JOURNAL OF ITALIAN ARMY 2004 N.2 "RIVISTA MILITARE" by Biblioteca Militare

CONTENTS

!\umber Two 2004 i\-fay - .lune

.July - August

Rivista Militare aim s at broadeni ng and updating the technical and vocatio nal training of the A rmy p erso nnel. It is thus a means of p ropagating the military way of t hinking and a f orum of st udy and debate. Through the pub lication of artic les of technical and scientific interest, Riv ista Militare also aims at informing t he general public on the Army and on m ilitary iss ues.

icaGOn, splrit ot sacrifice and high sense of duty etize our pets~1neJ. TTiC m61 ~nd wome11 of /ta=m Anny se,ve with honour. at home aro road. to bring peace and .'1berti; ,n a framewalk of security. A new yeatopgm to !he hl:s!o,y of tfle wo:KJ: and oor so.'diers, ;1ri fn !l:eir si,1e,.,; and di,1i{]C,flt dJ:rj worlr, continue to g;.,,e to many peoples the possi ~ of eni<1Jing /he precioos good of democracy

FOUR-MONTHLY Supplement to numbers 3 and 4 of Rivista M ilitare Italian Editio n

Editor in Chief: Giuseppe Maria G iovanni TRICARICO !"Jlanagement and Editorial Office

Politics, Economics and Strategy 2 The liquid gold o f the third millennium (GiMw111i A1ari::.::.aj

12 The perennial e vo lutive s ymbiosis of v,ar and technology (Giancarlo Rove) 26 Beyond force and vio lence ( Enz.o Gaspari11i Casari) 38 The foundation o f today's geostrategic order (A 111cmio Ciabclltini T.eonardi)

, Via d i S. Marco 00186 Rome Phone 0039 0647357373 dvertising

52 The private military companies (Ca r111ine ,'viasielloj

are of t he Secretariat f Rivista Militare hone 0039 0647358139 rint e r t ilgrafica - Rome hotoprocessing tudio Lodoli Sud - Aprilia (L1) ubsc ription and forwarding ymail aw 662/ 96, art. 2 , para 20/c o nditions for 2004: nenumber. Euro 2,10

Sociology 68 Overcoming stress (!1 11tonio Aiarchetti)

Legislation 82 The italian penal system for the military missions abroad (Giuseppe S candu rra)

ne back numbei: Euro 4,20 ubscription rates aly: Euro 11 ,40 a year broad: Euro 15,50 a year ayment must be made on postal ccount No . 22521009 - SME entro Pubblicistica dell'Esercito 23/A, Via XX Settembre - Rome esidents abroad may remit ayment through bank cheque or nternational postal order uthorized by the C ourt of Rome nder No. 944 of the Registry by ecree 7-6-1 949

2004 © Copyright by Rivista Militare

ASSOCIATED TO USPI UNIONE $TAMPA PERIODICA ITALIANA

he product ion o f this magazine as been supervised y Omero Rampa

History 96 The p rice of liberty (Luigi Poli)

102 The proud uprising of the neapolitan people (!ltrilio Barreca )

110 A journey inside an endless myth (A n ita Garih ald i)

122

Sommario - Summary - Sommaire Inhalt - Resumen - Sumario

Instruct ions for Co nt ribut ors: Anyone may contribute. To g uaran tee the highest objectivity of information, Rivista Militare leaves cont ributors amp le f reedom , t ho ugh it does not necessarily share t heir opinions. The Author is th us solely responsible for the articles whicl1, published unedited and without editorial ties, exclusively reflect his perso nal ideas. Artic les must be original in thought and should not exceed ten typewritten pages. Once the Author receives r,is fee, he loses all exclusive rights. Riv ista Militare may then pass the article on to other publications and EMPA (European Military Press Association) periodicals. Artic les should be accompanied by suitable photographs, illustrations, explanatory tables, together with a photograph of t he Author, a brief «curriculum vitae» and a ten-line typewritten summary. Rivista Militare reserves t he right to change the title of articles and choose the typeface deemed most suitable. Riv ista Militare is equipped with a computerized system for phototypesetting and videopaging . In order to make the production of the articles more expeditious, it is desirable that the Authors provide, besides t he text on paper, also the diskette with the t ext f iles of the article. Any system and type of computer can be used.

rrJ1 2/J!}JJJ!) JJ!ll!J lJ1 W]ll:FJ JJJJUJ_J}]}JJ{JJJJJ

our years ago, in these very columns, there was an anicle in which \Vater, ils a vaiJabili ty and the possibility and capability o f managing il were id e ntified as th e world's new strategic objective . T here were fond hopes that a new discipline , by drogeostrategy, woul d be dev elop ed and predictions that future \Vars \Vould be fought for water rather than for political reasons or for oil. Today, all this seems more li kely than eve1~ Drinking \,Vater is not scarce on Earth, yet the problem lies in its irregu lar distribution in ti rn e (climatic seasons) , and , even more, in di fferent areas . F resh water i.s very irreg u larly d istributed along the year, and this causes excesses in s ome p laces and droughts somevvhere else. Irregularity regards space too: a German baby consumes 40 times more water than an Indian one and a Swedish newborn 45 times more water than a baby in Bangladesh . In proportion, we Italians are the grea t est consumers of mineral water in the world, and to buy it we spend an av e rage of 500 e u r os per p e rson a year. Still, as in al I industrialized coun tries, also in Italy the levels of wate r purification arc increasing, but \ve prefer not to drink it but use it for cooking, Lo operate e lectrical appliances and to vvater the plants in our gardens . Meanwhile, on the other side of the world one billion and 400 million people do not hav e drinking water and it is esti mated that this is the rnain cause of the so-called ''avoidable mor tality". A PRECIOUS BUT BADLY DISTRIBUTED RESOURCE

Fresh water availabi.Lily is being drastically reduced because o[ man, who on one side n1assively pollutes it and, on the oth e rÂˇ consumes it so rapid ly that the supplies have not enough time to 4

re-form. But the problem is more po litica l, economic , legal and philosophical than environmental. Hmv can it be otherwise explained that i n coun tries q uite rich in drinking water, like Bra zil and Congo, most people have no access to w ate r resources? Or, how can it be explained that in California each person has at his disposal an average of 4100 liters a day, although that Stale has no larÂˇge water resources? There is no doubt that the world population growth affects wa ter c onsumpt ion, but. its destination s do not effectively c hange: 70% of the water is

Right The Tem.beling river in Malaysia. Below. The Kana river i11 Togo .

consumed by agriculture, 20% by industry and only 10% is for domestic use . Sixty p er cent of the world farm able land is cultivated for fodder, in particular for the ca ttle that will feed that 11% of the "rich" mankind , which owns 90% or the resources and consumes 90% of t h e global goods and services. Canada, a country qu ite rich in-

water but scarcely populated, is willing to se.11 part of its copious water wealth to th e rest of the American continent. A delicate aspect is represented by the fact that in many c ountries of the south of the world, from Cameroon to Mozambique and Bolivia, the Gov ernm ents - on request from the International Mone tary Fund and th e World

----'

Bank - are selling the dislribut ion of water to p 1-i vatc vVestern con1panics . Today in rnany cap itals like Djaka rta, Manila, Casablanca, Dakar, Na i robi, Mexico City and Buenos Aires, water is already in the h ands of private compan ics and the immed ia te effects are rises in prices and the \vith drawal from areas ,vhic h are comrne rc iallv less "interesting", even if they ar~ the most d isadvantaged. Since ancient t imes water bas always been consi d ered an essential means of survival and good health for human beings : lhe Hol y Script u res (and i n particular Leviticus and the Book of N u mbers) arc sensitive Lo lhe risks for men's heal Lh de riving from fa ili ng to respec t th; san itary regulations, and impose accurate regulations abou t iL As time \Vent by, even tactics, strategy an d politics were

influenced b y wa ter. In 843 Charlemagne's grandch i Id ren practically s h ared among th emselves the flu via l basins beca use, at. t he time, the rivers \Vere the safest and n10st rapid lines of communication.. Charles the Bal d received the bas ins of

the rivers Somm e, Seine, Loire and Garonne . Lot.hair rece ived the basins of the Rhine, Meuse, Rhone and Po, along w ith the title of "Caesar" in memory of Julius Caesar who, precisely along these watercourses, had succeeded in con trolling the West., lay ing the foundalions of the fu Lure coloniza tion of lhe Danubian region. L u dwig the German received the North, i.e . t he plain of paral l el rivers , wi t.h no connection arnong them, exLencling from the Scheldt Lo the Vis t ula; he a lso recei ved the m ission to conquer th e Danube in order Lo re-establish the Roman order in that region. Th is was the prelude o r t h e a lliance Âˇw ith H u ngary, the anc ie nt Roman Pannon ia, w hi ch began on th e 10th Century. Since ancient times the Rhone has been an essenlial gcostrategic ju nct ion, so much so that l\ilacKinder, the founder of British military geopolitics, in h is \1vÂˇorks po i nted OU L Lhe fa il ure or Gense ri c , King of the Vandals ,vho was unable to link h is conquests to th e Rhone artery. He described the adven t ure of t.h e Saracens who sailed u p the Rhone, the Sa6nc and the Doubs as far as the gates of Bu rgundy, and underlined the importance o r

Konna, Mali.

f,ake Die11{!, in

Ja11a, !11donesia.

the a ll iance among Savoy- power of the Rhone - Aus lria and England during lhe Spanis h War of Succession. In Gu many, the III Reic h, by realizing Lhe link het\.veen the Main and the Danube, thanks Lo the plans of Fred eri ck II of Pruss ia and the e con omi s l List for the canalizatio n between the Elba and Lhe Rhine (the !alte r had already been linked to the Meuse and the Scheidt by similar works carri e d out in Holland and B elgium), did nothing hut organi ze a contin e ntal geostra regic defence against the Eng lis h thalassocracy. Germany, led by f e deral Chan cellor Helmut Kohl, continue d th ose works and organi1.ed the waterways in a very good manner by digging lhe canal linking the Rh ine, the Main and the Danube. Today in Eu1Âˇope, with the Danube linked on one side to the 6

R h ine, and thus to the Atlantic, and on the other to the Pontic region and the Ru s sia n and Ukrainian rivers, lo the Don and, through the Lenin cana l, to the Volga and the Caspian Sea, lhe old geopolitical and hyd rnpolitical prnjecl which the Roman Empire had started but was inlerrupted because of the Romans' fall in the race of th e barbarian invasions , fo un d its concl us ion (curiously, this completion took place thanks to the progeny of lhose barbarian people). BETWEEN \\'HAT IS RIGHTFUL AND WHAT IS NEEDED

Going hack t.o drinking walc r, today's politi cal approach is a sort of litmus paper of the therapy that the world powers intenc.l to ap ply to man kind, a rler havin g s hmvn the ir lack or authorily (or will) to eradicate poverty. In 1992, at the Environment Conference in Rio de Jane iro, they decreed tha t the access to water is a huma n right, but e ight years later the

seconc.l world rorum on water, \,\thich took place in The Hague in Marc h 2000, marked an epochal lurning roint, s tating lhat it is not a right anymore, but a need (and quite oddly also the Governments o f many S outh e rn countries s igned this d ec larat ion ) . T he difference is nol a tr ifle: whi le a righ t is something to wh ich a hum a n b ein g is ent il le d, son1.ething whic h is nol to be dese r ved, and implies that everybody's duty is to make any possible effort to grant it, the concept: of need, instead, does not imply any idea of c oll ec tive respons ibility: every ind ividual person has to provide himse lf ,vith Lhe means lo satisfy such a need. And i[ he docs not, then it is his raul1. The logical consequence is that ,va t er ca n b e co nsiclc 1Âˇe d a comm odity as a ny ol her, and therdore it can be privatized and commercialized on a g lobal scale accord ing to Lh c rules or WTO (World Tracie Organizati on). As a commodity it must have an

economic value fixed by a price which .includes the real costs, lbe risks connec ted w ith the investment as vvell as the proriL of the inveslor: according to new free- trade criteria asserted in The Hague, this ,votdd be the most effective method to reduce \Nater waste. Another method to manage the available water resources is to build large darns . In 19.50 there vvere five thousand of them, in J 970 thirteen thousand, today there are about twenty thousand . The larger clams, al least those higher than th irty metres, obtained some resulls, but they also contrib uted to damage o u r p lanet's hydro-geological system, dispossessed millions of people of their Janel, in many cases forcing t.hem to resettle somewhere else, creat.e d big tens ions among countries, altered the course of rivers, the local cl imate, foresls, downslream waters and sometimes favoured phenomena of soil instability. Moreover the cost-effectiveness ratio is all bul positive. Big dams last at most .50 yea rs because t h e basins are rapidly filled with debris . Besides, the hydroelectric energy ou tpu L is neve r over three quarters of the estimated one, while 70% o[ the plants, afterÂˇ all, supply less water than expecled for agricu l tural irrigation . Moreover, these huge infrastructu res sometimes favolllÂˇs floods instead of preventing them and, on top of it, they rnake the greenhouse effect worse. If, in spi le of everyth ing, we keep on building them, it is becaus e th e re is still a 19 th Century vision or e ngineering, meant as masterv or nature: besides, these gre~t works give prestige Lo those w h o re alize them, not to mention the fact l hat the World Bank mak es things easy for them (up to this moment il has financed, for approximately eighl billion dollars, a bou l 600 b ig d ams in about 100 Countries). Besides the repercussions on the people and the environment, we

should not disregard lhe r isk of geopolitical inst.abil ity clue to the b izarre distri b ution or ,vatcr resources. A war for the control of Lerritorics 1ich in oil is nothing new but, in the fu tu re water may cause rnorc political conJ:licls than "black gold". In some areas of the world, the scarcity of water could become ,vhaL I.he oil-prices c1isis was in the 1970s : a pri mary source of economic and political instability. Today nearly 40% of the world popu lation depends o n fluv ial systems shared by two or more countries : India and Bangladesh quarrel over the Ganges, Mex ico and t he US over Colorado, the Czech Rep ubli c and H un gary about the Danube, as we are going lo see in the following survey.

The Niger in !'vla/i.

THE THIRSTY HOLY LAND The Middle Eas l is one of the driest regions of our planet, bu t the situation has not ahvays been like this. The Bible says that God created the world in six clays and on the seventh He rested. On the e ighth day He decided to present Adam w ith an Eden Lhal, as the Book of Genesis tells us, was rich

in vegetation and fruit-lrees, and vvas crossed by fo ur maj estic rivers. Two of these, the Tigris and the E uphrates, are still 'vVell-known nowadays, ,vhereas the names of the other two, the Piason and the Chicon, arc not on today's maps, although, wi th some imagination, son1e suppose they arc the Nile and the Jordan . Anyway, the Bibl ical descriptions arc sufficient to establish that, as God wanted to give man an earthly paradise He, after having looked around, chose the area thal we now call Middle Easl. Perhaps b y that time the region crossed by th e four rivers was really a parad ise of fertility and a bundance, but shou ld the Alm ighty choose today, He would probab ly choose h is Eden somewhere else.

T he area \VC are cons idering occupies 10% of earth's surface, hosts 5'/o of mankind , but has on ly O.4 % of world \,V aler resources. T h e four b ibli cal rivers, including the Nile, which is the longest river in the world , are not suffic ie nt to irrigate it, and not even the rainwater ra lling from lhc sky is enough: the M idclle East r ece ives only 2% of it. Israel, in order Lo change i ts condition of downstream country 7

Djenne, Mali.

to that of upstream count ry, conquered by dint of an11s the region of mou nt Hen110n, rich in springs and ground\vater tables. Alrea dy in 191 7 Chaim \.Veizman, Chairman o[ the Wor ld Zi onist Organ ization, insisted t hat the bo,-ders of t he future Jewish State should lo be d eterm ined taking water into consideration . Fi fty years latec in 1967, Gold a Meir warned that the Countries which tried to divert the Jo r·dan river "were not only playing with water, but also with fire". Accordin g to hy drologist T homas Naff, in the Mid dle E as t "the r e cannot be peace till the wa ter problems are solve d " . How can we say he is wrong? So the access to water becomes a sou r·ce of ten si on, increasing security problems. Moreover it is n o acci d e n t that on the Israel i territory water is supervised by the Ministry of Agriculture, whereas i n the o c cup ied territories water is controlled by the Ministry o[ Defence. Difficu l ties s eem to be insurmounta ble and infl uence also the peace talks, since th e socio -econ omic needs of bo th sides c o mbine with p oli ticoideological claims that are hard to reconcile. The Palestinians lay h istor ical clai ms on the explo ita tion of the water resources preserved in th e aquifers that originate in the 'Nest B an k, incl uding th ose that naturally Oow to Israel i territory and are exploited by the Jew ish S tate. Only vvhen the exercise of such rights is res tored, th ey say, cooperation agr eements c an be negotiated, in order to coordinate the man agement o f the resources a nd t h e j oin t de velo pment o[ initiatives, such a s desa lination plants. T hese in ternational d isputes, v,·hich interest not only the ArabIsraeli side but exten d also to in ter-Ara b relat ionships , are 8

increa sed by worries related to the internal needs of the people. We sh ould consider tha t in the Middl e East rn Ol'e than 70% of the water resources is destined to irrigation, alth o ugh the contribution given by ag,-iculture to production a nd occupation is d eclin ing. The factors explaining t he ch oices made b y t he Governments on water allocation arc the wish to be self-sufficient about food and the presence of influential lobbi es exerting press u re in d efence o[ the farme r s' intere sts, besides secon d ary reasons su c h as the need to restra in phenomena of p o tentially destabilizin g u rban migration .. The effor ts to reach a n agreemen t o n water sharing in the Jordan basin elate back to the beginning of the 1950s when, in 195 3, a Nort h ern American com pany draft ed a w a ter plan wh ic h w as sen t to th e Mi ddle East t hro ugh a sp ecial rep,-esentative of President Eisenhower. After four sessions of di fficult negotiations which lasted for 2 years, all parties i nvolvecl

agreed on the technical d etails of th e project. The taJ ks were fi rst interrupted for political r easons, main ly beca u se t he Ara b countries did not want to increase in any way the prosp ect s o[ development of the new State of Israel, then they came to an encl for good in 19 55. Sin c e then , many attemp ts have been made lo m ediate specific issues as, for examp le, the dam on the Yarmuk river, b ut a so lution of the water disputes in the Jordan b asin h as never been found. FERTILE CRESCENT? N O, THANKS! Apart [rom Israel and Palestine, the whole Middle East ha s Lo face water scarcity and all expen s agree that these p rob le m s will negatively influence the stability of the region. In 1987, Turkey and S yria s igned a protoco l c once r ning t h e wa ter of the Euphra tes at the boundary poin t between the two countries. The agre eme nt gran ts S yria a minirnu m amo u nt of 500 cubic metres per secon d, wh ich is about

half of the ava ilable water. But now Syria wants to increase its share, and Turkey has always turned do\vn this claim. The remark of a member of the Turkish Government is quite significant: Âˇwe do not say that we should share their oil, therefore they cannot say that \Ve should share our \Nater". A possible trump card in Syrian hands is the fact that Turkev needs a water agreement w ith it~ downstream neighbours in order to get the financial support from the \ 1\/orld Bank and other international agencies it needs to complete the "South-Eastern Anatolian Project", a complex of 23 clams 'lvhose cost has been estimated at about 30 billion dollars. Th e benefils that Syria and Iraq would get from an agreement concerning water security are evident. Calculations related to the [u ture population gro\.vth in the region (the average yearly growth rate is between 2.2 and 3.7%) and to its climatic and

hydrologic development, seem Lo promise an unsolvable imbalance between demand and supply o f water resources in the years to come, with consequent socio political tensions, both al internal and international level. The importance of water is confirmed by its inclusion in one of the "baskets" (we cou ld be ironic on the shrewdness of using a basket to hold \Nater) in th e programme of the l\llultilateral Talks for the Middle East, which has been dealing with themes concerning the peace process since 1992. But if Turkey should realize upstream, on the Tigr is and the Euphrates, the 23 dams of the project , S yria and Iraq, downstream, \.Vould be deprived respectively of 50% and 90% of th e ir water requirements, a scenario that would foreshadow armed conflicts, anJ this time not for oil.

IN THE BLACK CONTINENT More than 40% of the \Vorld population lives in \~..-ater basins divided among various Countries, and the Black Continent provides many examples of this. Botswana, Congo, Egypt., Gambia , Mauritania, Sudan, all receive more than 75 % of their water

supply from rivers originating in upstream n e ighbouring lands . Africa has no scarcity of water, but its reso u rces are very unevenly distributed, so that sometimes serious conflicts arise, like those between Mauritania and Senegal. The most striking example is that of the Nile. In 1989 BoutrosG hali, at that time Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, referring to lhe water problems, said tha t "Egypt's national security is in the h ands of at least eight other African Countries". This sentence explains pretly 'lvell the importance of water both as a natural resource and as economic and political factor~ as well as the po\ver exerted by the upstream countries on their neighbours downstream. Egypt exemplifies the dilemmas anJ uncertainties that must be faced by Countries with a fast populat.ion growth and a very limited ,vater supply on their territory. In Egypl no less than 60 million people depend almost completely on the Nile, but the river sources are quite far off the borders o[ the country. 85% o f the Nile water is generated by the generous rainfall of the Ethiop ian tablelands, where t he blue Nile has its source, from where it flows t hrough Sudan before entering

The Li river in China. 9

The Suez Can al.

IN ASIA

Egypt. The ren1a1mng part depends on the system of the White Nile, \.vhose sources are at Lake Victoria in Tanzania, and merges \Vith the Blue Nile near Kharloum. The longest river in the world supplies a total of nine countries, and Egypl is lhe last one. On the basis of an agreement s ign ed in 1959 between Sudan and Egypt, the latter has at its disposal 55.5 billion cubic metres of Nile \Vater each year, while the former has been assigned 18.5 billion cu. m. In order to meet its needs, Egyp t supplements th e Nile \vater with: small quantities taken from groundwater tables and agricul tural drainage water as well as with processed and purified town waste-water. In 1990 Egypt had at its disposal 63.5 bit.lion cubic metres of \..valer that, although it is more than the expected 55.5, is still not enough. In 2000 the Egyptian water demand has gone up lo 70 billion cu bic metres and the future forecasts show a co n l.i n uously growing trend. In order to find a political solu lion, negotiations are carried out, but most of the t ime it is a dialogue of the deaf. All the Countries of the N ile basin, for example, take part in a Forum for 10

cooperation c a ll ed Undugu, meaning brotherhood in Swahili. For the immediate future, though, there is no significant collaboration in view, certainly nol arnong Ethiopia, Egypl and Sudan. Since the "Africa \l\1ater Surnmit", a ver y important meeting which took place in Cairo in June 1990, Ethiopia has showed its total lack of willingness to share \Vith its neighbours even essential information, su ch as basic hydrogeological .data. Ethiopia feels tha t cooperation is conditioned by a renegotiation of the abovementioned Agreement on water sharing, reache d by Egypt and Sudan in 1959. Ethiopia considers that treaty unj ust and unfeasible, because it al.lots an enormous amount of Nile \Vat.er to these t\.\â€˘o Countries, which give little contribution lo the river's flO\v capacity. Therefore the future management of the water resources appears complex and d el icate and at the same time underest imated by those who do not fully understan d the potential sociopolitical risks which could derive from an irrational and shortsigh ted use of this essential environ mental resource.

Asia is becoming the Continent of mammoth clams, such as thal of the Three Gorges on the Yang Tse in China, . It is 186 m e tre s high, should be the biggest in the worl d and will cause the displacement o f one million and a half people. Then there is the complex of 130 dams in the area of Namacla in India, where another miLlion people w ill have to move somewhere else. Nmv, a financ ing by the \-'/oriel Bank or these projects is dubious, and this acids one more ques tion to the numerous ones already existing. China is facing a scar city of drinking and irrigation wat er, al though in its territory there is a concentration of more than 40% o f the \vorld \vater resou r c e s . The reason is to be found in the choice of the Peking Government to put industrial growth in the fo refront , ove rlooking th e protection of the environment, \Vi lh the resull that one third or the rivers is polluted and in the I.owns 50% Âˇ of lhe water is undrinkable. Also the case of the lnclus river and its tributaries, and the sharing of the ir water between India and Pakistan, is emblematic and should se rve as an example and a warning. During the first year of independence, \Var was avoided thanks to an agreement , financed by massive international help, to build huge containment barriers and a canal svstem. The costs of the operati;n, though very high, have certainly been i nferior to the huma n and financial losses that a war would have caused. The basins of the Ganges and th e Mekong, Loo, show the same risks of conflict, and those areas are lo be kepl "und e r spe cial surveillance".

IN THE NEW CONTINENT Not even America is exempt from tensions clue to drinking water, as is the case â€˘with the friction between Ecuador and Peru. Or in Bolivia, where there is no shortage of water, and yet the state of siege has been proclaimed to stop the protests against an increase of 20% on water tariffs, following a specific law which entrusts a European multinational syndicate \vith their management. There arc marked differences also in the Northern part of the Continent. At El Paso, Texa s, 50% of the water is used for luxury purposes, like s\;,,1imming pools, golf courses and air cond.itionin.g. The average yearly consumption is 750 lilers per person, whereas in the ivlexican twin town, Ciudad Juare7., v,-hich takes waler from the same rive1~ Rio Grande, the yearly consumption per person is only 285 liters. The United States has ongoing litigations with l\tlexico and Canada, and an old domestic quarrel among Alabama, Georgia and Florida for the sharing of the Chattahoochee river. \/\/hen the need for water increases, clue to population grO\vlh or industrial reasons, the American federalism shows ils limits, \vhich musl necessarily be overcome in the name of a superior uni Lary conscience.

weak ones will have to suffer the consequences. There are many possible tec hnical solutions, such as the fight against waste, carried oul by re- us i ng sewage waters, the desalination of sea water, the resort to solar energy. But we also need economical and lega l remedies, which could save water from extreme measures, such as market ideology or gratuitousness. The solutions presented so far have tried to increase the supply instead o[ reducing the demand, with ineffective results. The hig clams are being discussed because

The Elephantine island on the Nile.

In a context \vhere water is unevenly d istribute d and some areas are heavily short of it, we may finally single out two types of solutions: the technical and economic ones, whicl1 tend to rationalize the use of \vater and the institutional and legal ones, which should be aimed al neutralizing and solving the conflicts arising from its use , starting and promoting a serious cooperation at reg ional and international level. The politics of pO\vcr based on blackmail (\,vhich Lend to maintain the scarcity of water in order Lo favour one's O\vn mechanisms) and on causing supply diffic ulties to the enemy

WHAT CAN WE DO? Our planet is almost dry and perhaps we realized it too late . Owing to the population growth, the water available on Earth is today 40% less than thirty years ago, and it is foreseen, not without concern, that in 2020, when there will be 8 billion people on Earth, al least 3 billion people will be left without water. The strongest countries have a.lready begun to exploit the situation in order to transform this resource in a marketable commodity, so the suspicion lingers that only the

they cost a lot in human tern1s, environment and ecological functionality, while desalination is extremely expensive, and is not advisable from the environmental and energetic point of view. These and other stratagems show all their limits when compared to the complex ecosystem of the \,Vater cycle . Vis-a -v is the failure of technology, the catastrophic forecasts about the planetary ballle which has already begun to have access to the "blue gold" of our century are .increasing.

do not seem the besl way lo solve the problem. Also the proposal to consider water as a rare commodity, giving it a market price reflecting its scarcity, does not help peace and cooperation, as some would have it, but leads, instead , to a sort of assimilation of water to oil, which does not look promising al all.

''Major General, President, Institute For High Military Studies 11

THE PERENNIAL EVOLUTIVE SYMBIOSIS WAR AND TECHNOLOGY~· · The bond is explained by man's necessity to make more and more efficient weapons on which the survival of society could depend by Giancarlo Bove

-:r

he phenomenon of ,var is as ancient as civilization and impends on mankind like the s\vord of Damocles, with terrifying consequences. This phenomenon has been exam ined and studied in its manifold aspects by scienlisls, philosophe r s, theologians, sociologists and experts in the art of war and yet, up to this day, its uncertain and ambiguous nature is similar to the face of Janus, the two-faced god of lransition from war to peace and vice versa. In Lhe past, war accompanied the projection on the b attlefield of certain values and c u ltural aspects of an cient civilizations. The Persians used to fight with their traditional carts, ornaments, fea t hers and costumes ,vith which th ey terrif ied their enemies . In subst ance, it was a symbolic conflict ,vith anthropological connotations similar to the Maya's and lnca's. The Greeks, on the other hand, conceived war as a place, i. e. a space within which their Gods decided the fate of the warriors and the outcome of the battle , respectively as life or death, victory or defeat. In some lri bes, such as the Jivaros of Amazonia, lacking institutions and stable political organizations, war takes on the

meaning of "total social event" which mobil i zes the ma in instrument of cohesion, i.e. the family ties. On the basis of these bonds, in case of attack, the people arc called to side with the offended protagonist and fighl \vi th him. War breaks the normal elapsing

of time, rejects the normal daily habits and concentrates every energy on the cornmon effort against the enemy. The war events arc the quintessence of the Jivaro culture and have a strong influence on peacetime. The collec t i ve r.nemory preserves those events and the authority acquired with victory contributes to strengthen the tri b e's superiorily and to organize economic and social exchanges. Therefore, it should not be surprising that all aspects of social I ife are related to "Âˇwar matters". This shows that war is a cultural fact and , even if t his concept could seem terrible and alarming , slill we m u st adm i t that every civilization fights according lo i ls reasons , traditions and religions. From the psychoanal y t ic viewpoint, war is closely connecled ,vi th h u man destru ctivity, which is the m i nd's primary charac teristic. It is

worlh noting that it is especially after th e war experience that Sigmund Freud c onceives the "death instinct". In general, psychoanalys is acknowled ges that war is the institutional rcali;.r,ation of a deslructive urge.

SI VIS PACEM PARA BELLUM As a consequence, war leads to the exportation of violence, both ,vhcn the primary deslructivity is simply exported outside against others and when it seems to be a mere pa ranoid response to lhe alleged violence of others. The exportation of this violence to o t h er Countries lakes place through the language of v,rar, a special language governed by the rigid and ralional rules of politico-milit ary grammar and logic. After all, war and peace are t>vvo sides of t he same coin and a re comparable to scale p ans that diplo macy tries to keep in constant bala nce through the availability and the possible use of force. As Henry Kissin ger used to 14

say: if the recourse to force were practically imp ossible, diplomacy would also lose i ls effectiveness, and the impossibility of using force, far from lead ing to th e s olution of disputes , could peqJetuate them. The renunciation of force would leave the inlernational community to the mercy of their most unscrupulous and irresponsible members. T he concept implied in this statement is very old and goes back t o the tirn e of H eron , the Alexandrian mathematician of the 1st Century B.C., ,,vho said lhat ph il osophers had long been looking for a means for liv ing in peace but only the technicians were able to provide i t by employing applied ballistics which, in modern terms, is the scienti[ic and technological knowledge con tained i n lhe "Military Technical Revolution - MTR" that, in its turn, has prnduced a deep evolution of the military thought, adapting it to the new strategic culture of the "Revolution in Military Affairs - RMA". The d evelo pment of the

military technologies produced a s itu ation characterized b y the same fears and disputes that in the 16th Century had marked the transition from the bayone l Lo the firearm. Today we a.re witnessing the ris ing of the same delusions that in the pas t, in Machiavelli's times, were nouri shed by those who b elieved that \.Var could be es cap ed through u nilatera l disarmament, thus avoiding the recolll··se to force . Bes ides, one cannot speak o ( "Pax Romana" or "Pax Universalis" si nce Lhere is · only th e peace of the winners and the resignation of the defeated. "He \.vho w a nls peace musl prepare fo r war", Vegelius , a famous writ er and m i litary expert, said in.the 4th Century A.D., and he was only repeating a n ancienL Latin saying: "Si vis pacem , para bell u m". T hi s sentence actually hid es an ambiguous and disturbing message, expressed b y the dual sym bolism of Janus' face which transla tes i nlo "he who \.v an Ls war should prepare peace" . This

means that if \var is p lanned for obtaining peace, to speak abou t peace is instead . much more dangerous, because t.he same concept and the reasons lying at its foundations co ul d be instrumentally exploited . We can say that the bipolar era, marked by ·what \Vas defined as "cold war", was really the mask of a "cold peace" , since neither the East nor the West employed their strength on the battlefield , but faced each other in an armaments race wb ich was decisive for strengthening the concept of strategic deter rence through nuclear technologies and related armaments. To avoid war, seen as armed conflict and show of force, means to apply deterrence which, in the words of the Fre n ch wri t er Raymon d Aron t oday as yesterday, deterrence depends on the material means availa ble to the State that wants t o s top another one, and on the resolve that the Stale , object of t he deterrence, ascribes to the State t hat threatens it. Today as yesterday the essential prob lem of deterrence is psychological and tech nical at the same lime. History teaches u s that d eterrence, meant as strateg.i c tool for cl issuas ion, mostly conceived as defensive elemen t, can he comb ined with the military applications of technology as, for example, that connected with the weapons of mass d estru ction . As a matter of fact, the beginn i ng of the atomic era , marked by the events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the summer of 1945, opened a new historical chapter \vhich shmved how the nuclear m il itary technologies could make deterren:e a cre d ible a n d effective concept. Th us it was possible t o demonstrate to the \vorld that, in the future, it \vou ld profitable to avoid \Var. Since then, the history of deterrence coincides \Vith the

history of atomic Vv·eapons. Today the concept of \Var has changed and, as a c·onsequence, it is necessary to improve the princi p le of de t errence and dissuasion, b oth on the techno logical and psychological plane, as one can see in Raymond Aron's statement: today as yesterday, the essen t ial problem of deterrence is psychological and tee h n i cal at the same time. Later on we shal l see hO\v the d ual concept "strategy technolog ical evol u tion" affects the planning of modern \Vars. From the histo1·ical viewpoint the polyhedral aspects of \var are the outcome of that Polemos w h ich Heraclitus believed was al the root o( every d eed connected with man's agonistic and confl ictive natu re; a concept that contradicts the opinion of lhe ph ilosoph ers who consider the human being as an image of God and therefore naturally peace-loving. But it is a q u i. le con fl i c t i n g peaceful nature if v-.re consider that peace is a prerequ isite for

THE STRATEGIES OF DETERRENCE AND WAR Together with the Arme d Forces' modern ization there is a deep evol ution in \Nar planning because the background has chan ged . The development of armaments and th e economic fa c tors connected with

Computer, Communication, Command , Control!, Information -C41

Military Technical Revolution MTR

Revolution of Military Affairs RMA

and accords, which are fixed and signed not only for justice's sake but also for political ends. This consideration is in keeping w i th the t hought of Karl von Clausewitz, the P russian general \Nho considered war a continuation of poli tics, against General Erich von Ludendorffs ideas .The latter, i n his treatise "Tota l War" , refusing the subord ination of political p mver, conceived war as a phenomenon i n d ependent of p olitics and exp ression of the strongest living w ill of a nation. Vhu~ therefore, is not caused by po lit ica l reasons but by the demograph ic and te chnological development of the Nations.

