THE ITALIAN ARMY AND THE FUNCTION OF STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION LECTURE BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY AT THE INSTITUTE FOR IDGH DEFENCE STUDIES (Rome, March 18, 2004)
The cycle of seminars and conferences which evet}' year characterizes the development of the academic year at the Institute for High Defence Studies represents a unique occasion lo take stock of the major themes of topical interest for the militat}' world, to raise problems and suggest solutions on par ticular issues concerning the tasks that our Armed Forces are increasingly called to perform at home and in the - by now munerous - operational Theatres abroad. The goal is to stimulate the reflections and the contributions of such a qualified audience. The seminar on "Joint and Multinat ional Operations" follows this tradition, since these operations are - I dare say - a mandatory characteristic of the modern missions, whose components are rapidly changing. It is therefore necessary to adapt the instruments through a continuous process of transformation. It is no more a matter of opposing a single threat whose features are moreover sufficiently known, but that of preparing the forces necessary to face threats or risks that cannot be clearly foreseen, which have extr·emely variable quantitative and qualitative capabilities that could materialize at undetennined times, with different and generally asymmetric operational forms. Last but not least, the te1rn1ist phenomenon which, as was proved by the recent events, particularly those of the last days, has come to the forefront of the political, economic, militat}' and media scene. It is an unforeseeable enemy, silent and multiform, to which I will go back later in the course of my presentation, in order to better specify the in1pli.cations of the phenomenon from the military viewpoint. This evolution of the geo-strategic reference pictrn·e has compelled the Italian Anned Forces, and particularly the Army, like those of the Allied Countties, lo start a radical transfonnation aimed at adapting the organization and the capabilities of the military instruments to the new challenges that are appearing one after another; this change includes also interventions of "Stabilization and Reconstruction". The Am1y, in the wider context o[ the joint instrument, has already started an evolutionary process towards the acquisition of the capabilities that are today necessary to face tl1e emerging operational challenges. As a matter of fact, the radical revolution of the str-ategic context entailed a radical revolution in the milita1y capabilities, stn.1ctw·es and docnines. From the static tasks of territorial defence, typical of the bipolar period (in particular for the
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Europeans), we had to move to the dynamic employment of the interventions abroad, very different in their contents, s.ince they go from human.itarian missions to high-intensity operntions, covering the whole range of possible conflicts. It was a question of moving, in a short time, from a "static" organization, essentially anchored to the national tenitory, to a capability system based on rapidly projectable forces fully integrable into joint and multinational environments. The rhythm of this evolution is marked by the development of the politico-military initiatives emerging both witl1in NATO (as outcome of the New Strategic Concept and, more recently, with the HRF-NRF concepts) and inside the EU, within the framework of the construction process of a common Force of intenrention. The above remarks outline a dynamic context, where the Service is undergoing a full evolution along the following directions: • from in--fieri and mainly static force to projectable instrument with rapid-deployment capabilities; \ • from single-Sen,ice outlook to that of a component of a joint and multinational instrument; • from conscription to professional Army; • from mass force to a qualitatively and technologically advanced force; • from garrison Anny to an Army "in and fo1✓' Society. This process of reorganization, which started some years ago and is still going on, has already reached a high degree of development: the final target is to build an Anny completely renewed in terms of doctrine, personnel, structures and equipment. In practice, the Senri.ce has been suddenly called to regenerate almost all its operational capabilities, and is completing this complex transformation under the banner of the quality of its components, reducing its strength from 290,000 in 1991 to the 115,000 of today and the 112,000 of 2006: a 60% cut, as compared to 15 years ago. The land instrument just outlined envisages that the defence of the tenitory and of the national interests be realized by employing all the available forces, while the participation in operations of collective defence, within the Atlantic Alliance, should be implemented 'vVith the national component of the Rapid Reaction Force and t,-vo complete Division-level force packages, each of them formed by a Division-level HQ, four manoeuvre Brigades and the necessary tactical-logistic support. These two Di\ri.sion-level force packages are respectively assigned to the ARRC HQ at Rheindahlen and to the Rapid Reaction HQ (HRF-L), vvith an Italian framework, based at Solbiate Olona, near Milan. In due time, it will be possible to project outside the national territory about 45,000 man in "one shot", for a maxinmm period of 6 months. As regards the participation in out-of-area operations, which are generally long-term Crisis Response Operations conducted by multinational forces, our contribution consists of a Task Force made up of a Corps- or Division-level C 2 framework structure, two B1i gades and one Regiment, with up to a maximum of 13,000 men continuously in operations. If we refer to the present base-four rotation, the requirement is of 52,000 men. If, on the contrary, we apply the turnover system pointed out by the "NATO usability concept", i.e. base-five, the requirement for the continual sustenance of the abovementioned 13,000 men rises to 65,000 men. In te1111s of capability, the forces have been organized in different types Oight, medium and heavy Brigades, plus the Airrnobile Brigade and FOS (Special Ops Forces) which, as a whole, const itute a ham1onic, well balanced and 0exible manoeuvre component, adequately suited to the new scenarios. As concerns the Command and Control of the operational forces, today it is based on a Command for the Land Forces, responsible for the preparation, the operational readiness and the C2 functions. As is known, under this Command there are: • three Intermediate Operational Commands ( 2 FOD and one TA) responsible, in peacetime, for the preparation and tl1e level of r eadiness of the forces directly subordinate to th em, and able to exercise the Division-level Command and Control; • the C4-IEW Command; • Brigades/combat units and tactical-logistic support formations. As for the project.able Commands, the Command-and-Control chain is based on tl1e recently validated HQ HRF-L and on th ree Division-level HQs, two of which are rapidly project.able, while the third one has a low operational readiness. In the near future, after the approval of the relevant laws, the Command-and-Control chain of the Operational Forces will be revised as follows: • dissolution of the two FOD Commands; • establishment of a four th Division HQ, the "Legnano," in Florence, through the reconfiguration of the Inspectorate for Recruitment and Completion Forces (ISPERFC).
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Thanks to this process of transformation undertaken by the Service, it was possible to ensure the remarkable participation of our units in the operations in Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq, with a current engagement of about 6500 servicemen. But even more significant is the daily average of personnel employed outside the national borders in the last six years, which amounts to approximately 8000 men, i.e. 80% of the entire national military instn.unent. Besides, we should not forget the Army's operational engagements on the national teJTitory since 2001: the surveillance of sensitive points, known as "Operation Domino" has been employing an average of 4000 men, controlling about 150 sensitive sites in 88 provinces. Altogether, in the year just gone by, the Italian Army was employed in operational Theatres with J 6,500 men and in "Operation Domino" with I 0,000 men, for a yearly total of 26,500, equal to 33% of the entire operational component. As often happens, the activities carried out made us learn many useful lessons, not only from national experiences but also from those made by other Arn1ies. As a common factor, the international crises of the last decade (from the Balkans to the most recent ones in Afghanistan and Iraq) confirmed the central role and the decisive character of the land component for the achievement on the ground of the politically decided strategic targets. In particulai; these "indications" came from the experience gained in missions with the highest probability of occuffence. i.e. crisis management (CROs) and peace supp011 (PSOs). As a matter of fact, in these operations the conflicts appear in the most populated areas and this requires a widespread presence of the land instmment, which proved to be decisive for the settlement of c1itical situations. Moreover, these operations emphasized further elements, extremely important in view of the continuous update of the Service's capabilities. In particular: • the borderline between high-intensity operations and PSOs is vary vague and at tin1es even undefined, so that the military force employed must be able, if worse comes to worst, to carry out a \Vi.de range of sinrnltaneous operational activities: I refer to the concept of the "Three-Block War" which in the same area envisages: •• to conduct combat actions against remaining hotbeds of enemy forces or against terro1ist activities; •• to guarantee the security of the AoR \.Vith patrols and control of the territory; .. to can-y out activities of peace support, humanitarian assistance and restoration of the infrastn.1cture needed to get back to norn1al. As I said, all these activities can become necessary at the same time within the same AoR, therefore the same Task Force must be in a position to conduct all of them; • the modern technologies, the application of the concepts of the Network Centric Operations and the employment of new operational methods, pem1it to carry out high-intensity operations in very short pe1iods of time; this translates into a global and absolute superi01ity over an enemy who does not have these capabilities at his disposal; • the recent conflict in Iraq has confirmed the importance of planning and foreseeing the "post-conflict." In fact, it becomes very clear that, in order to transform a military victory into a political one, i.e. in something really positive, it is necessm-y, as our Anglo-Saxon friends say, to have the presence of "boots on the ground" and a civilian military (CIMIC) organization with an adequate operational capability; • the management of the post-conflict phase is a long and complex undertaking, and must be aimed at gaining "Hearts and Minds" of the civilian population, helping them to restore acceptable living conditions, rebuild the main infrastructure and reactivate the medical service. In short we have been confirmed that a land military iJ1Strument, in order to be able to face the prospective challenges, must have at its disposal an ample set of capabilities and complementm)' assets, particularly specialized ones, suitable for employment in all CRO activities, including the management of the Stabilization and Reconstruction ( S & R) activities typical of the post conflict phase. The specialized capabilities necessary for managing the post-conflict operations are only a part of those needed by a military instrument which must first of all keep a credible "Combat" capability, which is also a leading capability for the Service. Hming defined this point, let us take a closer look at the range of S & R interventions. The modern operations of response to the c1i ses (CROs) have taken on new and different features in comparison with those of the past, following an evolution synthetically characterized by the l'ollowing steps: • interventions in conl:1icts between States, distinguished by the perforn1ance of limited tasks, mostly consisting in enforcing ceasefires; 1
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l • interventions in conflicts with.in a State, characterized by the deployment of forces on territories involved in civil wars, often prey of anarchy, with great suffe1ing and losses among the civilian population, putting therefore in the foreground the humanitaiian operations led by the vaiious international Organizations - UN, VJEU, etc. - and their deep involvement in the political and social life of the State where the force is deployed. Form the operational/sequential viewpoint, in the present scenarios, we can schematically envision the following phases: • a phase of introduction and deployment of the forces, which on certain occasions can be sufficient to defuse the crisis; • a phase marked by intense conflicts, usually short, where the employment of "combat capable" forces is pre-eminent. This phase could be absent (as, for example, in peacekeeping operations): • a phase of Stabilization and Reconstruction of the civilian infrastrncture, to restore nonnal fo~ng conditions. The evolution from the high-conflict phase to that of stabilization can envisage a more or less long transition, where one must confront complex situations, inclurung humanitarian emergencies, guerrilla warfare and/or large-scale terro1ist attacks. Therefore the military activities following the high-intensity combat phase will continue to require a significant presence of manoeuvre forces, in order to guarantee the necessary security framework within which the units specialized in restming normality have to operate. In this sense, also the forces employed in the S & R phase must have at their disposal assets with a degree of operational readiness very similar to that of the forces employed in the combat phase, and must include capabilities of security, selfdefence and support. The complexity of the objectives to be achieved and the tasks to be perfonned in CROs and S & R, makes it necessary for the forces of intervention to have the capability of carrying out, together \.vith their st,·ictly military function, also a wider range of activities which can regard, albeit in a rudimentary form, the economic sector and tl1at of the life and democratic institutions of the Nation concerned. In fact, the success of the operation does not depend only on the military aspects in the proper sense of the word, but also on the degree of achievement of the wider objectives typical of the S & R phase, functional to the primary needs of a civil society, i.e. the economic, cultural, social and political aspects. In terms of assets the forces necessary to accomplish such a wide range of missions, reducing to a minimum the operational risks, can be schematically grouped in three types of formations. The 6r-st, capable of expressing a real and significant Combat Capability, indispensable also in this S & R phase, in order to face the bjghesl level of foreseeable 1isk, graduate the "responses" in a flexible and prop01iionate manner and, at the same time, constitute a strong deterrent power. The second complex - genera.lly no lower than Brigade and capable of controlling large ai·eas and precluding a part of them - suitable for operations in an environment as insidious as the urban one, in a position to perform the whole range of tasks (multidimensional control of the urban area and its main roads, conh·ol of social order, surveillance of sensitive points, activation of fixed or mobile checkpoints) also accepting close combat in case of anti-guerrilla or anti-terrorism activities. Finally, a third complex made up of specialized assets, indispensable elements in the S & R phase of a CRO, such as intelligence, CIMIC, PSYOPS, NBC, Engineers, Medical Service and Transport. All these forces express peculiar capabilities and are certainly useful and necessary in order to complete the ample range of those expressed by the land component. In short, the organization of a Task Force for S & R operations is based on 3 cl.ilforent ''formations", whose precise qualitative and quantitative composition depends on the task and on the characte1istics of the environment. ln particular they are: • a complex of "Combat" Assets (tanks, attack helicopters, ai111oured cars, etc.) including Special Operations Forces; • a complex of assets for area security, which comp1ise units tt·ainecl and equipped also for anti-guenilla and anti-ten-01ism operations; • a complex of specialist assets (CIMIC, NBC, Engineer, etc.); • other components, depending on the situation and the operational environment. Each f01111ation gives its conhibution to the achievement of the "encl state" within a framework or "militarf security which however must be assured as a prerequisite of the stabilization acth~ty and during its development. From the operational viewpoint, in the past the S & R operations were started by almost entirely "Combat" formations, with the addition of CJMIC/Civil Affairs, Engineers, Medical Service and others, which entered or were fully systematically activated only when the combat operations were really concluded. This operational attitude was the outcome of an employment concept which assumed a low evolutionary rhythm and a massive engagement of assets, in order to meet both the combat and the stabilization requirements.
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Today this kind of approach needs to be revised, in the light of tl1e cost/effectiveness of the formations to be projected and sustained, and also in consideration of the lessons learned so far. which pointed out that the levels of c1iticality between the "Combat" and the "Stabiliw.tion" phases are not very different. In fact, the modern operations of Stabilization ought to be started without interrupting the operational cycle. This means that the planning of the Combat and S & R activities must proceed simultaneously, as an integrant part of a single and wider operations plan. The key operational concept for a complete scenario is to employ the S & R forces in synergy and adherence \\dth the Combat ones, tasking the former with the control and security of the area, while the latter complete the combat action. This would facilitate the approach to the inevitable situation of anarchy and social disintegration, a state which persists also dw-ing tbe operations of Stabilization and Reconstmclion. In btief, during an S & R operation, the Command of the intervention force could be called to pe1fo1m the dual function of key "manager" of the S & R activities and of "director'' of all the in-Theatre forces, directing and controlling also the minor combat operations, should it become necessary. For thes..~ reasons one should envisage the inclusion of the necessary "expertise" in tbe command structure, particularly at the beginning of the "post-conflict" phase, as a prerequisite for the successive gradual return to the norrnal activities of the civilian snucturcs, \\~thin the larger inte1vention project of the "Nation System". The capabilities that are deemed necessary in order to carry our S & R operations are not an absolute novelty for the Italian Army. As a matter of fact, many of them are already included wiiliin the Service's strnctme, and were widely employed in the operations in which we participated. J refer to the capabilities such as CIMIC, PSYOPS, BC, EOD, Engineers, which enabled us to operate successfully and with unanimous international appreciation during the CROs in which we took part. Somehow, this potential not only places us in the vanguard of the multinational environment, but also fits perfectly in the recent European initiatives dealing with the Capability of Rapid Response {European Rapid Reaction Force - ERRF) \\~thin the framework of the Pctersberg missions. 1 am talking about the project for the constitution of' a pool of land forces made up of Regiment-level units (7 or 8 Batlle Groups with approximately 1500 men each) to be employed in Chapter Vil UN missions, with the coordination of the "Peacekeeping International Department of the United Nations. These Battle Groups can operate both within the NRF (follm\,jng the common NATO/EU procedures) and as Follow-on Forces of SHIRBRlG-type units. Italy is interested in this initiative and the te1ms of our participation arc being evaluated; in this regard, Lhe Italian Army is ready. On the other hand, also the American planners, on the basis of the lessons learned after Operation "Iraqi Freedom", have become aware of the in1portance and sensiti\dt-y of the phase following the actual combat. In fact, at the US Department of Defence there are studies and investigations in view of the constitution of lwo "multiservice units of Stabilization and Rcconst:mction" (one on active duty and one in rese1ve) for preferential employment in post-conflict operations. Coming back to our national environment, we can say that the optimization and streamlining process or the Service's capabilities has already started and is still in progress. Actually, the operational conditions of the possible modem scena1ios are always new and changing, and this occurs just in a historical moment marked by the appearance of a troubling phenomenon such as tcrrmism. The military events occwTed on the international scene (Afghanistan and Iraq) a[ter the allack of 9/1 l, changed terrorism from what was mainly an intemal issue of law enforcement into a problem of international secw-ity. In order to be adequately confronted, today's terror requires a wide range of political, economic and financial measures, as well as the engagement of suitable forces, capable of neutralizing and fighting this threat, which is also characle1ized by the "militaristic" nature of its organizational and operational parameters. We found ourselves before a transnational tl1reat which required an equally far-reaching response to which the milita1y insnument is giving- and will likely continue to give - an important contii bution. As a matter of fact, on the military plane, also NATO, at the meeting of the Chiefs of State and Government held in Prague on November 21-22, 2002, took a very clear and firm stand, recognizing that transnational teJTorism must be fough t also "miUtatily". In view of this, the Alliance decided to procure effective and balanced means, in order to face the whole range of possible risks, including the "teITotist threat from any side" preparing forces "capable or moving rapidly wherever it is necessary lo conduct operations over distance and time ( fATO Response Force - NRF). In practice, today the fight against ten-orism can be eaiTied out also through military operations characterized by much
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wider functions than the traditional ones, implying the simultaneous employment of the military potential, both to keep or enforce peace and to fight the terror organizations on the field, when they assume a significant military visibility. The operational organization typical of the employment of military contingents within the "Peace Support Operations" made so far - marked neutrality, restrained interventions, always well-anchored to the principle of "seH~defence" - is now being based on the capability of active interventions through an increasingly selective and well weighed use of force. The primary goal of this use is to guarantee the security of the territory, protect the civilian population interdicting at the same time every form of support to the terrorist activity and, finally, prevent or thwart the execution of teJTorist actions. In order to fight guerrillas and "militarily organized" terTOrism, one should have forces capable of conducting direct actions, Force Proteclion, armed escorts and patrols, as well as specialized units in charge of the operational information activity (tactical-level EW, surveillance, HUMINT), NBC defence, search and cleating of explosives (EOD teams), PSYOPS, Civil affairs. Moreove1~ the recent terrorist attacks against the civilian population and the units/strnctures of the military contingents in Iraq and Afghanistan show that terrmism exploits to its own advantage the urban infrastructure not only to cause devastating effects on the civilian population, but also to provoke considerable repercussions on the military, political and economic plane. In view of this, one should strengthen and, better still, specialize the capabilities suitable for facing and neutralizing the asymrnet1.ic and ten-01i st threat in every environment, including the urban one. The Ai:my has taken several initiatives in this direction, particularly in the training sectm~ through specific cycles aimed at acquiring the ability to operate in asymmetric contexts and in every dimension of an urbanized environment, including underground locations. Another sector that needs strengthening is that of proteclion and equipment of the individual fighter: In this field the main programme is the "Future Soldier" project, wh ich will enable our Service to acquire the characteristics and equipment needed to operate in urban centres, including a multi-calibre weapon, light and easily employable in limited spaces, and a number of different sensors like thermic-infrared telecameras, movement detectors, precision-aiming laser systems directly connected with the individual weapon, and so on. Finally, as regards organization and structure, the Am1y envisages to SlTengthen the FOS "pool" and complete that of the RISTA-EW, within the general frame\vork of the tactical Intelligence capabilities, with particular regard to the units designed for surveillance and intelligence, including tactical HUMINT. Last but not least, and clearly not aimed only at the "Stabilization and Reconstrnction" phase, is the creation of a pool of intermediate Forces, particularly suitable for operations in complex environments, thanl<S to their balance among mobility, protection and 6repower. The development of the operational scenarios imposes a process of transfom1ation and adjustment of the land instmment, which ought to acquire and keep all the capabilities necessary to successfully confront evel}1 operational situation in the whole range of the military operations, which are less and less separable "a primi". Proceeding as we said, we shall have and instrument suitable for keeping international stability by exercising a sufficient dete1Tent action, or for fighting if necessary. It is a matter of being ready to operate more also in particular environments and situations, such as, for example, urbanized areas. The presence of the Almy becomes as much necessary in conflict situations of medium-high intensity as in peace-support and peace-keeping situations, as well as in circumstances of humanitarian emergency or internal security. In canying out the CROs we have noticed that the Army has the experience, assets and capability to accomplish almost all the tasks envisaged by the Stabilization and Reconslrnction operations, also the long-te1m ones. Actuallj\ it is precisely thanks to the direct interaction with the adversaiy, the opposing sides and the civilian population, that one can obtain a sufficient control of the situation, which is indispensable for accomplishing the mission also, and above all, in inn¡icate operational scenarios. If one considers that the operational role of the land component is implemented through a substantial presence on the field for long periods of time, also after the conclusion of the high-intensity operations, one realizes the heaviness of' the burden that the Service has to bear in relation to the tlu-nover of personnel and the wear-and-tear of equipment and materials. I would like to conclude underlining that the Army, which was in the past an expression of "potential capability", is today a "Force in action", that operates efficiently on the field and is able to give a decisive contribution to the Italian policy in favour of national and international secu1ity. The gratifying results achieved dwing tbe many aclivities at home and abroad have proved the quality of our choices. We must continue on the road we have undertaken in order to give ever more timely and effective answers, fulfilling the commitments that await us in a more and more complex and unforeseeable future.
D Lieutenant General Giulio Fraticelli
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CONTENTS
Number One 2004 January - February
March - April
Rivista M ilitarc aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of the Army personnel. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of think ing and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at inform ing the general public on the Army and on military iss ues.
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I Lecture bv the Chief of Staff of the Army at the IASD. The Italian Army and the Function of Stabilization and Reconstruct.ion (LI. Gen. Giu!io Fraticelli)
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The end of the Cold War has reduced the extent of the threat but has unexpectedly increased the demand for security ~
Terrorism has increased the perception of da er our society but, on the other hand, new tech ¡ques f response have developed and they must be Pt:trsued together with coexistence and mutual respecBamo , peoples, overcoming the hatreds deep-rooted in history
Unfortunately the roots of evil come up with every generation. The. threat is the expectation of a real and imminent danger, caused by hostile entities. Security is a situation where a person lives without risks, leading a peaceful private and public life. As never before, the Armed Forces are on the frontline and, in order to achieve therr objectives, are following various lines: reduction of military and civilian casualties, containment of enemy losses and limited destructions, also because the damages would be paid by the winner.
They are all impli cit, immanenl and identifiable hostile su bjects and acts, ready to go into action, and their imaginable d imension is vast and frightful. Th e way lo a plausible reaction leads to coalitions, ulmost commitment and union of all forces, in order not to succumb. "Security", instead," ... implies a siluation where persons are not in dange1; not even al risk; on the confrar}\ they are adequately protected and in a position to cany out their social and working activity". The \vill/inlention of pro tecli ng/being protected is clear. 'We see a pacified and controlled s ituation, in keeping with t he brighlest and most par ticu lar personal expectations. The individual, rather than the whole Country, seems to be the subject of security and the aulhorized author of any claim in this regard. H aving taken note of the meanings, we can observe that in the presenl general scenario there is a r e markable di fference in the specific weight of the terms. 4
The threat has become milder, moving from th e d rama tically imminent and clear situations of the past to the partially risky and dangerous scenarios which imp ress and mobilize n ei ther the individual nor public opinion. Furthermore, what remains visible, or at leas t perceptible, is con fined to th e periphery of our attention by the growth of a precise , conscious and circum s tanti al d eman d for s ecurity wh ich, rather than a direct consequence of the a\vareness o f the threa t , seems to be an au tonomous aspiration. In poinl o f fact, the bipolar period, when arms, men, open inlen tions, official statements and wid ely flau n le d ideologies provided it w ith dramatic substance, has been over¡come. During the present evolutionary process, the c lassical threats, such as the arm ies of the \i\Tarsaw Pact, the extent and perception of the contrasting national inter esls, highrisk endemic situations, misinforma tion, ideo logical confrontat ions, religious fanaticism , hunger, crime and ignorance
have decreased or even disappeared. At first sighl. - but only at first sight - rnany of these threats seem to have i.nexorahly and - one could add - even too easily been levelled by the long wave of globalization, the \:Vest's resoluteness and the liberalization of the movement of peop le and ideas. The complex system or actions and reactions previously de scribed has not produced - and continues not to produce - only positive resulls ro r the imp rovement of peace and d e velopment. The growing demand for security has not expanded in a geographical sense only, but has reached sectors of collective life which were unthinkable till yesterday. Moreover, il is a demand that docs not vary so much from Country to Country. Il is true that now the threat is less visible, bul its potentiality is not reduced; it has only taken on mimetic config u ration s and adapted to the scenario or the moment, becoming planetary, transverse and diffused inside the social fabr ic . It has gained strength from ethic and rnoral re ferences, from the extent and firmn ess of the opposed beliefs; it re lies on customs, on the evolu t ionary processes of genetics and on environmental issues. The demand for security originates from different situations, either stab.le or under developrnent. If we ,vant Lo substantiate ,vhat ,vc have just stated , we can observe that the response to a seismic event clearly denotes Lhc extent of the expectations and the gap existing in the various Countries as regards the measures for the safeguard of Ji[e and goods of Lbe various communities. If we consider the t\vO earthquakes, of s imilar magnitude, in Japan and Algeria, ,ve can see that the form er end ed in a big scare \.Vhi le the latter caused great destructions and loss of lives. 5
To those who, vis-a-vis such an extensive investigation, ask what could the military's d irect informat.ive and cognitive interest and \vhat coukl be the ir future leve l of invol vement , \N e can answer that., a t th e present time, t he tasks of peace and war, police and mon itoring , assistance, reclan1ation and recons tru c Lion , both in I tal y and worldwide, have been assigned , \,Vilhoul Loo much hesitation, to the d efence sector. In fact this cornparlmenl is organized for facing the classic threats of the past and, in its cont inuous evolution , aims at conforming to the presenl heavy demand for security. With regard to thi s aspect, which only yesterday could he considered as pertaining to a distant future and now invo lves us more and more directly and on a grO\,ving scale, \Ve are go ing to d iscuss the merits of these two synergic situations.
