet mil itary) split into 'Management of National Security' , 'Antiin 1992 there was added as principal front line units terrorism Detachment' and the more pol itical two armoured divisions (each one with three tank reg'Nucleus' which surrounds the State High Council. iments and one mechanized regiment) and two Even if the new Constitution does not allow political mechanized divisions (each one with three mechaparties to have ideology concernnized reg iments and one tank ing race or religion (hence Islamic regiment). In 1993 five motorized religious parties are outlawed) ' One had wa unt 199 infantry brigades were added and Islam is considered the state relifor the 'renouncement' a ' special force' air t ransport gion and its illegal to practice brigade (each brigade consists of he armed s u e by h I religions that conflict with Islamic four infantry battalions and a tank amic Salvation Army, morality. And this is how we can battalion, in total about 3,500 military w1 o the S view the current situation, it is men), there are also seven indewas sti II II still dependent on mi litary divipendent artillery battalions (Soviet sions, of the political 122mm and 1 52mm canons and Commissioner. No longer finding over 100 multiple missile lau nchjust if ication in the original Soviet role this official ers of 122mm, 140mm and 240mm) five Air Defence refers to 'Dar ellfta', the religious institution created battalions (naturally armed with SAMs, the land-air by the Governor of Algiers in 2003 , to train 'indicamounted SA- 8/ 9 and the hand transportable SA- 7) tions and prescriptions' in matters of faith . and four battalions of engineers. The control of the The Navy includes 3 frigates of the l<oni class, borders is bestowed upon 12 companies that consti1,056 tonnage, 'Mourad Rais' (90 l ), 'Rais Kel lik' tute the 'Desert Troops' (each company comprises (902), 'Rais Korfu' (903), that eve n though they were 400 men) that, even if originally they travelled along bui lt in the early l 980' s are still able to f ire of 20 the borders on camel back, today they can count SAM missi le s (Gecko SA- N- 4) and 2 anti- submarine amongst their resources light modern reconnaissance torpedoes (RBU6000) as well as the latest versions vehicles. Final ly 2 anti-riot units (estimated at about of search radar, as always from Russ ia. Also 3 15,000 men), trained in the 'Commando Infantry Corvette missilelaunchers of the class Nanuchka II Academy' based in Bistra, entrusted with the responof 675 tonnage, 'Rais Hamidou' (80 1), 'Salah Rais' sibility of keeping the security of civil order (the main (802), and 'Rais Ali' (803) can be considered to be Military Academy is that of Cherchell, to the west of modern armoury systems , as before Russ ian. There Algiers , the training lasts three years plus a year of are between 8 and 1 0 pat rol gu n boat units of the specialization before bei ng assigned to a division). Kebir class, plus three t hat are in the sh ipyard in The 6 corps that today constitute the m ilitary regions Mers alKabir being constructed. There are only two (the first at Bilda/ Algeri, the second at Orano, the third landing craft of the class Kalaat Beni Hammed, of at Bechar, the fourth at Ouarg la, t he fifth at Costantine about 2, 1 30 ton nage able to land 240 men and a and the sixth at Tamanrasset) are all under the load of 650 tonnes. More interesting is t he presence Supreme Command of the President of the Republic, of two diesel- electric submarines of the class Kilo Commander- in- Chief of the Armed Forces, it is inter(' Rais Hadi Mubarek' and 'Hadi Slimane') to replace esting to note that before the reforms in 1992 that it

Nh ich

ega , ,

Flag bearers of a military unit.

two submerg ible s of the class Romeo, once again of Ru ssian origin . Chinese naval patrol boats of the class Djebel Chinoise (collaboration with the Peoples Republic of China began at the beginning of the War o f Independence) - 'Djebel Chi noise' (3 51) and 'El Chirab' (352) - the coastal patrol ships 'El idrissi' and the rescue boat 'El Mourafi k' complete the principal structure of the Navy, substantially 'equal' in respect to that of Morocco and Libya eve n if we could be better able to examine thi s type of information. One particular area that merits attention is the Algerian Air Force (QU, al Quwwat al-Jawwiya alJaza' eriya) in lig ht of the important recent purchases made in this sector. The air force began with their first MIG- l 5's (1962) and with the successive MIG-21 (1965- 78) to the more up-to-date MIG- 23 - in the different versions BN and UB - these arrived into Algeria in the early l 990's - and finally the latest generation MIG- 29 supplied by Russia at the end of the l 990's (and it was on this fighter plane that the sym bol changed from a 'yellow and black serpent' of a clear Egyptian inspi ration to a more aggressive ' black serpent' design). While France and the United States are key suppliers of air transport and helicopters (in 1993 they purchased from America 16 Lockheed Hercules C- l 30s, followed straight after by 6 Russ ian AN- 12s of t he same capacity and 2 Super King B- 200s for sea patrols) t he Air Force is com prised of 11 squadrons - among which interceptors and low flyi ng air craft - with a total of 2 50 aircrafts almost all of which are Soviet produced, namely MIG21 (75), MIG- 23 (74), MIG- 25 (29), MIG- 29 (36), SU22 (27), SU- 24 ( 10) and SU-25 (10) - however it is un known if they are fully operational or even out of service. The core armoury for these fighter planes are 'Atoll' Soviet air to air m issiles, models AA- 2 and AA6 and pilot training takes place in Russia, Syria (Syrian

pilots are deemed the lead ing MIG- 29 experts) and Egypt, other training takes place in the flying school near Tafraoua, near to Grano. Coming into the spotlight in more recent years has been the development of armaments. This news was d istributed by the Agency INTERFAX in January 2006: 'Algeria has purchased armaments from Russia at the value of $7.5 billion!' To better understand the size of this sum it is worth remembering that - the second largest exporter of arms after the USA - sells every year arms worth in total S5 .5 billion and t he previously large and important purchase was by India for $2 billion. After the visit by Putin to Algeria in March 2006 (the first Russian President after 50 years) there was the signing of a 'complicated scheme' to cancel part of the debt of Algeria to Russia and reduce the figure indicated to S4.74 billion. In add ition to the certain satisfaction of the Moscow Government (their principal clients - China and Ind ia - are chang ing suppliers) there was the confirmation of the armaments that had as of then not been confi rmed. Specifically, the 36 to 40 MIG- 29s, 20- 28 SU-30s, at least 8 air missile defence systems (s - 300MPU2 Favorit, the latest update to the S- 300 with a range of 200 Km) and about 40 T- 90 tanks, as well as other as yet unspeci fied military supplies. Looking at the details of what type of 'advanced technology' Algeria is buying we can see that the MIG-29s in question are probably the SMT Model (some sources say that they could even be 49 and six examples of the UBT, sim ilar to t he SMT model but derived from the MIG- 29UB for training purposes with the double seat. The MIG- 29SMT identified as 'Product 9.1 7' is the latest update to the famous MIG 29, a sophisticated 2 mach mult i- role plane, firs t in use soon after 2000, it has now been incorporated into 21 air forces worldwide as well as being the only air plane adopted by NATO after the German Luftwaffe had perfectedly incorporated it into their ex German Democratic Republic air force. Single seat, a 11.36 meter wingspan, initially 2 turbo-jet Tumansky R-33 D engines (each one with a 8,300 kg thrust) the SMT model has opted for two R-43D engines with a single thrust of 9,800kg, but stil l with after-burner. Even the original flying range was enhanced to 2, l 00 km with the addition of other fuel tanks, and so there was also the increase load capacity (4,500kg), in the basic model there are 6 missile pil lions for AA- 10/1 l missiles as well as a 30mm canon. It also has the NO19MP air to ground tracking radar to map the terrain below and guide missiles into targets. Finally it is even 'd ressed up' the cockpit display w ith two multi dimensional MFD (multi- functional) liq uid crystal screens. But we have to add that according to many observers (among whom we are including the Federation of American Scientists) it is recogn ised that the current MIG- 29 - NATO code FULCRUM - is potentially better than the 'Eagle F- 15' and the 'Falcon F- 15' - but there is always the limit of the capability of its pilot.

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The T- 90 represents the latest generation of that much tried and tested Russian tank the T- 72 from which it almost completely based on (the T- 72 is probably the tank most prod.uced in the world) and is considered the most competitive combat transport in respect to what else NATO have, even if objectively it is less powerful than those latest generations from the west. With a reserve armament of rocket lau nchers and machineguns, a 125mm canon and a t hree man team. It's important characteristics are its trustworthiness and robustness - it can withstand two antitank rockets at the same time from two different d irections. The engine choice is interesting which is a simple and econom ic diese l (a polycombustible diesel, wit h 12 cylinders and 850HP) instead of a turbine engine, and it has a top speed of 70 km / hr, a relatively heavy weight of 46.5 tonnes and a range of 5 50km. Low and profiled like the Soviet original (the height is the same 226cm), it was the target of an important deal by India in 2000 - more than 300 complete tanks, accessories and exchange parts - a large part of which were made under licence locally - with a visit to the site by Vladimir Put in to New Delhi. As regarding the remain ing possible supplies there is the hypothesis of the purchase of lig ht armoured reconnaissance vehicles (the 'T2' , a joint Ru ssian and Byelorussian venture) equ ipped with 30m m automatic machine guns, grenade launchers antitank and anti-air missiles. Made with 'Stealth' technology (in other words nearly invisi ble to radar) they are able to reach speeds of l 00km/ hr and re main suitably silent. But the real pote ntial of t his transport consists in the fact of being able to mount a 'non-piloted reconnaissance plane' that wou ld enable the considerable increasing of its 'tactical intell ige nce' activity, that is to say to greatly extend the area t hat can be observed and controlled. It wou ld appear therefore the ideal purchase for the purpose of surveillance along the long desert borders of Algeria, wh ich was the reason they had shown interest in the T2 in 2001 on t he occasion of its presentation to Algeria, Egypt and UAE.

WHY SUCH IMPORTANT AND DIVERSE ARMAMENTS? The response t hat comes most simply is that we are simply facing the updati ng of the Armed Forces - they haven't been updated since the l 990's - or instead should we be concerned with an exceptionally large arms bu ild up in what is considered a 'quiet' zone of t he Mediterranean1 The western Intelligence agencies t hat have reported this news haven 't put forward any theory as to the interpretation of this data and activities. But the events are exceptional and we will search a way to analyse the information in ou r possess ion and then to elaborate an interpretation that takes into account t he current geo-political situation in Algeria. We will start by analysi ng the principal internal dif -

ficulties of the cou ntry, i.e. the 'casual terrorism' of which we have already mentioned. Even if we consider t he GIA (Armed Islam ic Group) is defeated - or more accu rately the second generation of Alegerian ex- combatants from the Afghanistan War of t he late l 980's - now red uced to a few hundred guerrillas hidden in remote villages with little capacity for action - we cannot underestimate the role played today by the Salafita Preach ing and Fighting Group (GSPC). These men, the sons of the Islamic Salvation Front and easy enemies of the GIA have already been promoting Islam ic terrorism in a large part of southern Africa. Even if, like the GIA, they do not enjoy the support of the majority of the population, these fundamentalist hardliners can count on a 'force' of an estimated 2,000 men and sophisticated arms and communications. Of specific interest to western intelligent age ncies (it seems that GSPC intend to oppose t he pacification of the Darfur region and also create other conflicts in regions such as Guinea, Senegal, Li beria, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast - where in effect the first signs of tension seems to have arrived) t his hardli ne group is also at the centre of the 'Pan Sahel Initiat ive' (PSI) - a programme from the Wash ington government - in accordance with Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Niger - to increase the internal potential of t he zone in terms of mi litary, policing, ant i- terrorism and intelligence. The collaboration of the various governments seems to have give n a favourable stimul us, as we ll as including the USA with its satellites and 'elint' points system on the area. This situation would seem to be 'u nder control', or rather not able to j ustify the ex penditure of the Algerian government , specially if you consider the ir m ix is much more suitable for a land battle than anti- insurrection ist activities. And what about the strategic situation1 The 'uncomfortable' neighbours of Algeria are Li bya and Morocco, and even if there was a brief border battle in 1976 which put into the spotlight t he problems of the ANP, today there doesn't seem to be any real military threats between the two count ries. But let's try to examine t he 'balance' of the two armed forces: Morocco has a larger sized army but Algeria can count on superior artillery and armoured transport. The Moroccan Air Force has an inferior number of American planes in comparison with the more nu merous Soviet planes in the Algerian Air Force. Libya could boast in numerical terms with regards to t he Air Force and Navy - in respect to Morocco and Algeria - but remains significant ly lacking in t he 'global structure' of t he Army. So even here we seem to have reached a parity in t he status quo, but lets look a little deeper. We have stated that the Algerian new purchases could include the T2 reconnaissance planes t hat would be able to patrol the long Algerian desert borders. The population (27.5 mill ion inhabitants, 1993) is concentrated along the coastal strip about l 00 km long - with an average density that quickly decreases as you move north to south away

Algiers. the Great Mosque.

from t he sea. This means that in practice great swathes of t he desert are deserted, technically making Algeria vulnerable to an attack from the west by Morocco which would give great advantages if one considers the natural boundaries of the At las Mountains. Also with Libya t he problem of t he sout h- west border seems difficult to resolve: it's a zone isolated from the rest of the country and it's sole connection is the road to Edjeleh t hat would be easy prey for t he superior Libyan mechanized divisions. The extreme south cannot realistically be under threat: the distance and the desertification of t he area - even if it's a problem for Algeria is an insurmountable prob lem for Mali and Niger. Furthermore an agreement on the frontier with Mauritania has already been signed in l 985 after three years of negotiations. With Tunisia there doesn't exist any real motive for danger. Even here a 20 year border dispute was finished in 1983 and the continual reduction of the Tunisian army means t here are no concerns for t he Algerian general staff. The opposite in fact, when Libya had tried a 'roar' (a violation of air space, threats and troop movements) Algeria didn't hesitate to deploy troops along its border in Tu nisia's favour. Even if the information at our disposal doesn't concern the naval forces it would be t horough to examine the Mediterranean issue too. Already by 2001 the Atlantic Alliance had in p lace a project called ' OM' (Mediterranean Dialogue) with Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Mau rit ania, Morocco and Tunisia. The common aim is t he 'Security of the Sea' and under this banner there was also deployed Israel (2005) and Russ ia (2006) with joint forces operations streng thened by our Ambassador Maurizio Moreno (t he Italian resident Ambassador to the Alliance) that had wished a type of 'partnership' between t he countries involved - not only putting great value on NATORussian cooperation but also putting value on seeing Israel and Arab countries together at t he same table. Let us know look at the Algerian armament in terms of politics. Already by 1999 the President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika had announced a new military politics with

the objective of transforming the Army from a traditional institution to a modern professional apparat .JS. Even if we have to recognise that attentive observers of the financial sit uation and military investments (especially Rut h Leger Sivard with his 'World Military c.nd Social Expenditure") have seen that the Algerian expenditure in comparison w ith other North African countries as being lower in the last ten years, the amount that the government will be spending with Russia seems disproportionate in relation to the other problems in the country (mass unemployment, housing shortage and a insufficient water and electricity supply service and grid). Furthermore, even if we recognise the necess ty of buying arms from abroad due to a lack of sufficient national arms industry, t he percentage of the military expenditure in 2003 (3. 7% of GDP being already accounted for) it will go skyhigh putting it above othl r North African averages but also Europe. And we can add that its normal division of expenditure, name f 86% for the Army, 6% for the Navy and 8% for the A Force w ill be completely skewed, unless it also intends to apply to China for a similar commission for the Navy President Boutefilka is certainly busy with good inter tions (the National Peace and Reconciliation Charter, the approaches to the United States, the focus on the new international image of the country, and the receI laws on carbohydrates, 22nd Maf 2005 , which opens the doors for investment by foreign companies> but his state of healt h is perplex ing international observers. The latest generation of Generals, who have preserved a type of monopol'y on recent economic power, share the political power w ith the President, or is it that wield the power in Algeria? The Generals Larbi Belkheir (ex- personal advisor to Boutefilka), Khaled Nezzar (ex Minister of Defence) and Mohamed Lamari (ex- Chief of the Army General Staff) are often under criticism, as for example by Abdul Qadeer Shareef (Chair of Science and Technology at the University of Ajman) 'T he military behave as 1f they are at the top of the jurisdiction of the civil insti t ut ions ... as if t hey don't have to answer to anyone about their activities." Perhaps it' s a sign, the mi litary are forcing his hand, or perhaps Russia is able to exert some sort of pressure. It is out of the question t he type of intense marketing t hat occurred in t he last few years by 'Rosoboronexport' - t he state owned company ded icated to the exportation of Russian arms - who are exercising a role as a protagonist for t hemselves in the Middle East and Nort h Africa. It is clear that in response to the drop in sales by their chief clients (China and India) Russia is shifting its attention to these favourable areas, having already secured important comm issions from Jordan, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. It's a type of politics that we can certain-

Rivista Mili/are English Edition n. 212007

A patrol on surveillance duty.

ly consider 'agg ressive', and the confirmation comes from 'SOFEX' (Special Operations Forces Exh ibition), an exhibition of great interest for the Middle East and North Africa, which was held in Jordan between the 27th and 30th March 2006. Notwithstanding the attent ion on arms and innovative equipment for Special Forces operations 'Rosoboronexport' decided to present in t his occasion the latest and most sophisticated weapons: air defence systems, rocket launchers, naval weaponry, armoured vehicles and helicopters1 Therefore their objective could really be the reconq uering - first via a m ilitary profile and then later political the old 'leadership' exercised by the Soviet Union, which was put in crisis by the offers of military technology made by t he new republics - such as Poland and Ukraine - and become in a certain way the 'Western' protector. Another important key to this sector could revolve arou nd hydrocarbons which makes up over 50% of government income . It has the fi fth largest natural gas reserves and the fifteenth largest for petroleum making Algeria at the centre of atte ntion for Russia and the United States . The American strategy in t he area (we have already noted it s anti-terrorist activity) also concerns energy sources in the Gu lf of Gu inea, that could supply 2 5% of the total American domestic demand for petroleum. The accord includes Algeria, Nigeria, Li beria and Niger and even the inclusion of the tormented Republic of Angola that t ogether with the others add up to one tenth of the world's supply of petroleum. And let's have a look more close ly at Moscow's strategy. Russia is the world's number one gas producer and has recently discovered that its export to Europe cou ld be strangled by t he new republics that surround it. The Gas War with Ukraine only resulted in a truce on the 4th January 2006.

Ahmed Ben Bella, historic leader of th e Nation al Liberation Front.

Russia decided to focus its attention on new projects, that start with gas pipes to Europe (across the Baltic Sea, directly reaching Germany, and with the 'Blue Stream' that reaches the Turkish term inal at Ceyhan) to a new energy axis between Russia and Algeria. With two import ant companies already present in Algeria 'Lukoil' in the petroleum industry and 'Stroitransgas' wh ich deals with gas- Russia has already guaranteed itself a key strateg ic posit ion in t he international gas market. Algeria is in effect a depository of raw materials that is just wait ing for the advanced t echnology, therefore it is necessary to 'buy it' from abroad even if it is at the cost of the emancipat ion of the country politically and social ly. In order to an sw er our ques tion we have tried to exam ine the most im portant aspects of the geopo liti cal situat ion in Algeria and probably the answer ' tie s' everyt hi ng toget her al l the fac tors analysed. But in reality it was already supplied by the Foreign Min ister (Abdu l Bedj aoui) straight after the famou s and histori c visit by Vladi m ir Putin in March 2006: "R ussia has substantially co ntr ibuted t o t he deve lop ment of the Algerian Armed Forces in term s of armame nts and traini ng .. and the natural resources indust ry offe rs a real poss ibili ty of assoc iation between ou r co untries ... A lge r ian and Russian companies wi ll develo p their cooperation within the gas market and cou ld eve n w ork together in other regions of t he world". Now t he alignment of the pieces on t he ches sboard of North Africa is clear: Russia is th e Qu een an d Algeria is its Bi shop! Daniele Cellamare Expert in History of International Relations

THE INDIAN <<MIRACLE>> A new giant of the XXI Century, India concentrates and emphasizes potentialities and contradictions. And yet, it presents a stabi lity and reliability that are certainly greater than other important realities and do not suffer the effects of cultural prejudice, not even in today's problematic relation with the Islamic world . Meanwhile its economy and society continue to grow...

Referring to the attention that two important international meetings, which have been recently held at the Universities of Rome and Siena, have dedicated to India and to the increasing political, economic and strategic interest that this nation generates in the West, deepening the knowledge of t his real ity an d cons ide ri ng its col location in the system of international relat ions is an highly topi cal issue. India is one of the most important countries in Asia and in the world and today it re presents a big reality t hat is destined to become a great power. It can be defined as a mu lti - ethnic country and as a democracy that is surrounded by non- democratic countries. It is led by a stable government which Hind us, Muslims and Catholics, who represe nt 82, 12. l and 3% respectively in the country, belong to. It is the second most populous country in the world and it is placed seventh with regard to geographical extent: it has a population density of 274 peop le per km 2 . Its inhabitants speak eighteen principal languages, which are all recognized by the Constitution . Its judicial authority is independent and conforms with English model. Its banki ng system (w hi ch is di ffere nt from the Chinese system, where banks are public even though they work according to criteria that are based on competition) is efficient. Like China, it has a hi gh econom ic growth rate . To make an analys is of India we need just a few data. In the last years its economy has grown by arou nd 8%. T his country distingu ishes itself in the sector of hig h technolog ies (computer t echnology makes up 20% of exports) , has an efficient pharmaceutical industry and stands out as the leader in lots of sectors. The number of unive rsities, grad uates, research centres is impress ive: there are more t han 380 universities, with 1 5 thousand faculties,

Right.

A statue of Mahatma Ghandi.

Title pages. Madura,, temple city of southern India.

Riv1sla Militare English Edition n . 212007

from which two mil lion and half g radu ates come out each year: among them th ere are l 50 thou sand engineers t hat are specialized in technological research. The num be r.of t he graduates is twi ce that produced by the American universities. In addition, universities around the w orld are full of Indian professors and students. We should cons ider these data carefu lly. Who is afraid of the com pet ition in trad itional sectors (like textile sector) should thi nk t hat this situ ation w ill open up new horizo ns for all ou r products, provided that they are of top quali ty. With regard to t his, Italy does not have to miss the opportun ity to establish close collaboration even in the sector of high tech nologies for defence; t his necessity was recognized by the Italian industry of t hat specific sector, wh ich in February 2006 attended Defexpo Ind ia - which was organ ized by t he Ind ian Minist ry of Defence and by the government - together with ot he r companies, in particular of the Fin m eccan ica Group. In t he research f ield there are important collaborations betwee n their respective un ive rs ities about nanoscience, nanotechnology, electron ics, automat ion and app lied mat hematics. India is not perceived as «p lace of difficu lty» by forei gn entrepreneurs: with regard to market, they have a dif ferent app roach from that ad opted by t he Ch inese , because of greater bran d protection and because of the Anglo-Saxon mode l; desp ite t his the re are still corruption and excess ive bu reaucracy. The rise of India does not start today , in the age of globalization , but it dates back to the fir st decades of t he 20 th century, when it started to fight for its own independence , whic h was gained in 1947 thanks to t he adoptio n of unusual form s of fighting, like the non - violent resistance that was supported by Ghandi , wh ich led India to free itse lf from the trusteeship of Great Britain. Afte r it became a sovereign stat e, this fascinating stat e, wh ich has lots of facets, went through a process of modernization and «it did not have any he lp from the Marshall plan either, on which t he coun tries of we ste rn Europe cou ld cou nt at the end of t he Second World War» . With regard to foreig n policy, India, at the instigation of Ghand i and Jaw aharlal Nerhu, opted for no nalign ment and was one of t he greatest oppone nts of the log ic of power blocs. In fact, in 1955 , at t he Conference of Bandu ng on t he problems about decolon isatio n, it was one of t he greate st inspi re r of t he pr inciples the final declaration of peace and cooperati on between populaces refe r to. These principles represented the essential aspects of the moveme nt of the no n-al igned co untr ies. With

Logo of t he Co~herence o~the University of Siena which was held on 12 and 13t December 2006.

regard to do mest ic policy, India tried to stimu late t he development of the country despite some accidents in 1984 a terrible accident happened in Bophal, which is the capital of Madhya Pradesh, w hen a g reat cloud of toxic smoke comi ng out of t he facto ries of the American multinat ional Union Carbide caused about 3 000 victi ms, infected 20 000 peo ple and affected an area of 60 Km 2. In t he Nin eties t here was a sign ificant change, but only in 2000 the world started to realize th e «In dian mirac le». Howeve r, altho ugh it sets a good examp le to lots of devel oping countries , in India t here are still wid e pockets of poverty, despite t he recent attempt to integrate the more underprivileged classes into society: the untouchables and the Mu sli ms , whose politica l importance has been inc reasing recent ly. In this cou ntry, whose econo mic grow t h is extremely dynam ic, the manufacturing industry is behind because other sect ors have been given priority; even infrastructure (roads , ports and airports) is not sufficiently developed and, consequently, t he li nk s, and in particula r the air traffic, can be improved. The m ilitary aspect, agriculture and the struggle against poverty are today the Indian priorities .

Ambassadors Dogra and Pacifico.

Havi ng said t hat, in order to analyse the role of New Delhi in t he intern ational context and its ro le in the fi ght against terrorism, it is necessary to focus on what t he d irector of OPINT and organizer of the Conf erence of Siena, Giovanni Bucc ianti, has hig hl ighted. India plays a key role as privi leged partne r of the US in nuclear matters . In fact, t he US considers New Delh i a reliable interlocutor and therefo re trustworthy. For this reason, it made a treaty w ith this country in 2005 (wh ich provided for nuclear techno logy to be transfe rred for civil purposes). It is a t horny issue cons idering t he di fferen t atti tude of Washington towards Iran . As t he analysts of ÂŤLi me sÂť have pointed out, in a strategically relevant area the American ch oices cou ld become convergent. T hi s po licy, which has tu rned out to be able to manage t he nume rous co m mun ities in th e coun try has proved the US to be a mult i- et hnic and mu lti -confessional democracy that is ab le to hand le relevant rel igious mi norities. In fact, we

should conside r that the Mu slim Ind ians are 200 m ill io n whereas t he natio n with t he biggest number of ls lam ists in the world , Indones ia, has just 20 m illion Mu slims m ore. With regard t o t he Musl im population , India is t he seco nd count ry in t he world . However, t heir presence in the Armed Forces is marg inal. T he alliance betwee n the US and India m ust be asses sed taking t he unknown quantity of China and a series of ot her im portant fact ors into account, such as: t he need fo r a balance tow ards Pek in g ; t he g rowth in the techno logical service sector; t he fact t hat t he analysts see Ind ia as the f ut ure forth world econo mic pow er . Professor Hesto n B. Carter, who was assistant of t he Secret ary of Defence in t he fi rst Cli nton adm inistration , has com pared t he current agreement between the US and India w ith the fa mo us po li cy of opening- up t hat was adopt ed in 1971 by Pres ident Ni xon towards China. However, he has said that whereas Chin a of Mao Zedo ng represented a com m un is m t hat was not non- alig ned with the Soviet system and shared with t he US the need t o face t he threat of t he Soviet power, t he present China is a de m ocracy that is not likely to fo ll ow and suppo rt the Ame rican interests uncritically. New Del hi, wh ich is not t raditionally pro ne t o estab li sh close i nternat ional li nks signed agree ments with Peking , w hich are no less important than t hose reached with t he US , and t urned to Ru ssia to obtain military vehicles and t echno logy, as if it want ed to hig hlight t he fle xi ble policy t his country has adopted . With regard t o the ro le played by India in the mainte nance of stabil ity in t he Asi an continent, it has become more and more im portant and precious, es pecially in t he last fifteen years. Today the West in general and It aly in particul ar aim to involve it in Afg han istan m ore t han in the past, tog ether with other countries , in order to

INDIA AND ITA LY: SIMILARITIES Millenary culture

Great histori cal heri tage

Sens1:: of hospita lity

Common values ( family, educat ion, etc.)

/\ ncicnt bilateral Lrudc traditions (s ilk, jewels)

Importance approach to the problems or defence

Cu ltu re of' beauty

Ethi cal approach to Lht: problems

or defence

Dr Jacob Rose. representative of the Indian Chamber of Commerce in Italy, from his intervention at the ltalo-lncli:m Meeting. Tli" riw r!f' !11diu lo the infC'motional scene. Uni versity oi'Sicna. December I 3, 2006.

R1vista Mih/;ire Eng/1sl, EdillO/l /) 212007

The archaeologica l Area of Hyde rabad.

make th is area and t he entire contine nt more stable. A burn ing issu e concern s the deep rift wi th Pakistan, w hich resulted in three confli cts (194748, 1965, 1971) and laid the foundation fo r t he rise of two new nuclear powers: th is goal was reached in 1998. With regard t o t hi s, it is necessary to reflect o n the followi ng aspect: having all owed India and Pakistan to equ ip t hemselves with a nuclear arsenal has led so me co untr ies , which aim t o play a reg ional ro le, t o claim the same right. T he refore, even if the policy aimed at ach ieving a balance in the A sia n area betwee n Ch ina, Ind ia and Pak istan has turned out to be valid , its limitations have become ev ident, as the Iranian and North - Korean cases show. With reg ard to the relationships between Islam abad and New Dheli , Jammu-Kashmir, wh ich is a part of t he Indian Rep ub li c, and the area of Azad - Kas hmir (the t erritory of Kashmir that has been occu pied by Pak istan), have led to occas ional clashes between t he arm ies and to t errorist vi olence t hat has cau sed thousand s of deaths among civilians, Indian po lice forces and t he separatist fig hters of Kas hm ir. Up to now, because of t he o ral and material support t hat has been provided by Pakistan to the mil itant separatists, India has mai ntain ed in

loco a st rong m ilitary presence, which aims to counter the co mbatant g roups , who are divided into th os e who cal l for inde pe ndence from Kashmir: (All Party Hurriyat Conference - APHC and Jam mu and Kas hm ire Liberatio n Front - JKLF) and those w ho fight for its annexation to Pakistan (Lashkar- e- Taiba and Jaish -e- Muhammad). Save Kash mir Movement, Harkat-ul - mujahideen and Lashkar-e - T aiba are te rrorist movements. Recently, the im provement i n the relationsh ips between Ind ia and Pakist an has made t he situation of Kash mi r better, layi ng the foundat ions for a d ipl omatic solution . The lndo- Pak ista ni relation ship has im proved since the figh t against terrorism started. Afghanistan has acted as a catalyst in t hi s process and di plomatic sol utions have settled the differen ces bet wee n India an d Pakistan. India supported the Alliance of the North an d backed Karzaj w hen he came to powe r in order that the Taliban s were not able to ÂŤexportÂť the Islam ic fundam entalism to t he relevant Mu sli m m inority of Ind ia. Paki stan entered into partnersh ip with the US and se nt troops with modern equipment and technology to the border with India to prevent infiltratio n t rying to mak e its borders less porous. In 200 5 t he relation shi ps between India and Afghanistan have flo ur ished and the im prove ment in t he re lations hips with Pakista n led, in 2006 , to the co mmon statement of two Foreig n Ministers, who arran ged a new m eet ing for January 2007.