...,__......__

_. Intelligence. Surveillance, " Reconnaissance -<SR •

Real Time & Integration lnformalive - System

Precision Guided Munition -- - PGM-

life and, at the same time, j u stifies war as necessary for j ust ice . This conception is the foundation of the in ternational l;nvs on \Var, represent ed b y multilateral conventions such as the London Agreement o f 1933, the UN Charter of 1945 and the Kellog-Briand Treaty of 1927. vVar is governed by legal rules

globalization and i n ternational politics have been accompanied by the birth of new territorial con figurations and new States, such as those generated by the disi n tegration of the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, all this has partly caused the replacement of the classic concept of '\ var" with that of '\vars",

shaped according to the military high technology, w hich includes information nets, microelectronic and oploelectron ic devices, biotechnology, new materials, "stealth" techno I ogy ( w hie h makes \veapon systems and equipment und etectable), and direct energy. An important characteristic of the military high t echnology is its integrabil ity with other technologies suitable for formi n g various gro u ps, which give rise to a multiform fragmentation of \var. One should a lso distinguish between Deterrence Strategy and War Strat egy and have availability o f two instruments of an alysis known as "Deterrent" and "Flexible Answer", whic h sho uld both be employed \vhen studying conflicts. "Deterrent" refers to any means capable of preventin g a given action; o ur French colleagu es 16

interpret this term as "Dissuasion'', meant not as a means but simply as an action . Actually it woul d b e more appropriate to translate "Deterrent" with "Dissuas ive" even if in the ordinary langu age "D eterrent" is a synonym of "strategic strike force" - at leasl according to the classic concept of defence, \vhich considers as such whichever means capable of d issuading. Ac cording to the above conside rati on also natural obstacles, such as geolo g ical character is tics of the ground represented b y mount ai n s, distances and net-hacking, should be considered d e terrents. F u rthermore , lhe strategy of deterrenc e shoul d not b e cons.id ered in s lrictly m ili tary terms if we bear in mind that the nev.1 wars will be fought on very different fronts, s u ch as

economic compelilion, industrial espion age, sp ecul a tion on the in ternationa l market and , in general terms, terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Historic a lly, the S trategy of Dete rrence goes b ack t o long before the Latin maxim "Si vis pacern para bellurn" and today, in th e era of modern m il itary te c h nol ogy, it requires many other m ea ns in o r d e r to guarantee a model of peace like th e one conceive d by Paileve through the ins ti tu lion o f a special "P ea c e College" as an alter ego of the "W'ar College". The basic id ea a ppli ed by Paileve considere d only the moral and politi cal aspec ts, according to a pure perspective of intellectual idealism while, in the case of the S trategy of Wm~ to these aspects one should acid material motivations wh ich are meant lo compel the adversary to

reflect rather than raise his moral standards, for the s i m pie reason that if the enemy does not yield he must necessarily he destroyed, according lo the sa:/ing that. "desperate ills demand desperate remedies". Besides, we should not forget that when a ,.var breaks out. the Str ategy o f Deterrence ends up by showing its failure to the international community, together with the failure of all the means that were adopted t o ensure peace, and is replaced by the Strategy of War and its analytical i nstr um en t, represented by Flexible Answer. In ord er lo appl y a F lexibl e Answer, one has to define Lh e objectives and targets fixed by Strategy which, in il s lurn, conveys them to Tactics, for selecting the means needed for the conflict. It is important Lo spec ify that the terms "objective" and "target" are two distinct and independent concepts . The "target" is in practic e th e material infrastructure that has to be hit, suc h as .important lines o f communication, airports, bridges and m i lila.ry bases, w hile "objective" is a concept not easily defined, conn e cted \,Vith the thought of the Prussian military strategist Carl von Clause\vitz wh en he said that "war is th e continuation of politics" . This concep t \vas more concisely taken u p b y Liddel Harl, a British officer and war theorist, who defined ,var, or rather strategy, as the art of using military means t o achieve a political goal. The objective therefore has a political value that in modern wars could be, for example, lhe achievem ent or victory against terrorism, \Vhile terror ism itseU implies the notion of a war fought through a suitable combination of eve ry ava i lahle means, appropriately proporÂˇtioned through the Flexible Answe1: For instance, in planning a \Nar

Str ategy against lerrorisn1, lhe Flexible Answer consists of the appropriate comb irration or Lhe th e ories and instrumen t s of Sanctions, lnte l ligenc e and Networks. Another example of a possibly successful combination can b e found in the strategic planning adopted by NATO during lhe conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which e nvisaged Sanct ions , Intell igence, Diplomacy and Electronics. In the civilian environment, p rec ise ly during an economic conflict, such as the one that took place in 1998 betvâ€˘.leen t he Government of Hong Kong a nd ri nancial spec ul ators, a commer cial \Nar Strategy w as worked out which contemplated the com b ination of "Norms, Finance, Network" and achieved positive resul ts. The term "war" derives fron1 the G ermanic word "\Ve rra", meaning dispu t e, quarrel,

struggle, and is regulated by very precise norms ,vhich remained unchanged throughout time, even if the technological e vo]u lion contributed to the modification of some features of the face o r; if \Ve prefer; of the image of wai; which is now characleri z e cl h y the employment of modern wea pon systems. The basic rules of what the great Chinese strategist Sun T w d e fined as the "An of Âˇw ar" are : Organization, i.e. the f irst operat ion conducted in ant icipation of a confli ct, consisting in the procurement and organization o [ the necessary resources and 1neans: 1nen, vehicles and a,--rnarnents; Strategy, a term deriving from the Greek word Strato s and Ago ,,v hich mean, respectively, "army" and " 1 lead" , i. e . the art of leading armies. Strategy is the parl or the Art of War ,,v hich defines the goals to be achieved by striking t wo t ypes of target s: Infrastructure, i .e . what is

p hysically visib le, such as lines of communication , airports and constructions in general, and Info-structure, nol visible, such as the flmN of information managed by the m ilitary or c i vilian cornpuler nets of the systems of communicat ion , command and contrnl; Tactics, through which one determines the means and resou rces needed to achieve the obj ectives fixed by s tra tegy. Tact ics also d eals \V.i Lh the employment i n comba t of t h e t raditiona l u nits or th e Arrny, such as Regiments, Brigades and battalions . ln substance, its task is to make Strategy o p erational by p lanning t he operations more su i ta ble for the situat ion : advance, retreat, relocations, with

characteri zed by a c lose interdep endence ,vith strategy, scien ti fic an d te chnologica l research, industrial and logistic organization, in order to a dap t th em to the specific scenario represented by the three configurations rnentionecl above: .Military \i\lai~ Trans-military \ 1\!ar, Non-111ilita1~y 'v\lar. Each of these configurations requi res the app li cat ion or a strength resulting from the sum of a ll human, economic , scientifi c and industr ial components w hich , in their turn, are synthesized and represented by th ree ve ctors : Man , Enviro nn,enL, Equipment. Each vector is a power in itself wh ich w ith a p e rfect integration

Classification of War

_Jl_ Trans Military

Military

l~L(

Convenlional

,-Ii

Non Milftary

Nuclear

Diplomatic

w Bacteriological

Chemical Electronic

:-!

; -11

Cornpu!e rized

Market

Psychological

i - ...--Intelligence

Prop.Jganda

• Surgical Envimmenlal

Terroristic

th e ultimate goal of attarnmg victory; finally, Logistics, from the Greek term "Logisticos", i .e . calculator, wh ic h is the clement of Strategy which solves the organizational problems con nected, for exam p le, with transportation and supplies.

THE WAR'S INSTRUMENTS OF ANALYSIS Today, war em ploys continuou sly evolving means,

and harmonization permits to get the best r·esults. In any case, we sho uld remember that the fu ndamental component or vector of any war is Man, w i th hi s moral and intellective qualities that play an important role in the s trategic planning o f all operations a nd not only the military ones. The "Equipment" vec t or, w hich can be classir i e d according lo the specific use of defence or offence , does not

.inclu de only the \veapons that technolog y pro v i des in r elat ion Lo lhe o bj ectives and targets to b e achieved, but a lso th e cornmunication and reconna issa nee eq ui pmen t i nd i spensable [o r tb e information net. The "En vironmenl'' vector has instead an intrinsic va l ue d erivi ng from th e phys ica l chara cteris ties of the na tura I habi tat, such as land, sea and a ir; where man operates, to \vhich \Ve must add the conquest of space. One shou.ld p ay great attention to the Environment b ecause the transformations occurred in the 20th Century have changed the relat ions among the States and the nature of the in tern a tional act1\·1t1 es, conforming the methods and techn iques of war to t h e ways in wh ich \veal lh is produced. The Env i ronment is in [a ct comparable to a sp ace limited by bo u ndaries w ithi n w hi c h the modern technologies are applied. This place in vol ves not onl y geographical coordinates, such as latitude and long itude, b u t also the space where the artificial satellites used fo r m il itary and civilian re c onnaissance are orbi ting. To understand the importance o f the Envi ronmen t s uffi ce it to think of NATO's commitment in Kosovo, marked by a reduct ion of the component of the "Man" vector, as compared to the o n e mobilized for the first Gulf War~ but offset b y t he component or the "Equipment" vector, constituted by the satell i tes em p loyed in support of intelli gence missions such as STGTNT, COMINT and ELINT. Space is an environment where powe rfu I in Lerests concentra t.e, and not o nly mil itary bu t also c ivilian ones, particularly on the economic plane. We should noL forget LhaL several private firms manage an d di s tri bute s a te I Ii l e i rnages b y leasing in tercon ti n e n ta 1

communicalion channels and sell to many Countries the technolog ies that are indispensable fo r designing and building Lhe entire infrastructure, i.e. the communication net. To witness the birlh of a cooperation bct\veen military and civilians is therefore nolhing ne\,v, as proved by the recent Iraqi war. Actually in this case Lhe U.S. purchased part of the information material concerning the images filmed by commercial satellites flying over the Persian Gulf. Images that were broadcasl by the TV nelworks, in public programmes, lon g be fore the war's outbreak. In vie,v of these consideralions, \Ne can understand that in the future some military st.ruclures will become integrated with the civilian ones, in a [usion of synergies destin ed to create flexible organizations capable of meeting any need. Suffice it to mention the "Privale Security Companies " , the 'De fence Completion Forces' and th e reservists recalled for support clulies together \vilh the military contingents. Going b ack to th e "Environn1ent" vector, we can also define it according to four variable s that describe lhe scenario of a possible conflict. Alessandro Ceci , an expert in charge of Lhe s c ient i fic committee of the Centr e for High Stud ies against terrorism and political violence (CeAs), in his i nteresting essay "Intelligence in collaboral ion and confli ct strntegies in the system of internalional relations" dcsc,~ibes "Intensity" as the profit d eriv ing from victory and the cost of defeat in the various clashes; ''Frequency" is the number of times in which the opponents must confront each other \Vith conflicL strategies; "Localion" is the place, meant a physical area of i nteracl ion bel,.vecn enemies , habilat and socio -cullural

microclimatc; "Entity" is defined as a distinction between "Hawks", i.e. a synonym of the military or, if \Ve wanl Lo pul it. in more diplomatic terms, peacemakers, and "Doves", i. e . pacifists. Also in this case there is a war, intended as an ideologica l non-armed c lash bet\veen oppos.ile e ntities, precisely "Hawks" and "Doves". THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION The scientific and technological conlribution to the develop ment of a modern military infrastructure derives par-tly from the Defence research centres engaged in lhe elaboration of projects entailing complex and delicate problen1s, and it is practically impossible to

discuss them thorough ly in the space of an article. One of these problems is ho\v to adapl lhe more and more sophisticated technology to the various armamen ts and lheir systemic integration in a basic logistic nel \-vhere at present the computerized technology plays a determinant role. The decision-making process aimed al overcoming this problem is carried out lhrough the continuous Formulation and exploration of an e normous amounl of often abstract ideas, solutions and ~oncept.s, ,vhich are deslinecl to be abandoned later for practical and budgetary reasons and \Nhich are replaced by other solutions that are nonetheless valid on the pl ane of operational requirements and technical specifications . Ho\vever, on o th er occasions 19

the opposite is true : an idea or a concept, born as a low-priority and l ow -interest research programme, w ith tim e acqu ires importance in such a vvay that i Ls technical and economic feasibility, as \vell as its operational merits, become more and more evident so that, a t the end, the p revious concepts are dropped and Lh e new idea is adopted as the best solution. An example o f how methods, con c ep ts and weapons soon become o bsolete is repr esented by th e first modern techn ological war against Iraq, during which Russia, together with the rest OI t h e world , ,vas amazed by the practical uselessness of the Iraqi Mig a ircraft and Scud rn issiles vis - ~t-vis the US mili tary technology. Bu t what was most impressive was not the armament in itself but rather the tendency to systemize the d evelopmen t and emp loyment of the weapons. For instance, the US Pa tri o t antimissile system intercepted the Scuds and, once l a u nched, neutrali zed them. Everything seemed so easy but in fact, beh ind the scenes, th ere \Vas a com pl ex rnu l litude of d evices located thousands of ki lometres mvay: as so on as the po tentially most d angerous and c losest-tot h e target Scud missil e was s potted and selected th rough a DeCense Su ppo r t Programme (DSP), e quipped Âˇw i th six thousand sensors able to perceive an infrared r adiation g ive n off from t he exhaust of the propulsion unit of the enerny mis s i le , a n alarm sign al ,,vas transmi t ted to a USAF ground s tation near Ali ce Sp r ings, Austr alia . The signal \vas success ively sent to the Central Comman d in R iyadh, Saud i Arabia, through the US Missile Warning Centre space command, concealed inside the C heyenne .M oun tain in Colora do, and fina lly to t he operators or th e Pat riot emplacements, vvho were

ordered to start the atta c k procedure. All this activity took place with a warning time that coul d vary from 90 to 120 seconds, w ith a maximum o[ a bout [ ive minutes, thus p erm itting to perfect t he successive launching operations. T hirty years ago this l evel of o p erationa l and organizat ional effic iency \.vo ulcl have b een unthinkable. As a matter of fact, hi story ha s taught u s that for millennia the milita ry techno logical evol u tions have b een ver y s low : they cou Id perhaps b e m eas ured by centu ries, and the grea t com manders were also brilliant s trategists . T he Macedonian phalanx, the Roman legion, lhe Carolingian heavy cavalry were, in their ti mes, great innovations \vhich ma d e poss ible t he supremacy o f lhe great empires. Th e s ame was t r u e for the Ivlongolian bow of Genghis Khan's horsemen an d of Nap oleon's artiJlery: t hey were partial innovations or ingenious and flexible applica tions of some fundamental logistic ru les. Julius Caesar often paid more attention to hi s frumentarii (v ictu allers) and to t he leg ionaries' skill i n di gging moa t.s t han to thei r weapons . Bow s, j avelins and swords \vere almost identical on both sides and the Au strian canno ns vvere not very di fferent fro m Na poleon Bonaparte's a t Austerlitz a nd Friedland. Nei ther vvere th e British gu ns fired by the Duke of Wellington at \Na terloo nor tho se fir ed by Admiral Nelson at Tra fal g ar more powerful than the Fre nch ones. Still d uring World \Nar .I I the weapons of the opposing armies were more or less comparabl e , but th e superiori t y of the Germans ,vas cl ue to t h e ir capabil i ty of blending technol ogic deve lopment w ith the new organizational d octrine of Blitzkrieg which , in a certain sense, an ti c ipated the modern "Revolu tion in Mil ita ry Affairs".

Blitzkrieg, i.e . "lightning \var" , war of the coup de main, aimed a t destroy in g th e en tire enemy Com munication , Command and Control ne t work . T h e German armoured troops had two-way .radios on each tank and t h is de ta i I was a very er1Âˇective multiplier of the ir military power. T his advantage was clearly seen i n the duels \.vi t h the Russian tanks which, albe it more

n umerou s and tec h nically superior, ,.v ere pe nalized by the ina bil ity to coord inate movements and ord ers throu gh radio communications. However, we m u st a lso remember t hat the tech n ologic superiority of armaments a nd strategy is not always a winn ing card if t here is not an ad equate synergic integratio n betwee n professio nalism and intell igence. Man a nd hi s idea s a l w a ys remain al the cent re of every dec ision: the Gerrnans learned t his at th eir expense s when,

during the occupation of Poland, they confronted the Polish cavalrymen who, armed with rifles and swords, forced the German armour to follow them into the swamps, ,vhe rÂˇe Lhe tanks got bogged down with no way out. That was an unforgivable mistake, which proves the great importance of lhe support of information aimed at gathering data concerning the enemy and

scientists al the NASA facilities at Huntsvi lle, Alabama and Cape Canaveral, Florida, They did not know the radar, but had b ui lt equally effective infrared devices . T h ey did noL invent si l icones, hut had developed a compl e tely new organ ic chemi s try based on eight-atom carbon rings. Beh ind these rather radical technological differences , a lso a diffe rent

the nature of the ground w here the mili lary operations take place. N evertheless, at lhe Li me, the German military technology ,,v as very advanced, even if Germany had cul itself off from the rest of the world since 1933, fo llo,Ning a way comp letely different from that o f traditional research. In fact, th e Germans ,vere late in developing the atorn bomb but, on the other hand, they h ad s tarled a missil e programme which ,vas later resumed in the United States by Wcrnher Von Braun and other GerÂˇman

phi losophic and scient ific thought had taken shape which refused the principle or relativity and also, in part, the theory of quanta or photons. These theories were the foundation of the so-called De utsche Physic, wh ich is not the classic atomic or terrestrial quanlum physics but the ''German Physics", \Nhos e concepts \vere described in a book \Vhich was kepl aL th e library of Lhe University of Rome but is no more available, Al the end of the \Nat~ both the \Nest and the East, th anks to the

German r esearch, \Vere able to produc e no less than two hundred thousand inle rnational p aten ts in t he field of military and civilian technology. The valu e o f the scientific and technologic document s is e n o rmous, since the return to industry can be a ssessed at countless billions of dollars. Even the officials in charge of \ 1\lashington's technical se rvice declared I.hat. tons of documents had been piled in the offices of the US capital. It is reasonable Lo beli eve that al least one mil l ion German programmes [ound their app l ica t ion in th e U .S . If vve consider all the v ictorious Countries, the number comes to about three mill ion paper doc u ments which we re subsequently computeri zed at spec ia l re search centres for farther study and development. We can mention that firrns like "I. G. Farb en" and "Hoechst " a lone, unintentionally provided the U.S. rnore than fi~y thousand p atents. In the c ivilian environment some technologies were not exploited - and industrialized to avoid damaging the economy. As th e German missile specialist E ugene S~inger said: as strange as it may seem, despi le the very accura te descriptions conta ined in th e patents, scientifically very precise, some of the envisaged inventions could not be realized. From the encl of v\TWII lo this day, instead , t he general development of technology has introduced immeasurable d isparit ies in te rms of innova t ion, . design and production of the variou s Eastern and \h/estern weapon systems. Just consider the tec hnological gap b etween t he U .S. and th e former U.S.S.R. at the time of the Cold \Nar, characterized by the American supremacy in the field of sem ic onductors a nd electronics vis-~1.-vis the Russians 21

who, instead, had progressed in the research concerning magn etohydr odyna mics and bacteriol ogic warfare. With regard to the latter~ particularly a larm in g arc the st atem ents made hy Ken Alibek, a scientist o [ Kazakh origin, \vho graduated in medicine and epidemiology at th e Russian sc hool of Ton1sk b efore emigrating to the U .S . Alibe k is no\\r an advisor to the U.S. Armed ForÂˇces and pr esident of "Advanced Biosys tem" , a Maryland firm that studies counte n neasures and vaccines for biologica l war(are . Until 1992, h e had t he scientific responsibility for Biopreparat, a secret Rus s ian research programme, dealing w i th the construction of bacteriological intercontinental warheads w h ich carried the viru ses of haemorrhagic fever, smallpox, anthrax and tularernia . In 1992, the U.S. secret services helped him to expatriate with his family 22

a nd th anks lo his disclosures it \Vas possible to understand the s i tuat ion prevailing in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A situation that was made worse not on ly hy th e illegal tran sfer o( armam ents and technologies, but also by the flight of experts and scientis ts Âˇwho sold t hemselve s to the highest bidder: In all likelihood, many sealed containers full or test-tubes with viruses a nd bacteria have bee n sto len from th e Bioprepara t laboratories and could be used in the preparation of bacteriological weapons. In any cas e, the most disquie t ing aspect: o f military technology is that some Nations, especi ally t he Third-World emerging ones, see i t as a potential m eans to im pose their h egemony on the battlefie ld , at lea s t according to an old conception of 1.var: \Nell, if this statemen t were

really truthful, Europe would ha ve lost , on the armament plane, some of its strength vis-~tvis the d eveloping Countries. To make things worse about the alar mis m concerning the r isk of possible nuclear conflicts, ,,v e hear the statements made by Mohammed El Baraclei, director general of the International Agency for Atomic Energy, who, in an inte rv iew given to t he German weekly Der Spiegel said that "the risk has n ever been so great, an atom ic war is approaching unless we agree on a ne,v sys tem of international control". This technological b lack market prob ably ena b led some Co u ntr ies to develop the ir programmes for p rodu c in g nuclear weapons. Jn various Countries there are highly specialized engineers and technicians capable o f plann ing attacks to the world computer n ets.

They are the sa me engineers, educate d in th e best w es tern univers ities, who parlicipated in planning th e systems nmv empl oyed at in ternational level by the computer industry. THE FUTURE MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES

A~er the Cold War, the military technologies in general underwent some s ig ni ficant changes . Th e pul itical a nd military leaders noticed th at the civil ia n technologies were developing faster than the military ones and that, in many sectors computer technology in parLic ular - this trend orien ted pa rl o f the a c tiv ity of th e organizations, suc h as the military centres for research a nd development, towards the pursui t of the activity of their civilian counte rparts and the adaptation of its results in the field of m ilitary applicat i ons . Simulta neously there ,,v ere attempts to promote new research programmes whic h from the beg i nn ing envisaged a dual use, i.e. civilian a nd m ilitar:y. \l\le should not forget that every r evo lu tion d e riving from the introductio~ of scientific discoveries and techno lo gical inn ovations imp I ies also changes in the m ilitary and strateg ic field and tha t, w itho ut t h ese changes , th e new technologies cou ld not find their full expression. Actually they risk clashing with military structures c harac te rized b y s tra tegic and c.:0111 mand doctrines tied to themÂˇe tical and

operation al concepts which are a nac hronis ti c, con sid e ,-i ng th e n e w requ i r c menls se t by th e modernization of the weapon systems. Clearlv thi s entail s a radica l c hange of mentality produced by the techn ological impact on the "Man" component, n o t only at psycholog ical, behav ioural and orga ni zational le vel, but a lso from a philosophical viewpoint, i. e . as a way of think i ng and

conceiving the new rÂˇeality arisen from the m odern technologies. Bes ides the centres for researc h and deve lop ment o f military technologies, wh ich fix t h e o r erational re qui,-eme nts and t ra nsl ate Lhem into proj ec t specificati o n s, on e s h o u ld a lso carefullv study the solution of the

problem of a greater integrat ion a nd mo dern i 7.a t ion of o ur menta li ty from the point of view of the decision - making, in formatio n a nd psych ological relations. Ho wever, if th e use r s are unable to make the most of the new capa bil iti es or arc even r e fra ctory to the nc\v technologies, which they conside r incompre hensibl e and unreliable sci-fi inventions w hic h jeopardize the o rderly fl ow o l" professi onal p r inciples, th e re are two possibilities: convinc ing th e users of the conc re te advantages of the technological in novat ions on armaments, h oping for a th oroug h pro f css io n a l update and trainin g, or re n o uncing the acqui s ition an d modernization of the future weapon svstcms. In this laller cas e, the proje cts should be impl e m enled in such a wav as to simplify the ent i r e conven ti o na l de c i s i on - m a king process, for example reduc in g to th e ess e ntia l the emp loy ment of comp ute,-izat i o n , such as data banks a n d a u tomati o n of communications. Thi s cou ld lead Lo the aban don ment of l hc old technolog ical conce ptions w itho ut learning, appreciating and accepti ng the rea l importance o[ th e n e\.v ones in Lhc process of mod e rnization of the military i nsrr-u men t. On this poi nt a debate is o pen and no op ini o n ca n be conside red as fin al. T he Coun try which better tha n everyone else, 23

,vi t h lhe exceplion of the U.S., gives a positive answer t o the impacl of the ne\,v technologies is J apan, since it is accusLomed to live wi Lh a modern nientality. In order to understand the choices and the innovations of th e Coun t ry in the pol it ical, military and technological field, one shoul d Lake a step back, precisely lo September 2, 194."i , the dale marking its surrender in World War II. T he Amer ican General DouglasMc Arthur imposed the disbandment o r all educational s tru ctures connected \,v ith the traditional Japanese militarism, the dismant le ment of th e armament induslry and t h e discontinuance of the military programmes of research and developmcn l. Being a man oC p rofou nd b ib I ical education, t he General should h ave remem bered that man proposes, but God disposes . In fact, in 1950, at the ou tbreak of the Korean war, almosL all the troop s that garr isoned th e archipelago were sent to the front line, l eaving the Country practic aliy d erenceless v is-a -vis lhe p ossi b ility of a Chinese or Soviet attack against what, at any rate, was still the main logistic base. That ,vas the beginning of the Japanese boom, owing to the extraordinary occasion offered by the market of the Korean wa1~ As regards th e future deve lo pmen ts in the sector of military prod u ction and technology, it could be useful to refer to th e concepLs of th e "Revol ution in .M ilitary Affairs" (RMA) and "Mi li lary and Technica l Revolution" (IVITR) which arÂˇe closely connected and are d efined by the American Admiral William O,Nens as th e "System of Systems". Through this revolution the U. S. has organized the fulure moderni zation of its Armed Force s , apply i ng the ne\.\; "fut uristic" technologies within 24

two distinct periods : 20 10 and 2025. It is a fac t that \vith the i n lrod u ction of the nev.r technologies, in a sense the classic definition of the Ai-t of War disappears, leavi ng i ts place to the Science o[ War. In other words, the guidelines and principles or the strategic planning or military operations provided by strategists like Karl von Cla usewilz and Sun Tzu arc now being updated. This updat ing consists in the application of the scientific and techno logical knowledge, especially computer s cience, Lo the Art of War which, u ntil the 18th Century was considered as an a pplication of mathematical and probabilistic theories to the strategic acLions develop ed through the observalion and the experience made on the battlefield. T hese are the same observat ions that enabled von Clausewit.z to write "von Kriege" a treatise on th e synthetic st udy of over one hundred military campaigns. 1L should be specified, as the Prussian slrategist himself did , t hat his writings do not represent the theory itself, but rather a tool for lhe theory. This explains ,vhy his doctrine is stil l applicable today. It is only a matter of complet ing and adj usting it to the new mode] of military culture which E u rope wi ll necessari ly have to implement in order to keep abreast of the times. Military technology has made the U.S . Armed Forces practically invincible. T h e ir war machine destroyed the Iraqi Army i n about five ,veeks. All this is sound according to the traditional conception o r war, which envisages a confrontation ,,v ith an e quall y tra diti onal enemy, represented by an army. Quite different is the situation in an asymmet ric war waged by terrorisLs. In this case the vectorial comp onents, Man-Environment-

Equipment, change very deeply. The t errorists , i n fact, have neither real armed forces, ,.v ith ships and tanks, nor borders, names and addresses. Jn su bstance, they are an invisible enemy who has no force of h is own but can use the strength and the technology of the antagonist, more or less as in Ju-Jits u , the oriental wres tli ng lechn ique

which uses the opponent's strength and elan to v,Âˇin. T he "empire of lerror" lives and reeds on fear, because the objective of terrorism is psycholog ical and, more precisely, aims at making people I ive in fear and d eter them through fear. T herefore one shou ld not be surprised if the terrorist's mind u nders t ood long ago the importance of lhe concepts

contained in Raymond Aron's sentence "today Ii ke yes Le rday, the essential problem is psychologica l and technical al the same time". Therefore, a real Revolution in Military Affairs \Vill have to envision th e clcvelopmen t of models and theories in which scientific , techno lo gical and psychological knowledge are

an d more complex and wideranging . F urthermore, in the fut ure the Arme d .forces \Nill h ave to face sudden and probably less for eseea b le threats, on account of the si t uat ions imposed by the new world order and by dangers such as international terrorism . The war against terror has also an impact on the NATO

new tee h nologies make the military commands lighter and more flex ible, with no difference between \Nar and peacetime; the decision - ma ki ng p rocess becomes faster, o\ving to more reliable logistic ne L\vorks and less personnel. In any case, tcch nolog ical innova t ions require large investments and for th is reason NATO decided to concentrate some strategic dec isions in the All ied Command for Operations (ACO ), ensuring at the same time, througb the Allied Command for Transformation (ACT), the modernizalion of the military structures. CONCLUSIONS

mixed toge th er, especially in order to kno\..v everv single detail about the enemy ;nd fight him with the same weapons, lhe same techniques and the same way of thinking and acting; in short, trying to penetrate the mind of the enemy, so as to foresee and interpret his strategies in advance. These considerations enable us to u nderstand that the defence instruments will become more

command struclure, w1p111g out the configuration devised i n 1999. The prec ision of the new v,,eapon systems and the acquisition o( the technologies which led , for example, to the developmen t o f GPS, make possible the numerical reduction of the "Man" vector. Whal today can be done by one hundred soldiers, te n years ago could only be accomplished b y one thousand men. Bes ides, lhe

History teaches us that scient i fic p r ogress and technological innovations are partly the resul t o f researches designed for military programmes. This fact emphasizes the longknown connection hct,.vccn war and technology, reinforced by man's need to produce more and more perfect and effective weapons. Since the survival of a g iven society depended on those weapons, clearly, in time, th is n eed bas continued to confirm not on ly the importance of research and development in the sector of military tec hnologies , bul a lso lhal of the investments aimed at modernizing the Armed Forces and the Defence Industry. The s lo\v and gradual rnobilizalion of resources and equipmen t is destined to transform lhe mililary culture, fashioning it according to th e new technologies through a continuous updating, limited in costs and times of reali1.aLion, in line with the requirements and resources ava il able to th e Nations, also in peacetime.

â€˘ ÂˇÂˇ'Researcher

in Strategic Sciences

an arbitrarily subverted state of legality, to safeguard a s is always the case for concepts whose meanings are very abundant or difficult, and which are right and to contrast or repress individuals or groups \vho, frequently used also with regard to "violence", we because of their ideology, commjt acts which ~r~ cleatJy note how much easier it is to detect it during the contrary to the law of nations. . In any case, from the etymological vkwpoint~ J•v)olence" examination of historical events or in our everyday derives from the Latin word "vioJentia" whicb1 in'i ts tum, experience, rather than define it as a category in itself. comes from the adjective "violens", whose root can ~ If we were to trust only our impression and the evocative power of the term "violence", which can be immediately found in "vis", i.e. force. Violence, therefore, is tile exercise . connected with a situation of crisis, chaos, disorder or even of an act of strength aimed at' getting the better, -- fot the transgression, we would consider it an abrupt and se1·ious most disparate, la\l\ful or illicit, reasons ·- of another '"ill exit from a condition of recognized normality. In this case, which either opposes or simply disitgrces with that · therefore, violence would be a sudden , more or less expressed by the party concerned. l'tic latte1; always in tbe temporary subversion of a precise reference situation, with original context of a clash of wills, can be subjected t Q .equally violent defensive reactions, . different degrees of gravity. Thus, ·on the basis of the lawfulness or illicit:ness of its While we acknowledge that the concept has use, one can refer to a so-called "good" or " bad"'violence. progressively acquired an increasingly negative meaning, and t hat there are schools of thought which demand its To put it better, .since the te·rm " violence'' h-',s bce.n condemnation in toto, we must also admit that violence in assuming an increasingly negative meaning, making it itself can be categorized neither as negative nor as positive. almost a synonym of a:rrogance, oppression, coerciO'li pnd Jts possible acceptability is actually indirectly determin~d criminality, today we prefer the word "force" to define its by <the situation against which it is applied, i.e. its position use for licit or right ends, while "violence" is empJoyed in the nelcl. of Jaw or, on the contrary, in that of abuse of to describe its use for wicked aims. Furthermore, there power, with all the nuauces that this distinction imply. Jn is a gradation also in the merits of this "surrogate", this rega~p, d(ltdrtlessty, violence, as en extreme form of thanks to the employment of qualifying adjectives such contempt of the law, o,f inth nidationJ tnrnsgresslon, as ' 1controlled'~1)l' " unrestn,ined" which, by specifying a r~pressian of the individual and the community to which larger or lesser degr-ee of control in the application of · hl.l belongs, denial of their .inalienable rights, annulment of force, descl'ibe also its level of acceptability. Clearly a their dignHy and legitimate expecta tions, can only be "controlled force'' ts one del'iving from the conscientious Jndgod as utterly negative~ witJ1 no po~s(bility of appeal. and responsible employment of :arms which im.plws, On .the othct hand, the recour:s-e to viotcmce, ,wlum,i.t is besides t he sense 01' responsibility and moderation of the · indispen-s able ... und in the- f01lltls and ways ullow~d by the user, also an accurate traildng and the development of a process of planning and evaluation carried out by law ,... is not only fully justified, but even necessary. Similarly, the use,of violence - or.to pllt it bette1; of for.cc its leaders. fo the case in point, they will h.avc to - is also justified iu order to restore~ afinternational level, dcfJ1t.e clearly 1md irnposc tlle p1-1rposes, p:1i oritics- and,

ab ove all, lh e limits of the m ission assigned . O n the contrary, the "uncontrolled" or "ind iscriminate" force, precisely becau se of lh e disprop ort ion b e tween the c ounter m easures adopted v is-a -vis the nature and degree of the challenge accepted or endu red, is perce i ved a nd judged as m orally unacceptable. Furth ermore is very oft en accompanied b y poor plann ing and lack of seJ[-control and this is considered an indi cation o f scarce professionalism and even mo ral decay of the leg i tima te users of v iolence . Who, to day mo re than ever, are identified with the Armed Forces and the Police. In other words, loss of control or excessive exertion of a "righl" violence by the legitimate users i n the p er forma nc e o f the ir insti tu t ional lasks is in no ,vay excusable anym ore. All the m ore so, because th ere seems to be anothe r direct consequ ence of the use of forc e: the so-called "colla teral effects" , i. e. th e conseq uen ces on people or things, completely fo reign to th e clas h o f w ills i n progress a nd

the resulting exchange of blows, but who e ncl u p by b eing the firs t suffere rs of the ir consequences

VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSIVEN ESS If we examine the contents of viol en ce m ore thoroughly, w e

come across lhe no tion o f "aggressiveness" . With rega,-d lo this, the follovving consideration sho uld be ma de : if from l h e m ilitary viewpoint aggressiveness has a lways been considered an attitude pro fessionally valid in a so ldi er or un it, th e same dispositio n h as progressively acqu ired a less and less negative connotation also according to the

Facing page. Patrolling the s1reets o( Kahul. Below.

