Naval and Maritime Tools for Present Geo-economics and Economic Warfare, by Adm. Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte “

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by Adm. Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte

introduction

When speaking of economic war, it is worth recalling that, according to one among the most valuable scholars of this strategic phenomenon, «it can pursue different aims: political, strategic and economic. When it pursues political aims, economy is used as a weapon to induce the other states, through embargoes and sanctions to heed to the will of (the nation) which uses it. It pursues strategic aims when it proposes to make unavailable to a potential adversary critical products and technologies, through the so-called strategic embargoes, or when it aims, during a conflict, to deprive the adversary of the needed supplies. It pursues economic aims when a state pursues the increase of its citizens’ welfare or its own wealth»1 .

If we consider these three types of economic war, we might say that the first implies essentially an offensive strategy, while the other two imply, according to circumstances, both offensive and defensive approaches. The «rule of the thumb» says that when a nation is powerful and wealthy, her first concern will be to defend and protect her status.

Competing nations will try to undermine her, being helped, when required, by smaller states, the «underdogs» who will strive to get some benefits from their collaborative efforts. Of course, the intended victim will react, initially «in kind», thus undertaking initiatives in the economic domain, in order to thwart the enemy offensive, by depriving him of the required financial means, before recurring to force.

The maritime domain is quite peculiar: few nations can be classified as «Maritime Powers», while others will most often succumb to the formers, in case of conflict, due to starvation and deprivation of resources. This

1 Carlo Jean, Geopolitica, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1995, p. 142.

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process, taking quite some time, has, however, seen several instances in History.

But, which are the driving requisites for a nation, to be classified as «Maritime Power»? To be included among these powers, a nation must hold, at least in part, what is called, since the early years of the XIX century, the «Sea Power».

the concept of sea power

The sea, in Strategy, has always been characterized by the fact of being an integrated environment, where all human activities, be they military or commercial, lawful or criminal, peaceful or adversarial, take place at the same time, and often in the same place.

Of course, in the origins, not all groups, involved in the activities mentioned above, started using the sea at the same time. In fact, «man’s use of the World Ocean over many centuries led to the creation of merchant and fishing fleets, which led in turn to the expansion of trade and the construction of numerous bases and ports. (Later) the seas and the oceans have for long been a specific area of rivalry and armed conflict, entailing the creation of special arms systems and the birth of forces subsumed under the term Navy»2 .

From the quotation above, the sequencing of the man’s drive toward sea activities in quite clear, and it is easy to understand the strict correlation between commercial and military activities in the maritime domain, leading to the concept of «Sea power». This concept, first expressed by an officer of the Neapolitan Navy of king Joachim Murat, Giulio Rocco, and later developed by Mahan, can nowadays be defined as «the totality of the means of harnessing the World Ocean and the means of defending the interests of the state, when rationally combined, (which) constitute the sea power of the state, (and) determines the capacity of a particular country to use the military-economic possibilities of the ocean for its own purposes»3 .

It easy to imagine what kind of interests attract the governments’ at-

2 Sergei G. Gorshkov. The Sea Power of the State. Pergamon Press, 1979, p. ix. 3 Ibid.

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tention to the sea, as its economic importance is vital for their nations’ wealth. On this aspect, nobody was able to provide a better description than Mahan, who noted, more than one century ago, that: «sea power primarily depends upon commerce, which follows the most advantageous road; military control follows upon trade for its furtherance and protection. Except as a system of highways, joining country to country, the sea is an unfruitful possession. The sea, or water, is the great medium of circulation established by nature, just as money has been evolved by man for the exchange of products. Change the flow of either in direction or amount, and you modify the political and industrial relations of mankind»4 .

This statement reflects what, in more recent times, has been widely acknowledged about the strict correlation between force and wealth. Speaking in more general terms, for instance, Paul Kennedy highlighted that «wealth is usually needed to underpin military power, and military power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth»5 .

This is even more true for sea-going activities as, in our days, the economic importance of the sea has incommensurably increased, as compared to Mahan times, since man has been able to exploit the riches of the sea-bottom. But the teaching by these strategists is, in sum, the explanation of the dynamics of human activities in this environment, which, several years later, is still the same.