TABLE OF M IGRATIONS - FORECAST FOR TH E YEARS 2005-2030

NORTH

+ 39 MILLION IN TOTAL - 65 MILLION OF WORKIN G AG E

SOUTII

+ 1 695 MI Li.iON IN TOTAL - 1 037 MILLION OF WORKING AGE

The Europea n population is tk creasing. The Ch inese and Indian popu lations, who represen t about -10% or the ,vorld's still have a potential of growth . In India, the \\'Ol'king age population "ii I have grown by 2050. \\'hereas Chinese and /\ merican populations wi ll have increased and China in particular ,,·ill have c losed its demographic window by 2025 . Or Cri stiano Marini, Uniwrsity of Rome --La Sapienza'': from his interve ntion at the Con ference: Meeting ltalo- Indian . The Rise o(lndiu to i111em o1io110I scene. Uni versity of Siena. December 2006.

Accord ing to Kashm ir In dia has proposed the de m ilitarisation of the region and accord in g to inform ed sou rces Pakistan is disposed to accept. It is to India's advantage to work towa rd s sol utions to arrest the internal deve lopment of Islam ic fu ndamentalism: since 1998, in fact, zo nes that previ ously were immune to ethn ic- religious te nsion have started to be faced with t his problem . To ana lyse this q ue stio n w e sho ul d refer to knowl edge and experience t hat qua lified members of the Armed Forces have gained . It is no co incidence that they were speakers at t he ltalo- ln dian Confe rence. T he ri se of India to the International scene, which was organi zed by the Un iversity of Siena, there w ere two Generals of the Army : Giuseppe Cucc hi , associate professor at t he University of Siena , who has recently been no minated General Secretary of CESIS, and Fabio Mini. T he report t hat was made by General Min i on this country high lights t he im portance that Ind ia has for our country. It could turn o ut to be extreme ly important in lots of secto rs and act as potential partner in t he sphere of security. Th is cooperation must co ncern t he f ight against terrorism as well as t he economy. If this cooperation were bilate ral, it cou ld not influence the situati o n dec isive ly because there is not an important interlocutor : Europe . In fact, Europe alone is on t he same level as t he so- called «Giant Nat ions»: the US, Ch in a and India, which are different fro m small er countries (wit h regard to num bers and t erritory). Today, Europe, wh ic h is not a large nation, rea lizes that since it has focu sed on t he econo my rat her than problems of security that it has not been ab le to

so lve desp ite the missions in Bosn ia an d Macedonia. The present Europe is not united in fron t of the Atlantic Alliance and is co nfronted with confli cting opinions that different nations, which take part i n the operations, hold . Italy, wh ich is not a sign ificant country in milit ary terms , has been able to assu m e a d ifferent attitude , w hich w as unan imous ly appreciat ed by our interl oc utors , in lots of m issions, which have been ca rr ied out ab road : for Ind ia and China, which unde rtake these m iss ions for the first time , the Italian approac h rep resents a signi ficant po int of reference . The relations hips between In d ia an d China wou ld improve more an d more if these «G iant Nations» had as inte rlocuto r a un ited Europe that is able to operat e in foreign pol icy acco rdi ng t o the Itali an mode l. However, as Lucio Caracc io lo, w ho is director of «Li mes», says, Europe as unita ry po litical actor sti ll be longs to the sphere of unreali ty. Wit h regard to internal dynam ics of As ian co nt inent, India seems to be flexible in t he competition with China. T his is surprisi ng conside ring t hat t he relations hips between t hese two countries , in the Fif ti es and Sixties, creat ed d ifficulties for inte rn ation al commu nity. Today they have in common lots of inte rests, especia lly econom ic interests that Ita ly w ants to share with both of t hem . In particu lar India seems to be more stab le and reliable than other realiti es (for exam ple, the ex perience of the so- cal led «Asian T igers») and is not in fluenced by cultural preju dices eve n in th e proble mat ic re lation ships with the Islam ic w orld. A ll these reaso ns pus hed th e fo rme r Pres ident of the Rep ub lic, Carlo Azegl io Ciampi, to visit India in Febru ary 2005 to

Riv,s/a M,litaro English C:<11hon n 212007

A 25 pound English g un in service with the Indian artillery, photographed during the war agains1 Pa kistan.

make the potential and the perception of Italy tangib le in this country, wh ich aim s to obtain arm s of strategic p roj ection in th e sector of defence. In fact it has shown an interest in the project aimed at the creation of an aircraft carri er like «Cavour» in order to rep lace its «Vikrant». Rome, in fact, had realized how India conside red, as European points of refere nce, France, Germany and Great Br itain and how thi s co uld become a problem for us in future thou gh in the framework of a legitimate European com petition. Prime Ministe r Romano Prodi visited China and India (Chennai, previously known as Madras) in February 2007. This shows how Italy pays atten tion to t hese big and dy nam ic countries. In conclusion, it is evident that the polit ical and economic ax is is shifting tow ards A sia and the Indian Ocean. Statistics provi de us w ith t his information; therefore it is unavoidable to study and understand these changes w ithout getting ideas for all pol icies, including the poli cy of secu rity. The role played by the academic world, the inter-

academic observatory for Inte rnational Policy and the analysts of th is sector to provide entrep reneurs and poli tical and military author ities with useful instru me nts of understanding is extre mely important. T his criterion is applied with the help of the diplomatic , economic and entrep reneurial world and focuses on the positive aspects of bilateral relations rather than cr itical aspects: this is not a fa ult, but a pe cu liar aspect of th is kind of approach. Riccardo Caimmi Lieutenant Colonel, Commander, HQ Command, l nterforces School for NBC Defence, Expert in History of Treaties and International Politics, University of Siena Stefano Ciaramelletti Researcher in History of Treaties and International Politics, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Siena

JOMINI THE ANTI-CLAUSEWITZ A Swiss-born general, Jomini served Napoleon and the Czar and, although a self- taught man, he was able t o spread hi s ideas. Considering strategy an exact science rather t han an art, he was in complete disagreement with von Clausewitz. But a deeper knowledge of his treatises reveals a surprising complementarity which, still today, finds application in the theatres of operations.

In a previous article we highlighted some Clausewi tz's assert io ns because th ey are of high topical interest even in the complex cont ext of the «asymmetric war», alt hough it is very d ifferent from th at war betw een regu la r armies that is fought in t he plains of Cen tral Eu rope, which is one of the subjects the Pru ss ian Gene ral, w ho se mod el was Napol eon, r eflected on. In the previous articl e we also mentioned the antithesis between his theories and the coeval theo ri es developed by Gen eral Jomini, who has strongly infl uenced the strate-

g ic thought up to now. So, who was Jom in1? Di ffere ntly from «A bo ut war» by Clau sewitz, his works, especially in Italy, have captured very l ittle attention up to now and duri ng the 2otf ce ntury th ey were never transl ated into Itali an· however, in his work of 19 12 «Strategie - h is torique, evolut io n», Comma nder (a nd General to -be) Mordacq , wh o was a teach er at t he French War School, pinpointed in the European strategic thought two opposing schoo ls of t hou ght: bot h of them ai m to interpret th e training of the Napoleonic wars: on the o ne hand, the ideo log ists - led by Clausewitz - , or the oth er hand, the doctri naire s, led by Jomi ni. Although he praises the Prussian General's the ories, w hich w on h is count ry the victory of 1870- 187 1 against France, Mordacq stresses the major criticism t he school of ideologi sts has met with: it flies too high, p hi losophis es, wand ers from th e to pi c, tal ks in abstractio ns and loses sight of important an d concrete aspects of the reality of wa r ; it p uts a gre at em phas is on the doctri nai res, who «a re very keen on learning from the Napoleonic ep ic deeds but end up losing the ir way and deve lop ing one of t he narrowest doctr in es . They reached the fo llowing conclusion: the art of war cannot be refi ned [ ... ] . They aimed to redu ce war to equ ations». Before making a comparison, It Is importan t to give some informat ion abo ut his li fe and his works. Differently from Clausewitz - who die d

Left. Antoine Henry Jomini.

Title pages. General Lasalle leading a charge of Light Horsemen.

Riwsta Mditarc English Edition n. 212007

m il itaires», which would be publ ished as a eight- vo lume edition i n 18 1 1- 1816 . In t his fi rst vers ion he explai ns his th oug ht t he rapi d concent rat ion of the mass of forces at a cru ci al po i nt, where he f i nds the secret of t he Na po leo ni c wars . Field Marshal Ney i s keen o n hi s work and gave him a job in t he Gen eral Staff. In 1806- 1807 h e jo i ned Napoleo n 's Ge neral Staff, w ho had read a new m o re extensi ve ve rsion of «T ra ite». After the peace of Ti lsitt (1 807) he we nt back to serve Field Marshal Ney but, beca us e of m isunderstan ding wit hin t he Gene r al Staff, in 1 8 1 0 he decide d to go to wo r k for the Tsa r . In 18 1 2, how ever, he left him becau se he d id not w ant to fi g ht the G reat Armee and ret ur ned to w ork u nde r Napoleon, who appreciated his co l laborat ion and in 181 3 appoi nte d h im as Ch ief of Staff. Even th ou gh he disti nguis hed h imself i n th is new job, f ee lings of envy came out again and, in 1813 , he ret u rned to work u nd er the T sar def in it ively . Fo r th is reason he was accu sed by the Frenc h Generals of t reason. He w as no m inated by t he Ts ar as Genera l of Divisio n, aidede - camp and hi s advi ser and w ent w it h h im to In ternationa l Meetings . In add it ion, he beca m e p receptor of the Russi an crow n pri nce. Fi na ll y , after havin g ret i red t o privat e life in Bel giu m and then in Fra nce, he suggested to Napo leon Il l the p lan ai m ed at win n ing t he Fren chPiedmo nte se war of 18 59 aga i nst Au stria. Th e pe r iod he spent at the Tsar's service w as ve ry frui t ful. In 1830 he pub lished «Tabl eau An Officer of the Light Horsemen of the French Imperial A nalyti q ue des p rincipa les co m b inai sio ns de la Guard (Napoleonic era). g uer re et des leurs rapports avec la pol i ti qu e des Etats» , whe re the art of w ar is d ivi de d i nto f ive bran ches: th e pol it ics of w ar (w hic h art ificia lly disti nguishes itse lf from th e m il itary pol in 183 1 - A nto ine Henry Jo m i ni ( l 779 - 1869) icy), strat egy (o r art / sci ence t oo k pa rt i n t he Ru ssi a nof m ovi ng th e mass es in t he Tu rki sh war i n 182 8 , i n t he w ar of Cr imea d ur ing t he peri- ' ' ... he has pinpointed in the theatr e of war), the great t ac od l 854 - 1 8 56 and in the European strategic thought t ics of manoeuvres and fig htItal ian Wars of Indepen de nce two opposing schools: on the i ng (wh ich in vo lves m ovi ng the A r mies in the batt lefield), in 185 9 and 1866. D iffere nt ly one hand, the ideologists - t he art o f the eng in eer from Clau sew itz , al thou g h he led Clausewitz - , and on incl ud ing t he att ack an d t he had devel ope d an earl y m il ithe other, the doctrinaires, defence of stro ng holds and t ary vocat ion , Jo mini never d id the t actics of detai l. Bot h th e m ilitary stu d ies and never led who followed Jomini ,, strate gy an d t he «great tacunit s i n w ar ; he se rved in t he t ics of manoeuvres and fig htGenera l Staff of t he Great ing » are summ ar ized in the co ncentratio n of Armee and was unpopular with th e Fren ch fo r ces at a cruc ia l poi n t. T he strategy concerns Generals for h is Sw iss origi ns because he w as a the comp il ation of the plan of campaign, w hich p arvenu, as w ell as being a we l l- co nnected, i nvo lves t he analysis of 1 5 factors; t he pl an o f t ouchy, p retenti ous, arroga nt theo retica l self cam pa ig n is ca rried o ut by «th e great t act ics». taug ht m an . After havi ng ded icated himse lf , i n St r ategy - unl ike the tactics - is an exact sc iPari s, to bus i ness and the Stock Exchange, in ence, mo re tha n an art . The «tact ics of d etail» 180 3 he wrote t he fir st version o f his m o nu i nc ludes t he t ra ini ng of per son nel and th e mental w ork «Tra ite des g randes operat io ns

French in fantry at Waterloo.

autono mo us b ranc h of the art / sci ence of w ar. wh ich fo r him i s mo re science than art - con t rad ic t ing him se lf - an d has as i mmutable bas is, as point of refe ren ce t hat sh ou ld al w ays be cons idered , some pr incip les motivated b y histori cal ex pe r ience. T hi s p rocess m akes t he formu lation of a comp lete the o ry of war poss ib le. He makes logist ics a real scie nce of detai l o r of Ge ne r al Staff and d iv ides it into 18 b ranc hes among wh i ch - as wel l as t he bra nch es that t oday w e cons ider as inc lud ed i n th e field of log ist ics - th e o rgan izatio n of r eco nnai ssa nce and se cu r it y , the issu e of o rders an d other thin gs . In add i t ion, as «old>> Offic ial of General Staff he says t hat leade r sh ip sk ill s are not sufficient : a Com man de r needs to count o n ca pab le and loyal sol d iers, on a we ll - prepa red and effi cie n t Co mm and , on ar me d and we llt rain ed troops an d a goo d lo g ist ical o rgan izatio n . He al so conside r s geo g raphy ext rem ely i mpo rtant. In particu lar, he t hi nks th at the st ud y of th e charact er istics of the t heat re of w ar an d t he bat tlefie ld and t he stu dy of th e en emy devices ena bl e us to f ind th e key poi nt at w h ic h forces m ust be co ncen trated an d show how they must be m oved and f uell ed rap idl y and pre cise ly . Befo r e th e Napoleon ic w ar s, the wa rs of em ploym ent of m inor units in t he f ighti ng . In Frede r ick II prov ided hi m w ith a go od mode l «Tab leau » he int rod uced fo r the f i rst ti me t he because t hey w ere rapi d , de cis ive and con duct te rm " lo gis t ics" , bu t t hi s new branch w as not ed by small vo lu ntee r armi es w it hout bothe r in g cons idered as a part of the art / sc ience of war t he civi l ians: fo r t his reason he cons idered th e yet and he gave it the ro le of «han d maid of pro bab le o ccur rence of b loo dy Napoleo nic wa rs st rateg ies», w hich cons ists in i n f utu re, w hic h w o u ld origi o rganiz in g t he move m ent and nate fro m the Fre nch th e st ati on ing of t roo ps ' ' Both Jomini and Clause Revo lu t ion and be bas ed on accordi ng to the strateg y. The witz are real interpreters com p ulsory m i l ita ry serv ice , current co n te nts of log ist ics of the Napoleonic model as a m i sfo rtune . He a lso are inclu de d in th e m ilitary and both of them consider hig h li ghted t he negat ive ad m inist rat ion , wh er eas the aspect s of the sys te m of th e b ranches of artil le ry a nd strategy as dependent on Napo leonic Frenc h ar mi es Corps of Eng i neers mai n t ain a politics , , a nd of th ose of t he l o gi stica l- admi n ist ra tive Revolut io n w hich had aro used o rganization. the pu b lic hostil i ty beca use The m ost i mpo rtant an d comp let e w ork is of extort io n and robbe ry, i n wi d e, sparsel y «Pre cis de l' art de la g uerre ou no uveau t ab leau popu lated or poo r geogra ph ical areas (fo r analytiqu e des p r inc ipales combina isions d e la ex ample , Ru ss ia, Swed en an d Po land ) leav ing strate gie , de la g rande tactiqu e et de la po li t hem w it ho ut any p rovi sio ns ; the refo re, it is t iq ue m ilitai re» (two vol u mes - 1838 ). In d isnecess ary t o be able to explo it t he re so u rces of agreement with Clausewitz (wh o i s not cited in t he cou ntr ies t hat have been in vaded sens ib ly th e open ing chapte r w hen he refers t o the and m oderately. m asters of the art of w ar), but ma k i ng concesAcco r di ng to Jo m in i t he act iv it ies of gu er r illa sio ns to his ant i- dog mat ism , he co nfirms and wa rfare and cou nter- i nsu rge ncy cannot be deepens the co nten t s of his prev iou s wo rks i nc luded in t he syst em of p r incip les wh ic h he and , fo r t he f irs t ti me, def in es log istics as an form ulated. Howeve r , referr ing to th e consi der-

Riv1sta Mi/1/fJre Engt,s/1 Edit101111.

Napoleon inciting the troops.

able d ifficu !ties that the French Armies encou ntered in the Spanish guerr il la wa rfare during the per iod 180 8- 18 13, he obse rved that «in these kinds of wars it is difficult to subdue people w itho ut separat ing them from each oth er; if soldiers join each ot her in the fig hting, they wil l be li k ely to lose t he provinces that have been conquered . The on ly solution is to have an Army th at leads ca mpaig ns and some ind ependent Divis ions that organize the zones behind the front l ine . Th ese Divisions must be comma nded by wel l- educated Generals who are good adm inistrators and res o lute and fair peo ple in orde r that thei r sold ie rs can subdue, with the force of arms, t he provinces that have been assigned to t he m ». In addition, he emphasizes the posit ive aspect s of an Army (li ke t he Eng lish Army in th e war of Spain) that can be provid ed w ith supplies by sea. Both Jo mini and Clausew itz are rea l interpret ers of the Napo leonic model and both of them consider the strategies as dependent on politics : whereas Clausewitz sees war as an art,

212007

Jomin i regards it as a science, with its own p rinciples that are im m utable . Clau sew itz con sid ers the princip les in a different way: he rec ognizes that they exist and are useful but he points out t hat the Co mmander needs th em for his perso nal tra ini ng but «he does not have to app ly them in the batt lefield>>, where they can be put as ide if need be. According to Clausewitz, «war is a chameleon », co nseque nt ly, al tho ug h he considers it nece ss ary to look for the concent ration of forces at a cru cial po int, he does not gi ve to it th e sa m e im porta nce as Jo mini. What is more im portant i s t hat he considers wa r as «socia l phenomenon » t hat is unexpected b eca use it is subj ected to i mmeasurabl e moral and spiritu al forces, w here the skills of t he leader prevail: in fact, he is not subj ecte d to co m mon rul es bu t to rul es th at on ly he, thro ugh his genius, can unde rsta nd . Co ns equently, it is not possib le to fo r m u late a co mp lete theory of war. Differently from him, Jomini te nds t o rationa lize t he war and is able to formulate a comp lete theory of war, whic h is based o n exempl um historicum that has an eno rmous value for h im (for Clausew itz , on the contrary, it is j ust a usefu l point of referen ce ,

Battle of Wagram, 1809.

that is to say a base of depa rtu re th at has a variab le imp ortance ). Othe r diffe r ences arise from the im porta nce th at is g iven to material, weaponry , goo d orga ni zat ion , trai n ing and logist ics: Jom in i co nsid ers these factors f un da m ental; on the contrary, Cl ausewitz refus es categor ically to co nsid er t hem because he th in ks they do not have any influence o n the co nduction of operations. Fro m t hi s oppos ing ap p roach a d iffe rent d ivis ion of art / scie nce of w ar ari ses. For Clausewi tz it consists in two parts that concern on ly t he conductio n of op erations (strate gy and tact ics) an d not h is preparat io n, logist ic s and othe r th in gs; whereas Jo m in i give s us a more co mp lex defin it io n o f war. A cco rd ing to Jomin i , there i s a gap betwee n the strateg ic t heory and its bei ng carri ed out (w hic h coi ncides with t actics), for Clausewitz - whos e tho ught is directed on ly to action - the re are not artifi cia l differences betwe en theory and pract ice, beca use a t heory meas ures up to expectations if it is able to

adhere to rea lity. However, diffe rent ly fro m Jom ini, he real istica lly says t hat it i s more d if f icu lt to for mul ate valid strateg ic concepts rather t han to make dec is ion s in t he f iel d of tactics, wh ere th e doctr inal regulations are a more vali d po int of reference because th ey adhe re to reality mo re easily t han the strateg ic concepts . Even the low er cadres need a poi nt of re ference . Th ere are also sig n ificant d ifferences in oth er f ields: for exa mpl e, Clausewitz i s iro n ic about geog ra p hy an d cr it icizes the con cept of «do m inan t posi t ion» which had a rath er ne gati ve infl ue nce unt il the First Wo rl d Wa r . Wherea s Clau sew itz r ig ht ly fo recas ts that in fu ture wa rs between t he m asse s based on the «arm ed nat ion» wi l l be inevitab le, Jo mi n i co nsiders thi s as a danger, t hat is t o say somethi ng bad th at must be avoid ed , an d th i nk s t hat the governments shou ld wo rk towards an ag reeme nt in order to prevent these w ars fro m «reach ing t he absolut e», to which Clausewitz gi ve s a great im portance - in con t rad ict ion with other assert ion s he has made about t he diffe rent as pect the wa r cou ld take on - attach ing hig her impo r-

Rivista Militare English Edition n . 212007

tance than Jo min i to «popular wars» and guerc ru cial point that, alth ou gh it does not assu m e rilla wa rfare. Grante d that no author i s a t he categorical and abs olu te significance of th e prop het, but he is a man an d a ma n of his t ime past, applies even to th e terroris t orga nizati ons that pub lishes wo rks that have the ir mer its and w hi ch operate in t he «asymmet ri c war» , whose limitations t hat need to be pinpo inted ; these success depen ds on t heir ab il ity to con cent rate two key figures, wh ich mu st be stu d ied and t he forces at th e most convenient po ints rapidcompared, are of topical interest and this ly, t aki ng the enemy by su r prise and t hen emerges cl early from t he comparison that has b re aking up. On the oth er hand the negat ive bee n drawn above. Without any doubts some aspects of Jomin i's thought are the excess ive concepts that hav e bee n formulated by hi storicism t hat has give n substance to th e Claus ewitz, such as his strong ant i- dog mat ism accusation that the General Staffs of the 20 t h and his assertion that wa r is a cham el eon and a centu ry were p reparing wa rs like in the past, to social phenomeno n, ar e of h ig hly top ical intert he excessi ve schematism and ord elin ess est; however, he is not the on ly one to f i nd t he sh owi ng attention to deta ils. Th ese aspects are re latio nsh ip between pol itics and w ar and his not on ly typ ical of the French General Staff. The strong sp iri tua lism does not match a hi gh ly «l ine Mag in ot» originated fro m th is schoo l of techno logical w ar - whi ch aim s to keep th e thought and it was wrong ly seen by t he Fre nch losses to a min im um w itho ut ma ki ng use of army betwe en the tw o Wo rld Wars as a sort of mass and conscript armies - th at western soci ph ilosopher 's ston e to wi n - cheaply an d w ithet ies m ust fig ht in the 21 st ce ntury. Even in the o ut strateg ic alternat ives - t he aggressiveness two World Wars of the 20 t h cen t ury the w inners of the new Ge rman Wehrmacht. The General we re th ose w ho had many more weapons and to - be De Gaul le stigm atised prophetica lly thi s supp lies, as it had happened in the American te nd ency in h is w ork «The Ed ge of t he Swo rd » Civi l Wa r during the period 186 1-1865 . (1 93 2): «it seems that t he Fre nch m il itary sp ir For a l l t he se reasons Jo mini's t heories , it d oes not recognize t he emp i r ical natu re the despite th ei r dogm at ism an d th e cla im to make act ion of w ar shoul d have . He tries incessantly war a ratio nal phenomenon confo r ming to wel lto develop a doctrine that enab les him to orient defined r u les, match the weste rn modern wars the acti on and determine its shape a priori , very we l l, where equipm ent without tak ing into acco unt and tec hn o log y have a domi the circu m stances that shou ld na nt and even excessive ro le '' What is needed is the g ive it a sol id base. T hi nki ng because th ey tend to replace constant and deep study that you have an i nst ru ment men . It is no co inc idence that of the real situation of to avo id the dangers and the Jomini has had a stron g influ su rpr is es of the circum each conflict and in that stances ence in th e US from the and domi nate t hem Am erica n Civi l War u p to now respect both Jomini and means givi ng your m ind the and has i nspi red the theo ri es Clausewitz give us pre - rest it strives for i ncessa nt ly of the famous Am e ri ca n cious material ,, [ ... ). Without any dou bt th e Ad miral A rt hur Thayer Ma ha n French spirit stri ve s for it and of the Ita li an Giu li o because it is d ri ven by its Dou het. Th is influ en ce - w heth er it w as uncongreat love for abstract ion and th e sys tem , by its scious or not - st ill lasts i n t he West for the wo r ship of t he absol ute and th e categor ica l simple reason that the curre nt jo int em p loyconcept.. .». These are th e da ngers t he Ar med m ent of powerful an d com p lex forces, whi ch Forces m ust avo id an d thi s i s truer today than belong to d ifferent Armed Forces of d ifferen t in the past, w it ho ut preco nce ived ideas. What co untries , an d th eir logist ical support req uire a we need is the constan t and de ep study of t he diffe rent trai nin g, w hi ch is ne it her eas y nor rea l sit uation of eac h con fl ict and both Jomini brief, and meticu lo us advance p lann ing th at an d Clausewitz give us precio us mater ial to do must k eep t he un expect ed to a m i ni mu m . t hat. In addition, in th eir works - and the po litConsequently, th ey also require the important ica l- mi li tary lead ersh i p consists of this - it is wo rk of the Ge neral Staff w hereas t he Leader's necessary to be able to choose what is more ge nius, wh ich is exalted by Claus ewitz , has ve ry usefu l: t his operation i s difficu lt since the reg litt le room for m anoe uvre. u lar Arme d Force s have lots of limitations and In add it ion , we shou ld consider t hat the reg fau lts and t he e nemy who does not consider ular A rm ed Forces of any States have a lw ays t he m gains a g reat advantage from t hi s. needed strict and comp lete doct ri nal rul es based on pri nciples. For example, Jom i ni's Ferruccio Botti principle of the concentrati on of fo rces at a Colo nel (re t.)

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARMY All complex systems tend to change with time in order to adjust to the experiences matured or to prepare for future challenges. The Army, like, and perhaps more, than other organ izations, along the years has been the subject of continuous changes, which lately have undergone a decisive acceleration. This article has been written by the former Chief of the Department of General and Financial Planning of the Army General Staff, on the basi s of a conference he held last October for the students of the Centre for High Defence Stud ies.

The evo lution of the mil itary instrument, which working in an operational framework based on has been concerning our Ar med Forces during t he netwo rk-centric technologies . last decade, has been deve loped in accordance • Validity of the 190,000 mode l, w hi ch, neverth ewith norms , directives and docume nts, as wel l as less , could have to be trimmed down for f inan on the basis of t he results of the analyses of poscial reasons. si ble scenarios: elements that constitute the nec• Pursu it of synerg ies with in the operational comessary conceptual grou nd of the change. Among ponents, ex plo iting the profess ional characterithe docu ments, t he Mi nisterial Directive and the stics of each Service, avoidi ng the uneconom ic Strategic Concept of the acq ui sition of "all- range" capaDefe nce Ch ief of Staff represent bilit ies in each com ponent. fu ndame nt al gu id i ng inst ru - ' ' ... the Ministerial Directive · Professionalizat io n, as a f unme nts an d clearly outl ined and the Strate9ic Conc~pt of damental and irreplacea ble courses. the Defence Chief of Staff rep- eleme nt of person nel policy. T he Minis ter ial Directive ( l) is • Priority in programming githe document that "identif ies resent fundamental guiding ve n to the needs of the fightin g the political intent ions, in t erns instruments and clearly outsoldier, t he main actor, w ho of o bjectives and method of lined courses ... , , carries out the tas ks connected developm ent of the m i litary wit h peace maintenance and instru ment so that it m ay con inte rnational security. tri bute to achieve the objectives of secu rity and The Strateg ic Concept of the Defe nce Chief of national def ence in synergy w ith the "Country sysStaff is t he document t hat "outl ines t he conce ptual tem". The 2006 version is based o n the following frame of refe rence for the planni ng of the Armed m ain points: Forces, as a concrete technical- military implemen· Centrali ty of man, within a mi litary instrument, tation of the politico- mil itary guide lines". The verinterservice and interope rabl e in international sion pub lished in 2004 precisely defined t he essencon texts , w ith expediti o nary characteristics, tial elements of the th ree principal dimensions: • Qualitat ive: with refe rence to the characteristics and quantity of assets, mat erials and instrument s, all interoperable in mu ltinat ional enviro nments ; • Quantit ative : defin ed as volum e of force sui table for complying w ith the level of national am bit ion (known as 190,000 Model); · Capacitive: gauged to acco mpli sh a wide range of poss ible m issions, accordi ng to the probab il it y of the sing le events. Title page. A "Lagunare" employed "Leonte".

in Lebanon in

operation

Left. A company of the 55th Infantry Reg iment on parade.

Riv1slf1 M i1il8t e E11glish ÂŁrli(IOrl 11 212007

EVOLUTION TRENDS FROM CONSCRIPTION ARMY

~ > ~> [

TO PROFESSIONAL ARMY

-65% Suspension of conscription (Ja11uary 1, 2005)

~ 5%

196.000

DL. 464/97

DL. DL. 214/00 215/05

D General Support (C2, Schools, Support Lo gistics, Territorial Area, p ersonnel on training)

â€˘

Projectab le Component Personnel emp loyed outside the Service (Joint, International)

Th e d imens ion s, t herefore , are evaluated and defined in order t o allow the Cou ntry to play a protagon ist role in internatio na l contexts. The assu med scenarios are all marked by a high level of uncertai nty and great hete rogene ity of t he actors , especially the no n-st ate one s, pote nt ial t hreats to t he security of t he Count ry. Hence the necessity to have forces capable of carrying out a wide range of m issions, some of wh ich m ay be very far from the t raditional ones. These forces should be able to react in a dive rs ified and flexible way and, in a short t ime and above al l in a post-confl ict dimension , shou ld be able to carry out, sim ultaneou sly in t he same area, activities of peace support, humanitarian assistance and restorat ion of infrastructure; area security; war on t error.