Jw.lian armoured veh icles ir1 /vloza111 bique.

Right. Italian se1vicernen i11 LÂˇ.'asl Timor

evaluation stand ards typical or the civilian sensi liveness. Suffice it lo think , for example, of lhe world of sport, trade and finance, politics and even entertainrnenl.. When this stance, marked by hyperactivity, 1111t1a1 ive, combativeness and, in some cas es, l ack of scrup les, is assumed by their operators, it comes to mirror sk ill s and qualifications whose possession is considered desirable at every level. The aggressive b ehaviour of a military leader or fighter, aimed at overcoming the en emy even in a condition of infe riori ty or difficulty, as \veil as that of a manager who adjusts his strategy in such a \Vay as to resist. and overmatch his compet itors in order to get an access to the market or the exc lus ive sales

rights for a p roduct, proves to be winning in most cases. Provided that th is be supported by the appropriate psyc h ophysical resources (willpower, energy, intellectual capabilities), by nonindifferent material and financial resources and be guided by a constant and careful examination of the resu J ts, in a cost effectiveness outlook. Last but not least, a behaviour of this kind must also be su bmit tecl lo an introspect ion about the indefeasible moral values which shou ld be the common heritage of all men. Tf vve were moreover to make a very short historical and markedly military digression to bear out what we have just said, we could think of El Alarnein . .In particular, there is no doubt that the continuous aggressiveness that had marked General Erwin Rommel's actions up lo then, with \N i nning results from any point if vie,v, just at El Alamein ende d by being complete ly counterproducl ive for a favo urable continuation of the war effort in A[rica. The causes were chiefly the rapid decrease of the material resources available to the Axis' forces but a lso the decline of their spiritual "cha rge" : less confidence in victory a nc\ in their leaders , in their own residual fight ing spirit and stam ina. Aggressiveness therefore is the origin of violent behaviours , even \Nhen they a.re emotionally very asept ic and proceed and devel op on rat ional bases . Nevertheless, aggressiveness can be sublimed - as, after a ll, can violence or, to say it better, force - when the Ja1.te r is not subject lo i rrationa l instincts h u t is addressed to t he performance oC a mission . A subli .m at ion that directs i l towards goals t.hal go bey ond a pure and simp l e express ion of physical overpowering. This is true also when i t concerns sports and competitions of any type.

phys ical pain. Similarly, in Lhc climate of increased sensitivitv and a,vare n ess shown by ; public opinion certain ly more attent ive and socially involved than in the past, h u man beings are not the on ly ones being cons id ered victims of vio len t abuses . .Also animal s ( expe ri rnentat:ions, vivisection, living condit ions, b ree din g t echn iques, indiscriminat e exp loitation for pro[i L and enterta inment, and even their u se as food), the environment (po l lution, defacement, uncont rolled impoveris hment, adu l terat ion, genetic rnan ipulation) and t h e social

II r

S imilarly, the military peace missions have obvious.ly imposed a redefinition of the aggressiveness prerequisite, since the personnel par ticipating i n these missions m ust be able to combine their usual pure and s i mple reactiv i ty, attention, swiftness and ardour with sel fcon u-oI, pondering and a n1arked capabili t y of perception and evaluation.

VIOLENCE AND THE NEW SENSITIVITIES .As regar ds violence in general, it is equally evidenl that it has been assuming certain aspects that are less and less typical of a p ure and simple expression of physical strength exerte d in order to achieve coercive goals. T here are forms o[ pressure, psychological constraint, forced acquiescence or submission , pseudo-reeducation and more or less open cond itioning ,vhich, even when they are not psych ic torture, a wide range of which we have seen in recent history, arc expressions of vio lence in every respect. 'Ne must acid to the above the less d evas tating rnodern forrn.s of misuse of pmve r (the so-called 111obbing) ,vhich are no less insidious for 30

the psy chophysical balance or the i ndividual, and seem to occur in various working environments . The ter111 "moral violence" i n increasingly and correctly used to show \,v here it has stricken and left its mark (the soul, not the body) although undoubtedly the psychology of an individual can never come ou l completel y unharm e d of the effects of

sector (social 1111ustice ; economic exploitationÂˇ; unfair \Vages and bonuses; non application of the inclispensabie safety and hygienic norms in working places; exploitation of minors; racial, sexual, political an d rel igious discrimination) are seen today, especially in relat ion lo clear situations or degradation and i n to lerance existing in m any Countries or

Facing p age. Italian soldiers in Afghanistan.

Below. APCs of an "Alpini" unit <J.uring an exercise in a snowy environment.

Right Italian servicern.en on surveillance duty in Iraq.

the Third \ 1\/orld , as eloqu en t and increasi ngly unaccep table displays of v iolence against the individu als and th e society lo which they be l ong . Also t he nearly unanimous refusal of the

death penal ty, b oth in t he socalled "civilized" nations and by p u blic op inion s is - beyon d any consideration o r ethical or legal nature - a sig n of this increased , and in a ce r tain sense exaggerated, sensit ivity of our times a b o u t anything that can cause ex c ess i ve sufferi ng or constraint. In a word, w i t h time the conc ept of v iolenc e has been

progressively widening, reaching subjects and sectors w hic h previo usly had been overlooked or neglecte d, with an acce lerati on particu larly felt in t he last decades . Likewise, viole nce has become less and less acceptable. This reali ty, if on th e on e hand can be considered a sign of the increased h uman sensitiveness towards one's fellO\vmen and environmen t of l ife and develop m en t , on the other, if t h e trend is no m ore regula ted by a sense of measure and the wisd om deriving from nor mal comrno n sense , it r is ks to cause, sooner o r later, a sequence o r well-k n o wn se l floci, i ng effects .

A "STRON GER" AND "LESS AND LESS VIOLENT" VIOLE NCE

Going deeper into the aspects of more specific military interest, it should be underlined that this study docs not have the purpose of tackling iss u es whic h have a l read y been amply dis cussed an d pop ularized by the abundant p roducti on on t h e s u bject of Laws on Armed Confl icts and vio le n ce . 'vVe s h al l therefore r estric t o u rsel ves to general cons iderations, one of wl1ic h is th at also the common concept of v iolence for m ili tary pu rposes h as been slowly and contin uously evolving in a di minutive sense, 31

parti cu l a rly in t he last t ,venty years. Once violence Vv'as brutal and fierce, like the blov-1 of a m ace on the helm et of an u nsaddled horseman a t the mercy of th e enemy, bu t we m ust admit, to its credit, th at that kind of violence was rather selective in its chosen targets (,.vh icb were almost exclusively of a m ilitary nature), even if this ,vas d ue m ore to the weap ons' s ca r c e tec hnic a l effici ency tha n to a p articula r h umanitarian spirit of t he users. S u b sequently, the growing sensitivity o f t h e high m ilitary leade rs, increasi ngly integrated in the social and cultural reali ty a nd in the debates of their time, made violence more controlled in its effects and more discri minative in its object ives, and th is prod u ced th e

m i ti gations in duc ed b y th e H u m an itari an Law on Ar med Con flict s a nd by the \Nar Conventions. Kevertheless, while all t h is o ccutTed th e re w as a n e normo us i ncrease i n t he effectiveness, da magi ng powe r and ra nge (with an en su i n g increase in collateral effects) of t he a r m am ents, as t hey were made available by tec hnological and scientific prog ress a nd unfa il in g ly introdu ced into service. Goi ng back to a pa rticu lar ly significa n t period , s uch as that of t he Cold War, it becomes evident that , during all its c ourse, th e main raison d 'etre of the Armed Forces w as the external d efence of the ir Co untri es and 1 nsli lu l ions against attacks launc hed by antagon istic Nations o r blocs. But it is also clear that,

despite t he further improvement and d evel opme n t of th e inteiÂˇnat ion al laws on con Llic ts, p rÂˇe cisely in tho s e years th e procedures on \.vhich the d efence w as ba sed e nvis aged t he practically au tomatic recourse to det e ,-i-ent an d offensi ve instr u me nts with a d estructive power never seen hd o,-e. Later the t raditional types of milita ry operations were joined by n e,v mis sions "o t h er t h an ,.v ar \-vhi ch h ad becom e n ecessary in a rapidly changi ng international environ men t and had purposes and goals very different from the prev ious ones . This l ed to a do pt new para me te ,-s in t he c ond uct o f con O ict s. T hese parame ters , specifical ly r epiÂˇe sented by the r ul es of eng age m e n t, cl early defin ed th e circum st ances,

Facing page. "Alpini" on pa.1rol in Kabul.

Right.

Canine uni1s in Afghanistan, in 1heir first "out of area" employmrm1.

limits and m odalilies or the application of violence/force beyond the strictly techn ical and tactical requiremen ts considered by the previous discipli ne of fire . In other words, t hrough Lhe "Rules of Engage ment" (RoE) the modalilies of employment or military violence were subjected to a thoro u gh control , wh ic h was moreover extremely d etailed. As matter of fac t, the said Rules o r Engagement , besides envisaging almost always a kind o f checking list of the typical situations which could cause an armed reaction, actually d ea l with Lh e lowest organizalional levels of employment - in Lh is case the ind ividual sold ier - destined to carry it out . At Lhe same time , the i ntensity of force that can be used in these reactions is reduced to the l owÂˇest quantitative and qualitative level s (minimum force) necessary for Lhe task, in order not to infringe the limils or the mand ate, practically elimina ting the risk of c ollateral d am ages. Needless to say, all this must b e closely correlated with Lhe type of operation and its objectives. Also the s uccessive stu d ies and d ebates on the adoption of the so-called "Non Lethal \Neapons" (NLW), which have been going on for a d ecad e, should be seen i n the perspective of a furth e r gauging of the use of force according to the situation, and of a progressive reduction of the level of violence. For this ,-eason, the NL\:Vs are fu lly entitled to be pla ced w ithin this trend . All Lhings cons idered, i t was precisely from the rnoment when lb~ particu lar nature and

the full id en tity o f the "Opera tio ns Other than \1'/ar " (OOTW) \,vere sa n ctioned and compared ,vith the traditional "War Op era ti ons" ( \VO) that, wit hi n the military, t he s e p ara ti on of force from v io lence was somehowÂˇ made officia l, eve n if its premonitory signs date back to the stipu lation of the first agreements on the war laws. T he employment of a military unit to fulfill a mandate in order to li mit a conflict, to stand between

opposing armies or paramilitary m ilitias, to contribute lo restore l a ,.v and orcle r, now as never b e fore imposes limits to the concepl or the use of force and, a l the same time, it compels to u nequ ivocally di s tingu i sh iL from t hat of recourse to violence. The latter, refused also by the media, is no,v d escribed as a procedure only typica l of the "o t her" i rregu lar or param ilitary forces operating in the Thealre, which are usually al odd s with each other and o ften

refuse to coope r a t e w i lh lbe peace Contingent in th e performance of the task . Th ese are "violen t" forces , \,vhose characteristics arc moral unrel iability, improper fighting procedures and techniques , treacherous acts and b r u tal b eh aviours . To resist these forces, the Co ntingenl's uni ts especially in the face of a ll kinds of provoca ti ons and in a generally uncertain environment - must u se povver w i th greal caut ion in their interventions, be selective in the choice of targets and well -b a lanc ed in their reactions . Last b u t not least, the personnel must have the peace of mind derivi ng from the firm belief of legiLimaLely serving in th e name of justice and for the achievement or a di s inlerested and superior goal.

THE TYPOLOGY OF VIOLENCE Let us sec now, at least in their ess ential characteristics, the main archetypes of violence by wh icli the men of a peace Contingent could be confronted, often sim ultaneously, while they carry out an in-Theatre m ission. In every case, Cadres and privates m ust he able to apply the appropriale countermeasmÂˇes, in order to prevent nc,.v outbreaks and the transition to an escalation that \Voulcl be clearly antithetic Lo the dictates and purposes of the mandate. Precise ly for this reason, the countermeasures can be considered, be_yond the military requirements of defence, an integral part of a composite set of m easures and provisions \,vh ich, together, forrn the ca legory of "management of violence". In broad out li ne , base mainly on t h e causes of t heir occurrence, these expressions of vio l ence can b e divided into son1e reference groups \vhose boundari es are often unstable and subject lo ov e rlaps. 34

Left. An /1alian servicemen 011 su rveillance du1y wilh a personal i w:apo n equipped 1vith a night/day siP,lzlinh device .

Facing page. An ope ration:,; room during an exer-

cise.

\ I l

\ \

\ 1

Therefore, there co ul d be an i ns u rrect i onaJ violence caused mainly b y the hardships , sufferÂˇings and tensions endured by the resident populat ion, often aggravated by a condition of p ro t racte d deprivations . These more or less l atent tensions can of course be exploited and, once lhey come out in the open, directed towards specific objectives by occult (or not s o concea l ed) centres of power associated v.,ith factions or political groups, such as the leaders or th e Pa .l estin ian "Inti facleh" or Somalia's "clans", with Lbe in Len Lion of causing political and social chaos, obviously in th e exc lusive interest of these factions and \Vilhin the context or a specific destabi li zing design. T he fo rces of th e peace Contingent can fight this type of vio l ence c ssen t ia l ly by implernenling the most effective measures o f secur i ty and protect i on o f their own members, obv iously supported by appropriate forms of active intervention, both psychol ogical and c ivi l/military, towards the population. These measures could, if n ecessary, take the form of intervent ions spec ifi ca ll y aimed at restoring l.nv and public order. There is a .l so a criminal and Ivlafia-type violence, born of the in stit u t iona l weakness of the State and the l eve l of degradat ion and co rruption reached by its organiza ti onal apparatus, whic h favours t.he establishment and rise to pmver of "parallel groups" determ ined Lo achieve the ful l politico-

economic control of the State , such as, for instance , the Colombian " narcos". This type of violence, which pursues more unmistakably private interests than the pre ceding ones, is certainly more difficult to identify, at least ,v hile it rema in s be lo,v a certa.in qualitative threshold as regards the level of the offences and the nature of their objectives . Usually it does not have a particular interes t in acting directly against the forces of the Contingent, even if undoubtedly the latter could be involved, considering that their widespread presence and cont rol of th e territory inevitabl y brings them into contact with those responsible for unla,.vful manifestations and criminal activities. For this reason the military units need to acquire a thoroug h

knowledge of the topography of crime an d of the criminal districts existing with i n t heir jurisdiction, as well as the techniques and modalit ies employed by the criminal gangs, the degree of intimidat ion and pressure exerted on the population, the level of the people's involvement and the nature of the risks. Our military forces will also have to be put in a position to protect themselves as best as possible and, if necessary, to give their contribution (Operat ions "Vespri Siciliani ", "Partenope", "Riace") or to act autonomously (Operation "Alba") in order to oppose this kind of violence and stop its development . T h ere is also a so -called "comm itted" violence, i.e. in the service of a religious, political or social cause, which is generally supported by specific

factions which, even if they are usually elite groups, can take advantage of lhe not ahvays fully conscious support of the masses (Taliban, Ayatollah, alQaeda) . Terrorism is certa inly the most insidious of its acting procedures . The extreme topicality of this type of threat is quite evident; to oppose it the Coalitions' military forces, with a remarkable contribution by Italy, are no,v engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq. Conlen ding with terrorisn, means, first of al.I, implementing a progression of measures and prnvisions whicb should permit to gel r id not only of ils most dangerous man ifestations but also of its causes and motivations. Of course this can involve only in part the capabilities and responsibilities of a military Con tingent. Nevertheless, o,ving to its 35

Left. A Special Forces Unit in a ''Fas / Rope" exercise. Facing page. Con1rolling 1he area around Kabul.

Below. VA,J wheeled vehicle armed with

w 1

MG 42/59.

diffused presence on the territory, i ts equipmen t and methods, as \.velJ as lhe solidity and relia bility typical of a mil-itary organization, th e Contingent can give its decisive contrib ution to gather and screen the information useful for understanding causes and motivations, and implement, at the same t im e, the most appropriate op positi o n slralegies. These strategies, could a t \Vorst be considered ,.vithin t he context o( an "asymmetric" conflict. Finall y, th ere is an ins Li Lu lional violence carried out and fomente d by total i tar ian regimes, often undermined from within by oppositions which, although numerous at times, are denied an y kind of le gal recognit ion by the ruling bodies. In fact, the latter ground their ex istenc e and p ossi bl e

development on a cons t ant reco u rse to forms o f coe rcion and violence whose q u ality bec omes more di versified and

ambitious as t h eir expectations of s u ccess .i n crease . In s ubstance, institutional violence is what is made by the so -called "rogue states", which, toget her \Vit h a systematic repression o f their internal o pp onents (d iscrim in ations, r epress ions an d genocide), as regard s foreign policy d evelop aggressive an d destabilizing armament programmes. Fu rth ermore, at int.ernalional level, they sup port, in a more or less covert manner, th e lerrorist organizations around the vmrlcl. Clea,-ly against this kind of enemies the Ar my cannot but operate within a perfectly legal, institutionally legitimated an d ethica l f r amevvork . Lacking even o nly o n e of thes e requi rements, ils act.io n would risk being perceived in a dis to r ted or al least suspicious w a y, thus la ying open t o

oppositions, even if Lhes e, in most cases, turn out to b e clearly biased. Similarl y, th e context just outlined implies a sequence of righls and duties that must be taken into account once the intervention is decided. Among them , the Rules of EngagemenL are very important, precisely for preventing that an act of force could be interpreted as an act of v iolence and a buse of pmver.

CONCLUSIONS

The gap bet,veen "violence" and "force", wh ich has ahvays been accepted by the \VesL and as such also acknO\,vledged by its military institutions, has by now become unbridgeable and this also because of the

spec i ficity of the Crisis Response Op erations (CROs) with i n the "Operations OtherÂˇ than \:Var". In olhe,- terms, the recourse to force, a modality of application of an act of coercion l eg itimat e , respons ibl e , controlled and necessary for the accompli shment of a mission appears to be nwtivated by very high moral and ethical e nds ,vhile these are completely lacking the case of violence. Vve see an actual regulation and self-limitation in lb e use of force by the Western -led coa li tions, ovving both Lo the RoEs and Lo the stdct adherence lo the dictates of the Humanitarian La,vs in Armed Conflicts, as ,veil as to the adoption of em ployment procedures and Lech nological aids a i rnecl at avoiding collateral

effects . It is a lso evident that the re has been a progress ively increasing insid iousness and impropriety of the rightin g t echniqu es emp loy ed by thÂˇe param ilitary and irregular forces opposing the Coalitions in Lhe Operation Theatres. AL the top of these techniques there is obviously the recourse to shifty and d evastat ing forms of terrorism. In substance, as regards operational vio lence, t wo different flows are no\v n,oving in opposile d irections : one is evolving towards a regula,- force and the other \Vh ic h - owing lo the br u tality of its fighting techniqu es and lack of any form of discrimination - on the contrary goes back to a barbarity completely incompat ible w i th our sensilivily, ,vhich moreover has become very acute and diversified as never before. In conclusion , mil it arv force is today the only legitim; te form of a "just" and legal violence as opposed lo a violence wh ich is, at the same time, a manifeslaLion of desperation and w ickedness. Since Lhe degree of the selfcontrol p rocedures for the use of force, and the abi l i ly to master it, seem lo have reached a very satisfactory leve l, both in norma l i ve/ legal and techni cal/operational terms, it is now time for lhe experts Lo turn Lhe i r efforts towards the " manag ement of vi olenc e ". They should achieve firÂˇs t of all a full kno\,v ledge of the various types of vio len ce, their specifici ties and the causes or Lhe i r onset and deve lopment, subsequently proceeding lo prepare the b est. strategies and employmen t techniques in order to oppose a nd eradicate them. L 'Lieulenant Colonel, Com111m1cle1; 1st Squadron,

"Cavalleggen: Guide" Regirnenl 37

., T

From the conflicts between Countries and Coalitions to the risks of today's terror, centuries seem to have gone by. But only fifty years have passed and a lot has changed in such a sHort time. Let us see how and why.

ith the end of the last conflict a bipolar system is esta. blished: at Yalta: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Iosif Stalin sign the Chart which, with the San Francisco Conference of 1945, will originate the United Nations Organization (UNO). The system envisaged by the new international order is not a bipolar one, but rather a system of collective security, linked to the creation of a new international organization that could overcome the limitations of the old League of Nations. Thus the UNO (or UN) appears to be the resuJt of a kind of compromise between the system adopted by the Congress of Vienna and that of the League of Nations. In fact, the UN Assembly abides by a democratic principle: one seat-one vote, but in the Security Council the victorious powers are given a special privilege: the Security Council cannot make a decision Âˇwithout a unanimous vote. This principle (better knovm as "right of veto") was demanded by Stalin, who thought that af1er fighting together to win the war, it was unthinkable to split to keep the peace. Therefore it was necessary to operate by common consent. This axiom will later on he a hindrance to the functioning of the Organization. Thus we can say that the system. of collective security, born after VvWII and envisaged already since the inter-allied conferences, is a result of the conflict much more than the League of Nations, which was born after WWI and within the peace conference. Actually the UN was bon1 before the end of the v,mr and came about as a compromise between a democratic principle, represented by the Assembly, and a principle of security and balance, represented by the concert of the great powers. The Security Council is not made up of European nations only

but a lso of pow ers p la ying a worl d wi de ro le, su c h a s t he Uni ted States, th e S oviet Union a nd Ch ina . There a re only France and G rea t Britain as European po\vers, but t he ir weigh t h as been g r e_atly reduced b y t he results of th e war. This is the p roject for the n ew international order, b ut the r ight of ve to p r e vents it fro m vvo rki ng. T h e Sovi et U ni on a lo ne, i n th e fir st tw o y ea rs, i mposes abo u t fifty ve toes on t he de c isio ns t ake n b y t he Assembly. A se rious sp lit takes place, (or e xample, w hen t he wes tern powe rs veto the en try of Bulgaria, Ru man ia and H u n gary in to t he U N, a d du ci ng as a r eason their r efusal to a dhere to the principles o f the decla ration o n free E urope. The S oviets will do the same a b o u t the proposal o f Italy's en try. Stal in a c cus es the \Nestern po wers of inte rfe ring i n the elections of 1948: therefore a lso Italy does n ot have a d em oc rat ic g ov e ,-nm en t . Th e f i r st s kirmi s hes begin t o s how that t he new internation al o rÂˇd er is pra ct ical ly unrea lis abl e .

Hu ngar y, Bu lga ria , Rum an ia a nd Italy will be a b le to join the UN only in 1955, after a c hange in the East-Wes t rela tions. Fo,- differe nt rea so ns, t b e s ituation r ese mb les th at p revailing after \ \!\NI, w hen th e defea ted Co un tries had to s ign the peace treaty w ith the Cha,-ter o f the Leagu e o f .r--: ations as e nclosure. T his m eant that they w ou ld not join the new in ternational organization u nless t hey s ign e d t he t r eaty. Al so w it hin the L e ague of Nat io ns the re wa s a kind of d is cri mination, o bviously w ith differen t mo tivati ons a nd co ntex ts , w ith t he res u lt of paralysing the new organiza tion . T he Cailure o f th e ne \.v i nterna tion a l order po ses t he p roble rn of h ow to res to r e stability' and security lo E urope a nd the \,Vorld . This task nat u rally fall s on th e m a j o r po vie rs e merged frorn \VWII: the United States and the Soviet Un ion. Thus we c a n understand that the balance problem o f the po stw a r syst em ca nnot be s olve d r apidly, o w ing precisely to t he p re sen c e of th ose two

._~,,.

... . .

superpm-vers. Only a d ecade later~ fro m 1945 to 19 55 , it b ecomes pos sib le to tal k abo u t t he ach ievernent of a ce rta in equilibrium as a resul t or a series o f 1.ve ig hts a nd counterwei g hts, which encl up by balancing a nd a dj ust ing their relations . They a re called "s u per" i n o rd er to disti nguish them from the "great" o n es, in c o nsideration o f their

role, completely different from that of the former great powers.

A FIRST WORLD BALANCE

The U.S . and the U.S .S.R. establish a new world balance which lasts until 1989. Eacb or them adopts a different strategy: according to the Soviets it could be called "strategy of bilateralism"; the Americans instead adopt a "strategy of muhilateralism". They conform to two different conceptions of securi ty. For the Sovie ts the problem of security exists only on the strategic -military p lan e . Stalin's plan is Lo create his own anti-German system against the possible revival of certain ideologies. The U.S.S.R. has the same problem also in the Far

East, where the development of a great China is loom ing and this can hinder the Soviet Union's plans. As a matter or fact, Stalin does hi s best to reconcile Communist Ch i na and National ist China, i.e. l'Vlao D1.eDong and Ch ang Kai-Shek, since he believes that t\vo enli Lies arc better than one, lik e the two Germanys in Europe. Jn fact,

China remains divided in two, but \,\,bil e the Nationalist side is confined to the island or Taiwan the con tinenta l part b ecomes Great China. From this vicv./point Stali n fails and later will have Lo confront Mao. T he Soviet bila teralisrn, therefore, succeeds only in Europe where it can be easi ly realized because there are several

Countries, large and small, but weak as a resu lt of the \.v ar events. Suffice it to think that in Central and Eastern Europe, from Poland to Czechoslovakia, from Hungary to Ruman ia, all \Nent through lhe German invasion first, and later endured the Soviet occupation. They are weak Co u ntries and, what is more, ohen in contrast with each oth er 1or ethnic and terr.i tori al problems. Thus it is easy for Stal i n to implement bi lateral accords \,vit.h them, wi th an eye to the security interesls or the USSR. To this encl, the first ins trument used by the Soviets is not economic , but military. In fact, th e Reel Army, \,vbich had arrived to " l iberate" those Countries, remains there in order to guaran tee their securi ty aga ins t a possible revival of the German threat. The Soviet bloc is thus born , based on hilateral alliances which, in order to be stable and functional according to Stalin's design, must be managed by strong governments, well a li gned \Vith the Sov iet positions. It is true that in Eastern 41

Europe the re are elections, according lo lh e Yal la agreements, but they are held under p rÂˇessurÂˇe of the Red Army's p resence . All those \vho have collaborated \V ith the N a zis or oppose the Communisl Party are persecuted. T hus the so-called "people's democracies" are born, bu t in none of them the Comm uni sl Party gets th e majority, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, the only Cou ntry \vhich had been allied with the Soviet Union altTacly during the war. There, the Communists achieve 38% of the votes, while in all other Counlries they reach a meagre 10-11 % . They remain in power anyway, because this 1011 % enter the Governm e nt together w ilh the d e111ocratic forces hy virtue of a unanimous

recog111t1on : t h ey are th e ones thal have fought Nazism . The progressive democratic forces want lo introdu c e radical reforms, the agrarian reform, for example . This is possible because these Coun trÂˇies co111e from systems where large estates were the main characteristic . The de111ocrals b elieve that these 42

reforms can be reali1.ed only with the le ft and that with lhe Communists i t is possi ble to c ollaborate . The people's democracies d er ive from this cooperation, but the Communist represen t at i ves en cl up by holding th e key positions: Prime Minister, Minisler of the Tn terim~ Minister of Foreign Affa irs ,

.Minister of Defence, i. e. all s trategic posts. In Poland, actually, until 1955 the Minister of Defence has been the Sovie t Marshal Rokossovski, imposed bv the Reel Armv on its arrival. S;) there is a tri~nsition from a people's d e mocracy to a onep arty system since, \vith the Communists in power, the progressive clernocralic forces a.re deprived of power. On th e econorn i c p lane, initially there 1s a rea ll y u n ilatera l ex ploitation. A distinction is made among these Co u ntries, s ince some or them have been defeated, like Hungary, Bulgaria and Ru man ia, and they had to sign peace treaties which envisaged huge econom ic advantages for !Vloscow, while others have fought at its s ide . Among the defeated Countries, for instance, Rumania must hand over its oil p roduction to the Soviet Union as compensation for war damages, and if this is not done \Vith due regulari ty a fin e of 5% is added. In substance, unti l the sixties the Rumanian economy is heavily conditioned by the Soviet interests , \.vhi l e Bulgaria b ecomes a rea l

protectorate, in line with the ancient czarist traditions. The Soviet bloc s.bould not be confused \vith the \.Varsaw Pact, which is born in a completely different context. The Soviet bloc dates back to 1945-1 948 and the bilateral alliances are al most exclusively anti-German. When, with the East-\l\1est confrontation, these alliances become ant i\Alestern, an actual network is set up in 1947 - 1949 among t.he satellite Countries wh ich sign mutual agreements, such as those between Poland and Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Hungary and Rumania, Rumania and Bulgaria. The network is obviousl y controlled by Moscmv. This is a success for the Soviet strategy in Eastern Europe, strengthens on the political p lane what Stalin has accomplished at military level during the \Var, and stems from the nevv internationa l order proclaimed at Yalta. The bilateral strategy does not get the same resul t in the Far East, since i t does nol succeed in preventing the establishment of a great continental China. The only favourable element is that, at the

beginning, there is an ideological brotherhood, also because Mao is interested in the Sol(iet Union's support. Stalin's worry is that China cou ld be re-included in the international community. The U .S. , in ract, after the failure of the intermediation between Mao and Chang Kai-sb e k, begins t o consider the recognition of Peking and its reintegration \Vi thin the international comm unity. This \VCH.1ld be a hard blow for Stalin's policy, \Nhich is aimed at subjecting China to the interests o( the Soviet Union, but also at isolating it from the international context, in order to bind it. more and more to the Soviet requirements . T his objective is reached ,vith the Korean crisis. Wi th the Korean \var of 1950, China is opposed to the U.N. and it is only after Stalin's death and the consequ ent inte rna l political crisis - that i\11ao can seize the opportuni ty to escape Moscovv's influence, confronting the Soviet Un ion w it h a policy ,vhich, in the '70s, wi ll lead China Lo be seen as a possi b le th i rd pole.

THE AMERICAN EXAMPLE Also the Uni ted States adopts its own s trategy, definable as "rnultilaterali sm strategy " . It succeeds in Europe but fails in the Far East for reasons that are different but anyv,ay similar to the Sovi e t ones. Washington, unlike Moscow, docs not have a problem of strategic security since it is militarily stronger, not only for having won the war and .h aving suffered no invasions and damages, but especially because for some years i t has been holding the monopoly of the atomic weapon . The vvÂˇar has b rought wealth, the armament industries have been \.\'Orking at full steam supplying all batlle field s, from Europe lo the Far East, reaching a very high level of 43

production and employment. Jn this period th e U. S. enjoys an u nprece cle n led pe 1-io d of e conomic strength, but is also worried about the post- \var period. There is t h e risk o[ a seriou s economic recession which could throw the nation in a si tua tion worse than that of 1929. Without a strong ccono111y it is difficult to remain a strateg ic - rn i Ii Lary power. It is necessary to p roceed to an i 111 mediate industrial changeove r and t u rn out consumer goods instead of ar-rne-rncnts, keeping at the same time hicgh prod uction l evel , because the troops returning home require nevv so urces of employ ment. At the end of WWII, the main proble n, is to secure the markets . The "globalization" process is starling to take root, with the purpose of [inding econom ic and commercial outlets . In fact, alr-eady before the end of the war, the Bre tton \:Voods agreements marked the tra.ns i l ion fro m a system l inked to the pound sterling to a new one tied to the dollar. Not surp ris ingly the United Kingdom co ns iders thi s system the most serious threat to its role as world pO\ver. The British now feel more threatened by th e Am er ican power than by the Soviets. The U.S. b eg i ns lo replace them starting from 1940. When Great Brita in succeeds in driv ing back the German invasion, it suffers heavy losses and, in September 1940, signs an accord w ith the U.S. call ed th e "Destroyer Agreement" since it envisages the delivery of 40 or these crah. T he ships are not delivered free of charge: in exchange the U.S . asks some bases in th e Caribbean and economic concessions inside the Commonwealth. T hen there is the "Lend-Lease Act" ,.vhich is a decisive help fo r Grea t Britain and the others powers at ,,var. This is another spur Lo succeed the European powers i n thei r im pe ri a l po s iti ons , an d lhe

Bretton \:Voocl agreem ents mark the multilateral strategy v,hich is rounded off in October 1947 in the Havana Chari.er with a g en eral agreement on customs d u ties and trade (GATT). This is the centra l problem : how to guarantee the liberal ii'. al ion of trade in order to secure ne\v mar k ets o n wh ich to s e ll th e surplus of production which is by now a fa c t. Th e U.S. cannot adopt a bilateral strategy because the Counlries that arc exhausted b y ,.var are not l ooki ng for lib eral i za ti o n but rather for protectionism, so that they may s La rl the ir economic recovery and protect themselves from external co mpetition. This gives birth to the "Marshall Plan" (narned after lhe U .S. Secretary of State ) which intends to li bera Ii ze the markets and favour th e American

foreign policy. It is preceded by the "Trurn a n Do ctr ine" (economic support to Greece and Turkey) a kind of politicoideolog ical plaLform. Actually, it is an econom ic matter, in Lh,H the Ameri cans do not fear Moscow's military threat, also because, as we said, the Sovi e t bilateral alliances are not anti-\.Vest, but want to prevent the res urgence of Germany. The Marsha]! Plan is fundam en ta! in order to und ers tan d a strategy whose mainstay is prec ise ly Germa ny, because there is where the problem is . Placed at the heart of Europe , it is th e Coun try most devastate d b y war. It is Lhe hungriest, and this creates a political, economic and rnilitarÂˇy vacuum whic h, iF il ,vere to be filled by the Sovie t Union, co uld mean th e e ncl of the America n influence in Europe. When the Plan is launched on June 5, 1947 , the Am e r ic a n Secretary o f S tate, w ilh a fa mo us speech delivered at H arvard, underlines that iL is not a s imple humanitarian plan. Mars h all corn b i nes I h ree important conditions - or we

could call the m characteristics wil h h is aid project. First of a ll , the plan mus t concern all of Europe, a nd therefore it is global and not directed only to t h e Count rie s c lose r to th e U.S. interests, but a lso to the Sovie!