The main remark about these dynamics is that trade and extraction activities tend to proceed preferably, as Mahan said, along the «most advantageous route» which is always the “line of least resistance”, thus avoiding sea areas where conflicts and hostile actions are present. When Columbus declared to «seek the Levant through the West» he meant precisely this, as the direct route to China was de facto curtailed by the Ottoman Empire.

Of course, the entrepreneurs call for assistance of their parent Navies only when they cannot avoid turbulent areas any more, even if they do it reluctantly, as they hate being constrained in their freedom of movement by the Admiralties. Navies, in turn, follow trade and exploitation activities, and protect them from threats, as much as they can.

4 Alfred Thayer Mahan. Naval Strategy. Ed. Little, Brown & Co., 1911, p. 139. 5 Paul Kennedy, The rise and fall of the Great Powers. Fontana Press, 1988, p. xvi.

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Which are the elements of sea power? As said before, the Navies are the first element, ensuring protection, imposing embargoes and controlling the seas, in order to prevent, deter and defeat all possible «asymmetric acts of war», as piracy, besides countering their competitors’ initiatives.

The second element, also mentioned above, is the merchant fleet. Nowadays, though, the majority of vessels have escaped Nations’ control, as the use of «flags of convenience» is increasingly widespread. This causes problems to the Navies, whose legitimacy of action, in what is called «Police of the High Seas» is mostly limited to the protection of their own nations’ trade.

Not by chance, to overcome this impasse, in 2005 the US Chief of Naval Operations called for «a thousand-ship navy, a fleet-in-being, if you will, made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world. Can you imagine the possibilities if we work toward increased interoperability through more standardized training, procedures, and command and control protocols? This thousand-ship navy would integrate the capabilities of the maritime services to create a fully interoperable force, an international city at sea. This calls for a new—or maybe not so new, but very different—image of sea power»6 .

His proposal was quickly dubbed as «Global Navy protecting global trade», and went not completely unheeded, notwithstanding the widespread reluctance by maritime nations to protect vessels hoisting flags of convenience. In fact, for instance, the EU-led Operation ATALANTA has protected vessels belonging to the World Food Program, regardless of their flag.

The third element of sea power, often forgotten, is the port system: trade must reach the country of destination of the goods, and ports are the indispensable interface between land and sea, apart from being bases for the fleets. Not by chance, China bases its «New Silk Road» on these infrastructures, and attempts to acquire ports also in the Mediterranean.

6 Adm. Michael Mullen, «USN. A Global Network of Nations for a Free and Secure Maritime Commons», in Report of the Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Sea power

Symposium. US Naval Institute Proceedings, 2006, p. 7.

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Conflicts at sea and their approaches

Even if the wealth potential offered by sea is immense, historically not all populations have been able to cut their fair share out of it. Therefore, since most ancient times, man has always sought to acquire wealth at the expenses of others, and the economic importance of commercial activities at sea has brought groups of individuals as well as states to seek cutting off competitors from them, thus leading to the «rivalry and armed conflicts» mentioned by Gorshkov.

The character of these conflicts, taking place at sea in our times, is often peculiar. While in the past recourse to open war was the norm, now nations have become more prudent in committing themselves directly. As a scholar noted, «from 1945 to 1985, about 155 marginal wars have erupted. These conflicts, known to be at low-intensity, have taken place in (great powers’) zones of influence. Instead of acting with their own forces, they have used indirect means, tactical or strategic, And in them, most frequently, the economic reasons or pretexts have been mixed with political motivations: protectionism, limitations, bans, interventions of multi-national companies»7 .

These approaches, notwithstanding the fact that they imply limited human losses, cannot be necessarily considered to be soft: especially when, in particular, these bans are «used as alimentary weapon, they can have dramatic effects, (thus they) spark brutal reactions, up to the level of military intervention»8, or other types of retaliation.

The embargoes against former Yugoslavia, for instance, led to a number of attempts, by Serbia, to oppose the UN-led fleets enforcing it, in order to ensure safe passage of her vital supplies, and only the visible disproportion of forces restrained her from fighting openly against them.

