In A League Of Our Own - Summary Report

What Is The Purpose Of This Report?

In October 2011, the CSA commissioned Rethink to study and report back on the viability of a new men’s professional football league that would operate at the division II level of the North American football pyramid.

Headed by former Canadian youth and national team player James Easton, the project was split into two phases. In phase I we collected information on previous failed Canadian leagues, studied leagues in markets similar to Canada, and consulted with stakeholders at all levels of the game to gather information and possible design features for a new Canadian league. After analyzing and synthesizing our data we were able to identify four options, two of which we recommended to the CSA for further study in phase II of the project.

In April 2012, after a four-month period of review, we received confirmation from the CSA that the Association was in full agreement with our recommendations from phase I and approval to move forward with phase II of the project. This report is a summary of the findings and conclusions from both phases of the study.

Why Is The CSA Interested In Establishing A New Canadian Football League?

In Canada, the game of football has experienced substantial growth and increased popularity over the past three decades and it is now the number one participation sport in the country. Canada currently ranks 37th in the world in total population while numbering 10th in the world in youth football participation. However, while football at the grassroots level is thriving, the same cannot be said about the elite level of the men’s game. When we first began this study in November of 2011, Canada’s men’s national team sat 72nd in the FIFA World Ranking between Austria and the People’s Republic of China, and lay eighth in CONCACAF. For most followers of international football however, the real measure of a national team’s success is its achievement in continental championships and World Cup competition. In football’s modern era, Canada’s success in international football amounts to a coin-flip-aided top place finish at the 2000 Gold Cup, and a three-game group stage appearance at the World Cup Finals in Mexico, 1986, where Canada failed to earn a point or score a single goal. Irrespective of the measure used, it is widely agreed that Canada’s men’s team is falling short of its potential, relative to the country’s wealth, population and levels of football participation.

Commentators have posited a number of reasons for Canada’s record of underachievement in international football, including the country’s size and harsh winter climate, insufficient investment in facilities, lack of a coordinated approach to youth development, and a sports governance structure that is rooted in an amateur ethos. Undoubtedly there is a grain of truth to all of these observations; however, many believe the dominant cause of Canada’s failure is the lack of a sustainable, national professional league.

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Why Does Canada Need A League When There Are Three Canadian Teams in MLS? Isn’t That Enough?

On the surface, MLS’s expansion into Canada would seem like a positive development for Canadian football; however, a quick examination of MLS rosters quickly highlights how few Canadians actually play in the league.

Some believe the under-representation of Canadian players in MLS will reverse over time following the establishment of Canada’s three MLS team’s academies. While Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal are to be commended for their significant investment in youth development, it remains to be seen whether they have the alchemist’s touch to produce Canada’s next generation of Bruce Wilsons and Dale Mitchells.

Academies serve an important funneling function that help to forge and measure talent, but they are useful only up to a point. It is almost impossible to predict with certainty whether a teenage player will transition to first-team football by dint of their time in the academy.

Very often there is no other way to reliably access a young player’s professional potential except by observing them in the crucible of first team competition.

Therein lies the problem faced by academy graduates: opportunities to play in the first team are naturally scarce, and few get the opportunity to prove themselves. For young Canadians already burdened by a selection bias which assumes they are less accomplished than their U.S. counterparts, the opportunity to play first-team football in MLS is made all the more difficult by league rules that treat Americans playing for Canadian clubs as domestic players but do not extend the same recognition to Canadian players playing for U.S. clubs, where they are considered internationals.

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Wait—A National Football League?

Hasn’t Canada Tried That Before And Failed?

There have been numerous attempts to establish a viable, professional league in Canada since the turn of the 20th century, and each in turn has failed to leave a lasting impact, with most surviving fewer than five years.

