QIO 11.1: The Summer in Review

QUEEN’S INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER A LETTER FROM THE EDITOR Emerson Murray Dear Reader, Welcome to Volume Eleven of the Queen’s International Observer. Since 2003, the magazine has offered a global perspective to students at Queen’s University. This fall, an entirely new team of staff writers and editors will take the reins of the magazine. We look forward to a year of providing readers with thought-provoking analysis and quality research on international politics.

Our first issue, “The Summer in Review,” aims to provide an alternative look at key political events from summer 2014, and expose those that deserve greater attention. Corey Goldberg interprets the electoral victory of a Hindu nationalist party in India, while Dylan Edmonds analyzes the power dynamics behind the BRICS’ New Development Bank.

Assistant Editor Holly Kallmeyer discusses both the need for a peaceful resolution to the South Sudanese civil war and the potential for Kurdish independence amid Iraq’s Islamist insurgency. Meanwhile, Assistant Editor Hayley McNorton examines the tense relationship between Sinhalese Buddhists and Muslims in Sri Lanka. As editor-in-chief, I investigate the motivations behind Thailand’s most recent coup d’état.

The QIO is excited to display the work of a number of external contributors. Darren Henry-Noel explains the recent escalation of violence between Israel and Gaza. In global health, Lindsay Ruiter sheds light on maternal and sexual health initiatives in Pakistan’s Sindh province. Nirali Patel, President of the Queen’s International Affairs Association, chronicles the ongoing Blackwater Trial and the role of private military companies in modern combat.

The “Summer in Review” is merely a glimpse of the creative ideas and diverse insights that the incoming team has to offer. If you share a passion for international affairs, consider writing for the QIO. External submissions are always welcome, and the magazine is hiring additional staff writers this September. Until our next release, we hope the “Summer in Review” leaves you wanting to learn more.

Sincerely, Emerson Murray, Editor-in-Chief Vol.11 Holly Kallmeyer and Hayley McNorton, Assistant Editors Vol. 11

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SUMMER IN REVIEW

THE TEAM

Emerson Murray Editor-in-Chief

Hayley McNorton Holly Kallmeyer Assistant Editor Assistant Editor

Dylan Edmonds Staff Writer

Kanivanan Chinniah Staff Writer

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Corey Goldberg Staff Writer

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SOUTH SUDANESE CIVIL WAR ISRAEL-GAZA CONFLICT SRI LANKAN RIOTS IS & THE KURDS INDIAN ELECTIONS THAI COUP D’ÉTAT BRICS BANK BLACKWATER TRIAL SEX-ED IN PAKISTAN

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NEGOTIATING PEACE IN SOUTH SUDAN

“South Sudan 022” by Steve Evans via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.

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by Holly Kallmeyer, Assistant Editor

his July, the world’s youngest state marked its third birthday amid an ongoing civil war that has claimed the lives of over ten thousand people and caused over 1.1 million to flee their homes. The creation of South Sudan in 2011 was supposed to bring an end to its citizens’ suffering after a 22 year long civil war between the Republic of Sudan’s government forces and southern-based rebels, howev-

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er the inter-communal violence that began last December in South Sudan itself and escalated in recent months has only exacerbated their plight.

This summer, negotiations between the warring parties in South Sudan became even more urgent as the war interfered with the region’s planting season and food distribution, leading to a famine that could affect over three million people. Currently, the warring

sides are deadlocked while mediators desperately try to bring the parties to a durable consensus on a peace deal.

In December 2013, President Salva Kiir accused Riek Machar, his former Vice President, of plotting a coup d’état. A power struggle that had began in July of that year when Kiir kicked Machar and his allies out of their government posts re-emerged between the two men and their respective fac-

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ETHNIC & RELIGIOUS CONFLICT // tions. The feud took on an ethnic dimension when government security forces massacred members of Machar’s ethnic group in Juba, the county’s capital, killing an estimated 300 citizens. Reprisal attacks that have been ongoing since December have had devastating consequences for civilians of each ethnicity.

The primary cleavage in this civil war is between Kiir’s ethnic group, the Dinka, and Machar’s, the Nuer. The Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA, the government forces), which was multi-ethnic before December, saw massive desertions early this year of Nuer troops. These Nuer troops defected from the SPLA to fight for Machar in the White Army, a poorly organized militia. In recent months both the White Army and the SPLA, and a variety of smaller militias, have thrown the country into chaos.

The first hurdle is reaching a formal peace agreement between Kiir and Machar.

But the cycle of intercommunal violence in South Sudan is not intractable. Ethnic polarization and conflict between the Nuer and the Dinka is a relatively recent phenomenon.

Ongoing negotiations between Kiir and Machar are being mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an east African multilateral organization, but the negotiations face severe challenges. The first hurdle is reaching a formal peace agreement between Kiir and Machar.