THE VISIBLE THREAT The residual visible threat continues Lo be class ic and direct, originates from the existing differences and is 111ade vis ible hy the declarations of intent and the preparations made by the opponents. It is p artially managed by Lhe western Countries through their choices in internal and fore ign pol icy. As we pointed out, Lhe threat is reduced hut, in practice, th e causes that may produce it. a re unchanged. The scenarios that can threaten a peaceful coexistence are numerous and go fro111 the crisis of the reference model b efore the fall of the Berli n Wall to the collapse of the Communist Pacts . The scope o l the investigation is not only political, economic and social. For example, just think ahout the \vrecks of the Cold Wa,arm i es and the pollution they cause where sensi tive malerials,
"
such as radioactive waste, are stocked, and the risk d e riving from the criminal sale of nuclear, biological and chemical substances and other dangerous stuff. It is also possible to examine the development of the democratization process. Democratic values play an important role in human d evelopment, since they p romote commilrnen l and change at p u blic-opinion level, involving people direc tl y. Al though imperfect and contradictory, these values have s ucceeded in attracting the general atten tion, gaining a vast consent and influencing more and more the
6
-political choices and decis ions of the governments. To~day their crcd ibili ly slill has trouble when directly facing the logics of other idcol~g ies. Their weak points der¡ive from the continuing evident lack of harmony between ethics and market, and from the wide differences in role and specific weigh t among Lhe Countries of the world. The difference in l he dislr-ibution of resources among peoples gives rise to expectat ions and yearnings lhat can take violent forms and are triggering many conflicts of the prcsenl Lime. The commitment to the cooperation for developrncnl is often 7
considered insu fficient, and this creales an evolutionary situalion in ,vhich il is increasingly difficul t to manage changes according to the various indiv idual expectations. The instability exist ing inside and outside the Euro-Al lantic zone can degenerale into crises and conflicls. Many Countries in E urope or in its periphery face serious social and economic problems, \.Vi th ethnic and religious lerri torial disputes. The e ffo rts made to implement democratic reforms and increase the level of development have often b een inad equate or have fa iled strnightaway. In order Lo better define the admit teclly theorelical scenarios where tbe threat could materialize again, ,ve can refer to the present problems of Africa. There, at times, local pol icies marked by authoritarianism or open anarchy prevail, w ith a rigid clefence
o f status quo and ultra-conservatism. Oil problems, territorial disputes, racial clashes and xenophobia dom inate those areas . Wars and violence . Terrorism, crime and drug trafficking. Injustice, corruption, passivity. Statecenlralization and a bandonment 8
of the cities. Irresponsible population growth. Poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, unemployment, migration , child morlali ty, epidemics and Aids . Urbanization /ghell.o ization, and its contrary, i.e. persisting nomadism in areas which have become smaller and
smaller. Lack of transports . Internal discrimination. \ 1\iomen conditions. Draught, aridity, advancing deserts, problems in \,v ater distribution. These are all vigorous shoves towards political failure, coups d'etat, civil war, corruption, genocide. These traged ies lead to exodus, a phenomenon which, more than any other, sho,.vs the disintegrating effect of so much injustice on indivi<luals, families and small communities. The reaction lo l his general ruin is a massive dose of hate. which naturally flows int o l h e vast fie ld of those \,vho, for any reason, are aga inst the deve lopment of democracy. The resistance of a lar ge coalition of wills is already evident. In such a situation we can foresee a hyslerical and jerky fu ture for the
new lerrorism of the 21 st Century which, also for this reason, is more dangerous and harder to fight. Moving on to the motives and ensuing behaviours, the rnost wo rr isome seems to be the clash/coexislence w ith other cth ical and development models. The threats to collective security have changed following th e change in the r-clative balance of the States' relations. The .lack of alternatives has increased tensions, a.lso becau se the European and the American \,vays have progressively become closer; to the point of almost coinciding. The radicalization of refusal has become more mar ked and so, whi le on the one hand there was a progress in democratization and cooperation under t he aegis of US, EU, UN , OSCE and any other international Organizati on concern ed with collective recogn ition and aid to development, on the other there were cases of rebellion by some States
which tried to oppose the rules of general development with lhe intention of maintaining and possibly increasing t heir relat ive pmver. We can mention the Gulf War and Iraq, the internal struggle in Soma.lia, Mi loscvitch's despotism in t he Balkans and the recrudescence o r the conflict between lsrael and the Palestinians, \vhich has visib ly exceeded the schemes of comp romise and tolerance which lately had succeed e d in containing violence. One should also remember that \Vil.bin the system of \,\lestern values there are different positions, th at go from agnostic behaviou r to one commi lted to change, or to another endorsing overthrowing, according to micro-political, pressure-group, nationalistic, or even global, perspectives . This dangerous d iversi ty/d ive rgence could be caused by a cultural incompatibility, by a different individual choice about the model of grmvth vis-~1-vis t he one accepted by one's Country, or r esul t rrorn a
9
In view of this, the terrorist actions carried o u t are the visible tip of a much larger iceberg, on which il is necessa,-y to take action in every possible way if \ Ne wan t lo get rid of t he collective fear and rebuild a climate of confi d ence and freedom . Elsewhere, poverty, marginalization and alienation funnel individual reb ellio11s i nto organ ized crime. This is nmv global and has much more inc isive effects than those achieved by the various States, lo the poin t of becomi n g an invisible State of rernar ka bl e econom i c we igh t . Crime is int erconnected with every kind o f terrorism, owing to
simple p O\ver dash. T he deep root of the contrast seems lo be tha t lhe var ious Countries have a different conceplion of freedom o f action and though t, a n d a different vvay or understand ing and governing it. The confrontation of the pas t, an unu su al liberty a t all levels and, most of all, the opening of infor mation and commu nications, have fos tered t he old terrorism and brought abou t a new one, comb ining their different palterns in a communicating system. The worst case we can envisage is that in which manifold an d diverse forces join together under the ant i-American a nd anti-vVestern banner. 10
Terrorism as a whole, in its diversified total i ty, has grown to become the most serio u s lhreal Lo t h e reference val ues and to freedom, lerrilory a n d l ives . It ca n no more b e as cribed to a single Nat ion, Government or leade1~ b ut ra ther to a tough opp osition \vh ich has gained strength in the bipolar scenano. A far-reach ing opposition, just as far-reaching are the contrad ictions of a very imperfect world, so we can and must imagine that, if t he co u ntermeasu res imple mented are i nadequate, t he a lready lar ge number of militants is destined lo grow, together wi th that of the instigators.
their similarities and mutual needs as regards invisibility, complicity and illegality. It is in a position to exerl considerab le multidirectional pressur¡es on the single Nations and on the international context. The reason for its present effervescence and for the widening of its modal.ities and instrnrnents is connected with the most negative effects of the global economic interaction, but also w ith an act of conceit of the enemy. Crime has alreadv tried to come out at Stale level (Narconation) and probably feels strong enough - or considers us weak enough - for a further visibility leap.
SOLICITED SECUIUTY
In th e \Nest, the -evolution of the security contents has taken giant steps in the last hundred years, to the point that we can say that the protagonist of our time is security rather than threat. Furthermore, the nuclear component favoured those who pursued their own security by keeping alive and credible the threat of inflicli ng an apocalyptic punish ment on the rival. Nov,, everything is under discussion, and it was not enough to confine the atomic weapons lo a limbo \Vith no (plausible) return,
move on to sn1art. weapons, prevent ncllher then repress, protect the civilian communities in the war zones, face the feroc i ty of some by applying the good manners demanded by the democratic and advanced Countries' public opinions. lt is like saying that the reaction has exceeded all foreseeable levels of com1non sense and concrele ness, becoming a utopian concept driven by hysteria and frustration in the face of the fact that mankind is unable to live in peace. \ 1Vhile lhe asymmetry bet:V1.-een intents and inslruments, benveen the available and the employable tools b ecomes nor-
11
mal, the \vave o f collective resentment against the emp loym ent o f force keeps growing. Against any type of force. And this gives rise lo many probl erns, bul o nly for us and among us. The ethic and social resentment is flanked b y the corning on in the advanced societies or a kind of political realism, according to which it is not necessary lo re ig n s ym pathy for "unfortunate Africa" in order to defend one's income. Nowad ays, cynicism sliJles enthu siasrns to the detriment o f collective securil_y. As a maller of fact:, violent reactions are on th e increa se, sorriehow spurred by 12
lhe disengagement trend , \vhose negative effects fa11 mos tly on civilian populations. The drop in collective secu r ity is mostly ascribable to the difference of a ttention between economic and social development. In particular il can be attributed to the quantitative and qualitative rnodesLy of the defence strategies ¡which should have protected the Vvay to development. The project \Vas obviously considered Loo exacting and not su ffici ently involvi ng. T he fact is thal \Ve st ill cannot speak of seCLtr ity strategies. This vulnerability has been immediately detected and h it.
To the sense of insecurity vis-avis tbe classic lhr ea ls and, rnore generally, vis-a -vis the continuing and nu merous confl icts, \Ve m ust add the new awareness of indiv idua ls a nd pu bli c opin ions of the fact that there has not been an adequate wi ll Lo preve nt and cu rb th e other insecurities com ing from every s ide , which endanger the physical and mental health or t he c it izens . Today's wide- rangin g information ac quaints us with a series of serious and imminent, old and new clangers '\vh ich besiege us more and more directly: the still incurable or new di s ease s, ep id emics, drugs, d angerous (or considered
hazardous) experi rnents, environment., earthquakes, cloud b ursts, lan dslides, th e green-house effect and conseq uent climatic changes, traffic , savings protectio n, ju stice, security and personal sarety. The list becomes longer with every passing day and people have th e impression of having been abandoned in a scenario which gets more and more host i l c clu e to sornebod y else's fault.
NEW POTENTIALS AND NEW STRATEGIES
The d emand for securit y i s grmving, tbe visible threat is decreasin g and, for various reasons, the h u man and material resources which should ensure a ne,.v opt imal picture are dw in dl ing. The potential threat of the intentions and th e availabi Ii Ly of instruments fo r carrying it o u t remain h igh .
Jn any case, the scenario seems to be a positi ve one if vve compare it w ith the conflict potentiality or the Cold \l\1ar. So m u ch so that an ample, American -l ed interven ti onism is n o,v takin g shape , characterized by measures taken with courage and large resources, and su pported by the parLicipating Countries' public op inions. Nevertheless Lhc real size of the threat seems to be able to escape the effects of so much effervescence in the securi Ly sector. The achieved, a nd achievable, results, are not the invoked ones and oft.en no t even those declared. The origins of this malaise, and of this hysteresis, are h istorical, economic an d political. Th eir roo ts arc in the typ ical misdemeanours typical of mankind , in the reasons that have in duced the Supreme Ma ker t o create Paradise, hut also Purgatory and Hell. There is no farsighteclness, no gr·eat d esign of coexis tence, no grand strategy.
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13
Every creed is continuously rev is ed. Commanding becomes even more difficult. There is a decline in transparency, personal credibility, national cohesion, international synergy. The tendency is to limit decis ions and commit111en l w ithin an ever shorter and 14
narrO\ver present time. Besides, one should not forget the existence of a close net of treaties, accords, praxes and customs which produces advantages, but also conditionings. The residual opening is shut by the mass-media information and
by its rather questionable initiatives that spread through everybody else's province. If all these constru ctions had led to the desired model of coexistence there wou ld be nothing Lo complain about. But unfortu nately 111attcrs do not stand that way. The security that we have to build must be constructed in an integrated and cooperative for111 among Countries and peopl es, without conditionings d ictated by fear and selfishness, but rather with the conviction that only a ve ry g r¡eal commitment can strengthen the clevcl op111cn t achieved and pave the way to further goals. It is a matter of giving depth Lo every aspect of th e evolution, avoiding lo return Lo the da\Nn of coexistence, to the Middle Ages, the towers and the [orlified en closure walls . It is a rnau.er of p aying atten tion to the thousand aspects of security, assembling them in a single strategy of management,
Lbe democratic inslilu tions and communit.ies must be \~,..icier, clearer and more involving th an the flaun ted claims \,Vhich, on the med ia and in the operational response strategy, should be incessanLly played down. Terrorisrn strikes eve rybod y, both within and without the circle of national interests . Victory ove 1¡ terror \V i 11 be won on ly through a new type o r relation bet\veen peoples freed from the false problems of coexistence originated by national perspecl.ives. Democracy, with its amp le involvement and consensu s, beats any terrorist logic and seems to be the best medicine against all types of violence. The democratic process is under way and is far from be ing completed , so m u ch so t hat \vhen politics is not capable o f mak i ng itself adequately u nderstood and appreciated, violent reactions re-emerge, even in getting rid of Lhe logic of threa t, of defence, of the peripheral sold ierliness of Lhe past, extending the in volvement as much as possible an d givi ng great space to investigations, combining expe rience a n d in nova ti on w i th the cour age of a lion. Old and new governing i n stru ments must be coordinated . The reactio n to terrorism, for instance, is not a new exper ie nce. In the past, t he most commo n m istakes were the u nderestimation of the phenomen on and a reaction centred on the p a r ticular event, paying attention only to th e visible p an or the iceberg. Also common was th e excess of reaction-repression, which tried to obtain a result equal or high er than that ach ieved bv lhe terrorists. It was also a mistake to indu lge in t h e demora li7-at io n t hat the non-achievement of the o b jective may h ave brought about. Against terroris.m , the fundamental conceptual aspect springs prec isely from th e opening or the confrontation . The reaction of 15
the most emancipated Countr·ies. Therefore, the ,vhole world and every individual musl be involved in t he democratic process but, meanwhile, both m u st he protected. Globalization looked like a good ans\ver, since it \Nas potentially able to equalize welfare and reduce the inj u stice on which terrorism grows and thrives, but a lso terror became global, by choosing the fighting forms typical of an open and intercornrnu n icating society. In view of this, we must under-
line two potentially very strong characteristics of the present historical period, consisting of the possibility of cooperation of yesterday's enemies and the new role played by .individuals, pressure groups and public opinions, which have often become co-protagonists, together \Nith the various Cou ntri es and international Organizations. A new international osmosis is just around the corner. Fervour and good will arc plentiful and visible, and this particu-
lar· period encourages to take in itiatives that until yesterday were consiclcrccl unscru p u lous. Jn such a scenario, the most significant result to be obtained should be that every ind ivi.dual, all over the world, should be aware that, as regards terrorism, the limits of any acceptable compromise have been crossed. An epoch is over and a new one is b eginning, a time of ,var in which all human beings are called to the h-ontline. The f irs t objective of th is war should be p recisely the dernoli-
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16
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tion - o r at least an ample and visibl e r egress ion - of compromise, fo llovved by a s im ilar action against amb igui ty, at all levels and everywh ere. The ethical and moral education of o ur personnel and of those ,,vith whom we cooperate is fundamental, even more than technological training, also because in a democratic \vorlcl ,vhere freedom of opinion, of values a nd behaviours has long been considered inalienable, one could run Lhe risk of unpleasant surprises. F urthermore, a new value is a Llachcd to th e \Vcapons \vhich penetrate intentions, looking for the capabililies, weaknesses, structural lin1i1.s of the enemy~ giving a new visibilily lo the mimeti c threat, high lighting it in its mosl. p lausible substance, avoiding equally d angerous exaggerations and underest imations. Espionage, psywar, intelligence. In the security sector, professionalism is emphasized by the
magnit ude o( t he d emand . T he profess ional components are reval uated, together with I.hose that were wrongly considered " mercenary" but ,vere actually tinged with ancienl glory, idealism, motiva tion and ro rnanticism. These were drives that were aimed at finding a turning point in li(e, an occasion of redem p tion for ethically and morally motivated individuals . The grou p strength has always turned out to be a ll-importan t in emphasizing the power or the religious and ideological a l liances . Nowadays an alliance en tai ls an i ntense relations hip and m ulual resp ect. As such il cannot meet on ly contingen t o r occasional requ irements, nor can iL be programmed on paper. \ 1\!ar as collective violence has by now been memorized at genetic level . Precede n Ls are count.less. Right o r own ership, concept of terri Lory, revenge for directly suffered wr ongs. In the near f-u17
ture it could be possible to make this behavioural error just ou l of bell icosity and grou p solidarity, even without a serious and just reason. Every day \Ve can witness t.h e deviation of groups into packs when boredom, irresponsibi li ty, boldness, arrival of deviant leaders, or any other contingent s ituation change the objectivity of the social relations \.,.• ith the other groups. The lack of a visual contact with the adversary, caused by the tec hnological evolution, makes the recourse to w ar and the perpetration of unnecessary atrocities much easier than before . The resor·t to ·war must be regulated with limits corresponding to the level of development achieve d. Atrocities must b e banned, emphasizing, at the same time, the socio-econon1ic significance of war, meant as the highest point of contraposi-
.... 18
tion and dissent within the possibiliti es of react ion avail able lo enlightened, advanced and conscious people. The security effort \Vill have to be exte nded to the utmost. One of the many possible examples of the vastness of the research is given by the observation that, in the past, epidemics \Vere the cause of decline of many empires and this could happen again . The first epidemic we can rem em her ravaged Athens, four centuries before Christ. JL killed one person out of three, undermining the bases of the Greek supremacy. The there \,v as the plague of 1347-52, during which Europe lost bet\,v een one half and one third of its population and moved the centre of i t s com merce from South to North. The cholera epidemic of 1830 contributed Lo the disintegration of the great empires, particularly the Hapsburg's, paving the way
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for the European democracies . After W\11/I t he "Spanish influenza" infected more than a billion people and killed over 40 million. The field in which security can be achieved is wide and, luckily, the possibilities of response are growing. The potentially interesting innovations are ample and range over every field of knowledge . They require non-stop, detailed and future-oriented monitoring. In general, the highest effort can be noticed in the technological field, which makes a com ment of strategic valence necessary. As a matter of fact, Lechnolo-
gy does nol only define the continuous pursuit of improvement but highlights also the shmt duration of materials. Tvv·o aspects which produce an equal number of requirements: adaptation and operation. The macrosystems become heavy and vulnerable. Those who are not loaded with these burdens can move ,vith less predictability and more fa ntasy, at times \vith surprising results. In the technological field, in any case, astonishing goals have been achieved and are now v,;ell established. Some examples: • po tential of outer space. Nol only the search for extraterres-
t r ial l i fe, with the c onnect ed new resources and profits, but also the monitoring or the planet. An information network .is being realized ; suffice it to think of the satellite secur ity system, now installed even on private cars. This allovvs us Lo anticipate the near future: less privacy and more security; • study of unpredictable events according to the dynamics o f chaos, \vhich n10ve between science and geomet ry. Tryin g to u nderstand the concrete complications of reality, from the \,v himsicality of meteorology, to the vortices of a stream or to 19
•
•
•
•
masses' behaviour vis-a -vis an emotion; progress on lhe \vay to invisibility (more and more sophisticated camo u flages and explo i lation of the present weaknesses of the e lecir-ornagnetic equ ipment for surveillance and detec tion) . At t h e same ti me, development of a tec b nology focused on the infinite ly small , capable of increasing the technological a dvantage of t hose \vho can afford it; artificial intell igence and ils app lications in coordination an d control; robots and their capability o f substituting for men, part icu larly for fig hl ing men; e leclronics and its foreseeab le developments. Very p robably
20
it will he poss ible to build and miniaturize everything, widening the capabili ties of th e individual to incredib le limits; • advantages and disadvantages of a world witho u t al.lrit:ion . Speed againsl endurance. A flywheel with no attrition could repl ace a petrol engine with only a modest starting impulse. Accord ing lo Jack Bitterly, inventor at the "US Flywheel", 12 Euros vvorth or electricitv could suffice to travel 500 kildmetres . The way to ridding o u rse lves of the strategic dependence on oil is u ndoubtedly open; • sound and its capability o f t u rning in to light, ,vith high probability of getting u nl irnited energy;
• u ltra wide b and. The new \-vireless single-impul se t ransmissions (Fullerton and Pet roff) have exceeded the l im its of the continuous waves, which often bounced against obstacles, ca u sing in terCerences that weakened the signal. Today, signals arc ahvays loud and clear; obstacles are passed throu gh and this provides a ne\N capab ility of vision through position detectors. • l ight beam comp uter. Cables are replaced hy lasers and mirrors, thus increasing mobility, surprise and manoeu vre; • the role o[ hands and particularly of fingers in digital communicat ion, [or memorizing and transferring bits us ing lhe nat ur al elect ric cu rrent of the human b ody.
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CONCLUSIONS Technology by ilsel[ w i II be unable to contain the threats within narrower anJ more eas ily controllable limits. The first great fo rce capable of promoting the mutual recognition of peoples is coexistence. It is a long way, difficult to travel, \vhere one can easi ly lose his direction. While the world rallies around the victims of terror, \Ve discover that the un iversal recognition fostered by globalization, Lhe free trans it o r information and the awareness of t h e world problems in real time, has not re moved hatred and craving for d esLrucLion. Th e roots of evil outlive every generation. Everyone has done someth ing wrong . People have often resorteJ Lo violence . I-late has bred hate and this process has led to an increasingly critical and probably hopeless situation. In this climate or cl i ffuscd rancour and mistrust, the a id that one is able, and in tends, to give, can hurt feeli ngs and b ecome
poisonous . Just as the punish menl for those guil ty of unacceptable acts of violence can bccom e an a li b i for furthe r revcnge. As one can sec, problems increase, answers become more exlensi ve, far-reaching and sophisticated anJ call [or a c u ltural, Lech no lo gical and cognitive process which is in itself a prerequisite for survival. l\ileamvhile, a lso the military have raised the threshold of their security. T he first objective is lo avoid death. The second is to win and achieve the target \vithou t killing. The Lhird objective is Lo avoid causing damages, since they \vould be paid by the winner. How will it end'? ll is difficult to say. If it is t rue, as recent studies reporl, that in the \.Vhole universe a t least 20,000 planets could be inhabited, the Saga of Man is just beginning .
•
,., !Vlajor General (re!.)
21
TOWARDS ANEW WORLD ORDER The future universal projects will have to take into account unforeseen and unexpected consequences, but the solutions i,vill arise from i,vithin the different civilizations
The bipolar world has left a legacy which still exists, and must be known and understood in order to build a new world order. The economic choices of the '70s and '80s brought about decisive consequences for vast areas of our planet. The process of adjustment is still in progress. The coming years will be crucial for establishing at last a new international stability, provided that the Nations and the international Organizations tackle the problems of resources and human rights. Our hope is for a real opportunity of growth for the whole world, in a framework of stability and general security. 22
u r memory o u ght to go back to Lbe crisis of 1971 1975, which led to the establishment of a real worl<l board 'vvilh the creation, at first, of the so-called "Library group" and then of the "GS", which was soon to become "G7" . T his board was actually the outcome of the econom ic, financial anJ nrnnelary instability caused by Lhe U .S. decision to dismantle the GATT sys t em (Genera l Agreement. on Tariffs and Trade) signed in 1947, on the ini tiative of the U .S., by t he rep resenLatives of 2 3 Nations. Its objective was to reduce trade barriers and customs duties, open ing Lhe old colonial empires Lo internationa l commerce . This ,,v as the accord on \Vhic h Lhe economic system of the post-\.\1\,V ll period was built. In 1975 the economic-industrial world opens lo ne,,v hopes , sin ce the G7 (group of Lhe most i ndustrialized Countries: U .S.,
O
U.K., France, Ger many, Japan, Ita ly and Canada) should be the arena through which its members could fi nd the possi bility of re-stab ilizing t he economic-Gnancial system through the creation of a new monetary and financial arch i tecture, capable of relau nching th e econom ic recovery and develop rn.ent. Therefore, 1975 is Lo b e cons idered a year of justified hopes, from lhe vie,vpo int of a new ec onomic order (also t hanks t o lhe results o[ the Helsi nki Conference) as well as from tha t of political detente and East-v\Test collabora tion . The 1975-79 quinquennium is that in which the aspiration to
by Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi~¡,
~.1wffe
collaborat ion makes its appearance and musl be considered a lrans ition period, wailing for a serious relaunching. These expectations vanish in the successive period , 19791989. The decade begi ns w it h the second oil-crisis, because of the formation of lwo factions, a radica l and a moderat e one, w ithin OPE C (Organization of P et roleum Exporting Co untries) . The former believes thal the producing Counlries arc ent itled lo impose high prices in order to counter th e price increases of the goods produced by the industrialized Countries, posing as protagonists of a kind of \vorld socialism, as if this could le ad to the redistribu tion of wealth and a \,\lorlcl,Nide redressing of inequities. Particularly the Count ries \vher¡e the Islamic fundamentalism is p r esenl show the aspira-
23
tion to carry out a poliLico-ideological mission. The radical current is for increasing oil prices ,viLhout vvorrying a bout possible consequ ences, not only i n Lhe industrialized Countries, but also in the developing ones. vVi Lhi n Lhe latter, there is a split between those vv¡hich own energy sources, since they are also oil produce rs, and those which do nol. T h e oLher current ,vithin OPEC is the moderate one. Unlike the radical Countries, it is in favour of cooperation with Lhe industr.ialized Countries and therefore ta kes in Lo account their economic -financial re quirements. On the other hand, the moderate current makes th is cooperation conditional on a reconsideration of the political problems afflicting the Middle East and, in particular, the Palestinians . All thi s gives a chance to influence the industri-
24
alizecl Countries, prompting then1 to look for a solution of the cris is belween Israel and Palestine ,,v hich is, at the same time, also a problem for the relaL.ions within the Arab ,vorlcl. As a consequence, the fracture ,vi thin OPEC is the same existing in the entire l\lliclclle East, i. e. a rift between progressive and rnoclerale Countries. The consequences of t h is situation are evident and the crisis in the Easl-West dialogue only makes things worse.
THE CRISIS IN THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE The 1-l elsinki Con Ference (whose final Act was drmvn up bet,veen July 1973 and August 1975) gives rise to expectations caused by the ne\v econon,ic order. The East-\,Vest dialogue en-
ters a new difficult phase, to the point of being called "the new Cold \ 1Var". Its repercussions can be noticed a lso in the appea ls that the industrialized Countries keep on addressing to the East (to COMECOM, the Council for .l\llu tual Economic Assistance, created in lVIoscow in respon se to the European Common Market) asking t hose Na t ions to contribute to the aid-policy for the development of the so-called d eveloping Countr ies. The d ia logue breaks off because Lhe Soviet Union fai Is to comply ,vith the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference . Considering a lso the strong imperiali stic drive \vhich characte r.i zed the lasl phase or Leonid Brezhnev's era, we can say thaL after th e Czechoslovak crisis (v.' here he launched the "limited sovereignty" doctr¡ine, in order to restore the strength and stability of the Soviet b loc in Eastern Europe)
the USSR begins to get ahead with a policy o f expansion involving the Far East, Africa and Latin America (the central repub lics in particular). We remember also the cris is in Angola and :Mozambique and the support given Lo Fidel Castro and his policy of penetration in Africa. \.\lith Brezhnev the Sovie t Union reaches the top of its imperialistic thrust but, at t h e same time, shows its economic and financial weakness. Th e East - West d ialogu e comes to a crisis whose most critical period is that from th e encl of the ' 70s to 1984-85 , the beginning of M ichail Gorbachev's presidencv. Bu t ,.vhat causes this crisis? \Vith the "Act" of t he Helsinki Conference, the Soviets pocket the r ecognition of the borders established at the encl of \.\TW I L. Then they undert.ake to proceed
to a dual libe ralization process : one concerning t h e modalities of the relat ions and t he o t h er wh ich should lead to the cooperation between East and \Vest. On the other hand, the so called "human rights basket" is disregarded by Moscmv, since it considers the \Vest's support to t he opposit.ion n,ovements in E asle.rn E u rope as " i nterfere nces" in the internal affairs of the USSR . This leads to t he deploy ment of I.he SS2Os, the European -range missiles, \V ith the aim of not only d ividing t he vVestern Countr i es b u t also compelling the Americans to declare their ,villingness to intervene in Europe . There is a d e bate no t devoid of tensions on the prospect of deploying n ew missile bases in Europe . In short we g o back to a "Co l d vVar" climate: the accords on nuclear b a lance vanish; SALT 2 is not ratified by the US; on the
economic and financial plane, aid lo Eastern Europe is blocked, in particular as re gards Pola nd , \vh ich is coming to grips with "Solidarity", t he firs t free Polish labou r-union of the pas l-vVW 11 period.
THE NEW COLD WAR
In the '80s the w ind s of a new cold war start blowing again , w ith the engagement of the two Sup erpowers in the armaments ra ce and the deployment of Lhe SS20s . It is a race to rearmament t hat the Soviets try Lo avoid, s ince thev are not able to s u stain a ne\v ~onfrontation in this ri e lcl. It should be noted tha t in l\iloscow there is a ,var going on between the power cen tres: t h e Party on o ne si d e and, on t h e other, the m ilitary an d t he KGB (Komite t Goz.udarsLve nnoj Bezopasnostj - S tate 2 .)