In our days, due to the situation where sea power is the prerogative of relatively few nations, also the opponents of maritime powers tend to use indirect approaches. This has led, in particular, to the re-birth of an ancient system, i.e. piracy, which is often sponsored by groups or nations, to harass opponents and impoverish them, as in the past.

The inevitable reaction of maritime powers has been able to contain this

7 André Vigarié, La Mer et la Géostratégie des Nations. Ed. Economica, 1995, pp. 7-8. 8 Ibid.

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threat, but the consequences have nonetheless been significant, in terms of commodity prices, and – even more – in the impoverishment of nations whose revenues mostly derived from sea trade, due to the adoption, by merchant vessels, of different routes, far away from them. The instance of Egypt is relevant: when ship-owners decided to avoid the sea area of the Gulf of Aden, plagued by piracy, thus ordering their vessels to follow the route of the Cape of Good Hope, transits through the Suez Canal dwindled, and Egypt experienced significant economic troubles.

Another bone of contention is the attempt, by some nations, to ensure their dominion of the Exclusive Economic Zones off their coasts and especially around islands, placed in oil-rich areas, as the Spratly-Paracel archipelagos, and for the control of passages, some among them being economically vital for littoral nations. On the latter issue, the care taken by India to militarize the Andaman and Nicobar islands, controlling the Straits of Malacca, is a powerful instance of the importance of “Choke Point control”9 for economic warfare at sea.

the Western approaches to maritime economic war

Western official documents, related to Defense and Security, do focus mostly on the warfighting role of the Navies; nonetheless, they are quite clear on the Navies’ role to defend prosperity and trade, while carefully avoiding – with only one exception, as we will see - any reference to offensive forms of economic warfare. This does not mean, however, that Western nations have used their Navies only for defensive purposes: a tentative list of instances where Navy assets were used, independently or in support to operations on land, in furtherance of economic aims, is provided in Annex.

There is no doubt, in fact, that nowadays the economic maritime war sees Western countries mostly focused on protecting their own economic interests, as a first step, before shifting to the offensive. The struggle, for the West, in this economic war, within the maritime environment, is therefore declared to be mainly defensive, at least in official and semi-official

9 Pier Paolo Ramoino, Fondamenti di Strategia navale. Ed. Forum di Relazioni Internazionali, 1999, p. 81.

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documents, while carefully avoiding any reference to offensive economic warfare at sea.

Already in 2002, a semi-official document, published under the auspices of the French Navy, noted that: «the exchanges of goods through maritime lanes represent today more than 5 billion tons per year, i.e. almost 80% of international commerce. These flows are vitally important for the world economy. And this situation increases year after year: they increase constantly by 5% annually. This explosion of commercial traffic includes raw materials, and notably oil products, but also high technology goods and the food supply of nations»10 .

To this aim, the role of the French Navy was identified as follows: «having to face emerging threats (terrorism, piracy, illegal migration) the need exists to achieve a dynamic approach, as close as possible to the (sources of) threats or trafficking, ready to disclose the precursory signals»11 .

This was confirmed by the US National Security Strategy, in 2010, where it says that: «Across the globe, we must work in concert with allies and partners to optimize the use of shared sea, air, and space domains. These shared areas, which exist outside exclusive national jurisdictions, are the connective tissue around our globe upon which all nations’ security and prosperity depend. The United States will continue to help safeguard access, promote security, and ensure the sustainable use of resources in these domains. These efforts require strong multilateral cooperation, enhanced domain awareness and monitoring, and the strengthening of international norms and standards. We must work together to ensure the constant flow of commerce, facilitate safe and secure air travel, and prevent disruptions to critical communications. We must also safeguard the sea, air, and space domains from those who would deny access or use them for hostile purposes. This includes keeping strategic straits and vital sea lanes open, improving the early detection of emerging maritime threats,

10 Bleu Marine. Enjeux et Perspectives pour la Marine d’aujourd’hui. Ed. Perrin, Marine

Nationale, 2002, pp. 16-17. 11 Ibid. p. 46.

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denying adversaries hostile use of the air domain, and ensuring the responsible use of space»12 .