The difficultly of this was on display in June, when a ceasefire announced

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by the two parties broke down within five days of signing. More recently, Machar’s representatives refused to attend the first days of IGAD’s second round of negotiations in early August.

The question of who will have executive power after the civil war is driving much of Kiir and Machar’s resistance to negotiation; each is afraid of being marginalized in a new South Sudanese government. To resolve this, IGAD mediators are considering offering both Kiir and Machar high-level and visible involvement in the implementation of parts of the peace agreement, such as security sector reform or economic restructuring, in exchange for participation in negotiations. Another arrangement on the table would be to grant one party more control over the peace talks in exchange for a promise to not run in future presidential elections. Either of these options could be useful, but the high-level IGAD peace process needs support from other actors to ensure a durable peace agreement is reached.

While IGAD is attempting to resolve the dispute between senior-level members of Kiir and Machar’s factions, there is a growing need to address mid-level commanders in their armed forces. In many civil wars, mid-level commanders act as “spoilers”, undermining progress in peace talks because they have much to lose in terms of personal power if a peace agreement is reached.

...many mid-level members of the SPLA and White Army have dual citizenship in western countries and hold assets abroad.

As a result, they have an incentive to disrupt ceasefires and pressure their leaders to resist negotiations.

In South Sudan, international actors are well-suited to deal with the challenges presented by mid-level commanders. For example, many mid-level members of the SPLA and White Army have dual citizenship in western countries and hold assets abroad. To create an incentive for cooperation, targeted sanctions (such as travel bans and asset freezes) can be imposed for failure to abide by the terms of the June ceasefire. Sanctions would require strong action by the international community, either through states like the U.S. and U.K. imposing their own sanctions or through action at the level of the U.N. Security Council. While some bemoan the tendency of the U.N. to act slowly in times of crisis, the U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), has actually begun to have an effect on reducing the conflict in South Sudan, particularly through its efforts to ensure compliance with the June ceasefire. Continued efforts to neutralize the warring parties on the ground combined with harsh punishments for failure to abide by the ceasefire would reduce the ability of mid-level commanders to exert disruptive power over the peace process. IGAD’s peace talks would greatly benefit from more external support along these lines by the international community.

Like the previous civil war against the predominantly Arab government in Sudan, South Sudan’s current conflict revolves around ethnicity. This time, however, regional and international actors are working hard to bring South Sudan back to a state of peace. For their part, the people of South Sudan desperately need a peace agreement to be reached to begin the process of reconciliation and, eventually, to have life return to normal.

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UNDERSTANDING THE ISRAEL-GAZA CONFLICT T

by Darren Henry-Noel, History 15’

hose who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. While brief, this adage applies broadly to the arena of foreign relations. For the second time in two years, Hamas has launched a massive rocket bombardment of Israel, in an attempt to achieve Palestinian freedom that has invited a hasty response from the government of Benjamin Netanyahu. This time, Israel has responded with a ground offensive of significant proportions alongside its air campaign, a decision criticized for both its military redundancy and political brinkmanship, with President Barack Obama warning Israel that ‘the US and our friends and allies are deeply concerned about the risks of further escalation and the loss of more innocent life”. By examining, however, the domestic and regional context of the crisis, each sides’ actions become more understandable. From afar, it is easy to criticize each side for lacking foresight, but for those on both sides who experience the horrors of the conflict daily, the desire for a quick and decisive

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end to the conflict is unsurprising.

Israel’s decision to invade Gaza on foot was lauded by the hardline conservatives of Netanyahu’s own right-wing coalition, while his apparent reluctance at first to sanction a ground offensive earned him criticism from high-ranking Israeli politicians, including the Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman. Lieberman argued that ‘all hesitation works against us . . . We have to end this conflict with the IDF in control of all of Gaza. There is no other way”. What seemed like a disproportionate response to many spectators was a question of survival or death for many Israelis, particularly those in coastal cities that saw the heaviest rocket bombardments. There was also a belief that decisive action against Hamas would send a clear message to other extremist groups, such as Hezbollah and the Al-Nusra Front, that Israel was able and willing to protect itself. A full ground offensive was considered the only solution to the constant threat of rockets and terrorist attacks that Israel faced

daily from an unyielding enemy. The goal of this policy was to break Palestinian faith in Hamas. Moreover, the Israeli government blamed Hamas for the increase of civilian casualties, accusing them of using the images of young corpses to evoke sympathy from the international audience.