DIRECTION GUIDELINES In order to gove rn suc h a many- sided and complex process, initially th ere has been a w ill to define clear direct ions , wh ich cou ld lead towards a single big objective al l t he num ero us stru ctures involved . In fact, the process now in prog ress follows four main trend s, divided into projects t hat concern t he entire Se rvice in al l its co mponents :

hum an, conce ptual and tech nolog ical. A process w hi ch, bein g of course "son" of t he pre - ex istent geo strateg ic bipo lar cont ext, is based on t he socall ed "Summ its Law" and is cond itio ned by th e t ragedy of Septe m ber 11. 1 st direction: fro m "pot ential" force, mainly static, to in strument with capabil iti es of high projectabil it y and rap id dep loyment. It permits t o have a readily emp loyable fo rce, taki ng advant ag e of t he experience s made in t he m iss ion s carried out fro m "Lebanon ' 82" to t hi s day. 2 nd direction : fro m conscript ion Ar my t o profes sional Army, reducing the "quantity" parameter in favour of the "q uality" com po nent. Con sequently , an instr ument t hat could no mo re correspond to a model based o n conscription . T herefore , we have proceeded t o t he profess ionalization of the A rmy . A process that is sti ll going on , which, when completed , will permit t o have operational forces of about 78 ,000 men, from wh ich a proj ectable component of abo ut 67,000 men co uld be draw n (65% of t he entire Service), except ing poss ible fu rther reductions, wh ich at present cannot be q uantified . In th e last l 5 years the Ar my has reduced by 4 5% the num ber of its effectives. 3 rd d irection: fro m a concept of single Service to t hat of com ponent of an interse rvice and mult ina-

An Ita lian patr ol Afghanistan.

recon naissance

activity

tional in strument . The employment of the forces in multinational cont exts, su pported by an ample con sensus, suitable for operations in t he three dimensions and under joint command , has induced the Army to develop capabilities th at in the past were non ex istent, or greatly unde rsized ; some of them, on the other hand, have taken the lead wo rldwide. In fact, in the last five years we have: · Constit uted the Italian-led NRDC- ITA Command, at Co rps leve l (one of the main NATO, recently deployed withi n t he ISAF operations in Afg hanistan). emp loym ent assets · Strengthened the fo rce pac kage for the cond uct of special operations, assigni ng to the Special Forces, based on t he 9 th "Col Moschin" Regi ment, two FOS units, precisely the 135th RAO Regiment an d the 4 t h "Ranger". · Participated in the const itution of the Command of the Sea Projection Force, on a group of j oint land ing forces (Army and Navy), which can operate autonomous ly in areas d istan t from the national territory for a long pe riod of time . · Guaranteed contributions to the NATO Respon se Force, to t he EU BG, to t he Multinational Land Force , as we ll as to EUROFOR, as mu lti national initiat ive for t he co nstitution of a Command for the management of operat ions under EU and NATO aegis . · Constituted the Cim ic Grou p South , anot her fundame nt al part of the NATO Force Structure (NFS), which perm its to f ul ly accomp lish the CIM IC function th roug h the creation of CIM IC Centres and the conduct of CIM IC activities on the ground, the rea lizatio n and maintenance of the re lations of cooperation and collabo ration with al l the civilian acto rs in t he area of interventio n (IOs,

NGOs, popu lation and local institu tions), and t he formu lation of informative evalu at ions on th e civi lian aspects of the situatio n during t he operations. • Constituted the 2sth "Pavia" Regime nt, achieving real PSYOPS capabilities. Reinforced the 7th NBC Reg iment, which parti cipated, as fo rce of surveillance and ready int erventio n, in many events of national and inte rnatio nal im portance. 4 th direction : from mass force to qu ali ty and quantity force, in o rder to give effectiveness to t he nat ional amb it ion and ensure continuity to the current and prospective engageme nts. T he land in strument, w hose employment remain s decis ive in the present scenarios and in the fu ture ones, needs adequate volumes of personnel and techn ologica lly advanced materials . Th e "mode rnity" of the latter, in part icul ar, is expressed in operat ional versatility , besides ra ising t he level of protection. However, it should be unde rli ned t hat , in the long r un, the f inancial frame wo rk supporting the whole process did not co nform to the prefi gu red ass umpt ions ; t hi s const itutes a limitation to t he achi eve ment of the qualitat ive object ives w it hin t he plann ed time and causes a progressive expo nential declin e of t he effectiveness of the enti re system .

THE CONCRETE ACTIONS The abovesaid ''directions" co nstitute "roads" t o be fo llowed and point ou t goals to be ach ieved: neverthe less, spec ific secto r s of interve nti o n should be deve loped in order to accom plish concrete actions. In partic ul ar, t he sectors t hat have been se lected will give substance to the process. Th ey constitute the wef t in which to weave the warp made of interventions at all leve ls, in order t o obtain a fabric of efficiency and operativeness incl uding: Doctrine; Organ izational structures; Train in g; Leade rshi p; vlog ist ic sup port ; Infrastruct ure; • Personnel ; • Intero perabi lity. A new doctrine. The cyclic natu re of the process , if we ll carried o ut , ens ures a "dividend" of profession ali sm re- investib le in the overall quality of th e Instrum ent. T he dept h of the analyses, never separate from a good deal of programm ing capabilit y, characterizes th e cu rrent studies, particu larly for t he newly- develo ped particular capab ilities, constantly compared with those worked out in t he

Rivista M1i<IA1H £11ghs/1 C:c/it1011 " 212007

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES - THE FUTURE ARCH ITECTURE main partner Countries. It is a sector where every event is a cue for new thorough stud ies, where experience is the starti ng point for new analyses ~ A~MY . ·. and the finishing line of in sightful investigations. CHIEF OF STAFF Among the most significan t initiatives started by the Army, there is a plan for an Excellence Centre responsibl e for operations of stabilization and reconstruction. Among t he main tasks of the insti tution there are . Functioning as bind in g agent in the matter of concepts and doctrine, to the advantage of the institutional actors that have an active role in "out of area" interventions. AAMY . Perfecting the training prog rammes of the perLOGISTIG COMMAND sonnel connected w ith the operations followi ng the confl ict (post co nfl ict operations), envisaging also the participation of the allied Countries . Organization. Today the Army is organized in five ranges) and aspects connected with security. functional macro- areas subord inate to the Army • The Schools Command (Rome), respo nsible for Chief of Staff. It is the goal, not definitive, hinged on basic training , specialization and the followin g Law 25 / 97 and articulated by successive norms. qualification of the whole personnel. Decree 464/ 97 instituted the Command of the • T he Logistic Command (Rome), responsible for Operational Land Forces, the Logistic Inspectorate the management of the resources of assets and and the Branches Inspectorate, structures where the mate rials of the Service. pre- existent Inspectorates of the single branches, • The Inspectorate for Infrastructure (Rome), re specialities and services converged. Later, in 2000, spons ibl e for the maintenance and modernizat he frame of reference of the professional instrument t ion of the entire infrastructure property. The rewas further enhanced by Law 331 /2000, which also sponsibilities of this In spectorate will be redistri specified the tas ks of the Armed Forces (2) Decree buted to the other four areas 214/ 00 later modified some prewithin 2008, year when it will ceding provisio ns , constituting ''The depth of the analybe dissolved. the RFC Inspectorate (which took Training. Despite the vagueses ... characterizes the curon the top role for the whole terness of the scenarios, ritory, replacing the three Military rent studies, particularly for Regi ons), the Infrastructure the newly-developed special Warfighting remains the scenario suitab le for complete Inspectorate and the Traini ng and capabilities, constantly com - training. For this reason, the Specialization Inspectorat e (which pared with those worked out availab il ity of convenient areas took over ISPEARMI and ISPESand ranges is an ind ispensable CUOLE) . Recently, Decree. by the main partner Coun prerequisite. In this regard, t he 253 / 05. concerning "integrative tries ,, in creased activities in ranges and corrective provisions of abroad, started a long time ago Decree 464/97 and the following and gradually increased, have permitted to refine modifications and integ rations, containi ng a strucprocedures that have subsequently been profitably tural reform of the Armed Forces", operative within transferred to operational fields . An activity that, 2008, wil l implement f urther simplifications of the in any case and li ke other activities, risks a proArmy' s Chain of Command and Control. gressive atrophy as the mentioned financ ial prob The fi ve areas that co nstitute the current struclems become chronic. Nevertheless, the successful ture, ensure simplicity and co ns istency of the introduction of training methodologies based on com m and action by having: simulation, in the last years has permitted to inte · The enti re operat ional component of the Service grate the training assets availab le with simulative unde r the orders of the Command of the Operasystems and models, realizing scenarios within tional Land Forces (Verona). which real systems, simulated systems and virtual · The In specto rate for t he Recru itment and Com models operate in an interactive and coordinated pletion Forces being transformed as Command manner. The Army has been co ns idering for a long for the Army Territory (Florence) , responsib le for t ime and with attention th is opportunity ; the introactivities concerning recruitment and selection, duction of simulation in the operational cycle is by garris on, State property, management of various now a pri mary objective of the Army, as was bodies (museums , log istic- training bases, firing

****

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LOGISTICS - INVESTMENTS PROTECTION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FORCES IN OPERATION /

,, ------PROTECTION

-- '

--·-·-·-·-·EFFECTIVENESS

------------proved by t he rece nt est abl ishm ent of th e Simulation and Validation Centre at Civitavecchia (Rome), which is already usi ng a system for t rainin g the Command Post s of the operat iona l un it s, at both regiment and Brigade level. Leadership. A factor muc h less vi rtua l and evanescent as on e m ight be lieve. It is deve loped th roug h an accurate character' s fo rming of t he personnel , based on an interdiscipli nary, interservice training approach at univers ity leve l, with large employment of courses in t he Defence and m ultinational ambit, provided by the attendance in t heo retical and practical courses at in stitutes of other Countries. Logistic support. Where the gravitation of the efforts is aimed at ensuring: • Protection of t he forces, considering the safety of the pe rson nel an element of absol ute priority, not o nly fo r evident ethical- mo ral reaso ns, but also for t he ind uced person nel's motivation . · Forces effectiveness, as the irreplaceable factor for ca rrying out eve ry m iss ion. A set of tas ks that are constantly at r isk owing to a permanently negat ive fi nancial picture. Infrastructure. A large part of the app rox imate ly 45 00 infrast ructure now availab le to the Army go back to WWII (some as far back as t he end of th e 1800s). In view of the transformation of the m ilitary instru ment into a prof essional one , and the opening to the female com pone nt, t he present

'·-·-·-·-·- · -·" availability, num erically excess ive vis- a- vis t he actual needs , does not meet t he standards envisaged for the f unctions it performs. The efforts in t hi s sector are therefore mostly concentrated on : · Bu ilding of new housing for t he voluntee rs. • Modern ization of the infrastructure, adjusting it to the changed need s, sorting out at t he same time t he no more usable infrastructure that may be transferred into t rade- in or casting- off program mes. • Rationalizatio n of t he in frastructure, through the uni fication in a sing le place of homogeneou s fu nction s. A process that is very muc h cond itioned by costs and loca l problem s due to the repositionin g of detachments and units. • Recourse , w hen poss ible, to ex changes w ith t he loca l admin istrations , thro ugh the transfer of desirable infrastructure agai nst the construction , at no cost for the Defence, of new com plexe s, preferably o utside the inhabited centres. Personnel. The human component doubtless ly remains the most important co mponent of today's and tomorrow's Army, as it was in the past and perhaps even more today. No technology, as advanced as it may be, can ex press its potential if it is not emp loyed by w ell - trained and mot ivated individuals. The education and training of a so ld ier are fundam ental act ivities, factors of a product th at r isks to be annulled if the capability of performi ng correctly comes to an end . To find and prepare in divid uals co nti nu es to be a wi de-rang-

R1vista Militare Enghs/1 Edition 11. 2/2007

[

EVOLUTION OF THE OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENT

2007

2014

]

2020-2025

······································································•• CONTINUATION 1s t MEDIUM B.

OF DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIUM CAPABILITY LAND INTEGRATED FORCE

~ ACQUISITION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES

about the same size , with low / medium availabil ity of technologies, but in a position to carry out the missions found in the mode rn operational scenarios and suffi ciently capable of interfacin g with si milar NATO/ EU formations. However, in the long term , the hypothes is being studied envisages the establishment of a robust core of intermediate units, with high technolog ical conte nts and with multifunction al capabilities, boosted by a set of heavy and light (specialized) forces that will be t heir real enablers. T he process should lead to t he completion of an Integ rated Land Force (FIT) ; a fle xible force, bal anced in every component, in a position to project packages , also jo int, suitable for being integrated with allied forces. The FIT will have not on ly ve ry high characteristics in terms of projectability and flex ibil ity of emp loyment but, like the objectives of th e evol uA LOOK AT THE FUTURE ' ' The choices made up to tio nal trends in prog ress w ith in our main i nternational interA change t hat concerns a so now envision an Army submuch complex real ity that it canstantially constituted by a locutors, w ill be ex peditionary, not be gauged on intermediate light, a medium and a heavy net capable and effect based orie nted. The mi litary in strust eps, even if it is in order to component ... ,, ments of t he West are mostly make amendments and re- mod employed in operations characulations on the basis of cond iterized by short phases of t ionings and restraints t hat may high-intensity combat, followed by more or less have intervened , be they endogenous or exogenous . long periods of stabili zat ion , marked by peak s of The choices made up to now, in the short/ middle tensio n that require t he app lication of the force term, envision an Army substantially constituted by according to techniques and modalities very near a light, a medium and a heavy com ponent, of j ust

ing chal lenge, which provides the ind ividuals not only with technicalities, procedu res, informat ion, but also consideratio n and respect. Interoperabi lity. It is imple mented throug h the participation in a series of worki ng and study groups, besides othe r numerous m ultinatio nal joint initiatives . We also wish to me ntion the working groups - withi n NATO and FINABEL (3) - which concern all t he develo pment sectors of the Service (logistics, interoperability, new capab ilities), as well as t he bil ateral talks w it h the main partner and allied Countries, in orde r to share the experiences, points of view and knowledge acquired w ith the employment, as well as the li nes of deve lopment of the respective land components.

TREND OF RESOURCE ALLOTMENT Cifre in M€

Total for Defence Function 15232

rinvestemen.t.

l•• i,90

Total Army Budget 13638

•• ••• •••• 258

••• ••

running

4339

301 3

---

NE personnel

IN REAL TERMS (2005)

1837

1990

4.876 4 .657

306 535 921

··-~

••

8037

8757

2005

2006

.382

2005

2006

to the high-inten sity ones. and adequate resources. The progressive cuts in resources obse rved d uring the last years corre In view of this, the attention is concentrated more on the "effect to be obtained" than o n the objective sponds to a constant increase in ope rat ional task s t o be achieved. A change of method , which means to and a continuo us r ise in the costs connected with acquire the capabilities to monitor the manoeuvre professionali zat ion. Co nsideri ng only the Defe nce space continuously, is t he synergic employment of Function, the resources al located for 2006 total € all the components however available. The minim um 12,106 m illion and represents 0.843% of the GNP. dimension of the force to be modern ized is a diviOne of the lowest amou nts in Europe and the hi ssional complex of about 9000 men, with Brigades of torical mini mum since the end of WWII. T he various types, one of which for "early entry". On the process of transformation accomplished until now has weigh ed more on the Army, as it is the Servi ce basis of these parameters, the Army has worked out a project for an Integrated Land Brigade (BIT), which that needs more personnel. On the other hand, should be realized by 202 5. Conceived as evolution the incidence of the expenses for the personnel , of the modern medium Brigades, the BIT will be which has now reached 72% of the entire budget developed according to an evolutional spiral, which of Defence (an anom alou s amount in th e European and w orld's context) represents a disat the moment envisages the completion of the first unit, organized on a VBC platform tort ing ele m ent only due to and equipped with digitised systhe reduction of the resources tems, within 2014. Subsequently, ' ' The financial prospects destined to Investment and the updating process will be con - for the immediate future do Ope rat ion . The fact remain s ditioned by both the leve l and type not leave much space to op - that in abso lute term s the per of the new technologies on the capita expense for the Italian t imism,, market and by the availability and sold ier is far from what is continuity of the financial dest ined to the American, resou rces. British, French or German soldier; a situation wh ich reflects a!so o n the budge t of the Army, for wh ich the re has been a remarkab le increase in the THE FINANCIAL ASPECT resources employed for personnel (related mainly to professionalization), compared with a drasti c No farsighted and comp lete plann ing can do redu ction in the resources for Operation and Investment. anyth ing if it is not supported by a flow of ce rtain

R1v1s1a Mihlfll'O English Ed1lt0/l n. 212007

REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS The fi nancial prospects for t he immediate future do not leave much space to optimism. Even a t urnabout of the present negative trend could not allow sufficient margi ns for the implem entation of all the project s envisaged . It should be pointed out that the wished objective of the budget is that of bringing the fin ancial trend of th e it ems of Operation and Investme nt back at least to that of 2005, incremented with the financial volumes nece ssary for redres sing the capacitive decline generated by the ano malous budgets of the past years. In orde r to better un de rstan d t he impact on the instrument of the present "s inking" of the volumes of t he resources, one should refer to the parameters that, in fact, ex press the Strateg ic Concept of the Def ence Chief of Staff. In t his regard , the o nly lever on which it seems possible to act is the "quantit ative" one, with an immediate tran sfer of the level of nation al ambiti on . Cons idering that t he latter element is also cond itioned by capacitive and qualitative parameters. Surm ising the persistence o f the present financial sce narios and imposin g an allocation between Personn el / Operation/ Investment of 50%- 2 5%25%, t he entire military instrument should reach l 36,000 men , compared to the present model of 190,000, approxi mate ly 78 ,000 of whom for the Army, assum ing t hat t he prese nt divi sion remained unchanged. It is quite clear that a reduction guid ed only by fi nancial conditionings would have larg e diversificat ions, for it w ou ld es sentially affect the capabili ties expressed by the Army, where the human element su bstantiates the realization of the potential. Therefore a re- examination of the Model of Defence would affect main ly the Army, owing to its mance ntric nature and also because of t he role of protagonist that t he land component plays in every military operation: in practice, th is woul d reduce the effectiveness of the entire military in strument, makin g it no more su itable for attaining the present level of ambition. Ne ither can o ne envisage an instrume nt that ensures its existence to t he detriment of its effectiveness and efficacy. Likewis e, th e theo rem according to which t he cuts in person nel are the road to a qualitative growth o f the instru men t, is an his to rical falsehood that can be easily de mon strated, also in f inancial term s. Therefore if t here were no poss ibility or will to reverse t he pre sent trend in terms of financial resources assigned in the short and long term , it will be necessary to: · Reconsider the leve l of nat ional ambiti on , trimming it down. · Redefine th e role and tasks assigned to the mi lit ary in strument.

• Reconfigure the mode l in all its com pone nts (q ua litative, q uantitat ive and capacitive) in the sense previou sly pointed out. Therefore the decisional process related to a possible new re form, in its course should env isag e: • T he assessment of the poss ible employme nt of the Armed Forces in view of the probability that the foreseeable operati onal sce narios m ay occu r, consider ing also t he political ri sk conn ected with a hypothetical in tervention. • The exploitation of the operational systems and of the capabilit ies that, for their versatility and int rins ic adaptability to the vari ous situations of employment, show to have a more advantag eou s cost ' effectiveness ratio. • The ba lancing of the need to maintain the know how in the field of highly techn ological weapor. systems with that of keeping t he acq ui sition and operation costs within acceptable limits, through a carefu l evaluation of the actual poss ibilities of emp loyments of the ass et s to be acqu ired. • The preference granted to choices t hat tend to confer compl ementarity among the components of the entire mi litary instrument, em phasiz ing th eir j oint quali ty and avoiding sect orial and speciali zed choices. T he measures that spri ng from the expre'.;:.ed li ne of action must be clearly politically backed and be the outcom e of the ge neral ackn owl edge m ent t hat th e mi litary apparatu s is an in st rumen t of political objectives and national and inte rnational security, always keeping i n mi nd the cen trality of m an in the mode rn o perational scenarios . Giuseppe Maggi Lieutenant General, Commandant, Application School and Mili tary Studies Institute of the Army

NOTES (l) The correct denomination of the document is "Mi ni steri al Directive as regards mi li tary pol icy, inform a t ion and security activity". (2) Art. l, comma 4, of Law 331 / 2000 states that "the Armed Forces have also the task of operati ng in order to realize peace and security , in compliance with the rul es of international law and the determi nations of t he organizations to which Italy belongs". (3) The denomination of the initiative originates from the i nitials of the founding States (195 3): France, Italy, Nederland, Be lg ium and Luxembou rg, w hich have later been joined by Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Greece and Portugal.

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force • • • 0 r I g 1 n a I I ty • ex p er1ence

THE MANAGEMENT OF LOGISTICS The technolog ical development and the new international scenarios requ ire the development of integrat ed systems and logistics in support of t he units which must be realized according to precise strategic choices and sustainable technical and economic evaluations. It is a difficult and complex course that requires of t he operators wise choices and professionalism.

For a soldier the real problem is not to acquire a new idea, but to abandon the old one. Liddell Hart

The final years of the last century constituted one of the few significant periods of history regard in g the log istic organization of the armed forces. And connected to this, in terms of t he new world strategic paradigm and what it has broug ht w ith it, a comp lete ove rhaul of the tasks and duties of the army with the consequent entire restructuring of

logistica l operations. The Gulf War, with t he impressiveness of the initial intens ity and the eventual successes, had made understood, again, t he fundamental importance of logistics and su ch logistic complexity wi ll also be needed for the transfere nce of the Coal ition forces into Sau di Arabia. What foll ows will examin e some of the aspect s that characterise the new scenario, th ose elements that have been most useful in t he im petus of t he changes to logistics management, ideas that are in novative and up-to- date but above all adhere t o the new reality and its needs.

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT The technological impact on man of the last te n years is, to say t he least, surprising - above all in regards to the soph istication of transport, materials and information technology. In this last fie ld, in particu lar , the increase in power and the reduction of cost of hardware have stimu lated a real revolution. The average level of IT knowledge g rows , and continues to grow at a ever increas ing ve locity, all facilitated by th e transmission of data - the job of the sat ell ites and mobile phones t hat have changed t he way we communicate today. In the civilian world it has res ulted in a situation today that means any bus iness t hat operat es in the commercial sector cou ld employ a soph isticated satellite system to get informat ion on its sales an d stock in rea l time , acting as a closed circuit tv network to keep managers and se llers informed on merchandising strategies. Bar codes and scanning

Left. Unloading a CH-47 'Chinook ' from an Antonov aircraft. Title page. A CH-47 "Chinook" transporting a VM- 90.

Rivisla M1lilere English Edition n . 212007

In alig nment w ith the focusing on technology there comes the deployment and integration of f inancial, human and tec hnical know- how resources, all in respect to strategic alliances and research from external sources.

INTEGRATED LOGISTICS In recent years t here have been cha nges in the ap proach of industrial apparatus as compared to

Above. A Command Terminal. Right. A portable terminal.

mach ines are able to avail ab le all the informat ion with a rapidity that makes the traditional forecasts useless. Even in the m il itary wo rld t here have been softthose for m il itary purposes, becom ing more speware developments dedicated to tra nsport mancialized and specific, but above all becom ing more agement, to mat erials, to communications - that integrated . It's not simp ly about a se rvice contract have allowed the armed forces to be able to but more about an operational integrat ion by the employ an appropriate piece of technology for Ar med Forces t hat, in comp lete harmony with the every new need . latest log istic engineering, pla ns from t he very In part icular it is evident in the area of Asset beginning t he weapon t hat wi ll end up be ing Tracking the mi litary world is as up- to- date as the introduced. An integrat ion t hat, although in its inicivilian, being able to monitor conveys and the t ial stages seems destined to become t he best w ay materials they are t ransporting . to organize managerial aspects that, in practice, Asset tracking is a piece of equipment able to are about substa ntial financial supply, extreme ly q ui ckly and budgets. with a lot of detai l, info rmation on dislocation, movement, sta' ' ...the impetus of the In times in wh ic h th e system is to be ma intai ned in an tu s and identificat ion of units , changes in logistic manageautarchi cal way, with an openpersonne l, equipment and ment is based on modern ing towards rnal world materials. Wit hi n t his frame and innovative ideas that, only in timest heofexte su rplus, is in work the development of the subsystem Cons ignme nt above all, adhere to the new definit e crisis , the t endency to reality and needs , , now integrate the operational Tracking f inali zed the monitorpotent ial with that of the q uali ing of resources , in terms of fi ed industr ia l products has person nel, transport and matedefinite advantages. Suc h openings toward indus rials and related transport vectors, ass uming the try shou ld be set in motio n in the immed iate importance and priority of guarant ee in g com plete f uture, setting off a necessary review of all t he visibility of al l assets in trans it. systems employed by the Armed Forces, based of The change also affect ed more trad it ional indus co urse on it contractual, regulatory and leg is lat ive t ries in a way t hat now all sectors are much more fo un dations. techno logical ly focused t han at t he end of the last In the achieving of such a hoped fo r change, century. And t his focus is extremely evident in the there woul d have to be t he abandoning of t he culfields of t ransport and storage as we ll as informature of hes itatio n that surrounds the fear of losing t ion tech nology and health.

A soldier equipped with latest- generation material.

the reorga nization that came in 1997 as the fi rst and substantial example. The constant curre nt w o rk by the Itali an Continge nt in out-of-area ope rations shows t he need to have avail able, in real t im e, a flow of info, mat ion regarding t he com ple te complex situation they f ind themselves in. It seems log ical therefore to organ ize stand ard proced ures and a "netcentrico" model that is able t o hold a si ngle log istics system able to integrate in a coord inated, synergic an d harmo nious m an ner across the te lephone network . In such regard the Logistics Command of t he Italian Army have already started , for a while now, the creat ion of a series of proj ects t hat have th e purpose of defi ning an in itial model for a Network Ce ntra l Logistics (NCL) operation. Above all t he various aspects of o peration s, log istics, techno logy, management informatio n comprise, in te rms of today, a complete system in which one aspect can not be more or less important than another. For example, how many of the just me ntioned aspects wou ld be i nvolved in infl u enc ing the decision in which one must decide about a new means of transpo rt or whether or not an 'out- of- area' ope ration is viable or not? In the first place, though, it has to be arg ued that of t he character istics of t ranspo rt tech nology it knowledge and ability since thanks to the synermust be stated that the spec ifi c mil itary req u iregetic activity behaviour of such com plementary ments and subseq uent analysis must answer t o fu nctions it w ill allow the interchange of t he t he needs of the Armed Forces befo re all else. It respective 'know-how's anyway. would be important therefore in t hi s aspect for research t o be done by t hose involved in research at the cuttin g edge, with the purpose of ass uri ng THE NEW SCENARIOS: MULTINATIONALITY, COMt he sup ply of, other than operational req uireMUNICATION, INTERACTIONS ments, but also the g uarantee of the security of person nel. The operatio nal sce nario is increas ing ly viewing Next is the choi ce for ope ratio nal needs , t o stabil ity as the key, am ongst the assure t he availability of a suitco untries t hat are adhere to the ab le logistic support system mil itary and i ntern atio nal ' ' Management must focus t hat is focused on its eve ntual organizations with a t ight inte- on speed, quality and strucfutu re activities right from the grat io n of mu lti national force ture , , moment it is be ing acqu ired. t hat is able , fle x ible, compl ete ly Close ly con nected to th e interoperab le, able to operate technolog ical factor and to its with institutions and non - gove rnme ntal civilians re percuss ions to the needs of security of pe rson forces. In order to be able to operate in this scenel, today more th an ever, it mu st be take n in to nario t he forces m ust be deployable , rapidly accou nt t he effect on t he moral of the soldie r and formable and complete ly as su red of sustain ed the socio- political impact that such new system s log istic support from those backing them up in a could have on t he loca l popu lation in t he operasituation of m ultinatio nal and integrated log istics. tional area (t he employm ent of wheeled instead of In this evolved context, just defined , the structracked trans port) . tu re and logisti c orga ni zatio n of the armed forces Finally at t he end of th e supply process other have the continued necessity to adapt t hemse lves iss ues are brought to light, poss ible re marks by to new world pictures wh ateve r is happening, w ith the commu nity o r publ ic op inion about th e

R,v,sta M11t/a10 English Ed1//01111 212007

acceptance of mi ssions or the min imizing of r isks, or also rega rdi ng the Armed Fo rces being able to manage the news that sprouts from all kind of sources and which the m~d ia can mani pulate and distort. As we have seen the refore it means that as a whole the process is rather complicated and only a management of all the activities in its global entirety, can assure a w inni ng formula, all encased in a general ambience of modern methods, net work- centricity, integ ration and above all profes sionalism by operatives.

with the accessing of data and being able to co nnect up with ot hers are ass um ing a primary im portance. It can be affirmed though that it is not only an issue of the techno logy within the organization, nor in j ust one sector, but rather it is an iss ue that includes t he whole of the supply chain. Finally, t he speed of decision-making seems to be the issue hardest to address, this area is the step in the process which is remaining behind all others and this is not an issu e related to technology but rather the unwill ingness of command au thority to delegate. The qual ity

A MODERN CONCEPTION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF LOGISTICS Based on the above mentioned assumptions managem ent should focus on th ree fu ndamental aspects that characterize and represent the way forward : speed , quality an d structure. The speeding up The marked focali sation on the speed of processes (decis ional, informational and co mm unicational) is a consequence of the technological development of recent years. The availab ility of information in real time und erlines how everything could happen much faster. The perfor mance deve lopm ent in total shows that it could have a direct impact on three different areas of logistics operations: processing, information and the taking of decisions. It is obvious that where the process of speed ing up takes place that there is at least a maintenance, if not an actual increase, in the efficiency and quality of the service offered. Th e aim is to accelerate the process w hile ma intaining the sam e standards , or preferably improving standards. Speed of information is a reality in today's technology and is a need oft requested, making possible now the carrying out of operations in all parts of the world yet with a chai n of Command and Control able to communicate in complete real t ime. Not al l organizations have this complete capacity or are ab le to maintain an accurate information system of the hig hes t quality. It is certain though that the challenge of these years is for the achievement of the sharing of information amongst the o rganization s, remembering that the speed of information takes on a different connotation when there are various interested parties. It is worth stressing that the problems connected

Proposed integrated communication apparatus for the Future Combat System.