While the circumstances behind the collapse of each failed league differs, there are several broad commonalities that contributed to their premature end that require consideration when developing a new structure for the future. These factors include the ad-hoc way the leagues were formed, the relatively low franchise fee charged for entry, the tendency for league founders to put the interests of individual clubs above the league entity as a whole, and the general disregard towards existing amateur and semiprofessional leagues and teams even though some had been in existence for decades. This lack of detail and attention meant that the clubcontrolled leagues were only as solid an enduring as the teams that operated within them. It also ensured that there would be little concrete discussion concerning the role the leagues would play in player development and what their national mandate would be — in short the leagues’ purpose. These shared missteps meant the leagues were too unstable to survive low attendance, several requisite lean years, economic recession, or the lure of other competitions promising better profitability.

Are There Other Countries From Which Canada Can Learn About How To Build A National League?

Owing to the similarities between the two countries, Australia is oftencited as an example Canada should follow in developing a professional football league. Although Australia placed somewhat higher than Canada in the FIFA rankings from 1994 through 2004, the two countries’ shared much of the same volatility and inconsistency. In 2005, Australia lobbied FIFA to transfer from the OCF to the AFC, which provided the country and its club teams the opportunity to play in more competitive matches and gain valuable international experience. It was also in 2005 that the Hyundai A‐League was established, replacing the country’s old and failing NSL. By any measure, the improvement in Australia’s national team program since moving to the AFC and the inception of the A‐League has been impressive and the consistency in the country’s FIFA ranking is remarkable.

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Some might argue that it is unfair to compare Canada only to Australia, one of the world’s most successfully improving football programs. Yet if we compare Canada’s football development with two other non-traditional football powers, Japan and South Korea, we find that both country’s national teams have also been positively affected, albeit more modestly, by the founding of a new professional league, the J-League (1993) and the K-League (1998) respectively.

Unfortunately, the current football landscape in Canada does not allow for the establishment of a league structure similar to the ones used in Australia, Japan and South Korea. No foreign-based league operates teams in those countries, which allows the A, J and K-leagues to function as virtual monopolies, excepting competition from the lower leagues in their own countries. Since they have little to worry about in the way of foreign and domestic competition from rivals, the three leagues have tremendous bargaining power when it comes to negotiating television, apparel, logo and other rights. This is not the case in Canada, where the U.S. controlled and headquartered MLS, NASL and USL all operate teams in Canadian cities, to varying degrees.

Canada is a relatively unique sports market. The country’s large size, small economy relative to the U.S., lack of a long professional football history and competition from other football leagues and sports indicate that a new Canadian league might not necessarily be best served by following the exact mould of others, but rather by a bespoke solution that combines elements and best practices from a variety of different models.

Who Was Consulted With Regard To Identifying Possible Models For A Future Canadian League?

In developing a consultation strategy we tried to be as inclusive as possible to ensure all relevant ideas and thinking were considered. Our data included contributions from people at all levels of the North American football industry, from Federation presidents down to club youth coaches.

In addition to targeting the region’s football leaders, players, thinkers, influencers and writers, we also felt it necessary to engage with those who may not be directly involved or employed in the game, but who are nevertheless passionate followers of Canadian football. We did this by inviting supporters to answer questions in an on-line questionnaire. To encourage people to respond to the questionnaire, those who participated were entered into a draw to win tickets to see Canada play against St. Kitts

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or an autographed national team jersey.

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What Were The Study’s Findings?

The initial intent of the project was to identify possible models for a new professional league and to assess each model’s viability within a Canadian sporting context. Time and again, however, we heard that Canada faces a critical problem of losing too many good players between the ages of 18 and 23 because they have few opportunities to play. Many of those consulted felt the country would be better served by the addition of a new elite development-focused competition rather than a professional league.

Given the large number of people who responded with this suggestion, it was felt that a rigid adherence to the original project objective of only considering a professional league would only hinder the game’s longterm development in Canada. Therefore, when narrowing down the list of conceivable options to assess further, we also included three concepts that have a development focus in addition to a national professional league model.

