AEROSPACE CONSIDERATIONS IN DEFENDING AUSTRALIA’S NORTH-WESTERN MARITIME APPROACHES

AM FRAeS (Rtd) is a former Assistant Chief of Defence Force for Operations, was a Director of Surveillance Australia and is a Director of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation.

AIRMSHL Sir Richard Williams KBE CB DSO was the first Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) of the Royal Australian Air Force. He served as CAS on three occasions: 1922, 1925-1932 and 1934-1939, overseeing the development of Australia’s independent air force during its difficult first two decades. Williams not only established the organisational foundation of the RAAF he also laid its doctrinal foundation; a doctrine not just constrained to continental defence but also including a more expansive use of airpower over Australia’s maritime approaches.

In May 1925, Williams tabled his Memorandum Regarding the Air Defence of Australia. The memorandum was a comprehensive analysis of Australia’s strategic setting and of the threat from Japan. He argued the aeroplane, and its emerging capabilities, would be key to Australia’s national security by controlling Australia’s maritime approaches and sea lines of communication. He went on to propose a RAAF force structure including technical requirements, personnel establishments, logistic support, budgetary costs, local aircraft production and training.

Williams was perceptive of the growing influence of Japan, an emerging Asian power growing in confidence after its military success in defeating the Russian Baltic fleet at the Battle of Tsushima Strait in 1905. Japan soon formalised its imperialist ambitions and aggressive strategic aspirations under the innocuous label of ‘Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-

The spectacular Milky Way dominates the night sky as a No. 11 Squadron P-8A Poseidon sits on the hardstand at RAAF Learmonth. © Department of Defence. Photographer: CPL Craig Barrett.

Prosperity Sphere’, and although the threat from Japan was not well-recognised in Australia, Williams perceived the Japanese threat as likely to come through the Southwest Pacific.

The north-western maritime approaches to Australia did not generate the same level of concern and for good reason. Pre-World War II, the British Empire still sat firmly astride the Indian Ocean from the Middle East through India, Burma, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and into Southeast Asia, primarily Malaya and Singapore, with a string of ports and bases integral to supporting Britain’s geostrategic and economic interests. Those ports also served as bases for the Royal Navy, which many assumed would maintain a protective presence in the Indian Ocean and across Australia’s sea lines of communication and north-western maritime approaches. A reasonable analysis especially given the oil, natural gas and iron ore deposits of WA had yet to be discovered and therefore did not weigh in the strategic calculations of the time.

However, World War II changed those perceptions, especially when Japan’s navy sortied, with deadly effect, into the Indian Ocean in early 1942 before returning to the Pacific to meet the

In May 1925, Williams tabled his Memorandum Regarding the Air Defence of Australia. The memorandum was a comprehensive analysis of Australia’s strategic setting and of the threat from Japan. He argued the aeroplane, and its emerging capabilities, would be key to Australia’s national security by controlling Australia’s maritime approaches and sea lines of communication. He went on to propose a RAAF force structure including technical requirements, personnel establishments, logistic support, budgetary costs, local aircraft production and training.

growing military might of the United States. Certainly, German raiders and submarines operated in the Indian Ocean, often with impunity, until they were neutralised. However, from 1942 onwards a small flotilla of Japanese long-range submarines operating in the Indian Ocean, emerged as the main threat to Australia’s north-western maritime approaches.

Post-World War II and following Britain’s decision, in 1968, to withdraw from ’East of Suez’, the Soviet Union attempted to fill the major power vacuum in the Indian Ocean caused by Britain’s withdrawal from East of Suez. But the Soviets lacked the economic resources and naval capacity to do so, with the US gradually assuming the role as the major power in the Indian Ocean.

Today, Australia has vital interests in its exclusive economic zone and Indian Ocean maritime approaches and island territories, involving oil, natural gas and iron ore resources, and essential international lines of communications.