Defence Committee), the political Police established in 1954, tasked w ith internal and external counterespionage. In the first phase, the military old guard prevails . President An dropov and President Cernenko are representatives or this class and, on the rearmament plane, they support a confrontation . The US take lhis confrontatio n to the extreme, up to the strategic design d evised by President Ronal d Reagan of a "space shield". Mo,-eover, Europe blocks the aid promised with the "Helsinki Act"; thus the Soviet "ship", without the resumption of a policy of dialogue and cooperation, is certainly doomed to sink. As a conse quence, the relations \,v ith the developing Countries become a second priority. The NorthSouth dialogue comes to a standstill, at the expense of the emergent Countries. 26
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT Another r e ason weighing heavi ly on the development of this dialogue is the new explos ion of the Middle East question, in addition to t he second oil cris is, the crisis in the EastWest relations and the new Cold War. In 1979 a peace treaty is s igned at Camp David (USA) as a premise for the pacification of the Middle East. Inst ead, not only is th e treaty refused by some Ar ab Count,¡ ies but becomes the cause of a dispute on East Jerusalem, wh ich has been annexed hy Israel. Successively the Lebanese crisis b egins, Khomeini, in Tran, fosters Islamic fundamentalism and the Iran-Iraq war breaks out. The M i.ddle East question has repercussions on OPEC. The ind ustria l.iz.ed Countries promote a policy of assistance, but with a
political stn., tegy of cooperation. In th e late '70s a new cooperation strategy takes shape, which env isages that th e beneficiaries are to take their responsibilities so that the aid does not fall on barren so i l but becomes a source of ,.vealth. OPEC creates a common fund for the developing Countries, transferring 1% the oil prnceeds, conditional on the ir political s upport, particularly on the lVIiddle East question . The COMECON Countries are called to cooper ate but, not being a ble to match the industrialized Countries, encl up by competing with the emerging Countries fo,¡ the acquisition or new mar kets. In order lo justify the scarcity of its aid, the USSR declares that, having nothing to do with colon iali sm, it is not in debt with those Countries. Thus the industrialized Nations are left alone, while the contrasts between the U .S . and
or
the European partners continue to be high. The G7 , su ccessively G8 with the adm ission of Russia, cannot be considered a directorship for Lhc attainment. of common decisions bu I. an arena on which the economic pmNers clash while they try Lo cope with the situ ation as best as they can, in order to avoid a cris is of their economic-financial system.
THE BRANDT COMMITTEE The only voice wh ich foresees scenarios of conflict b e t\vccn North and South is the report published by the "Brandt Committee", a board , named after the forn,er German Chancellor, created on th e in it iative of the World Bank. On 1980 and 1983 the Committee iss u es two reports with the description of a reality very sim ilar to the present one. In 1980 Brandt pro-
poses an emergency plan for the per iod 1980-1985, in order to take care in good time of the prob lem of hunger and that of the energy sources, \Vhich are affecting the emerg i ng Countries, including those that have their O\,Vn sources of energy. T here are Lwo interesting proposals. The first is a greater· involvement and expansion of the In ternational Monel.ary Fund and o f the Inter national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, besides a larger partic ipation of the deve lop i ng Countries. Th is should be done in order to face the crisis in a better way, a lso considering that the Committee insists that a strict monetary policy does not suffice but also the poli tical and social proble ms m ust be taken inlo account. The secon d proposal is the i nLrocluction of an automatic international taxation on some incomes (e.g. sea freights) to be
e mployed for the implementation of the assistance plans for Lhe developing Countries. These t\.vo proposals are indudecl in Lhc global con tex t of a dialogue which shou ld take place bet1..vcen North and South, within the UN Organization, in order to guarantee contractual parity. ·what docs the G7 ans\,ver? Officially it agrees, but in practice there arc frictions, nol so much over the Brandl Report's proposals, but rather o n Lhe ·w ay to overcome the economic/finan cial crisis . Presid e nt Reagan tackles these problems w i th a rig id monetarism, compelling the European Count ries - particularly the EEC members - to take a resolute action, espec ially on the financial plane, through the foundation of SME (European Monetary System). This is done lo avoid that the doll ar's instability should cause continuous fluctuations of the exchange
27
rates, w ith serious consequences for Lhe European Counlries (and possible financial competition arnong them). As a matter of fact, the G7 does not give many positive ans\vers, neilher to the Brandt Plan nor to the problem of Lhe debts incurred by the developing Countries . The U .S. t,-ies to find a solution by favouring the exports of the ind e bted Countries, in order to enable then, to acquire the re sources necessa r¡), to pay their debt. Th is is due to the fact that many American banks are creditors and want their money back. The European Nations and Japan, on the contrary, are no t vvilling to favour exports beyond a certain limil, fearing negative repercussions on their productive system . Therefore, tensions increase . T he U.S . believes that the disc ussions on the aid to d evelop-
28
ment could, on the one hand exert a strong p ressure on those Countries, and on the other reduce them Lo a minority.
THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE T he North - South dialogu e continues outside the UN, in the econom ic and financial arenas created a fter WW! I, i. e . \vithin organizations like the "International Monetary Fu nd " (IMF) and the "lnterm;tional Bank for Reconstruction and Develop ment'' (IB RD). For some years i L has become an establ ished procedure for the maj or powers to inv ile, before the G7 summit, the representatives of Countries from different continental areas, in order to s how the existence of a consultation policy. Thus there are now tal ks of G l S , G18 and
G22 . Actually this is no t sufficient, since today the discussion is not only about cooperation but about a "parlnership" based on lhe principle of sol idarily. This could be seen as a posit ive evolution . Actuall y a partnership based on solidarity implies that the emerging Countries enjoy the financial support of Lhe international financial institutions , provided tha t they guarantee internal democracy and global economic reforms. The developing Countries cannot foster~ a rapid democratization process owing to the difficulties deriving from historical legacies and the new s ituations \vhich prevailed a fter their independence. In the developing Countries democracy cannot be esLab lished all at once, but must result from a maturation \vhich requires time and sacrifices .
On the econom ic plane, Lhe main difficu lty is thal of introducing global reforms in Countries where critical economic situations are slill prevalent. For example , they must deal with and solve the p.-oblem o f product differentiation. This process must be encouraged, together with industrialization and construction of n ew¡ infrastructure. But then one can ask how they can succeed if they cannot give guarantees. Thus the dialogue enters into a vicious circle. Todav there is a strong desire for a n~vv Bretton Woods, the place in New Hampshire where the agreements on the reform of the lMF was signed. The new international economic order is far from a solution, but it m ust also be said that, in parallel, a lso the political order suffers the consequences o f this s i t u ation. 'Ne
have seen this in the years that go from 1989 to this day, afte r the fall of the Soviet e mpire.
THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL The fall of the Wall brings about some hope of getting over the divisions of the past and of s tarting the construction of a new in ternational order. Fifteen years have gone b y, but we are still far from finding the instruments for its realization . The fall of the Berlin wall is not only a return Lo the "Helsinki Act" (the "Common European Home"), but also a reference to another h istorical moment: Yalta (in the Crimean pen ins ula) . Th e re Iosif S talin, Franklin D. Roosevelt and \l\l i nston Churchill no t only signed the Charter of the ne\v-born United
Nations (the organization in defence of common peace and security), but a lso a declaration on the li berated parl of Europe: the t hree greal powers ple dged to favour, in the free d Countr ies, the establishment of democratic governments b ased on free elections. The d eclaration was largely disregarded, and this is al Lhe root of the Cold War. Helsinki reopens the doo r on Yalta and as the Sovie ts undertake to foster a process of liberalization, they also re tmn to the spirit of the declaration . T herefore it cannot be said that i n Yalta the Big Three div ided E u rope among themselves, because i n that case there wouldn't have been any reason for a Cold War. On the contrary, precise ly becaus e a t Ya l ta. there is some hope o f overcoming this division, the situation, vis-a -vis the non-enforcement of the declara-
29
tion, renwins high ly dcstab il iz:ed. Helsinki is th e momen t \,Vhen t h e US SR resumes the spirit of Yalta, \vhich leads to a l iberalization that, i n its t u rn, challenges the poJilical, economic and socia l sys t em on \Vhich the Sov ie t Uni on has bui lt its em p ire . Helsinki he comes then a fun d amental test, in the face of which the Soviets are compelled to sun-ender. The crisis of 1989, and the opport un i ties given to the Eas t European Countri es to make political choices based on free e lections, represent a relurn to Helsinki and Ya lta .
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER After 1989 we really enter a ne\N international order, in that the \,v orld set-up does no more
30
depend on the consequences of Europ e and t he victorious p owers get rid of the old bipolar¡ity bu t o ther unsolved problems re-em e rge. Today we witness two irrefutable realities : on the on e hand a globalization process, on lhe other a fragmenla ti on. This mak es us unders tand that the new \Vorlcl o rder s hould be reconstructed from its foundations, trying to tackle the problems t hat arc hi storically unsolved. \A/e have entered a new century which appears lo have a very dramatic tonality but, on the other h and , can also be very interesting. There cou ld be the historical op p ortuni t y for a change based on a pannership characterized by the principl e of sol idarity, which is th e challenge facing t h is generatio n. A sol uti on should be found for the ce ntu ries - old p roblems W\:\11 I.
which vvere not so lved precisely becaus e certain v alu es were never acquired a t u niversal level. Hence the proposals ror the reformation of the UN and particularly of the Security Council. In any case, the fa ct that. there are no (and there have never been) g lobal institutions with powers compara b le to those p ossessed by the national governments \Vithin the ir territories does not m ean that t he incen tives lo cooperatio n are nonexistent. Nei the r il imp lies that the regulating effec t of the b ipolar structure prevailing a t the time of t h e Cold \,Var and nuclear weapons has been the only res t ra int on the Nations ' amb itions s in ce 1945 . On the con trary, since they constantly follow the r ules oC the international institut ions, thcv show their willingness lo roum~1 the coope r¡-
ation models and, as never before, they tend LO strengthen the prospec ts of stabiliLy. In relaLion Lo these poi n ls, we should avoid making dogmatic state ments on the em erging political a nd struc Lura l pol ic ies. Today we need new global conditions. In the present world the main co ncern is that of discouraging a ny tende ncy to isolaLionism a nd dis in teg ration of the state entities, because this could turn out Lo be very dangerous for tb e collective security an d development. Nowadays the dividing line between a CounLry's foreign and home policy has dissolved, therefore any choi ce in one secto r contributes in de termining another. If it is true, as it seems, that one or the post-war \Vorld's ce ntral dilemm as is th e te ns ion among glo bal interests, the n the coordinatio n between these r,vo
levels is a fu ndamental prerequ is ite for g lobal stability. CONCLUSIONS T he chall e nge for th e \/\lest is nor o nly that of m a naging a d ifficult integration of new Countri es in a world order, but also th,1t of im agining a new self-conce ption w ithin the in ternation a l comext and along the economic gu ide lines. The challenge of the future is not o n ho\v Lo shape the events but on how to adapt to them as best as possible. The onler of the world w i 11 neve r he completely s ta tic. The prospecl ivc s tructu re, in a ce rtain sense, wi ll be a .-~presentation in which there will be some productive areas and some violent ones. T he solu Lion will have lo co me mainly from w ithin th e cultures concerned.
An era is closing and a new one begin s, wher·e the u n iversal projects w ill always have t.o Lake into account unexpected consequences . T herefore they will never he really universal. There is a reality w here i i. is possib le to live in a better o r worse way, but th is can only be le arned ·rrom experience and not once and for a ll, beca u se r ea lity is ve ry intricate and i L is imposs ible to reproduce the exact c i n;um stances in which a speciric line of conduct was successrul. We cannot take for gran ted that e ither barbarirv or c ivilizat ion are rooted in the human nature in an cxclus.ive manner. Whether or not we lea rn to ra ce the n ew e mer·gencies a nd proceed towa rds a better fu ture will depend, afler a ll, only o n our ovvn behaviour.
• ·:, 1::,xperl in S,rategic Scie11ces 31
A new instrumen the Atlantic Allia -e e and an opportuni y for the national Armed Forces or the first time in its history, NATO has provided itself with an integrated rapid reaction Force able to operate by land, sea and air: the "NATO Response Force" (N RF). This force will be under a single joint force command and w ill be kep t in a steady rotalion, through the contribution in turns o[ the member Countries o[ the Alliance. Approved in November 2002 during the Prague Summit, the plan is already an operative reality and its completion is expected by 2006. Some observers consider this new capability the most important change s ince NATO ,vas established in Washington 55 years ago. Other military experts look carefully at the goals w hich could be reached ,vith this nevv instrument. It can certainly be said that the NATO Response Force \Nill give the Alliance a new military capability: the more rapid insertion of units in deteriorating situations and during crises, ,,vith a \Vider projection-range deployment and increasing effectiveness.
F
32
-._,_J 'I- !lL ·: The NATO Response Force is a new reality, readily deployable, which will complete the ~ reaction capabilities of the High Readiness fE. Forces Headquarters (HRF HQ). Able to operate ~ in the three dimensions, under joint command, -· it will reach its full capability in 2006, and will consist of 20.000 servicemen.
FUNCTIONS AND MILITARY CONCEPT
The NRF concept refers to a ,vhole o[ highly operational and \vell trained units [Tom the various national Armed Forces. The plan, which has been given high priority by the Atlantic Alliance, answers tv.1 0 distinct yet complementary purposes . The first one is the availability of a high-readiness force, made up of joint forces which can be activated at very short notice. In view of
this, the NRF stands at the top of the ideal pyramid wh ich sees the allocation of the Alliance forces according to their readiness level and degree of projectability(fig. 1).
The second aim consists in setting up a mechanism aimed at promoting the indispensable improvements of the military n1pabili Lies and the constant transformation of the Alliance, in order to cope with the new· threats, including those coming from t errorism. In practice, the NATO
Response Force is going to be considered the real catalysl of this change. And, from this point of view, the Alliance wants lo establish a specific link between the qualifications requested of the forces to be allocated and th e modernization of lhe Unils, according to the criteria set during the mentioned Prague Summit (Prague Capability Commitment - PCC). Moreover, the military concept refers Lo two fu ndamenlal aspects: multinationalit:y and inter-
Fig. (NATO RESPONSE FORCE) (LANJ.> .8.RfCI\Dfi)
Graduated
Readiness
CLASSIF(CA 'rJON v>-!Rf' I •.'{_AYl·U~•H R(";A01t li:i.SS"~C'CS l,jl{f; I >!l(-J-, ~f'.>0-•~1:--.;.s FOFl'<:t:S
I, :_n-1 Q·i•,···:Ei.illl
HRF~ XXX
~X3
33
COMMAND AND CONTROL
lt being u n de rs tood that th e employment o[ the NRF is subordinate to the decisions of the Atlantic Counci.l, a chain o[ Co mmand and Control has been se t up, which assigns different r esponsibilities in the preparati on o[ the forces and the conduct of the operation. SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) is responsib le for defining the validation proce-
Left. American sappers in Kosovo. Below. Italian and Spanish soldiers unloadinf!, a heavy rnowr vehicle.
operability. Both are key factors which must be pursued with appropriate criteria: an adequate (but not excessive) degree of multinationality, in order to maxim ize the val.ue pertaining to a coalition force wi thout invalidating its operational effecliveness, which couJd decline in the event of an excessive rnultinationalization; a growing leveJ of interoperahi Ii ty in order to guarantee the gradual attainment of total integration among the forces of the Alliance. As regards the missions th at co uld be entrusted to the NRF, they have to take into account the Force's task, i.e. to assure a 34
ready response, and must be sustainable according to th e p rinciple "first in first out" (i.e. the first force deployed must be the first rotated). More specifically, the force might be deployed: for the evacuation of civilians and personnel in danger; to deal \Vith humanitarian emergencies or situations due to NBC risks; to support antiterrorist operations; in crisis management o perations (CRO) and/or peacekeeping operations; as an entry force , in order to fac ilitate the incorporation of the main body of the contingent; for tasks in support of diplomatic actions.
dur¡es and for the joint m ilitary exercises; after the national political authorities give their assent to the Transfer of Authoritv (ToA), SACEUR will hold the authority of Operational Command. The nev.,ly established Allied Command for Transformation,
stationed at Norfolk (USA), is the body responsible for defining the necessary capabilities and developing the relevant doctrine; it utilizes t he NRF as a focal factor to modernize the Forces of th e Alliance and to increase its interoperability in a joint and multinational sense. When deployed, the NATO Response Force vv¡ill be di rect ed through the Operations Con trol (OPCON) of a Joint Force Com mander, who can avail himse] f of one of the Regional Headquarters (AFNORTH in Brunsum, AFSOUTH in Naples or AFWEST in Madrid) and conduct the operations with a D eployabl e Join t Task Force HQ. A very important role will be played by the newly establi shed
High Readiness Force Headquarters (HRF HQs), ainonll: which the NAT O Rapid Dcploya ble Corps - IT (NRDC - IT) of Solbiate Olona. This Headquarters will be involved in the certifica tion phase of the detailed forces and in h andling the deployme nt, as
Fig. 2
NFR COMMAND-AND-CONTROL STRUCTURE
NAVY COMPONENT HQ HRF(M)
well as in th e direction of th e conduct phase of the operation.
COMPONENTS OF THE NRF As mentioned above, the NRF has at its disposal land, navy and
air forces. In 2006 it \.Vill achieve its full capability, and will consist of a bout 21 ,000 men, but already in 2004 there \Vill be over 1.S,000. All the forces ass igned to the N RF \,viii have to be deployable in a CBRN e nvironment (Chemical, Biologi cal , Radiolo gical, Nuclear). As regards the Specia l Operations Forces (FOS) and the NBCCB RN units, th ere \.v ill be two dedicated Headquarters , directly under the authority or the Joint Force Commander. The naval component ,vill be formed by a Task Force, and the air clement will have as many aircraft of di ffc rcnt types so as Lo ensure a fixed number of sorties per day. The land Brigade, a fu ndamental pawn oC lhc NRF, will be und er th e authority or the Lan d Componen t Commander (LCC) v.'ho in his turn will be subordinate to a Jo in t Force Commander, who could be deployed in the Theatre wi th a Deployable Joint Task Force HQ (DJTFHQ) (fig. 2). Th e types of manoeuvre and su pport units envisaged for the Brigade-l evel land component has b een fixe d by specific requireme nts and include motor35
izecl units , light infantry and paratroops, p lus various combat support units and logistic support units (he]icopters, artillery, target acquisition, engineers, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), psychological operations units (PSYOPS), s u ppli es and trans port). That is, they answer th e concept of setting up a reservoir of forces, among w hich one could select, in case of need, the most su i table ones, as regards nature and typology, for performing a speci ric mission. In order to ensure consistency, the Brigade has to be organized \Vith a \,v ell defined Framework including the Brigade Head quarters, t he Headquarters Command, at least one manoeuvre Regiment of its own, plus most of the tactical and logistic suppo 1~t units. 'Within such rrame'vvork it is possible to in corporate other manoeuvre troops, after an appropriate training, in order to complete t h e group of forces, including multinational units. In case of emergency, the most suitable organization o f the NRF will be d ecided depending on the 36
specific tasks and the particular operational environment.
ROTATION CYCLE
A rotation cycle has been scheduled for the NRF in order to achieve a fair allocation of tasks and lo spread the experiences among the Countries of the All iance. Therefore a detailed cycle has been worked out, based on six-rnonth periods: six months on joint training and six months on stand by. In other ,vords , every force complex assigned to the NATO Response Force wi ll be engaged for a year (fig.3). Since an NRF a ble to perform lhe whole range of fixed missions \,vill not be available before October 2006, the expressible capabilities will be gradu ally increased, keeping up with the raising standards of the national offers. As far as Italy is concerned, the Armed Fo1Tes are taking part in NRF J and 2 (October 2002 - July 2004) with limited assets, wh ile the land component wil l concentrate its efforts on N RF 3 (July 2004 - January 2005), and the
navy component on NRF 5 and 6 (July 2005 - July 2006) . The land cofftponent for the NRF 3 will be formed by a group of forces based on the "Taurinensc" Brigade, with the contribution of at least four All ied Countries. More specifically, s tarting from the month of January 2004, the joint training
activities ,,viJI be carried out toaether with the NATO validalions ~eeclecl to certify the opcrntional levels required for the ~uccessive possible employment. The Corps Hcaclquarter (NRDCIT) at Solbiate Olona "'"ill also b e fully involved in the NRF 3 cycle led by Italy, and will be, as we said, the Land Co mponenl Command.
Fig. 3
NFR ROTATION CYCLE Oct 03 Jan 04 Jui
URF1
N'RF2
04
Jan OS
NRF3
Jui OS Jan 06
NRF4
NRF6
NRF 6
~NITIAL OPERATIONAL ~--C~APA~ILITY SP MARFOR
AIR >
The NATO Response Force represents the natural development
t l
Left. An AB-205 helicopter of 1he ltalian Army .
Below. M-109 L self-propelled gu ns in Koso vo.
in the transformatio n proce ss started by the Atlantic Alliance a few years ago . This new ca pability is the cutting edge, highly trained, a t the top o f the rapidly cleploy a b le forc es and is not a separate unit, detached from the rest of the F orces stru ctu re . On the
NRf9
Jui 08 Jan 09
NRf10
NRF11
NRr 12
-
B B
I
NAVY
. '. .. _ ,IR ~ i -~
.
• •_,.r.:=7
i
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I
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CONCLUSIONS
Jui 05: Jan 07
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contrary, the NRF is the natural completion of the capabili ties alrea dy achieved throu gh Lhe estab lishm ent of t he High Readiness Force Headqu,ffte rs (HRF HQs) . If we consider the specific requ .iremen ts an d the organization of the NATO initiat ive, its
distinguishing fea tures come ou t very c learly. They are th e high -readiness ope rati onal levels required and the great value of the join t and m u l tinational forces. Because of the latter aspect, the national commitments to the NATO Response Force will have to guide the transformation process of the natio nal instruments also in the joint field. Moreover, we can consider that the NRF creates the preconditions for proceedi ng to the complete integration of the European armies and Armed Forces. And it is p recise ly from this point of vie,,_, that we can see Lhe "value added" brough t in by the NATO Response Force . This is the direction that s hould be followed in our training efforls a nd in the allotment of o ur human and financial resources, in order to achieve Lhe longed for synergy among all ied military inst ru ments.
•
'' Colonel, Chief, Plans Office, Army G eneral Staff·
37
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laly participated in the land operations against international terrorism in Afghanistan, within Operalion "Enduring Freedom", \Nith a contingent, the "Nibbio" (buzzard), of 1000 men (and women) from February to September 2003 . The duration of the mission was 180 days from lhe ToA (Transfer of Authority) - which look place on March 15, 2003 with a mid-lerm turnover. "Nibbio 1", cenlred on the "Taurinense" Alpine Brigade, ,vas replaced by "N ibbio 2", based on the "Folgore" Paratroop Brigade. The "Nibbio 1" returned home at lhe end of .Jun e 2003 , afler four rnonlhs in Afghanistan, three of which ,vere spenl in surveillance operations in Khost, a very turbulent provi nee bordering on Pakistan.
I
40
Above.
i\llap of Afghanistan with the indication of the bases of the "Nihhio" milita1y Contingent. Right.
An observation turret near a. base of the Italian Contingent.
It was a type of rnission where the resul ts are not measured on the number of e nernies neutralized or the quantity of weapons seized, but rather on the number of negative events which did not occur in the area con trolled by lhe "Nibbio l" Task Force, s i nee this indicates the level of stabilizalion achieved. The Contingent had lo foce and overcome the hardships inevitably connected ¡with a new Theatre o( Operations, where the men had to continuously keep their allention at the highest level
.4 surveillance patrol i11 Af.~hanis1a11.
in order lo deal w ith a constant climat e of real t hreat, living through a s ituation of h igh psycho logical stress. The servicemen o f "N ibbio 1" carried o ut their m ission against internatio nal terrorism in t he best possible way, particularly in relation w ith the reconstruction of Afghanistan, a Country w hich had just emerged from more than twenty years of wars. Their st rength came from the determination and serenity, a lw ays devoid of presumption and arrogance, shown in the performance of the nume rous o perational and humanitarian tasks. They experienced strong emotions and had to face an environment which \Vas hostile not only [o r the rigours of the weather 41
and roughness o[ the ground but also, and rnainly, because of the situations that had Lo be confronted, wh ich required physical courage, strength of character and inner moderation. The ins truments ava ilable to d eal \Vith these difficulties were profess ionalism, resolute comm itrnent, ,villpower, the pride of contributing to the rebirth of a Nation and the honour of representing Italy on the international scene.
ORIGIN OF THE MISSION Operation "Enduring Freedom" was started by the U.S. in October 2001, follo\,\•i ng the terrorist attacks o( 9/11, on the bas.is of a series of Resolutions issued by the UN Security Co u ncil (1), wh ich fixed the goals of the mission on the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan under its legitimate Government. The Operation, which is part of the "Global \ 1Var Against Terrorism" (GWAT) and engages a Coalition of more than 70 Countries, envisages the follO\ving fo u r phases: • PHASE I: p lann ing and development of the forces in the USCENTCOM responsibility area (2) (concluded); • PHASE II: air campaign in Afghanistan against particular targets; humanitarian aid, support to the Northern All iance and s u rrender of the Taliban regime (concluded); • PHASE lII: employment of land units (to prevent the use o f Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorists), d ecl aration o f a ceasefire and beginning of the Cou ntry's paciCication and stabilization (concluded); • PHASE IV: definition, in ag,·eement with the other Countries of the Coalition, of the instruments necessary to p revent the re-emergence of terrorism and to support the hurnani larian operations which have a 42
gre a ter significance in this phase (in progress) . The Command of the Operation is entrusted to USCENTCOM in Tampa, Florida (USA), ,vhe re about 40 of the 70 partners of the Coalition are represented, while 20 more are present with troops or other assets in the Area of Responsibility (AoR) of CENTCOM. ln Afghanistan the US es tablished a Corps-level Theatre Command, located in Bagram, called ~
~
Right. The C-130 J transport aircraft provide:, Lhe Contingent w ilh the 11ecessa1y supplies for the performance of the mission. Below. A look-out pos/ seen through a snooperscope.
"Combined Joint Task Force 180". The Ilalian forces arrived du ring the transi lion bet,veen the III and IV phase of the Operation. Phase IV, currentlv un d er wav, provides for the e,.;'ployment ~[ land units, creation of a stable
and safe environment, definition in agreement with the o ther Coalition mem bers - of the instruments n ecessary to prevent the reemergence of terrorism and to support the humanitarian operations, as \Nell as for tr aining the Afghan National Army (ANA).
in the easle rn part of the Count ry, bordering on Pak istan, the so-called "Sanctuary den ia l area", with the ass ignment of neu t.rali,.ing the terrorist. formations, their po ss i ble logistic bases and the remaining recr¡uitment centres. The transfer to the Th eatre \Vas carried out only by air and start.eel on January 9, \,v ith an Advance Party tasked wi th the organizat ion of the area in view of the successive arrival o f t h e main body of the Contingent. The deployment, supported by th e US strategic air transport, was concluded on Feb ruary 27 ( 16 missions of llalian C 130 Js and 68 missions of USAF C 17s). On March 15, 2003 the Contingent, after about a month for acclimation lo the new environn,ent and familiarizat ion \Vith the US operalional procedures, undertook the responsib ility for the Khosl prov ince, replacing a US paratroop b atta li on, and passed u ncler the operational leadership of the American Commander o( the C.JTF 180.
Phase IV was declared open on May 1, 2003 by the US Secretary of Defence \V ho, on t he same occasion, declared forma lly that the war in Afghanistan had ended. In Afghanistan, bes ides the Contingents engaged in "Enduring Freedom", there is a Multinational Force of about 5600 men of the "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) wh ich, in compliance with the UN Resolutions (3), was deployed i n the Kabul area (4). The "Nibbio" Contingent has been operating in the Khost area,
l_talian soldiers co111rulli11/!, a village from a mortar emplacemenl.
43
THE OPERATIONS AREA T he Headquarters of th e Contingen l was located at Bagram, approximately 69km north of Kabul, al one of the main US bases (the other was Kandahar,
in the South) with a logistic-support component and a small operational reserve, while the operational component - the "Nibbio" Task Force - \Vas sta tioned i n Khost. The Area of Re sponsibility (AoR) of the "Nibbio" TF included the province of Khost and most of the Paktya province (5), \vith an area of about 9000 square metres (equal to the Italian region o f Marche) a nd approximately 506,000 inhabitants. The AoR was remarkably complex because of th e rough grou n d, long distances and the very bad road conditions, \Nhich caused a marked compartmentalization o[ the region. The Khost Province is a mainly mountainous and very large area, which was a base of importanl al-Qaeda training centres and, being on the border路 of Pakistan, was suitable for路 giving shelter to the f-ugitive leaders.
44
The region is characterized by two intermountain basins located at different h e ights (Gard ez, at 2300m and Khost, at 1200m), divide d by a deep mounta inous barrier vvill1 some rel iefs higher than 3000m (the average he ight
Above.
Du.ring a mission the rela1ions HJith the local population are ofprirnary importance. Right.