The four options are:

n National Professional League: A structure based largely on previous attempts to create a national professional league in Canada (eight to ten clubs located in Canada’s large metropolitan centres), with some modern innovations that could help increase the likelihood of long-term success.

n Club Canada U-19 & U-23 Teams: A concept involving the establishment of two new teams comprised entirely of the country’s top under-19 and under-23 prospects known as Club Canada, or some similar brand, that would play in USL PRO and NASL, respectively.

n Regional Semi-Professional Development-Focused League: A new semi-professional division III competition operating in the country’s largest provincial football markets that is focused primarily, but not exclusively, on providing players aged 18 to 23 years of age an opportunity to play in meaningful games.

n USL PDL Expansion: Like the Club Canada and Regional Semi-Professional Development-Focused concepts this option also has a development emphasis and seeks expansion of the current USL PDL competition into more Canadian markets.

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How Were The Options Recommend For Further Study In Phase II Determined?

In evaluating which of the four options to recommend to the CSA for further study in phase II of the project we used a SWOT assessment to judge each concept’s strengths and weaknesses and identify potential opportunities and threats.

Each of the four options has its merits and drawbacks. A fully professional and national football league has the advantage of attracting a higher international profile and more domestic sports media attention, but would be financially uncertain, particularly considering several failed historical attempts. Of all options, the Club Canada one is the most straightforward and most conservative, but offers few long-term returns with regard to player development or the betterment of the national team, as it focuses only on a small nucleus of players. A regional, semi-professional, development-focused league could interlink and harmonize with Canada’s existing footballing set-up at the provincial level, but is far less likely to attract significant fan interest, at least in the near-term. Finally, USL PDL expansion would take advantage of a large pool of existing talent in the CIS, but would involve a short playing season and would be subject to USSF scrutiny.

In addition, each option offers a different level of risk, potential for player development success, workability with Canada’s and North America’s existing football pyramid, media exposure and, finally, fan interest.

History tells us that aggressive ambition and financial risk does not typically translate into either long-term stability or a viable means for player development. On the other hand, an overly cautious approach risks preserving the status quo.

Which Of The Options Did Rethink Ultimately Recommend For Further Study In Phase II? The initial aim of the project was to identify potential models for a new Canadian professional league. A national structure like option one, outlined on the previous page, would give talented Canadians the opportunity to play in a professional senior environment and help expand the pool of players available for national team selection. It would also provide an ideal training ground for Canadians who have an interest in furthering themselves in the game as coaches, referees and administrators. For that reason, we recommended to the CSA that in

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phase II of the study we investigate further the feasibility of option one, a fully professional National Football League.

In a League of Our Own

While the initial intended goal of the project was to determine the viability of a professional league, the broader objective has always been to identify a coherent and sustainable pathway that would help Canada’s emerging talent reach the game’s elite level. Therefore, in addition to investigating the feasibility of option one, a fully professional and national league, we also recommended that we further study option three, a Regional Semi-Professional Development-Focused League.

What Were the Findings in Phase II On the Viability Of The National Professional League Option?

The question of which Canadian cities would be suitable for league franchises is central to the establishment of any new professional sports league. When determining possible locations to place teams in a new Canadian football league, we considered four key requirements. They included above average population growth in the metropolitan area, a younger age distribution for the metropolitan population, better than average football participation in the community, and a suitable playing venue. Unfortunately these conditions are not all met in any metropolitan market located in Canada outside of areas already served by a professional football team.

To some, the idea that football is a business is anathema; however, a new league needs to be financially viable if it is to survive more than a few short years. Our estimates suggest that a hypothetical ten-team professional league in Canada operating in accordance with the “Professional Soccer Standards” as set down by the CSA would incur a combined loss of over $10 million per season. While some clubs have the potential to be financially successful, the long-term stability of the league requires that all clubs are profitable. MLS has been in operation for almost 20 years and is only now beginning to achieve financial stability. The continued operation of a professional football league in Canada that utilizes existing playing venues would require investors who are willing to incur losses for a significant period of time.

The $10 million plus operating loss projection is probably conservative.

To provide some perspective, the ten-team Hyundai A-League in Australia incurred combined losses of $20 million (AUS) in the 2010-11 season and is rumoured to have incurred losses of $27 million in the 2011-12 season.

Without the adoption of a salary cap system, player costs are highly uncertain and likely to be larger than the amount estimated in our analysis.