Hamas, of course, was by no means innocent of this accusation, and it seemed that the organization hoped the rising civilian casualties would be enough to put significant international pressure on Israel to cease its military operations. Israel, however, could be accused of the same, as the heroic glorification of slain soldiers fuelled domestic public resentment of Hamas. Previous engagements showed that Israeli policymakers relied more on military operations to achieve political goals, which were mainly to destroy Palestinian civilian infrastructure and discredit Hamas as a political actor. Meanwhile, Hamas will undoubtedly lose credibility among Palestinians for refusing to negotiate and opting for a military

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“Destroyed ambulance in the City of Shijaiyah in the Gaza Strip” by Boris Niehaus via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0.

conflict while being outmatched.

The question of ‘why’ a ground offensive was launched then became a question of ‘why now’. The periodic exchanges of rocket fire and airstrikes preluded a greater conflict – one that Israeli society welcomed, having gradually shifted to the right.

With the exception of Arab-Israeli citizens and a few members of the leftwing Israeli political parties, the bulk of Israeli society has been united behind the invasion as a result of Hamas’ relentless targeting of common areas of investment, such as Tel Aviv and Ben-Gurion Airport. While the world of realpolitik and foreign affairs so often overlooks the human factor, the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teens, followed by the killing of a Palestinian youth, were undoubtedly central to escalating the crisis. To Israelis, it was a vindication of the warnings of their leaders that only decisive action could lead to a future without Hamas.

For Hamas, it fulfilled their warnings that a Jewish state would never tolerate the presence of a Palestinian mi-

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nority, and that previous negotiations were merely a stalling tactic used by Israel until all Palestinian hopes of achieving statehood were crushed.

The international stage this summer - otherwise cluttered with sectarian violence, civil strife, and aerial fiascoes - created a lack of political capacity among states that might ordinarily have pursued a more active role in mitigating the violence. Egypt, a frequent mediator between Hamas and Israel, had just seen a coup oust an elected Muslim Brotherhood government and replace it with a military dictatorship nearly identical to the one expelled almost four years ago.

Given the need to stamp out Brotherhood protests in Egypt, it was unlikely that Egypt would protest a renewed Israeli offensive against Hamas, itself a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot, or push for any sort of ceasefire. The so-called ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings inspired such fear among the dictatorial regimes in the Middle East that they willingly backed Israel so that the Americans would, in turn, help them

secure their position. Furthermore, Hamas had lost the support of its key regional backers, Syria and Iran, for supporting the Syrian uprising over their traditional ally Bashar al-Assad.

The regional turmoil that engulfed the Middle East meant that countries who might otherwise have applied pressure on the UN to undertake a more active role in defusing the crisis were too busy dealing with internal unrest to significantly counterbalance Israel.

The greatest tragedy to emerge from this is that the recent escalation of violence will only convince both sides to entrench themselves further apart. With an international audience overwhelmed by political crises and the Middle East wracked by chaos, the political situation seemed ripe for Israel to strike a finishing blow to an enemy. But when both sides saw themselves as innocent victims, there was no room for negotiation, only for absolute victory.

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RESPONDING TO ALUTHGAMA

by Hayley McNorton, Assistant Editor

n 2009, the Sri Lankan government won the Civil War against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Following the victory, President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared that all Sri Lankan citizens could “now live as equals in this free country.” Five years have passed since the President made that statement, yet Sri Lanka still struggles with equality and unity between its religious and ethnic groups. This summer, tensions between these groups peaked when anti-Muslim broke out in June.

On June 15, the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), an organization known for its nationalist and extremist promotion of Sinhala Buddhism, held a rally in Aluthgama. At the rally, several BBS leaders preached the dangers of other ethnic minorities to the Sinhala Buddhist race, and argued that Sinhala Buddhism was a superior ethnic and religious tradition. General Secretary Galagoda Atte Gnansara Thero went as far to say that “…if a single Marakkalaya [Muslim] or some other paraya [alien] touches a single Sinhalese…..it will be their end.”

The thousands of supporters present at the rally enthusiastically agreed with these sentiments, and echoed their support as they marched towards the nearby city of Dharga Town.

According to the official account given by Ambassador Ravinatha Aryasinha at the 26th session of the UN Human Rights Council, stones were thrown at BBS supporters as they proceeded through Dharga Town. In reaction, violence broke out between BBS supporters and local citizens, which escalated into riots that spread to the town of Beruwala. As the violence persisted, Muslim businesses, homes and communities were targeted by radical Sinhala Buddhists, resulting in more then one case of buildings either being looted or set on fire. The riots lasted approximately 48 hours, leaving 4 people

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dead and numerous people injured.

After the violence ended, many questioned the effectiveness of the government’s response. When the riots initially broke out, the local police and a special task force were sent in to impose curfew on the affected areas. However, following the riots, many residents of Aluthgama and Beruwala insisted that the curfew did not stop the violence because the police and special task force either stood by or responded late to distress calls. Because of this, many of those who were physically injured or whose property was damaged accused the government forces of prejudice, as they failed to halt the violence that they believed was targeted specifically at Muslims.