An Army dog-learn controlling a truck's load.
is 2270m), narrow valleys and vary bad roads. The area is crossed by th e routes to Pakistan, al ternative to the main ones, 路which are to the north of the valley of Kabul (Jalalabad - Khyber pass). The mountain roads can be locally very steep and narrO\N and m any g orges and p a ssages are right under the heights. The climate is continental, dry, v,,,ith hot: summers and very cold winters. Khost (also called Matun in th e local language) is connected with
Bal!ram, via Gardez - Kabul, bv a single caniageway w路h ich is d ih icult to travel due to its Ii rnit:ecl capacity, particularly in winter, a nd to its course which runs al on g the bottom of valleys or is cu t into the hillsi d es, making its us e r isky for military columns, also for the risk of ambushes. At the Lime of the Soviet occupation, the province of Khos Lwas the scene o[ long and violent battles , and the Russian garr is o n
was practically cut off hy the Afghan guerrillas. Furthermore, the road to Gardq was almost constantly impracticabl~, due lo the frequent interrupt ions made by the Mujhaeddin.
STRUCTURE OF THE CONTINGENT The "Nibbio" was organized as follows:
• Nalional Contingent Commander (NCC), who was the highest national authority for lhe entire Afghan Operat ions Theatre; the NCC had under his cornmand the Italian Forces deployed for· Operation "Nibbio" as well as those for ISAF; • National Contingent HQ, based on the 'Taurinense" Brig. I IQ; • "Nibbio 1" TF, hinged on the 9 th Alpini Regt "Aquila" of the "Taurinense" Alpini Brig., with
diverse operational capabil ities, lhanks to various specialist assets. The "Nibbio 1" TF, in its turn, was organized on: HQ, 9 th Alpini Rcgt; • "Aquila" Alpini bn, with: •• 2 rifle companies; •• 1 Alpini Paratroop companies; •• 1 120mm mortar company; •• 1 A/T company; •• l"alp ie ri" (mountain warfare) platoon;
4S
• • • • • • •
Special Forces unit; Close Support Group (GSA); Signal company; EOD engineer company; target-acquisi tion battery; NBC platoon (6), Military Police p latoon.
For t h e first Li me after \VWII, (with th e excepti o n of the first m ission in Lebanon - 1980), the War M il itary Code wa s adopted for the Contingent. The Cod e was recently further adjusted to t he cl icl.al.es of t h e Constit u tion
46
th roug h the tu r ning into la w of Decree Law· 4/2003 . The en forcement of th e Wa r Code was an important change, since it acknowledged the Armed Forces' sp ecificity and part icular role.
TASKS OF THE "NIBBIO" CONTINGENT T he miss ion assigned to the Contingent \Vas to contri bute, together wi t h t he other member of
the Coal it ion, lo the neutralizatio n and elimination o f t he residual terrori st groups and their possible logistic and t rain ing bases still p rese n t in t h e Area of Responsibility, in order to create th e conditions o f security and stability necessary to rebuild the A[ghan organization and re-establish the leg it imate internal orde r·. Even if t he 11.alian forces intervened a l the moment o f t he transition from th e III to the 1V P hase o f Operation "End uring F reedom" , when the terrorist
of patrols and rnobile u n its and were aimed al gathering informat ion and hindering the movem ents of arrned groups as ,veil as intensifying the contacts ,.virh (he population, also thi-ough the distribution of aid and interventions of reconstruction and support to the local institutions. Very often the operations ,,ere carried out i n very d illicult environ ments, on passes and trails that often reached an altitude of 3000m, where it was difficult to m ove and b reathe. T he "Ki bbio" T F (about 750 men) was deployed in an Advanced Operation a l Base of the coalition, siled a few k ilometres from Khost, named "Salerno" FOB (a fter the name or the Carnpan ian town ,vhere the US 82 nd Airborne Division fought in Septern her 1943). The FOB is a fortil'.i ecl and very r ough earn[), wh ere the living
Left . A delega1io11 of the Iwlia11 Co111i11ge111 visiti11g a US /\nu,路 base. Below.
Italia11 111ilitary i11{01111i11g the local
/JCl/11tlatio11 (/1/ found l'llllllitions {1/Jd !heir da11ger.
conditions a nd comrorr a rc less important. than the vital security requirements. Following t.hc US concept, t he units garri son lhe camp on a ro tation basis and for limited periods or lime, in order to conduct operations in the surrounding ,:u-路ca. At approximately 3km from the FOB, the "Nibbio" garrisoned ano I her b ase, near the rormer (Russ ian) a irpo1路t of Khos l. At this camp, called "Chapman", there is another landing strip. The "Salerno" FOB ,vas tacti cally and logisti ca lly isol a ted from the ot her garrisons of the Coa l i Lion , especia ll y from the Ital ia n r ear b ase of Ba gra rn, which is al a distance of about 300km (a two-day's journey). Khost is still the main ou Lpost of the Coa lition, presently manned by US units, from which is possible lo conduct operations to cont rol the Paki slan i b o rder, which is still used by lhe terrorists lo penetrate into Arghanislan, and as a transi t area for many fugitives. \!ext to the FOB there was a " ri re base" ,vith th e high-angle l'i 1路c component or the TF, consisting of the 119th mortar company of the 9 th Alpini Rcgt or the "Taurinensc" Brigade w h ich, w ith its
presence was reduced tu unconnected pockets of fighters, the job assign ed to th e T F imp lied the operational initiative that could prevent the movements ur the enemy a nd poss ib le penetrat ions from PakisLan. All this entailed conducting territorial-control and area-interdiction operations, a s well as performing dynamic and static aclivities aimed at garrisoning sensitive areas. T h e d v nami c act ivi li es were carried out with a large number 47
Emharkation of ltalia11 troops on a CH-47 transport helicopter.
6 Thomson B1¡andt RT-Fl 120mm mortars contr ibuted to the security of the FOB and the "Chapman " detachme nt providing, if and when requ ired, the necessary fire support. Furthermo,¡e, th e unit was tasked with a s imilar su pport to the patrols moving within the range of the available munitions and w ith the assistance to the TF
48
elements engaged in operational or hu manitarian activities in the AoR.
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ENEMY The hostile forces, generally defined as ACM (Anti Coalition Militants) we re different and nonhomogeneous g roups, such as smugglers, drug and arms trafl'ickers, petty c rimina ls given to robbery and kidnapping people
for ransom, and - naturaJly residu a l form a tion s of Taliba n a nd al-Qaeda. The latter were formed both by local elements a nd othe rs coming from Cou ntries wh ich were hab itual providers of "labourers", such as Cheche n and "Arab" mer cenaries, ("Arab" is the general term hy which the people of the M iddle East are indicated). The tactics ac.loptecl by the ac.1vcrsary was that of guerrilla warfare and the most pursued ac tion was ambush. This capability was
..
-
the mos t wi d espread forrn of combat in Afghan ista n an d also the most suited to th e terrilory, vv¡eapons and lech n iques emp loyed by the enemy (heavy machine guns, light ,veapons, dynam ite attacks). In all these activities, the ACM vvcrc greatly helped by the morphology of the Country: rough , without roads, fu ll of gorges and valleys and crossed b y rav i ncs a nd embanked sl rcams, an ideal terra.in fo r g uerrilla warfare, ambushes and surprise attacks . In addi tion, the dirt-roads a rc s trewn w .i t. h for d s and holes, wh ich makes it easy lo conceal and lay mines very rapidly. For th e Contingen l l h c most dangerous Lhrcat came from aclio ns against its forces engaged in external movements, \Vith the employment of Ligh t weapons, RPG 7 rocket la unchers on corn p a rtmen ted grou ncl which offered good opportu nities for arnb u s h fire, launch i ng of hand grenades , explosion of remo lecontrol devices along the roads and use of 107mm rockets an d mortars against the Bases of the Coalitio n.
The enemy were most dangero us in th e initial p hases of the fight, because of th eir agility in attack ing a n d disengaging, thus becoming a very d ynamic an d d ifficu lt target. The fact thal the terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan were lo ca ted within a lhi rty-km range fro m the "Sa lerno" FOB raised the threat's level , since la unch ing an attack with th e a l most absolu le certainty of not having to face a retaliation was very reward in g for¡ Lhc attackers. Moreo ver Lhc host ile ac ti o ns and the attacks to Lhe road network throu gh the exp losion o f tank-trucks or other vehicles, also agains t c iv ilian targets, had the additional purpose o f creating insecuri l_y and t ension wi th in th e population. The local threat was potentially more aggressive in s umme1~ since the enemy could move more easily on foot also at high altitudes. This requ ired appropria te countermeasures , s u ch as avoiding th at Lhe enemy could fin d out the type of the d iffe rent components of the TF, making no n-periodic patrolling p la ns, reducing routine acli vitics as m u ch as possible, carrying out a better control o f Lhe a r¡cas near the base a nd increasing Lhe su rveillance of the env i ronment aroun d the garrisons. T h e "Nibbio l" Cont i ngent worked in its sector with great a uto nomy, facing the di fficult reality of figh ting against a m ilitar ized terrorism, in a land \vhere guerrilla warfare has been p racticed for centu ries. The Task Force , besides carrying o u t daily, day-and -night pa trols with in its AoR, in its three months of d u ty m ade several operations of territorial co ntrol, often together w ilh US units. Of particular significance were two im portan t operations carried out w il h the US units of the "Dev-
Raising the Fial!, at !he Italian camp.
49
il" I F : "U nifie d Venture" and "Dragon Fury". They \~/ere catalogued as "combat" operations, i.e. planned and realized considering the possib iliLy of having to m ove on lo an a ctual-fig ht phase. It was the first time that the Italian troops returned to operaLe at a ltit ud es of abou t 2000-3000m , where mili tary detachments were stationed in order Lo "seal" the bor der ¡with Pakistan and b lock the mou ntain passes. In the sam e operations, th e "Ground Assault Convoy" techniqu e \Vas ap plied in long ln.1.nsfers, profiting b y the Soviet experience in the region. It consists in employing motorii'.ed p atrols w hich can move autonomously over long distances, mostly without roads, in a hostile or potentially dangerous territory. In Operation "Unified Venture", in early May, th e "Nibbio" carried ou t the first combat air-attack at
50
battalion level in the history of the Italian Army and Armed Forces. The air-attack, especial ly if carried out in rough and mountainous areas and without a road network, as ,vas the case in Afghanistan, is one of th e best tactics for cond ucti ng indepen dent su rprise actions against enemies \vho know the grou n d and whose bases are in remote and almost unreachable zones. The operation's goal ,vas lo restore stability in the area, in order to su pport the action or the Afghan ad-interim Governmen t throu gh area-i nterdiction aclivi-
Right. VM-90 militarv vehicles patro/linf!,
Afahan village. Below. The !1a!ian servicernen are wannly welcomed b_v the local people.
w1
ties aimed at neutralizing the ACl\11, avoiding the reestablishment of enemy sanctuaries and limiting the freedom of movement of the host ile forrnalions and the ir possibility of accom plishing terrorisl attacks, realizing al Lhe same time humanitarian interventions in favour of th e populalion. One of the leading actors of the "Nibbio J" mission was the RT-Fl 120mm Thomson Brandl morta1~ which lhe Italian Arn1y employed in operations for lhe first Lime. The "relative" lighlness of the ¡weapon, together with the pmver
d erivin g from its calibre, made this morlar the high-a ngle firesource more appropriate for the Contingent's mission, considering the particular slructure of t he terrain of the Italian AoR. Thanks to its technical fealures and the great variety o f available mun i ti ons, the ,veapon co u ld reach, wilh extreme precision, targets at a dislance of up lo 13 kilo melres . T h e mobility and range of this weapon, increased by the possibility of transport by h e licopter (7) a roused also a particular interest from the US Forces.
Anolher protagon ist of the rn ission ,vas the C 130 J of lbe Italian Air Force which , for the f i rs t Lime, landed on a half-prepared dirt slrip, such a s th e one i n Khost. The aircraft assured the re-supply flight from Bagram to Khost, and vice versa, from mid-lVIay unlil the Conlingent's homecoming. In lh is activity, lhe ere,vs of the llalian Air Force disl inguished themselves for lheir professional skill , determination and wellpondered evaluation of the r isks which have always warranted a support aclequ ale to the needs.
51
The Rules of Engagement: an d the "Force Protection" measures ensured the correct behavioural frame, within \vhich our mili tary could operate wit h clear normative and security references. The Rules of Engagemen t ( RoE) (8) guaranteed the conditions for accomplishing lhe tasks and achieving the goals. They authorized the use of force \vithin the norms of the internationa l laws on armed conflicts and the national regulations consistent \vi lh those o[ the cooperating forces . In particular, they \Varranted the best safeguard and security of the p ersonnel. The force protection passive measures adopted, both d irect and indirect, which derived from the guidi ng directives of the US Command o f the Coalit ion, were integra ted (and completed) b y the provisions issued by the national Command. The measures helped to o utline the refere n ce
52
Above. An Italian 'Afpino" in his machinegun ernplacemenl.
Right. Patrolling a road in the desert.
pictu re necessary to provide - inside and o u ts ide th e bases - the securi t.y of the forces, the equip ment and the installations where the u nits h ad to opernte . The mission was carefully prepared at home from every point of vie,,1, in order to reduce to a minimu m the possible unexpected events in the Theatre. T he selection of personnel an d the p reparation of men and units was accurate and exhaustive, as were also the m aterials issu ed , \Vith particular regard lo the in dividual equipmen l. The troops underwent a specific training in Italy, wit h t he p urpose of increasing the ir physical
efficiency and operational capabilities, as well as p rep a ring the units for their taskf in the new environment. T he amalgamatio n of the d ifferent units was made \villi the utmost care, since it was n ecessary to achieve tl,e appropriate homogeneity wi thin the Contingent. The avai labili ty o f very ad vanced equiprnen t perm ittecl to deal with .i mportant technological realities which, in fact , changed the face of the operations. During the Sovi et-Afghan ,var, the Mujaheddin \Vere the "masters" of the night; today the situa-
tion is reversed: the real rulers of the night are those who possess the ins truments \Vhich enab le them to see and figh t, and \vho can hit the en em y befor e being discovered . Absurdly we could say that the daytime environ rnent has become the d angerous one, since it ham pers these technological capabilities a nd puts the gu errillas and the \,Vestern un its on the same level. As a matter of fact, the real difference emerging in today's scenario is th e actual "all weather" capability of moving and fighting \Nithout breaking the rhythm o f
th e operation and, most of all, exp] o i ting the e nemy's inability to do the same despite their better knowledge or the ground. The relations w ith the Allies, i.e . practically \,Vitb th e Ameri cans, \Nerc always kept on a p lane of mutual trust, which was also the ou tcome or past experiences made on the occasion of NATO exercises and d u ring past operations , especially i n the Balkans, \Vh ich p erm itted to probe into the n ew procedures and the mentality of lhe Allies. Besides rank, professionalism , knowledge of the procedures and of Lhe Englis h language - which
':i3
were taken for gra nted in a multinatio na l env ironment - it was ext remely imponanl to establish good interpersonal rela ti ons al every level.
CONCLUSIONS
In the three month s o[ .i ls opcr·a t i o na l resp ons ibility in the p rov ince of Khost, the Contingent was attacked several times by te 1Torists. This was proof of the risks o f the mission, but the person nel , infrastructure and equipment of the Contingent wer e not damaged : • FOB "Salerno" 3 attacks: •• March 18, a 107mm rocket 54
fired and a s uccessive a cti on conduc ted by host ile men armed with indi vidual ,veapons a gainst Observation Pos t no 7; •• June 3, firing of two rockets: one I 07 nm1 and one 122 mm; •• J une 11, ,.vith a 1·cmole-control device m ade up of 2 A/T Russian mines (12 kg of explosive) placed near Gate 3; • "Chapman" Detachment 7 a ttacks: •• M arch 2 1, firin g of a l 07 m m rocket; •• March 22 , two I 07 mm rockets ; •• Ma rc h 24, two 107 mn, rockets; •• Ap1il 2, three I 07 mm rockets;
•• April 6, three I 07 mm rocke ts; •• April 12 , ahead -of-time explosion of a car-bomb 500 m from t he Bnsc; •• M ay 1, device launc hed 100m from entrance no I of the Base; • "Nibb io l " TF pe1·sonnel 2 attac ks: •• Apri l 5, a patrol fired at with auto mati c weapons on its way back to the FOB; •• April 12, two hand grenades thrown at a patrol (l not exploded). The attacks confirmed that the mi ss ion ,vas dem and i n g and r isky; o ur so ld ie rs p e rformed their Lask with a professionalism
An Italian patrol s upported by helicopters.
NOTES (1)- Am ong wh ich, no 1368 (Septem-
recogni zed and apprec iated b y everybody. The "Alpini" , Para troo pers, Range rs, "Carabinieri", Sailors and Airmen of the Ilalian Contingent, Lhe men and \Vomen of "Nibbio 1" earned the esteem and consider at ion o f th e Ameri can soldier s \Vith whorn they cooperated in a di ffic ult environment, characterized by a constant and u nforeseeable threat. Aware of the miss ion, th e risks and th e threat they had lo con fTont, the soldiers of the ContingenL carried out th eir tasks ,-vith great professionali sm and r e solve, disp laying an exceptional capability of survival and adaptation in a n environment that was
parlicularly hostile, and not only for the presence of Lh e enemy. They showed t h e offensive capabilities required for that type of mi ssion and faced up to th e ir engagement ,vi t h the right mental ity for an anti-guerrilla operati on - di fferent from a ll t hose conducted by the I talian Armed Forces since the encl of V/WII never losing their determinatio n. The units worked vvith d y namism and flexibility in mostly high-mountain areas, marked by an extremel y compa r tmente d morphology and extreme climatic conditions that often changed \Vit h very Ii ttlc forewarning. T h e men were aware of th e risks a nd went o ut on th e territory every clay to check t he situation, m eet in g peopl e , earnin g their trust and respect and displaying a high fighting s piri t a nd a credible dissuasive force. The ir t actical mo b ili ty was greatly improved by the recourse to tran sportation by helicopter. However, this imp lied long psychoph ysi cal engagemenl, made harder by t he duration of the opera ti ons and the intrinsic e nvi ronmental difficu lties. T h e "Alpini" of the "Nibb io 1" Contingent, \.v ho ,ve1-c abou t one hal ( o f t he force and th e rnai n component o( the combat u nits, displa yed once more Lhe ir c u s tomary versa tility and their marked operational a u tonomy, which had led them to operate, Lhrough more tha n 130 years o f history, in a ll the scenarios where the Italian Army has been a protagoni st: from East to N ortl1 Africa, form the Alps lo the Balka ns, from China to Russia.
D ''Brigadier General, Deputy Chief; General A-flairs Divis ion, Arrnv General Sicrf{
b,:r 12, 200 1) and no 1373 (September 28, 200 1) . ( 2 ) - Th e AoR of USCENTCOM incl udes : Afgha n ista n, Egypt, S udan, Dji bo ut i, Ken:v-a, Ethiop ia , Eritrea , So m alia , Seychell es, Saudi Ara bia, J orda n, Bah r a i n, Kuwai t, Oma n , Qatar, Un ited Arab E mirates, Yeme n, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan and Tadzhikis La n, Turkmenis tan, Uz bckisLan and Pakistan. (3)- Resolution no 1378 and n o 1383 dea ling respcnively ,vi th the Bon n Agreement on th e ins ti tution of a n ad-i n te rim Authoritv and wi th t he inLcrnat ional comm i tm e n t to ensure protecLion and territ.ori,t! secu ri ty, and Resolution 1386, a uthorizing the deploym e nt of lSAF. ~ (4)- ISAF opera les under Chapte t· V I T of the UN Ch a rte r, with the tas k o r assisting Lhe "ad-inte rim" Afghan Authoritv, installed in Kabul o n December 22, 200 1, in the m ai n lenance of a sa te e nvironment in Lhe ci1.y o f Kabu l a nd surround ing areas, w it h i n t he f'rnmework of the Bonn Agreement (December 5, 200 1). T he Com mand o f t he o peration ro tates on a six m onth bas is. (5)- The: subdivision of this region into L\•VO provinces is the sarne i m ple111cn ted at t he ti m e of th e Soviet invas io n; d u ring t he Taliba n regim e, t he two regions were joined Logether in to the Paktia province, ,Nit h Gardez as i ts capital. (6) - An NBC platoo n is p rese n t i n every Con tingen t engaged ou tside the n a tion a l te r r ito ry , most!)' as a precautionary meas ure, for t he p relimin ;.1ry control of the deploy ment areas, Lo protect the uni ts from p ossible mi lita ry o r indus trial contamination in areas particularly degraded by years of confli c t, and for activi Lics o f chemica l and rndiological d e tection i n a l l a r e as, s t n 1~turcs a n d premises o f mili tar y int.crcst, w ith panicular attention to ca nLOnments a nd oth er area s garriso ned by o ur pe rsonnel. (7)- The possibility 0 1 transporting on the same CH 47 helicopter the m ort.;,u· a nd its VM 90 T t rac to r wi th crew and amm u n itio n, ass ured a flexib il ity o f employme nt and a rapidity o r reaction n ever· ach ieved before. (8)- T he RoE are dir ccLives for the rniliLary forces , ind ividuals in cl uded, de l'i n ing t he ci r cu mstances, cond iLio ns, clegree an d ma nner in whic h l'orce, or act.ions Lha t could be perceived as threats or dangers, can or canno t be a pplied.
55
The seve a;mtn• ~ of', are.gafh.~ _ hor h ~ . . , ge h1cal' grou . -A+gihamsta~--:tz"a ruan~ rgliizistan, ~ kist~L 1stan, Turkmenistan and Uzbeldstan. Until half a · ·1:ll11ago--die and Spices •Roads passed through them. Merchants and myste people went along the caravan routes which favoured the b · ancient civilizations. Even the armies of the past made use of routes, led by famous figures: from Cyrus the Great to V arius of i from Alexander the Great to Attila, from Genghis Khah ,.to-.ifa'lnTerlane. Today Central Asia is maldng a new comeback. Or perhaps it has .i,llways been in the limelight with its long history and its multiform 'tl@s. -
w a as \la.!' t , Europe's. t. poverty, rou~ nternal conflk , , akistan, ..and perha
·-~·.
,.,..
'
As ia. The huge sta tues of the Buddha of Bamian, demolished by the Ta liban, date back to lha t time. 1n 700 A.D. Buddh ism and o ther religions were almost everywhere ousted by Tslamis rn, as a result o f the Arab invasions. But for a better un derstanding of the present situatio n in Central As ia, we w ill proceed w ill1 a b rief separate h istorical analysis of the va1ious Rep ublics w h ich fo rn, that vast area.
AFGHANIS TAN
In this coun t ry, democracy started in 1963, w hen K ing Moh a mmed Zahi r S hah (the same ma n who has just retu rned to Kabul fro m a lo ng exile in Ro me and is now we ll over e ig h ty) wan ted his n ation to become a m o dern S t ate . H e ra tified the Cons ti tution, i n troduced a constitutional Monarchy and held parlia m e nta ry el ec tion s . \,V om c n 's equa li ty w a s recognized: they could be admitted to Universities, b e e l e c te d l o P ariia m e n t a nd work i n p ublic offices. Th e first
58
lypewriters arrived, w hile th e Soviets and the Ame1·icans provided substantia l fina ncial a id. France and Germany, as well as the U.S., sent teacher~ of language, mathem a t ics, scien ce a n d m ed ici ne . Th e S oviet Uni on bui lt houses and trained the Army. This democ ra tic fc rvom~ though, d id not go o u t o[ Kabu l. The count ryside could only be reach ed through d irt roads an d less tha n 10% o f lh e inhabitants could read and
write. A liligious Parliament legislated in Kabul and the new at111 osph c r·e of rreedom f ostercd strikes and demonstrations. In 1973, King Zahir Shah was overthrow n by his cousin Daoud and wen l into exile to Ita lv. In 1978, Daou d was assass in.ated and the com m unis ts took powe1: This was the beginn ing of a terrible civil wa1· that wen t on for 23 years, with 1.5 m illi on d ead and 4 million refugees; these are not
negligible figures in a Country of about 25 million inhabi lants . Thousands o f heclarcs of good agricultu ral land were covered w ith anti-personnel mines. Kabul vvas destroy ed and bridges and roads were s\.vept away. The present illiteracy rate is 32%, the highest among the seven Slates, and life expectancy is 46 years , against an average of 63. Ch ild mortality is 17.7%, the highest in the region. The count ry is governed more hy force t han persuasion . After the clisintegralion of the Ta i iban regime and the arrest or flight of many leaders, it can be perceived that the influ e nce of al-Qae da has
¡weakened. Some of its acti vists a r e corning to believe that on S eptember 11 the organization made a bad mistake If within alQaeda the politico-strategic ability of its leaders is questioned, the international coalition will score a moderate success, but not a final v ictory. Unfortunately t he var ious Afghan e thnic groups look to foreign Count ries [or support, interfering with the Government act.ion . Some wou.lcl like to adopt a Swiss-type policy model, declaring neutrality and defending it from any threat. But this requires a strong unity, even \.v ithin the plurali ty of national comp onents, but under the pre-
Above. Italian soldiers of]SAF in Kabul. Below. U.S. Atlarines on physical training aboard a ship in 1he Persian Gulf Right. The geographical area considered.
59
sent circumstances this can hardly be assumed.
KAZAKISTAN
The main ethni c g roup, the most "russ ifiecl" of Central Asia, is the Kazak one, a Lribe of Tu rkish stock boasting to be the direct d escendants of Ge ng his Kha n's Mongols. The Russian expansion in these lands dates back to the Eig hteenth Centu ry. Since then, numerous far m ,vorkers, looking for lands to be tilled, have occup ied this steppe. During th e T hirties and the F orties of th e last century, in particular, S tali n decided the fa r ced transfer o[ the s ubjects h e didn't trust: they ·w ere t h e Germans of the Volga area and the Koreans of Lhe Soviel Far East. Those wa stelands became the emblem o[ the fa ilure of the "Virg in Lands P rogram". Kazak
60
leaders were p ut in prison , books and loca l culture were destroyed, far m workc,·s were collectivized. Nowadays the p eople speak more Russian than Kazak. Oil and gas attract foreign investments. From 199 1, theycarofind ipende ncc, up to today, 12 bi ll ion dollars came into the Country and, after a remarkable oil exporta tion in 2000, Kantkisran is bound to become Lhe ri chest among the five ex-Soviet Stares. The new oil strike in the Cas pian S e a ,viii ma ke thi s Country one o f the most important in the drilling ind u stry. B ut very little of this wealth reaches th e citizens . The number of jo bs has increased, but: the unemployment rate is still al. 14% anc..1 in son,e areas at: 50%. Money p ours mostly in the coffers of the oil and gas indus1.ries . A g reat m any peop le s u pport Pr es ident Naza rbayev, the last leader of the Communist P ar-
Ly before the collapse of the USSR, who won rhe election in 1999. The clo se ties between Ka,.akistan and Russia arc most of all the result of about 7,000 km of borderline in common .
KIRGHJZISTA
It is possibly lhe mosl m ountainous and rough territo,-y of Central Asia. l lymns to I.he frcedo 111 , bravery a nd unity o r the Kirghiz tribes, representing 65% of the entire population, arc sung a l all celebrat ions during wh ich Mana s, the popula r hero wh o lived more than a thousand years ago, is a lso remcmbe1·ccl . F or these people, hi s s l.ory represents strength, pride and hope. l n 1876, Kirghi7.istan was annexed to Russia as part of Turkestan and became a Republic in 1936. The m ajori t v of the Russian eth ni c
Left. A U.S Marine during a nigh1 operation in Afghanistan.
Below. A Pakistani T-YO tank. Right. A Pakistan i F- 16 aircrafi.
group, which today is 13%, went away soon after the Country became indepe ndent in 1991. They were mostly technicians and specialists, disappointed by the progressi vc "Kirghi:r.i zation" or all jobs. This land is poor, tormented, and sometimes r u n acr oss by bands of fundamenta list guerrillas, ,iv¡ho enter from Tadzikistan in order to spread their .rel igion and political ideals. Elected in 2000,
President Akauev relies greatly on the support of Russia and China, with which he signed agreements to fight te rrorism. Yet the economy has difficulties in taking off, the companies find it hard to raise priva te funds, unemployment and inflation arc high and the lines of communication are in appalling condi tions. Encu m berecl ,vith public debts, the Country needs sizeable inte rnational loans. It could get help from the International Monetary Fund and th e \A/oriel Bank, ,vhich
are willing lo grant it, but only in presence of an eve n minimal financial planning.