It is clear that clients (u nits) ex pect that they are su pplied with products / materials or services of hig h quality. Quality for the manager of logistics is divided into three areas ; 'zero defects', continual improvement an d performance maintenance. 'Zero defects' is the 100% performance target. Even if it is not always poss ible to ach ieve in prac-

t ice the idea of completely sat isfyi ng th e needs of started to change and t o make room for the t ecrnology that was emerging in that decade and tl u the unit is not an exaggeration. In itself 'zero defects' stress the creation of the rig ht item, in was to become even more prolific in t he years to t ime, every ti m e. The reach ing of a performance come. At the heart of the structural changes were three fundamental changes: Net- working, t l e level below perfection is like promis ing to some units a leve l of dissatisfaction. Guarantee ing a recourse to external consultant s, ethics . success rate of 95% also ensures a failure of 5%. Net- working. T he tendency to i ncrease the Pe rformance based on the average wou ld have extent of the organizational network of represer been acceptable in the days of less precision and tation, nowadays, is not a choice if you want to when information was slow, and it was in part jusstay up to speed with the other partner countri e tifiable in the sense that there was no way to preAnd hel p came to aid this activity in the form c the Elect ronic Data Interchange (ED I) an o ld idea dict w ith certainty. that fou nd itse lf reborn th ro ugh renovation thanks T he idea of planned defects is obsolete in the to the increased capacity of management via th real time environment and the time has now come use of outsourc in g t hroug h the use of informati on that organizations have to be measured in te rms tech nology. It's certain , howeve r, that t he of perfection. increased efficiency of a system makes man1y The task concerning continual improveme nt is a operatio nal prob lems surface t hat req uire a over mental attitude of continua l research of new ways and procedures to improve logistics. It's about haul of work systems and foundatio ns continually setting, calibrating and improving Furthermore some experts insist that traditiona organ izations had to fi rst spli t apart before bei ng someth ing which is already fun cti oning well. It able to start the process of evolution that would con sists in the continual refi nement and perfecting and not in 'great leaps forward'. In situations bri ng them to a position of being able to corn pletely take advantage of the power of informa of very advanced logistics such improveme nts are tion. Th e organizational struc only possible throug h strategic alliances, whi ch could include tures of yesterday became sub alliances with industry and the ' ' The technological devel - j ect t o inc redibly d is rupt ive private sector. opment and the new world changes. At the heart of thi s change was the focus on team Therefore, to be sure of continscenarios are increasingly work ual improvement every organ izain order to carry out cer t ion , and in that is incl uded mili- calling not only for grand tain tasks and processes, or on tary organizations, would need to works, but also for integrat- netwo rk gro ups w ith determi systems and logistic nate be d isposed to make experi- ed 's ki ll s' d ist rib ut ed ments with new concept s, even if services for the units ... ,, amongst all the organization that were dealing with such they need to revolutionise the change s. Co nseq ue ntly it was mental approach from a previous traditional viewpoint of which way was best to follow to create a network for particular tasks to be disfor a particular function. tributed within and to allow the creation and dis mantling of specialist teams as and w hen need s The concept of maintenance of performa nce is si mple. All new levels reached have to be required. In su mmary it can be confirmed thereentrenched and this cannot happen if only the surfore that the management of networks constituted face symptom s are tackled and not the more fun the principal challenge to the trad itional organizadamental problems that support all change. The tional structure of the com mand and control hierarchy. technique to ensu re that a level is m aintai ned is norm ally at the cost of perform ance. In order for T he use of external consultants. In recent years it has become commonplace to base activity on th is to happen there is a loss in the relationship the use of external specialist con sultants. For the with cost an d efficie ncy, of rationalizing the reason that they have been ab le to expand th e resources at their disposal, but it must be made opportunities for an efficient management. The clear to all, without illusions , that the entire process of modernization cannot occur without concept of external cons ultants is old and owes its t he avail ability of all the syste m to accept change . roots to the econom ic specialization, of wh ich strategic alliances are a modern day example. By The structure outsourcing certain professional and spec ialist functions it allows the focusing of a company's Already by the 1 980's all organizations, both priinternal resources on its core business (and the vate and public, and the economic system general Armed Forces are no exception). It 's clear that the started to unde rgo sign ificant changes . The typical pro liferation of thi s form of activity requires th e single management structure of organizations had availability to use funds in an ad hoe manner, and

Riv1sta Militare Englisl, Edition n . 212007

general practices that are beco m ing leaner, less bureaucrati c and necessarily mo re transparent.

CONCLUSIONS

Electron ic helmet of the "Fe/in " System.

not t he constant but steady use of fi nancial resources via in- house structures. It's also clear that t he app roach to this type of collaboration requi res new attit udes that conseque ntly allow and favour t he eme rgence of strategic alliances in t he long t erm between clie nt and supplier. The strategy of value added se rvi ce could even reach the suppli er of the suppl ier and the cli ent of t he client. Little by little businesses are red ucing i n size and are moving tow ards structures ever more lean and flat, it is probable that they wi ll be ent erin g into other alliances and t hen having t o face the need of expanding their horizontal management structure. Et hi cs. In whatever activity man is involved in it becomes a central iss ue. T he recons ideration of what is right o r wrong in a fu nctio nal relations hip is a reaction, above all of a financial character, both to ever increasi ng needs , w hich are not just the bas ic eve ryd ay need s, and to past reckl ess choices. But in tod ay's w orld , con side ri ng the w ide range of sources a typical logistics organ ization encompasses, the potential to violate ethics is significant. As a consequence t here came the t ime that the tradition al practice of procurem ent had to be closely and attentively exami ned, and so to the

Technical developments and the new world scenario are increasingly calli ng fo r, in te rms of the area of logistics , not on ly fo r the needs of grand ope rations but also of system integ ration and log istic servi ces to be un ited in order to ach ieve preci se strategic objectives as wel l as the eval uation of tech nical versus econom ic cho ices that provide a susta in able resolution . In the current situation clearly characterized by m ultinational joint integrated operational forces, not only in terms of war but also 'peace support' and humanitarian aid, the capacity to integrate and enter into the t rue spirit of "joint " and "combined" becomes fu ndamental, in terms of the allied European and Atlantic forces, for achieving a greater capacity of interoperability and com plete integration. It can howeve r not be forgotten that technologi cal progress im poses a steady and constant adaptat ion to every m ilitary piece of equipment so as not to become outdated, inefficient and incompatible with the eq uipment of ot her countries. On t heir part t he econom ic restrictions im pose, in accordance with budgets , choices that must be long-sighted, inte lligent, efficient and focused on the acqu iring and develo pment of primary purposes. At this point in the fields in wh ich it needs to express it self best the d isting uishing ele ment betwee n countries will be the relevant technology. As a resu lt t here will be the need for the all the Armed Forces and for ind ustry t o combine their separate specializations, in a 'big pool' of knowledge, in order for the achievement of a maximisation of uti lity. To this regard there will be the need to invest hum an and financial resources, in a clear and dyn am ic w ay, taking account that rhe best of logi stic competence requires to take into acco unt the quality of perfo rmance of a static o rganization operating across an ' envi ronment' characte rised by t he fact that every element is looki ng t o be improved upon. We are t alking about a collaborative relationship between industry and defence that is becoming more intense and open, and above all with fi nancial resources that are consistent, trustworthy and safe, and in t he absence of such a situation there is left the risk that the final objective will remain unachievable . Antonio Monaco Colonel, Head, Motor ization and Engineers Div., Tra nsport and Materials Dept, Army Logistic Command

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FORTIFICATIONS IN COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE Fortifications are one of the most effe::tive instruments for ensuring freedom of movement and projection capability. Besides, they contribute to increase the chances of success for the forces engaged in the pacif ication of a region.

As stated also by the rece nt US Army pub li cation In co unterguerril la operations, where fight ing FM 3-2 4 / 2006 "Cou nterins urge ncy", to be sucstarts in places and circu mstances not related t o cessfu l in countergue rrilla warfare, a regular army the locations occupied on t he gro und by t he mu st be able to control the te rritory, have t he suptroops, fortifications are the most suitab le instru port of t he pop ul ation and enough time to co nd uct ment for guaranteeing to the units freedom of t he ope rations. Fortified positions are one way to manoeuvre and capabi lity of projection outside the achieve th is resu lt. T here is no main positio ns occupied by t he univocal defin it ion of these force s. However, t hi s situatio n positions . The US doctrine, t he '' .. . to be successful in is not new. In every non - con most complete on t his subject, counterguerrilla warfare, a ventional co nflict of the past. cal ls a "base" any defensive regular army must be able fortifications contributed t o position used in counterguerril to control the territory ... ,, increase t he chances of succes s la ope rations . In particula r , of the forces engaged in t he publication FM 90 -8 (1986) pacificatio n of a reg ion. Suffice "Coun tergu erri lla Ope rations" gives an ample it to remember, for example, t he garrisons of th e description of the various types of bases in relaFrench Foreign Legion in North Africa, the forts of tion to t he stre ngth of the forces garr ison i ng the the US Cavalry during the Indi an wars in t he in stallation : "patro l base" at company or lower American North - West and the It alian redoubts in level; "o perational support base" at battalion leve l; Libya. "su pport base'' at Brigade or hi ghe r level. The bases ca n be employed both in areas garFurthermore, append ix E fixes criteri a for the risoned by friendly forces - bu t not safe enough selection and construction of th e pos ition . to prevent penetrat ions by ho stile gu erri l las and i n order to protect t he bo rd er s fro m enemy infi ltrat io ns. As a matter of fact, any guerrill a movement, in order to last, must have safe p laces at its dis po sa l, th e so-called "sanctuaries", usua lly located outside the State where th e in su rgency takes place, where t he guerrillas can fall back, recover thei r capab il ities an d, above all , get an easy supply of weapons and amm uni ti on. Fort ifications kept t hei r specific functions als o in the post- WWII period, being amply used in th e co lonial and post-colo nial confl icts and, today, in

Left. The US Fire Base of Pleiku in Vietnam.

Title page. An Ita lia n emplacement for a Afghanistan in 2003.

72 0mm mortar in

Rivista Militaro English Ed1li0tl n. 2/2007

THE FIRE SUPPORT BASES (FSBs) IN VIETNAM The FSBs, also commonly known as Fire Bases (FB), consisted of protected artillery emplacements, located in a position commanding the surrounding territory, tasked w ith providing all-around cover to the infantry units operating within the range of the base' s weapons. Constructed by Engineers with expedit ious procedures and defended by infantry units, the bases were occupied by transporting howitzers and mortars (together w ith their munitions and materials) by hel icopter. When the manoeuvre went beyond the FSB's range of action, new bases were bu ilt where the arti llery was deployed, in order to continue supporting the infantry. This necessity was further increased by the extremely rough nature of the ground, with remote areas in the northern mountains, rolli ng central plateaus, th ick jung les in the centre and, in the south, an infinite number of swamps in the Mekong Delta. This solution gave back full flexibility to the operations, perm itting long movements with the capability of reacting, rapidly and with the necessary f irepower, to the kind of combat conducted by the enemy. (. ..) The 2nd mechanized battalion, 2nd infa ntry Regiment (less one company) provided the security of the perimeter of the Artillery Fire Support Base on Road 4 (... ). Within the "caravan" type circular perimeter there were two American artillery batteries and a detachment of Engineers. These latter were building an airstrip and a camp for Special Forces. The perimeter of the fire base was protected by foxholes manned by infantrymen and soldiers from the artillery and Engineer detachments. At about every 50 metres there was an armoured vehicle for troop transport (. ..armed with 50mm, 7. 62mm and M- 60 machineguns). The vehicles were interred. The field of fire in front of every defensive position had been cleared (... ). Acknowledging the intrin sic value of these positions, the American Army gradually extended their functions , including garrisoning the territory and carrying out "search and destroy" operations. Thus the FSBs turned into Forward Operating Bases", where the indirect- fire component was only one of the assets available. However, this entailed the need to increase its dimens ions, both to accommodate the units that were pr ogress ively detached to the position and to adopt more effective measures of protection, since the bases rapidly became very important targets for the enemy. The defences were improved in order to face larg e-scale or increasingly intense attacks, with internal "respect areas" for stopping possible intruders stolen into the outer perimeter. Extremely thick and elaborate barring systems were laid around the encampments. They consisted of concert ina, Claymore mines, tripping w ires, poi nted bamboo canes and, in some cases, ditches. Sources: • Major V. Nicol i: "Fire Support Bases Oevelopmenr". • Tom Carhan: "Battles and Campaigns in Vietnam 1954-1 984 ·•

"geometrical" wo rks by Vau ban (one of the g reatest military architects of all t imes), sin ce t hey are built either by us ing pre- exist ing infrastructure or earthwork s integrated with re info rcement materials . On t he other hand, these "exped itious " insta l lation s, wi t h their sand bags , their tren ches du g in t he ground and t heir underground shelters, st ill follow th e same pri nciples to put a barrier between defen d er and attac ke r, con ce ntrat ing t he heavi es t vol u me of f ire aga inst the latter.

Above. South Vietnam. the US "A lpha " Fire Base. Right.

A US Fire Base in Vietnam.

counteri nsurgency operations in th e strugg le against international terrorism . They are nevertheless not ably d iffe rent from the buildings of the past t heir aspect is more and more "field - like" and they resemble very little the

from us ing the scarce and d ifficult roads, and freed them also from the conditions of t he g ro und, wh ere many areas cou ld on ly be reached by air. T hu s, acknow ledging th e in tr ins ic value of t hese position s, the A merican A rmy gradu ally exte nde d its functions for t he defence of th e ground and the conduct of "search and destroy" operations . T he FSBs beca me th erefore "Forwa rd Operati ng Base s/ FOBs", where the indirect-fire compone nt was only one of t he assets availab le to th e base.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

French Indochina: often the outer fence of the French fortified positions was complemented with sharpened bamboo canes and several lines of barbed wire, in order to prevent the Vie t Minh "death-volunteer" sappers from opening breaches in the de fensive line, neutralizing the "blockhouses" with explosive cha rges.

T hese emplacements are often isolated , and their garrisons live in Spartan conditions, w ithout almost any of th e comforts that are now in fact indispensable for a western army, used to increasing ly elevated standards of "field" life. The pos itions are garrisoned by soldiers who - in a time characterized by "technolog ical conceit", where satellite comm unicatio ns pe rmit to fo ll ow "live" the operations cond ucted at di stances of t housands of kilometres - carry out com bats reminiscent of the battles of "other t imes" whe re man w as always the decisive eleme nt of the clash . Bes ides, starting from the Vietnam war (1965 75), they have taken on a new role, and from static elements of the deployment they have become pre- em inent in t he conduct of operations, pivots of the lan d offe nsive manoeuvre. T he US Army, in o rde r to take contro l of t he con tended reg ions - a goa l that cou ld not be reached by us ing heli co pters - developed t he "Fire Support Base/ FSB" system (1), on t he grounds of the experie nces of its Special Forces whic h, already in 1961, had reali zed a network of camps in order to rest rai n the Vietcong act ivity. As a matter of fact t he batt lefield, m arked by a flu id an d non - lin ea r pattern, which besides preven ted the arti llery from adhe ri ng to the infantry actions by dep loying beh in d the friendly lin es, entailed new tactica l proce d ures . The so lution freed the whe el ed vehicles of the manoeuvre

The Lebda redoubt at Homs in Tripolitania, Libya.

Today th e fortified positions are stil l w idely employed be the regular arm ies in co unterguerri lla ope rations . Th e US Army, based on the lessons learned in Vietnam , has adopted, as mainstay of its presence in the Afg han and Iraq i th eatres, a de ployme nt of permanent or t emporary inst all ations (Forward Operating Bases and Fire Bases/FBs). Th e purpose of the former is to increase the Com mand, Control and Comm un ications capabili ty as well as to provide support (medical care, amm un it ion , fue l, etc.) to the operations conducted in the area . The ir structure can guarantee an adequ ate level of security to the garrison s an d the to forces possibly prese nt for carrying out special actions, and a bette r comfort compared to that offe red by th e surround in g area. In ge neral, the bases include a semi- prepared "aviation area" and / or a hel icopter land ing pad , as well as a m orta r and/ or cannon un it in a position t o interve ne all arou nd, within the range of t he mu nitions availab le. In their turn , the Fire Bases, armed with how itzers and mortars, form an "advanced" network of garrisons located on the critical points of the te r-

Riv1s1a Mi/ilaro Eng/is/I Edition n. 2/2007

THE ITALIAN REDOUBTS IN LIBYA (1911 - 1930) The criterion by which the Italian permanent and semi-permanent field fortifications in Libya (cal led redoubts) were reali zed from 191 1 to 1930 was that of opposing, for an indefin ite length of time, the violent attacks carried out by rebels on foot or horseback. In order to face this threat, ample recourse was made to passive obstacles, consisting mostly of barbed wire entanglements and sandbags, with the addition of trenches and loose- laid low walls to protect t he shooters. Large nu mbers of sandbags were used to rein force the structures. Arti llery emplacements were set up on rises of the ground in order to overlook the defence sector and permit the employment of direct fire. there was also a great num ber of observers on towers especial ly built to provide the widest field of vision, especially for the indirect- f ire artil lery. Searchlights became very important for opposing the incursions of the Arab rebels, who attacked almost always at night. When possible, pre- existent defensive walls, lookout towers and ditches were used. A rather large recourse was made to artillery shields and individual devices for protection from light weapons' fire. These defensive organ izations often prevented the enemy from conducting strong attacks. Thus, they preferred to assault the Italian and Eritrean Askari units in the open. The artillery and automatic weapons of the redoubts kept the rebels at a distance, compelling them to carry out mainly distu rbance actions. (The Italian redoubts in Libya are well described in the film 'The Wh ite Squadron", made in 1936). (From the Archives of the History office, Army General Staff).

ritory, in orde r to support the units operating w ithin t he range of their weapons and li mit the movements of the enemy. Withi n an FOB t here is also a "Quick React ion Force (QRF)", a hel ibo rne rese rve, ready to intervene in favour of both the operationally su bord i nate FOBs and of patrol s t hat may be unde r enemy threat. A FOB controls several FBs as regards coordinat i on of act ions , QRF in terve nti on a nd logistic/medical support (2). In Afghanistan, in t he summer of 2006 the British continge nt resort ed to several forti fied garrisons, called p latoo n hou ses, in the northern part of t he southe rn provi nce of Helmand, to face the recru descence of the Taliban guerrilla activity in the reg ion. In Colombia, the government authorities have reached positive results in cou nterinsurgency by establishing fortified po lice st atio ns along the LOCs (Lines of Comm unicati on) of t he guerrill as . T his network of outposts red uced the iso lation and neglect of the rural co mm unities, who have always been v icti ms o f internal co nflicts , and increased the operating range of the reg ular forces. In Pak istan , as in Colom bia, the locatio n of garrisons along the Afg ha n frontie r perm i ts a bette r contro l of the borders a nd, at the same time, it guarantees the security o f the Coal ition's LOCs.

"The emplacements of automatic weapons and the observation posts of the Pakista ni stro nghold of Mangrotai overloo k one of the most sensitive frontiers of the world. This commanding position on the Afghanistan-Pakistan b order is paradigmatic of all the dilemmas emerged from the fro nt of the war against terror. Deployed on the snowy mountains of the lawless tribal area of No rth Waziristan, the contingent of 30 Pakistan i soldiers

The Italian redoubt of Sidi dakis in Libya.

is hemmed in between the Taliban militias and the US/ Afghan forces on the other side of the border.. .In North Waziristan there are 97 strongholds, deployed on the barren brown ridges or on the snow- clad p eaks dotted with pinetrees. Here, the militiamen, using numerous gorges, cross the border and attack the US and Afghan garrisons ... "(3). In Amazoni a, the Brazilian Armed Fo rces used combat bases, at company a nd battalion level, in the cou nterg uerrilla o perat ions of t he '70s against the insurgents of FOGUERA (A raguaia Guerrilla Force , a rm ed formation of Braz il's Commun ist Party) and FARC (Revo lutio na ry Armed Forces of Colombi a) .

THE ROLE OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS In orde r to be effective in t he g eneral context of a counterinsurgency campai gn , a fortified installa-

A Soviet emplacement near Bagram, Afghanistan.

tion must be set up with a unitary vis ion and conceived so as to play an offens ive role against t he guerr illa movements, interacting with the other components of the manoe uvre. In view of this, fortifications can be a central element in the system of control of t he area, performing the following tasks: Guarantee the availa bility of safe places i n host i le or not completely pacified territory, from wh ere t he forces ca n be projected to th e sector of responsibi lity whil e protecting fr iendly LOCs. Interdict enemy LOCs, reducing the enemy freedom of action, movement capabilities, as we ll as concentration and transport possib ilities, compelling the in surgents to aband on the Country's most important areas and / or drive the insurgents away from the ir sources of su pply and recrui t m ent. Support a network of outposts proj ected to the most sensitive zones of th e AoR (Area of Respons ibility). The dep loyme nt of t he Ame rican bases pe rm its to divide the AoR int o Operations Areas, each assigned to d ifferent units , which, in periods of inactivity, carry out operations aimed at ens uri ng presence and survei llance in their respective areas , subsequently concentratin g for a pre - establi shed t ime whenever believed necessary for major operations . " ... The "Lum b eryard " FOB was built at the beginning of May 2006 to pro vide a point of sup port for Afgha n and US troops moving north in the provinces of Kun ar and Nuristan ... Th e Coalition forces move among the insurgents ' m ost remote hideouts but cannot guarantee the security of the local population, who say they need help in order to drive them out for good. The ina bility to provide security to the population

in these areas thwa rts the long- term effectivenes5 of operation s such as "Mountain Thrust ", a large scale offensive of the Coalition, launched recently in southern Afghanistan follo wing an increase of the insurgents' activity. They cont rol part of t he country around the operational bases in the southern provinces. Instead of securing entire areas like those of the southern dese rts and the northe rn mountains, the US forces have built bases such as "Lumberyard" fro m where they go on patrols, meet the village notables and check the roads in search of bombs and other devices ... " (4). Thanks to bases set up on the gro un d, the US Ar med Forces can put a co nstant pressure on t he enemy, applying the concept of operational balancing and select ive employment of t he units, to reduce the ri sks and ach ieve a force rat io favourable to the Coalition , also from the qualit ative point of view. In substance, it is a matter of us ing t he "quadrillage'' technique ("quad rillage", from t he French verb quadriller, i.e. to divid e a town or a territory into square sectors in order t o facilitate their co ntrol) , adopted by t he French in Alger ia (195 4- 1962). " ... During the Algerian conflict the French, having isola ted the opposition movement insid e the borders , focused on the elimination of the insurgents ' inte rnal cells. They started special operations aimed at providin g security to t he population and to the various installations. A ll these activities we re carried out by organiz in g the Country on the so- called "quadrilla ge system ", wh ich envisaged dividing the territory in to geographic sectors to b e kept under strict con trol. Each square was assigned to a garrison that provided security ins ide the area through an

Kabul, Afghanistan, 2002: a fortified position of the !SAF fo rces.

Riv1sta Militare English Edition n. 212007

AN EXAMPLE OF FORTIFIED POSITION- THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE IN AFGHAN ISTAN (1 979- 1989) The Soviet strongholds w~re organized on a system of trenches, dug- out emplacements and shelters for munition s, food and water. Personnel lodgings, ammu nition dumps, Headquarters , common rooms, kitchens, water reserves and toilets were also fortified. Generally, an outpost consisted of a mot orized rifle platoon, one or two automatic AGS-1 7 grenade launchers, one or two DShk heavy machine guns, one or two 82mm mortars and a tank. The outposts could be joined together to form a security detachment (a company- or battalion- level motorized rifle unit, reinforced with artillery, tanks and Engineers). These forward positions were active around the clock. In daytime, one man for each squad or tank was on guard duty, while a two-man patrol inspected the area. At night, each outpost set up one or two security points formed by four man placed 500/ 800 metres from the defensive perimeter and able to communicate with the outpost both by cable and visually. Each garrison had a defence that could cover the entire perimeter; thus it could face mujahidin attacks coming from every d irection. Al l platoons had a primary and secondary fi ring sector, with f ields of fire overlapping those of the adjacent units. The outposts were generally reinforced by artil lery detachments. The artillery f ire was planned so as to cover all directions from which the mujahidin could launch an attack. Targets w ere recorded and numbered. Fire could be corrected - in relation to the targets fixed during pre- planning - by the Commander of the security outpost, or, if he was unable to communicate directly with the artillery "subu nits", by the battal ion Commander. Normal ly it did not take longer than two-four minutes to take the artillery fire against a g roup of mujahid in. Each outpost was enclosed within a double line of barbed wire, among which there w ere antipersonnel mines connected with tripping wires. Sensors and flares, also connected with tripping wires, were hidden at various distances along the z.iccess routes . At night entrances and exits of the outpost were closed and mined. Warning boards about w hat to do and not to do - in Afghan, Russian and English - were affixed along the perimet er of the security area and outside the defensive boundary. Sources: â€˘ Lester W. Grau: 'The Bear Went Over rile Mouncain: Soviet Co mbat Tactics in Afghanistan â€˘. â€˘ ,he Soviet-Afghan War. The Russiar. General Staff". University Press of Kansas, 2 002.

and simple mea ls are prepar ed at the makes,11ft organization of fortified p osts and patrols to mess. There is n o run ning water, and the sollocate and intercept the insurgents . The garridiers sleep under the stars, protecting themson 's main task was t o ensure a level o f securi ty selves from the las hing sand with sleeping b ags. adequate to the threa t and to the needs o f its More tha n a do zen Humvees surro und the operation s zone ..." (5) . perimeter o f the camp, providing a security cor Convent ional units garriso n the bases and, at don , whi l e soldiers build an 8ft sa nd- wall t he beg i nn in g of an operation, fi x the time necaroun d the base .. .(6). essary to con t ro l the critical areas, while the As happened in the past, duri ng guerrilla cam Special Forces move from the periphery to the paigns that had a favo urable conclus ion , t hese centre of the " sq uares" concerned, neutraliz ing garrisons can achieve results going we ll beyond systematically the hostile elemen t s present in t he mere organ izational aspects. t he area . Accordi ng to the idea that " ... Only a wee k ago t his area, the objective of a counte ri nnot far from Musa Qala, was s u rg ency campa ign is the nothin g but a ba rren piece of ' ' The garrisons are often support of the popu lation and d esert, full of d ust and com- catalysts for the local peo not th e co nqu est of the te rripletely useless. No later than ple .. . ,, to ry, the bases can also crelast Thursday it has become an ate the cond it ions fo r pac ifyoutpost full of activity, defending the area by ga ining the confidence of t he ed by 7 05mm h owitzers and snipers, protected civil ian settleme n ts in areas not yet und er co m by a h igh sand wall. A US base built in the m id plete control. dle of nowhere, in support of the offensive " .. . This operat ion ("Baaz Tzuka ", a Pashtun agains t the Taliban in t he unstable southern part term for "Fal con Sum mit") had the purpos e of o f A fg hanistan .. In the camp there will be stocks protecting from the rebels th e d istricts of of food, fuel and m unitions, in support of Panjawayi and Zhari in the Ka nda har p ro vince, as Operation "Mountain Thrust''... The o utpost is at well as pro viding genera l support to t he t he considerable distance of 180 miles from the Government in the ve ry place where the ISAF Kandahar permanent base, and about five m iles forces had fo ught against t he Taliban in fro m M usa Qala, a small village in t he Helmand Operation "M edusa " in September 2006 ... Wh ile provin ce, wh ere the Ta liba n are very active ... /n "Medusa" was ISAF's firm response to the Taliban the small tent of the infirmary there i s a sur geon,

OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS

Khost, Afghanistan, 2003. an "Alpino" wa tch ing over his sector from an emplacement of the "Salerno" FOB.

intention of entrenching near Kandahar, capital o f the p r o vince, and besiege i t, "Baaz Ts uka" is a larger opera tion with similar milita r y objectives, with the addition of political and econom ic pur p oses, t rying to win t he "hearts and minds " of the population and to d evelop the i nfras tructu re of the region ... One of the main goals is to offer the in habitants an alternative to the Taliban. The ISA F and Afghan forces are d istributi ng humanitarian ai d and m aterials for the reconstruction to the elders of the tribes, besides g iving help to the Afghans d ispersed by the reb els .. ." (7) . As a matter of fact, the garrisons can offer a w ide range of se rvices of public ass istance (m edica l care, schools, g rants) , make interve ntions of var iou s nature (political, legal or military) on the local authorit ies and / or leaders. They also know better t he situatio n of the area. The garriso ns, furthermore, are often cata lysts fo r the local people, who tend t o gather near t he pos itions, both to be protected and t o ta ke advantage of the mil itary as a sou rce of sustenance . ".. .At Paktica, the p resence of the US forces permitted the materialization of som e kind of progress. Hundreds of camps, consisting of m ud and brick houses, occupied by ve ry numerous families, have ris en around the Shkin and Orgun Fire Bases. Some shops and some industries have moved to the area, and schools have started their activity... ". (8) . Finally, in some case s, such as t he Braz il ia n reach of t he Amazon River, m ilitary garrisons can pl ay a dete rm inant role for th e growth of t he scarcely inhabited areas, helping the socio- econom ic deve lopment of the reg ion (9) .

If t he forti fications are planned only for def ensive purposes and ce nt red o n force projecti on, security of LOCs and of th e main and most vuln erable targets (i.e. o il pipelines , dams, et c.), t he emplacements cou ld turn out to be useful im mediate ly, but wil l not contri bute to the success of a wider offensive strategy. So as to avoid it be ing a useless waste of resou rces that could be better employed, a fo rti fied dep loyment m ust be sustainable in terms of miss io n, availability of forces and log istic support: if this is not the case, the fortif icatio n risks to tu rn into a limitation in t he co nduct of t he o perations. Bes ides, one shou ld not forget t he effect on t he med ia if a pos ition fall s into t he hand s of t he adversary , owing to the stro ng em otional and symbo lic repercussions of t he event. The Soviet concept for the securit y of LOCs i n Afg hani stan (l 9 79-89), for i nstance, env isag ed a series of st rongho lds, where the personnel had the task of garr isoning the posi t ion and wa it: a pas sive an d reactive approach, wh ich d id not inc lud e agg ressive pat ro ls or reconn aissance act ivitie s. On the co nt rary, guerr illa warfare has no need t o att ack t hose who are already on the defensive: it has o nly to move its act ivit ies elsewhere, leavi ng the enemy where it is, entrenc hed in a place that becomes peripheral and un import ant . In th is regard , T.E. Lawrence (better known as Lawrence of A rabia) wrote , " .. .By the n we were blocking t he ra ilway, and the y only defended it. The garrison of Medina, re duced to in offensive proportions, remained crouched in the trenches and des troyed the ir possibilities of movement, eating t he animals they did not kn ow how to feed. We had deprived them of the possibili ty of harming us and now we also wan ted to seize their city. But what for? .. .. (1 0).

A n isolate garr is on is useful for t hose who bu ild it only if, to besiege the post, it is necessa ry t o employ a force larger t han the fortification 's, or if the posit ion can block an important enemy line of com m unication. " ... the posts located along the roa ds and the itinera r ies of the enemy contrib u ted to a remarkable reduction in the Mujahidin 's provisioning of materials and arms, forcing them to adopt special measures to neutralize their effec tiveness. When their convo ys and caravans where passing (usually at nighl), the mujahidin block ed the activities of the fortified posts close to routes used by them. In fact, they were able to determine the stren gth of the garrison, study the terrain and organize the attack while the suppli es we re going by... ( 1 l ).