Although President Rajapaksa continues to claim that Sri Lanka is a multicultural society that treats all of its citizens as equals, regardless of their religion or ethnicity, accusations of the contrary persist. In Sri Lanka’s constitution, there is evidence that the government favours Sinhala Buddhism over other ethnic and religious groups in the country.

Although the constitution states that no person shall be discriminated on the grounds of their race, religion, language, caste, sex, political opinion, or place of birth, it also states that the government pledges to foster and protect Buddhism, and gives it the “foremost place” in Sri Lankan society. The result is that although the Rajapaksa government may claim to represent all of its citizens, regardless of their religion, it still has a bias towards certain religions. Consequently the structure of Sri Lankan society, as dictated by its constitution, gives credence to those who say the government has failed to treat its various ethnic and religious groups equally.

The result of giving Buddhism the “foremost place” in Sri Lanka is that the government is reluctant to take action against extremist Bud-

dhists. An exemplary case is the treatment of Gnansara Thero. Although there is verified video evidence that Gnansara Thero blatantly threatened the lives of others at the rally before the riots, he was not arrested. One questions that if a Muslim or Tamil extremist group threatened the lives of and incited violence against Sinhala Buddhists, whether they would also be treated the same way.

As journalist Kalana Senaratne emphasized, Sri Lanka is a state that has the legal, military and judicial resources to supress any organization it deems to be illegal. However, the Rajapaksa government continues to not only allow the BBS to exist as a legal entity, but it also continues to put the organization on equal standing with other religious stakeholders.

One possible explanation for the government`s inaction is that although the BBS is extremist, it does not pose a threat to the government or to Sinhala Buddhism as a whole. Therefore, it has no urgent cause to ban the group.

Additionally, rumors circulated that the government, specifically Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, was supporting the group and its goals.

Although these accusations were denied, the lack of action against the group leads to questions surrounding the government`s impartiality.

While the complexities of the anti-Muslim riots of June can be discussed in more depth, an initial conclusion is apparent: despite the diversity of ethnic and religious groups in Sri Lanka, they are not all treated equally. Without meaningful change, the marginalization of minority ethnic and religious groups will continue to reinforce the idea that they are outsiders in their own country. For the citizens of Sri Lanka to live as equals, their government should first treat them equally.

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KURDISTAN RISING

by Holly Kallmeyer, Assistant Editor

hile the Islamic State’s (IS) brutal insurgency has dominated media coverage this summer on the future of Iraq, there is another group that challenges the country’s unity. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), a semi-autonomous region of Iraq, will be a decisive player in the Iraqi federation’s survival. The KRG’s response to the war against IS has demonstrated the Kurds’ potential for greater influence in the region, and perhaps signals their intention to secede. The KRG’s strength has given hope to the 30 million Kurds of the Middle East, 24 million of whom live outside Iraq, that their calls for an independent Kurdish state will finally be answered. Iraq’s Kurds may have the capacity to secede, but whether their politicians will pursue independence remains to be seen.

The Kurds’ military capabilities in the face of IS are impressive in comparison to Iraq’s national army.

When Iraqi soldiers fled their posts at Kirkuk in June, the peshmerga (the KRG’s army) showed competence and solidarity by securing the oil-rich city. Whereas defections from the Iraqi army have skyrocketed, the peshmerga have been able to retain and even recruit troops.

Currently, peshmerga forces are maintaining a 600 mile frontier against IS. In Sinjar, Kurdish forces were criticized for failing to protect the Yazidi population (a Kurdish minority who were targeted in IS’s attack on Sinjar), as pershmerga troops withdrew from the town in advance of IS’s attack. Their retreat, however, was due to a lack of ammunition rather than a military command issue. Moreover, Kurdish rebels on the Syrian side of Mount Sinjar were crucial players in the safe evacuation of the Yazidis before the U.S. airlifted supplies to the mountains.

The peshmerga’s primary weakness in its fight against IS lies in its outdated military equipment. The IS forces have much stronger conventional arms than the Kurdish forces, which partly enabled IS’s to take both Sinjar and Mosul. However, incoming international military aid to the Kurdish forces will substantially help in fighting against IS. Early effects of this aid are already apparent: just days after President Obama announced the U.S.’s assistance to the peshmerga in the form of air attacks and weapons, the peshmerga were able to re-take Mosul from IS. While the peshmerga may not be able to eliminate the IS insurgency altogether, with external support it will likely be able to keep the KRG secure.

Some have interpreted the peshmerga’s strength as a signal that Iraqi Kurdistan is positioning itself to secede from Iraq, fulfilling a long-held desire for independence. Indeed, the notion that Iraq will

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continue to exist in any form in the coming years is debateable. However, the head of the KRG, Masoud Barzani, has been skillfully manoeuvering for both outcomes.