MLS salaries for a typical club are known to average approximately 25%

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of operating costs. This figure is low compared to the other major North American sports leagues and reflects the centralized contracting of players with the league office, rather than with each individual team. Nevertheless, the payroll figure estimated for a Canadian professional league is less than 25% of operating costs. Adjusting this to MLS levels would further increase losses for the average franchise.

The prospect of a new national professional league is exciting; however, the survival of such a league in Canada is not likely at this time due to a lack of suitable venues, competition from other leagues and uncertain consumer demand.

Estimating Canada’s Return From Establishing a National Professional League We used statistical analysis to estimate the improvement to Canada’s FIFA ranking if the country was to establish a professional national league of approximately ten to 12 clubs. Data was collected on FIFA rankings for a sample of 60 countries that have at least one professional league. The rankings were taken for November of 2011. The choice of countries was limited by the availability of demographic and economic variables that were used to estimate the FIFA rank. These included total population and per capita gross national income (GNI) for 2011. The other explanatory variables include the number of professional leagues in each country at any level, the total number of professional clubs within each country and the number of professional clubs squared to account for any non-linear effects between FIFA rank and size of the league.

Given Canada’s population of roughly 33.5 million and per capita GNI of $40,541, the national men’s program could expect to achieve a FIFA world rank of 54 on the basis of a single professional league with ten clubs.

This assumes that the league behaves the same as the average of other professional leagues in the world, meaning bringing in talented players and coaches from abroad, establishing youth academies, insuring financial stability and so on. Canada could move from its ranking of ninth in CONCACAF (May 2012) to fifth, a good improvement, but still not enough to insure consistent World Cup qualification as only the top three countries qualify automatically.

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What Were The Findings of Phase II On The Viability Of The Regional-Based Semi-Professional Development-Focused League Option?

Around the world there is growing recognition that a young player’s football education is not complete at age 18 and that further honing and tuning of their skills is needed before they are fully ready to jump up to the rarefied heights of first team football.

Many of those we spoke with as part of our public consultations identified the CHL as a possible model for a new region-based, developmentfocused football league in Canada. The CHL is an umbrella organization overseeing the WHL, the OHL, and the QMJHL. It is worth noting that the circumstances behind the CHL’s formation in 1975 are applicable to the current circumstances in division III football in Canada. While junior hockey faced a problem Canadian football would love to have (two professional leagues fighting for young, elite talent in the lower leagues), there are several important lessons to be learned from studying the history of junior hockey. First, the CHL gave the three regional leagues some national uniformity, particularly in regard to player contracts. Second, it required the elite professional leagues to negotiate in good faith for players across Canada. Third, it indirectly guaranteed a national standard in play and oversight in the development of young Canadian hockey players.

Fourth, and most importantly, it did this not by creating an entire league from scratch, drafting feasibility studies, building new infrastructure and securing investors for new teams — rather, it was born of a constitution drafted by a single Toronto lawyer. A minor first step perhaps, but one that over time gave junior hockey a measure of uniformity across Canada while still preserving the unique identity of each regional league.

Even though it was the predatory practices of the NHL and WHA that forced junior hockey’s hand in 1975, we hold the opinion it would be in the best interests of Canadian football to find a way to work with the existing framework of leagues, clubs and teams in the country, encouraging them to work to professional standards, rather than attempt to engineer a new league structure from scratch, as has been the practice in the past. An arrangement similar to the CHL that would unite current and aspiring “non-amateur” and “semi-professional” leagues, clubs and teams under a similar philosophy and competition framework, while still allowing each league a high degree of independence and entrepreneurial freedom to respond to local complexities and opportunities is, in our opinion, the most viable of the models we studied and the one that holds the best chance of prevailing over the long term.

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What Might Be The Characteristics Of A Regional Semi-Professional Development-Focused League in Canada?