Un ion i tse l r. Furthe r more, the ai d mu st b e considered as an integ.-ation of, and not a su b sti tute for, a Eu,Âˇopea n initi al i ve . Alb e it g iven o n a bila LCl'al plane, the aid is conditioned by a m ulti lateral decision. Finally, the European initia t ive mu s t lead LO a programme Cor a customs union and the creatio n o f free-trade zones. This is the Marshall Plan. If we <lo not ltlke these cond itions in to account we cannot und ersta nd its strategy and the U.S.-Eu rope rela ti ons hip . T he Plan's g lobal c hara c t e r con ce rns al so t he Sovie LUn ion. The Un ited States has a political and a strategic reason to do so. From t he p o li ti ca l viewpoint , in fa c t , a di fferent solu tion would e n tail the acc u sa tion o f having div ided Europe, beca use the indi catio n or the Countries in vited to join the Plan would produce a list of Lhe "good" and "bad", whi le in reality t:::urope is already d ivided , both o n the strateg ic-mi Ii Lary plane and on the political plane. 45

of...

ii. Therefore Lhe U. S. does not assume this responsibility and decides to d irecl the Plan to t he whole of Europe, not only because the Eastern Countries (and lhe U.S.S .R. itself) need it, but a lso because il knO\vs very well lhat the Soviets will never be able to accept the olher t'INO conditions, i.e . the customs union and t he areas or free trade (GATT- General Accord on Tariffs and Tracie), s i nce lhis would intcrfe rÂˇe with Moscow's sphere of influence . lt is no accident that , when Poland and Czechoslovakia announce lheir initial willingness, the Soviets rebel against it, saying Lhal the U.S. wants lo enslave Europe to lbe American dollar. When, al the encl of June J 947, the French and lhe British govcrnmenls invite the rne.r nbers of the Soviet goven1ment to Paris to g ive an answer to Marshall's speech, the Fore ign lVIinister Vyaches lav Molotov atTi ves in lhe French capital with the proposal that Lhe Plan, in order Lo be accepted by his Country, should be approached on a b i lateral basis,

because also the Eastern Countries need that aid and the U.S. could favour their economic recovery \,v ithout questioning t he pol itico-military presence of the So vie t Union . To impose a mull. i]aleral policy, such as the European initiative and the freel rad zones, means to induce also those Co u ntries to join a

system Âˇwhich \Voulcl permil to at least lo restrain or even eliminate the Soviet pressure. T he Am ericans , by addressing the Marshall Plan a lso lo lhe Sov iet Union , generate a situation of tension with in lhe USSR's sphere of influence and even question its presence there. T he th re e - party meeting 111

Paris fails. The Soviets bunch a counteroffensive (action and reaction) ,vhich takes place in September 1947Âˇ with the Warsaw Conference ~nd the creation of lhe Cominform (the Buchares t-bas ed information office of the Communist Parties, closed do\vn in 1956). The Soviet delegate, Andrej Zdanov opens the first meetin g by saying that Europe is divided on two fronts . Thi s theory is later known as the "Zdanov docLrine" or "doctrine o f the two fields", but in practice is noth i ng but the acknowledgement of a preex.istin g r eality, wh i ch is attributed lo the .Mars h all Plan inste ad of ascribing it to the outcome of the war. The Plan is accepted by all lhose Countries which, having es c a p ed the Soviet Union's control, see the American aid as a blessing [rom

heaven which e nables them to start the reconstruction.

THE MARSHALL PLAN The European initiative, \.vhich is supposed to lead to a customs union, is not liked by everybody. Great Britain, in parlicu lar, feels

pl aced at the continental Countries' level, a lthough it considers itself a world po\ver. It cannot accept the proposal of the customs union because it has alread y its system of imp erial preferences (the Commonwealth), and ri s ks to irn pe rÂˇil the Jvlarshall's Plan aid. But the British, smarter than the Sov iets, react with diplomacy, insis ting that th e European initiati ve should take in to account the British interests . The U.S.-Europe relationsh ip, not e.xactly idyllic in general, at t he e ncl of \VWII is rather animated. The Marshall Plan does not result in a customs union . The negotiations, started in 1947 and

ended in April 1948, give rise to a European Organizat ion, today's OECD (Organization [or Economic Cooperat ion and Development). The Marshall Plan explains the U.S . strategy and clarifies the East -West relationship, perm itt ing to und e rstand the origins or the process of European integration. Washington, of course, docs not think of creat ing the United States of Europe but .m akes the Europeans think of the possible realization of a co mmon initiative. In the summer o[ 1947, wi thin the .M arshall Plan's negotiations, there are the Lirst signs of a "Six - Country Europe", \Nhich is ac Luall y going to be born ten years later 47

\.Vith the Treaty of Rome . Th e experim.ent fai l s because it wou l d iso l a t e Great B ri ta in from the European context and weaken i t s position i n the dialogue \Nill1 lhe United States. In their action, the British are allie d w i th th e Eu r opean nat ions linked to the poundsterling area, espec i a l ly l h e Scandinavian Countries . This is also a n embryo of what is go ing to be i mplemented ten years .later. In fact E FTA (European Free Trad e Associalion) is born a s an outcome of th e R ome Treaty. Once lhe cu sloms u nion is set aside, i n order not to throw Europe back into a Coldv\/ar dim.ate, the British plan is accepted. G1Âˇeat B r ita i n leads this in itiative u ntil March 1948, when th e Bru ssels Pact g ives birth lo the \Vestern Union (later called v\Testern Eu ropea n Unio n) , which some see as a change in th e process of integ ra tio n. Actu ally the Brussels Pact is th e tomb of European i ntegralion. As a rnaller of fact, it sanctions the partners' eco nomic, socia l and cu l l u ra l union and the collec tive legitimate defence. It is patterned on the Dunkerque Pac t (a fi f t y - year alliance between Britain and France) and i s a i med at containing Germany, exactly like the Soviet al liances . T here is no lack of c r itic ism from the U.S. to Grea t Britain w hi ch , to the p ro posal of setting up an anti-Soviet and anti- C ommunist sys t em has a ns,vered \.vith an anti-German e nlargement of the Dunk e rque Pac t. 1t is the realization of w h al St a lin had foreseen in 194 1: one sys Len1 on the East, o ne system on the \,Vest. Hence the prepostero u s s i l uation of 1948: precisely as the Cold War starts , the B r iti sh se t up an alliance vvÂˇhich ena bles them to silence th e Sovie ts (\vhal yo u di d on the E ast, \Ve are doing on the \Vest) and offer t he Gen11ans an a ll iance o n th e 48

b asis of \vhich t h ey can get successi vel y th e American war ranty. The strategy of th e Brussels Pact allows London to r e gain lhe leading ro l e i n Europe and place itse lf at the basis of this continenta l process of cooperatio n , reaffi rming the accord \vith the transatlantic allies . !'vlu lti laLeralism succeeds in Euro pe because th e U .S . is deal ing w i lh Countries \v h ose political, economic, cultu ral and m il itarv traditions do not stem fro m -Âˇ colonization or c o lon ia li srn . O n the con t rary, they have their own t rad iLi ons and have made the most of the Arn erican initiative not to remain satell ites but to manage il [or their recovery, con ti nu ing to be acti v e partners . Th e European Countries have begun to un d ers tan d that e ith er they uni t e or they wou ld r eally become satellites. At t he momen t \,v h en t h e two sides of th e Atlantic Joi n up the ri sk i ncrea ses , because the U.S. is the

of Havana and on Lhe GAT T system (liberali zati on process) vvh ich at that rnornent envisaged an exception about the existing preferential sys tem s (Commornvealth) in order not to antagonize G rea t Britain. The Americans believe that, w ithin a few y ears , the d ecolonisation p rocess th a t they are urg ing will be rapidly completed, and the GATT systen-1 w ill spread all over the \vorld. With t h e signature of t he Trealy of Rome, Washington b egins to understand that things arc not going in that directi on, b ec ause not only t h e so-cal le d corn mon exter na l rate is introduce d, bul th e policy of association o f t he former colonies to the EEC is extended also to other continenls (\.v it h more than 70 a ssociates), h ence l imi ti ng t h e possib i l ity o f economic expansion. P r esi d e n t John Fitzgerald Kennedy tries to resto re the strongest pmver with its atomic monopoly, is the keystone of the Alliance, and t h e E urop ean Countries , taken as a whole, can not bal anc e its weight. P rec isely \,v hen the Atlantic Allian ce is set up, the E u ropean imp ulse becornes more incisive. Therefore there is a strong bond bet\veen At lanticisrn and Europeanism, b ecause only by joining together the Europeans can hope to become partners or the U.S . Thi s conviction is still present, because t h e integration o f the cont i nent has b een imp lement ed on the eco nomic p lane b u t not on the political plane . This only i n creasc s the predominant role of the United States. The U.S .-Europe relationship a l the t i me is ve r y li v clv and interesting, unlik~ the U.S. and the Sovie t Union 's , wh ich are openly on a head-on collis ion, because there arc initiatives that serve onl y to g uaran lee the d evelopm ent of th e European Countries.

GLOBALIZATION Tn the globali zat ion process the Uni ted States and E u rop e a re co mp e t i ng for th e e conomic i ntegration which has ena bled Europe to bec ome a \.vorld e con omic p ower. Th e U n i tee! States ha d not foreseen it (but has had lo accept it) because it goes b eyond the lVlarshall Plan, fail e d in 1948. The Ame r ican approach is b ased on the Ch arter

cooperation , launching the idea "from the European community to the Atlantic c o mmu nity" , a design Lhat ends , vith h is death. Nevertheless l h e cl ialectic relatio ns hip between E urope and the U.S. permits lo contain t he Sovie t threat and to create a Western bloc \.vhi ch includes also Germany. The great U.S. strategy, started w ith lhe Mars hall Plan is impl e m e n ted t hro u g h t he Atlan tic A.I I iance, leading the 49

po! icy of containm e nt to a successful outcome

THE ASIAN EXAMPLE The American strategy is not very successful in the Far East, where the Eurorean methods do not work in Countries I.hat do not have the same tradit ions. Countries like Korea, Indochina, New Zea land and Australia (the last two are still memhers of the Commonwealth) have just come ou t. of the colon ial sys te m and, in the face of the Sino-Soviet threat, the U.S. is compelled to turn to Japan, as it had done in Euro pe with Germany. Also in Asia the Americans t1-y in vain to establish a multi la teral sys tem, hut they are forced to intervene with their troops and equipment to restrain the S ino- Sovi et threa t.. Multilateral all iances such as SEATO (Southeast Asia) are bo rn, but they rcrnain on pape1~ because at the outbreak o[ any crisis t he U.S. e nters the fi e ld with scarce r esults: it is the fail ure oC multilateralism . Thi s exrlains why in the Far East it is impossible to talk about stability, security and balance. Instability p ers ists , a n d the re cove r y 01Âˇ Japan compels the U.S. to gi,Âˇe direct guarantees lo th ~ Co u ntries that had s uffe r ed Japan's aggression, in particular Australia and New Zealand. Anoth er Am e r i can commitment is to contain the th reat in the J\11 ic.ldle East a rea, w h e r e the s ituat ion is very unstable owing to the ArabIsraeli war of J 948 . T he U. S. makes an att em pt w ith the Baghdad Pact of 1954-55, which later b ecomes CENTO (Central East '-Jear 'frealy Organization). The Treaty fosters a kind of hinge between NATO and SEATO, with Turkey as linking c l e m ent between the Atlantic Alliance anc.l CENTO, and Pakistan as a hinge between CENTO and S EATO.

CONCLUSIONS The system born after vVWII is a bipolar system, because it is

rea li zed on the basis on the actions carried out by the two superpm.vers and is made stable by weights and countervveights. After the collapse oC the Soviet Union, some said t hat the world woul d inaugurate a post-Cold War era, since the latter had given shape to Europe rnore than it had done to .Asia. For Asia the most important problem was that o f expell ing the colonial pcl\vers, establishing fai rly stable national States. Later, the real chal lenge s were industriali zalion and economic gro,Nth. Of course, Count,.. ies like China and India played a certain role in the Cold \Va1~ but it ,vas certa inly not what the U .S . and the U .S.S.R. would have wanted. Their struggle did not regar d the expansion or

The multilateral strategy fa il s also in this case, because the U.S. cannot ride two horses: the Israe li force and the Arab League's. The differences within the Arab League make lha t policy even more d ifficult and we are seeing the consequences t o this clay.

resistance Lo Communism, but rather the adven t of a process of industria li Lat ion and modernization of their societies. Thus China and Ind i a are t rans forming a continent four times as large as Europe . This shows that: what can be done in the held of industry is feasible

in the military field as well. The American policy aims at preventing the realization of this type of picture. This would represent a great increase in the threat to th e U.S. territory: former ly lhe threat came only f rom the U .S.S .R. but in the future m any others cou ld be in the Russian position. In view of this, n ex t to the v ita! fight against terror ism, lhe second top priority, basic pillar or the American strategy, is a wide and global antirnissi le defence , ,vhich should includ e as many international actors as possible , willing to share and finance i t. Any nevv order i n Asia wil l have to face some fun darnental di lemmas . Th e Countrie s controlling the greatest pan of th e oil prod uct ion are directly exposed to the terrorist Lhrea t and fight very hard to guard themselves from that ins id ious enemy. The United States has the poss ibi l ity of s t aying in

Asia: for many rÂˇea sons the Countries of the region need its all iance which, 110\V more than ever, is ind ispensable to their security.

â€˘ ' Expert in Strategic Sciences 51

Born as prlvate co-;,,panies, they have become more and more widespread in all operational theatres

Either admired or feared, often seen with prejudice or mythicized, the "Priva te Military Companies" (PMC) are fruits of our time. We are going to discover the origins, situations and projects of a much-discussed phenomenon that deserves an exhaustive analysis.

he more and more numero u s operal ions carried out by Italian and fore ign Arm ed Forces in cris is areas far from the motherland have been characterize d bv a series of factors \.vhich until a fe\v years ago wou ld have been imposs i ble lo i magine. On or these is certainl y the considerable number of civil ian operators who, in civilian dress, perform tasks which were once assigned to the military. Thes e nc\v actors belong to organizations commonly known as "PMCs" (English acronym for Private Military Companies) , v\1 h ich enter the interna ti onal sce nario Lo fill the posl- 1989 security vacuum and to offset the lack or interve ntionism from States that are loath to risk their sold iers ' li [e i n m issions no l connected to their primary national inleresls. The b irth and growth o f the PfvlCs was favoured by the h igh nu mber o f servicemen who in the space of a few years foun d t hemselves out of work, thus becoming a large reservoir of manpower to draw from. The first factor ,vhich fostc ,-eel th ei r birth and therefore, in a

certain sense, the beginning of the privat i7.at ion of the n, ilitary universe, \,v as t h e e no rmo u s number of crises that marke d the las t decade of the 20 t h Cen tury. T he scarce interest shown by lhe superpowers to keep all cri t ical areas un d er con trol in orde r Lo preven t the small hotbeds of trouble from d ege n e rating i nto larg er confrontations, let off tensions t hat had been dormant for years. The second factor lies in the armies' reduction. As a matter of fact, this produced a s urplus in the offer of military manpower endowed ,,vith much-prized and usefu l skills. To have an id ea of this phenomenon, suffice it to consider lbaL lh e fall of the B e rlin Wa ll caused in the opposing armies a redu clion o f at least 7 mi llion men. T his concerned not only the \Narsav,i Pact, but also the United States, wh ich reduc e d i ts n,ilil ary apparat us by a third, and Great Britain, \Vh ich today has the lowest number of soldiers in the last two ce n t u ries . T his d emobilization was not limited to conscripts, but involved a cul in the number of Cadres and, for

those who rema ined in service, a drastic reduction in their career possib iliti es . Thus a considerabl e num b er of unemployed Officers and NCOs was d e livered to the m arke t. Fina ll y, the u n i ts c l iminaled were mostly the logistic ones since the corn bat units, be i ng consider ed the core business o f the military fu nction, were kept as mu ch as possible. For example, the Logistic Command of t he U.S. Army und erwent a 60% reduction. vVith hinds igh t, iL turn e d oul th at the calculations were ,vrong , because the new .requirements of force p rojection needed hi gh logistic capabilities. Jt ,vas easy for the PfvICs to occupy this free space because, w ith the ir \vork, the)' made up for the scarcity of capabilities in th is sector.

any Lime and this makes him different from the classic soldier, bound by a permanent relation to his Country, or 1rnr11 other part icular units, such as the Gurkhas or the Foreign Legion. Finally, mercenaries are mostly individuaJ ists: when they have to be grouped into units they have scarce capab ilities, clue to scarce cohesion and lack of common Lraining. The first aspect that should be pointed out is that the P lVICs are like firms which operate on the market according to i ts rules and arc therefore structured according to the organiY.ational criteria aimed at finding t he best possib l e efficiency. Here one can sense their difference from the ad-hoe coa.li tions of mercenaries, ,vhich assemble in v iew of per1orming a task, rece.ive the agreed payment and then and break up. Furthermore, th ese

A superficial analysis 01 the phenomenon could lead to the conclusion that the P l'vlCs are a simple rebi rth of the old mercenary companies. But they belong to different times, have different purposes and are very different, even if, in the general imagination, the two real ities are equivalent, to the detriment o( the PMCs, because the term "1nercenary" carries a sense 01 negativeness. The \Vorel indicates an individual vvho works for someone other than his Country, is moved by economic reasons only and does nol have any sense of b elonging to a political community. The loyally of the mercenary is characterized by the terms of his contrac t wi th the emp loyer and not by a creed, a choice or a particular

âœ“

1:-Âˇ6

sense of duty. For h irn, war is a cho ice of life. A soldier serves his Country to avert war; a mercenary considers war his \vork and source of income. A mercenary can decide to leave his chosen way of life at

organizaLions operate according to a logic of company and not individua l profit as is the case w it h mercenaries. While the latter work for money, the PMCs can stipulate rnany types of different contracts , jus t like

any mode rn firm , v,,r he re t he terms of p ayment can be t he most different ones. A third aspec t that should b e underli ne d is that the P l\il Cs o perate on t he mark et a nd publicize t hei r presence, arc usuall y r egister ed with the ir Cou ntry of origi n a nd ma n y have an in ternet si te a dvertising their services and capabilities . In short, while the PMCs want to be k now n , the mercena ries strive to hide and operate in the s hade. The co m pan ies do not wo r-1, in the c ombat sector only. On the contra ry, th at is \v here they a ,Âˇe less p resent. T heir activity c ove rs the w ho le range of m il i Lary fu nctions : logistics, training, i ntelligence , adviso ry s e rv i c e s , e la b o r a t i o n of doctrine and p rocedures. T hey o perate at wi de range, vvit h no ge ogra phi c li mi tat ion s a nd serve seve ral c lients at the same

time, b ut in some ca ses the ir a ctions can be concentrated on a single t arget. They ac t a s ind epend ent enterprises or as me mbe rs of muc h mo r e c om plex stru cture s a nd therefore th e y hav e la rg e resources al their dis p osal. a s regards both c api tal s and r elations, and this makes them extr emely competi tive.

A POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION It should be pointed out that t hese fi rn1s must not b e confused with the PSCs (Private S ecurity Companies) - ,Âˇ ecenrly come to the limelight in Ira q - wh ose exclusive job is to prov id e security. It is difficult to categorize the PMCs, sin ce the y o perate in different sectors and in variab le ge o graphical a r eas, and ha ve

different dimensions. A recent classification made by a student o f the phenomenon, consid ers three types of PMCs: c om bat, advice and services.

PMCs for combat Th ey opera te al tac tical level on the ba ttl efiel d . Their membe rs supp ly their services e ith er by fig ht ing (b oth as s pecial ists and al un it level) or by carrying out a Command-anclCon trol ac tion for the uni ts or the client army directly engaged in b attl e. T he usual cl ients are t hos e w hi ch ha ve r el ativel y limited capabiliti es and have lo face h igh-risk situations on short w a rning . T he re have bee n examples of PMCs that d eployed b attalion -level un its, co mp lete w it h t heir O\VB artillery, h eli cop ters, c om bat and transport aircraft and specialists i n several sectors . I n shon, a

small but complete army, in a position to integrate the ex isting one and, above all, lo replace il, accomplishing autonorno us ly the action for wbich itÂˇ is p a id. The effectiveness o f these small priva te units is much highe r than that of larger forma tions which ei ther lack some operational functions, are insufficiently trained or have no weapons as technologically effi cient as those emplo_yed by the private organizat ions. These PMCs can also provide specialists \\rho a re re al powe r multipliers: fighter and h e licopter pilots, Comm a nd ancl -Control experts . As an a lter native th ey can provide tactical glohal advisers, \,v h o take charge of the client's unit and, thanks to their well-tested leadership talents, considerably increase the capabili ties of the un i t . T his is the ty pe o[ PMC that rouses the crit icism of th e internationa.l communi ty the most. For this reason, often th e Pl\lICs do not admit their presence officially, or list their specialists as advis e rs or instructors who are on the frontline simply to v e r ify the results of their teach ing.

PMCs for advice

This category includes th e PlVICs that provide a d v ic e on training and force restructuring, besides supplying organizational, operational and strategic counsel. Unlike the preceding group, thi s typ e of firm provides services \Vhich do no t engage them on the battl efield . Their cl ien t s are

Countries that need to reshuffle their forces in order to make them rnore adequate t o t h e changed stralegic pictu re. The required interventions are not urgent and th e contra cts are long-term matters anyway. The cornpany can limit its action to a simp le analysis o[ the situation but, once the possible sol u tions a re roun d, it can offer its training advice and s u pply a complete package o f serv ices, short of th e fina l phase represented by lhe inter ve nt ion i n combat . This working relationship is more accepted than the previous one and for these reason some PMCs of the first t ype in the las t years changed t h e ir organization, in order to provide mainly advisory func tions. PMCs for services

They supply an ext:ren,cly wide range of services not directly connected \Vith combat but equall y important: log is t ics , medical assistance, intelligence, transport. T he possibilities o f i nterven tion are considerab le, since they operate in sectors where t he Arme d Forces have 57

suffered Lhe largest reductions. The clients are usually looking for immediate intervent ions, in order to concentrate on the core business of the military activity, i.e. combal. !Vlosl companies of this sector are firms Âˇwhich were already p rÂˇesent on the civilian market and took the opportunity to expand. T heir business is thriving mainly in the sector of transports since they tend to intervene in areas far from the home country. A spec ia l position is held by companies that provide intelligence. They are among the most sought-after, in that they allov,,1 non front - ranking Countries to acquire prestigious positions thanks to thei r control of information.

THE PMCs IMPACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET In a classic v1s1on of i nternationa l re l ations, the States that hold the monopoly of the use of force are the main actors, and t he .inters t ate relations are strongly influenced by the d ifference of povver between them. Here the PMCs come i nto play and, as th ey can participate in \Var operations, they depr i ve Lhe States of the exclusive possession of force . The ava il ability on the market of the military services prov ided hy Lh ese organizations definitel y u psets th e international balance and , in particular, has a direct effect on interstate and intrastate relations . The PMCs are not, as one co uld superricially believe, just another factor to he counted in defi n ing the power of a Slate. As a matter of fact, one should not take for granted that a PJ\ilC registered in the territory of a State operates only for lhat S tate . On the c ontrary, especially if Lhal Country is not particularly 58

inclin ed lo b elligerency, the private company will operate only i n favour of other customers. During the Cold \,Var, the structure and quality of the military instruments were decided and realized on the basis of the opposing threat. The operations were planned know ing the strength o[ Lhe enemy and the ground on which the assumed engagement would Lake p lace. Through exercises and simulations the p lanners cou ld also establish Lhe type and quantity of the forces needed in

order to en ter the struggle with a reasonable probability of success. Today's p lanning of force is based on the capabi li ty concept. T hrough the analysis of the possible scenarios, the p lanners cl e Lerrnine the capabilities needed b y a modern mil i tary instrurn ent and then proceed to their constitution. They arÂˇe often precious and resulting from an advanced t e chnology that only a few Countr ies can afford. Those are precisely the capab il iLies wh i ch make the difference between the armies,

of economic ava i labi lity resources is now the distinctive element of the potenl ia ls of a Country wh ich, in a short Lime, can acquire former ly denied capabi li ties . \.\1i th t h is approach, t he first t hing that vanishes is the power balance among the Countries . In fact, to say t ha t a Country has more military capab ilities l han anoth er and could t h erefore \Nin a possible conflict, is not true anymore. In case of war, th e weaker s i de could have recourse to th e PMCs and receive not only advice but also a real ope rational assistance (in the shape of intelligence) that could cha n ge the ratio of the forÂˇces . Another aspect is connected w ith the size of the capabilities that a Country actually needs to acq u ire . In other \vords, \vhy spend a great amount of money to build and maintain military instruments that will probably never be used? \,\Thy contin u e burde ning the Country's b udget i n vinv of an ev ent whic h , espec ially in the present scenario, has very scarce or zero probabilities to occur'

and to h ave or not to have th em, and in \Vhat quantity, permits to p lace t he armies along a continuum of military po,ver \vhich characterizes each Country. T h e constru c t ion of new capabilities is not on ly a problem or financial resources but also a qu es ti on of having access to nev,,, technologies and availability of human resources trained for managing them and keeping them a t their topmos t efficiency. With lhe adven t of the PMCs, anybody \,v ith econorr1 i c resources can a fford to acquire a ny capabi li ty. T he

deriving from an agreement , was h o lding the sn-1aller one in check. The acLion of th e PMCs breaks these alliances an d, in a certain sense , sets the smaller Country Cree from th e yoke o f its stronger partner. Another point concerns the replacement of the strÂˇ ic t l y military relations w it h other bonds based also on financi al considerations. In othe,Âˇ \vord s , in order lo help a S tate in need of military aid it is no longer necessary to provide exclusively this Lype of assistance b u t the h elp can be g iven in the shape of f i nanc ial su pport. For examp l e , in 1995 som e Countries \vhich wanted to h elp th e nascent M u slim Bosnian state, avoidin g at the same t ime the surfacing of forms of extrem ism , financed the "Tra in These considerations arÂˇe valid especia lly for those me di um small Countries \,vhich do not h ave sufficient resources to maintain a mi litary apparatus complete in every operational f un ction an d therefore must establish a set of priori ties . Once these are defined, i t will be a matter o f finding the PMCs t hat can prov id e the other functions, if and when necessary. Anoth er less technical-military an d more typ ically political conseq uence, connected wi th the increasing presence of the PMCs on the market, can be seen i n the less firm a lliances among small and big Countries. Unt il some ye ars ago, this relationship was based o n t h e m ilitary assis tance that a large Country would give to a smaller one in exchange fo r a "friendly" att it ude in internationa l questions, or for its \villingness of being "gu ided" in other si tua tions . This was a ki nd of vassalage und er a strong Co untry wh ich, in exchange fo r .its promise of m"il i Lary assistance, not nec ess aril y 60

and Equ i p" programme, conducted on the field by a PMC. These s ur rogates of the traditional mililary relations have some disadvantages . For instance, the continuous training relationship among Lhe military was somehow a guarantee that, on an emergency, all lhe actors employed would operate according Lo the same procedures deriving from a common slanclarcl . With the entrance of the PMCs in the scenario, th is kind of guarantee comes to an end.

negat i ve idea of the PMCs. Through the emp loyment of th ese un ils, some inlernational organizations are able to increase the ir capab ilili es considerably. Just think, for exampl e , of the intelligence secto rÂˇ: iL is a fie.Id where the jealousies of the member states prevent them from irnplernenl.ing common structures , thus blocking the birth of a real

do not have enough deterrence capab il ities to prevent the altacks against Lhe human itarian organizations . Thus, the allernalive is Lo resort to forms of defence hired on the spot, but, on the other hand, these lack the guarantees of imp artiaJ ily Lbal arc i ndispcnsable for such operations. In a second poss ible scenario, a private company cou ld provide a sort of rapid

multinaLionaJ capability (the U .N. turned to a PMC for t he satellite survey of the Iraqi siles). Also very significant are the opportunilies in t h e seclor of peacekeeping operations, \vhere one could al most envision a kind of privatization. There are several levels where a recourse to the PMCs could be considered. A likely scenario, the less "offensive" one for the United Nations, co uld envisage the employment of Lhe PMCs for ensuring security to the humanilarian operators o[ Lhe UN and other Organizations. The idea should be given a serious thought. F irst of all, there are nol enough "Blue Berets" to protect all humanitarian interventions and, secondly, they

reserve force, capable of intervening when the truce with the UN forces is broken and the Organization is threatened and unable Lo carry out its mission for lack of means. In t his case it would b e a matter of pa ying a PMC Lhal cou ld provide a u nit, armed and equipped for combat, ready to intervene promptly in the o p erat ion s 1.one. The l atter scenario is one where the PMC supplies the whole intervention force . This possibility was stud ied thorough l y in 1996, during the crisis in Rwanda. On that occasion, in a situation of humanitarian catastrophe, an d in the absence of any will or possibility or i nternational involvement, the intervention of

THE PRIVATIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING The preceding considerations should not lead to an exclusively

a private military company for ope ning s ome h u manitarian c o rridors vvas discu sse d at length, both by th e Sec u rity Cou nc il and by Lhe Go vern men ts o r the mo st importa n l Coun tri es . Finall y the idea ,vas disca rded vvhen the core of lhe questi o n \Nas reached , i.e . w ho was going to pay.

DRAWBACKS IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE PMCs T he recourse to t he PMCs is no doubt a p ositive poss ibi lily and must b e pursued. But some aspects deserve reflectio ns o f vari ous kin ds, s ince they limit considerably lhe a dvan tag es deri ving from the outsourcing. T he f irst one is the very nature of the P M Cs, whose sole purpose is th e realization of the high est poss ible pro fit. While the military always look for t he most effective solution an d are only relatively conditioned b y its cost, a civilian fi rm c ou ld deem more convenient to adopt a l ess e ffe ctive bu L more profita ble option . A pec ulia r feature o r the PMCs is tha t they are bound to the cl ient by longterm co ntra cts which can produce eve n a lmos t monopo listic situations . T his allows t he company Lo underbid in order to win the con tract, knowing only too \veil that late1Âˇ there w ill be time for increas in g the margins of prnfil. Anther problem is the clash of interest s. In practi ce, sin ce conflicts are th eir source of income and their raison d'etre, vvhy s hou ld th e PJ\/IC s endeavour to en d th em ? Th e con tracting fi rm cou ld have an interest in exp and ing a nd le ngtheni ng the conflict 0 1Âˇ in changing the initial conditions ("we need m ore p ersonnel than previously estimated"). A drmvbac k of o u tsourci ng is ce rt ain ly th e possi bilit y of

losing co n trol of the engaged ( ir m and he c ome t oo de pend ent on it. T his is very da ngero u s in th e mil ita ry sect or, where one cou ld be aba ndo ned by a com p an y wh ich ca nnot fulfi l] th e obli gations of the conti-act or, on the o ther extreme, becomes so indispensable tha t the client cannot do ,vithout il. I n the first case, whe re the Grm does not f ulfil ! the t erms of the c ontract a nd desc ns the customer, it could be said that in the lo ng run this choice d oes not pay, b ecause very soon the com pa n y will fall i nto dis repute for bei ng unreliable. This is tr u e but, o n the o t h er hand, some P M Cs co uld o p t for a "one sh ot" choice, leaving to geograp hic dis tance and the r api d evolution of the s itu ation the possi b iliLy of returning to the game in other scenarios . In the second case, ins tead , the firm becomes indispen sable s ince the choice of outsourci ng

in that sector was to tal. These companies slowly a cquire th e exclusive control of a particular f u n ctio n and , o nce the dependence is comp le te ,

.. "Âˇ -~-

sometime s proc eed to re al b l ac kmail. Undo u bt ed ly the entire out sourcing of certai n c ap abilities c an lea d to regrettable situations . I n 2000,

considered b y the greal powers as well . As r egard the United States, for instance, the matter could become very critical. Just think of a scenario o f b iolog ical or chemical threat: during the first Gulf War most losses were due to a SCUD m issile \vhich wenl m ad and landed on a US reserve unit charged wilh th e pu ri ricat ion of w ater. Today this capability is complet el y ass ig ned to civilian firms . \!\That woul d happ en after the first ci v ilians' dea th? Cou ld the company sliLI find volunteers to honour the con tract? T he sit ua lion coul d become very critical. So far the Command ers have not r ealized th e importance of t his asp e ct and s lil I Len ci to p l an t h e i r operations as if a ll the operat ional functi ons were to be c arrieJ oul by p ri va te organizations .

THE ESSENTJALITY OF SOME FUNCTIONS

a shipping firm was engaged to repatriale w it h a big freighter a contingent \Vhich had [inished their vvork o u t o f area. Besides the personnel, the freighler was carrying about 500 wheeled and armoured vehicles and more than 350 containers full of ammunition and other sensitive materials. Owing to a dispute on the fre ighta ge, the ship li e d at anchor off the Can a dian c oa sl , ho ldin g the personnel as hostages. Besides the obvious e mbarrassing situation, one cannot but think of what could have happened in terms of operational outpul if the incid e nl had occurred during the phase o f project ion to the operations theatre. These situations of d esert ion are more rrÂˇequen t \vhen s mall Countries or private cuslomers

are concerned, but the damage of a Lola! dependence on a civilian firm must be carefully

At t he beginning of th e nineties a nd al t he sa m e time of th e progressive redu clio n o f armame nt s in t h e military instruments, some anal ysts remar k e d that th ere \Vas a

possibility tha t the States could find themse lves in situ ations of de pendence . The Amer ican military doctrin e rejected these observations , maintaining th a t t.he U .S. was goi ng to o u t.source only th e fu nctions that did not fall ,vi thin t he category of "emergency essential support" .