In early July, Barzani announced plans for an independence referendum to be held in the KRG and told Al Jazeera that “[the Kurds] will no longer accept other people deciding our fate. We will be the ones deciding our own future.” At the same time, Barzani was a prominent figure in the negotiations that led to the nomination of Haider al-Abadi to succeed Nouri Maliki as Iraq’s prime minister, which may indicate an intention to stay in the federation of Iraq.

Reasons for the KRG to remain a part of Iraq are largely economic. While Kurdistan’s oil reserves are vast, secession would limit their profitability. In Kirkuk, the largest oil reserve near Kurdistan, a complicated arrangement of profit-sharing prohibits the KRG from unilaterally exporting oil. Moreover, American companies are currently barred from purchasing oil directly from Kurdish suppliers as part of the U.S’s commitment to a unified Iraq. As an incentive to remain part of the federation, in Iraq’s constitution the KRG is entitled to 17% of all national oil revenue, which could be a substantial figure considering Iraq’s potential oil output.

On the other hand, regional conditions for Kurdish secession have not been better since the end of WWI. Syrian Kurdish militias positioned along the KRG’s border, many of which are associated with the PKK (a Turkish-Kurdish rebel militia with a history of separatist ambitions), are simultaneously holding their defences against Islamist insurgents and Syrian government forces while providing basic government functions. Iran, which had previously opposed Kurdish secession because of its own Kurdish minority, has reached out to Iraqi Kurds in an effort to form a Shiite-Kurdish alliance. Most notably, Turkey, which has the region’s largest Kurdish population and only recently ended a decades-long fight with its own Kurdish rebels, showed signs this summer of welcoming an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. At the beginning of the summer, Turkey signed an oil deal with the KRG in an attempt to break its reliance on Russian energy sources. When asked about the prospect of an independent Kurdistan, a Turkish government spokesperson said that it would not be something Turkey would fight, signalling a major shift in Turkish foreign policy.

The borders of Iraq have not been this fragile in decades. While IS has presented a significant threat to those borders, the deciding factor in Iraq’s survival may be the political will of the Kurds.

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DEMOCRACY & DEMOCRATIZATION //

INDIA VOTES 2014

by Corey Goldberg, Commerce 15’

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Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India

his past summer saw a political revitalization in India with the 2014 general elections. It was a remarkable event in the history of Indian democracy, as the 814 million eligible voters exceeded those of the previous election by 100 million. With a suffering economy and rampant corruption, Indians demanded a change after ten “lost” years under the Singh government. This election granted their wishes, revealing a transformation in the Indian political climate.

Narendra Modi, former Chief Minister (CM) of Gujarat, was elected Prime Minister of India with a landslide vote for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Defeating the United Progressive Alliance, a coalition led by the historically predominant Indian National Congress (INC), the BJP was the first political party to win an outright majority by itself in the Indian parliament since 1984.

The BJP’s electoral success was largely the result of Modi’s own popularity throughout India, which stemmed from multiple factors. Modi was seen as a man of the people: born into a disadvantaged caste, he worked his way up from being the “chai boy” in his local railway station to a Prime Ministerial candidate. Modi’s prominence within the BJP and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sanghc (RSS), a nationalist paramilitary group, gained him a reputation for supporting Hindu nationalism, winning over a massive and unwavering Hindu base. Furthermore, Modi was known for his intolerance towards corruption, a topic of prime importance in the election.

The main factor in Modi’s popularity, however, was the general perception that he had the strongest economic vision for India among all the candidates. Beginning after his first term as CM of Gujarat, Modi shift-

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ed his political focus from Hindutava (Hindu nationalism) to economic development, promising to enact the “Gujarat model” nationwide during his electoral campaign. His accomplishments in Gujarat–increasing the GDP and opening a Tata Nano manufacturing plant, to name two–led many Indians, particularly those within the growing middle class, to see him as the leader who would strengthen a suffering national economy.

While Modi was known for his sound economic policy, his political record remains controversial, and his critics have put forth two closely related concerns. The first deals with the status of India’s religious minorities under Hindu nationalist governance. Historically, the treatment of religious minorities by Hindu Nationalist Governments has been poor, with the destruction of the Babri Masjid Mosque in 1992 and the Gujarat riots in 2002 as examples.

The second concern involves Modi’s alleged role in the Gujarat riots. In 2002, an attack by Muslim insurgents killed 58 Hindus on a train in Ghodra. The state plunged into chaos, resulting in the deaths of approximately 2000 people, the majority of whom were Muslim.

After the riots, Modi’s government underwent heavy scrutiny and faced allegations of involvement in the killings.