Rivis/D Militarc English Edition n. 2/2007

Col. Roger Trinquer, a French Officer with a great deal of experie nce in co lonial wars, in l 96 1 observed " ... The military emplacements, set up with a great waste of energy in the areas to be pacified, usually have no influence at all. They are mostly p laced on the points of passage that we have to keep in order to move our heavy equipment safely, and they do not disturb in any way the guerrilla s who have no need to go th ro ugh t hese areas. Their bands can circulate freely inside the large areas that separate the fortifications, without having to worry about them, organizing and controlling the population to the ir advantage. Later on, some wisely planned terrorist attacks will be sufficien t to subject the inhabita nts to their will. Furthermore, the layout of these emplacements is displayed like an open book under the eyes of our enemies that can observe them as they please. Th us, no activity carried out ins ide the fortification can escape the ir attention. The only real usefulness of these emplacements are the needs they create: to maintain and supply them compels us to open roads and to guarantee, sometimes over long itineraries, the security of the convoys, therefore conducting a certain military activity, which otherwise would not exist... " (1 2). The Russian Army in Chechnya, taki ng for granted the ir centra lity in the overa ll scenario, employed the strongho lds as key instruments in counterg uerrilla warfare, dispersing its forces in numerous small fortified garrison s, convinced to achieve territoria l contro l with on ly the presence of the t roops. On the contrary, the raids of t he insurgents compelled t he Rus sians to concentrate in less and less fortified garrisons, whic h, after all, turned out to be insufficient and wit h a limited capacity to counter t he guerrill as' activity effectively. The same situation occurred du r in g the fights for the Chechen capital, Grozny, when the Russians, as they prog ressed, set up defe ns ive positions in the urban versio n of the outposts, thus scattering their forces an d making them much more vulnerable. In Iraq, the logistic support of the large bases had req uired a ve ry burdensome su pply system , involving a conti nuous flow of logistic convoys, exposed to guerri lla attacks. As a matter of fact, the protection of the convoys is one of the mai n tasks of the Coalitio n. In so ut hern Afghanistan, in the Helmand province, in 2006 the British forces had to reduce t he "p latoon houses", owing to t he difficu lt ies inherent in a regular supplying of the isolated and bes ieged garr iso ns, w here he licopters could not fly w itho ut great r isks, wh ile the convoys o n the road s w here often amb ushed by the insu rgents . " ... Th e so- called platoon houses, which are nothing but reinforced govern m ent centres, have

Khost, Afghanistan, 2003: an observation turret of the "Salerno " FOB.

scarce amenities. The combats have been so intense that th e helicopter could not re - supply the troops ... Food, water and ammunition must now be carried to the positions occupi ed by the platoon wi th convoys travelling on the roads, ris kin g being am bushed and running into expl osive traps set by the rebe ls. An American convoy wa s ambushed in nearby Uruzgan by insu rg ents that launched rocket - propelled grenades, killing two civilian contractors ... The platoon houses have witn essed the British troops of the 16 th Air Assault Brigade engaged in the most violent and fierce clashes since the Korean war (7 950- 53), wh ich often ended in individual hand- to - hand fig ht" ( l 3). In Iraq, the Forward Operating Bases were so ex panded that th ey be came an obstacle to the manoeuvre and, among other th in gs, caused the separatio n of the troops from the population, th us violating the basi c princ iple of count erguerrilla operat ion s: never lose contact w ith t he te rr itory. In order t o avo id th is iso lat ion , t he US Co mma nd has recently introd uced a new type of deployme nt in t he areas freed from the hostile forces, sett ing up a syste m of o ut posts called "joint security stat ions", jo intly garrisoned by American and Iraqi units. The 100 American soldiers that live there call it "Alamo ", even if their superiors hate any reference to defeat. It is a camp consisting of six hea vily fortified buildings, in the front line in the infinite war betwee n Sunn is and Shi'ites at Chazaliyah, in the western part of Baghdad. There is no wate r, no heating, the lavatories are prim itive latrines. The only hot meal of the day

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---'--------Âˇ-Âˇ.lliiii The peripheral protectio ns of th e bases are erected with the increased employment of container belts called "hesco bastions". These are baskets of different sizes t hat are named after the producing firm. They have a wire - netting framework and are filled with sand or earth.

is transported by a vehicle. A l l windows are prot ected b y sand bags. The soldiers sleep side by side an d are wakened by shootings and ex plosions. This is t he first of t he 20 JSS that the American Com mand wants to pla ce in t he hot areas of Baghdad, with the arrival of part of the 21,000 reinfo r cemen ts. These garrisons will have to repress fights, train t he Iraqi Arm y and encoura ge the local populatio n to r evolt ag ainst the Shi'ite milit ias and the Su nni guerrillas. It is a big change, compar ed with the idea of caging t he US t roops inside large isolated bases ... the )SS is surrounded by barriers, sentry posts and concertinas . Th e American s occup y two b uildings. Two other buildings are inhabited by an equal n umber of Iraqi s. The last two edifices are used as barriers against fire. The troops go on p atrol every day, on vehicles and on foot. They talk to the Iraqis instead of knock ing down the d oors of their h ouses. The sol diers take workers w ith t hem for r epairing the electric lines and, f or the first t ime after many months, have organized gas supplies fo r eating and cook ing ... (1 4 ) .

LOCATION OF THE BASES The effective ness of a base is not represented by the installation in itself , but rather by its locatio n, which m ust be easily defensible and command a view over the surro unding area, wit h an am ple f ield of visio n and f ire , pe rm itting fast deploym ents in various direct ions, in order to facilitate patro ll ing and o ffensive activities, as w el l as a regular logistic supp lying.

" .. . The Ameri can soldiers have opened fifteen out of about 30 Joint Security Stations that were p lanned in Baghdad. Th ey have also set up a certa in num ber of small "combat outposts " ... The American Commanders have stated that the j o111t security stations and the combat outposts have been located where they can restrict the freedom of action of the insurgents ... (l 5) . An app ro priate position ing of the bases can also be usefu l for engaging enemy forces, preventi ng t hem from be ing employed in other areas of g reater operatio nal int erest. The Soviet strategy along the b order with Pakistan was based on keeping a great number of outposts, both large and sm all. Their purpose was to close the border and preclude our supp ly routes. During the whole war the majority of t hese garrisons were under siege, at least par t ially... With hindsight, those towns and camps diverted our efforts from Kabu l and other object ives very impo rtant fo r the g uerrillas. Trying to ta k e isolated ga r risons located near t he border was too tempting. They were close to our m ain bases, wi th all th e advantages that th is entails. It was no t difficu lt to achieve small successes, and the Commanders could be sure that their victo r i es wer e going to b e ack nowledged. The re wards for this t ype of low- r isk triu m phs, relatively easy to achi eve, were booty and propagan da. Probably the contin uous and cos tly efforts made by Soviets and Afghans t o keep these gar r isons were fru i tful. It is in fact unquestionable t hat the y manag ed to keep engaged a great n umber of Mujahidin . " ( l 6).

THE REALIZATION T here are no handbook sol utions or standard designs for bui ld ing a fortified position . Its co nfiguration can vary according to operationa l situation , type of m ission, availabi lity of pre-ex ist ing infrastru ct ure, nat ure of t he g round and t he garrisons' degree of creativity. " .. . Lagm an is the fire base from which the helicopters ta ke off for their ra ids ... The outposts scattered in the region of Zabul, in A fghanistan, are trying to keep it under control. Th ey are typical Afghan farmho uses, o ccupied by the Americans. Squares of mud and clay, which serve as r ooms, a well, a stable, and a boundary wa ll all aro und. They are trenches rather tha n outposts, where 30 members of a platoon of the 173rd Brigade of the US Army have a breather between raids ... " (l 7). The criteria for bu il ding a base have not bas ically changed in time, and are very similar i n all operational theatres .

Rivista Mill/are Engl,sh Edition n 212007

THE "5ALERNO" FOB OF THE "N IBBIO" CONTINGENT IN KHOST (2003) The "Salerno" FOB was occupied by the US Forces in September 2002. Initially it consisted of a single pre- existing brickwork building, protected by a fence of sandbags, and was progressively expanded to include: . Protected boundary system integrated w ith f ire centres, lookout and combat posts, observation posts . . Central area for normal daily activities, with Headquarters, field hospital, service area, encampments for personnel. . Storage area for fuel and ammunition . . Parking lot and general depot. • Landi ng strip with control tower for air t raffic. • Landi ng pad for helicopters and protected area for aircraft parkin g . . Fi re base for howitzers and/ or mortars. Close to the FOB, an FB for fire support. The protection system, based o n several lines, envisaged: • A very high and strong external barrier, made of a triple concertina and barbed wire, set at a distance equal to that of the throw of a hand- grenade. • An internal anti-i ntrus ion barrier, at a certai n d istance from the former, very close to the base itself. • Further protections for the most sensitive sites (Com mand Posts, dormitories, munitions and fu el depots, etc.) with embankments and/ or Hesco Bastions and sand bags. The access to both the peri mete r and t he interior of the active base cons isted of a serie s of Hesco Bastions, concre te obstacles or 200 litres barrels fil led with sand or earth, in order to compel vehicles to take sharp turns in different directions, thus reducing their speed (ch icanes) and preve nting a car bomb from smashing through the barri er or the entrance gate. («Camp Salerno/Forward Operating Base Salerno», www.globalsecurity.org / m ilitary/faci lity /fob salerno.htm).

" .. . The emplacement (Algeria, 1954- l 962) is post, heavily defended and nicknamed "Dragon's located in an old farm near the village. It is surLair" had been built by the Afghans during the rounded by barbed wire and sandbags. The entire Russian in vasion ... " (19). positio n is progressively reinforced.. .Soldiers live in Spartan rooms, with no comforts. Their only means of communication with the outside world is TH E ORGANIZATION through the mail. The outpost's task is to guaran tee the security and control of the village and its T he fort if ied camps , precise ly because of surroundings ... " (1 8). the ir fun ctio ns, are sti ll located fa r from the The external protectio n is put up by employing, ma in co ncentrat io ns of frien d ly forces , in areas bes ides the traditional syste m s of field works were the quality of li fe depends on security , (ramparts, sand bags), belts of containers call ed survi vabi lity and re acti on to the attac k s of the "hesco bastions", fi lled w ith aggregate , which at gu err il las. present disting ui sh all the in stallations of t he Fo r these reasons, together w ith the need to multinational fo rces engaged in avoid "habituation" phen ome na operatio ns. among the pe rso nnel, t he units The works must be ca rried out ' ' The fortified camps, pre occupy the instal lations by progress ive ly, and req uire con - cisely because of their func - turns for a given period of time. stant im provement, in order to As i n t he past, airp lanes and tions, are still located far adequate the defence and find a heli copt ers are the most suitlevel of protection co rre spon- from the main concentra - able means for en suri ng the ding to the hi ghest assumable tions of friendly forces .. . ,, provi sions , cons ideri ng the threat, even if unconce ivab le at long distances and th e con di t he mome nt. ti ons of the roads, when t hey Pre-ex isting building s are used when pos sible ; ex ist , i n te rms of security and practicab ility. On they are suitably fortified by em ployin g strengththe other hand, this cou ld rep resent a lim itation ening o r recyc lable materials fo und on the spot. in the flig hts ' regu larity both in periods of bad Moreover, not infreque ntly also pre- ex ist ing forw eath er and for th e leve l of risk in the area contificat ions may be utilized because of t heir particcerned ; t herefore , in som e cases, owing to t he ular feat ures . enemy threat, airdrops become necessary. " ... The British troops occupied also the ANP Hill The quarter in g and daily activity areas must be (Afghan National Police), a strategic position overspaced o ut inside the camps, envi sag in g, in t he looking that tormented town (Nowzad). The out vicinity, protected shelters for pe rsonnel.

MAIN PURPOSES OF FORTIFICATIONS IN COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS Divide the battle space into more easi ly controlled sectors. Improve the units' ability to move rapid ly and without obstacles in the area of respons ibility. Contribute to the preservation of the forces, by not exposing them unnecessarily to enemy attacks. Reduce or neutralize the threat and/or the insurgents' activity, block the enemy LOCs to increase the tactical l imitations of the guerri llas. Protect the main friendly LOCs and support al lied patrols and convoys. â€˘ Aggregate groups of local people for socio-humanitarian interventions. Support the fixed or mobile check-point networks. Be a constant demonstration of the strength and presence of the legiti mate Government and its allies.

The bases must also inclu de spaces destined to take in un its temporarily detached there for a special operation . As the orga nizat ion al wo r ks become m ore establis hed, recreat ional structures are also reali zed and enlarged, so that the so ldiers may be able to recover th eir physical and mental capabilities w orn out by combat stress. Through the widespread use of technology (the Interne t, satell ite phones, etc.) the personnel can remain in contact w ith their home Country also when they are in o peratio ns areas. The use of FOBs has changed the American sol d iers' way of fighting. Instead of be ing a simple station ing area for project ion forces, they have become a sort of "home away from home", places wh ere many causes of discomfort, which are considered endemic in operations areas, are assuaged; where t he fighting spirit can be reki ndled and the d ifficulties of war can be psycho logically evaded. T he nee d to perform their task without i nterruption (the t ime is not beaten by the r hyth ms of garrison life as on the nat io nal territo ry) compe ls th e forces i nside the bases to organize their dai ly ac tivi ty in the entire space of 24 hou rs and t o envisage, in times of operational stas is, a da ily emp loyment - oriented tra ining programme. The rehearsals of the action and the repetition of t he technical and tactical proced ures , based on lessons learned , are useful for keeping the personnel alert, secure, and operationally, physically and psycholog ically prepared to fight.

THE DEFENCE The defensive organization must ensure a full operativeness of the assets present in th e installation , w ithout cond ition s/ l imitat ion s i n the ir employment. The defence can envisage both ord inary and emerge ncy measures, and includ e d irectives aimed at prot ecting t he ne ighbo uri ng civil ian commun ities. The fac t ors to be considered are:

Characteristics of the pre-existent usable infrastructure. Natural features of the terrain. Use of artificial obstacles, in order to improve the natural features of the gro und. Exist ing roads and / or watercourses usab le as m il itary and commercial lines of communication . Control of the surrou ndin g g round over a range wider than t hat of t he enemy mortars and rocket s. The main ele men ts of the defence are vig ilance and effective security measures, as we ll as aggress ive act ions conducted with continui ty . Th ese measures reduce the possibility of ene my interferences in the operations carried out in t he area, and prevent the ene my actions from co nverging the re. " .. . The fortified posts of the 21th BCA (Battalion Chasseurs A/pins) are supplied once a week ... Mahagga is a village of small houses covered with reddish tiles m ade from the clay of a nearby forest... a small post protects it. It was for tified at the end of 1955 by old Indoch ina veterans and, "just as down there", it has a tower made of wooden poles and a triple line of barbed wire The post's mortars and hea vy machine guns are read y to intervene at the first sign of alert, or at the slightest doubt of a passage of a column of rebels through the forest". (George Fleury: La Guerre en Algerie). The modern means of survei llance and obse rvation permit an optimal economy of forces t o the western armies, which are characterized b y a reduced st rength and nee d to li m it the loss es. An air system of infrared sensors stands out among t hese means: it can be us ed from an aerostat or a stationary platform of approp riate heigh t, and is able to detect the prese nce and / or movement of host il e forces at great d istances. The sys tem, call ed "big brothe r" in so ld iers' slang , is used by the US Armed Forces both in Afghani stan and Iraq. In orde r to l im it the effects of the attacks made with VBIEDs (Vehicl e Borne Improvised Exp losive Devices) , the bases are integrated w ith a syste m of pass ive defence, segmented in depth on ba r-

Rivis ta Mi/i/MO Enghsh EdittO/l 11. 212007

riers and em ban kme nt s spaced out on several level s, co ntro ll ed by pe rsonn el tasked w ith ensuring its protecti o n t hro ugh observati on and fire. . The systems m ust be sufficiently far from the most sens it ive target s, to avoid that the explosion of a su icide veh icle, blocked by t he f irst leve l of defence , could st ill have effect s on t he person ne l an d equi pment of t he compou nd . Furthermore, t he forces present t here must be incl uded in t he base's external defence . Each unit must prov ide personne l and w eapons, in order to garriso n t he perimeter or be a part of t he QRFs. The def ence plans mu st be t ested with routine exercises , for every man to know hi s t asks and respons ibilit ies. Besides , combat em placeme nts w ill have to be built along the exte rnal bou ndary (not on ly places where to take shelter during t he attacks) from wh ich it should be poss ib le t o react also under mortar / rock et fi re.

THE FIRE- BASE SYNDROM E Life in side t he fort ifications, where t he un its in the periods of ca lm perform only routi ne daily tasks co nnected with the garr ison of t he position s, can cond it ion t he com bat capability of the pe rsonnel, creating a "bunke r" mentality, also as a con sequence of t he prese nce of m any comfo rts avai labl e in th e hom e Count ry. In Iraq, the need t o meet t he expect ations of the American soldiers and t o li m it t heir ex posu re to t he at tack s of t he guerr illas, has led t o in crease an d en large t he bas es, so as t o in clud e the shelters used as dorm itories and work areas, with ai rcon ditioning, large mess ing facil ities , roomy post exchanges , w ell eq uipped gym s and intern etcafes . Th is fact had already occurred duri ng the Viet nam w ar, whe re t he increas ing ly large dim ensions, the elaborate co nstructions and t he complex fortifications of the "Fi re Bases" end ed up creat ing a "Fire- Base Syndrome" , which cau sed a re luct ance to leave those safe and relatively co m fort abl e places and t he request fo r lif e standards very si milar t o those prevailing in pe rm anent garr ison s. Th is situatio n is also reflected by th e relat io ns am ong serviceme n, which creat e a m utual antag on ism betwee n t hose w ho go "beyo nd t he lines" (pe r im et er of th e structure) and those wh o never leave t he base, going as far as cal ling the latter "fobbit s" (from "hobb its", the apparent ly peacef ul charac ters who t end to hide in th e wood s, bu t are actually the real heroes of t he movie serie s "T he Lord of t he Ri ngs") . In any case the US A r my , in

Afghanistan: an Ita lian external patrol seen through a snooperscope.

order to acknowledge t he risks ru n by t he sol d iers ins id e the FOBs (rockets and morta r fire , etc.) has instituted the "Combat Action Badge", aw arded to the troops present in the base who have come into contact with the enemy, albeit in d irectly.

CONCLUSIONS In t he no n-conventional conflicts of the postWWII pe riod , fortified garrisons conti nued to have a significant tactica l and sometimes strategic w eight, eve n when they were simply made of sandbags or filli ng mate rials (and now, more and mo re, of "hesco bastions") . The hig h sophist icat ion of the battlefield , wh ich provides the so ld iers wit h a perfect view of the grou nd, also at night and in bad w eather, does not excl ude the need t o g uarantee a constant protect io n to t he sol die r , always enabling him to fight under the cover of something that may be more or less ass im ilated to a fortifi catio n. Fort ified post s facilitate t he t ime ly deployment of the forces and the decentralization of the Com mand- and- Control f unctions of t he operatio ns in t he area of responsibil ity, ensuring a rapid and effective respo nse to enemy actions . In o rder t o support the purpo ses of a counterguerri ll a campaign , t he bases must meet two essential prerequ isites: presence and continuity. The prese nce of the troops m ust be kept at suffi cient ly hig h levels, in order to extend stability o ut side the areas where control has al ready been ach ieved, while t he use of the bases must not be limit ed to th at of a place fo r q uarter ing troops or rot ating forces to more advanced posts, exclud ing the daily interaction with t he population, since this wo uld weaken t he purpose s of the operation.

The fortified bases have also a fundamental their strategy and started an inte nsive propoli tical importance w ith in th e ge neral conduct gramme of roa d building, in order to rep lace of a conflict. They are low- cost so lutio ns perthe old gra vel pa ths with two-lane roa ds . The m itting to save resources and operate i n remote n ew roa ds enable the troops to move faste r, areas wh ere it is poss ible to achieve the necespromote economic growth and loya l ty to the sary show of force, as se rting the pre sence of the Government, and are less easily mined. To proCentral Au tho rities , where otherwise it wo uld be tect the men employed in the constructio n of imposs ibl e to m ainta in a permanent un it. For t he roads and increase the influe n ce of th e examp le, this has bee n done by Pakistan by staGovernment, t he US Army has established a tioni ng several garrisons in Waziristan , a tri bal number of small o utposts i n the valleys, region in the north - western part of th e Country, manned by o n e or two p latoons living 111 historically known as a territory not easily subSpartan conditio ns. They have primitive jected, and Bal uch istan , a region bordering on latrines, no showers, fortificatio ns are reduced Afghanistan and home to violent i ndepend ence to a m inim um and th ere are no tents. The movem ents . troops can take a shower and call their familie s The bases are also a solution that allows t he foronce very two wee ks, du ring the 24-hour rest eign co ntingents to perform their role w it hi n a at the larg e o p erational bases. No intern et, coalition, without the political exposure of a direct te le phone, tele visio n or radio .. ." (22) . offensive actio n. Th e soldiers in the garri sons are t he f irst wh o A network of bases, appropriately located, have to face an im p laca bl e ene my that uses di f d ivides the area conce rn ed into ferent ru les an d is not condi more easily controlled comparttioned b y sh ining leds , but is m ents, wit hin wh ich one can ' ' A network of bases, ap capa bl e of w ait ing for hou r s system atically conduct opera- propriately located, divides and hours the arr ival of th e tions of elim ination of the the area concerned into convoy that he wants to hit, enemy (quadrillage). and is determined t o reach his " .. . After 2003, the more easily controlled com purposes even at the cost of Americans ha d to ta ke again partments ... ,, hi s l ife. th e difficu lt lessons of guer " .. . Last s u mme r (2 00 6) rilla warfare, facing an invis i these American soldiers (Jfd ble enemy tha t wears out their forces with sin squadron of the 71 st Cava lry Regiment) arrived gle shots or IEDs p laced on the roads ides. in the Afghan province of Nuri stan, a ju mbl e o f Applying the o ld methods of the colonia l wars, steep and wooded va lleys in the m oun tains of t hey try to control the ground by multiplying the Hindu Kus h border ing on Pakis tan. Th e the number of stations tasked with hunting the camp, probably the most vu ln erable America n in surgents ... "(20). outpost in Afghanistan, was attacked every da y Accord ing to a French Officer en gaged in t he during the first te n days since its establish Algeri an war as Commander of a unit in l<abi lia (2 1), it is better to have un its stationed in the same area , w ith respons ib ility for a specific region , rather th an move un its here and t here. As a matter of fact, the garrison fo rces are the on es that know th e situation, t he po pul atio n and t he loca l problems, and can i nte rvene with greater t imeliness in case of need . " ... This region has been traditiona lly ruled by tribal groups, wh ich entered into an alliance with traffickers and insu rg ents to let weapons and fig hters pass through the narro w paths crossing the valleys. Even a fter the Americans in 2002 had established a base at Asadabad, capital o f Kunar,, the Coalition's con tro l did not go mu ch beyond the barbed-wire f ence. Th is summer the American Comma nders changed British servicemen building a shelter at an advanced base in the desert, making use of a pre- existing structure and "hesco bastions".

Rivista Mtlitare English Edition n. 212007

ment. Th e ou tpost is placed at th e fo ot of peaks 5000m high, at the confluence of two wate rcourses .. The unit has the task of preven ting th e insurgents from crossing the bor de r towards the KunaÂˇr province. Until last month, every time the Ch inook helicopters reach ed the camp, after a difficult flight to the narrow l anding strip by the river, the rebels fired at them with rockets. Because of the enemy fire or for bad wea the r no helicopter could land for a certa i n pe riod of time, with serious repercussion s on supplying. Un til a mon th ago, b efore heavy snowfalls closed the mo unta in passes, the soldiers in the camp were constantly attacked by RPCs coming fro m the hills nea rb y... Th e insurgents us e weapons hid de n ins ide ca ves close to the position, and almost all pa tro ls on wheels are ambushed during their moveme nt... " (2 3). Giorgio Battisti

Major General, Head, General Affairs Division, Army Genera l Staff In these scenarios that take us back to R. Kipling's stories, the soldier remains the most important and irreplaceable element, ready to carry out close fights based on surprise and quick reaction: these men do not identify themselves in "technicality' but still believe in the traditional values of the warriors".

NOTES (l) A typical FSB deployed si x 10 5mm M l 02 howit zers

and a company- or battalion- level infantry unit, armed w ith 8 1 mm mortars, com municat ion systems, medical and ad ministrative personnel. (2) The FOB organizational concept has also been applied in the US, owing to its flex ibi lity, i n Ope ration "Jump Start" and carried out by the National Guard since August 2006, in support of the "Border Patrol" units controlling the southern borders against il legal immigration. Th is solution permits to provide an adequate level of logistic support w ithout burdening the local comm unities and bu ild ing pe rm anent instal lations. American Forces Press Service. (3) Bo rd erl ands where th e terrorists thrive. '' The Telegraph" . (4) Afghans tell troops: No secur ity, no hel p. "The Christian Science Monitor' (5) L. Dimarco: Losi ng the Moral Compass Tortu re and "Gu erre Re vo lutionnai re" in the Algerian War" . Parameters. (6) "U.S. m il itary erects Afghan desert base". The Associated Press.

U.S. soldiers placing a co ncertina in advanced base.

(7) "NATO: Many Afgh an i nsu rgents die"- CNN.corn. (8) Going in Small in Afghanistan. The Christian Science Monitor. (9) Wi ll iam W. Mendel The Brazilia n Amazon: Co ntrolling the Hyd ra. " Milita ry Review'. (l 0) T.E. Lawrence: 'The seven pil lars of wi sdom". ( l l) 'The Soviet-Afghan War. The Russian General Staff', University Press of Kansas. The events of a t ypical Soviet stron gho ld are told in the Russ ian picture "9th Company" (9ya ro ta) by Fyodor Bondarch uk, which is based on real events occurred in 1989. (1 2) Roger Trinq uier, La Guerre Moderne. La Table Ronde. (13) Afghanistan helicopter u se rationed, "The Herald Trib une" . British hi re anti - Tali ban mercenaries, " Timeson line". (1 4) At Fort Alamo the US Bag hdad, "The Times" an d "La Stampa". (15) Sold iers Sh ift to Bag hdad Outpost, " Washington Post". (16) Mohammad Yousaf & Mark Ad ki n. :"The Bear Trap" (Afghanistan 's untold Story) - The Bear Attacks". ( l 7) All ' inferno e r itorno from "Specchio" of "La Stampa". (18) "Laguer re des appe les en Alge ri e", Association des Pro fesseur s d'His toire et de Ceographie de l'Enseigne m ent Public. (19) In the Line of Fire, "Soldier' - Magazine of the British Army. (2 0) Dans le triangle de la mort irakie n, "Le Figar o . (2 1) D. Galula: "Counterinsu rgency Warfare: Theory and Practice". (2 2) 5 year s later, a more sophisticated mission in Afghanistan, "The Philadelphia Enq uirerÂˇ. (23) US outpost takes fight to the Taliban, " The Telegraph".

THE FUTURE OF STRATEGIC TRANSPORT At present the Italian Armed Forces are playing a lead ing role in various Operations Theatres, sometimes very far from home. Such role of peace force, proj ectable in extremely short times to any part of the globe, has required a remarkable operational and logistic reorganization in order to guarantee a flexible and effective instrument, which meets the requirements of our Nation and those of the International Community.

The concepts of intermodal transpo rt, inte roperability among allied Coun tries , network-cent ric log istics and integration withi n the syste m of commercial transpo rt, have become a fundamental link for operational and log istic planning. These stateme nts, in reality, must be trans lated into a common lang uage, in standardized procedures , in veh icles and equ ipment that can ope rate in joi nt and mu ltinational environments . Today, no Service can guarantee a level of acceptable effectiveness without a log istic instrument adequate to the prese nt requ irements of projectabil ity and rapidity of intervention . The object ive of the modern logistics m anager is therefore the impleme ntation of the co ncepts that have by now become we ll establi shed in the civilian world, such as the employme nt of pallets, containers, computerized managem ent and monitoring of t he materials in transit, all included in a net work-ce nt r ic context. In sho rt, the architecture of the future syste m of m il itary transport wi ll be based on the concept of t he "mat rjoska", i.e. a doll t hat co ntains seven identical but progressively smaller do ll s.

INTERMODALITY T he origins of intermodal transport In t he evolut ion of the world of transports , the advent of the railway has been a f un damental goal, so much so that it was defin ed the "first revolution of trans ports". Everyth ing beg ins in 1769, the year in which James Watts invents the st eam engine, until l 830, the year of th e inaug uration of the firs t railway go ing fro m Ma nch este r to

Title pages. Loading a CROP on an Astra APS- 95.

Liverpool. T he way of moving people and mate rials changes rad ically: just cons ider that the average speed of 8k m / h for land transport al ready reac hed by th e Romans, remained almo st unchanged until the first years of the twentieth ce ntu ry, when the employment of the steam traction perm its to achieve an average speed of abou t 4 0km / h. T he tra nsf er of big load s on medium lo ng distances was already poss ible at that ti me; on ly some phases of the cyc le of transport required animal tractio n (what we call now termi nalization). In fact, the good s where co ll ected by horse cart at the customer's p lace and transferred to a goods shed at a railway station. They were successively stowed in railcars, on which th e goods w ere transferred fro m one station to anoth er. Once they had reached t he ir de stinat ion , the rever se cycle was repeated, the g oods were unloaded at a railway store and success ively d istri buted t o the new markets by an imal traction. It is in this period t hat t he necess ity arises to have a packaging t hat facilitates the handl in g of t he wares du r in g the loadi ng and u nl oad in g phases , and sec ures t heir integ rity during the whole cycle of transpo rt. Th e second revoluti on of t rans ports coincides with the adve nt of t he moto r vehicle. Few know that the first step of the interesting story of t he internal - comb ustion engine is d ue t o the gen ius of two Itali an invento rs: Piarist Father Eugenio Barsanti and engi neer Fe li ce Matteucci. The "adventure" beg ins in Florence, w here on the 5th of June 1953 t he piston eng ine is born , and is late r rea li zed in England, where the invention is patented in 1854 . Jean-Joseph Etienne Lenoir (1822- 1890), French invento r of Belgian origin, is the f irst to emp loy it in 1863 for movin g a veh icle. To see th e birt h of the first assembly li ne of a motorcar, one has to wait until 1908, the yea r in w h ich American i nd ustria list He nry Fo rd (Dearborn, Michigan 1863- 194 7) starts the mass production of his "mode l T".

Riv1sla Militare English Edition n. 212007

Even if it does not chang e the cycle of transport, t he motorcar in fact replaces an im al - traction. Later o n, aft er 1930 , the t echnological evo lut ion applied to the sector of mad vehicles perm its the road transport t o impose itse lf , to the point of replacing the railway for longer and longer dis tances . The in itial sc he me, wh ich envisaged the road transport employed on ly in the collection and delivery phases of goods , start s to change. Eve n if t he distances to be covered are med ium- long, now, to carry the sup plies from the loading place

Above. Railroad transport o f military conta iners .