After consulting with many of the country’s football experts, and parsing the many responses we received, a new regional, semi-professional, development-focused league in Canada should consider the following characteristics to insure a reasonable probability of success:

n Regional leagues that would meet at the end of the season in a championship similar to the Memorial Cup in junior hockey.

n Regions should be determined by population, levels of football participation, per capita income and availability of suitable venues. Consideration should also be given to locations that are close to major CIS football programs.

n Each club should support male and female teams, travelling to the same locations to play.

n Canada’s four existing professional clubs should to be willing and active partners in the new competition and have their academy teams play in the nearest regional league.

n Rather than exclusive private ownership of teams, partial community ownership based on the supporter’s trust model used in the U.K. could be allowed as well as ownership by the country’s existing leading amateur clubs. This helps to distribute the risk across many “owners” and keeps the clubs more community-oriented.

n Facilities should be identified that are realistic in terms of attendance capacity, but are not unattractive venues for fans.

n Salaries should be set based on a salary cap formula. Salary caps insure more parity in each region and across the competition platform and are effective in containing costs.

n All clubs should share equally in league revenues arising from media rights, merchandising and other sources of league revenue. Sharing of shirt sponsorship, field signage and other local revenues could be determined.

n Given that a principle objective of the new league is to promote Canadian talent, each club should face an import quota.

n Resources should be directed towards coaching at the expense of compensation to players.

n The primary, but not exclusive, focus of the competition should be to provide meaningful playing opportunities for players aged 23 and under. Local players should be “allocated” to their local teams with marketing emphasizing their local appeal.

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What Can The CSA Do To Facilitate The Foundation Of A Regional Semi-Professional Development-Focused League?

To be clear, it is not the CSA’s mandate to seek investors or partners to establish a new regional semi-professional development-focused competition and we are not advising the Association to do so. However, the CSA and the country’s provincial governing football bodies can easily take steps to create favourable conditions for interested parties to step forward — to build the bottom up from the top down.

These efforts could include:

n The development of a document outlining a long-term strategy towards high performance football results in Canada that includes a broad vision for three, possibly four, regional, semi-professional leagues that are independently operated, but unified under a similar footballing philosophy and competition framework and governed by a national office (similar to the CHL model).

The advantages of a centralized office are numerous: the establishment of standard operating practices with respect to both business operations and the rules on the field of play; the standardization of the Canadian content of each club, the number of eligible over-age players that can be fielded and standard player contracts (that must also meet CSA guidelines); economies of scale from centralizing operations that are otherwise duplicated in each league such as media and advertising contracts, equipment, apparel, logos, legal business and so on; taking advantage of the combined market power of all three/four leagues to negotiate favorable terms that best represent their common interests; a common platform across multiple regions that give official sponsors and advertisers better visibility throughout the leaguewide system; and the possibility of some limited forms of revenue sharing.

n The CSA should not take any direct role in the management of any semi-professional league, however the lessons of the past cannot be ignored. The chief reasons for the failures of previous attempts to establish professional and semi-professional leagues in Canada have been overly optimistic attendance and revenue forecasts, and poor ownership structures. The CSA should be particularly vigilant when evaluating proposals to make sure these issues are addressed and not repeated.

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n The CSA should consider relaxing the financial requirements for a semi-professional league during the initial three years of the competition. The minimum budget of $250,000 annually could prove onerous for instances of senior amateur clubs, with wellorganized and established supporters groups, that are candidates for a semi-professional club. These clubs could prove to be valuable members of a league in the long-term, yet the short-term financial hurdles could prevent them from seriously considering membership in the first place.

n Finally, the CSA should consider expanding the number of teams eligible to play in the Amway Canadian Championship to include a team or teams from the new semi-professional competition. There is currently little incentive for teams or leagues in Canada to seek division III or semi-professional sanctioning, either provincially or nationally. In other countries, lower-level clubs are induced to invest in their playing squads by the knowledge that if they perform well on the field they have an opportunity to advance through a relegation/promotion structure to the next rung of play.

A relegation/promotion arrangement in Canada is not possible owing to the fact there are three independent, U.S. based and controlled closed leagues, each with their own set of fixed teams already operating within the country.

Unfortunately, by relinquishing a certain degree of control to U.S. headquartered and directed leagues, the CSA has limited the options it can use to incentivize teams at the division III level to invest in and professionalize their setup. However, the CSA is not completely impotent in this regard either. As the governing body for football in Canada, the Association still retains the exclusive right to set the format of the Canadian Championship and the eligibility rules of clubs that can compete in the annual contest.