More recently, the US Navy has issued another document, a Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. In the Preface, it starts by saying that: «Sea-power has been and will continue to be the critical foundation of national power and prosperity and international prestige for the United States of America»13 .

In the following pages, the document indicates how the US Navy will prevent threats from materializing, and calls for what had already been said by the CNO in 2005, and quoted above: «Forward naval presence is essential to strengthening alliances and partnerships, providing the secure environment necessary for an open economic system based on the free flow of goods, protecting U.S. natural resources, promoting stability, deterring conflict, and responding to aggression. As global maritime commerce expands, populations increase, competition for energy and natural resources grows, and advanced military technologies proliferate across the oceans and through the littoral, so too will challenges arise for anyone operating in those regions»14 .

The maritime situation, as seen by the US Navy, includes economic threats to the Nation, as: «Under-governed areas ashore create conditions for regional instability ranging from piracy and illicit waterborne trafficking to support for terrorist activity. Through the concerted efforts of U.S. naval forces and our global partners, piracy is currently on the decline off the Horn of Africa, yet it remains a concern around West Africa, especially in the Gulf of Guinea and on the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This regional instability threatens global economic stability in a hyper-connected world and underscores the need for a global network of navies that leverages the best capabilities of participating states»15 .

12 US National Security Strategy, 2010, pp. 49-50. 13 US Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea-power, March 2015, page ii. 14 Ibid., p. iii. 15 Ibid., p. 4.

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Even more interesting is another statement, where it provides an assessment on the economic importance of the sea: «Skyrocketing demand for energy and resources, as evidenced by a projected 56 percent increase of global energy consumption by 2040, underscores the criticality of the free flow of commerce through strategic maritime crossroads including the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, as well as the Panama and Suez Canals. Although the United States is exporting more energy than it imports for the first time in decades, we remain tied to the global economy that depends on the uninterrupted supply of oil and gas from the Middle East and Central Asia. This uninterrupted supply can be placed at risk due to rising political instability and regional conflict»16 .

The role of the Navy in economic warfare is described as follows: «Forward naval forces employ a full spectrum of layered capabilities for the destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, and protection of vital sea lanes, including ports of embarkation and debarkation, which enables strategic sealift and facilitates the arrival of follow-on forces»17 .

It is interesting to note that, in this aggressive quotation, the only mention of offensive economic operations, for the suppression if enemy sea commerce, is made in an official document, unlike what had been stated in the past.

In the United Kingdom National Security Strategy, issued in 2015, the Prime Minister, in his foreword, stated clearly that, among the main security requirements his nation cannot leave unaddressed, «we need the sea lanes to stay open and the arteries of global commerce to remain free flowing»18 .

In accordance with this statement, the document reaffirms the British commitment to participate to the protection of maritime trade: «Together with our allies, our Diplomatic Service and our Armed Forces contribute to global stability and help secure the trade routes vital to our economy –

16 Ibid., p. 6. 17 Ibid., p. 22. 18 UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. A Secure and

Prosperous United Kingdom, November 2015, p. 5.

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for example, working with partners to counter piracy. This supports global prosperity and poverty reduction, and makes it easier and safer for British businesses to operate and trade overseas»19 .

All in all, it is quite clear that, in the maritime environment, Western nations declare to be on the defensive, against «asymmetric threats» endangering sea trade. As already recalled, no «National Security Strategy», in fact, dares to openly state the willingness of the government to use the naval forces to pursue economic offensive aims.

Conclusions

All in all, an endless struggle to reap the most benefits from the sea is ongoing. Nobody knows whether the conflict potential of this dispute might degenerate into open war, and maritime nations have a great responsibility to prevent, contain and avoid them. This, coupled to the increasing concern for illegal activities, is the reason why many nations and groups of them, as the EU, are placing great emphasis on «Maritime Surveillance», the pre-requisite of control of the sea spaces.

Behind this curtain, though, Navies have demonstrated their importance to influence events at sea, especially when economic disputes, conflicts and wars erupt. This is something no government dares to declare beforehand, but that it is more frequent than one might believe.