Former BJP minister Maya Kodnani was notably convicted of distributing arms and inciting a mob of 15,000.

Modi himself was subject to an investigation under a Supreme Court order that lasted almost a decade, but the court eventually ruled that there was no valid case against him. His critics, however, viewed the decision as a farce.

Modi and other top officials made questionable decisions after the train attack. For example, victims’ corpses were transferred uncovered to the city of Ahmadabad, inspiring anger in many Muslims. Modi, refusing to apologize, said “hang me if I’m guilty.”

Nonetheless, the results of last May’s election suggest that most voters view Modi’s association with the Gujarat riots as a mere stain on his political record. Considering his politics in aggregate, an overwhelming number of people voted for him, including many Muslims and former critics.

This conclusion suggests a frightening reality with regard to India’s political climate: there is a general eagerness in India to overlook exclusionary religious ideology in favour of pursuing economic growth.

While the repercussions of this election remain to be seen, the changing political landscape makes India worth watching. Perhaps Modi will prove to be the leader the country needs, or perhaps history will repeat itself.

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THAILAND: DEMOCRATIC REFORM WITHOUT DEMOCRACY?

“Thaksin DOD 20050915” by DoD photo by Helene C. Stikkel - http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/newsphoto. aspx?newsphotoid=7105. Licensed under Public domain

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“Yingluck Shinawatra - World Economic Forum Meeting 2012” by World Economic Forum via Flickr.

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Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra, Former Prime Ministers of Thailand

by Emerson Murray, Editor-in-Chief

emocracy in Thailand is fragile. Last May, Thailand’s military seized power from a caretaker government after six months of political chaos that led to 28 deaths, over 700 injuries, and the impeachment of a prime minister.

The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), a military junta, took the reins on Thailand’s political affairs.

In the name of democratic reform, the regime granted itself sweeping power, tightened public censorship, and arbitrarily detained hundreds.

How was democratic reform without democracy valid?

According to the NCPO, Thai democracy had turned into a “parliamentary dictatorship”: corrupt populists had won the vote of rural masses with empty promises and welfare schemes, going on to use democra-

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cy as a vehicle for greed and tyranny.

The military was thus obliged to seize power and fix democracy to prevent them from winning future elections.

In reality, an elite network–Thailand’s royalists–felt that democracy had compromised the power and prestige of the throne. Changing political tides had taken the popular vote out of their favour. A military coup would thus enable the royalists to bring democracy within comfortable limits.

A Decade of Crisis The electoral success of Thaksin Shinawatra, a telecommunications tycoon and former Prime Minister, began the royalists’ unease with democracy. He entered Thai politics in the wake of the Asian financial crisis when IMF reforms lowered public

confidence in the right-wing Democrat government. A political rookie, Thaksin portrayed himself as an energetic and decisive businessman with a concern for the rural poor. He was elected PM in 2001 and re-elected, by a landslide majority, in 2005.

Amid accusations of corruption and abuse of power, a military coup removed Thaksin from office in 2006.

To avoid a supreme court conviction for conflict-of-interest over his wife’s purchase of state land, Thaksin fled Thailand on self-imposed exile in 2008 and lives abroad to this day. Nonetheless, Thaksin’s populist policies, such as affordable healthcare and economic stimulus, earned him loyal support across Thailand’s largely agrarian and lower-income Northeast. As a result, Thaksin’s political proxies have won every election since his ousting. Most recently, Yingluck Shinawatra–Thaksin’s sister– led the Pheu Thai (“For Thais”) Party to win an outright majority in 2011.

The past decade of political turmoil revolved around Thaksin and his proxies. His main support came from the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), known as the “Red Shirts,” and the rural segments of Northeast Thailand. His opponents were royalists, conservatives, the military, and the upper and middle class segments of Bangkok and the South. They affiliated with the Democrat Party and the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), an umbrella group that encompassed the “Yellow Shirt” People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD).

The round of unrest that led to the most recent coup began in November 2013 when PM Yingluck and the Pheu Thai passed a general amnesty bill that would enable Thaksin’s return to Thailand without trial, inciting PDRC protests. In May, the Constitutional Court ordered Yingluck to step down for abuse of power while

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DEMOCRACY & DEMOCRATIZATION // an anti-corruption commission impeached her over a failed rice subsidy scheme. As rallies by the UDD and PDRC ensued and heightened prospects of civil war, the military intervened with a bloodless coup.

The Monarchy and a Constructed Threat Thaksin Shinawatra and his proxies faced opposition because they came into conflict with Thailand’s monarchy: an age-old institution that continues to assert power behind the scenes.

King Bhumibol Adulyadej has historically intervened in political crises, endorsed regimes, and steered public opinion through media appearances. According to Duncan McCargo, a scholar of contemporary Thai politics, the King operated through “networks” of proxies across bodies such as the military and the Privy Council.