Unfortunately things arÂˇe very different . It is a fact b y now that t.he military h ave lost t.he "kno,v- hovvÂˇ" in severa l a ctiv ities, and in many critical sectors the respons ibi lity has gone cornpl etely to civilian firms. Suffice it to think of the logistic sec tor. Until a few years

ago, the contracts involv i n c c;ilical, highly tec hn o logical materials ,-cqu i r e d that t h ei r maintenance and possibl e correctives ,voulcl b e h and e d over to the military technic ian s after abou t a yea r from th e introduction in service of the eq uipment. Wi th th e contin u ous red u ction of ef[ectives, especial l y in t h e logistic sector, t he terms have changed . Today the logistics o f high-technology systems suc h as, for exam p le , "stan d o ff" armaments, is an exc lu siv e respons i b ility of the sup p li e r who, on delivery of th e system and on payment of a genero us fee, undertakes to keep it in ,vorking order for a certain numb er of years . Thi s is a logical choice in peacetime, b u t in case of crisis, sho u ld th e compan y have prob lems , it wo uld rapidly t ransla te i nto a serious l ack of ope r ational capab il i Li es. The problem of o utsourcing is not limited solely to the means, it involves also men. T[ the

logistic component is entrusled to c i vilian firms , man y logisticians wil l he presenl in the operations zone ins tead of lhe former servicemen. Such a situation deprives the Commanders of a reserve of capabilities thal historically proved lo be very usefu l on several occasions , both because a civilian docs not have the necessary training to shoulder a rifle and contribute to military operations and because, if h e did, \vould not be exLendecl the guarantees en visaged for lhe prisoners of \var.

REGULATIONS OF THE PMCs' ACTIVITIES From the considerations made so far it emerges rather clearly that it is necessary to adopt a form of regularization of the existence and activity of the PMCs . Moreover, the acliv ity of

individuals or organizations m the security seclor cou l d hamper the Slates' objectives of fore i gn policy. Th e regular forces cou ld find themselves in s i tuations of combat against units trained b y eleme nts bel onging to those firms, \.v ho could be forme r \ 1\!es Ler n servicemen who might have taught th eir "pup il s" sophisticated and even "classified" fighting Lechn iqucs (e.g., the procedures adopted by the Special Forces) . The nationality of th e PlVICs could have an indirect impact even on t he reputation of lhe companies' home Countries. It is difficu l t to imag ine, [or i nstance, that in case of unlawÂˇfu l behaviour someone would not think that some national government Author ity knows a bou l lh e occurrence. Fur thermore, the failure of an activity carried out by a private company could require the

intervention of regular military forces lo save the members of the organization from possibl e death. The regulalion of the PMCs' activi l ies is a very important issue beca use the consequences of a s ituation of anarchy could be very difficull to control. A frequently debated q uestion is \Vhether t his forrn of regu la tion shou ld have a nationa l or international character. In the first case national regulation - il is rather ev ident that the control could be more coercive and the companies would find heavy restricLions to the development of their acliv iLies . On the other hand, one can guess that in that case the PM Cs could adopt a nomadic attitude, changing their location according to their interests o f the moment. Thus one goes from a situation 'lvhere, at first s ight, there is a strong form of control to 65

another or lo tal anarchy. The choice of an i nterna t iona l archi tec t ure wou l d be prererable . In particular, ra ther than issue a n u mber of lmvs in the Counlries \Vhere the PMCs decide to set up thei r regislered offices, i l m igb l b e better to Lhink of a set of rul es establish ed by an inlernational bod y, such a s the U N or the Internatio n a l Courl of Justice. Th is choice appears a lso to be more objective, s ince il avoids th e possibi lity that more permissive national legislalions m ay induce the firms to move to those Co u ntries, w hi c h ,vou ld rapidly become a k in d of accumula tion points for m ili tary companies. I n view of t his, a kind of regislration with an i nternational body co uld b e required (wilh lhe possibility of having the activity s uspended in case of violations of t he norms) or the authorizations could be granted for single p roj ects (bu t lhi s solution, of cour se, would have a numberÂˇ of drawbacks in lerms of secrecy and operatio nal speed). Anoth er ,-eg ul aliv e option cou ld envisage th e p resence of a control team on the spot. The learn vvotdd act as a referee, observing the progress o f t he operÂˇa lions w i t ho ut interfering, u n less the company breaks the rules of the game. It is unlikely t hat such a t eam would have t he strength to stop an operation in p rogress, but obvio usly a negative judgement on the work of th e compan y would make it una ble Lo tender for fu tu re contracts . The team's presence could be an element of c on lrol in order to avoi d no t only the e rnployrnent o f tec hni q u es ba nne d by humanita rian conve nL ions bu t also t h at the compa n y shoul d extend t he durnt ion of t he mi ss ion in an " artifi cia l " mann er, i n order to earn more than st ipulated . On the o th er

hand, a company \Nork i ng according to lhe ru les would have everything to gain frorn I. he presence of a contro l t eam which wou l d guaranlee Lhe reliability o f the firm .

CONCLUSIONS The above considerations g ive us the possibili ly lo imagine the fu t u 1Âˇe of these organizat ion, which have by now reached considerable dimensions. The ir destiny is linked to the evolution of t he world scenarios an d , therefore, of the armies. During the Cold Wai~ the PMCs fou nd it hard to asse n themselves and the "mercenaries" \Nerc t h e "prima don nas" . Why? The ans'\ver is twofold. In lhe firs t p lace, the nu mber of crises was considerabl y smalle r an d the

t,-vo powers bad no interest in fu e lli ng hotbeds of tension Lbal \Vere dangerous for t h e ,vorld b alances. Therefore, at the first signs of crisis, the s uperpmvers lriecl l o so l ve any possib le dispute in a peacefu l manner. On th e other hand , the \vorld was divided inlo rat her clear-cut spheres of influence and each powe1~ in its area, laid dmvn the L:1 \V. As a ma t ter of fac t , lhe crises were breaking out in p laces w h ere the competence ,vas not \Nell defined (e .g. Africa) bu l. i n those Countries, e ven if the superpowers di d not fail to interfere more or less open ly, the burden of I.he in tervention was al most always left to I.he former colonial powers . Therefore, in th e crisis a r eas the r e \Vas no fertile ground fo r the P.tvICs. The same was also true i n their respective Countries, where the

number of soldiers was suHicienl to carrv out many f u nctions that today are entrusted lo private compan ies . The logistic , tra i ning and studying f u nct ions could be performed \.vithout problems since t h ere were enough men who could conduct t he battle and dev ot e themselves to the defence o [ the national borders. But in the last years the situation has radically changed . Soldiers are fewer and rcwer and many o f the functions ,vhich are still indispensable for supplying th e o u tp u t tha t the Counl.ry reques ts o f the Armed Forces must be ea rried ou t b y o l he r actors, i.e. the PMCs. We co ul d conclude t h at for these organizations the future is rosy enou gh, a lbeit vvith some specifications . In Fact, some Co u ntr ies - owing l o their culture, poli tical choice or other reasons - are strongly incli ned towards peacekcepi ng missions, \.vh ich are not as h u man resou rces cons u ming as th e combat ones and leave l ittle room for outsou rcing. One could a l most say that th e armies' increasing spcc ialization of th is type prevents the PMCs from becoming the a rmed tool of t he international organizations. Neverthe less one cannot b u t admit that the \vorlcl s itu ation is such - and so wi ll be in th e s hort and medium term - that the p rivate military companies still have remarkable margins for deve lopment. As th e Iraqi example 1s p ro v ing, the American in t ervention ism, always shared and supported by the Brit ish ally, will inevi tably require their support. A recent ana lys is foresees that in 20 10 t h e market o[ t h e PMCs ,,v ill prod u ce prnceeds of as much as 202 billion dollars !

''Lieulenanl Colonel, General Office of the Army Chie(o(Staff

ccording to the most classical definition by Hans Selye, a famous German psychiatrist of the first half of the 20th Century, stress is a "non-specific response of the human body to a request of performance". On the basis of such definition, since the response is the product of an objective component (the stimulus) and of a subjective one (the interpretation of the stimulus), we can say that stress is a personal reaction to a combination of objective stimuli that are subjectively acknowledged as a request of performance. To simplify, each individual reacts to the stimuli in a subjective or personal way, according to his own character, personal nature and way of thinking. In short, assuming that ten individuals undergo the same stimuli (the same boss, the same colleagues, the same job, sharing the same room) each of them will react following his own disposition. Therefore, some af them will consider the boss intelligent, competent, humane, understanding, and the colleagues unselfish friends, cooperative and sympathetic. Some others will regard the boss as cruel, selfish and indifferent. The latter, who experience frustration at work, where they neither fit in nor feel understood, will try to cope with the unfriendly environment and, living in a constant emotional tension, inevitably head for stress. During the 17th Century, in England the term "stress" was usually used to mean "difficulty, adversity,

affliction". Subsequently it coincided with the idea of "strength, pressure, tension or strain" exerted on a object or a person. It was only at the beginning of the 1970s that the word stress entered the scientific language to denote a "state of tension or rather the resistance put up by a person against external forces acting on him". This definition includes the fundamental principles that support the aetiology of stress. First, as was mentioned before, that stress is a non-specific reaction; then, that the stimuli can be either physical or emotional. Finall,y, that stress is first of all "a defensive, adaptive response, and so it is useful to the body", and only later can lead to illness. Thus, stress is not pathological in itself, rather it is normal and physiological, in that it allows an individual to react to different kinds of external stimuli every day. It is only its constant and lasting repetition or the same perpetuation of the stimulus that transforms normal stress into a pathology. At this point, that stimulus or that situation become stressing, i.e. dangerous. We have to underline, though, that stimuli of physical kind (heat, cold, noise, somatic changes), of psychosocial kind (threatening personal interactions, physical safety or life at risk) and of intrapsychic kind (character, personality), can lead to stress only when they cause an emotional reaction which triggers the production of particular substances within the body.

fn a wor<l, a non-s pecific stimulus becomes stressing only when an emotional parlecipa tion is triggered within the s ubj ect concerned. Let us make an example. If on our \vay Lo the office, we have lo take the underground, as thousands o[ peop le do, bul we personally suffer the presence of people, the crov.-d, the closed -in space, the heat, the pushes, the rigid respeCL or the schedule, the compulsori ness of taking that means of transport, all these nonspecific stimuli, \vhich act upon all the people tra vel! i ng by und erground, will becom e str essing o n ly ,v hen they cause emotiona l reactions such as su ffering , anx iety, anger, d iscomfort, fear, w o rry, restlessness, agitation. The emo tional response to the stimulus does not only m anifest itself at a somatic and biological level (tachycardia, stomach-ache, hi gh blood pressure, anxi ety, phobias, insomnia), but also at behavioural level, with precise adaptive a nd defensive aims. The

e m otion can be seen as an i n tegrate d behavioural and biological reaction, aiming at the individual adaptation to changed conditions of internal and external stimulation. As a maller o[ fact, in front of a th reat, the body reacts bot h at behavioural and somatic level in orde1路 to b ring back the basi c conditions.

WHAT STRESS REALLY IS

S tress is seen from the double p er路spect ive of bi ol ogical and psycho-behavioural stress and is a n integral part of the defensive and adaptive emotional reaction of the superior organisms. H aving sai d tha t, we have to explain hmv stress is connected w ith the physical symptom s we mentioned above (tachy card ia, stomach -ach e, ast h ma, sweaty palms, vertigo) and the psyc hic behaviour (anxiety, phobias, panic a ttacks, insomnia). In sho rt, how and by what process a stressing stimulus, such

as a thought, an idea , the e nvi ronment, a job, other people, can produce an organic disease that appears and a lters the normal functions of organs and systems (heart, lungs, skin, ears, slo111ach). 路what do stress and headache, du odena l ulce r, arteria l hype1iension and insomnia h ave in common? Why d ocs slress cause tachycard ia, na u sea , muscular pain and fatigue? There is a direct connection between the emotional reaction triggered by the stressing stimulus and the production, in our bod_,~ of certain substances , whose excess and permanence cause a change in the physiologica l functions of some of mn- internal organs. \.\1hat substances are we talking abou r> They are the hormones, and among them adrenalin e and its metabolites: lhyroid horrnone, growth hormone (GH), se.x hormones, cortisol and pi-olactin. Normally, i.e. physiologically, the production and aclivalion of these compoun ds take pla ce 路wh enever different kinds of

stimuli act on the person. Tbe.i r higher or lower presence in the blood circulation depends on the intensity of the stimulus and on the emotional reactionÂˇ they set

off. Without these compounds we could neither live nor cope with the normal activities or our daily life. lL is adrenaline Âˇwhich aUows us to brake when a passer-by cuts across our \vay, and which enables us to suddenly withdraw our hand just before an object hits il. Tl is this hormone that makes us nm for the bus in order to catc h it, and it is the same hormone, together with other ne~1rohumours, which makes us sweat when it is hot (in order to lower body temperature) and shiver when it is cold (to rise the temperature) . And so it is for the other hormones and bioactive substances, which are produced to make us live and adapt to the thousands of different situations we face. OnJy an excess and a constanlly high presence of these substances in our body will cause all the sy111ptoms we rnentionecl above, a presence sustained and fu elled by an unbalanced, unstable and excessive emotional reaction. These are the term s \vhich make the difference between a healthy individual and one who is going to be stressed. We are all hit b y potentially stressing stimuli, but \vhy only some p eop le fall ill? In short, Âˇw hat is wrong with the people who are going to be stressed? What do they have more or less then the others? In order to lmov., it, we have to go back to the defin i tion according to which stress has an objective component (stimulus) that is the same for everyone, and a subjective individual reaction. Therefore we shall have different subjective reactions Lo the same stimuli. According to this statement we can say tbal everything revo lves around the subject, the individual,

the person. II. is man, in the broadest sense of the term , w ith his inner psychology, emotions, e xistential views, character, personality, subjective condition, and his individual way of acting and reacting Lo events, who ,..vill open the way to stress! lL is appropriate to propose the abovementioned example again. If Len people experience th e same stimuli (same boss, same colleagues, same job, same room) each of them will react according to his nature. For some of them the boss will be intelligent, competent, kind, understanding and th e colleagues unselfish friends, cooperative and sympathetic. For others the boss will be cruel, selfish, indifferent. The latter, who experience frustration in the working place, where they neither [it in nor feel understood while trying to cope \Vi th a situation (adaptive response) which they feel hostile (defensive response), will sooner or later experience stress. Therefore, rather than discussing stress in a broad sense, it \Nould be more appropriate lo talk about a person potentially prone to stress, due to his nature, character and personal ity. This, of course, does not exclude the poss ibility that the event could strike people who do nol have s uch a predisposi tion, but certainly those who are sensitive, introvert and reserved by n ature have more chances to overreact to stressing events. Usually those who overreact to a stimulus do no t have the dispos ition to fully analyze the event. They are unable to think carefully about ,vhat is happening to them and cannot harmoniously p lace the circumstances they are going through in a virtual scale of values. In short, they are not impar-tial as far as fac ts, situations, tasks, roles and events are concerned. All this keeps them in a persistent state of emotional tension that causes an excessive production of bioaclive 71

substances w hich \VilJ affect, in a persisten t and a bnorm al w ay, their b od ies ' organ s a nd syste ms, w hi ch will respond \vith t he a bovesaid sy mpto ms (tac hycardia, headache, arterial h yp erten sion, duodena l u lcer, inso m nia, transi tory impotence, hyp erglycae mia , hyperch olesterolemia, vertigo, anxiety). Having b i-oa<lly ou tlined t he a etiology of stre ss, i L is nm,v appropriate to m ention a group of pathologies t hat arc usually the cause or the consequence or s tress : anxie ty, obsessi vecompulsive disorde rs, depression , p sychosomatic disorders, burnout syndrome a nd m obbing . All t hese syndromes are an in tegral part of the w ide-ra nging psychobehavioural field which is typical of stress. Anxiety

Pa raphras ing a n old sayi ng from the Gospel, we could say: let he who is without anx.ietv cast the first stone. 'vVe are i m m ersed i n anxi e ty, w hich is the background o f o ur existence. li ke the cloud s in a c le ar skÂˇy, a nd s om et im es it c on d i tions ou r day. 'vVe a re w orrie d ab out b ein g la te at work, about o u r son not corning h ome at the u sual ti me , about m issing the undergroun d, about o ur bo ss ' o pin ion and a bo ut performance . \ Ale worry abo ut managi ng Lo get by the end of the month w ith the little m oney left, a b ou t m a kin g a bad impres sion, abo u t f ee li ng un d eres ti ma te d in o ur jo b; a nyone c an con t inu e t his lis t add ing his own worries. Beware, though: none of this is patho logical, but it is vital to o ur ex istence, because i l ena bles us to r eac t pro perl y to prese n t o r fu ture even ts. Even if we could define anxiety a s "a folly unpleasant, vagu e and painful feeling o f danger or threat to our psychophysical safe ty", it imp lies "the posilive reaction to negative ci rcumstances". In this 72

case, to o, i t is the em ot ion al e xc ess t hat tu rns t h is p h y s iolo g ical an d unpleasant agitation into a path ological one. ln fac t, w hen th e e motional c onditio n o f anxiety bec omes p a thological, it m a y res ult in a phobia , i.e . an "excessive fear of someth ing or somebody vvhich compels the subject to exclud e, to remove, to e scape from t he p h obic s itu ati on (ope n -space, t unne l, lifl, confin e d pl ace , crowd)". Practically, a p h obic w ill e scape fa ci ng anxiety -inducing evcnls, situ ations and places by avoiding, removing o r excluding the cvenL.

Obsessive-compulsive disorders Gr a duall y th e disorder goes fr om pho bia to obse ssivecon1pulsion , w here so meone is c onsta ntly tormente d by unpleasant ideas w h ich occur in a sudden, repetiti ve a nd uncontrollable way, such as t he fear of loosing self-con trol, of ge tli ng dirty, of beco min g infected, o f not havin g turned off the gas, of h aving fo,-gotten to lock the h ouse's or the car's doo1~ E ventually, in order Lo fight the o bs essive idea w hich fill s h is mind and b rings it to a constan l and u nc eas ing anxie ty, the p ati en t s tarts to behave in w hat h e cons i d e rs a reas su ring m an ne r, b ut b y do i ng that, h e increa ses and worsens his already highly emotiona l r e spo nse , s i n e e his act s at-e repetitive and compulsory. So he vv iJl keep o n wash i ng himse lf several times to avert the fear of al I sor ts of g er m s; to fee l reassured , he will go back to c heck that the fronl d oor, the car, the garage a,-e locked, and he vvill avoid e ntering closed rooms . 1n short, he carries on a compulsive d efensive behaviour. In this case, too, ma n is the heart or the ma t te.-. \ \Th at character does an individual have, w ho faces a nd reacts to sti muli (non -speci fic component) in such a way (e motional response)?

H e is in t ro vert , sens1 t1ve , p erfec tionist a nd peda ntic. He lives t hin king constantly a bouL s ome impending clange,- (germs, thieves, other p eople) and has to preven t it. He must control h is e motions, o n p ain of a negative s elf-judgement, a nd fee ls to be p an of a sys tem in w hich h is response is self-punitive a nd selfpersecutory. He constantly swings between a slate of euphoria a n d o ne of depression. Jle is always in a b ad m ood ; he o fte n live s a lt ernating be tween peri o ds <l uring \Vhi c h h e feels con fiden t and op timis tic and ot hers when he falls into a state of apathy and finds it d ifficult to b ehave in a complex ,vay. Pra tica ll y, he c onstantly and p ermanen tly Jives o n the a lert.

Depression A depress e d pe r son has t he inborn capability of seeing only the dark side of the world. Life is negative, and so are jo b s and frien d s, everything is unfavourable. He wears dark glasses through which he filters his days , losing touch w i th a reality, \Nhich he perceives as hostile, harmful, use less . I le is convi nced th at everything is aga inst. him, nothing w il l \.v ork out well, any action is useless because it will not turn out well. He is unable to react to events, a nd tu rns a b i i nd eye to situations tha t he feels are far away and u seless. The depressed lets himself go, shu ts himself up in his home, his movements are s.low, hi s [ace

drawn, h is vo ice lo,v and plaintive. He feels \Veak, gets tired easily a nd does not sleep. He has a negative self-perception and feels in adequate and useless . He is pessimistic and convinced thal his personal d i ffic ul ties will las t forevec He does not \-vanL lo cope wi th eve1Âˇyday life because he thinks he does nol have a future, does not face problems that he considers rocks \.ve igh ing dcl\vn on his existence. He is convinced that his problems, and on ly h is, have no solution, considers birns el [ incapable of do i ng anything, overestimates the d ifficu l ties inherent to certa in tasks and does not ask for help or r eass urance of other peopl e, whom he considers more capable and more qualified.

Psychosomatic disorders Simplifying lo the utmost t he definition of psychosomat ic disorders, we can say that they are "organic diseases caused by the mind". As we mentioned a b ove, in e veryday Ii Fe the individual is exposed to negative stimuli wh ich can in te r fere with his psychic equilib ri u m. En1olionall y, his response to them will cause lhe occurrence of fee li ngs of anxiety, aggressiveness and fear. Physically, h is reacti on will stim u late the endocrine and the neu r ovege ta t ivc systems to produce and release a certa i n n u mber of bio-active substances (hormones). T he recurrence and persistence of these slirn u l i, an d the

consequent introduction inlo lhe b loo dstream of h ormones and ot he r su bstances, can cau se an a nato m ic al c hange in a s pecifi c organ and t he o nset of a r eal organic or somatic illness. lt should b e added that we all have our "target" organ, i.e. the one t hat suffers the consequences oC th e damaging emotional action, a nd is therefore the m o st vul nerable. Th u s t he p sych oso mati c d iso,-ders are "a hete rogen eou s grou p o f pa lhologies ,vho se beg i nni ng is fa vo u red an d s upported h y lhe p r esence of intense and prolonged stimu li". This docs not imp ly that th o se ,vho are stressed are a lso carriers of a somatic illness, bu Lcompared

to those who a re n~t stressed th ey will have nurny m ore chances to c atch o ne of th e ma ny psyc hosoma tic palhologies. Typica l exampl es of psychoso ma l ic m ani fes ta t ions, vvh er e stress plays t h e lea d ing role in fav ou ring, h elping and p,-edisposing to o rganic damage, a re : du o d en a l u lc e r, stres s in du ced an d p ost- traumati c gas tritis; fun ctio nal d yspep sia; Cro hn 's d is ease a n d ulc ero us reclu m -colitis; a drop in sexual desi re a nd exc i tern ent; som e lyp es of a rter ial hypertens ions; certai n fi ts of as thma; s pa s ti c c o l i lis or irri t a ble-col o n synd rome; several derm alological e pi sodes w hich appear w ilh diffused i tchi ng, fa ce red nes s,

sweati ng palm s; psoria si s ; vitiligo; s ome types o f urticaria; alopecia (hai r fall ing oul); som e clcrmatoses,; psychogenic itching; slammer. Th er e is, t herefore , a very w id e range of symptoms a nd paLhologies suppo rted by s tress or wh ere stress is a concom itan t cause. For exam p le, t he abdo min a l cra mps that in the m orning some people suffer before going out, o r an a lle-.-nat:ion of d iarrhoea a nd const i pa tion , typ ic al of a n irri table co lon, a re a ll s omat ic manifesta tions o f a psychi c problem . Th ese patie n ts who , psy c hol og ically, do not fe e l accepted (on their job, by o ther people) an d who dread to co pe w ilh a w orld they feel far a \Nay, hostile , c ol d and deta ched , unconsciously react in a defensive manner and physica lly release irritants in the intestine w h ic h , reacts to t hem with dianhoea. So, those w ho suffer from t h e se symptoms b elieve they are ill and t h erefore justified in t he eyes of their e mployer~ a nd excused for stopping lheir activity. Th e mechanism \Vhich lriggers and lead s to p sychosoma tic disorders is simple and repetitive: negative th o ugh t, emot ion al response , s t im ula ti on o f the en docrine system, p roduction of b ioactive substances an d the ir r e lease i n l o the bloodstream , e xcessive a mo un t of t h ese substances, a natomical changes in t he "target" organ, symptoms and , finally, illness . Bu t is it a real illness? Of cou rse i t 1s, and m usl not b e u ndereslim a t.ed because, neve ,- as in this case, it is t he entire body w h ich is being involved a n d n ot onl)' an organ or a n apparatus. Mi nd and bod y are eq u a ll y im p licated an d o nce lh e psy c hoso rn.a l i c pathology h a s been diagnosed, s hould the doctor lim it h im sel f Lo c u r e only th e syrnploms, in stead of looki ng fo r t he p s y c h ic causes , h e woul d make a very bad evalua tion, and a

discomfort, ni gh tmares , i rr itabi li ty, exc essive a nd unmolivaled ,~..-or-ries and fears, feeling of inadequacy, sense of gu il t, fee li ngs of frustration or failure , emotional d etach ment, r ig id sett ing and application o r norms and rules, cyn ic ism, lack of in terest, h ostili ty or reject. ion to,vards the fellO\vmen, pessim ism and loss of self-esteem . Th ose who arc suffering from the b u rn-ou t syndrome d o n o t find any fulfilment in their work and start to bel iLLle themselves bo th professionally a nd personal l y. Despit e a ll their efforts, t h ey cannot slop Lh is collapse o r se lf-con fi dence and

d iagnostic an d the r ape u tic m istake. Before curing their body, th ese patients should b e cured in their mind and their approach to the w orl d , to existence and to everydc1y life.

The burn-out syndrome For many people, work is o ne of the main sources of stress an d the burn -o ut syndrome represen ts it concretely. I t ,vas mentioned fo r Lhe first ti me abou l t h irty year ago , in order to id entify an occup a tional pathology frequently observed in jo bs with s trong e m o ti onal pa r ti c ipa t ion, and was charnc terized by th e sudden decl i ne of p syc hop hys ica l resou rces an d p rofession a l performan ce. The term burn-out, m ainlyÂˇ used in sports circle s lo in d icate a thletes w h o , after h aving been awarded th e highest pri1.es d id not manage Lo be comp etitive anymore, both from the agonistic and the per fo rma n ce poinl of vie,v. The term was Lhe n extended to describe a category of workers s u ffe ring from th e same

symptoma lology. From a psychophysical poinl o r view, bur n-o uL can be d efin ed as "a n emot iona l sta te or unpleasan tn ess and ineffic ien cy deriving from a feeling Lh at Lhe environment de mands exceed the individual's capabiLilies". IL s l10\vs u p as a psych o - behavio ural symp tomatology characterized by e m otio nal exhau s tio n , de p ersonali z a Lion , re d u c e d professiona l fulfilment, lack of control, high resistance to \Vork, apa thy, dern o ra .li za Lio n , concen tra t ion di fficulties,

abilities. Any com mitm ent seems unbearab le and they have the feeling or nol being equal to their work or private tasks. Moreover, they d o not manage to h ave balance d rela tions b e tvvee n thei r job a n d th e i r private life. They feel that ,vork is encroa c h ing them and Lhey cannot gel mentally rid of it. The relationship with their colleagues gives them a feeling of uneasiness w h ic h goes b eyond the working hours . T hey realize that. something is wrong a nd that they cannol go on like this. Thus Lhey 75

try to find a solution to a situation which is threatening and has no way out. They start staying a\Nay from work do not face problems, spen d a lo t of Li m e on the telephone, seek excuses to go out or to carry out tasks which do not n~qu ire an interaction with their colleagues . They gradually withdraw from the working reality, attending business meetings \N i thou L s p eaking , without any emotional participation and only when it is strictly necessary. Burn-out is a comp lex and multifactorial phenomenon, in which s tress plays a major role, not only as a concomitant cause but most of all as an accelerator of the psychological processes t hat sustain the etiology of the syndrome. It. occurs mostly in very ambitious and 111otivated people \vho let themselves be involved in their jobs beyond any acceptable 1i mi t, neglecting the pleasan t aspects of life, such as affection and fami ly. They see their job as a means of self-fulfilment. 'vVork makes them feel important and safe. They are moved by a strong social compeli liveness and unconsciously wish to exert t heir decision-111aking power on others. T heir role and their job are idealized and made almost mystical and perceived as stimulating and re\varding. Son1etimes, their professional self is so highly an d unconsciously personified that it leads to a form of pathologic narcissis111. When \,\le talk about burn-ou t we have to analyse not on ly the ind iv idual, bu t also the work environment and its atmosphere. 'vVe s h ou ld not forget that the place \.vhere we daily spend about eight hou rs oC our existence is an i nexhaustible source of stresscausing events. Among these \Ve could l is t the relationsh ip with bosses and col leagues, high competiti veness, scarce consideration, incompre h ensi on, higher re76

sponsibili ties compared to one's duties, role inconsistency, the s uperiors' contrÂˇad ictory demands, unclear tasks, disappointment for missed personal realizations , frustration for a failed promotion or career advancement, unfavou rable environment (cramped rooms, overcrowding, scarce n1a1.erial resources and poor means of transport). In conclusion, before deal ing ,v it h how to prevent, cure and solve the problem of stress and its consequences, one should briefly mention a phenomenon which , in recent years, has been increasingly emerging i n the \Vorking en virnnment and \,\lhich

is among the n1ain causes of stress: "mobbing".

Mobbing T h e \Vorld -farnous e thologist a nd Nobel-Prize \Ninner Konrad Lorenz coined th is term to define "th e exclusion of an individual from his her-cl" . In i ndustrial medicine it describes "a progressive aÂˇnd unbearable psychological violence exerted on a person and effected i n the \Vorking place". Mobbing is like a rising tide of ab use of power. It starts with a greeting refused, jokes turning into insu lts, and jests becoming tragedies. Colleagues ignore you , the boss is d isappointed, Lhe \.vork

load is ovenvhelming. The \vorry aboul i:naking mistakes leads to errors, restlessness makes you unproductive . You get to 'Nork w ith a sullen face, stomach cramps and headache. You come out ti red, Âˇweakene d and unsatisfied. Jn short, it is an ''intense and unceasing emotional p ressure, exerted al lhe working place by colleagues or superiors, on a person regarded as difficult, with the conscious or unconscio us intenl ion of d estroying him psychologically and soc ially, ca using hi s di smissal or his resignation". Pressure can be exerted in many \Vays, from n1ere marginalization

to the diffusion of slander, frorn conslant crit ic ism to deliberate persecution, from ass igning downgrad i ng tasks to compromising the social image. Among the most common ways of psychological persecu tion one sho uld m ention : slander; t he willful ref-usal of in format ion; the sabotage or deliberate obstacles lo the execution or a task; to exclude, offend, boycott and desp ise lhe v,;orker; Lo threaten, frighten or humiliate the person, as in the case of SCXLLal h arassment ; to i nsul t; to o \Âˇer-cnl1c 11.e or d e li beratel y pu t on hostile attitudes or reactions; to monitor the \Vorker's performance without letting him k now, \.Vith the

pu rpose of dam aging him; Lo impose adminis tralive sanctions for no apparent reason. Mob bing has far- reaching effects not only on the victim, who has Lo cope wi th serious psychological problems, b ut also on Lhe company, \vh ere one can notice an imp ortanl downturn in p.roduction, clue to the lack of [air and serene working conditions. Our travel around stress is over. \Ve certainly forgot some o f its forms and variants thal could have explained why, according to a recent research, in Ilaly almost 63% of the people, more or less consciously, show symptoms of stress. Before closing, i L is useful to 77

mention the non-phannacological therapy, i . e . the "re laxing techn iques" that certai nly do not cure full-bl ovvn stress, but can help coping with the thou sand stressing situations in our life.

REMEDIES FOR STRESS

From a theoretical point or view, the idea l r emedy \,voul d be to minirn iz.e the stressing situa tions, b ut o bject ive ly this is n ot a sol ut ion , s i nce the sources or stress are manifold . \Ne can deal with stress using a few techniques or behaviours, i.e .: by acknow ledgi ng t h a t we arc feeling stressed or anxious, \vhich is the fi rst s tep tcJ\vards t he solution; trying to u nderstand the reason of st ress; th ink ing about the negative thou ghts that crmvd o ur m i nd, and try to change t hem into p ositive ones; Je.u-ning the art of taking a res t , for exampl e leaving a job half \Nay and resume it the next clay; setting realistic goals and try to achieve them one at a t ime . If you think th a t a relat ions hip wi th sorneone is a sou rce of stress, try to analyse

whether i t is really essen tial. Develop a healthy self-love and selr-esteern an d , at least once a week, do what you really enjoy. Psychotherapy

There are various psyc ho therapeutic treatments for managing a nd controlling stress . One of the best is cognitive psychotherapy. It is called that because it works mostly on the ideas and on the real o r assu med opi nions held by the individ u a l. Accord i ng to cogn it ive psycho t he r apy every psychological problem stems from the person's \Nay of t hinking, i.e. ou t of his interp retation of reality. The bas ic concepts of cognitive p sychothera p y are that every expe1-ience is elaborated by t h e m ind, vv-hich is responsible for the in d ivi dual emotio n s an d behaviour. From a cogni tive point of v iew, the unconsc io u s can be considered "the \vhole of thoughts Lhat Lhe palient has about hi mself, abo ut others and about t he world". Once t h at the convic tions r esponsi b le ror t h e emotional disorders have been identified, the

p atient is actively helped by the therapist to change them, in orÂˇder to p roduce more objective and useful alternative thoughts, \Vi th a lesser emo tional load (cognitive restructuring). Aft er having a b sorbe d and metabolized the new thoughts, the person is invited to pul them into pra c tice along w i th the ne,,v behaviours (b eh avioural test) . The rol e p layed by the pat ient in cogni Live psychotherapy is very active. Cogni tive psycho therap y is a short psychol ogical ai d (some rnonlhs) and has accep table costs. More than thirty-year-long clinical stud ies have proven its val idity and clinical efficacy.