The geo-strategic scenario has also evolved with the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ appearing in the strategic lexicon together with new diplomatic alignments, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’) — involving the US, Japan, Australia and India — and the trilateral Australia, US and UK (AUKUS) security partnership. This is the new strategic environment in which Australia’s defence capabilities must operate. CONCEPT OF AEROSPACE OPERATIONS

Fundamental to successful military operations in any theatre, especially a vast maritime theatre such as Australia’s north-western maritime approaches and Indian Ocean territories, is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations — a capability in which Australia has invested heavily with recent decisions to expand the P-8A Poseidon fleet to 14 aircraft and to acquire the MQ4C Triton unmanned aerial system.

A concept for aerospace operations across Australia’s north-western approaches starts with the P-8A Poseidon and MQ-4C Triton, which are complementary capabilities exploiting the respective strengths of manned and unmanned aerial systems. The unmanned, high-altitude and long-endurance MQ4C, with high technology sensors and communication links, is optimised for the surveillance of expansive maritime areas while also having a multi-role intelligence and surveillance capability. The manned P-8A — air refuellable by KC-30A tankers — is optimised to respond, with additional surveillance capabilities, anti-submarine capabilities and anti-surface warfare capabilities.

COCOS (KEELING) ISLANDS

(AUSTRALIA)

The capabilities of the E-7A Wedgetail — with its time-on-station extendable by air-to-air refuelling — and the soon to enter service electronic support MC55A Peregrine, both add to the in-theatre surveillance, direction, and command and control capability. The combat edge is provided by F/A-18F Super Hornets, armed with the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, and F-35A Lightning IIs, soon to be armed with the Joint Strike Missile. Additional operational support and enablement is provided by EA-18G Growler electronic warfare support aircraft and KC-30A air-to-air refuelling tankers which extend both the range and time-on-station of most of force elements in the air task group.

Surveillance capability into the north-western maritime approaches to Australia also has been enhanced by the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN), which includes a radar facility at Laverton, WA. The RAAF could also be expected to deploy its tactical radars in supporting operations from Learmonth and Curtin, while the aerial operations conducted by the contractor Surveillance Australia for the Australian Border Force — would be integrated with the military effort such as occurred in Operation Sovereign Borders.

In time, Australia’s emerging national space capability will also play a part, although there is still much work to be done before the aspiration of an independent national space capability can be realised. SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE

Air operations require supporting airfields and decades of prescient investment have developed a robust network of bases from which to project power into Australia’s north-western maritime domain. RAAF Base Learmonth, a ‘bare base’ near Exmouth, with a 3050m runway and supporting facilities was opened in 1973, in the aftermath of the Indonesian Confrontation. Further north, RAAF Base Curtin, a ‘bare base’ with a 3050m runway and substantive facilities was opened in 1988; Curtin being located almost mid-way between Learmonth and Darwin.

Both Learmonth and Curtin are being progressively upgraded. The Learmonth works are yet to be contracted but will involve runway strengthening and lengthening, with additional fuel infrastructure to allow more sustainable KC-30A air-refuelling operations. At Curtin, the asphalt pavement has been resurfaced and the airfield lighting replaced; the most recent work managed by Barpa (part of ICON Constructing) at a cost of some $9.3m.

These two bare bases, Learmonth and Curtin, are supported by four airfields further to the rear: RAAF Base Darwin (3350m runway) and RAAF Base Tindal

Although the RAAF’s fleet of F-35 Lightning IIs are home-based at RAAF Williamtown, NSW, and RAAF Tindal, NT, they deploy to the air bases in the north and the west coasts of Australia and are integral to the defence of Australia’s North West region. © Department of Defence. Photographer: FSGT Mick Bott.

in the Northern Territory, the latter of which is undergoing a major infrastructure upgrade — including a runway extension to 3050m — at a cost of $1.6bn. Further south, RAAF Base Pearce (2440m runway) and Perth Airport (3440m runway) add to the airfield infrastructure that can support aerospace operations in the northwestern maritime theatre. Perth Airport has already been utilised as a base for long-range operations by RAAF AP-3C Orion aircraft, searching for missing sailors in the 1990s round-the-world yacht races and in hosting the military aircraft searching for Malaysian Airlines flight MH-370 in March 2014. With its long runway and supporting infrastructure, Perth Airport is well placed to support KC-30A air-toair refuelling tankers.