While in office, Thaksin revamped the Thai bureaucracy to replace the King’s networks with those of his cronies, sparking a royalist retaliation.

The royal endorsement of last May’s coup was an example of the King’s political role. Immensely popular among Thais, he remains a key source of legitimacy as the result of a Cold War project. To unify Thais against communism, the dictator Sarit Thanarat created a new persona for the King.

The image of a virtuous leader, responsible for providing moral guidance and caring for the rural masses through development work, deeply engrained itself in Thailand’s collective memory.

Meanwhile, strict lèse majesté laws have prevented critical discussion on the King’s place in Thai democracy.

Thaksin’s royalist opponents used the King’s moral image to legitimate their cause. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, a scholar of Southeast Asian studies, argued that because the King was integral to Thailand’s national identity, the royalists framed Thaksin as a threat to national security. For ex-

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ample, they accused Thaksin of “khai chat” (“selling out the country”) when he sold his telecommunications firm to the Singapore government in 2006, claiming that he allowed Singapore to spy on Thailand. Thaksin, according to the royalists, was willing to give the Kingdom away to foreign rivals out of greed. He was therefore a (constructed) threat to Thai nationhood, which warranted military intervention.

A Democracy with Limits The latest cycle of unrest saw Thai democracy come into question. After a decade of populist leadership, royalists declared it ruined by Thaksin.

Tyranny of the majority was behind the electoral wins of the Shinawatras, who bought the vote of naïve and uneducated farmers–or the “khwai daeng” (“Red Buffalos”), in royalist terms. The PDRC and the military thus argued that an appointed council was needed to reform democracy and protect Thailand from Thaksin’s greed.

These arguments surfaced last February when Yingluck asked the King to dissolve parliament and call for general elections, reacting to protests against the amnesty bill. With predictions of another Pheu Thai victory, the PDRC boycotted the elections and blocked polling stations across the South, leading the Constitutional Court to void the results and leave Thailand with a caretaker government. Before another election could be held, the military took reform into its own hands.

This summer witnessed a regime concerned with restraining democracy rather than repairing it. In July, the NCPO appointed a National Legislative Assembly of which more than half the members were from the security forces. The NCPO also passed an interim constitution that granted itself sweeping powers and legal immunity.

Neither the rule of law nor public representation appears to be part of the NCPO’s process for democratic change.

The NCPO also called for an “attitude adjustment” that reflected royalist rhetoric: to disagree with the removal of Thaksin and his sister, regardless of its undemocratic nature, was to distance oneself from the Thai nation.

Since May, the NCPO has arbitrarily detained over 300 people–journalists, activists, academics, and politicians– for criticizing the regime, violating lèse majesté, or disobeying martial law. After a summer of authoritarian rule, the future of Thai democracy is uncertain.

A Movement Unchained Without the rule of law, public consultation, or freedom of expression, the NCPO’s promise to reform democracy is disingenuous. Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra were the only leaders in Thai history to govern by popular mandate, which threatened the monarchy’s political grasp. Frustrated with democracy, the royalists cast Thaksin as a national enemy, his support as a tyranny of the majority, and themselves as rescuers of the Kingdom.

Thaksin was indeed authoritarian: he passed broad censorship and emergency laws, flouted the advice of human rights organizations, and oversaw a “War on Drugs” that led to 2,800 extra-judicial killings. He succeeded at the polls, however, because he engaged the rural poor that Bangkok had long overlooked.

Loyal support of Thaksin and his offshoots signalled a political reawakening among Thais, which neither royalists nor the NCPO will stop. Some Red Shirts have nonetheless realized Thaksin’s shortcomings and have gone beyond seeking his return to Thailand. The movement’s newly adopted symbols–The Hunger Games salute, the playing of La Marseillaise, and the reading of 1984–suggest a broader concern for democracy and social justice.

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// GREAT POWERS

RETHINKING THE BRICS BANK Dilma Rousseff President of Brazil

J

Vladimir Putin President of Russia

Narendra Modi Prime Minister of India

Xi Jinping President of China

Jacob Zuma President of South Africa

by Dylan Edmonds, Political Studies 17’

uly 1st of this year marked the 70th anniversary of the Bretton Woods Conference, which pursued economic stability in the first half of the twentieth century through policies on international trade and currency rates. More recently, the institutional offspring of the Bretton Woods Conference, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have faced criticism for pushing an outdated neoliberal economic model. Recent efforts to revamp the aging lending regime have fallen woefully short, as Belgium has more IMF votes than Brazil and China has less clout then the Benelux countries.

On July 15, the leading emerging countries–Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS)– announced the New Development Bank (NDB). Although the creation of the BRICS’ first institution signals a greater opportunity to advance

their economic agenda, competition between the participant countries could stall any progress made so far.