PAKISTAN
The relations between Pakistan and India have been strained since 194 7, when _IVlaharajah Hari Sing agreed with I ndian Premier Pandit Nehru on the annexation to India of the territory of Kas hmir~ a mostly .Muslim region. The 1949 armistice divided
the region in t,..vo zones: on one side Jammu and Indian Kashmir, and on the other Pakistani Kashm ir. Since the end of the second conflict of 1965, the balance of nuclear terror has reigned. India became a nuclear power in J974 and Pakistan in 1992. On December J 3, 2001 , after the terrorist attack in New Delhi, the two countries started again to mass troops along t he bo rderline which nms acr oss Kashmir. lt is a trench \,Varfare at an average alti tude of 5,000 metres above sea level whe re , at night, the thermometer reads bet,veen 45 and 47 degrees Celsius be lo\v zero. It has been described as "die only battlefield beneat h the clouds" . Fighting is reduced to mor tar and heavy machine-g u n shots. Pakistani advanced spotters are positioned at an altitude of up to 6,000 metres and the sentries sometimes reach 7,000 meters. But the worst dange r for the soldiers is the cold. The Baluchi a nd Pashtun ethnic groups which inhabit the Afghan region, on the North-\Vestern border, want independ e nce from Punjab, \vh ich rules the entire Country. Ln 1893, 61
Left. Rearming a Pakiswni F-16. Belo\.\'. British paralroopers in Kabul. Right. An Indian Bmp-2 tank.
to its mountains, ·which occup_v 93% of the lerritorv, establish in e: their bases for raids in neigh~ bouring Kazakistan. Its cap ital, Dusambe, is often a theatre of attacks and the various Tadziki factions are always in conflict. Even today the presence o [ Russian units, sent by Mosco\v in 1992, is essential. In order to fight pover·ty, the development of srr1all farms , privatized b y the government, has been fostered, together \,vith the cultivation of fruit and cotton . Agriculture lakes up 7% of the arable land, \Vitl1 doubled crops for farmers 'vvho obtained loans from the Afghan Foundation to buy sowing seeds, ferti lizers and irrigation syste.m.s. Bauxite, a primary product, has to be the British d ivided in hal[ the Pashtun ethnic group, 22 million peopl e , between Pakistan and Afghanistan, thus originating an unstable situation which prornpted claims of a plebiscite \Vhich \Voulcl allow· the Pashtun to decide to which State lo belong. Pakistan, at any rate, intends to keep it under its control. And it has the means to do so: an Army of 630,000 men, nuclear devices, and a Defence which takes up nearly 30% of the national budget. Half of its 14 5 million inhabitants are youths under 15 years. The majority of the fundamentalist conservatives is trained in the numerous religious schools.
TADZIKISTAN
It is the less rich nation among all "stans". They say that the Mus! i111 extrcn1ist guerrillas took
62
imported, electricity comes from dams in bad conditions due Lo continuous attacks and sabotages carried o ut by fumlam entalisLs o ppos ing the anti- t erro ri sm agreemen t endorsed by the Coun try. Although s till wor king, t he aluminium found ry, b uilt by the S oviets, has a foreign de bt of more than 120 million d ollars.
relatio ns with th e neighbouring Countries, mostly in the hope of exporting oil and gas. Gas goes to l ran, "Ckraine a nd other ex-Soviet :--Jations. The Afghan instabil ity caused the decline of a project for a pipeline to Pakistan , fore ign debt amoun ts to 2,3 billion dollars, and recently the President's goa l to make th e Country the "Kuwait o f Central Asia" has failed.
TURKMENISTAN A little more than I O years a ~er independe nce, Turkmen istan has not yet overcome the crisis caused by th e transi tion from centralized econo my to o pen marke t, al though its borders, on the Caspian sh ores, lie above vast reserves of oil-and natural gas. The President, elected for an indefinite term, is also the leader of the Democratic Party, the only one allowed by the law. Turk.rnenistan keeps friendly
UZBEKISTAN
It is a member of t he grou p of States which j oined toget her to figh L terrorism. Its security forces fight Muslim a ctivists, including the non-extremist ones. According lo the Government, they a rc responsi ble for a series of attacks carried o ut in the cap i tal, Tashkent, th e only city of Central Asia ·with an underground. The
Muslim Pa rty of Turkmenistan, wh ich is present \Vith a few thousand fun da men talis t figh ters, aims at creating a Muslim regi me. Also the Uzbeks intermixed vvith Genghis Khan's Mongols but they" kept their· traditions, so that for a long time - from the X to the XV centu ry - Samarkand (birthplace o f Tamedane, the fierce m ili tary lea d er a n d n ation a l hero ) , Bakhara, famous for its carpets, and Chiva \,Vere cities full of poets, mathematicians and astronomers. As for agriculture, cotton is the mosl important product. Bul the chemical products, used to stimulate the fertility of the soil. ar·e pollutin g the groundwater. Half the 25 million inhabi tants are under eighteen . Unemployment and poverly often lead them to join the Islamic h.rndamen talism.
•
"' .Major General {ret.)
63
b,y Giuseppe Maggi -::
THE LAND FORCES, AS FOUNDATION OF STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION The Army constantly avails itself of the most advanced operational branches: Psychological Operations; Civil-Military Cooperation; Clearing of Explosive Devices; Military Police; Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Prevention and Protection 64
Through a wide-ranging analysis we propose to examine the present configuration of the Italian Army and the capability of its operational instruments of dealing with the evolution of the tasks and risks that confront it in the employment theatres, with particular reference to the missions of stabilization and reconstruction. Our investigation is supported by a comparison with the studies being conducted by the U.S. Army, in order to draw analogies, differences and new grounds for reflection. h. e A.rmy has been working for many years in the inlernational contexl in favour of peacekeep.ing and return to legality and security, giving a very significant qualitative and quantitalive contribution. The resulls achieved earned and are still earning - the unresenred app reciation of the representa t i vcs of Countries which, until a few years ago, had not
T
spared judgments, sometimes very severe, on the operational capabilities of our Service. Let us analyse, for example, the wide range of operations conn ected with the "Crisis Response Operations" (CROs) which, in the widest meaning of the term, concern : peacekeeping, territorial control and security, fight against terror, humanitarian aid and "Nation Building", i.e . support to the
¡., :-r
65
TASKS OF THE LAND COMPONENT IN THE MODERN OPERATIONS OF STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
indis pensable fac tors for o btaining the legiti mation of their u iminal deeds.
THE PHASES OF INTERVENTION - Force security and control; - Counter-guerrilla warfare; - Force protection; - Liaison with NGO, GOs; - CIMIC, PSYOPS, NBC; - Stabilization, reconstruction; - Local Armed Forces retraining; - Operational information.
- Assistance to humanitarian aid - Public Order
ARMY
re-establishment of normal politico-social conJitions. This classification of the CROs into prec ise patterns respond s more Lo doctrinal criteria than to operational needs , conside ring that the operatio nal scena rios are o ften the result of a summation of all the said elemen ts, i.e. c rises d uring w hich the vario u s situations could prevail, albeit a l. d ifferent mom ents. Th is requ ires appropriate and tlexible responses, particularly as regards q uality and q uantity. Moreove r, t he r ecent sad experiences in Iraq have stressed once more that the bordcrl ine between CROs and traditio nal war is very thin o r do\vnrig ht non-existent. O n t his operational back ground, already complex in itself, the incr-easing internati o nal terror h,,s imp lan ted itself: it is p recisely in situat ions of cris is a nd d isi n tegratio n th a t terrorism fi nds the ha nds, mater ia ls and equ ipment n ecessary for achieving its goals . Fu r thermore, the extreme precariousness of the so-
llalion parairoopers on palrol in Easl Timar.
66
cio-political situation, the econom ic difficulti es a nd the re li gio us/ethnic ex tremisms favour its rooti ng in the territory and the support of the people, which arc
The fluidity of the conflicts' levels is a furthe r p roof of Lhe exislence of the evanescent border betwee n the typical "War Figh ting" ac ti vities a nd those t h at cou Id gene ra ll y be cld i ne d a s "pacify in g actions ", aimed at restoring the social o rder in the Count1y involved. In this sense, it could be useful l.o adopt the Anglo-Saxon definition of "Th reeBloek War", meaning that in a given (limited) area a force complex could b e called to monitor and control the territory, provide humanitarian aid and respond with ffre actions to the attacks of gu errillas, tc r-rorists or host ile formations in general. In short, the operationa l profile of these complex scenarios con-
EXAMPLE OF TASK FORCE FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION COMBAT ASSETS COMPLEX (INCL FOS)
I
SOJI
I
l~I
lc=>I
CX:I
~+
~+ PSYOPS
m
1
1
ICOI ~
E:\IG
~
~
~----------------------' sisl.s of a first phase, in which the forces are i ntrodut.:ed and d eployed, and a second one, usuall:v short and characteri'.l.ed by heavy conflict, with Lhe prevalent employment of combaL units. Finally there is a third phase - stabilization and reconstruction of the c ivilian i nfras lructun:, Lo get back to normal - <luring whi c h the land format ions employed are the result of the summation of manoeuvre units (for security) a nd units spccialize<l in differe nl sectors: CIMIC, EOD, BC, Medical, PSYOPS. Often, in this last phase, "Multinal ional Speciali zed Units" (MSU) arc also ernplo_ve<l. They are fo t¡med by "Carabinieri" or "Gendarrn erie" uni ts, entr u s ted with the tasks typical o f the paramilitary police and arc essenLiall_v in charge of public ordc1~ criminal investigations and training of the local poli ce. The transition form the second to the thir<l phase can be charac.:-
Le ri zed by a rehitively long period, during which it is necessary Lo keep the capabiliLy of facing complex situ ations, such as humanitar ian emergencies, gue rrilla war¡fare and large-st.:ale terrorist atracks. As a matter of fact, the potential actors who also in the fut ure could continu e to threalen the in lc rnational sccurily will slill prefer the so-called asymrnclric confrontation, in order to offse t their disadvantage in capab iliti es and technology as t.:ornpare<l l o more adva need Arme<l Fo rces, and to strike al Lhe m o m e nt and p lace more favoura ble to them . From lhe capability viewpoint, the scenario just outlined requ i rcs the employmenl of a strong a nd balanced instrumenL, a ble to exp ress different ope rational capabilities and prnvide security and protect ion to all lhe actors in the theatre, especially and mosLly - through a high a nd cred ible deterrenl power. 67
Training uf a.n NBC uni1 on decuntarnination of indivichial weapous.
We can roughly estimate thaL this capabili ty can be expressed by the Army, considering the variety of its assets, the availability of 1;ersonnel with extremely diversified expertise, materials and equipment. In terms of assets, the capabilities needed to perform a mission and red u ce the risks connected w ith the specific operational environment can be schematically grouped into three complexes (see diagram above). The first one, considering its forces, is suited to express a real and strong "Corn bat Capability", which is also indispensable in the "stabilization and reconstruction"
!1alian roadblock 1vith a VCC- 1 armoured car.
68
low er t..han Brigade, can control and/or interdict large areas. Furthermore, it is suited to o perate in insidious e nvironme nts such as urban areas, performi n g t h e whole range of poss ible tasks (multidimensi o nal control of city areas and their main roads, control of socia l order and sensitive points, eslablishment of fixed or mobile checkpoints, e tc .) and e ngage in clo se combat again s t guerrillas an terrorists. Th ere rore this forma tion fol10\vs the typical modus operandi of th e light un ils of the Army which, wi th their train ing, equipm ent a nd hig h mobility, exp r ess thei1· best performan ce in th is type o f operations. Besides, their Co mmand-and-Control structure is p a rticularly apt to establish th e indispensable frame capable o f "incorporating" and mak ing profitable, in terms of cost/effecti veness, the emp loyment of uni Ls from the fi rst complex and, most of all, the specialist assets, w h ich
phase to face lhe maximu m foreseeable level of risk and scale lhe responses in a rlexible ma nner, propor lionale to the atta.cks (unexpected , mullidimens io nal and multidirecl ional) and be al lhe same time a sLro ng deterrent. As a matte r of fact , the situaLion of more or less hidden co nfli ct which characterizes the scenarios, and the sud d e n changes in lh e threat, make the involvement in combat an ever presen t possibility. T h e "C omb at Ca p a bi li ty" , which is aher all the co1·e of the military functions, can be adequately be expressed by the Army units (tanks, armo ured vehicles, attack helicoplers, special fo,-ces, etc.) supported by joinl air-naval assets. Their exact qualita tive and quantitative co mpo s iLion d epends o f course on the m ission and th e e n viron ment ( us ual ly charac teri ,.ed b y an intense u r banization). The second complex, more numerous a nd usually at a level n o
arc essential in the s tabilization and rec onstruction phase of a CRO , such as CIM IC, PSYOPS, NBC, RISTA-EW, en gineers, medical service and transport (third speci,tlist complex).
THE SPECIALIST ASSETS In such a context, other compon ents can a lso b e round, suc h as Cendarmerie-type or M SU uni ts, tasked with special operational a ctivi Lies conn ected wi th specific Po lice functions - public order, fight against organized crime, interface \vit h the local police, UN, suppo rt/reconstructi o n of local Police forces. In this regard it is worth menti oning th at if. on the one side the "Cendarmerie-typc forces can count on judicial and military Police specia.lizations not available to the Armed Forces, on the other they do not have "Combat" capab ili Lies. Besides, in a cost/effec-
ARMY COMMITMENTS KOSOVO
BOSNIA
ALBANIA
«JOINT FORGE•
NCCC/NHQT
KOSOVO «UNMIK»
FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA «EUMM•
MALTA «MIATM•
AFGHANISTAN
WESTERN
SAHARA «MINURSO»
SOUTH LEBANON «UNIFIL»
ISRAEL «TIPH lb
«MONUC»
• --~ /I,J
AFGHANISTAN «ISAF»
mlllllllliiiallll!I
• • • .!.:
«UNMEE»
-
~
•rla-lsrael-Ubnnnn-Egypl)
«UNTSO»
EAU/US «ISAF• / «EF•
69
Takeolf" of a C/1-4 7 helicop1er of !he /1alian Army.
the contrary the aim is just the opposite: to let them expres s their capabilities as best as th ey can, but keeping the u nity o f corn mand, which is indispen sable also - and main ly - in this type of aclions. On the field, the necessary synergy among the different componen ts of the instrun1ent mus t come from the employment o f diverse, particular and specific capabil i ties, for which eac h component has been well trained and organized. Thi s means that the en durance of these in struments can be safeguarded mostly by recognizing the "peculiar functions" of th e various components. Failing to do so could cause overlaps and confosion about authority, duplicat ion of capabilities and \vast.age, th u s increasing the risks connected \-Vith the protection of the forces and the security of the personnel. tive [rame\vork, it seems senseless to give them these capabilities, considering that they ar¡e a lr eady available, and also to avoid distorting their role by the creation of useless conflicts of competency. Therefore \Ne can see that the multifaceted character of the activities to be carried out during stabilinJtion and reconstruction operations (combat, security, h umanitarian aid, operational and investigat ive intelligence) requ ires multifunctional .interventions and an ever increasing effort of coordination among the various components (e.g. military forces and local or ad-hoe police forces - CTVPO L/Civil Police, MSU or Gendannerie). Of course the various bodies present on the fie ld m ust be organized w it hin a single instrum ent, in order to operate synergistically in a multidisciplinary,
70
joint and m ultinational environment, \,Vith interventions encompassing the entire range of situations al risk. In this respect, it is important to stress lhe necessity to ach ieve a close coordinat ion between the said bodies of forces, by concentrating their control "in the hands" of the man who alone can effectively e xercise it : the m ili tary Commander of the task force . ln the final analysis, he is the one responsibl e [or the harrnon i1ation of the common effort and for reali z ing the general security frame necessary in order to accomplish the assigned mission. This should not be understood as a lim itation of the Commanders' freedom of action, on
En14ineers repairing a road.
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
The whole of Lhe a l:iovesa id complexes ideally constitutes a pool of "Stabilii.ation and Recons truction Forces" sui table for "Post ConClict Operations", structured according to a model wellknown Lo Lhe llalian .Army. This can be easily confirmed if we refer Lo the contingents that the Army has been deploying in the various theatres. From Somalia to Mozambique and Lo the Balkans, the Army has ah vays employed bodies of forces that included a combat component for security and several types of speciali zed units for stabilization, reconstruction and humanitarian activities. Also today in the Balkans, in Operation "Antica Babilonia" in Iraq and "ISAF" in Afghanistan , the Army is deploying Task For ces organized on a solid "Combat" component, in charge of security and protection, as well as a number of specialist units.
GLOSSARY
-.
War Fighting - Conventional military operations. Combat Capability - The capability of a military force to carry out its mission in an Operation Theatre. CIMIC- Civil Military Cooperation. HUMINT (Human Intelligence) - Unit tasked with collecting information from people (friends, enemies, prisoners) or other sources. EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) - Unit tasked with clearing explosive devices. RISTA-EW (Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition - Electronic Warfare) - Unit charged with setting up tactical units aimed at acquiring "control of the situation" f-i-om the tactical-level .information viewpoint. PSYOPS (Psychological Operations) - Units for the development of psychological operations in the operational field.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Today the sig nifi cance and sensitivi ty of the post-combat phase is a subject of stu dy and investigation in many Countries, and especia lly in the United
States. In fact, also on the basis oC the lessons learned after Opera tion "Iraqi Freedom", the planners of the U.S. Department of Defence are considering Lhe poss i bil i ty of est abl ishing two Division -level "Mu l t is e rvic e units for stabilization and reconstruction" (one on active duly and one in reserve), to be prefera bly employed in posL-war opera ti ons, within a security frame provided by a "Combat" component, constituted by a last-generation armoured Brigade, the socalled "Strik er Brigade" . The core of these rnultiservice units could be formed by 4 "Stabilization and R econstruc ti o n Groups" (about 2500 men) plus an adequate component for security. The entire package should include: a "Combat" u nit reinforced by Special Operations Forces; a Civi l Affairs unit (about 150 rnernbers) for providing expertise in sectors such as government, admin istration, services, reconstruction, etc.; an engineer baualion (w ith an EOD component) for the reconstruction of basic infrastru cture; a medical battalion for humanitarian aid (food, water d econtamination, training of lo71
-¡-""-
~-
An Italian palm/ ,vith a \!AI-90 vehicle.
cal medical personne l); a PSYOPS battalion. In addition, each Joi nt Stabilization and Reconstruction HQ w i ll have t he possibil i ty of including also other specialized u n i ts: a ba ttali on for mi li tary as sistance and training of the local and m ilitary Police forces; an intelligence, surveillance and acqu isition bat talion, t asked vvi th protecting the force; a military Pol ice!Gendarme rie Force which could conduct also criminal investigations; a s ignal battalion. The U.S. initia tive, even if it seems to theoretically recognize 72
\
the far-sightedness of the decisions made so far by the Italian Army, in practice confirms the primary role played by the land assets in the modern operations of s tabi lization and reconstruction. ln view o C this, looking at the present operational organization of the Army, one can say that the Service has already all the components necessary for establishing a pool of "Stabilization and Recon s truction For ces" on the terms described ab ove, in particu lar as r egards the special ist component, which is or ganized as follows : J R ailway Engin eer Regt; 1 Pont onier Regt; 1 NBC Rcgt; 1 C IMIC Regt (multinational); 10 Engineer Regts with EOD components (2 platoons each); 1
PSYOPS Regt; 1 HUM !NT u nit (being const ituted); 4 lVIedical Units. T he spec ial ization of these un its and the lessons learned in the various theatres suggest not to ra ise, at the moment, the orga~ nizational leve l LO Brigade or Group of Regiments (a lso - and mainly - considering the scarce resources available) si nee their adaptabil i ty fully responds to both the cri teria of mi n imum modularity e nvisaged for the rotation of the units in the theatres and to the optimization of the tra ining and preparation cycles o f the pe1~sonneJ who is being specialized. As a matter of [act, this specialist "product" is the outcome of an intense and specific preparation
deriving from a meticulous inclividual and , success ively, collective train ing, with the inclusion o f periodi7:al tes ts aimed al c hecking the attainme;u of the inter mediate objectives, preliminary for the following o nes, until the achievement of the final val idation of the unit, of any level, which has lo be dispatched to the theatre. Besides, the recent terrorist attacks carried out against civilians and m i Ii tary units an d structu res in the urban areas of Iraq and Afghanistan indicate that terrorism \Nill continue to condition sign ificantly the operational composition of the stabilization and reconstruction m issions . It is precisely in vie\v of t his that one should make th e b est possible use of the valuable components already available in the national context, optimising and strengthening their capabilities, p articu larly t h ose suitable for facing and neutralizi ng the asymmetric and terrorist: threat i n every environment, including the ur ban one, also through th e acquisition of highly technological equip ment and systems. 0
complicated by the high degree or u rbanization of the area concerned . From this viewpoint, the Army can in a sense be con sidered a forerunner in the development of assets a i mccl at stabilization and reconstruction, among wh ich the "cap a bili ty core" is always and in any case constituted by the manoeuvre forces. The remaining specialist components must be enabled to vvork \Vithin a frame\,v ork of security and protection, in order lo maximise their indispensable contr ibution to the stabilization and re-
Decontamination of a \/i\11- 90 vehicle by an 1\iBC tea.111..
Finally, it is \North mentioning that t h e Arm y, owing Lo i ts range of "Combat" capabilities and the experience gained, particularly in CROs during the last decade , is fully qualified lo unde r take a leading ro le in the specific sec tor. This \VOulcl be quite in line with the NATO d irectives that point out the need to develop anti -terror capab i.lities as a vi tal function fo r the future forces of the Alliance, and with the most recent intention o f NATO to set u p a "Rapid Reaction Force " w i t h a very high o perational readiness (less than 10 clays). It is interestin g to note that these newborn E u rnpean "Rapid Reaction Forces" (7 -9 u n its to
CONCLUSIONS T he activities that characterize the modern operations of stabili zation and reconstruction can be effectively carried oul by t he Army. As a maLLer of fact, the Service can express the "Cor·e" of the components needed on the field , which a re decisive fo r "Post Conflict" o p erations, from the merely "Combat" ones - w ith a high operational impact - to those v,•ith high specialist contents (NBC, E OD, Cl MIC, PSYOPS, HUM INT, antiterrorism, engineers, field medical units, supp lies and transport, human itarian aid), as \vell as the light units in charge of the direct security of the organization in an operational environment made more
construcLion operations , reducing risks to a minimu.m . Only with this type of conceptual approach can \.Ve avoid useless d uplications and waste of resources . At the same time, it is necessary Lo strive for the besl integration of the respective characteristics, thr ough the closes t coordination in every phase of the operation.
start with) w ill have an agile configurat io n - abou t 1500 men for each unit - and a q ualitat i ve stru c tu re that mirrors the one outlined al page 67.
•
'"·Major General, Deputy Chief; General c\! Finaru.:ial Planning Div, Army General Staff' 73
The Engineer Corps, besides being in the forefront of the technique for removing mines, explosive traps and any other kind of deadly device, also train the operators of the other Services and the Police Forces THE ORIGINS
Mine -clearing is one of t he most serious problems that a Counlry involved in war events has to solve at the end of hostil ities, since it is a prerequisite for the resumption of every productive and social activity.
74
Italy had to meet th is serious challenge both during WWTl and after i ls conclusion, because its territory was heavily bombed and strewn with miles or minefields. The phenomenon had enormous proportions and, just to give a faint idea, suffice it to think that sti1l today, sixty years after the end of the war, about three thousand operations are carried out. each year LO remove or neu tralize explosive devices. On the Ita.lian territory, fighting started after our troops had lert. Libya. Aher a short time, beginning from Sicily and gradually proceeding to the North, the opposing armies confronted each other, leaving behind large minefields and thousands of all types of devices, including a very high number of bombs, due to the massive employmen t the air force by the Allies. From 1943 to 1945 t he whole peninsula was transformed into an immense
battlefield. Immediately after the liberation, a new \~,ar against the unexplod e d devices began to threaten a population who had already been severely tried, precisely when everybody thought that he cou.ld return home with no more problems. The need to get rid of unex ploded devices is in general an operational problem which must be solved since it affects the mobility of the troops and the conduct of operations in general. Al the end of the war, it becomes indeed a conditio sine qua non for the resumption of any activity by the c ivilian populat ion. The first unexploded devices left on the ground were, occasionall y and incompletely, cleared by ordinary citizens who, risking the ir lives, did all they could with inadequate knowledge and tools . ln fact, very orten they were onl_y equipped with their own good will.
Clearing a minefield in \tVWTT.
Needless to say, th is caused a large number of victims, and this restrained the generous impulse of the volunteers. However, the most insidious danger were the minefields, vvhose clearing requ ired an efficient and sw.irt organization. Mines were widely employed by the conflicting forces, particularly on the littorals where landings were expected, and i n areas where the armies had to remain for long periods, owing to resistance and attrition actions. The shores of Sicily and Calabria were mined. High-intensity barriers stood on the coast between Salerno and Anzio - where there had hcen landings - in defence of the "Gustav" line on the Volturno and Garigliano rivers, and along the "Hitler" line, near
75
Cassino. Minefie lds and barriers were a lso present in Tuscany and a long t h e "Goth ic" line from Emilia-Romagna to Liguria {fig.1). Jn the summer of 1944 the Min istry of War ordered the mobilization of military u nits LO take care of the p roblem of the minefields. The 561 s i and 562 nu companies \ve r e cons tituted, wi th personnel from all brnnches and specialities. Their training was entrusted to a few Officers expert in the employment of explosives and to some Allied specialists. Once they ,-eached the ir opera tional capabili ty, the units were attached to the fight ing troops, in order Lo facilitate the advance along the Tyrrhenian litloral and to clear the Adri atic coast, hcginning with the town of Pescarn. The 5631-d Mine Clearing Company was established in the early spring of 1945. T he unit began its act i vity in Emilia - Ronu1g na, starting w ith the to,vn of Ravenna and was soon joined by the 564 th Company, ,vhi ch later clea red a lso th e Ch io gg ia and Venice areas. These units were actually the nucleus from which the who le min e-clearin g organi zati on derived. ln fact, a g reat number of th ose servicemen continued to operate, after thei,- discharge at the end of th e war, a s sk illed worke rs in the new organization.
THE FIRST MINE-CLEARERS For the above reasons, the problem of mine-clearing was a military matter and the Ministry of War; in concert wi th the Allied Comm ission, entrusted its execu tion to the Engineers and the Artillery. As a maller of fact, I he Eng ineers had to d ispose of m ines and other conceale d or buried devices, which had to be found and r emoved according l.o the norms and tech n iques typical of the Branch. The Art ill erymen were assigned the task of remov76
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!!lll!J.llRY OF DEFENCE (All.fil'.l_
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ing every device that cou ld be found on the surface, excluding mines. This gave birth ro MineClearing National Service, v,,hie h was tasked with the disposal of m i nes and other explosive devices and which maintained the same organization and tasks until 1998. Several Mine-Clearing Schools were o rga nized between l 944 and 1946 a ll over Ita ly; their operational and trai ning activi Lies were coordinated by a special Central Office. One year after the li beration, a be tter organization for tackling the huge problem of natiom,vide mine-clearing was taking shape.
On April 12, 1946, in fact, a General Lieutenant's Decree on this su bject was issued, followed on November 1, 1947 by a Decree of th e Prov is ional Head of S tale. Both docu ments entrusted th e whole matter to Lhe Ministry of
,,var.
