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Guzmán Loera in Culiacán. The GN and other elements captured Sinaloa Cartel leader Ovidio Guzmán, yet the violent Sinaloa Cartel reaction forced the government to release him.80 As Camp points out, the Mexican military lacks a strong core of noncommissioned officers and corruption tends to come from the command level. The GN is “more of the same,” a “military culture” in “civilian police” force.81 The training has tended to be military not law enforcement oriented, and while a “good concept, it has not been implemented well.” Camp further questions what this militarization means for the future of Mexican democratization.

The dangers of the militarization of Mexican law enforcement in the form of the Mexican GN include the increased use of torture. Recent studies have shown that torture by the military is widespread and there are gendered forms of violence in the torture reported, including women being more likely to be subject to rape and sexual violence.82 DanielWeiszArgomedo argues in his forthcoming doctoral dissertation that while the new GN was meant to be a civilian body, it is de facto a continuation of militarization of Mexico’s security.83 The GN suffered from accusations of human rights abuses, many of them gendered in nature, from its inception by constitutional amendment in March 2019. Human rights organizations such asAmnesty International produced reports as early as a year and a half from the GN inception on these issues.84

As Coste argues, Mexico has not fundamentally changed its civil-military relations during its democratic process. For example, while the military defers to civilian leadership, military leaders are derived from the military leadership class, not from a cadre of competent civilian elites.85 As Tony Payan points out, the Mexican population approves of the military, but would “rather the troops remain in their barracks.”86

80 Azam aHmeD, «The Stunning Escape of El Chapo’s Son: It’s Like ‘a Bad Netflix Show’», New York Times, online, 18 October 2019.

81 RodericcamP,«RodericCamponNationalGuard»,interviewbyNathanP.Jones,Telephone, 18 May 2022.

82 Abraham sáncHez ruIz, Carlos meJía reyes, and Marco Antonio camacHo ruIz, «Patrones de género en las prácticas de tortura cometidas por las Fuerzas Armadas de México (20112019) », América Latina Hoy, Vol. 88, 31August 2021, pp. 81-99.

83 Cit. WeIsz argomeDo, War on Women.

84 Duncantucker, «La Guardia Nacional está rompiendo su juramento de respetar los derechos humanos », Amnistía Internacional, online, 8 November 2020.

85 Jacques coste, «Columna Invitada: El Ejército y La Democracia En México», ADNPolítico, online, 25 May 2022.

86 Tony Payan, «Why Mexico’s Military Is Fighting the Country’s Drug War», Chron Baker In-

The Guardia Nacional is still maturing. It has effectively replaced the Policía Federal and component Gendarmería and is working toward developing a comprehensive preventive federal police capacity. In doing so, it must develop solid linkages with the PGR and PFM, especially enhancing investigative liaison and interface. The same is true of the need to co-ordinate activities with state preventive and investigative (ministerial or judicial police). The GN must also develop solid interoperability with both SEDENAand SEMAR forces. This interoperability is essential. First, it is needed as the GN builds its own internal command and control capacities and organizational ethos. Second, it is essential because Mexico remains a fragile state, challenged by corruption, impunity, and criminal enclaves where CAGs exercise territorial control.

In addition, mechanisms for combatting corruption, ensuring transparency, and developing the doctrine at tactical, operational, and strategic levels necessary to combat endemic insecurity, that challenges state solvency are essential. This will require support from the armed forces (FF. AA.) for the foreseeable future, as the situation still entails profound challenges to the state and mechanisms of internal security. Much like the debates over the formation of the Gendarmería under Enrique Peña Nieto, the current and future administration needs to sustain public debate in order to achieve constitutional balance.And as always, security is a prerequisite to effective public debate--the military has a continuing role until the civil police infrastructure is mature enough to operate alone.87

As the GN matures, it is essential to recall that gendarmerie or constabulary forces can fill the gap between community police and the military. Just as the military fills the security void when CAGs directly confront the state, gendarmeries (formed police forces) can help stabilize the situation and enable the development of community police. Stability police forces are better suited to the policing mission than their counterparts in the mainstream military.As seen in France, Italy, and elsewhere gendarmeries and the carabinieri have a long tradition of operating within a civil context while bringing the ability to integrate with the military during times of crisis or war.As Sullivan noted in 2013, “Modern formed police units (FPUs), also known as Stability Police Units (SPUs) like the French Gendarmerie or Italian Carabinieri fill the interstitial void in stitute Blog, online, 6 June 2013.

87 JohnP.sullIVan,«Mexico’smilitaryplaysanecessaryroleininternalsecurity», Chron Baker Institute Blog, online, 4 June 2013.