Relaxation therapies These therap ies cause a reduction of t he s t ress level th rough a progressive train ing lo self-control and m uscular relaxatio n. Among these we vvould like to men tion : a u togen o u s train ing, progressive re laxation and the more recent techniqu e of b iofeedback. Biofeedb ack is perhaps the most effective relaxation tec hniqu e . It

teaches hmv to self-relax and to manage the bodily functions thal are independent of the individual's will, such as nen1'ous tension, heartbeat and sweating. It is a strong poi n t in th e treatment of stress, chronic anxiety, panic attacks, phob ias, obsessive-compulsive disorders and, genera l ly, of all somatizal ions of anxiety: tension headache , tachycardi a d u e to stress and functional disorders of t he cardiac rythrn , transient arterial hypertension, gastritis and irritable colon. Learning the biofeedback relaxation lec h n iq u c is much faster and more complete than what can be obtaine d by any other technique. Selected studies show that .il is effective in 90-95% of the cases.

Autogenous training It is a relaxation method conceived b y the German psychiatrist .J ohann Schultz, based on exercises Lhal a ll ow lo reach a s ta tc of muscular and psychoemotional r elaxat ion throu gh pass ive concentration and the use of aulosuggestion form ulas. The term "training" refers lo a constant and disciplined repetition, for some minu tes every day, of a series of exercises , in

order to reach an aulogenous relaxation . Generally, a ulOgenous train ing is practised lying on a sofa or on a suitable armchair. ll is irnporlanl to be in a calm environment, in semidarlrness, al leasl for l he firsl times, undoing tight belts and clothes. These exercises are divided into basic ones (self-i nduced cairn, progressive weight sensation, progressive h eal sensation), vvhich

al read y allovv an excellent relaxation, and complernenlary ones which induce an even deeper relaxation (heart, breat h ing and cool-forehead exercises). There is also a h ig her cycle of autogenous training exercises, bul it has Lo be exclusively practised u nclc r th e supervision of a specialist.. Once learnt, it is easy to practise and iL only Lakes a few minutes to reach a state of relaxation.

In order lo learn autogenous training well, it is of the u Lmost importance to be constant in its practice, which has to be carried out follmving Schult:/ instructions, for at least six months. Breathing control Brealhing control is a relaxation lechni quc based on the assumption that breathing and muscular tens ion are directly linked. It is well known, in racl, thal nervous tens ions tend to change the rhythm and the depth of breathing, caus i ng, as a consequence, a reduction of blood oxygenation. Abdominal breathing (deeply diaphragmatic) is a natural method of relaxation. Already as babies we aU breathe in this \vay, hut, as time goes by, \.Ve forget it and start to use main ly a

thoracic-type breathing. This train i ng consists of a series of exercises a i ming at volun tarily re learning the diaphragmatic way of breathing. Acupuncture It consists in applying needles, so as to help the nervous system to produce internal tranquillizers (endorphin s) . In this ,vay we achieve mus cular relaxation, slowing down the heartbeat and lowering the arterial pressure. Each session lasts an average or 80

30-40 minutes. After the th ird or fourth application the pati ent begins to reel better. Acupuncture, anyway, has to be considered a soft technique of intervention, and is mostly valid when stress has not reached h igh levels. Music It can be used either lo help relaxation or as a separate therapeutic technique (musico th c rapy). In order to induce relaxation, it

resorts to listening lo slow and repetiti ve p ieces, at lmv volu me and according lo the person's tastes. Pieces of classical music (Bach , lVlozart , Chopin, etc.), lentos and the like can be used. Tl is a therapeu t ic technique based bot h on listening to a specific m u s ic chos e n by the therapist (passive music therapy), and on the creation of sounds and notes u sing the appropria te instruments (active music therapy). An un pleasant and badly organized environrnent at home or at work can be among the main sources of stress. In order to make it better, it could be usef-u l to d o some thin g aboul some factors, s u ch as : improving a i r qual ity, refraining from smoking in closed p laces, frequently airing rooms and enric hin g the environment with plants .

Lighting has to be appropriale, .in order to prevent the eyes from straining, increasing stress in lhe workplace. Tidiness, without becoming an obsession, helps to work better. Noise can be a source of intense stress, as it makes it impossible to concentrate. And, las t, the furniture and muscular tensions caused by uncomfortable chairs are among the main reasons for backache, and therefore can become a source of stress. CONCLUSIONS

Today's frenzied pace makes us live in a hectic and chaolic manne1~ Our job, family matters, our desire to he always at our best in order to give the best, often lead us to the limit of patience. Days follow one another so fast

thal we can hardly tell them apart, so that in the end they seem lo build an endless temporal arc. Such lifestyle affects our body and, being exposed to this pace for a long time, it rebels, refuses to conlinue and shouts to the whole world that things cannot go on like thal anyrnore. At first sporadically, and then fairly regularly, lhe sympt oms appear like physical signs that are not easy to recogni,.e, such as headache, backache, stomachache, bad digestion, insomnia, lachycardia, vertigo. We feel apathetic, restless, nervo us, anxious. \路Ve smoke more, pressure gets highe1~ ,ve easily forget things we used Lo remember in a quick and instinctive way. Moreover, ,ve often go to the doctor because we are tortured by pain in our cbesl, lhorax, arm, we are short of breath, we have panic

attacks and feel d izzy. We are ernbarassed to tell him \Ve have difficulties ,vith sex. \Ve live our 1i fe in a state of oppressive anguish. Anxiety and indistinct fear have become our failhfuJ companions. Every little mishap disturbs us, trivial .rn.allers look like insurmountable ,valls and, day after clay, we loose the analytical capacity that allows us to see things for what they really are. Our job gels more and more exhausting, and we feel sick at the very thought of gelling up lo go t:o work. Our professional skills are not rewarded and our boss does not regard us highly enough. So we try to understand what is happening. We would like to know路 what is causing our bad headache or the reason ,vhy every afternoon we are so tired. Blood tests, cLi.nical Les ls, X-rays start filling up our dra,vers. The result is ahvays the same: nothing is found . The idea creeps in our mind that our doctor does not understand our illness, he may be indifferent or even incornpete nt. Our body is rebelling and sending out signals of trouble! We loose interest in facts and situations, and we cannot relax as we did before. 'vVe develop a fixed idea: to run a,vay, to escape, to go, lo leave our world for a moment. The idea of "pulling out the plug" re.I ieves us and makes us feel much better. When all lhis happens, when lhe innocent and harmless ring of the telephone makes us slart off lhe chair and hearing it makes us fur ious, when \,Ve wake in the middle of the night thinking about our 路w ork, family, a c ertain situation, 路when we dream of events, facts or faces which were part of our day, when this happens, it all means ,.v e are stressed. ']

'''Lieutenant Colonel, Organiz.aiional Resources & Communications Office, Army General Staff

.~-~., -1111 l1At/All PENAl :SYllEM l'--~--IOR THE Mll/TARY MISIION$ ABROAD by Giuseppe Scandurra ,·~

TIie lun'damenfal ol,jecfive i1 lo increase fhe penal11leguard al lbe confingenf1 .employed al,road, ·guaranteeing f/,eir efficiency and . operafional capal,i/ify

The operations in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo should not be considered as regulated by the war penal laws which, on the contrary, apply to the operations of the "International Security Assistance Force" (ISAF) and to the other missions carried out in Afghanistan and Iraq.

THE MILITARY PENAL CODE IN PEACE AND WAR The military penal legislation \vorked out in 1941 is charact erized by a specific complement a ry codification devised for a time of war as opposed to a more general set of rules envisaged for peacetime. Th is dual system was marked by the principle of dou bleness and exc luded a lhird possible criterion, hardly suited to the particular requ irements of our lime, since in the present historical per iod speaking of "wartime" is s ca rcel y appropriate: today's war does nol appear as a ruinous and irreparable misfortune invo lving a whole nation , but assumes increasingl y the aspect o f a limited and partial conflict that can coexist with a normal state of affairs which can be summarily defined as "peacetime". Even the actual wars, especially aher the

Right. Delimitation ofa rnine-c!earing area. Below. Training Afghan regulars.

Cold \Nar, are technicallv and juridically different from tl1e old ones, which \Vere characteri zed by a declaralion of \var, signed by the Prime Minister and delivered to the ambassador of the enemy Country. The presen L reality, characterized by a continuously changing geopo litical scenario and an almost constant increase of regional conflicts, has remarkably changed the na ture of the threat to our Country. Th is makes lhe correct ness of our re1narks even more ev iden l, 84

preven ti ng conflicts an d defending ourselves from global terrorism and weapons of mass dest ruction. Now the serviceman is not a sold ier only, he has become a "p eacekeeper" as ,veil. Besides know i ng ho,v to use force, he must be a b le to deal with di fferent situations an d to esta b lish contacts \Vith the population. Jl is still possib le lo arrive al the proclamation of th e state of wa r but this, accord i ng to art. 11 of the Consti t ution , a lso w i th reference lo art. 52 - as recently stated b y the Council of Sta te (January 14, 2003) can only derive from situa tions o f very serious emergency for the Country, keeping in mind that any other type of mili tary o p era t:ion can only resp ond to specific aims of pac ification among Nations. Onl y in lbis perspe c tive ca n one get over the repudiation o ( war as a so l ut i on of interna t iona l disputes. As a matter of fact, in the last years, the world political picture h as been characterized b y remarkable e volu lionar')' drives, especially in relation t o the i nternational events occurred after Septemb er 11 , 2001.

THE MISSION S ABROAD

especially if we consider the operat ional act ivities of our Armed Forces, which are increas i ngly engaged, together ,vith those from other Countries, in the performance of functions of international interposition in support of peace, with i n a juridical dimension which is also going th ro u g h a continuous evolution. Indeed, we could even say that "war" does not seem lo be regulated by the States anymore and there[ore is not s u bjected to any rul e, particularly when

terrorist or criminal groups succeed in taking possession of y,--eapons and devices of mass d est ru ction. As was recent ly rernarked by our Minister of Defence, the Hon . An tonio Marti no, today the world h as radically chan ged: the n eed to protect Europe from a potentia l invader is l ess impell ing t han it was fifty years ago. \A/e moved from the classic concept of defence f r om an invader to that of security, i.e. to the nee d to guarantee the sta b ility of the crisis areas,

I n t he deca d es fo ll owing WWII, the Italian Armed Forces h ave been engage d in a remarkable and p rogressiv e number of commitments abroad , starting w i th Lh e par t ic i pa t ion in observation missions \v i t.h t he U . N., invo l vi n g small groups of officers and arrive d, w it h weigh tier contingents (resu lting e i t h er f rom a u tonomous initiatives or under the aegis of th e U.N ., N .A.T. 0 ., W.E . U., the European Community and other organ i1.ations), at t he performance of a b ou l a

hundred missions on all fronts, in over fort y Countries . The objectives of the rnosl important ones were : e rnployrne nt or security forces, safeguard of free navigation, mine-clearing, naval blockades, disarming of factions and interposition between struggling parties. These operations, v--f och can b e classified as nat ional or international missions of peacekeeping or peace-e nforcing , have been carried out in Somalia, the Congo, the Reel Sea, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the former Yugoslavia, Mozambique, BosniaHerzegovina, East Timar, Albania, Kosovo and IVlacedonia. Furthermore, the Italian Armed Forces have given the i r contribution to many mult i national peacekeeping missions in Sinai, Cypr us, Namib ia and other Count1Âˇies, besides several missions of assistance to civilian populations. In practice, our military have been called to appease conflicts, as in Somalia, or to sto p genocides, as in th e former Yugoslavia, or just to re-establish order or to facilitate an already started process of pacification, as in lVIozambique. These particular circumstances of employment were always authorized hy apprnpriatc legislative provisions and did not requÂˇire the transition from a "s tate of peace" to a "st ate of war". Nevertheless , their very peculiar characteristics compelled the military to fulfil] their duties wilh particular care and diligence, considering the specifi c nature o( the operations they were called to condlict and the dangerous env ironmen t in which the missions were carried out. Thus the military operations have assumed a configuration that hinders their comprehension and functional classification. This is mostly clu e to an extremely detailed and

necessa rily complicated set of rules, very different from those of a past \,1,1 hich was essen tiall y characterized by a bipolar confrontation and an enemy to confront. Still, obviously one cannot rule out the need to have recourse to a military v is , as vvas proved when it became clear that the U .N . was inefficient in the management of complex operations, as in the Horn of Africa and in the former Yugoslavia. This en tailed not only the adoption of international norms and principles on the modalities of employment , but a lso the selection of a legal system differen t from the one that was essentially envisaged for peace or w ar, w ith the implicit u se of procedures which were also different from the traditional ones . So, a bod y of parlicular norms was brought into being, alrnosl like a special legal system for the military missions abroad. Right. l1alian sappers in Iraq.

Below. Jtahan and French servicemen. in Bosnia.

EXPEDITIONARY FORCES ABROAD Having made these preli111inar"Y observations, one can see that the necessary prerequisite for the application of the V-lar Penal Code is the declaration of the state of \Var, ,v hich can only occur, as we said before, in an exceptional situation of emergency for the Country. However, our system considers other cases ,vhere the application can be enjoined also in pea ce time. One of these

is e nvisaged b y art. 9 of the War Code, and conc e rns the Expecli t ionary Forces serving abroad for mili tary operations . Th e practical meaning of the term "military operations" has been the subject of an intens e politico/doctrinal debate, especially on the occasion of the firs t e mployment, in 1982, of an Italian contingent in the Middle East, wh e rÂˇe it was to carry out Operations "Lebanon 1" and "Lebanon 2". The question was not \Vithout foundation, because in the \A/ar

Code the re \Nas no definition of t he concept of "military ope rations", also considering that all the act ivities where t he employ ment of the Armed Force ,vas not excluded a priori could be rÂˇcgarclecl as such. Therefore the sol ution o f t he prob lem was e xtremel y import. a nt, b e cause th e regulations und e r ,vhich our u n its \Vere supposed to operate depended on i t. In practice, it was a rnatte r of d eciding \-v hether the rules to be applied were the ge n e ra l ones

envisaged by the Penal Code for peacetime or the more stringe nt ones o[ the War Code.

THE "PELLICANO" MISSION The question did not arise for the "Pellicano" m ission, carried out in Albania in 1991 - 1993, which was characterÂˇized by an act1 v 1Ly o f assistance and distribution of humanitarian a id, excl uding absolutely the use of arms. The question was posed, o n the contrary, for all other instances where military operations, either offensive or in self-defence, could not be ruled out.

Mozambique, the embargo on the Danube, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hebron, Alb ania, Kosovo, Macedonia, East Tirnor, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Howev e r, the a doption of that system implied imporÂˇtant and serious consequences, since the military penal lav.,s fo ,- p e ac e time could no t perform any func t ion of protection o r d e (ence of the civilian population and d id not en v i sage any peaceful e mployment abroad of a military instrument . ll was impossible, moreover, to enforce the norms concerning the rep ression of infringements o f human rights laws, which were envisaged by the War Code.

OPERATION FREEDOM"

For these reasons, and also for the transformations that had taken place in the internationa l situation, there was a sharp and swift turnabout when it w a s decided that a contingent \Vas to participa te in the a nti -t error military operation call e d "Enduring Freedom", on a ccount o( the particular situat ion brought abou t by the e vents of Sep lember 11, 2001. In fact , a Decree issued in December 2001 provid e d tha t the personn e l participating in Afghanistan in the "campaign for the restoration of international lawfulness" was to be subj ected to the War Ivlilitary Penal Code.

THE OTHER MISSIONS O u r legislators, in ord er to avoid the rec u rrenc e of the problems arisen for the Lebanon expedition and bel ieving that, in any case, the body of ,vartime norms could be too onerous for operations whose aim was to support qr enfo rce peace, laid dmvn that the applicable norms were those prov ided in the Military Peace Code. T his decision ,vas reached also becaus e many criminal transgressions of the War Code were still punished with the death penalty. According to these guidelines, the first expedition abroad, ,,v here the application of the Peace Code was c learly admitt e d - with the implicit exclusion of the War Code - \Nas the nav al mission of 1987-88 for protecting the Italian merchant ships and clear ing mines from the Persian Gulf and adjace nt waters. ln the many expeditions that follovved, the Pe ace Code was always applied. Those were operations carried out in the nineties and th e i r operational Theatres were the Pers ian Gulf, Somal ia, 88

,. _ _ - -

"ENDURING

---

THE APPLICATION OF THE MILITARY WAR PENAL CODE

The reasons that \Vere in favour of the exclusion of this ctiscipline could nol be considered valid anymore, b oth because the death penalty had b een definitively deleted from o u r legal system and a lso b eca u se Judy's international commitment with this mission consis le cl in performing a m ilitary operation substantially similar a lo \Var activity. In d eed the military activity entrusted lo ou r contingent could rightly be considered an "armed conflict", a situalion that, in the lavvs and in the international practice, is now replacing the connection of aspects and eleme nts depicting

Above.

J->a1rollin_1:, a v illage. Left. Hmnanitarian aid in an Af.~han district.

lhe traditional war condition. O n 1.he other hand, this concept was implicitly admitted in th e report on t he Government's Decr ee, \,v here il is clearly slated t ha t " t he in tern a t ional comn1itrnen t

undertaken b y Italy co nsists in military carrying o u t a o peration \vhos e essenti a l charac t er ist ics are basic ally akin to those of a \Nar act ivity" . The same concept \Vas a lso confirmed during lhc ensuing parl iamentary debate , where operation "Encl u ring Freedom" was defined as "the mosl difficult: mission s ince the end of \NWII" . The ap p lica ti on of t he war m ilitary penal law has produced some irnporlanl effects : â€˘ firs t of all, through its

prov1.s1ons deal i ng ,vith incrimination, it permitted to i mp lement the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, which compe l tbe signatory States to. issue laws aimed at prosecut ing the v iolations considered ".serious infringements". The provisions, until the i.ssue of the abovementioned Decree , had remained a dead letter; • second l y, it prompted the legislators lo issu e a number of laws int roducing some partial mod i fication to the War Code which, since 1942 and for more than fifty years, had never been amended, with the exception of the abolition of th e death pena lty. These modifications vvere very necessary, besides th e fact that some provisions were nol consistent ,.vith the constitutional values , also cons icler·i ng that several other penal war norms were no more in keeping with the new reality; • the application of the military penal \var law has made possible a more specific safeguard of the rn.ililary condition and interests b ecause i l assures a more str ict protect ion of the military service and d isc ip line and, by applying the norms concerning the so-call ed offences against the war law.s and customs, the protection of civilians, wounded , ship\vrecked persons, n,cclical personnel, prisoners of war, i.e. all those subjects who have never had, or have lost, th e status of "fighter"; • f urlhermore , our servicemen were more protected because the i nd ict i ng provrs1ons concerning the violations of the war l aws and c u stoms apply al.so to the military and any other person belonging to the enemy Armed For ces, in case of offences committed 90

against the Italian State or an Italian c i tizen, and also against an allied State or one of i ts citizens . According to the ne,v lmv, the term "allied State" incl u des also a State which i.s associated in the operations or participates in the same expedi Lion or campaign; • fina.lly, one should not overlook the fact that vvi t h the application of the War Code a further protection is afforded to the m ili tar·y of the expeditionary force as regards the war actions they carry out, for which the absolving circu mstances envisaged by the general law are nol sufficient for an adequate protective function. As concerns the civilian personnel participating in the operations , the law e n joins that the same provision s in force for th e military should be applied when consisten t , with the exception of the penal law.s.

Above.

A checkpoint. Facing page.

Taking samples {ro rn contaminated soil.

THE AMENDMENTS OF THE WAR MILITARY PENAL CODE

The application of the \i\l.M.P.C. entailed the introduction of some modiAcations to a text that dated back to 1941 which, moreover, had not been subjected to the scrutiny of the Cons Li tu tiona I Court. S ome of these changes were direc tly introduced with the same Decree La,v 421 o[ 200 1, whi l e others were included when the decree was turned into lav,,r in January 2002 and with a bill subm i tted separately b y the Government for reasons of l egislati ve policy.

.Modifications introduced by Decree Law no. 421/2001 Among th e most important we should remember: • the exclusion of the provisions contained i n Book IV of the W ..M . P.C . and the relevant military j udic iary, whose co n sti t utionality wa s cons id ered dubio u s since it clashed with the consti tu tional principles governing the judge's i ndep enden c e and t he guarantees of the defence; • the extension o[ the mandatory arrest in flagrante delicto to a number of expressly indicated military offences, for which the penalty env isaged \,Vould not have allowed th e arrest; • the introduction of special rules for the interrogations of the military arrested in flagrant offence or subj ected to precautionary measures, \Vith telecom or audiovisual support; • the possibility of repeali ng the

interrogation of the defendant on h is return to Ita.ly and his right to be assisted by an Officer on the spot; • the appointment of Rome's MiJi tary Court as the competent court. This provision is not unlike the one envisaged by the F r·ench system, \vhich provides that a military Court in Paris is competent for the offences committed during military operations abroad. Modifications introduced by Law no . 6 of 31 J a nuary 2002 Among Lbe changes introduced by the d e cree turned into law no.6/2002 the follmving shoul d be mentioned: • a new and wider definition of "military offence" extended a lbe it only in r elat ion to the 1-Nar Code - to a whole series of violations of the penal laws (including the c ommon o nes )

committed by servicemen by abusing their power or by breach of their miliLary obligations, either on military premises or i n th e p erfo rmanc e o[ lh e i r duty; • abrogat ion of any proclamation pm,ve1~ p reviously held by the military commanders in matters concerning the lmv, the war penal military proced u re and the military judiciary.

Changes in art.9 of the W..M.P.C. - "Armed" military operations We ought to remember: • a change in art. 9 of the ·w ar Code, wh ich envisages its application in peacetime to the expedit ionary force s abroad, limits the application to the contingents participat i ng in "armed" military operations. This specification introduces a further element o f evalua tion . T hus the Code's prov is ions do not concern the expeditionary forces whose spec i fic activity exc.l udes even the h ypothesis of armed operat ions, as is th e case , for example, for the purely humanitarian missions; • the extension ratione personae o[ the application of the war military penal law also to the p ersonnel who, either in Italy or abroad, perform command -and-control and sup port duties for the expeditionary rorce. But this extension is limited to events connected with armed operations abroad , and onl y from the mom ent wh en th e personnel in question are informed of their assignment to those du ties, provided that the infrin gements are cornmilted be ca use, or on the occasion, of the specific duty; • the extension of the incriminatory acts againsl tbe \Nar llnv and customs to all cases of armed conflict, irrespective o( Lhe declaration of the state of war: 92

THE CONCEPT OF "AR.l\llED CONFLICT"

According to the definition o( armed conCl ict conta ined in art. 165 o f the \V.JVI.P.C . and on i ls exp] ici l reference l.o a clash among parties , with a militar ily organized and prolonged use of weapons for the conduct of ,-var operat ions, it seems plausibl e to believe that the j uridical definition excludes any re(erence to possib l e cases of interna l tensions or disorders. T he ne,v definition also enta ils Lh e a bro gat ion o f the preventive "authorization" of the supreme Commander and the condition of rec iproci ty w ith th e e nemy State i n order to pun ish the offences comm i tted by Italian cit izens against the enemy State or its subjec t s, as was or ig i nally required by art. 165 .

THE JURIDICAL REGIME OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS ABROAD

With a Decree Law of 200 l , turned into Law' i n 2002, a s well as ,vith other legislativ e measures, the enforceab il i tv of the vvar penal laws wa-~ confirmed for operation s "Enduring Freedom", "ISAF" , "Active Endeavour" and fo r those in Iraq. while the Peace Code continues to be applied for the other operation s (Macedonia, Al bania, th e former Yugoslavia, Kosovo , Hebron, Ethiopia and Er itrea) . Among the military operations, it is wort h ment ioning the international peace force of security and assistance ca1led ISAF, ,vhich operates in Kabul under a UN mandate and ,vhose command has been officia ll y assumed by NATO on August 11,

...,. :(

1 ,1.t

-; ~ - ~

. ,.

2003. ISAF commands 4600 servicemen from 30 Countries, 15 of which belong to I.he Atlant ic Alliance, and takes care of tb e security of the city or K·abul and surrounding area. ISAF was es tablish ed in December 2001 and up to nov.· its Commanders have been British, Turkish and German/Dutch. Furthermore, the laws ment ioned above provided tha t the offences committed by a foreigner on Iraqi or Afghan territory against the Italian State, or i ts c itize n s participating in the missions, should be pu nishe d - upon request of the Minister o r Defence - as ofCences against the Arn,ed Forces . The competent cou rt is the Court of Rome. Further confirmations of all the abovementioned provis ions have b een g i ven b y a recent Decree Law of January 2004.

Above. E111harka1ion of a mowr vehicle on a transport aircraf1. Left. Training of an l'.fBC learn.

CONCLUSIONS As a consequence of the rn easures described above, we must note that the missions of o ur soldiers abroad are d ivided into tvvo basic groups, depending on whether their task is Lo carry

out low·-risk simple m ilitary operations or high-risk "armed" military operations. In the first case, the military belonging to the expeditionary forces or Lo th e missions c harged w ith the general task of perform i ng mili Lary operations, or act ivities of a different kind, are subjected to the Peace Cod e while, in the second case, i .e. when t heir activity consists in armed military operations, l hey will be u nder the military \ 1Var Code, ,-vith the obvious exclusion of \vhat is envisaged

A "Bersagliere" in Iraq.

by art. 9 as regards lhe wartime procedures and organization. From the ahove il ensues that the operations presently under way must he considered separately, according to the 94

criteria menlioned before. In short we can say, therefore, thal the military operations carried out by our military in the PerÂˇsian Gulf, Somalia, Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo should not be governed by the War Code, which applies instead to lSAF and the other missions carried out in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As \vas pointed out at a recent meeting he]dÂˇ 'in San Remo in October 2003 by the Council of Military Magistrates, a possible unitary configu r ation of the various missions in a j uridical perspective inspired by criteria of identity is at present untenable and contradictory, parlicularly from a penological vie\vpoint, since the application of the

military p e nal la\-vs of the individual States participating in t he missions arc made up of ele m ents v ery difficu lt to compare or equalize. Thus it w ould b e approp riate, first of all, to increase t h e cooperation amo ng the Armed Forces of the different States , in order to obta in, later on, the elimination of the prob l ems tha t stem from t he non o bs erva nce of the indiv idu al

A Command Post during an exercise.

guarantees and from th e need to en s u re th e efficiency and operational capabi Ii ty or the forces engaged in the missions. It will a lso b e n e c essa 1Âˇy to increase the penal protection of the various military contingents call e d to operate in th e same m iss ion, in order to finally obtain the elimina tion of the ex isting discordances . T hanks to the activi ti es carrie d out in t he various operational theatres and in very different geographical areas s ucb as Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia, a s \Nell as in other difficult realities like

Leb anon, Eritrea , Ethiopia , Afghanistan and Iraq, the p ublic opinion or the w hol e \NOrld and of the other Armed Forc es engaged on th e field, toge th erÂˇ w i t h the civi lian populations , hav e a l ways appreciate d the high level of p rofess ionalis m and humanity of our Armed Forces, and this is an honour for us . Let us express to our Ar med Force s, then, our d eep appreciation and gratit ude .

â€˘

''l'vlilitary Attorney General the Supreme Court of Appeal

f we w anted to pre sent th e War o f L ibe rati on (1 94 3 1945) in a logical sense, we c ould p ortray it in a n unusual for m, dividing it into thre e periods of Lime: t he h eroic period of Mont e L ungo an d Mon te Marro ne; the manoeuvre in the Marche; the technical - mili ta ry period on the Go thic d efences. On O ctober 16, 194 3, just a l i ttle ove r a m ont h afte r the a rmistice , Italy ob ta ined t he cobelligerent status after havin g declared \N ,H o n Germ any, a nd p repare d for the fr o n t th e 1 s t Mo torized Gro up, a Br igade o f 10,000 men . Al.I \vent a t a fast pace, imposed b y the tragic events o ccu rre d a fte r S eptember 8 , particu larly in the Ba lkans , '.vhic h o pen ed a hi stori cal perio d, characterized by the conquest of Monte Lungo a nd Monte Marrone.

in fant rymen and "Bersaglieri" we re d eci ma t e d by th e Pa nzergrenad ieren of the 20th "Goeri ng" Div is io n . Gen era l Clark, Co mman der of the 5th US Army, conscious of having left us alone, on Decem ber 9 came in person to meet the troo ps of the Group and , n oticing that we were still valid soldiers, said : "You are going to a ttack aga in in a fe \v days with a better su pport from the Amer ic an infan try a nd ai-t ille ry" On De cember 16 th e Ital ian Tri colo u r a nd t he Am eri ca n fl ag \Vere waving togethe ,- o n the s ummit of Monte Lungo , ,vh ich had b ee n conqu ered fo r g ood. It ,vas the

em bl ema t ic i m age of our c o belligerency. The firs t - and w e ll known heroic e p i s ode w as t h a t of D ecember 8 , 1943 w hen we , thro wn into t he fur nac e o f Ca ss i n o, and not k no\ving th e size of t h e ene m y a n d t he rel iabilitv of the new allies, were decimat~d on the crags o f Monte Lungo. T he second and no less h eroic event was the resumption of the attack after the tragic massacre a nd , only 10 days la ter, against the same positions and the sam e enemy, b ut n ow trusting in the support of the ne\v allies. Bu L the hero ic period does n ot encl h ere . The third episode was the conq uest of Monte Marrone, w here h eroism took the fo rm of a dar ing coup de m ain carried o ut by the "Piemonte" battalion: they we re a ll "Alpini " of t h e "Ta u rinense" repatria ted fro m Mo nte negro. But Âˇwere \vas t h e heroism in this case? lt was in th e surprise a ttack a gainst the brave G e rrn an Li.ger and th e nig ht climb of an impervious rock wall, 800 metres high, jutting out over t h e p lai n , wi th m ate rial s, am munitio n and arms, including a 75 m m gun, on o ur back. In t he ni gh t of lVlarch 31 everything \.vas heavy, even t he

THE HEROIC PERIOD In a bewild ered Italy, in a foggy daw n, the 1st Motorized Group attacked th e ,vell organized defensive positions of Hi ll 343 o n Mon te Lu ngo. As s oo n a s the fog l i fte d,

/ 1a lia n armoured ca rs de fe nding Rome's Porta San Paulo d u ring 1he War of Liberaliu11.

A.P.O. 155, Scplcmbcr 24, 1944

TTALTAN CORPS OF LIBERATION ORDER OF THE D.A Y no 43 As from today, September 24, the Ilalian Corps of Lib cralion disbands for superior n ecessities. It does not disband, l believe, nor will ever disband in our hearts, the patrimo ny of the noble and ard uous events wh ich we lived through together, and the righ teous pride for those deeds which have a historical value for our Cou ntry. I am sure th at all or us ,.v ho belonged 1.0 th e C.T.L. w ill a lways ackn o\.\rledge our selves as brothers and, when we m eet, ,vill ahvays hold out our hands, however differenl the material fortune ror each o ne of us will be in the future, and however different our spir itual path. Thus our inslinctive and unselfish solidarity will b e a cement ror the c ivil life of our Coun try, as the comm on ideal of m aking it free at the cost of our blood was the cement of its military renaissance. On its disba ndm en t the C.I.L. w ill set up t,vo new Major Units. The "Legnano" and lhe "Folgore". Our wish and pledge must be that they sh ould become the most solid, the most fervent and firm un its in the service of our Country, as natural consequence of their birthright. And to this encl, any personal and collective sacrifice im posed by the hard necessities of a new organ iza tion must be felt as fair, even if painful for us. \Ve all come from the same mould, the C.T.L., and the small ideal flames of th e minor u n its now being disbanded or transformed will certainly not burn oul, but will merge in Lhc larger and brighLer路 0arne of the t,vo Divisions that are h orn of them. .As [or those who leave us only because in the new organization there is no room for all, it they go b ack to civilian life, there t hey will make their noble achievements known and loved; if, instead, Lhey join oth er Divisions, they w ill certainly car ry there the ferment of their recenl experiei1ce of a war fough t with the new spirit, that which rises like an offering fro m the ash es o[ our destroyed homes. This is the last Order of the Day of the Italian Corps of Liberation . Let my affection and gratitude of Commander be consecrated in this message for th e h eroic "Nemho", t he impetuous "San Ma rco", the (earless and firm IV and V mule-pack groups and CLXVI group , which l am abou t to leave for good . Let's take heart, all of us ! We are sure that, in opening their own new cycle, th e "Legnano" a nd th e "Folgore" w ill alv,1ays a nd equally be worthy of their past.

rolls of American telep hone cable I had filched on th e edge of a US camp, b eca u se th e i r w i re ,vas lig h ter than ou rs. "vVe reach ed the s u mm it a nd no Alpenj~lger ,vere to be seen. That was very good news w hi ch spread like lightni ng fr o m the scou ts in fron t to t he tail of the col um n , h u t Lh e Germans allacked again a fe,.v days later~

o n E aster night, relying on the euphoria cau sed by our many toasts to our far-a,vay fam i I ies, bu t by then it was too late for them : we had reorganized o ur defence and they were driven hack fo r good. The favoura b le develop ments deriving from th e brilliant actions or the "Piemonte" batta lion \Vere soon fel t. O n Ma::,路 24 , the 4 th

"Bersaglieri" R egimen L, t h e "Piemonte" Alpine battalion, th e CLXXXV Paratroop Un il, the JX Assau lt Unit and the IV packmule artillery battal ion received the order to advance on the r ise a l ong the d i rection Monte .M arrone, Monte Mare , Val le Venafrana, Picinisco . Th e German resistance \.vas very sti ff on Mon te Irto and Mon te PieLroso, \vhich bar the access to th e Fonclil lo valley. Advancin g everyw here, our路 fo rces reached P icinisco on t he 28th : Th e German front had collapsed a fter the attack from the high ground. If General Clark, Commander o f the US 5th Army, had heeded the advice of General .Ju i n, Command er of the French Moroccan Expedi tionary Corps , and followed his project o f advan cing on t he rise tO\varcls Ali na, along the Liri valley, the three bloody battles of Cassino wou l d have never taken place . The Italians succeeded in reachi ng Alina in t.he clays before the fall of Cassino: the "Arcliti" of t he IX Assault Un it put t.o flight. the left wing of th e Austrian 5th Gebirgsdivis ion, occupyi n g Picinisco and the subu r b s o f Ali na and [o r cing t he "Gustav Line" alo n g th e operationa l di rection o[ the Liri valley. Ji. was the realiza tion of J uin's dream. hut it was a lso the ord e r to go back, \vhen the Italian soldiers were already s h ou t in g "Roma, Roma!" The Allies , p articularly the British, di d not take kind ly to the idea of the Italian units entering Rome. T he heroic p eriod ends here, together with t he epic deed s of the lsl Motorized Group.