The lnspec torate for Clearing B uildings from Explosive Devices was established on April J, 1946 and lasked wilh the integral clearing of th e natio nal ten-itory by means of the territoria l organizations of th e Engineers and the A,·tillery. This organization ceased its acti vity on July I , 194 8 and its functions and duties were hand-
ed over to the General Di rcctoratc for \i\1orks, S tate Properly and Materials, \Nhich still holds them. During the fifty years ' between 1948 and 1998 the s ituation remain ed praclically unchanged, adapting itself to the modifications that concerned mostly the Artillery Directorales. The tasks of these Direct.orates in Lhe sector of ordnance clearing were g ive n to Lhc Su pply Units and later to the Supply and Maintenance Centres, w h ich were subordinate to th e Transport and Materials Commands of the Military Regions. The end of the '80s, characteri zed by a se ries of historically very impor tanl events, resultin g mostly frorn the crumb Iing of the ·warsaw Pact, imparted a decisive turn to the ordnance-clearing sector. In fact lhc first U N req u ests for t he participation of Italian personne l in Peace Support Operations go back to that per iod . These operations were carried out in the more and more numerous c ris is areas of the p lanet. Successively, there vvere the m ultinational operations und er NATO aegis, which implied the i ntervenl.ion of our Army, with units at full strength, for the first time after \ •V\.VII.
THE FIRST OUT-OF-AREA INTERVENTIONS In 1989 th e UN asked the Army Staff to participate w ith Engineer Officers and NCOs in the training of Afghan refugees in Pakistan Lo clear their land from mines. The Engineer School was tasked, by lhe l hen exis Ling Engineer Corps Inspectorate, with the organi zation of special courses o n min eclearing and disposal of explosive dev ices employed during the \var between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (1979-1989). Similar courses were later organized for th e personnel destined to conduct m ine-clearing operatio ns in Kuwait after the Gulf v\/ar.
Tn 1992, the Army Staff formally estab lis heel yearly courses on "BOE" (Bonifica Ordigni Esp lo sivi - Explosive Device Disposal) a imed at preparing Engineer Officers and NCOs for· "Peace Support Operalions", with the task of clearing every possi ble type of exp losive dev ice that co uld be fou nd on th e ground. Thus the Engineer Corps, in accordance with its doctrine of emp loymen t, ,vas taking up one of its fundamen tal task s: clearing the battle area in general and minefields in particul.ff This activily, in the post-war period and up to the end of the '80s, had been shared with other Army Branches, also because there were no operaLional enga geme nts that \vou ld have posed the problem of conforrning to the doctrine. At Lhe beginning, the train ing effort was mostly addressed to study the mines of the for mer v\/arsa\.v Pact, which were massively laid in the intervenlion areas, adop ti ng the mi ne-clearing method that had been ap p l iecl in Italy immediately afte r the \,v ar by Lhe Mine-Clea ring Companies . Besides, it was necessary to im-
Clearing a minefield.
prove the knowledge of dev ices other than m ines (bombs, projectiles). which since the end o f the war h ad been d ealt with by the specia lized personnel incorporated at first w ithin the Artillery DirectoraLcs and later in the Supply and Maintenance Centres (CERJ1\tlANT) of the M ili tary R egion Commands. The courses were very su ccessful since the quality of the technical leaching was coupled with the possibi lity of learning the English language, which was indispensable for the e mplo:vmen t abroad and for NATO interoperability. The more and more fre quent participatio n in PSOs (Somalia, M ozambiqu e, th e former Yu goslavia) improved the skill of the engineers in clear i ng any kind of device and encouraged a growi ng number of Engineer Officers and NCOs lo become speciali sts in that particu lar sector. Programmes were con tinuously updated according to the experience gained in those missions. 77
Left. A sap11er probing 1he _!;round in search of 111i11es while clearing a 111i11e/1'eld in Bos11ia. Right. A mine-recognitio11 lesson in 1\/ghaniswn.
The preparatio n of Lhe personnel, the constant update or the programmes, Lhe management of the electronic data-bank whe re all the in fo rmation a rriving at the Engineer School from the various theatres w a s conveyed , the relevant analysis and diffusion l.o the operaLors, could no t be carried out by personnel involved in oLher jobs. Therefore it became necessary to have a nationwide SlrT1cture which could work a,:; a central pole for a ny problem connected w ith that particular maUe1:
THE ORDNANCE-CLEARING OPERATIONAL CENTRE
In 1996 the En gineer· Inspectorate developed a project for the constitution al the Engineer Schoo l of an Ordnance-Clea,·ing Operat ional Cenlre (COB), taking as models those ex isLing in some NATO Count r ies (Canada, U K ,
78
F rance) , w ith Lhe purpose o f dealing with the en tire issue of ope raLional mine-clearing, with panicular consideration for oul of-area operations. The same yea1~ in October, Lhe Army Staff apprnved the project and authorized the establishme nl o f t he Centre, with the employment of dual-job School personnel, for an experimental phase. At the same time a studv w as started for a thorough investigation of the whole issue, in order to exami ne the possibility of reali7.ing, at the Engineer School, a n Army Ordna nce-Clearing Ope rational Cen tre, capable o f becoming the training, cullural, operational and logistic pole of th e whole Service. AL the sa me tim e t he progra mmes of the BOE courses were completed \Vith the study of anti-sahn lage notions, th us raising the stancla,·d,:; of the personnel's preparation.
T h e anti-sabotage tratnmg is another interest ing point in the evolution of the whole matter. As a matter of fact, specific courses had a lready bee n can·ied o ut in the '60s at the Engineer Sc hool, to face the terrorist activities in Alto Acl ige. After an interruption of some year·s, they w ere r e sumed under the denomination of "Active Obstacle, Demolition and Anti-Sabotage Courses". Sim il ar study cycles had been held in the '60s a lso at Ro me's Artillery Directorate and they continu ed after the transformat ion of the Directorate into 8 1h Supply Unit (later 8 th CER IMANT), a ls~ for the Carahinieri and the Police. In 1993 the An Li-sa botage Se ct ion \-Vas included in the Trans port and Materials School where, the year before, th e Artillery Artificer Section of the form er Armament-Speciali s ts Centre of Piacen za (CESAE) had been transferred. A fundamental stage in the evolution of this qu estion was October 1, J 997, the day of the official establis hment of the OrdnanceCl earing Operat ion al Centre (COB ) at the Engineer School, w hi c h was in ten ded to become I.he core of th e sector at Service level. The programmes o f th e BOE courses ,vere rev iewed and \Nide ned . They in clud e d t.hree different ph ,;ses: lang uages, mine-c learing operations and anti -sabot age a c ti vit ies . For t he fint time, also t he Artifi cer and Ant i-sabo ta ge Section of the Transpor-t and Materials School parti<.:ipatcd in the teaching programme. At I he end of 1997 Lhe /\rm_v \vas in the middle of deep a nd
s ubstantial c hanges \Nh ich wer e leading Lhe Insti(ulion towards a professional model requiring more an more marked efficiencv a nd opera tional capabi li ty. The irreversible rationalization of the struclures had already started, and led .Lbe Army Staff to s tudy t he l'u s(on of all com po nents or the ordnance clearing sector in a single structure. An Army Staff directive or Octo b er 1, 1998 sanctio n ed the b irth o r the Army OrdnanceClearing Operational Centre, with the present organization and tasks. It is an agile, efficient and modern in strument, ready to operate within NATO, in accordance with the standardizat ion agreements signed by Italy.
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE SECTOR Th e establishment of Lhe COB was the first step towards the ra-
ti onalization of t he sector. T h e s<::cond move was the issue of a new directive through which the Army Staff r¡cgulated in detail all th e aspects of rn ine-clcnrin g and disposal of al l kinds of unexploded devices. The document (no. 596/184.420) on the "Reorganization of t he sec to r deal ing \vit h clearing and d isposal or explosive devices", issued in July 1998, fixes the guiding principles of the matter, w h ic h can he s u mrnari;.,.ed in the following basi c points : attribution to the Engineer Regiments of the tasks connected with the occasional clearing o f th e territory, corn.:entrating in them the capability of intervening on all types of devices (in addition Lo the operational ordnance-clearing); centrnl i;.,.a lion or training at the Engineer School; adaptation or the procedures for the occasional clearing of the terr i lo 1¡y to th e 1998 di rec t ive on "Military cooperalion in p eacetime".
The d irective is the resul t of a year's work and is very far-reach ing. It has also the merit of summarizing the very numerous regulation s issu ed in the last fi fty years, co n firmin g Lhose which, albeit old, are still valid. The transition l"rom the old to the n e w orga ni zation \vas s upposed to take place gradua lly, so thaL, on May 3 1, 1999 the Engineer Regiments could undertake th e i r new tasks, even \.Vith the s upport of specia.f o.ed personnel from the CERJMAl'\Ts. This objective was only partially ach ieved d<::sp ile th e great effo rts made , owin g lo t h e c omplexity of th<:: whole matter a nd the scope of the measures LO be adopted. The n eed to a ( Lai n t h e fixed obj<::ctives in a period of tim e compa tible with the requirement s of the Service led I be Army Staff to issue fur t h e r direct ives a im e d at overcoming the difficulties ex perienced dur-
79
Fig. 2
ENGINEER REGIMENT
o
1 th
Sapper regt - Cremona
2 nd
Sapper regt - Trent
3rd
Sapper regt - Udine
sth Sapper bn -
Legnago
Pont regt - Piacenza
2nd
5nd
Eng. regt. - Rome
21 st
Sapper regt - Caserta
11 th
Sapper regt - Fogg ia
4th Sapper reqt - Palermo ing the early appl ication of the new norms. A new directive (536/184.420) was therefore sent out hy a project group, under t he heading "Reorganization of the sector dealing with the clearing and d isposal of explosive devices . .Application d irective" . The ne\v instructions, besides confirming the validity of t he structure outl ined in th e previous document, includ e some measures aimed al doing a\vay \Vilh the difficullies foun d by the Engineer Regimen ls in the performance of the new tasks. In p articular, t he "Explosive Ordnance Disposal (E OD ) Platoons " are cons Li luted, together vvith territorial twinships bet\veen lhe Regiments and the CERIJVIANTs for territorial clearing, confirming the availability of t he COB teams in support Lo the Engineer Regiments i n interventions on th e \vhole nati onal territory. The High Engineer Command (today's Eng Bde HQ) therefore iss ued a n e,v doc u ment 80
j
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY Valle d'Aosta - Lombardy Piedmont Trentino Alto Adige Veneto (except the provinces of Verona, Vicenza and Rovigo), Friuli Venezia Giulia Provinces of Verona, Vicenza, Roviqo, Ferrara and Ravenna Liguria, Emilia Romagna (exc provinces of Ferrara and Ravenna), Tuscany Sardinia, Marche, Umbria, Latium, Abruzzi Basilicata (MT), Campania, Calabria (RC, CZ) Molise, Apulia, Calabria (CS), Basilicata (PZ) Sicily
(0 2 /1806/2 4 91 -28 June 2000) which contained the "Implementation directives for occas ional clearings". As a consequence, as from July 1, 2000, t he appointed Engineer Regiments were officially entrusted with a.lJ the occas ional disposal operations on the en tire na tional territory (fig.2), a task they have been performing to this day. In the ru lure the d istribution of responsibility areas will probably be updated according to the specific technical skills of the Engineer uni ts (32 nd Sapper b n, Turin; 5 th Sapper Regt, Macomer) . Wilh the a ddition of this n e\v task to all the other training an d operational activi ties in Italy and out of area , the \Vor k l oad of th ese units has remarkably in creased, and they continue to operate with their usual silent d iligence and fl exibility. .Also the COB has had to step up its activ i ty, due to the increased number o( qualification courses given and the many advi-
TWINNED CERIMANT 3 rd ,
3 rd
'
Milan
151h,
Padua
15th ,
Padua
15th,
Padua 151h
Milan -
s
th
s1h, Rome o
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Padua
Rome
1 th ,
121h ,
Cagliari
Naples
10th , Naples 11 th ,
Palermo
sory services ,-equested by units not yet in possession of their full operational capability.
STRUCTURE AND TASKS OF THE COB T he Centre is the op erational, cultural and training pole in the field of explosives and clearing oC every type o r ordnance. As a matter or fact, it is the only national body authorized to grant Lhe p ersonnel of the four Services and o[ t he Armed Cor p s (Po l ice and Reven u e Guard) the qualifica1.ions connected with thal particular sector: EOR (Explosive Or¡dnance Reconnaissance), E O D (Explosive Ordnance Disposal), l EDD (Improvised Explosive Device Disposal) and I C (In cident Commander - the Officer responsibl e [or the management and conduct or the clearing o p era tion). The COB's organization (fig.3) re flect s its very delicate tasks which arc a irned at fighting two
extremely deceitful and n-eache1¡ous ene mies constituted by mines and explosive devices. The training activitv i~ carried out through a g rea l number of basic and specia li stic/advanced courses. The new teachings are charnctcrized by a profusion of English a c ronyms, pra ctically unknown until a rcw years ago, w h ich are proof of the ad a ptation to the NATO norms a nd of the interoperabili ty w ith the orher Countries of the Al liance. The basic train ing provided by the various courses concerns essen tiall y EOR, EOD and 1 EDD ac tivit ies . AL t h e end or eac h co urse, s uccessful students obta in a cert ifica te a ttesting thei1¡ proficiencv al various levels of
J\n anri-sahotage robor c1.I work.
Fig. 3 COMMANDER
2 Ops Cells
- I EOR, EOD, IEDD Section
= Equip/Mat Section
kn o wled ge, a cco rdi ng t o the STANAGS in force. Th e EOR a c l ivit y consh ls
mostly in the search and recognition of explosive devices. This is pursued through the crea tion and management of an EO R organization formed by mil itary personnel, o r also civilians, c.lepen<l ing on the circumstances, with a spec if ic prepa r ati o n . Th e ir tas ks
I Coord & Study Section
consi st in investi ga ting, su rveying, locating, marking, identifying and reporting suspicious explosive ma terials, so a s Lo de[i nc the interventions of the EOD operato rs , proposing, if necessa ry, I he evacua tion of the area. The EOD activi ty refers to the e ntire opera lions , including deteclion, identification, evaluat io n, sa fety, removal an d final
81
Fig. 4 NATO Specifications
License
EOR Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOR
Sapper - EOD , .. revel(')
Type of device / activity
Recognition of explosive devices. Personnel holding an EOR-instructor licence work as instructors for the recognition of "regular occasional" or improvised devices in favour of their units.
Clearance of regular explosive devices in use by the unit. Personnel tasked with dearing special munitions (HAWK, MLRS, SKYGUARD ASPIDE etc ) must attend specific courses.
Chief Sapper EOD 2nd level
Clearance of all-type explosive devices (also foreign), including war residuals, within the Country.
IEDD Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
Head Sapper IEDD
Clearance of "occasional" or improvised devices.
SUB
SUB
IC Incident Commander
IC
Underwater ops (" ")
Directing tasks for the management of an EOD/IEDD operation (contacts with local Police authorities. civilian population etc.).
NOTES:
n
must be capable of recognizing special-loading devices.
(..) to be coordinated with NAVY COMSUBIN (underwater raiders).
disposal of the explosive devices. This capability is acquired th rough two di ffe rent courses : first-level EOD (basic), which cna ble s Lo intervene on d evices used by lhe Service (ha nd grenades, mortar shells, a rtillery proj ect'ilcs of various calibres , mines) and second-leve l EOD , which qualifies for interventions on regulation devices employed by othe r S erv ic e s (aircraft bombs), fore ign tools and wa r residuals, applyi ng parti c ular techniques thal requi re remarkable experien ce . Second-level E OD courses can be attended on1y afte r h aving s u ccessfully pass ed the previous level and gained a practical experience of approximately Lhrec years in operational activities. Finally, th e !EDD a ct iv ity, ·w hich covers the o perations con cerning the cliscove1·y, identificalion, evaluation, safety, removal and final disposal of any impro-
82
whic h t he ope rator can intervene.
vised explos ive device and gear. The IEDD capability achieved after the successful attendance of the appropr iate course musl be considere d the mos t advan ced level of knowledge, since it p rovides the s ki ll to deal with the devices which do nol result from and indus tri a l process but arc the fru ils of c riminal imaginati o n and creativity. To gain access to the IE DD co urses th e Army personnel must possess the second-level EOD and the Carab.inieri and the Armed Corps of the Stale must achieve the first level. To allain a highe r level, candidates must be already in possession of the preceding qualiri calion. The ta ble at fig.4 s hows the NATO specificat ions, the ce rtificate or qualification achieved (ol d denominat ion s are still mentioned) and the activity tha t can be ca rried out o r, to pu t it better, t he types of devices on
ANTISABOTAGE TRAINING Al l training aclivities arc carried out at the EOR/EOD/IEDD Section, while the other components a rc c o n ce rned with the Cen t re's more o peration al aspects . T he Clearing Teams are tasked with the interventions on the national territory and abroad a nd provide, if requested, Lheir advisory services. The Materials and Equipment Sect.ion dea ls not only with the management of the Centre's equipment, but also vvith the test of new materials and the issue of technical opinions. Fina lly, the Coordination a nd Study Section is the mo tor of the whole organization; it is tasked with updating the techn ical records and the pcr·sonnel databan k, exc hang ing in formation with the international counterparts, developing EOD procedures for new mun itions, studying and revising the spec ific publications that deal with tests of equipment and materials .
COB COURSES ORGANIZED SINCE 1998 The students who attended the courses given at the school ha ve been n umerous (fig. .5) and it has also been necessa ry to update the qualifications of those who had been trained ,-vith the old method (artificers, chief arti ficers), who were ser-ving mostly at the CERIM ANTs and wit h the Po lice forces (Carabinie ri, State Police, Revenue Guard): There is s till a great number of requests, a sign of the recognition of the extreme care devoted by the COB LO the training of the operators who are engaged everyday in these very r isky acLivities. The Army Staff screens the applications submitted by the other Se rvices and the Armed Corps, in order to obtain
Fig. 5
Courses given I Since 1998
Type of course
Number of Students
Duration (wks)
318 EOD 15lievel
12
16
+
4 foreigners
ISDN (64 Kb); by ·w eb and e-mail consu ltati ons ; by v idcoconfe r cnce (slow), on the internel and inlranet; direct, for fax transmission and reception; direct data transm ission, \Vilhout having to pass through an i nternet provider, for security reasons. After an exper imental p hase, the Engineer Regiments were d.istributed the folhwing rnaterials, necessary for TELECOB to operate: JM IVIARSAT M 4 NERA WORLD COMMUNICATOR; GSlVI te lephone; portable computer with \vebcam; digi tal camera; e-map GPS GARMIN .
Completive EOD 1st level/2°d level
18
541
4
EOD 2nd level
3
40
9
IC
7
164
2
THE MEDIUM-TERM FUTURE
12
The evolution of the geopolitical scenario in the last years has implied inevitable conseq uences in the operational situations that the Serv ice has Lo face , com pelling the Army Staff to reassess the project of the capabilities that can be exp ressed b y the various
96
7
IEDD
+
3 foreigners I EOR instructor
7
TOTAL
54
the parl.icipation of a fa ir and diversified number of stud e nts , hovvever keep in g in mind th e ordnance-clea ring requireme nts of the Engineer Regirnents and the out-of-area e mployment of the EOD platoons attached to the national contingents .
4
172 I
I
1338 I
IMMARSAT Satellite
~
Fig. 6
S✓;
Cartography
TELECOB Purpose of the "TELECOB" p roject (fig.6) is Lo realize a constant flow of informat ion between the Centre and the E OD operators e ngage d all over the world in mine-clearing and ordnance disposal activities, in order lo provide th e necessary information both for safety and for disposal of all types o[ d evices. In order lo realize this se1~vice, a net has been implemented inside the COB, aimed at recording and processing all data through a communication server capable of
Server
m anaging the fol lowing types of connections: by phone with every part of the world (satellite systems ); thro u gh GSM phone (where available), by the internet
Data server Branches, a nd particularly by the Engineer Corps. The document issued in J une 2003, "The En gineer Componenl of the Capability Packages - Up-
83
--~ "E_X_C~E-LL~E-N-CY - CE_N_T_R..,.. E'-' F_O_R_P_O-LI_O_R_C..,,,.. ETI _ C_S_(C -O~B-)
--.J
Fig. 7
CEP Seer & Coord Section
•---+--
Course Section
Spee Material Team
EOD Department
Active Obstacle Department
EOR Section
EOD Company
Documental Centre
Mine Section Hq Squad
EOD Section
Section Countermine ' EOD Platoon
IEDD-IC Section
Ex losive & Demolition Section MOUT Section
date of the Executive Project for 2003-2004" envisages 'lvilh in the Training/Specialization sector, and particularly for the "Corn.bat Engineer" Activities, a further development of the capabil ities of the sappers against mines, explos ive traps and in EOR operations. In view or lhis, therefore, a new autonomous module w il l be included in th e sappers' special training, aimed at providing such capabilities, which \,vill also be periodically evaluated. This module, con ven l io nally called "MINEX", will be managed 1'1.nd appraised by the COB and used as a screening in the sappers' lraining: those who fail will be assigned anot h er task b y the Army Staff In this specific sector the Arrny ri rmly wants an agile ins tru ment, employable on short noti ce in any openltional condi tion . Th e target is not "greal numbers" but rather "high quality" . In order to achieve this target, the COB should be able to carry out these courses in addi-
84
tion lo lhose already under way (EOD, IEDD, IC) . As a consequence of these new objectives, the Army Operational Ordnance Clearing Centre will have to acquire an expertise on the whole compartment of active obstacles, adopting lhe general configuralion shown at fig .7. The peculiar funcl ion of the Centre is again that of training the personnel to face the most insidious dangers existing in the operational contexts: rn i ne rieJds, traps, regular and improvised explosive devices. Th e Centre's particular capabil ity of dealing \.vith every type of obstacle has even suggested to change its name to "Excellence Centre". Fu rt h ermore, in order to allain a better capability of response, cons idering the need Lo train the operators of the other Services and lhe Police Corps, the Army Staff proposed to constitute within lhe COB a Joint Centre for collecting documents of special interesL T he structure, once completed, will collect, keep and provide, in
a single centre, all t he documents and norms necessary for the development of the EOD activities. Finally, according to the Army's European vision of the matter, two courses in English will he available to the Armed Forces and Police Corps of other Nations . The courses will last t'lvO months and deal wiLh the identification and disposal of explosive devices. The part icipation of our operalors in out-of-area missions and their daily work on the national terri tory wi th very good resul ts are witness of lhe reliability and quality of the Engineer School.
CONCLUSIONS It is by now widespread knmvleclge that the entire clearing sector is ext re m ely important for both population and operators. In view of th is, it has become necessary to return the responsibili Ly for all prohlerns concerning the clearing of the teffitory (training, responsibil ities, studies on equip-
rnent, materials and implements) to the Engineer Corps. The unification of Leaching methods and operational approach accordin g to the NATO doctrine, profiting by the experience of all partners,
has proved to be the solution of the problem. In fact, starting with the first courses for Officers and NCOs sent to Pakistan in 1989, the continuous evo.l ution of the teaching provided has led to the
Above. First-level training of a sapper. Left. Second-le vel traini1·1g.
acknowleclgment of the good work carried out by our operators, both at home and abroad. Tb is is in itself a very good evidence of the good job clone by the Operational Clearing Centre. The problem of m ine-clearing and ordnance disposal in general h as been tackled with the r igh t determinaLion, but is far from solved, owing to the millions of mines scattered in many parts of the world and the great number of shells of every calibre present in the areas \vh ere conflicts of various proportions h ave occurred or are in progress.
•
·:Brigadier General, Commandant, Engineer School
85
•·
'TI'fu@ ~~~ &ml.~ @f]]i©fi@ffit!.Plm:NM1fi~~:;;i '®ft @}@ ll1wa~@1 ~rl@llf~ IJ.rm?11J \llo11r a;J1.l!Jl<BfE<B
~IP~wn~~~ 1]1~®~ ~1 ~rru.rs:1~1 ]1tr @®cil@rrmfl~c!i-O;r1tIDf.ID. ~ ®Jm1®r.r fr® 1b@ ~1 H"~~11~ ®lP)
fl:lli@
~IDfif.f@rf.ru.@ffiOO
®J.r i1Th1@ fil1.Ili]l®~
-
r@
Root Hall, seal of the course.
o pment of lhe U.S . military stra tegy in its concept ual, organ izal ional and technical evolution . Morcove1~ it is poss ible to apply the operational art in complicated exercise scenarios and to dehale on the problems d eriving from continuous world -scale engagements. Every year, about 340 Officers , Lieutenant Colonels ready for p romo Lion or j u s t- promoted Colonels, together with Civilian Officials, \,vho form lhe resident c lass, gather at "Carlisle Barracks" (Pennsylvania) - home or the War College - for a period of The experien ce of one year grammes and organ iz ation a l len mon ths (1) . A typical class spenL side by side \Nith the Amer- structure. consists of ahouL 215 Army Offiican colleagu es, e n gaged in a This continuity of the themes cers - some th irty of whom becc n Lml p eriod of their pro [es- is com.bined wi t h a continuous long lo the Nat ional Guard and sion al preparation, reprethe Reserve - 25 Ai,路 sents a sp ecial occasion Force Officers and an Table I lo better u ndersta nd and equal n u mber [rom the appreciate t he differNATIONALITY Naval Forces (2), abou t ences that d istinguish us OF THE INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS 30 Civilian Officia ls , in ATTENDING THE 2002-2003 COURSE from the Americans and cluding some corn ing prepares us lo cooperate from Lhe State and Secttin order to win lhe terririty Departments and, fiARGENTINA MONGOLIA ble challenges of the 21 sl AUSTRALIA nally, 42 Officers comin g MOROCCO Century. BANGLADESH NIGERIA From as many Nations alBRAZIL The United S tates Army NORWAY lied of the Uni ted Sta tes CANADA OMAN 路war College \Vas founded of America (table 1) . CHILE PAKISTAN on the 27 t h of November 1 \ \/ithin the Course's d iCROATIA PHILIPPINES 190 I and since lhen has dactic organization, lhe E GYPT QUATAR been th e fo r路emost trainEL SALVADOR in ternation al students are SAUDI ARABIA ing instit ution for the ETHIOPIA SENEGAL looked after by an official GEORGIA preparation of the OffiSLOVAKIA \Vi th Lhe rank or AmbasGERMANY SOUTH KOREA cers o [ the U .S . Army, sador of the U .S. Slate HOLLAND SRILANKA "not to promote war; b u l Department. HUNGARY SWEDEN to p reserve peace through The sem inar represents INDIA TAIWAN a deep a n d adequate ISRAEL the motor of the didactic THAILAND preparation , apl lo ward ITALY TURKEY activity or the Insti t u te. JAPAN off any aggression" UKRAINE Ea ch of the t\\路en ly semiJORDAN UNITED ARAB EMIRATES T h e \iVar S ecretary of nars, in \"ihich th e parlicKUWAIT UNITED KINGDOM t he lime, Elihu Root, in i pants are d ivided, i n MEXICO VENEZUELA h is inaugural sp eech cludes t he variou s m ilipo in ted out ''responsib le tary an d civilian cat e cmnmand", "nat ional segories wh ic h con stitu te curity" and "military science" as evolution of contents, learni ng the Cou rse i Ls elf. In a seminar it the primary subjects of study for methods and teaching aids . To is i mpossi ble to find t wo s tu the participan ls. Tod ay, af ler a he able to a ttend the Ar my War dents with the same experiences, centu ry, these themes still cha r- College is a unique opportu ni ty in order to ensure a maxim urn ac lerize the College 's p ro - to be acquainted with the d evel- di vers i ty of backgro u nds a nd
88
The library of the US Army lVar College.
-
oprn1ons. Every seminar is conducted by a team of t h ,-ee instructors, each or whom belonging to one of the three didactic Departments: Command, Leadership and lVIanagement Dept; National Security and Strategy Dept; IV! ilitary Strategy, Plans and Operalions Dept. Each day, during the 22 weeks devoted to the basic courses and in two furth er occas ions the seminar meets under the guidance of the instructor expert in the specific subject, and discusses the matter of the day. The topic is introduced w ith read ings assigned to the students the previous days and through conferences held before the assemb.l e d s tudents by personnel of the Armed Forces or from the c ivil world, as well as from students intentionally chosen for the technical aspects and for their previous professional experie nces.
The "fnclian Stand" gym in rhe Carlisle Barracks compound°.