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capabilities found in complex situations at the intersection between crime and war.”88

Unfortunately, as interviews and opensource reporting indicates, the current trajectory of the GN, (March 2019-May 2022) is one of militarization, e.g., the military pays 80% of all salaries and is the only source of recruitment for new officers. Attrition amongst the LE trained FP (absorbed into the GN) is high, suggesting a limited influence. If there are not significant changes to incorporate the policies recommended in the next section, the GN will not be able to fulfill its goals as a genuine gendarmerie force.

Criminal enclaves, such as narco-cities or criminal-states, challenge police and law enforcement agencies.They do so at several levels. First, they do so tactically on the ground when the CAGs dominate the local eco-system and challenge local and municipal governments and the police. Next, they challenge the solvency of the state by using violence and corruption to penetrate state organs and erode confidence in the police (and the state) leading to rampant insecurity and impunity. Violence is often the primary tool, but corruption and impunity are the actual deep threat, especially at the operational level where their corrosive effects diminish perception of legitimacy as the criminal bands and state organs engage in a battle for competitive control.

Law enforcement and police are essential to restoring and maintaining order and stability. To do so, they require the capacity to act and a force structure optimized to address the criminal armed threat posed by CAGs. This means having an agile, adaptive organization that is responsive to the community while having the means to effectively combat high intensity criminal attacks. Since the various CAGs use military TTPs and weapons, often in infantry formations (and increasingly using drones/unmanned aerial systems) to achieve combined arms capabilities, the police require enhanced skills and equipment.

From a strategic perspective, the GN, by embracing a gendarmerie or constabulary framework have the potential to meet the ‘hybrid’ needs posed by criminal conflicts. This will require both intra-conflict policing, and transitional justice capabilities when restoring order to criminal enclaves that were dominated by CAGs. This will also require developing and sustaining effective rule of law oversight mechanisms, reinforcing civilian and judicial oversight, and developing effective intelligence to inform operations strong interoperability and co-operation with state and municipal police and the PGR and its PFM, as well as liaison with international police and investigative entities involved in counter-cartel and counter-gang operations.89

88 John P. sullIVan, «The benefits of a paramilitary force in Mexico», Chron Baker Institute Blog, online, 4 January 2013.

The Guardia Nacional has the potential to provide Mexico with the foundation for police reform while also providing a viable capacity to address the threat posed by CAGs, especially criminal cartels and territorial gangs. To do so, the GN needs to enhance its interaction and interoperability with Mexico’s other law enforcement and police agencies. In doing so, it needs to enhance its capacity for community policing and interaction with communities ranging from dense urban barrios to rural colonias. This will require institutionalizing transparency and enhancing civilian control while retaining the specialized military skills and capacity needed to address high intensity, militarized violence by CAGs. The GN will also need to deepen its investigative and forensic capabilities, build liaison and interoperability with the PGR and state prosecutors and their investigative arms—the PFM and state ministerial police.

The GN will also need to enhance its internal corruption control mechanisms and build a solid internal career path for commanders and technical specialists. This will entail a high level of training that can be aided by building training and mentorship relationships with other police forces with military status including the aforementioned Gendarmerie Nationale and Carabinieri, as well as the Dutch Koninklijke Marechaussée, Spanish Guardia Civil, and other forces within the European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR).90

Training GN members in peacekeeping operations and rule of law precepts, as well as in depth legal training on human rights law and IHLare also necessary

89 See John P. sullIVan and Keith Weston, «Afterward: Law Enforcement Response Strategies for Criminal-states and Criminal-soldiers», Global Crime, Vol. 7, No. 3-4, August-November 2006, pp. 615-628; John P. sullIVan, «Establishing the Rule of Law/CivPol», in Manolis PrInIotakIs (Ed.), Countering Insurgency and Promoting Democracy, Washington, DC, Council for Emerging National SecurityAffairs (CENSA), 2007. pp. 108-121.

90 These EUROGENFOR police forces with military status are the Gendarmerie Nationale (France), Guardia Nacional Republican (Portugal), Koninklijke Marechaussee (Netherlands), Arma dei Carabinieri (Italy), Jandarmeria Română (Romania), Guardia Civil (Spain), and Żandarmeria Wojskowa (Poland).

Forza alla legge. Studi storici su Carabinieri, Gendarmerie e Polizie Armate 438 to enhance the functioning of the force.This could include training at the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), Interpol, and co-operative training with UN Civil Police (Civpol) and other stability police forces. Finally, the GN needs to establish a professional development and education component and share that training with its partner agencies in Mexico and other nations facing similar gangs and organized crime threats involving CAGs.

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