19 Ibid. p. 73.

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ANNEX RECENT ECONOMIC CONFLICTS AT SEA

Algerian war. (1954-1962) Anti-weapons smuggling patrol by the French Navy, through the use of 45 PCs, supported by Destroyers and Frigates, to thwart weapons supplies to FLN; Suez Campaign (1956-57). Following the nationalization, by Egyptian President Gamal

Abdel NASSER, of the Suez Canal Company, an Anglo-French contingent landed in

Port Said, on November 5, and occupied the whole Canal area, (Operation MUSKET-

EER). The financial consequences competed the two governments to negotiate a ceasefire, and, later, to withdraw the forces in March 1957; Cuban embargo and crisis (1962). The USA declare, on February 7, a total embargo against Cuba, followed, on October 22, by a “Naval Quarantine”. US Navy forces are deployed to stop the Russian merchant vessels carrying short-range ballistic missiles bound to the island, until an agreement between the USA and the Soviet Union is successfully negotiated, and the embargo is lifted on November 20; Beira Patrol. (1966-1975) Oil embargo enforcement against South Rhodesia, by two

British frigates or destroyers permanently on station, with the support of land and carrier-based surveillance aircraft and auxiliary vessels. In addition, various British warships cruised the Mozambique Channel 20–45 miles (32–72 km) from Beira and checking on oil tankers heading for the port, starting on March 1st; Cod Wars. (1958-1976). One-two British frigates permanently on station against Icelandic Coast Guard cutters, to protect British fishing vessels operating in Icelandic self-declared EEZ; The Fishery dispute of the “Mamelon” (1951-1988). One-two Italian corvettes/minesweepers permanently on station, with Frigates in support, in periods of increased tension, to protect Italian fishing vessels, against Tunisian patrol boats; The Lobster war. (1962-1963). One French destroyer to protect French fishing vessels, against Brazilian Coast Guard cutters, supported by the whole Brazilian fleet, thus forcing the French unit to withdraw, to be replaced by a smaller unit; Biafra blockade (1968-1969). The Nigerian Navy carries out, since June, the naval blockade of the coasts of Biafra, in order to thwart secession, until December 24 of the following year; The Fonseca patrol (1979- continues). The US Navy carried out a patrol to prevent weapons smuggling in favor of Nicaraguan rebels since 1984. From 1990 to 1992

Argentinian patrol boats with helicopter support, under UN-led ONUCA command, countering weapons’ smuggling and preventing commando actions off Nicaragua, during the civil war in that country. Later, the dispute on EEZ has caused repeated confrontations among nations bordering the gulf; Iran-Iraqi war (1980-1988). During this conflict, numerous attacks against oil terminals and tankers belonging to several nations are carried out by both parties. The US Navy starts escorting her nation’s tankers, until the end of the conflict;

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Embargo against former Yugoslavia (1992-1996). Following UN Security Council

Resolution 757 of May 31, 1992, the WEU and, shortly later, NATO enforced a selective embargo against former Yugoslavian states. Nine to ten frigates/destroyers were permanently on station, and two ‘close encounters’ with Serbian Navy took place; Allied Force. (1999) During the NATO-led air campaign against Serbia, NATO Standing naval forces patrolled the southern Adriatic sea to insect vessels bound to Montenegrin ports and to monitor activities of the Serbian Navy, from June to August of that year, in response to threats voiced by the Serbian government to disrupt merchant traffic in the basin; Ambalat dispute (2005-2009). Malaysian and Indonesian warships patrolled contested waters, claimed by both nations as part of their own EEZ, until Indonesia deployed her whole fleet; Spratly-Paracel dispute (1974-continues). Warships from China, Vietnam and Philippines patrol the contested area, in support of their EEZ claims; Operations ATALANTA and OCEAN SHIELD. (2008-continue). Two naval forces, one under EU and the other under NATO leadership, patrol the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, to protect merchant vessels from pirates’ attacks; Senkaku-Diaou dispute (2012-continues). Japanese and Chinese warships and Coast

Guard vessel confront each other in the waters off these islands, claimed by both nations.

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a Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Foreword.

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operation allied Force: Die wichtigsten beteiligten Luft-und Seestreitkräften 1999, Grafik Wernegger (courtesy by Federation of American Scientists)