THE MANOEUVRE IN THE MARCHE O n Apr路i l 3, 194 4 t h e Allied Control Commission an nounced that the Moto r i1.ed Grnu p was transferred to the Marche, aut hori1.ed to adopt the name of

Italian Corps of LiberaLi on (CI L) and assigned to the British 8th Army (Gen. Montgomery) . Th e da l e of Apri l 3, 1944 is unkno,vn to Lhe Ita li a n s, including the military. We remember that day on ly because we removed t he Savoy Coal or

Arms from the collar of our unirorrn a nd replaced it \Vith th e Pontida Cross. It is a date thaL o n ly a few historians like to mention but it has a p rorouncl meaning, because precisely th en th e Allies began to be.Ii eve in u s and al lowed our Army to deploy

25,000 men. This is \vhy April 3, 1944 marked Lhe li ne be tween two histori cal periods. Aft er reach i ng i ts complet e st r eng th , eq u al to t hat of two Divisions, on J u ne 8th t h e CIL started an ovenvhelming offensive, going from Gu arcliagrele to the Metauro river. Th e advance had some obligate stops since the German L XX\/1 Corps co nd ucte d a text -book ,vithdrn,val: three mo nt hs, from June Lo September, gained by yielding about 200 krn. T he Ge r man manoeu vre was made easier by t he morphology of t h e ground t hat faced t he Italian advance, _w hich consisted of lo n g ridges a lternating \Vit h valleys orthogonal to the coast . E very ridge was a "position of temporary stop". The term cou ld

Above and left.

Fighting in Rome during the \Yar of 1,i:bercuio11.

lnfa111ryme11 of rh e "Legnano " Regimen/ carrying ammunition 10 1he Aifonte Lungo fire-line.

seem "aseplic" buL for the ILalian Corps of Libera tion, inserted in a very dc li cale point of j unction \Vith the Polish II Corps (we \Vere two allies ,vith co m p lete ly different vie\vs on Lhe conduct or the actions and an equally di fferent progression speed), every stream and every hill \Nere a pain ru I to lI or b lood paid to the German manoeuvre plan. The breaklhrough or the \.,.· inter line, on June 8, led to the conquest or Canosa Sannita, Guardiagrele and Orsogna. Aher this operation, the ClL stayed on lo garrison the sector, while the "Besaglieri" and the "Alp ini" of th e J st Brigade continued the attack and occupied Bucchianico. The paratrooper-s lel.\ the Corps' sector~ reaching Chieti and some towns on the coast. 100

Thus, after lon g months of trench warfare we entere d a period of intense activity·, h aving to Lackie the complex log istic problems of a mo b.il e \,v ar, for which th e CIL was not prepared and equipped . On the 11 th, 13th and 1.'ith of June some units or the 1st Brigade reached Sul mona, L'Aguila and Teramo. The German r·es is lance on the Chienti river 'vvas strong, bu t on the arr iva l o r the formations that during the rapid advance were ec helon ed a lo ng tens of kilometres, at the end of J u ne To len tino and Maccrata ,vere taken, and the Ch.ien(.i was c rossed in the direction of Cingoli. Meanwhile, to tbe right of the Cl L, a de term ina t role was p layed by an autonomous u nit, the 2nd Corps led by Wladysla,v Anders,

the legendary Polish General. The Corps, organized l ike a Brit ish Expeditionary Corps, was based on t wo Di v isions, th e 3rd "Fusiliers o f the Carpathians " Division and th e "Kresova" Division. The Polish units in lhe Marche always worked in close cooperation will, Lhe ClL. The differences in language, training and equipment between Poles and Italians could have caused serious diff.icu !Lies in m u tual understanding and especially in cooperation. II. \Vas not so: \,ve got along immediately and the battle or Ancona was a beaut i ful example of common action . .Although the advance of the Polish and the Italian units had taken place in very difficu lt conditions, due to the German minefields and demolitions, on June 21 there \vas th e (i rst encounter wi th th e German units. On July 4 th e atlack p lanne d by th e Poles came to nothing, owing lo the preventive retreat of the Germans. On July 9 the rirst baul e or .Ancona was concluded and on the 17th and 18th the city was liberated. Before the battle of Ancona, the area o r F il ottrano, w hich overlooked the slopes declining towards the sea and was the strongest German position, had been entrusted to the Italians of the CIL. At the begi nning, the difficulty of the operation was underes timated and over 400 p ara troopers o f the "Ne mbo" died for the conquest of that area , a lso because the Germans counterattacked with tanks and an in tense and rnassivc art ill ery fire, but on July 9, at dawn, the "Nern bo" paratroopers raised Lhe Italian Tricolour on the tO\ver of Filottrano's town hall. In mid-July the Poles and the Italians resumed their movement

along a line running ,vest of the coast. Santa Maria Nuova, Oslra Vetere, Belvedere Ostrense , Pergola, Corina1do, Cagl i, Urbino, Urban ia: all these cities are linked to the memory our magnificen t fallen comrades. Il was a \Nearing rnob i le \Va r a l most up to the edge of the winter "Gothic Line" a nd t he ClL, comp letely exhausted, reached the Metauro after hav ing ab andoned along the \Nay most or its worn-out vehicles, \.vhich had miraculously survived the trench war ,vith the 5th Army, hut ,vere utterly u n r eliable in the mob il e war with the 8th Army. Second L ieutenant Alfonso Casa ti [e l I h eroically at Corina ldo. He ,vas awa rd e d a Gold Medal, and this ,vas t he last heroic deed of ou r period in the Marche. On September 24, the CIL was dis b anded, with a memorable "Order of the Day" by Ge neral Umbe1to Util i.

severe tests o[ operationa l efficiency, were dep loyed in succession: "Cremona" in J an u a ry a l ong the Senio; "Folgore" at the end or February in Val Santerno; "Legnano" in /\larch, south-cast of Bologna . Each Combat Group deserved and conquered its glorious pages. The "Cremona" \V i th the lihe,Âˇat ion of F usignano and Al fonsine. Th e "Fri uli " and "Lcgnano" ,vith the liberation of Bologna, but partic u larly the "Folgorc", ,-vhen on April 12, at daybreak, 200 paratroopers of the "Nembo" ,vere dropped b eh.ind

E111placi11g a gun of the J1alia11 Corps of" Liheratio11 (Janua,v 1944).

Glorious Corps of Volu nteers for Liberty. The Armed F orces of the ne\,Vand free Italy w ill continue to fight side by s ide with the Alli es until t he l iberation or t he North and the destn.rction of Fascism.

CONCLUSIONS Having il luslraLed in this study the first-han d evidence and the au then Lie interpretations of those who lived through that war, in closing it is vmrth reporting som.e significant da ta, since th eir precise language is, as always the most eloquent : the I ta li an contingent - Army, Navy, Air Force - panicipated in the Italian campaign with over half a mill ion soldiers, and was second only to

ON THE GOTHIC DEFENCES From September- 24, 1944 - day or the disbandment - to January 24, 1945 - date or the d eployment of Lbe "Cremona" Combat Group on the Senio river - no Italian has bee n figh ting in the War or Liberation? Il is not tru e! The continuity of the Italian presence on the Gothic d efen c es was assure d by the 205th, 209th , 210th, 227th. 228th, 230th and 231sl auxiliary Divisions - a total of 300,000 men, who fought ,vith the 5th and 8th Armies - as well as by the XX Group of "Combat mule-trains". J\tlearl\vbi le , in southern Italy, the u n its of the Combat Grou ps had no resL. On the contrary, they were in tensely trained by the inflexible Br it ish Officers and NCOs, and their equiprne nl was radically changed. The structu re of th e new Italian Army w as reformed at hi g h speed . The Combat Grou p s, after passing

the Ii nes al Poggio Rusco. This was the first batll e j ump for t he Ilal ian paratroopers : a really glorious page, which cost 32 dead. Giuseppe Dozza, the firs t mayor of a free Bologna, in h is proclamation, said to his fellO\vcitizens: our peop le sal u te w ith en thu s iasm and a passion of patriotism and li berty the val iant All ied armies of liberation, th e heroic renevvecl Ital ian Army, the

that o l' the Un ited States. The dead servicemen were 87,000; 368 Gold Nledals were awarded, 139 of which to the Un its. This was t h e d ear pr ice or liherty 1

L '' General, Sena/or of the Republic, former Chie(oj'Sta/T of the Armv

101

Reliving Naples' "Four Days" through the heroic deeds of the city s proud and self-respecting people

THE PIOIJD IJPIIIIM 01 THE NEAPOIJTAN From 27 to 30 September 1943, servicemen and citizens of the former Bourbon capital joined together to free the city from the German occupants, giving a significant contribution to the Nations second "Risorgimento" n a hot and sunny 28 September 1943 a voice on the rad io rÂˇan through the streets of the old Bourbon capi tal: "Armed gangs of Cornmunists, led by escaped British prisoners, have plundered 1he city, robbing shops and b reaking into private homes". With this laconic message on Naples' Fo ur-Day Uprising, Lhe Fascist Government dismissed the redemption of an entire population who, exhausted in th eir bodies but not in their spirit, decided to conquer their freedom by themselves, before the arrival of the Allies. T his is confirmed by the words of the award or the Gold JVIedal for Military Valou r conferred to the proud city: IA/ith a magnificen t patriotic impulse, among grief and ruins, it 1,vas capahle of regaining the strength to drive the German troops out of the Neapoliwn soU, braving their fierce and inhuman retaliation. Engaged in an unequal s truggle against the age-old enemy, during the Four Days of the end of

102

Septemhe1; it offered the 1\if.othcrland numerous noble sons. \!â€˘/ith its glorious example, the cit_v pointed to the Italians the way to fi'eedom, justice and lo the salvation of the Cou.n try.

AMON G GRIEF AND RUINS During the Second \Norld War, Naples su ffered w ith p ride and

G}) i :~ ( tt,

dignity, rebelling w i Lh t he typical im pulsiveness of its sons. In almost four years of \.v a r the city end u red 105 violent raids . The destruction of public and private edifices \Vas enormou s (233,000 rooms destroyed or made uninha b it a ble; the Mercalo n e ig h bourhood wÂˇas the most seriously hit : 13,2 13 r oo ms lost o u t of 14,642). The tel ephone system was 90% unserviceab le and the

();

railway system los t: 65% of its material. Also tl1e pmver and gas s tations and the harbour \.VOrks were ser iously damaged. Th e human losses were countless and co ul d be es tima ted at about 22,000 dead. Three tragic occasions ought to be particularly remembered: the firs t daytime b ombing, the exp losion o [ a sh ip in the harbour; the last bombardment.

At least 900 people died on December 4 , 1942 d u r in g t h e firs t air raid l aunched in d ayt im e, wh ich Look by s u rprise the population and even the anlia ircraft defence . Some ships at anchor (including the i\lluz.io A!Lendolo cruiser) ,vere hi t. 1\vo tra mcars load ed \Vith peopl e \vere destroyed in Via i\ilonteoliveto causing a real slaughter. The explosion of the ship Caterina Costa on th e a fternoon of March 28 caused 549 d ead and mor e t h an 3000 inj ured . The brand-new shi p, with a LOnnage o[ 8600 tons, had been carrying ammunition and provisions forÂˇ a year. On board ther e \Vere 600 Italian and German sold iers, bes ides 900 tons of explosives, 1000 tons of avia tion gasoli ne and 43 between cannons, tracked vehicles and tanks. For a t rivial accident, a spark triggered off a small fire: the cre\v, \vorried about the dangero us load, thought. it was impossi ble to p ut out the fire with t he shi p's e quipme n t. and reached safety on the wharf. Almost all the Germans, \vho were a t. the bo\v, did the same, \\'hile the Italian sold iers \ve re besieged as tern . Many p l unged into the se a but more th a n I 00 \V ere burn t to death. At 17:39 a terrible explosion d estroyed the sh i p, launching over a vast area pieces of white-h ot sheet metal, bombs, cannons and even parts o[ a rmoure d veh iclcs. D ead and wo unded were assemb le d near the cen tral station, in piazza Car103

The "scu1:,nizzo" Gennaro Capuoz.z.o.

lo III, in the Spaccanapoli area . The m unicipal policemen ,,vorked hard for several days in order to br ing back a minimum of order in the general chaos. On Aug ust 4, a roar of engines rem ind ed the Neapolitans that the war was indee d going on. Soon aft.er 2:30 p.m. hundreds of American and British bombe rs d ropped tons of bombs from very high altitude. T here were three thousand casuallies bet\veen dead and wounded, craters ,vere everywhere, more than a h undred buildings were pulve rized . T hat clay I.he people did n o l even have the s trength to mourn the dead. The Neapolitans had been dece ived by th e eve nts of July 25 and Septembe r 8. The armistice surprÂˇised Lhe ci Ly and ils military commanders, but not t he Germans, who imm e di ately dis armed the Italian troops. In the entire Cam pan ia th e Gerrn ans ,vere a t least twentv- thousand. T here \Vas t he 1Âˇ4-Lh Corp s, formed by three Divisions in support of the 16 th armoured Division, deployed on the frontline to resist the Allied land ing al Salerno. The 15 1h Corps was near Villa Literno in reserv e . Th e "I l ermann Goering" Division was deployed near Maddaloni, Lo cover the in ternal ver sant. Small combat units , equipped w ith Ti g er 104

tanks, ,vere s tationed in the Agnano a rea. Th e troops of the Naples garrison \Vere commanded by Col. Scholl, vvho on September 13 issued an order according to whic.h anybody who, openly or deceitfi,dly, acts against the German fc) rces, will be irnmediately executed. Furthennore, the place o{' the deed and 1he immediate surroundings of the culprit'., hideout w ill be destroyed and reduced lo ruins. Eve1y rnurdered or 1vounded German will be a venged a hundred times. T he order issued bv Scholl , a stocky Prussian Office~- who t ried in vain to acquire an aristocratic look by wearing a m onocle, marked the bloody defeat or the Italian soldiers who tried to oppose the Germans, not only d uring the Four Days bu t a lso on September 11 and 12 . And yet, in I.h e Napl es area , th e r e was a strong Italian deployment con sis ting of alrnosl 5000 men: the "Pasubio" Infantry Division, comrnan cled bv Gen . Penl.imalli , 5 coastal battalions and the 19 th Co rps , commanded by Gen. Del Tetto, lVIilitary Commissioner of the province. The Italian forces were largely sufficient to prevail over Scholl's 2000 Ger mans if they only h ad received, in those moments of tragic confusion, precise orders as to what had to b e clone.

Some Commands ,vere put by force in the in,possibility to act, other units were released by their Commanders Lo prevent the men from being captured; some units, surrounded b y surprise, surrendered owing to the ignoble threat of retaliation, but in other circumstances the soldiers reacted firmly and their arms, taken up against the e neri,y, fired ti ll the last bullet. In the afternoon of Septem he,10, a Ca rab iniere captured five Germans b y himself and took them to Pala1J.O Salerno, seat of the Italian Command, but th e b uilding had a lready been occupied b y the Ge rmans and t he Carahiniere, taken prisoner in its turn, was saved by a group of sailors w ho bravely opened fire. In the evening of September 10, the Germans had a l re a d y prevailed , but many Italian soldiers r efused to s u1Te nder. Capt. Mengoni and Lieut . Lubrano , t wo Navy officers, ba1-ricaded w i 1.h (orty sailors in the small barrack of the nav al base, fought. (or th r ee hours and three sailo rs died. They were about to gel the upper hand of the besiegers when Lt. Col. De Stefano arrived and ordered t hem to surrender, in order to avoid a ferncio u s retali a Lion against the population.

THE TERRIBLE RETALIATION On S e p tember 10, in Piazza Umberto, a soldier in the .M ed ical Corps refused to surrender his rifle and ,vas slain on the spot by thr ee Germans. Giacomo Lettieri, a hoy of sixteen who \VOrked in a blacksmith shop and ,vas present on the scene, picked up from the ground one of the guns ,vhich had a l ready been seized frorn other soldiers and fired against the N azis, killing one of them and pulling the other to flight. But on September 25

A group of fi ghters_

he was captured with .l l c iv ilians. They were forced to dig a large grnve and then vve re s hot on the spot. Young Lettieri was later avv路arded a Silver Medal for Military Valour. Also the soldiers or the Arcnaccia motor pool tried vainly to resist, as did those of the Military District and the Municipal Policemen of the Via Ch ia ia barracks. AL Casalnuovo, Lieu t. Gaetano Farneti, Commander of a post on the provincial road, ref used to surrender and fought until he \vas finally hit. The 48 th ArLiLler路y Regiment , commanded by Col. Di Pasqua, ,vas stationed in nearby Nola. Its armamen t consisted of 300 ol d rifles and 2 mach ine g uns. The LO\vn was completely surrounded by the "Goering" Division, which \.vas kept in reserve for Lhe Salerno front. To avo id a massacre, Col. Di Pasqua had to do his vc,-y best to convince the g unners to ren1ain o n the defensive, bul on the evening or September 10 the Germans t u rned up al the guardroom and enjoined the soldiers to surrender their weapons . They were p rornpLly driven out with hand grenades ; a German grenadier was killed. In order Lo avoi d the retaliation, Col. Di P asq u a sen t to th e Germans Lie ut. Carelli and a g un ner~ but they wer路e both mmvn dmNn by a

machine g un burst as soon as they were in sight of the outposts of the "Goerin g", ,vh ich meanwh ile had surrou nded the Regiment's barracks . The follm,v ing clay the Germans informed they would be content ,vith all the petrol stored in the depo l. The Colone.I Look every possible precaution on order Lo avoid in cid ents . He Look all the weapons away from the sold ie,-s and made them to remain in the dormitories . The Germans arrived with forty men, disarmed the guards and forced the Colonel to or路d er the m en to come clown to the courtyard . They were all taken prisoners and th e Colonel and 9 Officers taken al random were shot. This is the retaliation (or our comrade killed yesterday - shou ted the German Officer who led Lhe firing squad - this is hmv the Herrnann Goering Division punishes 1rai10rs . On September 12, the Germans overcame the last resistance at the 634 th an ti a ircraft batten,, at I.he Telephone B u ilding an d at the "Pas t.re ngo" Carabinieri barracks. At the "ZanL.ur" barracks four cust.orns officers were shot for resisting. AL Castel dell'Ovo, ,vhere 20 a rtillerymen of the 21 st Sighting Centre were barricaded with about 40 civilians , a Lank and several armo u red cars

opened a breach . Many so ldiers escaped by jumping into the sea, but unfortunately 8 gunners were li ned up with the civilians along the coasl road, via Partenope and via Nazario S auro and , when they all reached the Admiral ty, the 8 men in uniform ,,v ere separated from the grou p and shot. Thei r bod ies were left for three clays on th e flowe r beds near the parapet of the Santa Lu cia quarter. But the wrath of t he aggressors was not placated. Their fu 1~y b roke oul with looting and destruction against soldiers and defenceless c iti1cns and reached ils c l imax with the f ire se t to the Univers i Ly. ln the afternoon of September 12, six hundred Nazis, with tanks and light artillery, surrounded the Un i versi ty, ,vhich they considered the hotbed o f the insurrection an d, after assembling in Via Rettifilo a bou L 6000 people they had rounded up in Lhe area, set the buildings on fire, and forced Lhe captured crowd to kneel clown and watch Lhe execution of a sailor. T he 6000 Neap olitans were lined up and taken to Aversa. Those who had their pape rs in order were released but the others, abo ut forty, toget.her with 14 Carabinieri accused of preventing the d estruction or Naples' telephone central, ,vere forced lo d ig their graves and th en shot in a place called Madama Vincenza.

THEY \-\1ANTED TO TURN NAPLES INTO MUD AND ASHES According Lo I Ii tier's orders, the c ity was to be turned into mud and ashes. Between Septembe r 12 and 14 General I-l u be successfully coun lerattacked the Arnericans land ed at Sal erno , b ut this action \vas only meant to give the Germans behind the lines enough time l.o withdraw, takin g vvith 105

them equipment and male1·ials, cleslroying every fac ili ty. The harbour's wharfs and installal ions we,·e mined and blown up. T he Jlva steel ,vorks al Bagnoli, the Cisa-Viscosa p lants , the Chiappetta & Panzanel la mills and the Shell wa1·ehouse were pillaged an<l destroyed while the whole town was sacked , T he fo l lowin g day Co lone l Schol I sent away the greater part of his men. O nly 250 of them remained i n th e c ity. Roads and rai l,,vays were prac tically unsen iceable. There was no food and not even the thriving black market was able to red uce th e people's hunger. Wa ter and gas were cul off. Around the few drinking fountains still functioning th e re were long lines of people and brawls o l'Len broke out, so that several times the G ermans intervened with ,veapons, ,,v oundi n g some wom e n. Ow· i n g to the wa te r shortage and the h eaps of garbage piling up in the streets (the ve hicles of the stree t-deanin g service h ad been requis itioned and the dustmen were recruited for "compulsory wo,-k senice") the threat of an epidemic was looming on the city. T he evacuees crov.··ded in to the still habitable houses. The evacuation of a 300-metre wide coastal strip had been order ed, \,vh ich wou ld have been five kilometres had Prefeel Soprano not made firm objections Lo it. The nightmare was made \Vo rse bv t he u nceas ing ro un dups of men for "compulsorv work service" . On September 28, while the Ameri cans were a p proac hing Nap les, a gloomy and e ndless procession ,vent thro ugh lhe city. They were rounded-up voung men who had been kept in th e Capod i montc w oo ds . The un fo nunate boys vvalking under a Lo1Tcntial rain were on their way to the concentration camps in Germ a ny, guard ed by no mo re than l'ifty \Nehrmac ht soldiers. 1

106

RESISTANCE IN THE CITY

There ,.v as nothin g left for Scholl's men to plunder from factories and storehouses and theref'o r e, on Sep tem b er 27, th ey turned the ir attention to shops. Lale in the afternoon they arrived at the "Rinascente" department sore and stole all the clothes. Unsatis fi ed, they a s ked th e c h ief cashier to hand over the meagre takings of lhe clay. The clerk ref use d and was kno c ke d down w ith a s hove but, in an o utburst of rage, the man Look a pistol and started firing. A real battle took place among the rac ks . Othe r people arri ved and the robbers ran away, leav ing behind the loaded lorry. The e lectrifying news sp1-eacl vc1-y quickly a nd anyone who had something Lo protect or did not want LO be captured b.'· the patrols of the "work service" during the night, got himself a gun. The fo llo,ving morning t he Neapolitans were even more excited by the rumour, ,vhich ,vas later proved wr ong, tha L the Ame ri ca ns had landed at Bagnoli and Pozzuoli. On the 28 1h th-e population blocked the plundering in every a rec1 of the cil.v. Sc holl's me n were fort:ed to leave Via Roma and the Speran:1.e lla district empty handed. At Materdei the owners of a shoe factory so unded th e a larm: several so ld iers w h n had been hiding in ncarbv houses since the 8Lh of September, rushed to th e scene. The Nazis were besi ege d in a bu ildin g where 7 men tried in vain to enter. The Gra11atieri Lieutena n t Carmine Fllselli an d Gennaro Jacuzzi, a boy of seventeen, were kill ed while the others \Vere wounded. The Germans were later freed by their comrades w ho arrived in great n u mbers. In Piazza Plchiscito three Nazis pillaged the Leone Furrie1·'s shop. Cartain S tefano Fadda, who later· became the leader of the in sur gents, together with three young men tried to get hold of some

\VCap ons a n d rou nd m any or them in the nearby deserted Prefecture, but when he returned lo the square, the Germans had already left with the booty, while a group o f ind igna nt m e n w ere commenting t he event. These men became Captain Fadcla's small a rmy. They built a road block by tearing ou t t he pa vement and placing car wrecks in the middle of the street. They la.'" in wait behind the improvised trenc hes and the windows overlookjng the square. Their warlike spirit was high but the results were scarce, since the Germans passed, undisturbed, along parallel stree ts. In another area the Nazis attacked the hungrv .\Ieapolilans \.vho wa nte d to co llec t vic tuals from d e pots and warehouses. Th e Ge r mans arrived on t wo light trucks and lhe O ffit:er in charge gave the protesters t hree minutes' time tn clear t he place. At th e g ive n time the Germans opened fire, wounding an eightyea r-old boy. The crowd dis persed. The Nazis set u p a ma ch i negun, took lwelve hos tages from the nearby houses and dragged them lo the middle of the square. At tha t point the relatives or the prisoners flu ng themselves on the soldiers, coming out of cverv alley, most of l hem armed only with knives a n d clubs, but there we re so many of them that the Germans got into their vehicles and left al fu ll speed. Roadblocks \.Vere built, even using overturned tramcars to make barri cades . At Capoclimonte, Li e ut . E doard o Drnetto, w it h a bout 60 men, du g up a 37mm cannon which had been hidden on the 8 1h of Seplember. Al lhe F ire Briga d e barracks of the Miracol i district, Lieut . Vi nicio Giacomelli organized a prison for lhe captured Germans. In the afternoon, the insurgents o f Porta Capuana pu l u p a roadblock at Sa n Giovann i Carbonara: the,·e were forty of them,

A barricade.

divided into four squ a d s, each armed \Vit h a machine gun. The German soldiers ran into it: four were k illed, two wou nded and the resl were taken prisoners . E ight more Germa ns ,vere k.illed and seven \Nounded at a roadblock in Via Foria, held by about 60 men ,vitl1 L\vo machine guns. The rebellion was becoming dangerous and Colonel Scholl ord ered his men who ,vcre still in Naples - at t he Moncenisio Hotel, Villa Flor idiana and Vomero sports-grou nd - to pu l it dmvn. A first gro up of Germans went against t he Porta Capuana roadbl ock, ,vound i ng three yo un g men and forc i ng t h e others to clear the street. An armoured car left Villa Floridiana and roamed undi s t ur·bed t hrough the area, nor did the patrol that we n t out from t he spo n s-g.rou.nd meet any resistance. This patrol, w ild ly riring sub - mac hi negun bursts, k ill ed 7 residents of the ne ighbou rhood and bdo re going back to the sports-ground took 4 7 hostages. In t he afternoon of September

28, after a sudden storn1, two armoured cars lert Villa Floridiana to go on patrol. A group of fighters tried in vain to slop them on the corner of Via Roma and Via d'Afflitto. One of them \vas a "scugnizzo" 0 1· seventeen, the Neapolitan stree t urchin Pasqu ale Form isano ,vho by himse l r, \Vith two hand-grenades , confronted one of t he enemy vehicl es a nd then died ricldlcc\ \,vi th machine-gu n b ul lets. On Seplem b er 29, in Via de i Cesari, a thirteen -year·-old bov, Filippo Ill urninati, died in similar circumstances . The l\VO "scugnizzi" were pos thu mously m,vardec\ L\vo of the four Gold Medals for lVIilitary Valou r conferred to the pal.riots of the Naples uprising. Dur i n g the night the Nazi troops completed t h e p reparations for the destruction of the city. Neverth eless t he partisans s ucceeded in s;:1ving Ponte clel la Pigna, Ponte Caracc io lo and the water tank by defusing the mines they h ad seen placed by Lhe Germans, thanks to the intervention or Lieut. Droetto's men, who surrounded and captu,-ed six sappers.

A RELENTLESS FIGHT On September 29, at daybreak, Col. Schol l ordered the other forma tions to wi thdra,v, inc lu d ing the un it quartered at Villa florid iana. Only abouL a hundred Germans were left in the city: ten machine gunners at the two emplacements of the Universo and Torino hotels in Piazza Carita, about twenty SS at the Bo logna hotel in Via De Pretis and as many a t t he Parco ho tel - t he German Headqu arters - in Via Roma, and about 60 sappers at t he Vomero s p orts ground . But, at the same ti me, about 70 a r moured g,-enadiers f rom the ''Goering" rearguard had come to the Capod irnonte hi l I. In the morn ing there were no real fights, but there \Nere many tragic events and heroic episodes. Mario Men ic h i ni , a seventeen year-old member of the Fasc ist Militia, who was slalioned near ViLer bo, having heard that t h e population of h is hometown had rebelled against the Germans, deserted and ,vent to Naples to join the insu rgents. Alone, he lay in wait in Via Roma and clest n:i_ved 107

an armoured vehicle with a Molotov cocktail. He was kiJled by the German reaction . On of the Gold Medals conferred t.o lhe patriots of the Naples' uprising was av..-arded lo him poslhu mously with the following citation "Love of his Count1y inflamed his heart and his arm 1vas steady and did not tremhle. v\/ith an epic deed, worthy of the traditions of the true Italian youth, he {acecl and hit vvith a hand grenade a German tank ·w hich, advancing through the streets of the martyred city, was spreading death among the people revolting against the oppressor. His young life, srruck down by !he enemy /ire, lives and throbs in the soul of Naples wh i eh, in ii s legendary "Four Days", sang its most beautiful song of love and dea1h which announced a new l.l•t'" e . While a "scugnizzo" in Piazza Carita vvas immobilizing a tank by wedging an iron bar into the Lracks, at Cupafredda some Germans on a light truck wet--c murd ering four boys. Other fights took place in Piazza Medaglie d'Oro and Piazza Arenella, where the partisans, led by Gennaro De Paola, blocked a light truck loaded ,vith mines. The occupanls managed Lo barricade themselves in Palazzo Laniaro. After an hour of shooting, a German truck came to the scene but. \vas in its Lurn irnmobilized in Via Fontana by the patriots who blew one or .ils lyres with a hand grenade. An armoured car intervened an hour later. A partisan, Giovanni Attanasio, stood undaunted in the middl e or the street firing his submachine gun hut he could noL slop the vehicle and was killed. The armoured car freed Lhe besieged and took the t\VO trucks in tow. Three Germans \Nere killed in this action and l\vo \Vounded; the partisans' casualties were tvvo dead and three wounded. Early in the afternoon three Tiger tanks that had been stopped for a ,vhile hy Lieut. 108

Droetto's gun, came doVv·n from the Capodimonte hill . Once more the partisans had lo move oul of the st,-eets. T he barricades of Santa Teresa, l\iluseum and Piazza Dante ,vere literally crushed by t he tanks \vhich, fi ring thei r cannons and machine guns, kiUed many civilians . Once more the "scugnizzi" shcnved their boldness by cl imbing up the tanks and thrmving explosive bolll.es through portholes and slots. 'f\.\10 of the fallen boys, Vincenzo Baiano and Antonio Garofalo, were only twelve years old. Gennaro Capuozzo, also decorated with the Gold Medal, \.v as only eleven . A German grenade

litical direction was assumed by Antonio Tarsia, an elderly professor, and Eduardo Pansin i, a painte1: The fight at the stadium , bel'vveen M.ajor Sakau's soldiers, firing from the ,vindo,vs, an d Captain SLirnolo's partisans, hidden behind the trees and the enc losing \vall, went on for lh ree hours . Three patriots were wounded. After some time Major Sakau came out with a white flag and asked to go to his Command, at the Parco hotel, in order to be authorized Lo negotiate the surrendec "Of course - he spelled ou t - hy "surrender" 1 mean the termination of the battle and rwthin~ else. You 1-vill let us leave, assuring

killed him in Via Sant.a Teresa ,vhere he, on the balcony of the "Istituto Filippini", was helping the crew of a machine gun. At the Vorn ero , meanwhile, plans were being prepared for freeing the 4 7 hostages imprisoned inside the sports-ground. The assault was Lo be led by Capt. Vincenzo Stimolo, who had distinguished birnselr during the earlier fights - and would be killed son:1e months later; as a partisan, on the Apennines - while the po-

The American soldiers tried to help the people 0(1he city.

our security. The partisans' condition ,vas obviously the release of the hostages. The negotiations took the rest of the day, and Colonel SchoJl ex tended them to all the Germans that were still in the city. It was agreed that once th e hostages were returned , the insurgents would escort Scholl and his men

A district of Naples des1royed by the Allied air raids.

to Bagnoli. The Anglo-Ari1erican left wing was by th en al th e foot of the Vesuvius and several warships had already en Le red the gulf. On Sepl.e mher 30, at daybreak, as the partisans we nt Lo the Parco Hotel, as agreed, to escort the Germans out of the c ity, they discovered t hat Scholl had already left. During th e morning the last German platoons, who vvere d isengaging the msel ves from the Anglo - American vang ua rds , passed through Naples. Nevertheless as many as 9 p a triots \Vere killed in Piana Ottocalli, while on the Vomero, in Lhe Pel.7.alonga farmhouse, 13 boys and a peasant \Voman were ki lled by the fleeing Lroops.

THE LIBERATION On October .1, Nap les was completely free . The Germans continued to shell Lhe city ·while in the suburbs they were p ressed towards the Capoclimonte hill by the patriots who had smoothed the way 1.0 the Allies' advance. In fa ct the first vehicles were prec e d ed and e scorted by armed men. A late ed ilion of the "Roma", th e city's daily ne\vspaper, carried a warm bi! i ngual \vel come lo the American and British troops. T he legend of the "scugn i,.zi" is closely bound Lo Naples' "Four Days" and was confirmed by the allied war-correspondents, who were s urprised to see so many boys with weapons in thei r hands. The protagonists of the insurrection were actually all the Neapolitans, \vilhoul d istinction: sold ie rs , men, w omen of every social class, nobles and common peop le, middle class and proletarians, office rs , professionals, students and workmen. Th ere were many typical figur e s: Lenuccia (lVIaddalena Ce rasolo)

who handed baske ts of hand grenades Lo h e r fi g hti ng comrades; Mrs Lupino who, in Piazza Nazionale passed cartridge clips to he r son ; the women \,\,- ho brought weapons and food to their me n; a friar who le d a squ a d or re bels and, fi nally, the fearless and mocking "scugnizzi". Victo ry cost the life of about 500 patriots, who are remembered in the Gold J\1lcdal for Military Valour awarded Lo the martyred city of Naples, in the p ost hu mous Gold J\iledaJs con fer red on four very young protagonists of heroic actions, 6 S ilver Me dals (2 of which a w arded pos thumously) and three Brom.e Medals.