Australia’s Indian Ocean island-territories must also be included in the operational concept for aerospace operations in Australia’s north-western maritime approaches. Strategically, Christmas Island, located only 360km from Java, is of considerable value although not as well-placed as the Cocos Islands to project military presence and influence into the Indian Ocean. Christmas Island with its abrupt cliffs rising

from the sea comes with operational limitations and lacks a protected anchorage, with ships often unable Fundamental to successful to berth for weeks at a time due to the south-west Indian Ocean swell. Its airport is useful, but limited, military operations in any with a runway of only 2100m. Christmas Island is currently used as an offshore detention centre.theatre, especially a vast On the other hand, the Cocos Islands — located maritime theatre such as approximately 2200km from Learmonth, about the same distance Learmonth is from Tindal — Australia’s north-western commands Australia’s outer Indian Ocean maritime maritime approaches and approaches. Operationally, its airport on Home Island, established in World War II, comprises a runway of Indian Ocean territories, is 2440m with support facilities long-used by RAAF intelligence, surveillance and maritime patrol AP-3C Orion aircraft. The Cocos Islands lagoon, between West Island and Home reconnaissance operations - Island, also provides a useful harbour for small logistic support shipping. The Cocos Islands airfield and a capability in which Australia support environment is now being upgraded. The has invested heavily with contractor, Fulton Hogan, will strengthen and widen the existing runway and hardstands, and provide recent decisions to expand updated and more capable infrastructure to support the P-8A Poseidon fleet to P-8A operations. The $184m project is planned for completion by mid-2023. 14 aircraft and to acquire the MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial system.

Apart from the operational systems, significant investment in Defence command, control and communications systems are underway with the air force a significant beneficiary in ‘networking’ air force’s individual force elements and linking with naval capabilities. While the ‘networked’ ADF is still evolving, much of the advancement has been stimulated by the leading-edge technology and advanced military capabilities of the F-35A, a capability of which is still misunderstood by many. Put simply, the prefix ‘F’ does not do justice to the range of capabilities inherent in the F-35A combat system.

Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18A Hornets on the ground at RAAF Curtin during Exercise Northern Shield 2016. © Department of Defence. Photographer: ABIS Chris Beerens.

The arc of airfields from Perth to Darwin also remain as prime candidates for further investment to support increases in military training and to prepare better for possible national security contingencies on Australia’s north-western approaches. Of particular concern is the storage and supply of petroleum, oil and lubricants, an issue recently elevated to national consideration. A satisfactory resolution of the logistic issues involved is essential to the sustainment of credible operational activities in Australia’s north-western approaches.

Apart from the networking of capabilities, the decision to further develop Australia’s evolving space capability, largely led by Australia’s growing space domain awareness, augurs well for the future which will no doubt involve the ground-based telescope and radar at Exmouth. In time, some further sovereign Australian space capabilities will become available to supplement Australia’s existing access to US space assets, which are capabilities selectively made available to Australia.

The Australian-US alliance will continue to be one of the foundation stones of Australia’s national security and if the security situation in the IndoPacific continues to cause concern, an increasing presence of US forces in Australia can be expected. That presence, both transient and of longer durations, has already led to major construction activity in localities such as Darwin and Tindal, to enhance air force operational support capabilities and to accommodate visiting US forces.

The arc of airfields from Perth to Darwin also remain as prime candidates for further investment to support increases in military training and to prepare better for possible national security contingencies on Australia’s north-western approaches. Of particular concern is the storage and supply of petroleum, oil and lubricants, an issue recently elevated to national consideration. A satisfactory resolution of the logistic issues involved is essential to the sustainment of credible operational activities in Australia’s northwestern approaches.

In conclusion, there is a parallel between Richard Williams Memorandum Regarding the Air Defence of Australia, of 1925, and of today’s need to sustain presence and influence over Australia’s maritime approaches, where the utility and operational capability of Australian aerospace power is of great value. It is also noteworthy that Williams’ analysis of the vital role for air power in Australia’s maritime approaches remained largely forgotten until the late 80s, when the Australian Defence White Paper, The Defence of Australia 1987, built on the notion of protecting and controlling the island continent’s sea-air gap and extensive maritime approaches — perhaps an acknowledgement of Sir Richard Williams perceptive legacy is long overdue.