As such, the CSA should use the reward of competing for the country’s top footballing prize as inducement for clubs that join the new division III competition to invest in talent and player development.

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Afterword In mid-2011, when we were first contacted by the CSA and asked to submit a proposal to study the viability of a professional football league in Canada, the men’s national team sat 102nd in the FIFA rankings, the country was eliminated from the CONCACAF Gold Cup in the first round without scoring a single goal from open play, and the Vancouver Whitecaps and Toronto FC, the country’s then two MLS teams, turned out on the same day to play Colorado and Houston respectively and failed to start a single Canadian player. Across Canada’s football community — from the CSA President down to supporters — there is broad consensus the country is underachieving in men’s football and that the existing system of leagues and programs is insufficient to develop professional and international players. The view that Canada is under-performing and needs change to tap the potential that undoubtedly exists in the country is thrown into sharper focus by the relative progress being made by other non-traditional football powers like Australia, Japan and South Korea.

It is human nature to want to cast blame in the wake of disappointing results. Canada, however, is not experiencing a temporary downturn in its footballing fortunes. The sobering truth is that the men’s national team has not qualified for the FIFA World Cup tournament since 1986, and it is unfair to blame an almost unyielding 25 years of underperformance on one person or even a few individuals. Nor is it useful to unilaterally blame the country’s MLS clubs for failing to give young domestic players an opportunity to play first team football. There is now a preoccupation in the professional game to win at all costs, which has helped engender the practice of MLS coaches signing older more established players to increase their likelihood of immediate success.

Rather, the current crisis in elite Canadian men’s football has been decades in the making, the result of a collective failure to embrace technical and tactical changes and commercial advancements that have occurred in the game. Lacking a clear sense of purpose, weighed down by an amateur foundation, and suffering from years of benign neglect, the game at the top level in Canada has stagnated. Moreover, there are too many footballing interests covering the same ground or pursuing their own objectives. The system is disparate and the current “grab-bag” approach to player development, as one consultee termed it, militates against the creation of a viable national strategy that will return the maximum football benefit to the whole country. In practical terms, this means that the

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country’s footballing potential will simply not happen if Canada continues to charge forward with no coherent vision for the future.

To overcome the current farrago of competing football interests and ideas Canada needs a new wisdom; what is important is not to remain fixated on assigning blame for past disappointments but rather for us to pull together, professional and amateur, working with a common purpose to address the weaknesses in the Canadian player development model; to focus on the present and future rather than the past.

A Virtuous Circle

The importance of employing a collaborative approach to player development cannot be emphasized enough. Germany’s recent success in developing youth players, which culminated in the country’s outstanding performance in the 2010 World Cup, is the direct result of the DFB and DFL working in concert to improve the caliber of German youth players. In 2000, after a disappointing showing at the UEFA European Championships, Germany aggressively reorganized its youth development infrastructure, which included a requirement for all academy teams competing in the 16-19 age category to carry a minimum of 12 players eligible to play for the German national team. Although the effort required significant joint investment, the country’s strategy has paid off richly in a relatively short period. In 2006 and 2010, Germany placed third in the World Cup. The average age of the German national team has decreased, and given that 61% of players in Bundesliga Division I and 71% in Division II are German, the country’s prospects for replenishing talent are excellent relative to other European nations. Christian Siiefert, the Bundesliga’s Chief Executive, credits the country’s success in large part to the unity between the DFB and DFL. Germany’s recent success is the product of a virtuous circle that begins and ends, not with the narrow interest of a particular group, but with the global health of German football. The country’s achievement in international play ignites high levels of interest in the game, helping attract the best young athletes to the sport and drives revenues at all levels of the football pyramid. These increased revenues fund facilities, and development and coaching programs, which improves the technical abilities of young German players coming through the system, better preparing them for the challenges and rigours of professional football. In turn, this next generation of players improves the spectacle of German club football, which leads to increased attendance at Bundesliga fixtures,

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where supporters come to watch and cheer-on home-grown players with whom they identify and to whom they feel connected. All of which leads to a deeper and wider pool of players for Germany’s national team to select from. The whole process then cycles back to the beginning and repeats, reinforcing itself after each revolution with constantly improving outcomes.