The diversity that can be found in the seminars warrants an ample debate, dur ing which every participant brings his experience, his \Vay of seeing and considering the specific problem. The environment is extremely infor¡mal. Sometimes the seminars are held outside, in one or the many places w .ithin the Carlisle area, before a serving of egg and bacon and a generous cup of American coffee . Besides,
the frank express ion of one's opinion is fundamental. The instructors' role is essential in order to keep the d iscussion focused on the clay's issue and ensure that the main concepts are acquired by the students. Also the instructors come from the most. different experiences: Officers in serv ice or \Vho have left act ive duty, universi Ly Professors - ohen \,v i th previous teaching experiences in prestigious American
89
universities - and researchers in the various fields of interest to the Army War College. The instructors are also advisers of the students , both in choosing the courses (after the basic phase) and in writing the Strategy Research, which is the main individual project that the students are called to complete during the academic year. T he course is developed through seven formative peri ods: the basic phase which includes four courses: Regional
concludes with application exe1Yises. "Course l" (3 weeks) - nm b y the Command, Leaders hip and Management Dept - is focused on the examinat ion of the role, skills and aptitudes that distinguish the top leadership of comp lex organizations such as the Army and, in particular, on the d evelopment of innovative solutions that will be presented both to the politicians and to the members of the military organization.
strurnents of power are available to implement the Str¡ategy. Th e essential element is find ing a balance between objectives, r e sources available and methods of application of the latter. Everything is achieved through the examination of historica l events, regarding esp ecially the 20th Century, but ,vithout overlooking topical events, especially if they are thou ght-provoking, like those oecu rred in the first years of the new millennium are bound to be. Within "Course 2" there is a three-day trip to New York \.Vi Lh visits to the United Nations, to the Missions of the States of the international students, accredited with the UN, to th e public and private Agencies that have a role in shaping the U.S. strategy (cu lt u ral centres, television and papers, non-governmental organi zations). "Course 2" is certainly the one in wh ich the contribu tion of the 42 international participants is most stimulated and it is not unusual to witness frank di s cu ssions on the behaviours and interests of the U.S. towards a Nation or an area of the ,vorld . All this provides the opportunity for livel ,v and i nlerestirn2: discus sions. "Course 3" (4 weeks) - second course run b y the Command, Leadership and Management Dept - is centred on the employment of the resources available for implementing the national ¡ strategy. lt especialJy examines the planning process of the military instrument and the for n1ation of the Defence budget. A specific attention is given lo the development plan of the new U.S . Army, kno\vn as "Objective Force". "Course 4" (7 weeks) - managed by the Department for Military Strategy, Plans and Operations - concludes the basic phase. I t supplies Lhe students with the notions necessary for the application of military power ~
Strategic Assessment; Exercise on Crisis Management; Com plem entary Courses; Strategy Research; Compl e mentary and Sport Activities; Seminar on National Security.
THE BASIC PHASE The basic phase is developed during th e first 6 months and gives the participants a global view of the so -called major strate gy: vision and enunciation, structure, implementat ion and application . Each of these segments corresponds to a spe c ific course , which includes and
90
A. classrourn. sern.inar.
Group dynamics and interper sonal relations are a lso scrutinized during the course, in order to put the seminar in a posi tion to make the best of its potentialities. "Course 2" (8 \veeks) - directed by the Departme nt for Strategy and National Security - is centred on the study of Strategy and, in particular, on ho\,V national Strategy is formed, what are the national inlerests and how they intenelate, ,vhat actors are more imporlant in the national decision-making process , what in-
.
"Hupton Hall", seat o( the Military History lnstitule.
\Vi thin the national Slra tegy. Military operations arc examined at strategic and operational level, in a joint internat ional con text, considering the manoeuvre or format ions higher than a Corps (4 ). SpeciCic sessions are devoted to the eme1·gent operational capabilities - space, information, psychological and we b-centric Operations - and lo the organ ization of Command and Control in a combined and join t operational Theatre. In the last week there is a practical exercise of applicat ion of the method for the solution of the j o int operational problems, in a crisis scenario wh ich shmvs the entire range of the possible military operations.
THE REGIONAL STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT The frequenters are divided into 6 gro ups - the North and South America, Europe, area of the former· Soviet Un ion, Africa, Middle East, Asia - eac h of which comprises the corre sponding international students . The course develops through a series of presentations, h eld by experts from the Administration, the acadern ic world as v.•ell as by inte,-national students, in order to define the reg ional problems \.Vhich may concern in terms of risks and opportunities - the nat ional interests of the United Slates. In particular, hmv to employ the military instrument for seizing such opportunit ies and neutralize the risks. At the end, the seminars of the basic phase assemble again and the experiences acquired during the various regional sem inars are shared, in order to g ive every student the b as ic information o n each geographic area.
I
PREPARING FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT Aher the regional strategic Assessment, the participants are ready to sustain the most onerous training task of the entire course . The teaching staff of the War College are involved in the t\vo weeks of the exercjse - without considering the preparatory phase - together with a considera ble reinforcement of personnel coming from the S taffs and the Combat and Strategic Commands (5), up to the point of reaching a student/instructor ratio of 2: l. The students arc divided into
J
cells Lhat correspond to the following levels: • pol.ilical: Council for the National Security, Council for the Energy and Economic Policies, Crisis Cabinets of the State and Defence Secretaries, Agency for National Security; • mi li tary planning: Ch iefs of Staff Committee, Defence Staff, Service Staffs; • military operational: Combat Commands and Strategic Commands, Supreme Headquarters All ied PO\vers Europe (SHAPE), UN Agency for Peace Support Operation s. The participants spend one week in one of the cel ls of the 91
A "National Securiiy Council" mee1ing du ri11g a "Crisis ,'\!JanagemeJZJ" exercise.
THE COMPLEMENTARY COURSES The b asic p h ase d ocs not con -
cluclc t he engagement. Each fre-
first two levels anJ Lhe other at the operational military leve l. The crises proposed vary from humanitarian emergency to the so-called Major War Theatre - i.e. Iraq - going through post-conflict stabilization and defence against terrnrist risk. Every scenario is played in a mu lt inat ional, joint and inter-agency environment. For 10 consecu ti ve hours each clay, for 10 days, the students un dergo intense didac tic aclivities w hich , besiues the operational situations, reproduce also the relations with t h e political world (testimonies before Lhe Senate and Con gr ess Defence Committees), the med ia (inLerviews and
press conferences) and with the international actors (international meetings for Conning coalit ions or post-conflic t conferences), the latter again with the contribuLion of the international participants. Tn formative terms, a press confe rence, where y o u are in the spotligh t and bombarded hy the questions of j ournalists v\1 ho know their job well, is a u n ique experience. As it is to expound in a v id eo-conference to the rea l Commander of a Combat Command - a four star General - the line of action fo u nd Lo solve a cris is simulated in the real area attributed to him.
quenter must in fact select, from a list of abou t 80 cou rses offered by the Army War College (Table 2), 7 cou rses w hich he thinks interest him p articularly and t hat he will follow in the second pan o f the academic year. Th e object ive o f this p hase is t hat of giving the opportun ity o f study ing in d etai l the themes \vhi c h may b e useful in the future. In th is selection the p articipants are advised and followed by their instructors. Also in these cou rses the d idactic method employed is the seminar, in which the frequen ters arc protagonists and th e instructors their gu ides . Each stu d ent is called to pt-csent o ne or the subjects of the day as a base for the successive discussion and, at the encl of t be cou r se, to subm it a document of abou t 5 -6 p ages, \V h ich must conta i n e lemen ts useful for improving t he doctr ine of the U.S. Army.
STRATEGIC RESEARCH As we said, strategic research rcpresen ls the m a in indi vid u a l pr oj ect for the stu d ents o f the Army War College. Moreover, its completion is an essen tial prerequis ite for o btaining the "Master in Strategic Sciences" , awardeJ at t he end of the course. The co u rse's o bj e c Live is to s ti m u late the cap a bili ties of research, analy sis and synthesis t hrough the preparation of a t he-
Simulation of a Press Conference during, a "Crisis Management" exercise.
92
Table 2
.
LIST ,OF PHASE-TWO COURSES
Department for Command, Leadership and Management
Industrial preparation - Human relations - Basic elements on research, development and acquisition - Financial planning and programming Joint processes - The Medical Service as power multiplier - Military support to civilian Authorities - Strategic planning - Strategic environment - Religions in the world - The creative thought - Media relations - Use of human resources - Health and physical efficiency in the future military operations - Personnel employment - Mobilization and operational readiness - Organizational evolution - The critical thought Classics of mili tary strategy: th e Peloponnesian War - Readings on strategic leadership. Department for National Security and Strategy
Wars in the ancient world - WWII: from Normandy to the Ardennes The human dimension of war - Innovation and military transfor mation Intelligence at strategic level - Laws and Leadership - The economic aspect o f National Security - International politics and the media Elements of national power - Armaments control in the Middle East - War with other means: terrorism and political violence - Interagency r elations in peace and war - Relations between civilian and m ilitary leadership Problems of Latin America - Negotia tions - China - Security in the Balkans - The Congress and military policy - .Military operations in the "failed States" - Contemporary problems. Department for Strategy, Plans and Operations
Critical analysis of the doctrine - Operations at .JFLCC-level - Planning a t operational-theatr e level - Determination of the centre of gravity .:.. A major war-theatre: the Korean peninsula - The expeditionary war Partners of the Army: Air Force, Navy and Mar.ines - Joint operations - Air power in modern war - Computerized force - Special ope rations Doctrine of "Information Operations" - Wars of the future - Air operations and JFACC - Strategy at operational-theatre level Centre for Leadership Development
Information war: pol itica l considerations - I m pl ications of the "informa tion crime" on natio nal se curity - .Joint "War Gaming" Problems of Peace Support Opera tions - Planning in Crisis Management Weapons of Mass Destruction - Management of information - Leadership support syste ms - Logistic problems of the 21st Century - Environmental security - The Army's industrial component - Operational simulation in the Defence Department - The Just War - Strategic planning - Operations in urban env ironm ents - Supports to operational plannin g - Crisis management through the employment of military options - The "C2 v\larfare" Doctrine - .Military applications of Artificial Intelligence - Use of the post-operations analysis. Institute for Strategic Studies
Army Transformation - l\'1ain problems of the Army.
s is - of no .less than 6000 words on a subject. of significant importan ce for t he national secu rit y, the Ar m y or any other Armed Fo rce. The sub jects chosen each student is free to selecl his own theme - are approved at t he beg inning of November, v-.f ole t he final product m ust b e handed in within the first d ecade of April. In drawing up their project, t he s tudents are advised b y an instructor and can avail themselves of the two libraries of the Carlisle Barracks. T h e first library, p articularly u seful for hist orical research, belongs to th e Institute of Military History of the U.S. Arm y, which shares i ls quarters w i lh the Vvar Co llege. It is an extraordinary documen tal source, with 300,000 boo ks and as many doctrinal and technical handbooks, 7 millions official d ocu men ts and over one million p hotographs, that range from the Civil War to the present. The second library is the Army \Var College's . Lt is open twentyfour h ours a day, s even days a week, and offers the stude nts a collec tion of 360,000 books and 1,100 periodicals, t ogether with about 90 p osts for research and consultation \Vith unlimi Le d access lo the interne l. From Mon day to Friday, during the working hours, ther e is a s taff of 10 assistants ready lo help the students in their research. The quality of lhe assistan ce is of th e highest level, ovving lo the experience buill up along the years and the con tinu ous relation with the instructors and the e Jucational departments. Once the researc hes are completed and supplement ed \Vith an accurate bibliography, they arc kept in the War College Library and can b e consulted by whomever may need t hem (6). Th is is \.vhy the formal aspect is taken care of as m uch as the cont e nts. The researches d eeme d of greater in terest aye sen t on to the competent boa rds of the Defence Administ ration and subsequent ly published on m ilitary periodicals.
93
COMPLEMENTARY AND SPORTS ACTIVITIES Study and research arc integrated with complementary and sports activities. As regards the latter, the College's facilities are first class: three gyms, football , baseball and tennis fiel ds. The sporls activities start \Vith the softball tournarnenl (7), in \vhich all seminars must participate, and end \Vith the "J.irn Thorpe Days" (8): a three-day sports event which, once a yea,~ assembles at Carlisle the teams of the various l'vlilitary Colleges (9) . Tn between t here is a sequence of rninor tournaments and a classic rendezvous: the soccer match bel ween the international partici pants and the U.S. students (the Cup is lraditionally an appanage of the former). Among the complementary activities I vvould like to point out the "Commander's Conferences" (compulsory) and lhe "Programme for the families of the military" (optional, intended [or wives and husbands of the students). The former regard a series of conferences and meetings on Army topics and are attended by the Commander and by the representatives of lhe various trends concern ing the specific matter. Just to mention¡ some o f the themes discussed during the academic year 2002-03: advisability of the armed intervention in Iraq, discriminatory policies towards homosexuals, how to turn to betler account the racial and sexual minorit ies within the Armed Forces, the balance belween security needs and limitation of the c iti/.ens' rights. The "Programme for the families" proves the Army 's concern for the families of its personnel, which extends m u ch beyond lhe logistic support ensured within l.he bases. Such program.me, through a series of specific seminars, aims at preparing the \,Vives (and husbands) of the military to give lhem the necessary supporl 94
through the knowledge of the dynamics typical of the Armed Forces and the development of cornrnand capabilities in formal and informal situations.
THE SEMINAR ON NATIONAL SECURITY The last appointment of the year is lhe Seminar on National Security (the one held in the academic vear 2002-2003 was the 49th). .
It is a kind of final test for the frequenters, \.vl10 have the opportunity to take advantage of what they have learnt, discussing about national security with persons belonging to civil society and \Vith representatives of the most different professions and social groups . It is also the last occasion on which th e original seminars reassem ble. The Seminar on National Secu-
rity gathers at Carlisle Barracks, \vith students and instructors, no less than J50 American citizens \,Vishing to discuss problems conccrn i ng the security of the United States \Vith the mil itary. The only requis iles are: not to be, or have been, in the military and not having participated in previous editions of the Seminar¡. It is an excellent opportunity for the military and civilian worlds to .m eet and strengthen lhe already firm bonds between these two elements of the American society. The prob lems that have already been examined during the year are discussed and analysed again, taking advantage of ne\.v and different professional and life experiences.
CONCLUSIONS The first aspect of the \\-'ar College that caUs one's attention
The Comma.ndanl o( the US Army War College awards a prize to 1he Bra z ilian "Captain" of Jhe winning team of Jhe "lnternationals-U. S. Army" soccer match.
is the continuous search of diversity in tackling the themes of the course, \.vh ich goes together \.vith a di sarming simplicity in examining the operations conducted by the U.S . Army, witho ut excluding critical aspects or shortcomings in the doctrine or in the action of the line of Command. In s hort, there is a \Vish lo give t he studen ts the possibi lity to make a limitless analysis of Lhe strategy of the Govern ment and of the Army of the United States, thro u gh the exchange o[ views with colleagues, allies, instructors and representatives of Lhe civil society as well as \Vith the very protagonists of the events, even the most recent ones. The second aspect is the evident priority given to the stu dents' preparation, which is really above any other requirement. As \Ne have already pointed out, even the Iraqi campaign did not,
even m inimally, influence the development o[ the course. On the contrary, every day, d u ring the Exercise on Crisis Managernent, the Commanding General of the Coalition Forces in the Pers ian Gulf spoke, via videoconference, wi th the students who operated in Lb e corresponding cell , exchanging views end giving opinions. In short, there is a feeling that the Arm y of the Un i ted States invests a great deal of resources on t he students o( t he Army \•\ iar College, \vho have achieved this stage of their career aher a very hard selection. Also the deep involvement of the fam ili es is p arl of this picture. The serenity and p arlicipation or the families in the professional life of the Officers are consid ered necessary i n o rder to raise their performance l o the highest level. Program mes conceived for \V ives and children, their very participat ion in the fundamenta l moments o( the course, including the typically military ones, their possibility of having free access lo all structures, even the didactic ones, arc still far from being a reality in many other Armies. Another evident characteristic is t he search for elements of professional grmvth in the examination of historical events in wbich the U.S. Army has been involved. T he validity of the principles of t he operational arl is always so ught thro ugh the histor ical analysis. It is practically i mpossible to attend the Army \,Var College without at least once coming across a practical exercise that recreates an episode of Lhe Civil WarorvVW2. Finally, the possibility of observing the world events from an unus u a l perspective for a
European leads to apprec iate how important in the formulat ion of an op inion is the position of the observer v is-a-vis the event. The War College, through a wise u se of the international participants and of appropriately chosen lecturers , strives Lo make this understood lo those that arc going to be the future Commanders.
•
,·,colonel, Commande1; /5 1 Signal Regiment
NOTES (J) The Army War College p rovides
also a correspondence course, mainly for National Guard and Rcserve Officers. The courses last t,vo vears, with two "residential" phases of'iwo weeks each. (2) Navy, Marines and Coast Guard. (3 ) The State D e panment corr e sponds to the Ministry ol' Foreign Al'fairs . (4) Tactical-level operations B rigade, Division and Corps are studied a t the Command and General Staff College. (5 ) Th e Cornhat Cornrnands are: CENTCOM (]Vliddle East and Horn of Africa), EUCOl'vl (E urope, Africa and the former USSR), PACOM (As ia and Oceania), SOUTHCOM (Ccntrnl and South America), NORTHCQt\,I (North America and IV1exico). The Strategic Comrnancls of opcnuional interest are: STRATCO~'l (Nuclear Strategic For ces), OCOM. (Special Forces) and TRASCOM (Strategic Transport). (6) The individual Strategic Rc searchcs can be secn on th e int.crnet:ht.l p:i!,v,vw.arlisle.a rmy.mil/srp/ex ternal/external_pdf_search.dm. (7) Softball is a variation of baseball \A,f oeh reduces the possi bility of physical contact in the dynamic pl1ases of the game, thus reducing accidents in general. (8) Jim Thorpe, an American Indian w ho attended th e lndian School a t Carlisle Barracks, has been an exccptional a t.hlete (Olympic Gold Mcdal) and coach. (9) Bes ides the Army Vv'ar College, thcr-e are: the Naval War College, the Air War College and the National Defence University, which has a more comb ined connotation.
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Appeal and usefulness have alwavs accompanied the uniforms of all the soldiers in the world
by Giuliano Ferrari -:,
In the ,ad, style, colouu and accessories were designed
lo make the soldier recognized and to intimidate in baffle, as well as to give visibility lo the legitimate fighters What at first sight could seem a simple accessory has an explanation in its atavic usefulness for the fighters. This goes from protection to enhancement of the combatant's figure, from the acknowledgement of his valorous deeds to his social gratification. Some of these details, despite having lost their original function, remain nevertheless as evolutionary relics which, although no more used, are still bearers of ethical meanings which ought to be known and which have been taken into account in designing the women-soldiers' outfits. 96
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particular the effects of the function of "deterrent imposit ion" against the adversary, which was extremely important, at least until the fight required a dose contact of the forces. This was a req u i rernen t that went together \,Vith the search of a visual impact ,vh ich ,,.1as to rouse prestige and respect among public opinion. Finally, in view of th is latter aspect , we ,v ish to point out th e reasons why the unifonn has always enticed the fair sex and the difficulties met in adapting it to the feminine component of the Armed Forces and the Pol.ice.
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE UNIFORM
ETHOLOGY OF SOLDIERUNESS The military have always distinguished themselves for their uniform (with its accessories : hat, epauleLs, belt, collar, badges, decorations), \,v eapons, clear and strictly defined h ierarchization, "martial" bearing (loud voice, quick movemen ts, upright stance , parades), reciprocal salute , care of personal cleanliness and appearance. Usually the transformations or some of these aspects in time are examined as historical-cultu ral e vents , produced by runctional needs and vol unlary/ra tional in Lerventions made by n1an or b y soc ia l systems. 98
As we are going to sec, one can make an analysis - for example, in this case, of the evo luLion of uniforms - adopting the canons or comparative ethology and analyzing it as a succession of changes not always planned but subject to selection . Changes similar to the phy logenetic ones which have produced the cliffer路enliation of the an imal species (1 ). Having briefly recalled the uniform's functions and the transforma tion of its style according to the war cond iti ons, due to rcq ui rernents of visibility in the ancient times and o[ camouflage in the more recent period, we are therefore going Lo analyze - from a "naturalistic" viewpoint - in
Besides the obvious requisites o f operativeness, which are aimed at functionali ly (protection from bad \veather, transport o f weapons and equipment) which have evolved together with technology and combat techniques, cosl-effectiveness of mass-produced garments and accessor ies , I.he uniforms sh0\1\/ some charactc,路 ist ics that have other p urposes and ,vh ich are common to the a,-mies of the whole world. The first char路acteristic was certainly that o f permitting Lo lell fri ends from enemies and to distinguish the military from the civilians, which ,,v as necessary in order lo mark out the legitimate combatant (who therefore is entitled to the protection of international conven Li ons concern ing armed conflicts) and avoid mistaking him for a criminal, a spy or a lerrorist (2) . Moreover, within a single Army, they have the func tion of differen tia ting the various milita,路y "bodies" (Branches, Specialities, Corps, Categories). lnitiall.Y, and for the more modest armies, the uniform's role was performed by simply having men wear a coloured band on the arm or on the body (of wh ich, in case
of con flict, th e fighters got rid promptly in order not to be recogn izcd by the enemy and to take refuge in t he anonymity of tb e "sh irkers"). As th e commanders conducted the bat tle "on sighL", vi sibi li ty a nd recogn i:tability from afar or one's own troops ,,,•e re then essential, so as to be able to easily fo llow the course o[ Lhe battle. The English pol itician and econom ist O liver Cromvv e ll ( 15991658) main tained that the best colour for uniforms was bronzered, for it stood out better on the g,-een of the b attleCiel cls (considering that i n those times o n e avoided to fight in w inter and on impracticable rocky ground). Today, the ne eds of c oncealment and camouflage within the background , which e m erged at the beginning of the past cenLur-y w it h the introductio n of precision ·weapons, have fo rced th e arm ies of almost the whole ,.vorld to ado pt a bl end of vario u s sha des of grey-green - b rown (3) and p a tterns that break the form, apart from some ou tfits suited for special snow)' or desert environments. F or today's .Arm ies th e need for these special uniforms, fashioned w ith styles a nd colours suited lo the environment in whi ch they operate, occurs only in combaL occa sions. On the other hand, colours a nd pallerns, studied to b lend ,vi th the surround ing landscape, are no t cons idered suitabl e for th e dress u niforrn u sed in garrison , wit h Lhc exception of some Countries which li ve in an a l m ost per·ennial state of war. M ost other Nations often keep t h e heritage of l he world wars and lherefore their uniforms remain boun d to the colours that in those t imes were considered good for camouDage (khaki, blue-grey). The :-Javies h ave always had diffe r ent requi remen ls: s hips figh t at a distance, cre,,vs need no camouflage . Combat and garTison dress can co incide and as
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th ey m ust be easily an d often washed , th ey are mostly white. Formal uniforms, especially for O ffic e,-s, fo ll o w t he s ame req uirem ents of prestige a nd s tateliness common to t he other Services: e .g . the cocked hats of the Admirals of the Eighteenth and N in eteenth centuries and th ei r magnificen tly ornamented unifo r m s, as m u ch and even m ore splendid lhan lhose ,vorn by t h e h ighe st Officers of Lh e land forces. The Air Force, l ike the Navy, has no ph)rsical contact with the enemy during combat. But, having b een c r eated in modern Limes, practically in every Country has adopted un iform s similar lo th ose o f th e oth er Arm e d
Forces of the period, b ut choosing a gr·ey-blue or azure colour because, besides recalling the sky, with its cool colou rs launches a m essage or technological efficiency.
DETERRENT STATELINESS The func tion of stateliness of the u ni form consists in its vis ual e mphasis o n th e w arlike a llil udes, and therefore lh e operational capab ility, of the p erson who wears it, with the purpose of i ntimi dat ing the a dversa ry l h.-o u gh i ts display. No rm al ly, therefore, its style aims at makin g lh e figure taller and more athletic. 99
Fig. 2
which affect the feminine u nconscious (in many ways similar t:o those employed vvith great efficacy by the advertising techniques). These lryper-signals strengthen the function al reasons related Lo th e guaran tees oC psycho-p hysical fitn ess ensured by the mili tary selection, the social prestige of the category and the economic securi ty provided by a stable employment. This explains why novels and fil ms q u ite often entru st the role of the romantic hero to mil ita1)' characters.
SOLDIER IS BEAUTIFUL
Accidentally b ut not so m uch, as \ Ne are g;ing to see, the fea tu res that are stressed in order to ob tain this result are actu ally those "''hich d ifferentia te male a nd female of the human species. Indeed the b ody's h eight, the size of skuLI and neck, the shoulders' breadth, the chest's size and the pow¡er of Lhe breast muscles and arms, the r elative narr ov,ln ess of the pelvis and Lhe legs' length, together with the b igger s ize of wris ts and forearms, are traits associa ted with physical po\,ver which, even seen Crom afar, distinguish the fig ure of a man fro m Lhat of a \voman . A woman's average height is in fact lower, her head is smaller, the neck thinne1~ th e shoulders nar-
100
rower; she tend s to keep h er elbows dose lo the body, thus making the figure slimmer; her waist is slender, her hips vvide and the legs are us u ally shorter than a man's (fig. l). In su bstan ce, th e characteristics which m ake a soldier's aspect frigh tening are also the q ualities that idenli fy the nia.le's [orce and virility. Th us they make h im instinctively at.tractive to females, who see in him a prospective father, capable or Lransmilling an unimpaired genetic pa trimo ny, and a reliable guardian for them a n d their offspr ing. This means lhat th e comrnon beliefs concernin g the appeal of the uniform is certainly not an unfounded tale, for it is based on hyper-sign als
Let's then see and point o u t how, along t he ti mes, the u ni Corms have \vorked to widen t hese diffe rences between male and female (hg.2) . Let's start from the height. The military have always worn a h ead gear, which of cou rse can h ave also practical hmctions, i.e. to protect the h ead from blmvs and bad weather. Bu t its main fun ction is to increase and un derI ine the person's height, often w ith the addition of a bunch of feath ers or other trimmings, because of the well-known MuellerLyer optical illusion .(hg 3). T h e size of th e neck is in creased and emphasized through ruffs, co ll ars a n d other ornaments. The breadt h of the s h o ulders a nd lhe develop ment of the deltoids are emphasized by wadd ing and epaulettes often ornamented with li ttle braids and other s howy gol d en or silver decorations, so as to sh mv up th eir wid t h and m uscula ture. An attractive theory likens th e style of these accessories to the threatening stance that many en raged or frigh tened an imals instinctively take in ord er to appea r b igger and more th reatening. In man this translates in the so-called reaction of horripilation, i.e. in an involuntary bristling, especially on the s h o u lder¡s, with the result of
widening and raising the figure threateningly (4 ). The w.idlh of the chest is often stressed by buttonholes, braids and V-shaped rows of .buttons opening towards the shoulders or also \vilh ample lape ls. The chest muscles are made to stand o ut by the ancient armours, which often displayed an excessive rounding, 01~ late,¡ on, in the crossing of the shoulder slraps of the ammunition pouches. ln the historical uniform of the Grenadiers, the rows of buttons arc instead parallel, because in their up\.vard trend they empha• s i ze the s tature, which is the main image-characteristic or this speciality, which is further in creased b y Lhc very high bearskin. The power of the forearm, the size of .hand and wrist are underlined with ornamentations which, in order to stress the d imension of the arm, of ten use rank s tri pes, oversize cuffs, gaudy colours (set off also by the male tendency to keep the elbows at some distance from the chest, exhibiting therefore the upper and external part of the forearm) and gloves, which arc often compulsory also ,v hen they are not necessary for protection against cold or a brasions. The hips are made to appear slimmer through vert ical cuts and vents in the coat or by tubular ornaments on the side pockets , Lo sho\.v agility and res is tance. This pursuit of slenderness continues in the trousers through lateral and vertical strips of different colours, wh ich make the leg appear longer and slimmer:
THE EVOLUTIONARY RELICS As i n modern combat is no more necessarv (or at least nol often) to have <~ face to face contact, the adversary is almost al \.v ays too far to be impressed by
Fig. 3
the ostentat ion of physical force which, on the other hand, is not the most effective deterrent, the imposing or frightening aspect is quite pointless. Owing to an evolutionary process similar to that which modifies the organs of the animal species according to Lhc needs, we wi tness a regression of these imposing structures but, nevertheless, some real atrophic relics are o fte n maintained as if one had forgotten Lo get rid of them, letting them be reabsorbed little by little, like some primordial
and no more used organs of certain animal species. T he headgear becomes then a beret or a service cap, whicb do not substantially heighten the stature of the wearer nor do they protect from blows or bad weather and have therefore lost their original function . At t he same Li me one could say that Lhere is a tendency to avoid wearing them whenever possible, or even when it should be wrong not Lo wear them : ignorance of their function, physical inconvenience, lack of d iscipline, scarce 101
Fig. 4
considerations, the Guards of the Repu blic, the Italian Corazzieri, are a practical ly perfect example.