Left. James Watt, the in ventor of the steam engine.

plane, which is th e th ird revo luti on . Many years befo re, Leonardo da V inci had had th e id ea of real izing a machine wh ich, by im itating the b i rd s' f li ght, cou ld enab le me n to fly. Subseque ntly, in various d rawi ngs t hat are stil l in our possession , he described its f unctio ning , i.e . mate rials, parts and connect ions . It is in fact the design of an airplane. Later on, Sa ntos Dumont w as the first to ex p loit his idea. A Braz ilian of Port uguese origi ns, born on Ju ly 20, 1873 in the city of Palmira , he was t he first man to t ake off on board an airc raf t propelled by an aeronaut ical engin e, even if many Count ri es to t heir definitive destination, more and mo re co ns ide r t he Wr ig h t brot hers t he actual inventors often people employ road carrie rs . of th e airplane , for the take off they mad e on But t he packing probl em continues t o re ma in a December 17, 1903. However , wh i le Santos crucial problem . The optimal util ization of t he volDumont's airc raf t co uld take ume and surface availab le and off by its own me ans, th e th e necessity to g uarantee t he brothers' had to safety of the load require the ' ' The future system of Wrig h t employment of packaging sys- military transport wi 11 be employ a catapu lt. Sa ntos t ems that can meet these needs. based on the concept of Dumo nt's fi rst flight - where In the f ifties, the ope rators of the "matrjoska", i.e. a dol I he covered abo ut 60 metres, two or t hree metre s above t he syst em so lve the problem by having recourse to t he "unitiza- that contains seven identi- grou nd , at the Bagatel le f ield but progressively i n Pari s, on Octobe r 23, 190 6 t ion" of the cargoes, i. e. the ir cal was official ly documented by standardizat ion . It is com mo nly smaller dolls ,, the t estimony of exp erts , believed that defining in journali sts and by th e Parisian advance t he d imens ions and t he population. Final ly, in 1927, Charles Li ndberg ot her q ual ifying elements of the packing can result fle w ac ross the Atlan t ic. in an easier handling of the wares during t he loadIf we consider that Leonardo da Vinc i lived in the ing and un load ing phases, t hanks to the emp loysame epoch i n whi ch Co lumb us d iscovered ment of mechan ical means, a g rate r protect ion of America, i.e. between th e en d of 1400 and the th e cargo and t he o ptimizatio n of the employment beginning of l 500, and that t he f irst airp lane that of the surfaces and volumes in side t he veh icles. actually fl ew was that of Dumont and / o r the Finally , the fronti ers of mobility have moved Wright brothers ' in 1923, we realize t hat to pass forward remarkably with the invent ion of t he air-

The evolution of military transport In th e past, the mi litary trans port organ ization re fl ected the strategic co ncept of the "Co ld Wa r" t he heavy trans port was made by ra ilw ay con voys , t he lig ht one wit h m il itary veh icles. In th e postwar pe ri od, the nu mbe r of veh icle s issued t o the Army was enormous and could be incremented t hrough "requisiti on ". T here was moreove r a total lack of m ilitary assets fo r strategi c tra nsport and especial ly of aircraft and ships, and recou rs e t o commercial compan ies was made ve ry rare ly. The end of the "Co ld War" and the evolution of The C-130)- 30 military aircraft can carrv up t o 5 air the internati onal scenario, with the glo bal t hreat of landed pallets. terrorism , th e potential use of weapons of mass destruction, reg ional instability and t he possible jeo pardizing of the national vital interests, also from the phase of project to t hat of imp leme nt aoutside t he territ ory of the State, have entail ed a tion took abo ut 400 years. complete reco nfig uratio n of the log istic instru The fourth and last revolution of t ransport goes me nt, and of transport in particular. back to the sixt ies, a period in wh ich comb in ed The fi rst tentative steps towards modernization transport and m ult imodality become intermodaliwe re made already during the seventies with the ty, thanks ch iefly to t he employment of t he conintrod uction of new concept s, borrowed from tainer. T he first two types of transpor t consist of a civilian logistics, such as term inal ization and gen sim ple sequence of segments of mo nomodals eral cargo service. between one knot and the next. The intermodal With tran sport terminalizatio n we mean all the transpo rt, instead, pe rmits to transfe r t he entire log istic activities that pe rmit t o delive r goods by cargo un it from one ve hicle to anothe r. The origi road, in bu lk or in containers , up to t heir final desnality of th is techniq ue cons ists of it s ability to tinat ion (door- to- doo r delive ry). Therefore the combine seve ral moda lities t erminali zation includes vari w ithout di srupting the cargo . In ous activi ties such as : un load this third phase, characte rized ' ' The end of the "Cold War" ing of the goods (from a railcar, by the pos sibility of utilizing and the evolution of the in- a sh ip or an airplane), handl ing , various types of transport in ternational scenario have load ing on a truck ; road t ranslogics of i ntegration and comentailed a complete recon - port; delivery to the fin al conpleme ntarity, t he use of configuration of the logistic in- signee. tainers and a combined roadA genera l cargo service is strument, and that of trans- made when goods of different rail transport becomes established. T he container is born as port in particular , , types are t ransferred on behal f intelligent so lution to a problem of a numbe r of Un its with a sinof regu lation of road t ransport g le ve hicle. If one manages t o of goods . Upon request of sh ipping agents , the coord in ate the cons ig nm ents, one can make measures , hau lers and methodology of construcim portant economies, because the vehicle travel s tion of the new cargo unit are standardized by t he wit h a full load and, wit h a sing le j ourney- cyc le, International Standard ization Organ ization (ISO), o ne can make several home de liveries. which pe rmits a world diffus ion of the prod uct. After variou s reconfig urations occurred alo ng T he worldwide introduction of the new cargo unit the ti me (start ing with the "elephantine" logistics permits to obtain seve ral economic advantages , of the seve nt ies on four rings : l st ring battalion , such as: reduction of port costs for loading and 2nd ring Brigade, 3rd ring Ope rational zone, 4th unloading goods; reduction of t he ships' stops ; r ing Central organizat ion), t he present logistic drastic reduction of thefts and damage to the o rganization envi sages, also for t he transport good s du ring handling in ports . act ivities, a struct uring of the log ist ic instrument In t he seventies , fol low ing t he "revo lutio n" in on t wo sectors or levels adhere nce log istics , i.e. intermodal transports, many interports have bee n the fu nctional stru ctu r ing entrusted to t he respon realized in Italy. These structures enable the log issib ili ty of t he Commande r of t he Operational Land tic providers to manage an intense traffic of Forces (COMFOTER), responsible for t he direct goods. support of the Forces in Theat re; support logistics ,

Rivisla Militare English Editron n. 2/2007

A contain er and a shelter carried by an Astra - HD- 1 truck.

funct ional st r uctu ring entrusted to t he respon sibility of the Logi stic Commander of t he Army, respo ns ible for ensuring t he necessary "flywheel" of capabilit ies and reso urces necessary t o meet the needs of the adherence sect or. T he "bo ld" evo lut io n of t he past years was based main ly on t he develo pment of concept s such as: int ermodality and inte roperability; manage ment t echnologies for intermodal transports; i ntegrat ion with t he netw ork of civilian tran sport s and network-centric log istics. Generally, t he short age of as sets for m ilitary transport and t he Nati on s' need to com bine effectiveness with budget econo my, has entail ed a sharp increase in military t ransport made by com mercial carr iers . Especially in t he ambit of st rat eg ic tran spo rt, i.e. t owards Operatio ns Theat res (Bos nia, Ko sovo, Afghanist an , Iraq, Lebanon) o r to t he areas of exerci ses abroad, t he Army has resorted to assets of the civilia n network, utilizi ng military- capabili ty provide rs (bod ies t hat can hand le ded icat ed contracts with civi lian companies) .

With t he well - est abli shed recourse to civ ili an co m panies and t he defi nite deve lopme nt of int ermod al t ransport , t he co ntrol of t he m oveme nts be com es f un dam ental. This m eans pl an n ing , choice of the itinerary, planni ng and control of personnel and mat erials along t he li nes of corn m u nication . In t he future, the opti m ization of integrated logi sti cs, in a networ k- centric framewo rk, wil l pe rm it to f urther unburde n the log istic system and reduce t he sup ply ing ti m es in t he Operations Theat res . In view of t hi s, a jo int, international coo perati on w ill be f undamenta l, t oget her w it h t he recourse to t he Host Nat io n Su pport (HNS), i.e. the ope rational fu nction t hat supervises m ilitary and civi lian as sistance provided in time of peace, crisis and war by a Nation (Host Nation - HN) t o another Nat io n (Sending Nation - SN). The cha ll enge w i ll be that of co nsti t u t ing , am on g t he all ied Co untries , w hat in th e civil ian se cto r is d ef ined Ca rgo Commu nit y System. T he CCS is a syst em t hat can be shared b y all the ope rators of an i nteg rate d log i st ic ch ai n, w hi ch per m its to offe r a se rvice t hat covers th e t otal ity of the funct io nal and adm in ist rat ive com po ne nt s necess ary fo r t ranspo rt at i o n. Th i s

least two types of carrier. The re- modulation of the cargo during t he journey is envisaged in both cases (an o peration t hat de lays the d elive ry con sid erably). In short , the effort of logistic plan n ing mu st be aimed at red uc ing the idle t ime for the various addit ional operat ions: the cargo unit prepa red at t he home base must reach its destin at ion in good t im e, with ou t be ing reco nditioned or loaded and unloaded many times. For ou r pu rpo ses , inte rmod ality, or moda l integration, is th e in strume nt that, when properly applied , permits to multi ply the possibi lities of transfe r r in g goods. Protruding wings

Above. A four- way wooden ISO standard pallet (Europa/let). It can be handled on all fo ur sides with a forklift.

Right. A four- way wooden NATO standard pallet: it has a remarkable structural sturdiness and presents "protruding wings " on the sides (so as to be lifted by belts and cranes in field employment).

is possib le tha nks to a sing le telem atic com puterize d network that perm its to know, in rea l t ime , the carr iers' off er as a who le (airp lan e, t ra in, t ru ck and ship), t he necessary extra services (storage, re frigeration, insura nce and cus tom s procedures) as wel l as costs and ob ligatio ns. The first step towards such mod erni zatio n will be constituted by t he implementation of military i nterports. Combined, multimodal intermodal transport

and

Upper plate

Lower plate

80/ 1000 cm

Th e main objective is therefore a rad ical change in the way of conceiving transport: from sectorial to "g lobal carriers" for the mobility of materials. In v iew of this, a un itary organization based on pal lets and contain ers beco mes necessary. To this end, it is useful to consu lt the ILE- NLl 200- 0 050- 12-00B0l publi cation "Refere nce Handbook fo r ' ' The optimization of inte - the Employment of Containers, grated logistics, in a net - Shelters and Pallets (sub- confo r lntermod al work- centric framework, tai ne rs) Hand l ing an d Transport of will permit to further un- Army Materials ", 2003 edit ion, burden the logistic system issued by the "Ufficio and reduce the supplying Movimenti e Tras porti d el times ... ,, Comando Logi stico dell 'Esercito".

lntermoda l tra nsport is a diversified transfer of materia ls w it ho ut re- mod ul ation of t he cargo unt il its dest ination. Th erefore, the m ateria ls must be con dit ioned as standard cargo units (o n pall ets or con tainers). In the current meaning , the intermoda lity concept includes also combined and multimodal transports, wh ich have inst ead d ifferent characteristics and th erefo re require dec idedly les s sig nificant organizational efforts (plan ning, coord inat ion, and mon itor in g) and infras tructural investments (i nte rports, faci Iities). In fact, com bi ned transpo rt is carried out accord in g to two moda lities that can be: roadrai lway, railway- sea or road - sea. On the con trary, in case of mu lti modal transport, the transfer of suppl ies occurs with the uti lization of at

Condition ing of t he cargo: pallettisation and con tainerisation By "carg o condition ing" we mean the preparation of a certain num ber of items in packages or in a bu lk, which, in re lation to their dimens ion and weight, are assemb led in a single co nsignment t hat can be handled mechanically and transported safe ly. In t he past, the conditioning of the loads showed sectorial qualities (the load was prepared acco rding to t he characteristics of the carrie r),

R1vista M,ltUtre English Ed,1,on n 212007

while today the attention is centered o n intermodality and interopera bility (materials are condi tioned with standard NATO and EU procedures, regardless of the carrier) . . With t he concept of containerisatio n we mean the activity connected with the standardi zation of the transport modules, called precisely containers , conditioning and the securing of the cargo on pal let s (pal lettisation), preparation of the handling equipment and of the suitab le infrastructure of modal exchange (interports). With this working pattern the operators, when planning and organizing, can di sregard the heterogeneity of the mate rials contained in the stan dard modules (i .e. weight, volume, fragility, com patibility with other materials) because the cargo, conditioned and pred isposed by specialized personnel, has lost its identity and has beco me a standard cargo unit, transferable to its destination by any car rier, without any handling. In substance, today, any material that has to be transported w ith crite ria of int ermod ality must have dimensions that make its volume equal to the

Above. Military transport made with a "Roll on- Roll off (Ro- Ro) civil ian ship: this carrier has two ramps (on stern and prow) which permit direct embarkation / dise mbarkation of the vehicles, without employing lifting systems (cranes). Left. A standard cargo unit on a wooden pallet fo r artillery ammunition.

Also dangerou s materials (munitions, ex plosives) properly conditio ned in "large crates fo r goods in bulk" (G IR) can be transported with standardized procedures and containerised modules. GIRs are actually containe rs of d iffere nt m easures and types, suitab le for being handled mechan ically (i. e. with a fork lift), resisting the stress of trans port and containing dangerous materials (solid , liquid or in bulk) . New projects for conditioning t he cargo

basic cargo unit (pallet) or must be a submultiple of the d im ensio ns of a container, in order t o be transported wit hout further arrangement operations (fo r example: reconditio ning of the cargo or disassembly of components). In case of air trans port wi th a mi litary ca r rier (i.e. C- 1 30J - 30), materials m ust be transported with a dedicated pallet , i.e. a light-al loy pl atform equipped with a series of hooks to hold the containment net. The latter is us ed to sl ing t he item s placed on the platform itse lf (the platform can hold 4 wooden pal lets, or 8 pa ll ets if the type of material perm its to stack a seco nd row).

In view of a g lobal renewal of log ist ics, the Army has given its co nt ribu t io n, suggesting the introduction of new artefacts for intermodal tra nsport, such as the NATO- standard 20 ft container and the CROP (container roll -on roll - off p latform) . T he NATO-standard containe r was born of the need to have a heavy-duty artefact, for transportation in extreme conditions (s tress due to acceleration, stop , sharp t urns) . In order to safeguard military materials, in many cases particu larly expensive and sophisticated, the Army has submitted to the NATO Standardization Agency a proposal for a modified container, suitable for mi litary emp loyme nt. This has led to the implementation of a project for a NATO container, already acquired by the

prepare, already in the orga ni zation phase, a part of the most urgent material in a strate gic configurati on (SCL) on a CROP. Th is wou ld pe rm it an immediate deployment of the task force on recept ion of t he operat iona l order, embarki ng t he platforms in ISO co nta iners for the following intermodal t ransport, thus saving tim e and resources. For the abovementioned reasons, th e A rmy has suggested introdu ci ng th is artefact into se rv ice ; c ur rently the experim entat io n Above.

Pallet for air transport. Right.

Cargo unit on a 20ft "open side" ISO conta iner.

Army and being standardized by the NSA. The NATO st andard container is going to have 44 anchoring / ra ising point s, distributed on four sid es, with high resistance to tractio n. T he CROP - Conta ine r rol l- on ro ll- off platform - that can be handled and transported by loading it on trucks for demo untab le load ing platfo rms (for examp le AST RA APS-95), is particularly suitable for a palletised load in strateg ic configuration (Ammuniti on Strate gic Co nfig ure d Loads SC Ls). The SCL concept envisages CROP standardized schemes and load ing procedures , so t hat all types of munitions necessary for the deployment of a squ ad, a platoon or a company are allocated on a known number of flatcars, fo r the successive dispatch to the Ope rations T heat res. The SCL co ncept optimises the distribution of munitions and remarkably reduces the times of trans port, fixi ng in advance the necessary carriers. The CROP, i n fact, has ma ny versat il e features that permit to secu re a heavy an d sens iti ve cargo. This operation would be awkward and complicated if carried out inside an ISO stand ard container. The cargo un it t hus configured (pallets and CROP) ca n subsequently be loaded ins ide an ISO container or transported direct ly, withou t usi ng a containe r, embarking it on a truck fo r demount ab le loadi ng platforms. Moreover the CROP , com pared to a containe r , has cons iderable advantages as rega rds ove rall dimens ions. With t he same linear metres of load (about 6m), it can be pi led up to 8 un its and stored in a ware ho u se or under a shed. Obvious ly the same number of contai ners wou ld ta ke up a much larger space and, if they had to be stacked up, very complex equ i pment would be necessary to hand le them . On the contra ry, having a certa in number of CROPs in store , a regiment destined to a particular m ission cou ld

phase is in progress at the Po lyfunct ional Cent re of Experimentation (CEPOLISPE) at Mont elibretti , nea r Rome, in order to assess t he potential ities of the loading p latform for operationa l employment.

The shelters With the standards of projectab il ity and rapid ity, on which the present logistic organization of the Army is bas ed, one cannot ex pect that already in t he initial ph ase of the operat ion s there shou ld be a sui table in frastructure availab le for t he logistic su pport of t he Co ntingent. Therefore one m ust have recourse to systems that ens ure transportability, eas i ness of dep loyme nt and resistance to bad weather conditions. The shelte rs , amo ng the various prefabricated structures (tents, sheds, etc.), are the ones t hat better an swer the operational needs. T hey are actually modules that meet specifi c techn ical and dimensional requ irements , have a wide range of em ployme nts, am ong wh ic h: quartering , bread making, showers, command. Besides, shelters are su itable for the installation and protect ion of high-level tec hn ological equ ipment (especially of electronic nature). As concerns

Rivista Militare Engltsh Eclilion 11. 212007

The new type of NATO standard conta in er, suitable for military use, with 44 anchor points (22 on top and 22 at the bottom) plus other points on the sides.

transportability, most last-generation modules have dimensional characterist ics similar to those of a 20ft co ntainer; they are therefore standard cargo units , perfectly suited for intermodal t ransfers.

INTEROPERABILITY

In substance , the increase in interoperab ility enabl es t he allied Countries to operate synergisti cally for the execution of the tasks assigned. T he best instruments for attaining adequ ate levels of inte roperability among alli ed Nations remain t he standardization activity and a new way Uoint and integrated) of conceiving , planni ng and impleme nti ng t he logistics of transpo rt. The national and NATO pol icy are more and more oriented towards a joint and mu lt inational structure of the logistic assets ; obv iou sly th e employment of jo int and comb ined cargo units proves effective only if the level of interope rab ility of the partic ipat ing Nations is high.

Interoperabi lity is th e synergy that is realized betwee n differ- ' ' The increase in interoperent organ izations (for example: ability enables the al I ied INTEGRATION WITH THE NETArmed Forces of allied Nations) Countries to operate synerWORK OF CIVILIAN TRANSPORT t h rough the achievement of gistically in the execution of h igh levels of standard izatio n, T he sca rcity of assets for especia ll y i n the fo ll ow i ng the tasks assigned , , mi l itary t ransport and the fields of applicatio n: working Nat ion s' need to comb in e methods and procedures; effective ness an d budget economy have entai led employment of equip me nt or artefacts of the a definite increase in military transports made by same type that have technical and funct ional co mm erc ial ca rr iers. Especia lly as rega rd s characte ri stics th at m ake them interope rabl e strategic transport , i.e. those t owards the w itho ut modifications or addi ti on of other Operations Theatres ( Bosni a, Kosovo, devices. Afghanistan, Iraq, Leba non) or th e exe rci se area s Logist ic inte ropera bi lity (particu lar ly in t he abroad, the A r my has resorted to assets of the transport sector) is pursued by optim is ing and civ ilian networ k, util izing mil itary capabi lityperfecting the standardization agreements p rovi ders (o rgan izations capable of m anag in g (STANAGs). dedicated contracts with civil ian companies) . The common objective is therefore to ach ieve Unti l 2005, t he Logistic Command of the Army identical Command - and - Control procedures , has provided to insu re all the com me rc ial transoptim ise the employment techn iques of t he assets port assets in favo ur of both Army and and acq uire interchangeable equipment and sys "Carabinieri". terns.

Deployment and Movement System) ensu res th e accurate plann i ng, execution and coordinati o n of all movements and transports. The ADAMS and I.M.T.S. systems The ADAMS system was conceived especially t o remove possible contrasts and / or overlappi ng

Above and right. Loading a "Leopard" tank on a freight car with a crane.

Since 2005, for join t operations and exercises , such function has bee n assig ned in part to th e Joint Moveme nt Coordin at io n Ce nter of the "Comando Ope rativo d i Vertice lnterforze" (COI JMCC), which has absorbed the authority over the commercia l air ca rriers. Since last January also the Navy component has jo ined the COI JMCC. Anyway, the Armed Forces are already in a position to guarantee coherence and unity of command of the sector t hanks to t he evol ut ion of the managerial technologies for intermodal t r ansport, such as the ADAM and IMTS sys tem s, Asset Tracki ng a nd Consignment T racki ng.

(deconflicting activities) of the national Detailed Deployment Plan s (DDP). The I.M.T.S. de rives from the need to optim ise the load capabi lities of the carriers and acquire visibility of the transports to and from the Theatres.

Asset Tracking MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERMODAL TRANSPORT For planning, programming, organization and control o f the handling and transport require ments , a centra lized ou t look is ind ispensa ble. In v iew of this, and at joint level, as we have already pointed out, the general planning, the coordination and attribution of the priority of the transfe rs towards th e operationa l Theat res is entrusted to the Joint Movement Coord i nation Center of the "Comando Operativo di Vertice lnterforze" (COI-JMCC). The JMCC operates also as nat ion al knot of the system, and can exchange data with the Allied Commands and w i th the peripheral knots of the Service through the system of computerised management for out- of- area transport (Interactive Move me nt and Transport System - IMTS), an automated commun ication and data-processi ng system , w h ich, integrated with ADAMS (Allied

The new logist ic mode l (NML) com patible w ith a network- centr ic operatio nal scenario, must necessarily avai l itse lf of a logistic Command and Control ins tru ment, with asset tracking (AST) capab ilities. NATO defines AST as a "means to provi de NATO and othe r Natio ns , promptly and in detail, with information about the posi tion, movements, state and identification of units, personnel, equ ipment and materials" . With AST, we intend to achieve a tota l visib i lity of th e resources avai lab le (i.e. Tota l Asset Visibility TAV). As regard s functioning architecture and modalities, the Army Information Management System (S IGE) has all t he characteristics of an AST syste m and conforms to those defin ed by NATO as concerns logistics.

Consignment Tracking Once the cargo conditioning activity has been completed, one shou ld prepare the labelling of

Rivisfa M ditare E11glrsf1 Eclition 11. 212007

FUNCTION

ASSET TRACKING INFORMATION ON LOCATION, DEPLOYMENT, MOVEMENTS, STATE, IDENTIFICATION OF UNITS, PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS (STANAG 2184)

ACTIVITIES

A R D

M A T E R A L

M A

I N T E N A N C E

M E D I C A L

E R V

I C E

p E R

0 N N E L

A G E

M 0 N E y

SINGLE DATABASE (SINGLENESS OF INFORMATION)

rece ivi ng body has t aken charge of it and recorded it in th e SIGE databas e. Predictab ly, th e log istic label w il l be soo n rep laced by a more th e cargo units (package, pa llet o r con tain er) i n mode rn rad io- frequ ency syst em ca ll ed RF ID order to t rack t hem dur ing the tran sfer (Rad io Freq ue ncy Identificatio n), w hich consist s (Consignme nt Track ing). At present the t rac ki ng of th ree elements : an anten na, a transceiver w it h of th e transported asset s is ens ured by th e its d ecod er and a transponder (also known as "RF log istic label , wh ich, at NATO leve l, is called tag" , act ive or passive) . Serial Sh ipp ing Contai ner Code (SSCC) and has a T his information, i n a netwo rk-cent r ic model , hie rarch ical struct ure (package, pallet, co nta inenabl e the Co mmand - and - Co ntro l Centres of er) . The SSCC consists essentially of a bar code th e A sset T racking System, but also t he syste m s t hat identif ies a specific cargo un it , whos e com that fo r m the "Great System" of log ist ics , t o posit io n is listed in th e Ce ntral Data Bank of intervene in ord er to introd uce co rre ct ive dec iSIG E. Seve ral packages are sio ns in case there are d isgroup ed in a larg er cargo unit tu rbi ng eve nts in t he move- a co ntainer, for exam ple - ' ' ... the Armed Forces are in m en t. Th ey act on t he "act uathat i n its t urn is ident ified by a position to guarantee coto rs" , wh ich in this case are anot her lo gi st ic label. The herence and unity of com- also "se nsors", according to ass ociation of the log isti c labe l e abovem ent ion ed model , mand of the sector thanks th with t he ve h ic le per m its to i. e. on th e carriers /convoys track t he assets and is mad e in to the evolution of the that m ake t he transport . t he initial phase of t he jou rney. managerial technologies for The Move ment and Transport The supp lie r that se nds the intermodal transport ... ,, Office (M OTRA) of t he Log istic materia l makes a f i rst reading Command has sta rted t he of the label wit h a spec ia l activities necessary for realiz ing scan ner when the cargo unit is emba rked on the a Movemen t an d Trans po rt Management and carrier. T hi s pe r m its to record the ope rat ion Control Room. t elemat ica lly i n th e SIGE Cen tra l Data Ban k. T he Thi s is t he "mot or" of t he Co nsignm ent Trac king read ing is re peated at the delivery of the load to procedure , for it is charged wit h the: definition of the receive r: from th at moment, t he m aterial , no t he movers , m ilitary and / or civilia n, that best meet more asso ciated with th e carri er, is cons id ered t he trans port's specif ic requi rements, in a frame del ivered . T herefore, the second reading , made wo rk of t ran sport "inte rmodality", co nsidering the w hen the material is delivered, attests that th e poss ible restrict ions , the degree of ris k t hat any Th e architecture of "SICÂŁ".

The "San Giusto" carrying vehicles on its flight deck.

option im plies and in a cost/ be nefi t log ic; co ntrol, made through the mon itoring of the transport assets al l alo ng t he ir it ineraries (con sig nm ent tracking) and of each package of mat erial t ransport ed (in- t ransit visi bi lity). In particu lar, in o rde r to carry out its f unction of manage ment, command and control on the CT, the MOTRA office makes use of all the com m unication servi ces offe red by t he civilian and m il itary network s, using t he NATO E- m essag ing standard on the Army Intranet (Einet), for comm unicat ions w it h mi litary bod ies; e-mai l w it h formatted m es sage, i.e. w ritt en accord ing to a pre- estab li shed mod el, on t he int ernet for co nt acts w it h the con t ract ing firm s. T he pe rsonne l of the Room that ma nages and con trols Movements an d Tran sport issue th e o rders of t ran sport, fol lowing d ifferent iated pro -

ced ures, accord in g to t he type of move r, civi l ian o r m ili t ary , entruste d with the transpo rt . At t he m om en t, the act ivity of th e Room is st il l expe rime nta l an d is car ried ou t along two lines as fo r m il it ary t ran sport , it i nvo lves , as active parts of t he process , UCETRA in Rome , and t he provisio n ing Po le cal led "Magazz ino Centra le Ricambi A uto" (MACRA) at Pi ace nza; for ci vil ian t ra nspo rt th e Service has starte d a coo peratio n between the MOTRA office and the Fagiol i compa ny, wh ich envisages t he adopti on of a standard ized procedure for co nveyin g o rde rs, track ing mat eria ls and manag i ng info rm atio n; once th e syst em is t ested, th e network wi ll be exte nde d to all t he co ntract ing f i r ms of t he t ranspo rt syst em of Defence. T hus the imple mentation and monitor ing of t ransport are realized acco rding t o the same proced ural sc heme . Las t Ju ne 27 , at the Ar my' s "C en tro Po lif u nz ion ale d i Speri me ntaz io ne" (CEPOLI SPE)

R ,vista Mihtare Enghsh Eclition n 2/200 7

The Network- Centric Logistics.

In t he era of Network - Centric Warfa re - NCW (illustrations above and le f t) the Logistic Command of the Army aims at realizi ng Network -Centric Logistics, i.e. a managing system where all the actors are "ne t wo rked".

at Monte lib retti , there has bee n a me eti ng on t he " New Lo gistics a Ph eno m enon of Interdiscip linary Po larization" . At the end of the the pote ntial ities of a 360Â° Âˇ'netwo rk" organizameeting th ere has bee n a short sim ul atio n of a t ion, is gai ni ng g ro und . Networ k Centric Log isti cs , i.e. a m anage m ent As regards the ment ioned concepts, the new system wh ere all the acto rs are con nected i n a log istic m odel of the Service is based on seven networ k a "Dardo" tank w as hit in co mbat and syst ems (s ubdivided in to modules) : regimental, some me n of t he crew w ere w o unde d . T han k s to Centre for Relations with the User (CRU) , Decision t he promptness of the comm uni catio ns and t heir Support, Mai ntenance Pole, lnfolog istics, Indust ry t otal sharing by all the actors o n the g ro und, t he Interface , Operations Room. logi sti c service reached the t an k in a very short T he systems i nterface and exchange informat im e for its repa ir, wh i le t he medical team aided tio n , also with th e civil ian section, thanks to the the wounded . pot ential ities of the computerized ma nagement T his sim ulation co nfirms t hat in th e era of syste ms: Army Information Ma nagement System Network Centric Warfare (NCW), the challe nge (SIGE); Integrated Geospatial fo r th e mode rn logisti cian is Logist ic Info r matio n System con stitut ed by a glo ba l visio n of the o rg an izat ional evolutio n. '' ... the challenge for the (SIG LI), of t eleco mmunica T he refore , th e focu s i s not modern logistician is con- tions , sensors an d remote go ing t o be t hat of pu rsu ing stituted by a global vision sens ing. The regimental Mod ul e more and mo re sop histicated of the organizational evoluSystem, the basic unit of the sect orial m an age me nt system s, system, is based on a logistic but t hat of cre ating a large tion ... ,, instrument to wh ich all the networ k that w ill pe r mit an appurtenances of the TRAMAT in t eg rated support of all act ors branch refer within the unit to be supported. Th is (Forces in T heatre, Fo rce Co mma nd er , is t herefore configu red as frontservice. Adh ere nce - Su pport Gro up , Log ist ic- Sup port A new log istic f igure em erges from this picRoom, bodi es of the Logi stic-Sup po rt Se ctor , tu re a body t hat must fore see , prevent and Wareho uses an d mil ita ry Parks , civil ian i ndust ry) ant icipate , in order to g ive the necessary organi invo lved in a g iven m ission . The A r my, taki ng zatio nal answers. Between an organization conadvantage of the oppo rtun ities offe red by th e ce ived for t he d ivisio n of the activ ities and developm ents of t he information t echnology , anoth er for the governance of the procedures, has stre ngthened the principle t hat th e co ntro l the Se rvice has o pted for t he second one, transof informati o n and its sh ari ng amon g t he var ious fo r ming a sector ia l body, the Logist ic forces deploye d in an Operation T he atre has a Inspectorate, in an i ntegrated Logistic Comma nd multiplyin g effect on operat ional effectiveness. (COMLOG), w hich can operate in the new scenarWithi n t his fram ewo rk , the co ncept of Netwo rk ios , manag ing the new critical ities due to a large Centric Operat ion (NCO), a system that ex pl oits

The MOTRA (Mo vem ent and Transport) Office of the Logistic Command of the Army has started the rea lization of a Management and Control Room for Movement and Transports.

bu lk of informat ion. The log istic co ncept of the Network-Centric Logist ics comes from the operat ional concep t k nown as Effect-Based Operat ions, wh ich shifts the barycentre from the pe rforma nce of the various compo nents to the effects ac hieved on th e bas is of cost - effectiveness crit eria. One of the f irst main objectives, t he inte g ratio n of the sup ply chai n, can be attained on ly t hroug h a coo rdinat ion of the logist ic organ izations of the four Servi ces, which w il l have to generate a logistic system suited als o for combi ned em ployme nt; this will enable t he ope rationa l Commanders to have a total vis ion of the assets o n the ground Uoint Total Asset Visib ility - JTAV). This new way of carrying out a miss ion imp lies an adj ustment of the support and the rationalizat ion of t he perfo rmance, while pursu ing the econ omy of resources . In view of t his, fou r fundamen tal objectives have been singled out: Creatio n of a logi stic interface, linked w ith all t he forces present o n the battlefie ld . This link would be realized thro ugh satellite co nn ectio ns, through w hich t he log ist ic assets co ul d exchange k ey information fro m the battlefield, with t he rearw ard positions and with the industry at home. The common log istic vision (system governance) of the general and particular situatio ns wou ld perm it to adopt precise operatio nal and log istic decis ions, on t he bas is of accurat e informat ion, almost in real ti m e. Increase of the Forces' proj ectab ili ty thanks to t he new supplying syst em w it hin the Operations Theatre. Optimization of the Force 's "receptio n" activities in the Operational Theat re : bes ides the availabi lity

of adequate air and naval assets, a Force's projectability shou ld be based also on an accurÂˇate preparation of eve ry activity related to t he introduction in Theatre, starting from their land ing at the APOD/SPOD. Integration of the sup ply chain that can be implemented only through the coordination of th e log istic organization s of the four Services. In view of this, t he "mass based" logi stics, typical of the "Cold War", that envisaged storing enormous quantities of provisions through estimates "on a historical basis" and 'Ju st in t ime/ ju st enough" logistics , introd uced recent ly, have led to the "Sen se and Respond Logistics"(SRL) . Thi s log istics is aimed at introducing a new concept of log istics based on shared knowledge of the situat ion, rap id ity, coordination and synchronization of the interventions, adaptabi lity and flexi bi lity of the response, thanks to t he em ployment of the "Network-Centric Warfare" capab ili ties. In short, the network- centric logistic arch itect ure on a joint basis is gaining ground, owing t o wh ich the demands tend to disappear, thanks t o t he development of a new non- hierarchized "push" suppo rt doctrine .

