The Capability Approach to Happiness

I. Defining Happiness

The pursuit of happiness has long commanded the human psyche as the most cherished but elusive of all human desires. Philosophers ranging from Mill to Aristotle have characterized happiness as the supreme good, or ultimate end, of human life. Nevertheless, despite its ubiquity in classical literature and scientific texts alike, the essence of what defines happiness has remained an enigma. In its most basic form, happiness can be understood as the balance of pleasure over pain, although the nuances of these feelings and their perceived utility are under continuous debate (Bentham, 1977). In recent years, psychologists and policymakers pioneered the field of positive psychology – the science of happiness – in order to study the truths and illusions of what makes humans happy.

Widespread surveys of self-reported happiness have routinely been conducted over the past several decades. The most widely used assessments are surveys of evaluative happiness, which ask people to rate their own happiness and life satisfaction (Diener et al., 2009). Skeptics of these surveys cite their vulnerability to manipulation and contextual effects, proposing instead the adoption of moment-to-moment evaluations of experienced happiness that involve interval reports of individuals’ current state of well-being (Bronsteen et al., 2013). Nevertheless, given the novelty and complexity of this approach, social scientists remain largely unanimous in their adoption of the former method, leading to an aggregation of ample data that compare evaluative happiness levels of individuals across various strata and dimensions.

II. The Paradox of Happiness

In a rather unsurprising fashion, given the multifaceted nature of happiness, these data have revealed some findings that run contrary to popular notions. In a groundbreaking study, Brickman

et al. found that when surveying lottery winners and paraplegics 6 months after the initial shock event, they reported no significant differences in their levels of happiness in comparison to ordinary individuals (1978). In another puzzling find, Stevenson and Wolfers reported that despite the immense progress achieved by women over the past few decades, their happiness level relative to men has declined over that same time period (2009). Even factors that we take for granted to be health-promoting, such as pleasant weather, appear to have no effect on the happiness of individuals (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998).

These results are particularly jarring in the context of their counterfactuals. For example, paraplegics often report a willingness to pay large sums of money to recover normal functioning to their limbs (Brickman & Coates, 1978). This perspective seems to align with that of able-bodied people, who consistently extrapolate the happiness levels of paraplegics to be much lower than their own. Similarly, Schkade & Kahneman found that people residing in objectively worse climate conditions (Midwesterners) rated their own happiness levels as much lower than that of their Californian counterparts (1998). In general, psychologists attempt to explain this paradox by attributing it to survey design flaws and human heuristic biases, such as the focusing illusion in the climate study and the pathetic fallacy in the paraplegics study (Deutsch, 1960).

However, the contradiction between the survey assessments and their counterfactuals doesn’t inherently discredit the latter findings. In fact, the existence of this paradox may suggest a flaw in the current methods of happiness evaluation. Questions about life satisfaction and happiness, although seemingly straightforward, fail to capture an essential component of what it means to be happy. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach to evaluating happiness: one that extends beyond simply assessing the achievement of happiness to include, as a second and arguably more important benchmark, the ability to achieve happiness.

III. The Philosophy of Happiness

At their heart, happiness surveys largely adopt a utilitarian-based approach. Moment-tomoment well-being evaluations stem from a Benthamian philosophy that happiness is best measured through the temporal aggregation of utility gained (Bentham, 1977). Evaluative happiness surveys, on the other hand, apply the Millian perspective that there are inherent distinctions between the quality of pleasures, which are determined based on the preferences of those who have experienced both (Mill, 1863). Dolan coins these higher pleasures as “purposeful” activities, which generate a greater amount of happiness for the individual. Furthermore, tangential to both pleasure and purpose is the concept of agency – one’s happiness is most elevated when he feels ownership and a sense of entitlement to his activities (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993). This explains why the handicapped often reject physical help: the devaluation associated with accepting a lower physical status reduces the feeling of agency and thus results in negative happiness (Deutsch, 1960). The majority of surveys, then, attempt to measure the relationship between these three variables: pleasure, purpose, and agency.