THE DISPLAY OF ARMS
idcnti[icalion \vith one's role or image - bearer of the Armed Forces and an inclination to keep a 10\v social pro[ile , somehow contribute to the diffusion of this bad habit. The collar has become a simple fold of the sh irt \vhich keeps only a semblance of what was its original function of enlarging and setting off the neck. In underl ining the breadth of the chest the V-rows of b uttons in the modern coals are faintly rep laced by the trend of the lapels. Thin cloth stripes only hint at th e original function of the epaulettes which for the enlisted m e n cannot be used as support for the rank insignia which, in any case, could he \\IOr-r1 sorne\.vhere else. The same could be said [or many other accessories, such as the cuffs of short-sleeved shins, real atrophic relic of the rolled up sleeve, which is only a residual hint at the arm's musculature. The prominence or the pectoral muscles is today faintly outlined by the symmetrical po ckets placed on th e breast and to the 102
d ecorations and badges p i nn ed on them . The hips are made s limm er through the vertical and tubular ornament on t he pockets, th e band on the trousers tends to disappear and is replaced hy the less showy ironed creases and by th e side seams. In short, today, these acces sories, despite their hav ing an air of more up-Lo-dale functionality for the modern taste, with their modest aspect do not certainly serve for heightening the stature or making the figure more athletic by giving it more impress iveness, 1101¡ do they protect it as headpieces and sho ulder plates did. They are, in this sense, typical evolutionary vest iges , n o more and no less than the typical stumps of by now useless limbs of cenain an imals (fig.S). Significantly, many showy "stately" structures are p reserved almost unchanged also in today's arm ies, in [ull and parade uniforms, which have kept their historical aspect, keeping their clear function of intimidatory exhibition. ln the light of the abovesaid
The soldier carries \vcapons. He carries thern much more often than is necessary for the sole \var purposes. The exhibition of anT,s is in fact another ritual aspect of the mil itary form. It is ritual, in that it transcends the original functional ity of the gest ure, \Vh ich is that of having the combat m eans to hand, and takes on a distinctive caste-val ue and a threatening funct ion. As evidence to it, one ought only to observe that there ar e arms that are to be employed only in ceremonies and parades (sabres, dress-swords, halberds) or even objects that s imulate armament and armour. They are metal studs and buttons or elements that reproduce common componen ts of arms or military uniforms of the past and have therefore a strong capability of recalling the martial concep t:. A clear example of the magic conser vatism of these symbols are the "frogs", today's par-excellence military ornament, born of the ancient use of reinforcing the uni form 's but ton hol es with leather or \Vi re [a bric, in order to prolong their duration . The change o[ the people's sen t i n1en t and the com i ng o n of pacifist values have led to reduce the ostentation of arms practically to nothing and, therefore, also to remove the presence of metal accessories [rom "garrison" uni forms . From the combat ones they had d isappeared long before [or camouflage reasons.
THEIRRENOUNCEABLE FEMININITY A ne\v problem turns up today in the application of these criteria to the s tr ucture o f the uni-
form of the female pe rsonnel of lhe Armed Forces and the Police. In fact we are facing a kind of contradiction in terms difficult to be solved which has clc'fied stylists all over the world, who arc called to underline the martial character and combat efficiency (traditionally associated with the masc uline figure but wh ich are also need ed by women-soldiers and by Policev,romen, owing to lheir operational role) ,,v ithou l repressing 01· effacing their femin inity and without diverging loo much from th e traditional "style" of their respective Armed Forces, retaining a clear message of b elonging to them. T he ma in dilem ma s have been: to underline the curve of h ips and breasts an d therefore their tranquillizi ng ma le rnal protcct ive me ssage, u seful in ma ny s ituatio ns to the Pol ice Forces but also lo th e military contingents in peace operations ( relations with women and m inors, negotiations); to mode rate the ir sex-appeal, in order to avo id inciting c ourting beh a viou rs that can u ndermine discipline and espri t de corps; or to hide it co mple tely in order to su bdue feelings of preco nceived disesteem or to discourage a ttempts at reaction, suggested by the ass umed easiness of overpm.vering a representative of th e weaker sex. T he difficulty has been overcome (not the most serious o ne but also not a lesser one, a lthough at first sight it may appear a q u estion of trifling cxteriority) in order lo make fully accepted and fru itful the introductio n of women in the Armed Forces , also in cultures w hich still have a strong male chauvi nist conception and tend to reject the idea and the image of an "effeminate" soldier.
•
·:Lieutenant General (ret.}, former Commandant of the War College
NOTES ( 1) See Otto Konig: "Kullur 11nd \lerhafiensforschung. Einfuhrung in die Kul!urethologie'' - Deutsch.er Taschenbuch Verlag - Miinchen. (2) The international war law (2nd Addit.ional Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949, ratified bv TLalv) states Lhat legitimate combaLanL.5 are-not only those belonging to regular forces who operate according to their rules and respect the nor·ms, obey a responsible leader, wea.1.. a uniform or sho\\' a fixed bac.lge, recognizable and visible from a(ar , and carry their weapons openly, as set down by the lt.alian War L.,,v n. 141 5 of 8 July 1938), but also the members of or.gan i,.ed ar m ed groups, led by a respo nsi ble Com-
mand, \-vho are a ble to car-ry out long1.erm m ilitary operations concentrated on a part of tenitory under their eontr-ol , and who car ry their wea pons openly, at least d uri ng deployment and attack operations. Consequently they have the right to he h·eated as prisoners of war, while those \.vho commit hostile acts and do not have the above requisites should be prosecuted according to the w ar lav.'. (3) For the Italian Armv the choice was determined th rougl; the tes ting, p romoted by the Ttalian Alpine Club , of the so-called "grey platoon" o r the "l\,Iorbegno" Alpine battalion, \Vhich having prnved to be the hardest to be detected, led to the adop tion of the grcy-g1-een uniform fot- all units, from 1908 to the second Wodd \Var.
103
104
IT WAS AN EXHAUSTED AN D DIVIDED ITALY
enw ry must be cultivated: not I h e single episod e, bur its signi ficance. We must reconnect the scattered threads and penetrate inside the torn fabric of memories, face the p as1 hey o nd rhe superimposed i mpressio n s . Only by riddi11 g ourselves of prejudice a nd pas sion ca11 we reall_v understand 1he reasons and motivations of individual and collective behaviours . We must consider things w ith a clear mind, with.out p reconcep tions . Me mory, therefore, as reflection of a p ath of se ns il iveness, not rem.oval h ut de ep er k nowledge o f the av a ilable a nd verifir1 hle elements. In this jour-
M
ne:v of the mind, the scoriae disperse and 1h.e da rn of reali ty sland firmly. W ith thes e words, H istorian Carl o Valla uri introdu ce s hi s recen t book "Soldiers - The Italian Ar med Forces from Armistice to L iberation" .This is the h istori ographic m ethod ,.ve i ntend to fo llo w in our commem o ration of the balll e o f Mignano Monte Lu ngo (Caserta), do i ng our b est no t to fa ll into hagiog ra phic d e viatio ns or in dul ge i n temptations of se ntimen tal "veteranis n1" .
General view ofthe ,'11onLe Lu11go area.
A short accou nt of the politicom ilitary s ituation of Italy at the moment of the action of M on te Lungo appears to be n ecessary, especially b ecause today, in the light o f m any new indisputable cognitive eleme nts, it is possible to q u estion some of t he "trut hs" accepted as such in the exclusive i nterest of a particu lar faction. T he fall of Fascism and the arm istice of S e pte mber 8, 1943, t \.vo inte rconnected occurrences of t he same cha in of events, are the indica t ion o f a projec t of pro ud repossess io n of the d ecision- m ak ing pmvers i ndispensable fo r disengagi ng Italy fro m the di sast rous a d venture of the war. Certainly the dram atic and confused circumsta n ces in \Vhich t he armistice \.Vas declared cause uncertainty, bewilderment, disor d ers and disheartenments . T h e sudden euphoria that p revails at the end of ¡the war is followed by t he i mmed iate an d fr ightful awareness t hat Italy has become the a rena of fierce fights betw een two o ppos i ng forces . T he Germans ar¡e d eten11ined to inflict a
105
OPERATIONS ON DECEMBER 8, 1943 PONTE 2° 1'£CC IA Q3 2(351)
~0\\E S.<.iiACOHO
d readfu l p u nishment to the al leged Italian treachery, \vhi le lhe Anglo-Americans intend to exploit the stra tegic and pol it ical s uccess deriving from the shattering of the Axis. The monslrous reality of t he collap se of the Insti tu tions suddenly looms on a disoriented and abanuoned people. ln that 1110ment, on th e brink of disaster, \vh en the Coun try's sovereignty and independence seem lost, the (irsl signs of the ·will to reac L to the defeat come to the surface and are expressed by a moral force, even rnore than by operational energy.
LONGIN G FOR REDEMPTION The i ndivid u al, at first, and then collective d etermination to revolt against violence, arrogance an d ou lrage springs from an armistice rcsulled fr-om negotiations sLarted an d conducted very inefficien tly by the I talian side and bad ly managed and carried ou t by the Allies. A premise to this \Vas the trans-
December 8, 1943: the attack on. Monte Lungo.
106
fer of King and Government to a free part: of the national terri tory, in ord er to ensur e the effective exercise of the institutional pow·crs and the correct a pplication of the armistice . Leaving ouL the criticism about its execution, the lransfer resp onds to an operational neccss iLy, as was pointed ou t by Vallauri in his book. The vagu eness of the orders and the lack of dear directions and operational instructions Lo the Italian units stationed in the Cou n Lr·y and abroad have dreadful conse-
quences. Clara Aga Rossi, professor of history a t the Un ivers ity of Ag u ila , i n her book "A Nat ion adrift", says that d uring the Lwo months after the armistice our Country lived in a con d ition of practical s uspens ion of the authority of the State. The t hesis of "death of the Motherland " and the emotional reaction of "everybody home!" , is limi ted in lime, concerns only a minority an d finds no convincing s ubstanlialion in the behaviour of the Nation's military and civil str u ctures which, on the contrary, show their w ill and capabil ity to fight fo r Lhe dignity of the Counlry. The actions of Rome at Porta San Paolo, o f Bari, Barletta and Taranto, just to mention a fe\,v, and the heroic sacri Gee of the Divisions deployed in Cep ha lon ia, Corftt, Dal matia and Albania, the firn1 and determined intervention of the units stationed in Sardinia and Corsica, are emblematic and fundamenta l fragments of the truth that emerges from the sediments of history The logic of unconditional s u rrend er, the m isgivings about the combat capab ilities of the Ital ian troops and their \Ni 11 Lo fight, restra in Lhe insistent requests o f the Italian a u thorities to participate in the operation s for t he lib -
eration of their soil from the Germans. H esitations and postponements on the one hand \vorse n the slate of depression but, on Lhe othe1~ make . lhe Italians even more determined on lbeir intenlion of entering the fight. Aclually, lhe Allied advance proceeds very slm-vly, bolh on the Tyrrhenian sector (U.S. 5th Ar my) and on the Adriatic side. Thi s is the consequence o f precise operational in ten lions. Afler the armistice, the pre-eminen t in le r es t of the Alli ed Supreme Command is to engage the largest possible n umber of German units, in order to k eep them away from other fronts . Furthermore lh e opera tio na l plans already approved e nvisage the employment of the Ita lian troops in auxiliary tasks . Very s ignificant, in lh is respect, is lhe ansvver given by General Harold Rupert Alexander, Commander o f th e O pe rati ons in the Mediterranean, to the proposal o f lbe Italian Supreme Command to deploy three Divisions, in order to speed up lhe liberation of Rome: The plans for the Italian campaign were lVorked out long ago and cannot be changed.
events that had occ urred after S eple mher 8 had made Italy a "de facto" cobell igerent. In Quebec, President Roosevelt, in a message LO Ch urchill, declares thal 1he Italians ,vill have to start [i-om nothing to gain all. On October 17, 1943, Gen eral l\ilaxwell Davenporl Taylor~ Chief of S laff o[ the 82 nd Airborne Div ision, with a message to the Ila.I ian General Staff, asks to prepare a Motorized Group of 5000 men.
j or Unit of the 5th U.S . Army commanded b y Gene ral Mark \Nayne Clark, is called to operate for the c onquest of Mignano Monte Lungo, a defensive Ger man buhva rk on the road to Cassino . Monte Lungo is a long, barren and rocky karstic r idge stretching out tO\vards Cassino w¡ith successive undulations. it looks like the back of a whale semi -immersed in the middle of the valley, slrad-
OPERATIONS ON DECEMBER 15-16, 1943
Q 345 (1>•3)
This is the beginning of the Italian redern ption.
THE ITALIAN TROOPS BECOME COBELLIGERENT OF THE ALLIES
THE FIRST ITALIAN MOTORIZED GROUP
Only after t he signature of the "long armistice" (September 30) and the d e claration of \Var against Germany (October 13) is ther e some propensity towards the employment of Italian troops in war operations against the Germans, togethe r with the Allies. The firm reference made by th e Italian Gover nm e nt to the promises of Quebec - concerning the modifications of the armistice conditions depending on the Italian conlrihution to the German d efeat - has a decisive e ffect. The allied powers, in facl, acknow le dge that the military
The Group, constituted in the area o f San Pietro Vernotico (Lecce), is entrusted to General Vincenzo Dapino. lt consists o f units of the "Legnano" Division (essentially, the 67 th Infantry R egiment), the "Mantova" and "Piceno" Divisions, the 51 sL Bersaglieri Cadet ballalion, the 11 t h Artillery Regiment, an antitank company and a m ixed company of Engineers and Services. Armament, munitions and Services \Vill have to be taken from the available Italian reso urces. The Group, s ubo rdinate to the U.S. 36 th "Texas" Divis io n, a Ma-
Q3S2
CO\.LE ~ESc1ir:ro
dli ng the Casilina road and the railway to Rome. A nasty bottleneck, it leads to the plain of the Rapido r iver and to the s ubsequent labyrinth of mountains w hich makes u p the Apen nine scenario. Here the advance of the Allies is blocked after ford ing the Vollurno near Capua. This operational theatre has a lways h een considered impe netrable for military operations aimed at reaching Rome. Vve can remember Lhat Hannibal , \.v ho vvas a skil ful s trategist, ref-rained from taking Rome in order to avoid finding himself in the deadly gorge o f lVIignano, where he knew that. Quintus Fabius Maximus , the Roman commander, was laying in wait, ready to destroy h im in that host of hills, torrent s and marshy ditches. But history and the pre cise knowledge of the 107
•
108
the adversaries
109
Attacking on the s1011v slopes
of k1oi11e
T,lll'lf!,0 .
ground arc nol the main factors o f the Allied armies' opernLional planning; as a matter of fact they th ink thal, ,-vith their power and abundant resources, also the u nsupprcssable orographic d irCicullies can be overcome. The task is even h arder if the enemy is the po,verful and well trained Ger1nan Ar rny, capable of moving sk ilfully on a d ifficult grou nd such as Lhis.
IN ACTION AT LAST!
On receiving lhe order for the a c tion at Mon te L u ngo, l he Grou p moves w ilh its vehicles to Presenzano, a little town near J\ilignano. A pouring and ice-cold rain and the congestion or the fronl compel t he u nits to make long and useless d eto u rs . From Presenzano, a t 10 p .m. of December 6, th e Group reaches on rool the starting pos itions of the a ttack, which is fixed for December 8at6: 15a.m. The object ives of the operation arc the conquest of l\tlonte Lungo
The starling line of the llt/ac/.::.
110
and its subsequ ent defensive organizat ion vvilh security and resistance lines . The action must take p lace b etween Road 6 (Casilina) on the r ight and the Peccia torren L on the left, following the ridge of the mount ain . The 14 1st a nd 14 2nd U.S . Regiments participate in the action and arc tasked with pro tec t ing the rlanks. If all goes ,,..•elI, the action must be continued . Th e preparation fire is entrnsted to
the Italian battery and , if necessary, will be supplemented by lhe American ar tillery. There is li ttle infor mation on the enemv. Alleged ly the h ig h gro und is 'occu pied by the 1sth armoured Grenadi er Regiment and e lements of the "Herman n Goeri ng" Division. The Command er of the 36L 11 U .S . Division , General \.\'alton Harris Walker, is perplexed abou t the data in h is possession regarding the real strength of t he defenders and th ei r fortifications, and on Decem ber 7 starts looking for a volu n tcc r ready to make a reconnaissan ce flight over the area of the attack. The future Lieu tenant of the Kingdom, Prince Humbert of Savoy, who is prcscn t and hears of the request, volu n teers for th e mission and, emulating the hghting will of the Italian soldiers, takes off aboard a jolting "S tork", a reconnaissance aircraft taken from the Germans and piloted by a n Ame r ican capt ain, and ma kes severa l low flights over the enemy positions, noting a strong cl eCensive line w ith numerous machi ne-gun nests, pro-
tecLed by sleepers taken from the railroad nearby. Tn the morning or December 8, as the attack is about W slai-l, a th ick rog shrouds Lhe battlefield
A DEMONSTRATION OF ITALIAN VALOUR
The in fantrymen of the 67 th Regiment and the "Bersagl ie ri " of the S 1st battalion attack the enemy po sitions and rapid ly reach Hill 343. All of a sudden the fog vanishes and a v iolenl machine -gun and mor tar fire breaks on the attackers, especia lly on those w ho have remained exposed. The advance is b locked, losses are heavy. The first company loses all its Officers. The Germans counterntlack the harassed un ils, forcing them to retreat to the starting positions. The voids are terrible, b ut nevertheless the enemy a t tack is contained. AL th e end of the clay, t he Group's losses are 47 dead, 102 wounded and 151 missing. The Allies shovv unanimous and cornrade ly ap preciation for the brave behaviour of the Italian troops, \.vho a lso face with determination the repeated, dogged defence o f lhe positions occupied on the slopes of Monte Lu ngo. A Jo t has been written and clehatecl on the reasons for the failure of December 8: scarce i nformation on the German defences, non-inler·venlion of the Ame,·ican infantry units, hasty planning. Bul the spi rit of sacrifice emerges over every problem, together ,v i Lh t h e courage and valour shown by the Italian soldiers. General \!\talker~ Commander of the 36 th Division, writes Lo Genernl Dapino: / learnt from rna.ny sources about the splendid behaviour of your troops 1vhen they artacked Monte Lungo. Please convey lo your O/Ticers and Troops my congratulations for 1he en thusiasm, the spirit and the magnificent courage they have shovvn.
When, on December 16, after correcting all t he mistakes remarked on tha t unfa,.;ourable day, the same troops renew the attack with unchanged enthu siasm and courage, Monte Lungo is co nquered and the Italian and American fl ags wave on the contested hills. The Commander of the 5 th Army, General Clark, in his message to the Group, incisively underlines this aspect by saying that this action shmvs th e delermina-
Uni ls of the / 81 Motoriz.ed Group 0 11 their \t'OY to M igna110 before the ba!lle.
I remember with emotion the heart- rending whi le crosses in the small graveyard between the rai lroad and the slopes of 1\!lonte Lungo . At that time, the Memoria l now ris ing among those legendary hills had not b een bu i I L yet. Today Lhe Mon u ment invites the Italians' memory and respecL for t he martyrs of the ne,v "Risorgimento", the second in our recent history. Very moving are the words carved on a large stone erected among the white crosses or Lh e Fal len of Monte Lungo : When for our disoriented broth ers to hope was
l ion of the Italian soldiers to free their Country from the German domination. A cletern,ination that can set an example to all the oppressed peoples of Europe.
vain and to fight 1,v as folly we, firs/ believers, rushed here and, undefeated, fell for you, Italy. If \Ve loved _vou more than our life, oh please, together with our names, entrust the 1nountnin of' our (aith, 1vhere vve bu.ried, elo-
CONCLUSIONS
quent, lie, lo our hrotlzers for ever
l\•lonte Lungo righ tly marks t he beg inning of t he redemp tion of the Italian Army and of the whole Nation . The u nits ,,v hich struggled for the rocks of th a t s teep moun tain against the occ upying forces \vii] soon b e come a real Army, fig hting with pride, dignity and courage in order to achieve the most longedfor goal: the freedom of t h e Motherland.
reborn. In that d istant December 1943, many tears ran dm,v n the faces of the fighters, young of age but seasoned soldiers, many hearts ,,v ere proud, many un iforms reappeared.
• :.Former infantrv Lieute11n11t ivirh rhe 210th Auxiliarv Division al Mignano i\llonre Lungo and Monte ivfarrcme 111
SOMMARIO SUMMARY SOMMAIRE INHALT RESUMEN SUMARIO
La sicurezza si evolve al mutare della minaccia, di Maurizio Coccia (p. 2). Purtroppo, le r adici del male si ripropongono a ogn i generazione. La rninaccia e l'aspettativa di un pericolo reale e incom bcnte, procurato da soggelli che originano atti ostili. La sicurezza e u n a s ituazione nella qu ale la persona vive in assenza di rischi, conducendo in tranquillita la propria vita privata e di relazion e. Pi1) che rnai in prima linea, nel conseguimento degli obiettivi, gli apparati m ilitari stanno perseguenclo varie linee di tendenza: ridurre le perdite proprie e dei civili, contenere .le percli te awersarie, dislruggere molto poco. Anche perche i danni verrebbero pagati dal vincitore. Verso un u1teriore ordine mondiale, di Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (p. 22). Il mondo bipolare h a lasciato un relaggio esistenle ancora oggi, che e indispensabile con oscere e capire per costruire il prossimo ordine moncliale. Le scelte 112
economiche e politiche degl i anni 70 e 80 hanno determinato conseguenzc decisive per inlere aree del pianeta. TI processo di assestarnento e tuttora in a lto . I pr ossimi anni saranno determinanti per stabi lire, fi n alrnentc, il nuovo equili bria internazionale. A patto, perc'i, che gli Stati e le Organizzazioni Tnternazionali si confrontino sui grandi temi delle r isorse c dei diritti umani. La speranza e quella di u na reak occasione d i crescita per lutto ii mondo, in un contesto di stabilifa e di sicurezza collettiva.
LA «NATO Response Force», di Salvatore Farina (p. 32). La nuova realta e la NATO Response Force (Forza di Risposta della NATO), prontamente irnpiegabile, che va a completare le capacita di reazionc dei Cornandi ad Alta Prontezza (HRF HQ) . l n grado d i operare nelle tre dirnensioni , posla sotto corn ando congiunto, sara a regime nel 2006 c avra una consisten za di 20 000 rnilitari. II tenace volo di «Nibbio 1 » , di Giorgio Battisti (38). La Task Force «Nibbio I» era b asata sul 9° reggimenlo alpini clella Brigata «Taurinense», ri n forzato da personale di altre Armi e Corpi. I militari hanno prevenuto e contras lalo efficacemente il tcrrorismo,
conlribuen do in modo dcterminan te alla ricostruzione morale, sociale e materialc di un popolo c he soffriva da lungo tempo i peggiori pa timenti. Vediamo come, tra disagi, r ischi e sacrifici, il nostro contingentc ha saputo guadagnarsi la stima e la con sidcrazione della popolazione e degl i alleati.
Genti e radici dell' Asia Centrale, di Giovanni Bucciol (p. 56 ). Sona riunili in un blocco geografico omogeneo i sette Stati che terminano con ii suffisso persiano «stan», che vuol dire «terra di» . Essi sono Afghanistan, Kazakistan, Kirghizistan, Pakistan, Tagikistan, Turkmenistan e Uzbekistan. Da li passavano, fino a mezzo m illennia fa, le vecchie vie clella seta e dclle spezie. Mercanti e popoli m isteriosi percorsero le piste carovaniere chc aiutarono la nascita di antiche civilta. Eserciti del passato e cond ottieri famosi le batterono: da Ciro il Grande a Dario d i Persia, cla Alessandro Magno ad Attila, da Gengis Khan a Tamcrlano. I.:Asia centralc torna oggi nuovarnente al la ribal ta. TVla forse alla ribalta vi c sempre stata, con tutta la sua storia e le su e multiformi realta. Le forze terrestri a base delle operazioni di stabilizzazione
SOMMARIO SUMMARY SOMMAIRE INHALT RESUMEN SUMARIO e ricostruzione, di Giuseppe Maggi (p. 64). Mediante un'analisi ad ampio giro d'orin.onte, esam iniamo come l'attuale configurazione dell'Esercito I taliano e le capacita operative da esso esprimibili, sono attagliate all'evolvere dei compili e dei rischi che e chiarnato a fronteggiare nei teatri d'irnpiego, con particolare rifcrimento alle operazioni di stabilizzazione e ricostruzione. Gli approfondimenti sono supporlati da un confronto con gli studi in atto presso l'Esercito american o, per r icavarn e a nalogie, scostamenti e inediti spunti di riflessione. Bonificare per vivere, di Salvatore Gravante (p. 74). Dai Secondo dopoguerra fino ai nostri giorni, la bonifica da ordigni esplosivi e stato un problema con il quale ha dovuto confrontarsi ogni societa uscita cla conOit ti di vario genere. Ecco come i genieri dell'Esercito Italiano hanno saputo evolversi e fare scuola in Ital ia e nel mondo. Carlisle fucina di Comandanti, di Pietro Serino (p. 86 ). Entriamo in uno dei p it:1 esclusivi centri di studi militari de] rnondo per conoscere come l'Esercito degli Stati Unit i d'America prepara i migliori dirigenti e coma ndanli. I prograrnm i di studio e le
tecn iche d'insegnamento, estremarnente innovativi, sono creati appositamente per estrarre, dai principali fatt i vissuti dal genere umano, utili am maestrarnenti peril futuro professionale e per la societa. L'immortale fascino dell'uniforme, di Giuliano Ferrari (p. 96). Quelli che a prima vista potrebbero apparire sem plici accessori hann o spiegazione in uti lita ataviche per i comballenti. Essi vanno dalla protezione all'esaltazione della figura dcl gucrriero, dal riconoscirnento per le imprese di valore alla gratificazione sociale. Alcuni di questi particolari, pur avendo perso la loro funzione originaria, rimangono quasi come relitti evolutivi che, non piLL usati, sono portatori di significati etici che e bene conoscere e che sono stati considerati per progettare i corredi delle clonne soldato. Tutto ricomincio a Monte Lungo, di Girolamo Garonna (p. 104). Dall'8 al 16 dicernbre 1943, con la bauaglia di l'vlignano Monte Lungo, l'Esercito Ttaliano avvio l'atteso Secondo Risorgimento morale e materiale della Patria. I nostri solclati, clopo aver conquistato la fiducia degli anglo-americani, si guadagnarono sul campo la vittoria e il rango di
cobelligeranti. 11 senso del dovere e i sentimcnti dei giovani di allora, soldati d i u n'Ital ia in rinnovamen to, rivivono oggi nei [atti e anche nelle parole di alcuni dei protagonisti.
Security Evolves with the Changing Threat, by Maurizio Coccia (p. 2). Unfortunately, the roots of evi l come up again with every generation. The threat is the expectancy of a real and imminent clanger brought about by fellows who carry out hostile actions. Security is a situation in which a person lives in absence of risks, peacefully leading his privale and relation life. More than ever in the front line for the achievemen t of the targets, the military apparata are pursuing various trend lines: reducing both one's own and civilian casualties; shrin king enemy's losses; destroy as little as possible. Also because the damages \-v ould be paid by the winner. Towards a New World Orde1~ by Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi (p. 22). The bipolar world has left a heritage still-existing today, 113