THE INTERPORT T he opt imization of integrated log istics, in a network- ce ntric context , in the f utu re will perm it a further unburden ing of the log istic organization and a sign ificant reductio n in the supplying times of a Force in T heat re, squeezi ng t o a mi nimum th e time needed for the transmiss ion and manage ment of data (thanks to network-centric logistics), for conditio ning th e cargos and for loading and unloading them (thanks to the standard ization of procedu res, equipment and means of transport). The establishm ent of mi litary interports will be the first step towards t he modernizat ion of th e log istics of t ransport. In the comm ercial t ermi nol ogy, i nterpo rt mea ns a str ucture whose aim is the exc hange of good s am on g t he variou s modal ities of trans po rt , incl udi ng a railway statio n , where it is possib le to fo rm and rece ive trai ns, w ith connecti on s with ports, airport s and major road netwo rks, as well as sh eltered and uns helt er ed areas for depots, parking and services. The refore t he interport permits t o assemble in a si ngle body some of the numerous real ities of the world of log istics, such as long - distance road transport, rai l transport, cu stoms author ities and w idesp read dist ri butio n. At prese nt, the Armed Forces have no interport structures of thei r own ; the refore they make use of t he se rvice offered by the civ il ian compan ies

Rivista Mill/are Enghsh Edirion n. 212007

that in a pos1t1o n to offer an orga nic who le of structures and integrated services. In view of a f urth er deve lopm ent of intermodality , it w ou ld be adva ntageous to have m i lita ry interport structures, keeping in mind budget li m its and ass essing the project i n re lat ion to cost/ effect iveness criteria. Considering the costs of the project, we must take into acco unt that t he initial investment and t he ope rating cost s of such a structure are very high ; therefore we should possibly also t hi nk about an intermediat e hypothe sis, w hich sho uld combi ne effectiveness with inex pe nsiveness, i.e. a j oint solut ion, wh ich could integrate t he m ilitary

CIVILIAN INTERPORT

Above.

A scheme of integration between civilian and military interports.

Left. Standard ca rgo unit on a metal pallet for special use.

interport with in t he ex isting civilian organ ization. There fore, it would be convenient to create jointly managed mi litary interport areas wit hin t he ex isting ma in civilian structures . In view of this, one cou ld make use of th e of th e existing faci lities an d se rvices, all ocating t he saved m oney (fo r infrastructure and perso nne l) for the optimization of the purely m il itary as pects, i. e. safety and secu rity, monitoring in real time of t he goods in t ran sit (cons ignme nt trac king, j ust- i n- time delivery and increase in UN, EU an d NATO inte roperability). Besides, such civi lian/ m ilitary st ructu res would constitute a po int of reference also for the all ied Count r ies , in particular fo r t he new NATO me mbers , which have no si milar str uctures and no access to the Mediterranean Sea . In th is sense , the Service will have to deve lop a project that should st art from t he con st itution, w ithin t he Logistic Support Branch, of centres for t he collect ion and mars halling of goods, whic h, in the civil ian sector, are called logistic platfo rms. The log istic platform is not a structure planned fo r interm odal t ransport, because it envisages the handling of the loads, and gene rally belo ngs to the road transport sector. It consists of an infrastructu re aimed at facilitating t he reassem bly of t he loads, gen erally by means of automatic and sem i-

automat ic hand lin g and stocking systems, man aged by complex comp uterized systems (unload ing, poss ible storing, marshall ing for the next destinat ion , reassembly and loading). As regard s the military sector, t he co llectio n an d marshalling centres will be placed on the "ridge" of the national territ ory and their evolution sho ul d subseq uent ly lead to t he constit utio n of t he m ent ioned integrated m il itary interpo rts . A m i litary int erport shou ld the refore be equi pped with a j oint networ ked Com mand- and Cont ro l structure, a fre ight yard, a customs office, wareho uses with mechanical equ ipment for han dling and t rans hi pping pallets and contai ners, structures connecting w ith nearby roads, ports and airports. In substance, the real izat ion of mi litary interpo rts wo uld perm it to raise the logistics' leve l of efficie ncy an d bring down t he costs of transport by at least 25%, thanks to the inexpensivene ss of t he intermodal system , whic h the best experts of t he sector consider t he objective to be achieved.

Francesco Capilla Brigadier General, Chief of Staff, Southern Military Region Franco Frati ni Lieutenan t Colonel, Commander, Transport Battalion, 8th ÂŤCasilinaÂť Regiment

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THE 4 ITALIAN ARMY IN FRANCE The war operations carried out by the Royal Army beyond the Alps during WWII, albeit not particularly note worthy, deserve to be remembered, mainly for the dramatic involvement of the Jewish population .

At the end of Ju ne 1940, when the hosti lities ceased, the Italians occupied a small and uneven mountainous area beyond the border, as we ll as Mentone. Despite the costs and t he log istic difficulty in supplying the troops with everything they needed, they kept control of this area for reasons of prestige and as a tang ible resu lt of a conflict that had been characterized by the dishonou rable declaration of war on a country which had already been defeated. With the cessation of hostilities, for more than t wo years the relationsh ip with the France of Vichy would be regulated through a specific civil and mi litary organism, the Italian Commiss io n of Armistice with France (CIAF), whose seat was in Turin and which was directly linked with the Prime Minister in Rome, through the figure of its President. The Italian m ili tary commitme nt was significant. At the end of May l 943, t he 4 t h Army cons isted in four Infant ry Divisions , two Alpine Divis ions, t hree coast Divi sions and other mi nor un it s: in total almost 70 000 m en out of a population of about 300 000 inhabitants. The area of occupation of the 4th Army incl uded two sectors: th e first one, where the Com m and of the Army (M entone) led by Gene ral Marco Vercelli no was situated, wh ich extended from Lake Geneva, following the co urse of Rhone, to t he border Band ol- Avig none excluded . The second one , at the border between Ita ly and France incl ud ed t he Italian t er ritory and ex tended fro m Punta de l Mesco (La Spezia) to Pu nta San Luigi (Mento ne) . From the begin ning of the occupation, the Fre nch populat ion made a clear-cut d istinct ion bet wee n the two occu piers and even though it did not cooperate with them , it was well - d isposed towards the Italian t roo ps and hostile to the Ge rmans . The French Resistance, at least until 25th Ju ly, focused on the «wermacht» and tried to play on t he supposed antifasc ism of Italian so ldiers by using p ropagand a t oo ls and by distri but ing leaflets and und ergro un d cyc lostyled mate ri al, fro m the end of 1942. At the downfall of Fascism, on 2s th Ju ly, the moral

Above. General Mario Vercellino, Commander of the

41/J

Army.

Title pages . Houses destroyed by artillery fire on the Italian-French borde r.

cond itions of the t roops that were stationed in France were good. T he 4 th Army was considered as a sol id structu re whereas t he Alp ine Division «Pusteria» was considered one of t he most prepared units. T he Badoglio Governme nt, since the agreement with the All ies was im minent, in order to face the subsequent German reaction , issued operational instructions that appeared contrad ictory at that moment because even the Command of Great Un its was kept in the dark about the real intention of the Supreme Command in order not to arouse the Germans' suspicions. In t his framework, during the fi rst days of August, the passage to Savoia of Nazi troops , which were heading for Italy, was authorized and some Divisions were ordered to retu rn from France. In the second half of August, after t he agreement of Casalecchio between the German and Italian Supreme Command, which was signed on l 5th August, the 4th Army was stationed in the Italian territory, with the

Rivista Militare £ngl,sh Ec//(101111. 212007

l O p.m. on the sth September, issued t he orde r to retire to t he Italian territory and concentrate troops on the area of Cuneo-Mondovi. At midnight telephone and rad io communications with the units that were beyond the Varo we re disrupted by t he Germans who acted rapidly and efficiently. In just a few hours t he German Officials went to the It alian detachments to ask them to lay down their arms or to make a declaration of loyalty and prom ised to repatriate them to Italy after they had gained control of the area. Chambery, March I 943. Th e "Monterosa " Alpine battalT he Command of the Army tried to halt the German ion marching on parade in the city. advance to the Italian border and ordered to bui ld a def ensive redoubt in the Dora valley and to establish contact with the t erritorial Com mand of Tu rin. This project was impracticable, because lots of mountain exception of t he salient of Nizza, which was situated asses were controlled by the enemy, exactly as between the border and the so-called line Tinea-Varo. motorized troops of Wehrmacht were in Chivasso and According to the Agreement, the Germans had to Asti ; other troops were on the march to Turin and on assume responsibility for the defence of the area that th the afternoon of the l oth the fi rst motorized forces had been previously occupied. On 8 September, the entered undisturbed into its outskirts. On the mornproclamat ion of the armistice took the 4 t h Army by ing of the l l th two units of a motorized- armoured surprise. Its operational strength had been cons iderSS Divis ion closed from west the city which capitu latably reduced. The remain ing forces totalled about l 00 ed . On the evening of the l l t h Alessandria, Asti, thousand soldiers, of whom 60 000 were fighters, who Alba, Bra, Turin and Vercelli were occupied without were stationed in an area between France and Liguria. any resistance, there was a lot of desertion in some Because of the transfers that took place from the end units, whereas t he on ly Great Unit that was still effiof August, its efficiency started to decrease and this cient and able to fight was the 7th Alpine reg iment did not enable them to counter the enemy attack. Up that was deployed in the area of Tenda. So, General to that moment only the Division «Rovigo», the Vercellino ordered to disband the Army: it was the Divis io n «Alpi Graie» and t he l st h armoured prelude to capture and internment in concent ration «bersagl ieri» regiment RE.CO. had returned to Italy; camps for the majority of his so ldiers. Lots of units the other Great Units were head ing for the border. The and single elements went into hiding organisi ng t he German forces could count on the l 9 t h Army which, partisan resistance in Piedmonte. We should mention from the l st h August, had deployed the 343rd and t he cond uct of the soldiers of the l l th Alpine regi345th Infantry Territorial Division in Provence and ment of «Pusteria», in Grenoble and in Gap: the other un its which, after the Italian decision to evacuColonel Dom ingo Ferrara, after having refused to ate t he zone, entered the area the 3 56 th Infantry surrender, resisted attem pts at irru pt ion into the Division in the area that had been occupied by Division th Command of Gap unti l t he first «Taro», the l 57 Division in hou rs of the morni ng of the 9th Grenoble, th e 305th Mountain ''The French population September. Then, overwhe lmed Division to the right of Varo with 7 by the superiority of the enemy, the 75th and 94tl Division. Navy 11ade a clear cut distinctior he surrende red but he was g iven l l 000 men strong contingents oetween the two occupiers. the honours of war. were heading for Tolone and other It was well disposed to In Grenoble, the Alpine battal8 000 men were stationed in the Nards the Italians and hos ion «Bassano» of «Puste ria» Hyeres. What disti nguished t he tile to the Germans , , at tacked the German t roops , German forces from the Italian regaini ng t he co ntrol of the forces was the significant availCom mand Division before abanability of arms. They could count doning it to move to Italy; in Chambery troops of the on motorized troops , which were supported by 20th Alpine skier Group d istinguished themselves by armoured un its and by a d ive- bombing f ighter running the German blockade; in the meantime , on • «Stukas», which was based at St. Raphael. t he Hill of Moncenisio, the homonymous battalion skiers of the 20 th Group and some units of the Frontier Guard countered an attack before retreating THE DISSOLUTION OF THE 4TH ARMY AND THE to Saint Didero in Val Susa; a part of the Group could RESISTANCE flee to Switzerland, whe reas others continued to fight in the Piedmontese valleys starting t he partisan With the declaration of the arm1st1ce , the Resistance. Commander of the 4 th Army, General Vercellino, at

western Alps wh ich, from the Switzerland to the Mediterranean, follows the borderline between Italy and France, where the Ge rmans were deployed in defence of the pri ncipal passes to Piedmonte. The Allies divided the front of the Alps into two sectors: the first one was French, where al l the F.F.I. forces of the area were deployed, from the Swiss border to Col de Larche; the second one was American, from Col de Larche to t he sea.

THE CONDITIONS OF TH E JEWS DURING THE ITALIAN OCCUPATION Above. To/one, June 1943 . A sentry in coastal survei llance. Right. Operation "Anvil Dragoon" in August 1944.

Military operations which are worth mentioning are: the defence of the railway station of Nizza, which was led by Captain Carlo Breviglieri and, after his death , by reserve second lieutenant Salvatore Bono, who was decorated with the Gold medal for m il itary valour at the end of the conflict; the defence of the stronghold of Frejus by ele ments of the sth sector of the Frontier Guard ; the clash of Ormea, on the afternoon of the 1ot h , where the German forces who were going up Val Tanaro towards lmperia, clashed with an Italian garrison, which had just been organized, and suffered heavy losses . The total number of the Italian soldiers who had been captured, in September 1943, by the l gth German Army was about 60 000. Not all the prisoners were deported to Germany, the majority of those who had chosen the job in Todt, as an alternative to prison, were organ ised in groups of workers in France. The participation of the Italian sold iers of the 4th Army in the French Re sistance, who evaded capture or avo ided units of w ork, w as a phenome non which co nce rned the So uth- East and the oriental part that was close to Italy, where t here were lots of anti-fascist ex il es . During the first months after the armistice, the French partisan formations were cautious in encourag ing the assig nment of the Italian soldiers to the ÂŤmaquisÂť, to avoid infi ltration of spies and above all because, with the imminent arrival of the winter, their presence would worsen the already difficult situation of provision of fres h supplies. Their integration into armed groups happened with the adhesion to F.T.P.F. (Franc Tireurs et Partisans Francais), subsequently F.F.I. (Forces Francaise de l'lntereur) and rarely to the m ilitary organizations of t he A.S. (Armee Secrete). In September 1944, after the conquest of Talone and Marsei lles, after the all ied Forces had freed South France, a new front of fig hting was created on the

In order to assess the Italian occupation in France and the way the local Jewish population was normally treated , especially if it is compared with the concur-

R,v,sra Mililare Enghsh Ed,1,on 11. 2/2007

rent German occupation and with the behaviour of the French col laborationist authorities, mentioning the «a priori» historical and historiographical relationship between Fascist Italy and t~e so-called <~ewish quest ion», during the twenty years of Fascism in Italy and du ring t he first part of the war that was fought at t he Germans' side, is overriding: t he absence of a mass «pagan- racial» anti- Sem itism that was similar to the Nazi one; the integ ration of the Jewish popu lation into the Italian society; the «intellectual marg inality» of an original anti- Semitic fascist ideology; the absence, until 1938, of an internat ional anti-Semitic policy; the hostile reception to the racist legislation from the vast majority of the Italian population ; the «!egalitarian spirit» with wh ich the leg islation was appl ied , until the establishment of the Italian Social Republic, in Italy and in the areas that were occupied abroad by the pu blic administration, in primis the Armed Forces and the ad ministration of foreign matters; the dramatic turning point in the anti- Sem itic policy with the establishment of RSI. The attitude of the Italian civi l and political society toward s the Jews can be described by a high level of assimilation that was General Maurizio de Castiglioni. Commander of the reached by 1938. The Jewish people had participated «Pusteria» 5th Alpine Division. in the process of national unification, which had coincided with their definitive emancipation, and in many cases had been an essential part of the ruling class of anti- Semitic in 1938 with the exclusio n of lt~:,an the liberal State. The same participation in the First Jew ish people from the national comm un ity, proWorld War, among the ranks of democratic or even tected t he Jewis h popu lation in South France from national ist intervention ism, highlights an absolute t he Germans , as if they foreboded t he tragic con homogeneity of aims and not an eccentricity of the sequences of those events. Italian Jewish people compared to the remain ing part In the period between the Armistice of Vi lla lncisa of the national commu nity. Right from the start some and t he entry of the troops of the 4th Army in France, Jewish people were active members of Fascism and on the l l th November 1942, in occupied influential positions in the eight departments under the the structure of the regime. T he Italian jurisdiction (the Maritime 'At the announcement o regime did not have scrup les Alps, the Hig h Alps, the Low Alps, about estab lis hing re lations hip he armistice, General Ver lsere, Dr6me, Savoia and High with t he Zionist movement, not .::ellino ordered to fall back Savoia), the presence of Jewis h only with the «revisionist» wing of nto Italian territory ... , , people increased gradually and, Jabotinskij, and during the two at the same time, t he authorities World wars Italy was the country of Vichy adopted a strict antit hat, together with France, hel ped Semitic policy: at first there were l 5- 20 000 people the Jewish refugees of centraleastern Europe the (especial ly in the Marit ime Alps Department ), then the most. The passing of the racial laws in 1938, as well number grew to 40- 50 000 people as a consequence as the progressive political-ideolog ical approach to of the drift of refugees coming from the area of Nazi Germany and to the war of agg ress ion represent German occupation and even from Belgium and a real split in a framework of substant ial continuity. Holland. From t he winter '40- '4 l, the French prefecHowever, this split is not com plete, exactly as the torial and police authorities tried to stem th is drift events mentioned above show (De Felice, «History of through the adoption of measures aimed at sending the Italian Jewish people under Fascism», Turin, the foreign Jews away and, above al l, taking measu res Einaudi, 1972; N. Caracciolo, «The Jewish people and of forced residence or of internment in the concentraItaly during the war 1940- l 945», Rome, Bonacci tion camps of Gurs and Rivesaltes. In July '42, with the Ed itor, 1986). intensification of the Ge rman press ure on the These data reflect and , in a way, exp lain the Government of Vichy and with the ret urn to power of apparent contradictory behaviour of t he Italian Laval, strict anti-Jewish measures were adopted and m ilitary authorities who, althoug h they we re tied the French pledged to hand about 50 000 Jewis h peoto an oath of loya lty to a reg ime that had become

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Situation of the operations of the 4 th Army on September 8, 1943.

pie over to t he Germans, starting a ferocious manhu nt. In th is f irst phase, Italy tried to oppose this persecutory policy, t hrough the activity of consular authorities and the delegat ion of control of the CIAF, which were stationed in Nice and in other places of t he Fre nch Midi. By intercess ion of Angelo Donati (an Italian Jew, ex- Official of the Royal Army. Jn 1916, du ring the First World War, was sent to France as liaison office r in the French Army. At the end of the conflict, he moved to Paris, where he would become President of the Italian Chamber of Commerce. He was a ferve nt Zionist and from 1933 he took care of the refugees com ing from the central-eastern Eu rope and , after t he arm istice of Vi lla lncisa in 1940 , because he had cult ivated precious friendsh ip with the diplomatic and military authorities, he establ ished contact with the CIAF's highest authorit ies in orde r to protect his corel igionists as much as possible) these authorities provided lots of people wit h protection. The proper enforcement of the anti-Sem itic law, by the administration of Vichy in the colonies and in t he Overseas Lands, had already caused friction with Italy. In particular, in Tunisia, this attitude had excited t he CIAF's attent ion. With the decree of 30th November l 940, in fact, t he French racist laws were extended t o Tunisia and about 6 000 Jew s, who had t heir origins

SCALA A?PHOSSIMATIYA

in Leghorn, were persecuted, although, until then, t hey had been subjected to the conventional regime of 1896, which applied to all Italians t hat were resident in the Regency. The protest of the Italian Jewish people mobilized t he consular and diplomatic aut horities and led to t he Foreign Mi ni ster's intervention, who, with a note of l 7th March 1941 , ex horted the General Residence of France in Tunis to apply the Convention of establishment of l 896 to the Italian Jews. This disagreement was not solved in Italy's favou r; in fact, until the Italian- German occupation of Tun isia at the end of '42, t he French authorities were able t o drive home their point of view (R.H. Rainero, Mussolini and Petain. History ... citation p. l ). From the ent ry of t he Italian troops in Provence and Savoia, at the end of '42 , this activity of tutelage became systematic. The German aut horities t ried hard to get rid of the Jewish people who live in the region and demanded that the Ital ian authorit ies collaborate with them in t he activity of capture which t he French pol ice had to do. The Command of t he 4th Army answered them that Italy had ju risdiction on ly over its area of occupation and it could not adopt pu nitive measures against the Jewis h people, regardless of their nationality, beyond this territory. In the area of occupation of the 4th Army t here were three Italian concentration camps : in Sos pel, north of Nice, in Modane and in Embrun. The subj ect s of the enemy states, wh ich were not dangerous, especially the Jewis h people, were assig ned to ÂŤforced res idenceÂť in

R,vista Mt11mro £nghsh Ed111011 n 212007

Nice, January 1943. Emplacement of a "Breda" light machine gun.

June 1943. A checkpoint in a built- up area.

ing to what the R. Delegation for Repatriation in Nice places that were chosen by the Command of the has reported, the foreign Jews that live in the Maritime Corps. After November 1942, lots of Jewish people Alps Department have been assigned to forced resifrom the area east of the Rhone headed for Grenoble, dence in departments of German occupation and Italian Jews have been asked to leave the department Chambery and Annecy, for thermal cities, such as Aix-les-Bains, and for tourist cities, such as Megeve of Dr6me that is occupied in part by the German and Chamonix, as well as the cities that were situated troops. In this regard, we must make it clear that in along the French Riviera such as Nice that had accomthe Italian areas of occupation under no circummodation facilities that were avai lable to resettle a stances should the French Authorities force the forgreat number of refugees. There was a continuous eign Jews, Italian Jews included, to move to pl?.<"e'.; ~nat exchange of notes between the German authorities of are occupied by the German troops. The precautionoccupation and the Government in Berlin , between the ary measures against foreign and Ital ian Jews must be Government in Berlin and the Government in Rome, adopted only by our authorities, who have already between the authorities of Vichy and the Italian been informed about the rules to follow, as pointed authorities of occupation: on the one hand, the out by the telegraphic message mentioned above. It Germans stressed the need to follow a common antimentions the rules governing the treatment of the Jews in the Kingdom, except for some precautionary Sem itic policy, on the other hand, the Italians often measures that depend on military refused to adhere to these regularequirements. tions . In this regard, a good Since we are asked if the transexample can be given by the clas h 'In Southern France, the. fer of the Italian Jews to the area with the authorities of Vichy. On tal ian military authoritie c of our occupation can be facili20th December l 942 the prefect Jrotected the Jewish popula tated, we answer that it is Ribiere adopted a decree provid10n from the Germans ... , , agai nst our interests to facilitate ing for the forced residence in the departments of Dr6 me and the entry of undes irable elements into the territories that Ardeche of all the Jewish people that lived in the Maritime Alps department. In this are occupied by Italian troops. way, thousands of refugees would come under the The case of the Italian Jews who live in the areas German j urisd iction because the de partme nt of that are occupied by the Germans and who want to enter the areas that are occupied by our troops is Dr6me was occupied in part by the Wehrmacht and the department of Ardeche was situated in the quite different. We cannot refuse to accept them, German area of occupation. The Consul General of who will be subjected to the same precautionary Italy in Nice, Nicola Calisse, after having received a measu res that have been adopted against the Italian Jews that live in territories of our occupation». warning from Donati, informed the Foreign Mi nister who, by telegraphic message n. 34 12825, on 29th As a consequence of the fact that Italy wanted to December 1942, expressed his opposition to any handle the «question» independently, despite the protest of Vichy and the German doubts, the living external interference in the areas that had been occupied by the Italian troops. Th is is the teleg ram : conditions of the Jewish people in the Italian area of occupation improved, especially thanks to the oper«Following the telegraphic message n. 34/ R 12579, on 22nd December 1942, we inform you that, accordativeness of the organizations that provided the

•

Jewish people with help and aid in those areas and to the «tutelary» activity that Donati, t hrough the Comite Dubou chage of Nice, d id at the high command (the Jewish people that flooded into Nice from the rest of France could count on the aid of a special com mittee , wh ich was situated in Boulevard Dubouchage, to which the Italian authorities gave authorization to provide the refugees with identification papers). T he Jewish people who had passed th rough t he committee w ere sent to different centres, such as Saint Martin- Vesubie, Megeve, Saint Gervais, Vence, Barcellonnette. In February-March 1943, the clash with the Italian military authorities and the prefects of that area became serious; in retaliation for an attempt on the life of two German Officials the order to transfer the foreign Jews to the area that was under German control was repeated; thanks to the intervention of General Maurizio Lazzaro de Castiglioni , Commander of the th Alpine Divi sion «Pusteria», those peop le who had been arrested at Grenoble we re released and the process of arrests in the city w as stopped . This order was extended to all the area that had been occupied; for this reason, the process of deportation decelerated and the drift of the Jewish people to the Italian area started again. This caused a real deceleration of the anti-Jewish activity that coincided with the creation of the Centre of contemporary Jewish Documentation and of other aid organizations, in the spring- sum mer 1943, in Grenoble. The Italians did not surrender over the Jewish question and this attitude, which clashed with the policy of the Axis, led to the creation of a special unit of race police in Nice. General Inspector Guido Lo Spinoso was put in charge of the Commissariat for Jewish Affairs, which had already been established, in Nice; this man, did not «intend to approach the problem according to German criteria and in close col laboration with the German and French police» - as hoped for in the telegram that had been sent to the Command of Sicherheitpolizei (SIPO) and of Sicherheitdienst (S.D.) of Paris from Gruppenfuehrer Mueller, Head of the 4 th Section of S.D. of Berlin - on Donati's advice, he contacted Father Benoit- Marie and let the Comite Dubouchage do its work. After 2s th July, on the one hand the ideolog ical

reservations about the racial policy of the Fascism became stronger and were expressed openly, on the other hand the decision of the Italian Supreme Command to put an end to the occupation of South France, repatriating the 4th Army (this decision was made in August in order to assure, in the light of the immi nent arm istice, a more sol id defensive line on the west ern alpine arc to counter the German attacks) had negative consequences for the Jewish people who, up to then, had enjoyed the protection of the Italian soldiers. After the new s spread across the refugees, many of them announced t heir intention to follow the Italian troops beyond the Tinea-Varo line; this ques-

Left. June 1943. A sentry on duty at a roadblock with antitank obst acles (visible on th e right).

Below. June 1943. A piece of artillery employed for coastal defence.

Right. Italian soldiers organized in the French Resistance.

tion was discussed in Rome and the important decision was made at an interdepartmental level on 28t h August not to prevent people from entering Italy. By a telegram of 7th September, the Foreign Minister invited the consular authorities to «send those people who cou ld acquire Italian citizenship to Italy». The events of 8 th September, with the armistice, the disorientation of the 4th Army and the cessation of any form of Italian legal tute lage towards t he Jews of the occupied area, led to direct persecution. Just a few of them, who had taken refuge in time in t he regions neighbouring Provence, could find refuge in It aly and save themselves from deportation. In this context, we should mention the story of about 800- 900 Jews in S. Martin Ves ubie who , t hroug h the «Co lle delle Finestre» and the «Colle della Ciriegia», were able to reach respectively Entraque and Valdieri, following some troops of the 4 th Army who were disbanded and were returning t o Italy after the armistice. During the Italian occupation the small town of S. Martin Vesubie, about 60 Km from Nice, was equipped

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Nice, Janua ry 1943. An Ita lia n cava lry un it riding along as a place of forced residence for about 300 Jewish the port quay. families, who were foreign and came from centraleastern Eu rope. They were not al lowed to leave the country and they had to be at the local Italian police the majority of the Jews, except about 30 of them who force's disposal. This was the only rule they had to headed for Valle Vermenag na and reached Palanfre, observe. In this climate of tolerance that had been credecided to stay in the two vi llages of Valgesso. On ated by the Italians, the community could elect its own 12th September, a unit of the 1st Division Panzer SS representative Com mittee that was responsible to the ÂŤLeibstadart e Adolf HitlerÂť, led by Major authority of occupation. Schools were opened and a (St urmbannfuh rer) Joachim Peipe r, assu med comZionist juveni le cell was established in order to develmand of the German troops of the province of Cuneo, op an intense political- cu ltural activity. Lots of hotels adopting the first repressive measures; on 16th all were requ isitioned, among which Le Chalet Ferrix. On foreigners who were in the territory of Bargo San the evidence of the inhabitants and of the Jews, in the Dalmazzo were ordered to go to the local German hall of Le Chalet Ferrix a synagogue was created. Command under pain of death. On the previous day in Jewish festivals were celebrated there and even two Valdieri, without any notice, t hey had already cond uctweddings. The Germans continued to disagree about ed the first search for the Jews. The refugees of how the Jewish question had been handled. However, Entraque and Valdieri did not resist arrest and gave t he It alians always gave them a formal refusal and evathemselves over to SS; after l 5 days there were sive answers to guarantee the Italian military security. searches in Valgesso, in Stura and On gth September, when the Vermenagna, as a prelude to t he news came that in a few hours the area of Vesubie would fal l into the ' .. . with the armistihie, the intern ment of about 400 people Germans' hands, the Jewish comdisorientation of the 4t Army in the German concentration mittee decided that the communiand the end of any form of camps in November. After examin ing the cond itions of the Jews ty shou ld evacuate immed iately talian legal protection of the during the Italian military occupaand follow the Italian sold iers who ews, led to their direct perse tion in South France, Cavaglion's w ere forced into retreat. They words express the profound crossed the border in different cution ,, sense of the attitude of the Armed groups; the first one left at the first Forces and of the Italian soldiers hours of the dawn of gth towards the tragedy that had struck those people: September, the last one left Vesubie during the night when in a good part of Europe there was the cruel lest between the 1oth and the 1 l th , when the country had German repression, when the police of all countries of , already been occupied by the Germans. After cross ing central Europe were mobilized to arrest the Jews, the alpine divide, in groups and with makesh ift provisome areas under Ital ian occupation changed, as if by sions, these refugees overflowed into Valdieri and mag ic, into places of asyl um for the refugees although Entraque, whereas t he last people to arrive headed for Fascist Italy and Hit ler's Germany were bound togeththe valley bottom towards Bargo San Dalmazzo. Their er by the same destiny. arrival was unexpected and th is alarmed t he authorities of a podesta who gave assistance to them and, as Salvatore Orlando the case of Mr. Gerbino, Podesta of Entraque shows, Lieutenant Colonel, informed the section of the Israelite community of His to ry Office, Turin in Cuneo and of DELASEM. In a few days, the disArmy General Staff banded sold iers evacuated the two villages, whereas

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1867:CHOLERAINITALY THE INTERVENTION OF THE ARMY During the epidemic that hit Southern Italy, our soldiers carried out an extensive work of safeguard of public order and protection of the population, who had been completely abandoned by the local authorities. Writer Edmondo De Amicis, then a Second Lieutenant in the Royal Army, was a witness to those dramatic days.