However, quantifying happiness in utilitarian terms limits the measure of happiness only to its actualization. This approach wholly neglects the cultivation of happiness, which Aristotle refers to as potentiality, or dunamis. According to his view, it is the feedback loop between potentiality and actualization that generates happiness (Blumenfeld, 2016). Potentiality is the development and appropriation of one’s latent capabilities that increases the freedom to exercise happiness. This increased freedom, in turn, leads to an increased ability to achieve overall absolute happiness. This is why small children cannot be said to be truly happy – even if they achieve a high level of happiness on their own agency, it would be conceptually illogical to consider them as happier and living more fulfilled lives than adults (Aristotle & Sachs, 2002). The difference

comes at the level of potentiality: children are still developing their potential and are less capable than adults. Thus, even if their actualization of happiness is high for their given level of capability, their lack of freedom constricts their absolute happiness to an overall lower reference point.

IV. The Capability Approach

In this paper, I argue that the evaluation of happiness should not be based solely on the achievement of happiness itself but also on the ability to achieve happiness (i.e. capability). These capabilities can take the shape of physical, intellectual, social, and mental abilities. For example, one’s physical capability may refer to physical fitness or agility. Physical capabilities are the easiest and arguably the most important to develop; one can imagine that in a physically diseased or famished state, the need to actualize happiness through physical health precedes the need to seek spiritual or social happiness.

Because the two measures (achieving happiness v. cultivating capability) are independent of one another, it is possible to sacrifice the former for the latter (and vice versa). For instance, preoccupation with gaining intellectual capabilities (through schooling) can leave less room for investment in achieving happiness (through social interactions and other solely hedonistic means). Similarly, cultivating capabilities but not exercising this increased freedom (e.g. not using the newly gained knowledge) doesn’t elevate overall happiness. In general, goal-setting makes us happier – goals themselves provide a target for us to develop our potential, and even if they are not ultimately achieved, they are fulfilling in and of themselves. However, a string of empty goalsetting will leave us feeling depleted and unfulfilled. Thus, it is important to balance our investment in capabilities with an awareness of our limited mental and physical resources. Before moving on, I’d like to address the important distinction between actual capabilities (e.g. physical ability) and the means to capability (e.g. income or social status). Although the latter

can greatly contribute to the development of potential, its mere existence doesn’t necessarily derive an increased ability to achieve happiness. This explains why happiness generally correlates with income but only to a certain extent, after which it derives a diminishing marginal utility from the extra dollar (Dolan, 2014). Income is an input factor for both the achievement of happiness and the cultivation of capability. It’s easy to imagine how money can satisfy hedonistic desires and actualize happiness at basic levels (e.g. satiating the need for food or entertainment). However, the relationship between money and capability is not so clear-cut. The productivity of income as an input factor into developing potential depends on the situation and the individual. This explains why lottery winners return to their original levels of happiness 6 months after the event: they are so preoccupied with using money to actualize happiness (which increases their happiness initially) that they are inadequate in effectively allocating their money to cultivating capabilities. In fact, because they solely attribute happiness to its actualization, they often neglect capabilities that would in fact bring them more happiness. Many of them quit their jobs and have less incentive to invest in further educational opportunities, which ironically thwarts their potential to achieve greater absolute happiness.

The capability approach can also explain the U-shaped curve that depicts the relationship between age and happiness: the young and elderly generally report higher levels of happiness than the middle-aged. One can assume that capability levels generally rise as one ages; the dip in happiness among the middle-aged, then, simply reflects the difference between the happiness they expect at their given level of capability and the happiness that is achieved. At this age, many people have developed their maximum physical and mental capabilities but have not fully been able to apply these capabilities. Thus, these self-reported happiness assessments don’t accurately reflect their overall absolute happiness, as they disproportionately inflate the happiness levels of the less

capable (the youth). People are at their happiest and fullest potential only after experiencing the totality of life, which inevitably comprises of an ebb and flow of actualized happiness levels.