Après Nous le Déluge By contrast, England’s footballing reality, where everyone seemingly pursues their own interests and efforts to prioritize the development of domestic talent are considered anathema to some, can be seen as more of a cautionary tale. In the time period German football was recalibrating, while the Premier League was rising to become arguably the best domestic club competition in the world, England’s football authorities ignored the lack of young players being developed, assuming it represented a natural nadir in the cycle of the country’s football talent. Since waking to the reality that the drop-off in talent was not an aberration but a harbinger of things to come, successive efforts to fix the problem have been scuttled as a result of discord between the FA, Premier League, and Football League, leaving Sir Trevor Brooking, the FA’s Director of Football, to declare there is a “vacuum of leadership” at the youth level in England. The disorder amongst the trinity of governing bodies in the English game has meant the power to develop youth players has de facto rested entirely in the hands of the Premier League and Football League clubs, but the incentive for the academies of professional clubs, especially those in the Premiership, has been to develop the best players, irrespective of their national origin, with the hopes of increasing the profits and performance of the individual professional teams. This system has resulted in a series of disappointments for the country: English players now account for less than 40% of Premier League players, the country has failed to qualify for seven of the last ten European Under-21 Championships, and England’s senior and youth teams have failed to win any major trophy since the academy system was established.

The difference in approach between Germany and England has resulted in marked differences in the success of both countries’ respective national team programs and underscores the need for authorities at all levels of the football pyramid to recognize their common responsibility and interdependence, and work together. The importance of having homegrown role models in growing a football culture is undeniable. In Canada, a single successful, locally-developed player has the potential to inspire

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many others and success is passed down generation to generation. The more Canadians who star in MLS and go on to help Canada’s national team succeed on the world stage, the more the country’s best up and coming athletes will awaken to the idea that a career in professional football is something within their reach, similar to how young Canadians currently view the sport of hockey. Arguably, the predominance of outstanding Canadian hockey players in the NHL over the years has both endeared the game to the Canadian people and encouraged young Canadian athletes to believe they too can excel in the sport. By contrast, a country with no football heroes of its own to inspire its next generation of youth is not likely to progress quickly or far in international football.

No Short Corners To be sure, we are acutely aware that a new region-based, developmentfocused league, in and of itself, is not likely to spawn a Canadian Lionel Messi or overnight catapult Canada up the FIFA and CONCACAF rankings.

There is not a monocausal explanation for what ails football in Canada, so it is doubtful the game can be transformed by a single action or event.

However, a great deal can be accomplished when stakeholders, taking a long-range perspective on matters, align their interests and push in the same direction for incremental, marginal gains.

The new association of region-based, semi-professional, developmentfocused leagues concept we have recommended in this study, while not the national professional model some might have hoped for, has the potential to be an important stepping-stone in the elite player pathway along which young Canadians can rise to the top tier of professional football. But equally important, it presents an opportunity for the country’s professional clubs, governing authorities and top footballers and coaches to work together in a spirit of cooperation. Only with unity and support from the whole football community can Canada ever hope to rise in world football. Only thus will our achievements in world football begin to match our ambition.

James Easton Managing Director, Rethink Management Group July 2012

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About Rethink Rethink is a boutique, football-centric, sports and culture consultancy based in the San Francisco Bay Area, California. Our clients include professional football clubs, leagues, national federations and investment groups from across the Americas and the United Kingdom.

We have a diverse portfolio of consulting experiences and believe strongly in the importance of building lasting, sustainable relationships.

Our approach is highly collaborative, designed to build organizational capabilities, increase coherence and improve performance, from visioning through to execution.

Rethink is well connected within the football industry and can draw upon a global network of contacts and partners to develop bespoke solutions that deliver real and lasting value.

Contact: James Easton, MA, MBA Managing Director info@rethinkmanagementgroup.com

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