Giu seppe Gioacchino Bell i, in his dialecta l son net "Er Coll era Morribus ", describes the first cho lera epidemic in Ita ly w ith live ly, co lo urfu l and typically Roman ironic rhymes. Actual ly, they re present a rel igiousness th at interp reted the plague as a d ivine puni shme nt an d preferred prayer and the interces sion of patron Saints rathe r than the remedie s (wh ich, to say the truth , were sca rce an d inadequ ate) of the medicine of the time (1 ).

T he mag ic p racti ces, imbued with arch ai c superstition , in use in the country and in smal l town s - togeth er wi t h the widespread belief that the disease was not pathogenic, but caused by "po isons" administered by vi llai ns bribed by th e Italian government - hampered the necessary med ical interve nt ions , which consisted in t he adoption of app ropriate hygie nic and sa nita ry measures that, unfortunately, at the time were decidedly ins uffi cient, owing to a scarce knowl edge of that patho logy. In order to conduct a more effective battle again st the letha l vi brio o f cholera, man w ill have to wait until the stu die s made by McNamara, Koch, Metc hikoff, Sali mbeni , Pettenkoffer, Santarel li, Schwarz man , Lindenbaums and many othe rs. Those beliefs , deeply rooted among the popular classes, and particularly in the rural areas, also caused serious tens ions, which often led to actu al r iots that made the inte rvention of the military necessary. Edmondo de Am icis (2) was an eyewi tness o f tho se events . Th en a 2nd Lie ute nant in the Royal Ital ian Army, he d esc r ib ed in his book "On Mil ita ry Life", in the Chapter "The Ita lian Army during the cholera epidemic of 1867", th e comme ndable role that th e Army p layed with exe m plary abnegation . He writesâ€˘ Every time I think back to what the Army did and suffer ed for the Country during the cholera epidemic of 186 7, and I feel again that kee n sense of admiration and gratitude that in those days the news of a new act of charity and civil courage roused in me, I wonder whether the

Left. "Bersaglieri" sergeant.

Title page. Artillery Officers of th e National Guard.

R ivisu, Mi/1/are English Eclil,on n 212007

greatest part of those deeds ha ve already been forgotten by most, and man y facts have never been known, and all, or almost all, are known too vaguely to be appreciated and praised as the y deserve. Âˇ People in general have probably already con fused all those beautiful individual acts in a single concept - the Army did good - as the y usually do after a successful battle, expressing and extolling in the name of a General the feats and deeds of one hundred thousand soldiers. And I am confirmed in this wo rry when I consider tha t th e Country is only a spectator of wa rs and can, and usually does, observe many th in gs; on the cir cumstance of the cholera epidemic it was , at the same t ime, an actor and a victim of the terrible tragedy. Thus i t could pay little attention to the many and f leeting p artial acts, the effe cts of which, as genero us as t heir pur pose may have been, were small and almost unnoticeable, compared with seriousness of the ills that afflicted i t . Now, t here is no one that cannot understand how the feeling of admira tion and gratitude deriving from the vague news about the A rm y's wo rk for the Country on tha t occasion can be much less deep and enduring, and the example much less effe ct ive, because i f t he way in which that wo rk was individually done, and the sacrifices it cost, and the dangers that went with it had been known, its image would be engraved in everybody 's mind . During t he dead ly epidemic of 1867 (whic h hit the South of th e Country in particu lar) , the Royal Italian A rmy carried out a w idesp read w ork of territorial defence of pub li c orde r and protect ion of Infantry co rporal in field uniform. t he civil ian pop ulat io n, ahead of its t ime, consi dering t hat the latter was very often neglected by the local authorit ies . Nevertheless, all these duties were p erformed Let us go on with Edm ondo De A m icis ' vibrant everywhere, spli tting t he strength as minutely memory: The disorder of the Administrations, the as p oss ib le: consequently, almost everywhere up heavals and the general fear encoura ged rogues soldiers could never sleep two and brigands and occasioned nights in a row in their barnew ones, and all of them went ' Every time I think of wha racks and co uld not eat at the t hrough t owns and country, committing every kind of rob the Army has done and suf fixed t imes, b ut onl y hasti ly, whenever and wherever posber y and violence. ered ... l feel that de sible. The Army, which could not ense of admJrat,on an The hardest tas ks we r e leave off hunting them, even if 7ratitude . . , , those i mposed now and then i ts work was indispensable elseby unexpected pop ular riots, where, was t hus p resse d in t he m iddle of the nigh t, sometimes simulta between thousands of differe nt duties, one more neously in different spots of the same town ; and dangerous and exhausting than the o ther. a handfu l of soldiers had to g o out against an The strength of the units, already scarce for armed cro wd, a hundr ed times their number, meeting the needs in normal times, was comp letewh o knocked at the bar racks' doors furiously, ly inadequate for providing at the same time assisthrowing stones against the windows, threaten tance to hospi tals, sanitary cordons and public ing to se t the h ouse on fire, shouting "death to safety.

...

At many units, permanent assistance committees were set up; Officers went every day to the poor ' s houses to help, to give advice, to keep an eye. Th e soldiers ga ve their straw ma ttresses to the hospitals, assisted the ill in the laza rets and p rivat e houses, and there they went courageously and cheerfully, doing t heir utmost duty. In the villages where there were no more chemists left, our men, supervised by medical office rs, handed out medicines in shops, or took them to the houses where they were needed. In other places, where even the shops selling indispensable food were closed, the soldiers had the m opened by force and attended to the sales in person or oversaw them. It was often necessary to keep t he markets open, in part con trolling the delivery of the foodstuff and in part safeguarding law and order, which were continuously at risk. Both in villages and in towns, quite often the servicemen had to kn ead and bake the bread, a job tha t no one wanted to do, since it was believed that cholera could be caught by sweating . In many cases the soldiers had to sweep the str eets and the homes of the poor, together with "carabinieri " and police, beca use nobody wanted to carry out that dangerous tas k. The Officers were often forced to perform tasks wh ich, albeit less humble, wer e m uch more unusual and difficult: they had to act as Ma yors in the villages dese rted by the Authorities, and sometimes as doctors. And always they were almoners and m issionaries, among populations that were dazed and aggravated by fear and sufferings, heated by fierce passions. The same was true for the medical officers, who, Lieutenant Colonel of the Roya l Staff Corps. besides having to take care of the soldiers, almost everywh ere had to look after the civilian people, of whom, first of all, they had to th e poisoners an d to the overcome preju dices , repul assassins of the people" and 'For all, an immense sorrow sions and hatreds. all other kinds of insults. The Corps Commanders, hat of havmg to bid the /as Moreover, in most towns, the pressed by thousand needs, a.rewe/1 to so many bravE soldiers had to re m ove the dead difficulties and r esponsibilities, old,ers .. ,, bodies fro m their houses, carry were alwa ys concerned about them to the cemetery on regithe ir troops, divided and scatmental wagons, dig the graves tered here and there, always in and bury them. People had to be prevented from movement and in danger. fleeing their villages, be pursued and taken back For all, an immense grief- that of having to bid to their houses, seizing by the arm, one by one, the last farewell to so many bra ve soldiers, good whole families of poor wretches, throngs of chilcomrades , dear friends for a long time. dren and women shouting and crying despera tely. In t hat year also Calabria, amo ng t he many At every corps and detachme nt, money was colevi ls that had always affl icted that regio n, had to lected for the poorest fa milies; in some villages a face the ra m pant lethal cholera epidemics that quantity of bread was distributed daily, in others, hit twen ty seven municipal ities, with a very high meat and soup; where one could not give anything death rate, particu lar ly among the popu lat ion of else, one gave the leftovers of the soldiers' rations, Sci lla, Bag nara and Regg io. straw and old clothes, anything. The ragin g of th e epi demic was acco mpanied

Riv,sta MililDta Eng/is/l Edition 11. 212007

by popu lar co mmot ions th at resulted in actu al tumults (m ai nly orig inated from a co ll ective and blind panic fear of that pesti lential d isease, which most people cons(dered actua l pois on ing) which in some cases were repressed by the immediate in te rvention of t he Royal Army, whi le, in other cases, turned into bloody lynch ing of the "plague- spreade rs" , th e accused, detested po isone r s. Th ese dramatic events were also recalled by De Am icis in the abovementioned work: Meanwhile, cholera had spread over almost all the other provinces of Italy, especially in the southern ones, and in the Reggio province more than anywhere else. There, at the end of the year, it produced its last and most dreadful hecatomb. As a crown ing of misfortune, the old super stition that cholera wa s the effect of the poisons spread by the Gove rnment started to take root among th e populace, since the comm on people of most southern regions, for the habit acquired under the oppression of t he pre vious rulers , considers the Gove rnm ent an enemy continu ously an d secretly bent on damagi ng them in order to preserve itself. These popular prejudices were secretly fom ented by the Bourbonists and the clericals. All members of the police force, "carabinieri", customs officers and all government officia ls, were susp ected of poisoning. Seditious proclamations were di ffused and affixed on the streets, inciting to revenge and blood. Now and then t he mob, armed with sickles, pikes and rifles, assembled and ran wildly through the streets of the villages trying to find and kill the poisoners. The y threatened or assailed the barracks of "carabinieri" and soldiers, stormed into doctors' houses and plundered them; swarm ed into chemist's shops scattering and destroying everyth ing; invaded the city's office, to re the national flag to pieces, burned registers and documents. Whole families, accused of poisoning, were assailed unawares at night by crowds of people, and old people, women and children, were slaughtered one at t he feet of the other, with no time fo r proving the ir in nocence or begging for m ercy. In th is regard the events of Ardore (3) were emblematic. The f irst lethal cases of t he cho lera epidem ic occurred on August 14, 1867, as record ed by the Dean on t he parish reg iste r. The town and the entire munici pal te rritory were surrou nded by a tig ht mil itary- control led san itary co rdo n, preve nting everyone from entering or leaving . Furthe rmore, people coming from suspect places had to u ndergo a preventive treatme nt th rou gh special fum igations (with

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Standard-bearer of the 7sr Infantry Regi ment.

ess ences of su lp hur, rosemary and other aromatic herbs), wh ich, accordi ng to the be liefs of the time, we re sui ta ble mea ns for preventi ng t he epidemic contag ion . At Ardore , nevertheless, the people's discontent turned into a ferocious bloody fury and for two days , Se pte mber 4 and 5, 1867, t he enti re town was the scene of an armed popu lar revolt wh ich, at the end, left be hi nd seventee n dead, th irtee n of whom had bee n slai n because they had been con side red "plague- spreaders".

Captain of the "Saluzzo " Light Cavalrymen.

That massacre was also related by De Amici s, whose pen hands down to posterity the sacrifice of 2 nd Lieutenant Gazzone an d t he hero ic behaviou r of Cor poral A lbani, both detailed to Ardore by the Royal Army and stat ioned in the nea rby town of Gerace with the 3rd Company of the 6 8th In fantry Regiment: In Ardore, a small outlying ward of Gerace, there were six "cara bini eri" and twen ty- five soldiers from the 68 t h In f an try Regiment, commanded by 2nd Lieutenant Gazzone. In the morning of September 4, the armed population crowded outside the town shouting "death to the poisoners!" When the rebels considered they had reached a sufficient number, the y stormed into t own. Lt. Gazzone, trusting in the friendship shown to him in more than one occasio n, wa lked ami cabl y towa rds the crowd, trying to calm the m

down with good words : the answer were two bullets in his chest that knocked him dead on the g round. To avoid adding horrors to horrors I won 't say what was done to his body. The soldiers, attacked a few at a time, could not resist and could barely make it to the "carabinieri" barracks, whe re three families, named Lo Schiavo, had taken shelter, since the rebels, believing them guilty of poisoning, had burned down their homes. An immense crowd gathered in front of the bar racks and, with frightful shouts, asked that the poisoners be handed over to them. The head of the families , old Lo Schiavo, had the courage to come to a window and, crying and sobbing despera tely, implored the mob to spare at least the blood of wo m en and children. They answered him that all we r e going to be torn to pieces. The poor fathe r, overcome by desperation, fired a pistol shot towards the street. This was the signal for the assault. Th e crowd , armed with axes, with a high scream of rage, darted against the door and started throwing a hail of bullets and stones against the windows. The soldiers defe nded themselves from inside with gunshots. The battle lasted more than one hour. At last, seeing that their efforts were useless, the mob set fire to the barracks. What a horrible scene' The fla mes attacked the whole house and flickered everywhe re inside the roo m s, the air was hot and the roof beams were crackling, outside whistles and wild shouts of joy; ins ide desperate screams of women and children, seven soldiers and Lo Schiavo lying in blood. In this extrem e situation, Corporal Albani decided to try the only wa y to safety: he gather ed the three families in a small group, ordered the few soldiers left to carry the wounded on their shoulders; the group, led by him, quickly opened a door and, with fixed bayonets, rushed head first into the crowd. The mob, stunned by that incredible boldness, made way, but as soon as they had passed, fired with their rifles and k illed severa l m embers of the unfortunate fa milies, others escaped, some in the houses, some in the country; the soldiers were not reached. Two days later, three infantry companies arrived from Gerace, Monte leone and Reggio, and order was res tored. Captain Onesti of the Staff Corps, wh o for some time ran the muni cipal administration, Major Castaldini, wh o commanded the troops stationed in and around Ardore, and Broglia, the Battalion physician, beha ved in such wa y that I wou ld not k now how to praise the m appropriate ly.

Rivista M1ti/,1rc Englisli Editiou n. 212007

/ don't mentio n the soldie rs who, there like everywhere else, did t heir utmost fo r the town, with unrem itting zeal and religious compas sion. These very se rious eve nts and offences were fol lowed by a long crim inal trial, hel d at the Crimi nal Court of Regg io Calabria. It ended on June 12 , 1871 and i nfl icted a tota l of 262 years imprison ment and , for three defendants, the ve ry hard penalty of hard labour for life. Nevertheless, that sentence , although amp ly justified, does not appear to be exhau sti ve and convinci ng , in v iew of the re sul ts of the hearings. Actually, from what emerges from the trial, it is not farfetch ed to t hin k t hat the real chief in st igators, who had astutely remained beh ind the cr iminal sce ne, were left unpunished. As a matter of fact, we read in the bulky justification of the sentence : "The scheming of some evil persons, who took advantage of the situation to excite the souls of the people, moving them to commit the atrocious deeds "... Altho ug h the papers of the trial have not actu ally give n an answer, wh ich , on t he lega l an d hi storica l plane , may go beyo nd the chronic le of those tragic events, sti ll they have pe rm itted to retrace the painful course of t hat memorable and w oeful po pular tragedy that affl icted th at ancient - and truly civi lized - Calabrian town and al l its peop le wh o, because of that and afte r that , for many years we re po inted at, slandered and vitu perated. Bu t tim e, wh ich devo urs everything, h as "eaten up" t he m emory of those horrible facts and of those to r mented p roceedi ngs t hat marked t he lives of those m en inde libly. Men that were con demned also - and m ainly - for crimes co mmitted by others . Abo ut all t hose m en a chronic ler fro m Ardo re sa id in th e last centu ry: ''The deluge came and submerge d the less guilty". God's justice has certainly evened up the losses.

Captain of th e "Rea li Carabinieri".

Filippo Racca Lawyer in Siderno

NOTES (l ) In his sonnet G.G. Be ll i refers to a medal co ined in 1832 after the Virg in Mary' s appearance to St. Catherine Laboure in Paris, on November 27, 1830. According to trad ition, the medal was distributed to those affected by cholera duri ng t he epide mic that occurred in those years in the French capital and apparently some were healed. Since t hen, as the Roman poet recalled, t he medal was considered mi raculous.

(2) Edmonclo De Am icis (1846- 1908), an Officer in the Royal Italian Army, left the military to take up literature and journalism. From 187 1 to 187 9 he published six successful books on travels, followe d by "Poes ie" (l 880), "Amici" (1883) and the very famous "Cuore" (l 886) . The latter was his masterpiece, where his deep love for goodheartedness is the most sig nifi cant aspect of hi s personality and the most gen uine expression of his l it erary gen ius. (3) A small town in the province of Reggio Calabria, on a panoramic plateau (250m above sea leve l). about 6km from the shores of t he Ionian sea.

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WITH IRON AND FIRE This was the title of a show concerning "artillery stuff', which was held in Turin in 1995. Taking the cue from that interesting exhibition, we can analyse and get to know the French and Austrian artilleries employed du r ing the Napoleonic wars , with the related devastating effects. "With Iron and Fire" was the t itle of a show devoted to "arti llery stuff', held in 1995 at the Nation al Museum of Artille ry in t he Citade l of Turin. The title is su itable, si licet p arvis componere magna, also for th is art icle ded icated to the artillery employed in the bloody due l that tore to pieces for almost a generation the civil and Christian European continent in t he XVIII and XIX centuries, the so- called Age of Enlightenment. By Cod, Sir, ! lost my leg 1 By Cod, Sir, you are right! Th is surreal ~alogue apparently took place at dusk on the 1st of June 1 81 5 on the bat tlefield of Waterloo. The protago nists, speaki ng w ith typical Eng lish phlegm, are Ge neral Lord Uxbri dge , Commander of Wellington's reserve Cavalry, and Wellingto n himse lf. T he former had just reali zed that he had had a knee smashed by a French cannon shot. He eventually survived and went back home without his leg, wh ich had been amputated and buried in a tomb, complete w ith gravestone, in the garde n of the little hotel where he had been attended to. Antodne Faveau, Fre nch ca rabineer of Ke llerman n's 2n heavy cavalry Reg iment who faced him , but in the other Army, was less fortunate: an English cannonball hit him full in th e chest, piercing his front and back armour with a ho le about fifteen cent imetres in diameter. What happened to his body nobody knows: but his armour can still be se see n at t he Army Museu m in Paris, a striking evide nce of t he effects of the art illery in the Napoleonic wars . But how were these cannons? And how was th e artillery o rganized?

THE AUSTRIAN ARTILLERY In 1790 t he Austrian artillery was cons idered the best in Europe for the quality of its material but, above all, for its specialized personnel: the gunners, usually volunteers, were wel l t rained, better paid and better treated compared with the infantrymen. Their se rvice lasted 14 years , and often t hey enlisted qu ite young, sometimes at 1 5- 16 years of age. T he Austrian artill ery in the period of t he Napoleonic wars envisaged 3 - 6 - 12 - 1 8 - 241b can nons (the latter three emp loyed in siege or fortre ss batteries) and 7 and l 0 lb howitzers. Sim ilar to the French artillery, it also had standardized w heels and carriages, painted with a pretty light ochre colo ur, the so-call ed "imperial ye ll ow", wh ile the French ones we re gree n. The Austrian infantry regiments were supported by batteries of six 31b guns or by four 31b ones and a certain number of 6 pounders. The lighter pieces followed the movements of the troops during the variou s phases of the clash, while t he heavier ones were positioned before the battle . A limit to their tactical employment was the almost com plete inability to carry out violent and massive fire concent rations. The artillery fire could start with bigger pieces up to about 1800 Schritte, i.e. steps (1 135m), wit h cannon s posted 15 steps in fron t of the infantry and 10 steps from each other. When the enemy infantry, or its cavalry, arrived at a distance of 300 st eps (189m) t he cannon s were withdrawn by hand in the intervals of t he formation or, as in the case of t he English cavalry at Waterloo, temporarily abandoned by the gu nners, who took refuge inside the infantry squares nearby. During the clash, if possible, the guns we re moved to the flank, in order to rake t he enemy by enfi lade. The number of gunners and horses used for towing and pos itioni ng the pieces varied accord ing to the cali bre the three pounders had one head gunner every couple of can nons, 4/ 5 gunners and 4i6 utility sold iers fo r each piece, which was towed by two horses. A sim ilar eq uipment was provided for the six-i:: ou nder pieces of t he infantry, wh ich were hauled by four horses, whi le the faster "cavalry" bat-

Left. Aiming of an Austrian 3 /b p iece.

Tit le pages. Foot artillery of the French Imperial Guard in combat.

Rivista Mi/1/Bre Enghsh EdillO/l n. 2/2007

Field- artillery gun on a limber with a caisson for munitions.

Canister, comm on shell without primer, and ro undshot. We can see the wooden sabots and th e method of fixing them to the munitions.

teries had a greater number of gunners - 6 - no uti lity soldiers and were towed by 6 horses. A un ique mation, mowing down every man on its trajectory. At characte ri stic of the Imperial- Royal Army was that Waterloo, the double- charge shots of the English the artillerymen did not move on horseback, but art illery against the French cavalry had similar devasrode astride the carriage, on a special long multiple tating effects saddle appropriately cal led Wurst (sausage). The theoretical rapidity of the f ire was remarkable: The three- pounder cannons had a barrel - made of the cannon - for a short period - could fire a shot bronze, like the 6Ib ones - of 94cm, weighing 236kg. every l O seconds: with aimed fire one could achieve a Their firing angle went from + 27° to - 6.5. The solid considerable cadence of 3- 4 shots per minute (if the ball had a diameter of 7cm (with a space of 3.3mm piece was well positioned, the ground did not give between ball and barrel) and we ighed about 1 300gr. way, the gunners were quick and the recoil - 2-2,5 It was propelled by a charge of 0 .4kg that supplied a metres - d id not stick the tail end into the earth. range of 31 5- 760m for direct fire, 885 - 950 for the However, in battle one cou ld not exceed two shots per so- called Collschusse, ricochet fire . The canister fire minute. After 900 - 1000 shots a gu n, provided it had had a range of no more t han 2 50m. not already exploded , was ready be thrown cJ::-1a·y tor, T he six pounder (barrel 144- 1 58cm, weig ht about better, melted again). 330kg, carriage about 400kg) shot a bal l of 9cm in Ammunition. The launch ing charge was not loose, diameter (space of ea 4mm) weighing 2.700kg , probut was packed in a linen bag on wh ich the bal l was pelled by a charge of 8hg for t he ball and of more secured, and tied to a wooden base with metal str ips: than one kg for the canister. Its range varied from the whole made up the complete shot, loadable with 300 to 800m in d irect fire and up to 1 300m in ricoa si ngle operation . At the shot, t he bag was pierced chet: the range of the canister was a lit t le longer with a special device , the Bested<, subsequently the t han that of the smaller piece. The 12Ib piece (with a primer (Schi/frohrbranrohr) was inserted into the barrel almost 2m long, weig hing 771 kg) fi red an touch hole, and the charge was lit, with a match held 11 cm bal l, propel led by a charge of 1.7kg for a maxat the top of a stick, through t he touchhole. There imum range of a little more than one km, which were t hree main types of ammunition : the solid balls, could reach more than 1 500m wit h the ricochets. t he explos ive ones where the blast was determined Precision was acceptable against big targets (e.g. by a fuse that burnt inside a a dense ly deployed co mpany): at wooden tu be having a length 600 metres the probab il ities of • in 1 790 the Austrian ar adequate to the distance and hitting the target varied from a illery was considered thE: time of the fl ight, and the canisrespectable 70% t o a scarce 40%, the efficacy of a three pounder best in Europe for the qualit', ters (or boxes) (Kartatsche), con sisting of a certain number of d id not exceed 500m. On the its material but, above all. iron balls of d iffere nt size (from other hand , ot her tests, for a six pounde r , give a 9% of targets hit or its specialized personnel , 16 to 45mm), packed in a t in container that disintegrated in at 950 yard s. In a Pruss ian test flight. The canisters were used in of 1 782 , a target of 6' (feet?) of close defence. There were also height by 100 ' (feet?) of lengt h double charges, normal solid balls lin ked to t heir placed at 400 yards had supposed ly received 46% powder bags and topped by a Schrotbuchse, i.e. a of hits. From a di stance of 400- 500m a be ll tower can ister without charge: for example, the 3Ib gun could be hit, without too many difficu lties, by calm had a double shot with a 7cm bal l placed at the end gunners with aimed fire. of a container ful l of iron buckshots (1). Besides, for On long distances, the efficacy of a caniste r was special uses (e. g. against cavalry or batteries), there less effective: for a 6Ib, 7% of targets hit at 300m, 5% was the bar shot (Sperrschusse) where the projectile at 375. A 3 pounder reached 250m at its most, but was made up of two bars, one metre long, chained with scarce results. But when the shot hit straig ht into together, or by chained bal ls (mainly for naval use, the target, its effects could be devastating: P. De being ideal agai nst the masts or the yards of a Segur tel ls of a case, during the battla of Smolensk, shi p).Red hot balls were also used . where a shot penetrated until the 22n line of a for-

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An Bib French piece coupled to the limber. The caisson for munitions is fixed on the carriage.

there were obviously the 8 cannons, with their limber placed a little behind. About fifty metres to the rear T HE FRENCH ARTILLERY there was a second line of 8 caisso ns for munitions. Then there was a second line of caissons for the In the wars of the Revolution, and particularly in the reserve munitions, another fifty metres behind. Grande Armee, the artillery constituted one of the Finally, at a distance of about a hundred metres from most effective instruments of the French Army. It was the latter, there w ere six more wagons with the batmostly realized by Napoleon who, not by chance, had tery in struments, a wagon with the forge, one for the started as an Artillery Officer. He gave a great impulse tools and one for the munitions of the battery perto both the standardization of materials and the milisonnel, two with munitions and tarization of the towing services tools for the howitzers, and a and, above all, to the violent and 11 wagon spare parts. When the Than ks to Napoleon the battery with aggressive use of large concenmoved in a column, it trations of cannons hauled at a ~rench Artillery had a grea1 formed a rather encumbering gallop to positions very close to Âˇmpulse in the standardiza procession: 30 vehicles, cannons the enemy. The old method of tion of materials and the included, 64 gunners (i n case of 4 pushing the can nons by hand up pou nde rs, which were served by 8 to the fire line was replaced by militarization of the towing men ; wh ile the 8 pounders had a horse towing up to the danger services and, above all, in the crew of l 3), 22 drivers (employline, and even further. As regards use of cannons hauled at ing a minimum crew of one man ammunition, in the French per wagon) and at least 76 horsRepubl ican and Imperial era, as gallop close to the enemy ,, es (2 for each wagon and 4 for regards typology and performeach cannon): a total of at least ance it was equivalent to the 3- 400 metres occupied by a sinAustrian one (2). On the other hand, there were differgle battery in movement. ences in the types, organization and, above all, in the In the repub lican period the arti llery was formed employment of the guns. by pieces of 12, 8 and 4 pounds and howitzers of The French artillery pieces were usually grouped 6 pounds. This material had been studied by into batteries of 8 cannons. The deployment of a batGribeauval already in l 776. The smallest piece tery on the fire line, if one could make it by the handweighed about 900kg and fired a ball of 80mm in book, covered a depth of about 200 metres: in front diameter, weigh ing almost 2 kilos , w ith a range of 700- 1000m. The 8Ib piece, we igh ing 1400kg, had a ball of l 0cm, weighing 4.4kg , that cou ld reach a Repositioning of a 121b French piece after the shift due distance between 800 and l 500m. Finally, the 12 to the recoil. pounder, with its weight of almost 2 tons, could send a ball of 19cm of d iameter at a distance between the 900m of effective range and the l 800m of maximum range, but there the ball arrived almost dead. The elevation of the piece was ach ieved through a large ax ial screw, which w as in fact introduced by Gribeauval; the side angle was reached through the rotation of the piece, carriage included. As can be seen, the performances were almost equ ivalent because, although the smallest French piece was bigger and therefore more powerful, it was less handy than the Austrian smallest one. As a compensation, diameters, weights and power of the Austrian guns were more balanced than those

Rivista Mililare Enghsh Edition n. 2/ 2007

of t he French ones. Und er 12 pounds (the maximu m w eight for f ie ld art i ll ery) the Austrians obtained a mo re flexible volume of fire (with t he lighter pieces of 3 and 6), while the French had heavie r pieces (4 and 8Ib). During the Consulate , Napoleon increased t he firepower of hi s arti ll ery by replacing the 4 Ib piece w ith a 6 Ib one using also, irony of fate, the ve ry many Austrian cannons of th is type captured in the various battles . Also many 8Ib pieces we re replaced by 12 pounders ; actually, at th is point, the French arti llery resu lted unbalanced to the front and too heavy. Hence , in l 809, the 4Ib pieces w ere reintroduced. Nevertheless, some believe t hat this cho ice was not caused by t echn ical motivations con nected with the cannons, but by the poor qu ality of the pe rsonnel, ex hausted by 13 years of bloody wars. In 1805, at A usterlitz, the su bd ivision by calib re of the French artillery was as follows: for every 12Ib can non th ere were 8 pieces of 6 lbs, 2 pieces of 41bs Right.

Graphic plane representation of three 12, 8 and 41b field- artillery guns.

Left. Plane and profile representation of a carriage and limber of a piece of Napoleon's time. Below. Graphic representation of the position occupied by the crew of an artillery piece.· in th e forward movement; in the backward movement; in combat.

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and 3 howitzers, for a total of l 09 pieces; in 181 2, at Smolensk, the proportion was down to 4.7of 8Ib, 0.6 of 4Ib pieces and 2.3 howitzers for every 12Ib piece (for a total of 490 guns). It sho uld als o be remarked the much more aggress ive use of the artillery made by Napoleon (with t he pieces always hauled fo rward, in close contact with the advanc ing troops) and his abi lit y to conce ntrate larg e batteries of mo re t han l 00 g uns , fo r example at Le ipzig (but here also t he Pruss ia ns we re not j oking, con '.; ideri ng th at General Blucher managed to conce ntrate 220 pieces , between Russ ian, Prussian and Swed ish guns), Wagram , Bo rodino, Waterloo. On t he ot':::-r hand , Napoleon did not under stan d, or in any case d id not take advantage of, indi rect fire through explos ive grenades or sh rapnel on t roops, especially if defiladed, prefe rrin g t he violent direct ball f ire: on heavy ground , thi s li mited ve ry much the effective ness of th e strikes, as was the case at Waterloo, where th e balls sank, w ith little dam ag e, into the soggy ground of Mont St Jean . Leonello Oliveri Expert on Military History

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shot could have: between the norm al space with in the barrel, t he solid ball, the caniste r and t he single ball s ins ide the latter, there was also the different aerodynam ics of the canister and the ball, which very probably had a greater speed, therefore pus hi ng th e box where the dispers ion of the sing le pellets occurred at the same t im e: eve rything to the detriment of precision . (2) In the Italian ed it ion o f "Wate rl oo", published by BUR i n 1999, as regards the ammunition of the Napoleonic • guns (not only the French, but also the Engl ish ones), we find what is probably a mi stranslation. In fact we read t he caption of pag.63, refe rring to a French l 21b piece wh ich "f ired bronze projectiles ; the Eng lish pieces, instead, used brass projecti les". Very probably the reference is to the barrels, not to the proj ectiles, which - as far as we know - were always made of iron.