Applications of the Capability Approach

Applying the capability approach to the evaluation of happiness dispels the paradox inherent in the “paradox of happiness.” Paraplegics, for example, report similar levels of happiness as their physically able counterparts, but these reports only reflect achieved happiness. 6 months after the accident, paraplegics have mostly adapted to their physical condition and are able to perform daily activities without feeling enough pain to affect their enjoyment of those activities. This view is supported by paraplegics’ ratings of everyday events: the pleasure derived from these activities is not muted by their physical disability (Brickman & Coates, 1978). Patients with chronic pain or illness, such as multiple sclerosis patients, on the other hand, demonstrate a perpetual impairment to their achievement of happiness (Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999). Unlike paraplegics, they are unable to fully adapt to their condition; thus, their derivation of happiness from routine activities is severely reduced. However, none of these assessments reflect capability measures, which are unequivocally lowered in the disabled. Restrictions in the growth of their physical capabilities severely restricts their freedom to exercise happiness, not just in the physical realm. One can imagine, for instance, the resulting social or romantic repercussions that can interfere with the ability to achieve happiness.

The capability approach can also provide answers to the puzzling phenomenon of the declining relative happiness of women. As gender roles have transformed significantly over the past few decades, women have found themselves taking on more responsibility in all aspects of life outside of the home. They have been given opportunities to cultivate higher mental and intellectual capabilities, but they are taking these opportunities at the expense of investing time

into actualizing their happiness. In fact, many young girls find themselves increasingly under time pressure and report a decline in satisfaction with “time spent doing things [they] want,” which eerily mirrors the feelings of the middle-aged (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2009, pg. 26). Because women are still acclimating to the increased mental and stamina associated with their increased level of capability, they are sacrificing investment into actualizing happiness. Furthermore, as the authors suggest, women in the workforce are now comparing themselves to their male counterparts, who are achieving a higher level of happiness given the same set of capabilities. My hypothesis is that the happiness of women will adopt a trend similar to the U-shaped relationship between age and happiness: as women gain more and more ground relative to men, they will learn to maximize the achievement of happiness relative to their new capabilities and responsibilities.

V. Conclusion

The degree to which humans can adapt to any type of adversity is quite remarkable, reflecting the malleability of happiness. For example, Holocaust survivors often recount that their life during the war, although “unspeakably horrif[ic]” at times, was “eerily normal” (Frank, 2006).

However, it would be absurd and borderline inhumane to take these assessments of happiness at face value. These statements are much more logical in the context of the capability approach, which asserts that humans derive intrinsic happiness not just from achieving hedonic pleasure but from attaining the freedom or ability to achieve happiness through cultivating their capabilities. Thus, current happiness surveys are misleading because individuals tend to assess their happiness and satisfaction in the context of how much they could achieve given their individual circumstances, disregarding hypotheticals that lie beyond their control. For example, paraplegics consider their happiness in the context of their given physical capabilities (even if they are seldom

consciously thinking about their debilitation) because it would be a futile and perhaps even demoralizing exercise to approach life as an able-bodied person.

The capability approach to happiness evaluates both the potentiality and actualization of happiness and provides a much more well-rounded and comprehensive assessment than conventional measures of hedonic pleasure. Mill himself said, “It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (Mill, 1863, pg. 13). Although Mill was in this context referring to the difference between higher and lower pleasures, I would argue that central to his argument is the difference in capability between Socrates and the “fool.” Applying the capability approach to the legal and policymaking sphere, however, necessitates a radical transformation in the way wellbeing analyses are conducted. A more concrete relationship between happiness and capability would need to be elucidated before it is put into practice in determining punitive damages and other legal ramifications in the courts.

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