THE FIGHT CONTINUED IN THE PROVINCE Besides Naples, also other centres of the region paid v,ith their people's blood, beginning with the sacrifice of General Ferrante Gonzaga clel Vodice, Commander oC the 222 nd Coastal Division, killed at B uccoli di Salerno for his refusal Lo surrender. For the same reason also Colonel Michele Ferraio I o, Commander of the 6 th Coastal Regiment, was executed by the Germans. Figh ts took place also in Capua , whe r·e the Germans ki lled 6 boys and hanged Carlo Santagata, aged fi rteen. At Mug-

nano, rour clergymen were cruelly massacred without reason. Many \Vere also the victims a l Orta d i Atella and San Prisco; a t Bellona, 54 people were slaughtered on the edge of a 40-me tre deep quarry, and th e corpses were thrown in. Sparanise mo urned 27 victims. Pmverless, Caiazzo \,v a tched the murder o f 23 rnen and ,vomen because one of th em , asked about Lbe location of the American enemies, answered Lhat the enemies \vere the Nazis.

A PHENOMENON OF NATURE The grea l contribution given by Southern Italy and Naples to the secon d "Risorgimento" cannot be belittled. The intolerance towards th e occu pying troops appeared \Vith an out bu rsl of anger and pop ul ar fury. The "Four Days" were a proud and dignified revo lt, an honour to Naples, th e beautiful city, set like a pearl in a magnifi c e n t landscape. Born spontaneously, Naples' uprising was a unanimous struggle which involved a ll the people of the city who, alone, were capable of conquering their liberty.

• ,·,c olonel, former Commander, Naples Military District 109

fter a period of silence of almost twenty years, today th e r e is a revival of the history of our Risorgimenlo and its most eminent protagonists. Much is due lo the express wish of Preside1Jt Carlo Azeglio Ciampi vvho, in numerous occasions, has reaffirmed the importance o f the unitary p rocess in the conscience and the historical culture of Italy. Thi s appeal was backed up at many levels by the local an cl nat ional Admin i strations, by paper s and television, by the Arme d Forces' top levels, by conscientious c iti1.e ns who, in a moment of rapid transformation of associa ted life, are grateful to him for making topical the great issues lhal stirred the society o f the 19th Century, in Italy as in other Nations, contributing to the unitary structure o f the S tates and th e adoption of n e\v Constitutions. Th e memory of those memorable d ee ds whid1, in reality, has always been alive in the unconscious of the p eopl e , for w hom Giuseppe Garibaldi emerges as a mos t loved and revered personali ty, while the Italian midd le classes, w hich were th e promote rs of the R is o rgimenlo, had di s tanced themselves from it, turning tovvarcls ot her forms o f social participation. The format ion of the .n e\v en trepre neurial classes, fostered by the war demands, the conscr iption of y oung men and the following dramatic experience of th e s econd World \Nar promoted the formation of a newÂˇ social conscience. Today, I believe, the nume rous experiences of the recent past offer a precious opportun i Ly for reflection, which permit to weigh the facts with an awareness subs tantiated by the endless illusions wh ich were deady paid for: It is therefore useful to reconsider th e mos t authentic threads of th e thought which led to a uni tecl I tal y, w hi c h was claimed and theorized by Mazzini,

112

pursued through cliplornacy and pol i t ics by Cavou r a nd implemented by the Ni ce-born man in a reel shirt, who devoted his life, and that of his fa1nily, to the realization of that dream . Going over th e num erous w ritings and documents of the time, it is surpris ing that many of his thoughts, and the events that derived from th e m , can s till be taken as examples for a useful teach ing and stimulate, in the mean time, those forms of civil communal li fe among ltalians \vished by Garibaldi.

CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Son o f a Ligur ian family, brought up in N ice, Garibaldi a lready since his childhood showed the features typical of the seafaring people, together w ith the restlessness and openness o f mind of th e youths of the front ier zones . Touring the ports o f the Mediterranean s h ores, it wa s natural for him to absorb their spirits and relish the true flavour of freedom. Eve rywhere there \Vere talks of deliverance from tyra n ts , fr o m the Emp erors, Duk e s and Princes \vho s t ill

survived a l most everyv.' here in Europe. It ,vas openly claimed that Ilaly s hould rise free and united. The Risorgirnento meant that a people, d ivided b y the wish of various Nations to exploit i ts wealth, became conscious o f it and , at a certain point, demanded to reassemble in a homogeneous w hole the past and the present, in order to continue to bui ld a fu ture of liberty on spiritual and r a tional f oundation s, in a juridically defined balance. These were the d iscou rses that seemed to be made \Vith the precise intention to in flame the hearts of the young who were in quest o( ideals Lo fight for, exactly like the s h ip-boy Giusepp e Garibald i. He was called .louse at his birth, in the Nice custom, and n o t clubbed that b y Ani ta , a s maintained by the popular choir of "H omer's translators" who cyclically c ome up w i th fac ts al ready w ri tten in thousands of volumes about Garibaldi. Certainly the beginning of the awaren ess of "nationality" must be ascribed to the revolutionaries who wanted Lo insp ire t he new so ci e ty to the p rinciples or brothed1ood, equali ty and liberty. Concepts that are guarded in

that provided the historical setting adequate to his talents ,vere manifold. The positive outcome of t he unitary process was also favoured by trends, international events and logical forecasts and, last b ut not least, those considered by the British farsightedness which in the formation of a great Italian nation foresa\v a counterbalance of the rising German nation , \vhose expansionism \vorried also Napoleon III.

Left

The battle of S'ant'Antonio de! Saito. Below

Garibaldi's s ,v ord.

the fftincls and hearts of the multitudes, during and after Napoleon, who had only granted the liberty that the prior interests of France allowed. Af ter the Resto r ation, sanctioned by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, liberalism seemed to be languishing in the entire Europe. Neverlheless, while the blades of the guillotine were gradualiy cooling down, a few gleams survived, in their praclical and execu Live implications , in the little Sardinian-Piedmontese Kingdom, in harmony with the hard and real islic character of those people, who \Vere tired of manoeuvring bet,veen France, Spain and Austria. Many of the main advocates of the Risorgimento were among Lbe subjects of that Kingdom: D'Azeglio (1), Alfieri (2), Cavour; Mazzini and Garibaldi and, before them, Gioberli (3) who, with his "Moral and Civil Supremacy of the Italians" had reproposed to the minds of his generation th e same ideas included in the "message to the German nation" by Fichte (4) . Garibaldi appears on the stage of history as the right man at the right momen t, but the elements

This fores ight partially explai ns the attempt to influence Cavour's conduct and also the enthusiasm and affection with which Lhe British welcomed Garibaldi and his descendants \Vilh lhe spontaneous mass manifestations and the disinterested fTiendsh ip that only the British are able to express. During the vvhole period o f Garibaldi's life, under the apparÂˇent calm imposed b y repression, th e \.vhole Italian peninsu la and Europe w ere overflowing with post-illuminisL ferments. There were the echoes of the evocations and classical spl endours of the republican Rornan spiri t, the rights of man v,1hich carried Locke's emp irical stign.ata (5), Rousseau's (6) and Montesquieu's sociologic juridical mark (7) , the stamp of Hegel's dialectic idealism (8), the French radica l reformatory passion, Saint Simon's human i lari an socialism (9) . All these cultural factors influenced the Hero 's thought and he, since his youth, absorbed the patr iotic stimulation and the ,,vill to instil! in the soul of t.he llalians those concepts of liberty and solidarity wh ich cou ld favourÂˇ the common commitment to realize the Italian unitv. Thanks to his force and his charisma he was the h ighest inspiration of the people's action, witho u t ,.vhich the unity could never be accomplished. Many Italians know a bout Garibaldi's visil lo Turin. He was e lected to the first Italian Parliament, wh ich had its seat in Turin, then capital of Italy, in the ve rÂˇy beautiful little theatre of Palazzo Carignano. But few know about the spectacle, remained indelible in the history o[ the Parliament's sessions, of the crowd flocked fort.be occasion, of his presence announced and put o ff several limes because of a serious fit of rheumatic fevers , and which (inally occu rred some time after Cavour's cession o f Nice Lo France. 113

The publ ic's galleries were packed with red -s hi rted "Gariba ldin i" and numerous women dressed in scarlet cloth : wives , sis ters and daughters of famous personal ities who h ad come from every part of Italy, i n the hope or meeting the Hero. A profound silence fell in th e hall as Garibaldi entered, limping for the consequences o r h is

Parliament d id not include the Catholics, who \vere restrained by LJ-1e Pope's Decrees of the "Non Expedit" encyc lical wh ich forba d e them to particip ate, as elected as \,vel I as candidates, in th e political contest of the new Italian State. This obstacle was overcome in 1913, through the action of Gioli tti (1 0), the liberal s ta tesman who upheld the

contrary, the Pie d monte se bureaucratic administration wor sened the hostile feeli ngs o l the southern people and adopted expropriation provis ions, confiscating the properties of the religious communities. After the unificat ion, th e government adopted a vague ly protectionist conduct, unab le to rormulate economic policies that

rheuma tisms , dressed \Nith his red shirt and th e us u a l poncho over his shoulders, making his Âˇway among the depu ties, all in grey and b lack 1,,vith stiH while co ll ars . T here \Vas a first, very long applause. The speech that follo1,,ved was punctuated with numerous applauses hu t a lso with exclamations and booing when he mad e a d irect attack on Cavour, guilty of having rnade h i m "foreigner in his homeland". At the end Garibaldi \Vent out into the sq u are in front of the P arliament , fo ll owe d by a delirious crowd that \Nanted to to u ch h i m, see h is eyes still brilliant with ange1~ grab a nod, a word, a souven ir. .A clay that none of the participants would ever forget. At the beginning the just-born

opport u nity of the "patto Gentiloni" (11) and the a ltitude o r t he Holy See, finally intent on recovering that large a r ea of bel ievers.

\Vould rneel the requ iremen ts of the entire national territory In particular the customs d uties introd uced in 1887 by Francesco Crispi Lo p rotect from the import of industrial goods the buckling industry o[ the north, produced an European rep risal, through the interruption of the purchases of southern agricullural products, h ich caused a crisis in the \vhole south and gave rise lo th e m igratory flows that deprived the southern regions o r t he i r best hu man resou rces. The world crisis or 1929 and the fo ll owing hank lcnv of 193 3 , concerning the banks' in d ustrial property, led to the creation or IRI (IstitulO per la Ricostruzione l ndustriale) and t.be concentration of the managing pmver in the hands of the Stale. W i th t h e law of 1936, banks

114

THE HERITAGE OF THE RISORGIMENTO Once the Risorgirnen lo was accomp li shed, th ere came t h e problems of a large territor::,,. which [ell the weight of different experiences, for th e Nation as well as for Garibaldi, for his fami l y and for the socia l and associative movements that \Vere related to "Garibalclian ism". l n the economic field , for example , the re was no risolu tive policy which could offset the differences of development between north and sou th. On the

\.\1

were forbidden to 0\vn companies, enterprises, etc. The law remained in force until 1993, when Haly acknowledged an EEC directive \Nh ich reopened lhe possibi.lity of banks' shareholding in enter prises, \Vithin [ixed percentages of parLicipation. All these vicissitudes, near and faraway in time, \,Vere lived by the Garibaldis \Vith successes and tragedies, \vith g lorifications and fa ilures. They were all prisoners of lhe destiny linked with Lh e ir name, from generation to generation. Some of them, in order to survive, became es t ranged from their fam il y, others s uccumbed, still others tried to be worthy of their name up to the extreme consequences. An exampl e, glorious but dramatic. Setting: the F irst World War. Ricciotti, Garibaldi's son, at lhe beginn i ng of the conflict, convinced of the necessity of an Italian intervention, travel s to

Facing page. Garibaldi carrying a dying !lnita.

Below. The inkwell and the cigar case used by Garihalcli.

Pa ris, despite h i s wa l k i ng on crutches , with th e in tent of forming a Garibakli an legion, and his sons arc soon involved in Lhe terrible battles or t he Argonnes, \d1ere two of them, Bruno and Costante, arc kill ed a fe\V days one af1er the other: As soon as Italy enters the \var; the surviving bro t hers go back to Italy and are sent on the eastern Alps . Pepp i no, firstborn o f Costanza and Ricciolli, appointed Lieutenanl Colonel, at the head ola battalion of the Alps Brigade leads his men to attack lhe summit of Col d i Lana. After a violent figh t, he reaches l h e summit and, al 2464 metres, finally p lants the Italian Tricolour. In the clashes on the steep rocky mounta in faces , ano therÂˇ Garibaldi is wo unded : the youngest son Ezio, hit by a bullet in the throat, lies bleeding on the snow. A soldier who passes by sees the body and notices some movements, he li fts h im and carries him on his shoulders Lo the first-aid station clown the hill. Ezio w il l be saved by a miraculous operation, through a silver diaphragm in his throat ,vhich p ermilled him to survive until o ld age despite his serio us disablement.

Many other examples could be mentioned, but this suffices to say thal to follO\v in t he steps of a myth , devoting one's life to the defence o r oppressed people, or to be th e \vife or mothe r of a Garibaldi, was never an easy or advantageous choice of life. The roots of a unilecl Europe are fir m ly se t in the p eriod of the Risorgimento . This seems a contradiction, because exactly in tha t t i rne t he nationa.l ist ic impulses and th e writing of Const i t u tions \Vere prevai l ing cverywÂˇhere . Nevertheless, th e reference to Europe was very clear in the writings and \vords or many protagonists or that epoch. Garibaldi s h a red the same conv ictions and clai med peace among Nat ions, common runds ror financing infrastructure, school s, roads, hosp itals and systems of assistance to the needy. The r e ferences to the projects ~f the European Community or tod ay could not b e c lea rer and they go back lo October 1860. Today Europe proposes Nations as its Regi ons, in a gradual constru ction ,,v here, up to now, the national identity has been prevailing, and much remains lo be done in order to p ron,pt the consc ious participation in the governm.ent of the tenilory by the c itizens. According to Garibaldi's notion, l believe t hat it would be positive to p romo te courses o r integration, marked by a spirit of concord and brotherhood within the State, whose unitary process takes us back Lo the heart or our hislory. It is the eternal dilemma or t he human choices, hovering bet\,v een rÂˇeason and sentiment. After all, in my opinion, a more humane median line should prevail, as occurred in the past ,vithin the family of the a uthor of this article, respect ing their rnost famous exponent: G i useppe Garibaldi. \V h at \Vas his method for achieving Lhe objective? Educate tbe masses to be people, people to 115

be nation, nations to be humank i nd , national law to become human la,v, go from autonomous States to cosrnopolitism, or, as ,vc ,vo uld say toda y, to globalization. Evervthinn: direc ted towards the h an;10ny~ and ,vell-being of mankind. Kant (12) had dreamed o[ universal peace, Garibaldi talks of a universal State as foundation o f peace among peoples. His multiform sensibility made him inclined to to lernnce but not to confusion, as ahvays happens when man tries Lo balance memory of experiences, rntiona lity and ,v iii: the three sources of human experience which do not allmv hegemonies and subord inations; on the contrary, they require a balance between the sense of the humane and Lhe divine, in the deepest fabric of history. lL is a clear and simple lesson which comes to us frorn the hero of the Risorgimento and a hope that harmony w ill inspire the actions of the men and ,vomen of the governments who, today as at the t i m e o[ the Risorgimen to, have to tackle the proble1T1S Lhal peoples have Lo f ace in their e ternal struggle for existence.

THE PEOPLE'S EDUCATION Brmvsing through Lhe yellowed pages of a hundred and fifty years ago, a lot more is offered to our cons idera Lion. Alr eady during the years of the struggles [or unity, the question of the "p eople's ed u cation" \Vas notably posed by both t he intellectuals who anticipated the problem o f a common citizenship for millions of people ,vho found themselves llalians in all respects, and by the masses ,,vho w ished lo imp rove their level of education, w ith particular attention Lo the adults' instruct ion, conditioned by d estilution, oppression and lack of basic schooling. 116

This awareness, springing frorn the philosoph ies that insp ired the "uprisings of the Risorgimcnto", induced many intellectuals to "go Lo Lhe people", in order to spread culture and ans,ver the calls for j ust ice coming from those who, for the most part, couldn't read or ,vrite. In the immediately post-unitary period there was a lively cultural circulation, without p recedent in our history. Customs and frontiers \,v ere knocked dO\vn, and voluntary speakers, enjoying the ri rs L thrills o f t he free dom of expression, travelled all over the country \>.i.ilh great enthusiasm, stimulating a gen eralized debate, try ing Lo circulate modern ideas and concepts , germs of a newÂˇ knowledge . T h e attack ,vas on superstition, alcoholism, illiteracy, the anach ron is t ic rnonarchic inslilution and the circumscribed forn1s of education inherited from the precedent centuries. Already at the beginning of the s ixt ies, the Workers ' societies, born main ly in centn1l and northern Italy, were doing their best to open schools [or their members and later on they were the promoters of the League for the People's Education. The first president of the Lea1:,1ue was Giosue Carducci, a 6>reat fiiend o f the workers, who p u t into prac tice the Leagu e's inspiring principles which, refusing to Leach only the notions according to the traditional methods, fixed that: the adult ,v orkcr need s a Leaching which, speaking to his heart and Lo his fantasy, arouses in his mind the struggle -for ideas from whic h derives a craving for learning and organ i1.ing them ... and that in the categories of teaching he may understand and explain to himself the physical and moral phenomena of the world in \vhich he lives. Courses o f a ll kinds were promoted on the n.1ost varied subj ects : history, for e ign languages, economy, accounting, administration, ethics, literature , physics, applied chemistry.

T he names of the m ost distinguished scholars follmved one another in th e tea chin g , engag i ng a lso in discu ss io ns during Sunday readings, sorne ofÂˇ which were a cc omp anied b y projections, so that the teaching would not be only for the ears, but a lso for the eyes, in ord er to

Landi ng of 1he "Gariba.ld ini" Sesto Calende.

llf

penetrate into the m ind and be fixed in a more effective way. Carducci emphasized t he character of urgent h isto r ical necess ity assumed by the cffon towards the people's material and cul t u ra l growth on which, he said, the progress of the new Italy clepenclecl . We have been able to find the works of the "Universit:a Popolare Giuseppe Garibaldi" in Bologna, one of the most ancient ones, fo u nded in 1901, whose o r igins date back Lo Lhe League for the Pe opl e 's Education, ,v hich i n Bologna had a rem arkable development.

The so -called "Scuola Samaritana", a first-aid school, was founded in 1903, ,vith a convention bet.,veen the Popular· University "Giuseppe G~iribaldi" and the Regional Subcommittee of the Reel Cross. The school was very dear to Costanza Garibaldi, Garibaldi's daughter-in-b1\v "vho, for many years, held conferences in Italy, accompanied by h er daughters Rosa and Italia, Lo explain methods and principles she had .learnt in England.

of the First World War, in the period of non-intervention and after, when Ita ly en l e 1·e cl th e war , a frac tu re occurred betwee n the leading group, who were for Italy's in te,·venLion on the Allies' side, and the body of t.be rnernbers ,vho were against the war. Actuall y, these and other contradictions prevented Lhe People's Universities to lay the foundations of a w ide and radical movement ,vhich could tackle in a

In practice, through conferences, lessons, monographs, the concep t of public assistance ,vas spread for the first time. The courses were attended by members of the Red Cross hut also by workers, foremen, overseers, firemen, pol icemen, and afterwards, b y primaryschool teachers, and high-school students. For many years th e Peopl e 's Unive rsities continued Lhe i r commendable acti v ities , managing to abide by the principles of non-participation to po.lilical movements. Unfortunately, a l the outbreak

modern and autonomous form the problem of popular education.

THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BRITISH Litt.le is known about the relations that Garibaldi and h is desce ndants maintained with Great Bri tain, in the context of the Risorgirnento and beyond. The contrasting actions of the French, lu ck ily for the Italian patriots, were offset by Great Britain's pro-Italian sentiments. The Defence o[ Rome, an,ply reported b y the English

ne\vspapers, had a remarkable i m p act on the middle class , \vhos e feelings had a decisive \veighl in determining the policy of the Nation that was then the greatest and most d emocra tic power in the world. The reportages of "The Times" which, to tell the truth, in the beginning were not very object i ve, did their b est to Jet transp i re Garibaldi's and his legionaries' courage and devotion lo the cause, arousing a still unconfessed romantic adm iration for those valiant men destined lo defeat or perhaps death among those Roman walls so dear Lo the British classicists. The heroism sh0\,Vl1 i n that fateful 1849, ten years later would produce in Grea t Britain important fruits in favour of the 1ibe1·ty of the Italian lerriLory. In a d ifferent context, but: in the s ame line of eq uan i mity and loy a l ty, in the House o C Commons, ·w inslon Churchill, at the height of the Second \Vorlcl Conflict, celebrated the deeds o f the I La l ian units , who had opposed the Engl ish boys in the African desert, calling thern "L11e lions of the 'Folgorc' who never surrender". Apart from th e geopolitical considerations \vhi c h have undoubt edly their importance, there \Vere other factors that led to a mutual good understanding b etween Garibal di and the British. HisLorv in fact is not made by "ifs" and "buts" v,:,hich, on the other hand, in the context of an analysis can serve as an hypothesis of work. By examining the lwo lands and the two p eoples, we notice that the two Nations show a geometric "upside down" symmetry vis-~t-vis an imaginary Mittclcuropean \Va lers h ed which crosses also France. But these arc the plays of nature. Real factors a re , instead, the longitudinal extension of the r es pecti v e te rritori es and the deriving practical difficulties of 117

comrnunicalion in those times, besides a residual handicap of the regio ns more d istant from the vivifying contact \Vith the centre of the European continent. Garibaldi, essentially a seamen, understood tha t both were marit i m e la n ds, with fateful projections towards the unknov,m tha t th e sea has ahvays rep resented. This attraction, in both p eopl es, has a lways given r ise to discoverers and raiders, penetrating the consc iences as a propulsive factor, a n unending longing for escape and conquesl. Li verpool and Southampton, \vith their grea t s hips and the men used to sailing the oceans, as h e had ahvays done , were for Garibald i like his own home. His conversations with the English "Garibaldi no", Colonel John Peard, one of the "Mille" (the Thousand), besides a s trong community of libertarian ideals, were centred on the experiences on th e seas, on the bliss of navigation, in which the sailing sh ip symbolized their homeland, free and roaming the oceans of the who le world, and on the insular life \.vhich both kn ew very well. In short, they spoke about liberty, in the light of a common sensibil ity. Also in Scotland Garibaldi had [ound a "home" . His dea res t friend was in racL the owner of a caslle near G lasgow, Bedley Cas tle. He was Captain John McAdam and Garibaldi referred to him as "my lie utena nt .in Scotland". Until recent times, Alex McAdam, J ohn's greatgrand son was living in the cast.le. During a visit he showed me some [ifty unpub lished letters written b y Garibaldi , Âˇwhich revea le d th e depth or th e relationship of esteem a nd b roth erly affection that bound Lhern. Scots are independent and difficult to control,as he himself was, unless they are convinced of the goodness of the cause. For all these reasons, and also for t he unreserved admiration that the British had for gen erosi ty 11 8

and altruism which, in their eyes, \Vere personified hy Garibaldi.'the bounds became stronger a nd stronger. Garibaldi's son Ricciotti, was taken to Lon d o n w h en he was eight years old , to be treated for p roblems in his leg. S ome time later, once his leg was h ealed, he was sent to a college in Liverpool, where he stayed ror several years, learning to know and understan d the culture of the Country. It is not surp rising, therefore, that years later, unable to enter a national and family context that was foreign to him, he should fal l in love \\;th a g ir l rrorn London, with whom he emigrated to Australia . Thu s the second generation of "G aribal clian eaglets", Giuseppe's and Anita's grandchildren, were all Englishspeaking and Protestant. ll is common knowledge that, at the beginning of the S icilian campaign., in 1860, the landing of the "Mille" at Marsala \.vas racilitatecl by two English ships which were placed bet\.veen the

patriots and the Bou r bon ships, and that the developments or the Sicilian i nsurrection were attentive l y fo llo wed and a lso hacked by the many Englishmen who had financial interests and family ramifications in Sici ly. At th e end o f the campaign, when a very sad Garibaldi left Naples, ignored by all, and headed for Caprera with his sacks of seeds, he was saluted by the salvoes of the guns of the British ships lying al anchor in the port. But only a fewÂˇ kn ow that the stones around his hou se of Caprera were covered \v ith English earth expressly sent [rom En g land , stuffed in sacks on an English s h ip , to a llow him lo cultivate the produce of vegetable gardens and orchards, according to his w ish. Nol for nothing, in Facing page . Emharka1ion uf Garibaldi's ";l;Jille" al Quarto. Below. Garibaldi ar the hatt/e of Calata/im i.

the census form, he defined himself a farmer! Moreover, because of his English ancestors, a nephew of Garibaldi's, in the mid:thirties, was asked to go Lo London to negotiate a possible alignmen L of Italy with the Allies, ,vhich would have resu lted in the \viLhdra\.val from the alliance with Germany and from the insane Nazi pol icies. This allempt failed on ly because of a crisis of the English cabinet, \Vhose replacement., in a scenario of international tension with Laval's French Governme nl , thwarted the accord, which had already been signed by the Fore ign Minister Lord Hoare, and announced by Mussolin i at a meeting of the Great Council convened for the occasion . Useless lo say, that the disappo intment \Vas greal, and the consequences dramatic. Equally little known is the fact that Giuseppe and Anita's <laugh ler-in -law, the Engl ish c1t1zen Costanza Garibaldi, pron10ted the buildin g of little hospitals in some Italian villages, in particular at La Maddalena, with her own money and collections among her fello\.v countrywomen. The hospitals ,vere equipped and organized by English nurses for the inhabitants of La lVIaddal.ena and especially for the \,V omen who, unLil then, had had no a lternative but be LreaLed at the military hospital, where they \,vere attended by male personnel, which sometimes ,vas rather embarrassing

HIS SPIRITUAL HERITAGE La Maddalena, an islet north of Sardinia, is linked to Caprera by a wharf on which all the Garibaldi generations have set their foot. Garibaldi had made La Maddalena his home, having caught a glimpse of it during h is flight to safety afler Lhc tragic conclusion of the Defence of Rome in 1849. Even after many

years, and a lot of hard work, it was nol a comfortable place. Leaving aside the romantic sight of the Hero standing against the sky, his foot resting on a rock, very few celeb rities today would adapt to live in those conditions. After organizing his life af1er the typical farmer's activities, wilh wh ich he provided for his needs as much as he could, he had very li ttle to spare . Food ,vas often scarce and it was difficult to m.eel Lhe duties of hospitality imposed by the presence of guests and visitors arriving from all over the \.vodd. T hey ate ,vhat was possible to grow on the sleep slopes around the house. Bread \Vas bal<ed in the brick oven that Garibaldi himself had built, meat was in s hort supply, even if some common [armyard animals were bred . Eveiything \Vas conditioned by the scarce water which, th ro u gh various devices, one could extract from the top of Lhe cliff and from \veils. Bul in winter, heating the water was a difficu lt problem. Since childhood Garibaldi had loved to b athe and, out o f necessity, he got into the habit of Âˇwashing himself in any water: co ld, salty, fresh, frorn lakes or rivers - or wherever he could, if there was no water in the house.

lJnti l the day before his death he insisted on taking a daily cold shower, in a b a thtub or a washt ub, convinced as he ,vas I.hat the intense col d ,,v ould not. have negative effects on the rheumatisms that had been tormenting him since b is thirties and ,vere undoubtedly caused by his cont inuous exposure to the humidity of the n ights often spent on a sh ip's d eck, b y Lhe long marches and by his sleeping in any con dition, in the rain, on marshy soil and on river banks. His son Ricciolt i learnt something about it. He met his father only fleetingly in his youth, but had lived with him for some lime in Nice and Caprera. When he was li!lie boy his fa lher used Lo plunge him every clay in a tub of ice-cold water, despite h is strong protests. Nor did things improve at the co llege in Liverpool, since the very Spartan conditions prevailing there were enforced in order to shape and toughen the p hysical and moral fibre of Lhe you ng fellO\VS who were destined to be the cadres of the British ruling class. His English \.vife, in her turn, was a volu ntary Red Cross n urse ,vho at home irnposed the strict observance of the hygienic rules 119

she had learnt during the training courses organ i 1/.ecl by an extraordinary woman, Florence Nighti ngale, the found e r of lhe rnilitary and civilian nurses' system, wh ich she had inilially created for assisting the wounded in the Crimean v\/ar; from 1854 to 18.56. Twenty-five thousand young men had died during that period, and the suffering of the wounded, who after the battle were almost left on their own, had left her with a terrible and unforgettable memory. The meeting between Garibaldi and Florence Nightingale, which took place at Saint Pancras station Âˇon the occasion of his visit to London in 1864, has been handed clown orally in the family. They t alked about the field hospitals she had organized some years before, during the \Var in \vhich also Piedmont and Sardinia had taken pari. From the icy and bloody trenches around Sevastopol, from the first attempts at establishing military

120

centres in Scutari, she had transformed lhe nurses' system so as to include her concept of the soldier's rights . Garibaldi was aware of it, and deeply grateful. On that occasion he had also wished to make clear that he didn't want to be considered a warmonger and that he cared for the protection of each one of his soldiers. FINAL REMARKS Our territory is delimited by a high mountain range and by the immensity of the surrounding sea, and this contributes to its ethnic, moral and cultural homogeneity. Unfortunately our peninsula, already at the beginning of the Christian era, was Iike a lreasure chest overflowing with material and cu llu ra l goods i n ,,vh.ich everybody \Vanted to dip his hands. vVhen the invaders arrived from many quarters, it was Christianity

which, with ils slructures and its spiritual and moral aut hority, carried ou t an act ion of containment. The Church, needing a temporal po\ver of i t s o\-vn in order to mark its presence in material and t erritorial terms, safeguarded the 1-cmaining Italian id entity and, at the same time, had to administer the balances of the various invaders. It \Vas such temporal power that had lo be confronted in order to complete the Country's territorial unity, v.'hich could not be considered achieved without the acquisition or its symbol: the city of Rome. The q ueslion o [ "Rome Capital" was precisely at the core of the ups and clowns of the relations Facing page. Garibaldi 1vou nded on 1he 1-\::ipromonte. Below. The historic mee1ing of' Gariba ldi and Victor Emrnarn1el !I near Tean o.

bet\~··een Garibaldi and the Papal State. Furthermore the "Hero of the Two \Vorlds" consid ered unconceivab le the fact that the ne\,V concepts or Lbe French Revolution, enthusiastically accepted in every field , had not led Lo the achievement of equal rights and du lies for both sexes, or at least to the voting right for women, which was obtained only at the end of the entire cycle of the Risorgimento. And ye t, also many wo1T1er1 ·worked and died for a united Ital y, among them many emblemat ic figures such as Eleonora Fonseca (13), Giuclitta Arcuati (14), Cristina di Belgioioso (15) and the enticing "Nicch ia", Countess of Castiglione, who had the undeniable merit of leading Napoleon III lo sec u re u s a decisive success in the Second vVar of Independence. Garibal di had accepted S a int Simon's proposals on women's equali ty, with the same citizen's rights, even if this theory was all r ight for all except for his \Noman, Anita, who was fighting at his side for the same ideals but in her p rivate life, for example, \Vas not allowed to find a job outside the house. In 1867, h e personally signed the enrollmenl of his daughter Teresita in a Florentine confraternity, the "Charity and Anita" Lodge. Since the grO\vth of his soldier's reputation, that is, practically s i nce the battles in Uruguay, many vvomen, journalists and wri tcrs, both Italian and foreigners, had been \vorking with him. \Vomen that would be called today public-relation operators. In conclusion, we cannot ignore \vho, eve n from apparently abstract posit ions, in the same period have left a new mark on Western civilization. The Risorgimen to \Vas fly ing towards the sun accompanied by Verdi's music. And the sun

became the image o r Garibaldi protecting Italy from the Alpine peaks, with Carcl u cc i's poems. And Alessandro Volta's memory was still alive \.v hen Pacin otti, Meucci, Cannizzaro, Marconi, Fermi and many others confirmed, if ever necessary, the reality of a Country which revives with every century, w·ith the courage of its sons, the soundness of its talent, the creativity of i ls ideas and the optimism of its will, still follmving Garibaldi's path in order to improve the human condition and pay homage to Lhe religion of I iberty.

•

,·, creat-granddaughter of./J·1e "Hero of t1vo ll' oarld . .s "

NOTE (l ) Mass imo Taparelli, marquis cl'Azeglio (1798-1866) writer and pol itician . (2) Vittorio Alfieri, (] 749- 1803), Romantic poet. (3) Vincenzo Gioberti ( 180 118 5 2), phil osopher and politician. (4) Johann Gottlieb Fichte (17621814), German ph ilosopher. (5) John Locke (1632 - 1704), English ph ilosopher.

(6) Jean Jacques Rousseau ( 171 21778), Swiss \.Vriter of French origin. (7) Charles Louis De Secondat N!ontesquieu (J 689 -17:i S), French phi losopher and \vrite1: (8) Georg V-hlhelrn Friedrich Hegel ( 17 70- 1831), Ge rman philosophe1: (9) Claude Henry de Saint Simon (1760-1 825). French thinker. (10) Giovanni Giolitti (1842 1928), statesman. ( 11) Count Vincenzo Ottorino Gentiloni (1865- 19 16), President of the Italian E lectoral Catholic Union. ( 12) Immanuel Kant (1724- 1804), German philosopher: ( 13) E l eonora marchioness of Fonseca P imentel (1752 -1799), patriot and writec (14) Giudi.LLa Tafani Arcuati (1832-1867), patriot. (15) Cristina Trivulzio princess of Belgioioso (1808- 1871), pa triot and writer. (16) Virginia Oldoini, countess of Castiglione (1837-1 899) cou sin of Camillo Benso count of Cavour. (17) Antonio Pacinotti (184 11912), physicist. (18) Anton io Meucci (1826-1910), inventor of the Lelephone. (19) Stanislao Cannizzaro ( 18741937), chemis L. 12 1