As its name suggests, the NDB aims to “mobiliz[e] resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing countries.” Details on the bank’s structure and functions remain unofficial, but its main components were announced in Fortaleza, Brazil. The NDB will call Shanghai home, its first president will be Indian, and its Board of Governors will be comprised of Russians. Most importantly, the bank will hold $100 billion USD in authorized capital in the reserves of participant countries, while dividing $50 billion in subscribed capital equally among each. Although $100 billion of capital is substantial, one must keep in mind the NDB’s western competitor’s pockets run much deeper: the IMF

alone has $1 trillion at its disposal.

Aside from the relations between each of the 5 countries, the BRICS is little more than an acronym. To be successful in offering a new economic model, the NDB’s inter-organizational relations must promote cooperation.

Questions of potential conflict among the BRICS have already surfaced in the media. Herein lies the BRICS’ paradox: by grouping together and initiating closer relations to counter the traditional Great Powers, the BRICS’ own conflicting interests and goals become more apparent. Take the example of India and China, two major players in the BRICS. There are some in India who fear that China will be the first among equals within the bank.

The bank’s preliminary details have outlined voting rights, which are important for cooperation, but what about India’s failed pitch to house the

“Dilma Rousseff ” by Agência Brasil via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC-BY-3.0-br. ±:PEHMQMV 4YXMR ¯ ² F] 6YWWMER 4VIWMHIRXMEP 4VIWW ERH -RJSVQEXMSR 3J½GI ZME ;MOMQIHME 'SQQSRW 0MGIRWIH YRHIV '' &= ±2EVIRHVE ( 1SHM² F] REVIRHVEQSHMSJ½GMEP ZME *PMGOV '' &= “Xi Jinping October 2013” by Antilong via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0.

“South Africa – Jacob Zuma” by the Commonwealth via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.

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GREAT POWERS // NDB’s headquarters in New Delhi?

Oliver Stuenkel, a professor of International Relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation and a firm believer in the BRICS’ capacity to diminish neoliberal hegemony, voices concerns over the group’s rivalries, stating, “The fact that the agreement about the location of the bank’s headquarters was reached only hours before the signing ceremony underlines that it will take considerable effort to manage intra-BRICS rivalries.” Is this an example of India taking the back seat to China in the NDB’s inter-workings? All questions aside, there is a prospect of future conflict between the BRICS countries over which national interests will play out.

Echoing these concerns, one writer from FirstPost, an Indian News Agency, wrote, “India should not fall into the trap of bleary eyed and mushy rhetoric. It’s a Hobbesian jungle out

there where power and power politics runs the roost. Let India not lose sight of this.” While fearing Chinese expansion, India is also weary of countering its rival’s growth and inadvertently supporting American dominance.

As a whole, the BRICS are plagued with a long history of distrust and conflict among their members.

For example, the Russo-Chinese rivalry occurred back when both countries were under communist rule. To a certain extent, history still can still play a role in the level of distrust within the BRICS and many see an organization that is still suffering from historical grievances and chronically narrow national interests. Recently, when choosing a new leader for the IMF after the departure of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the BRICS were unable to stand in solidarity: China and Brazil withheld support from the only

candidate from an emerging country, which was Mexico. By failing to set national interests aside, China and Brazil compromised the BRICS’ solidarity.

There is no doubt that the NDB will have many challenges to overcome well before the institution even begins to lend. The world has become no less complicated since the IMF and WB entered the economic fray some 70 years ago. One point, however, is unambiguously clear: despite potential conflict among the BRICS, the political will for an alternative to western IFIs in the Global South is showing. We can only look to the future to see if this will is unstable, or solid, much like real bricks.

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2014 BRICS Summit in Fortaleza

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// EMERGING TRENDS

THE NEW PRIVATE T

by Nirali Patel, President of QIAA

he use of private soldiers dates back centuries, ranging from colonial privateers to the Nubians. At present, they operate as part of private military companies (PMCs), undertaking security-related tasks outside the scope of government forces. PMCs became the focus of public attention seven years ago with a shoot-out at Nisour Square in Baghdad that killed Iraqi civilians.

Since June of this year, five personnel from Blackwater, an American PMC, have been on trial for charges related to the incident. Although the trial is still underway, it is one of the first instances where a PMC has faced legal recourse for its activities abroad. The trial highlights a need to more closely scrutinize PMCs, recognizing that their role in the warzone is here to stay.

Blackwater was founded by Erik Prince, a former businessman and Navy SEAL officer, in 1997 and based in North Carolina, operating within a wide market of other military contractors. On 16 September 2007, Blackwater personnel allegedly shot and killed twenty Iraqi civilians and injured twenty others in Nisour Square, Baghdad. Although the incident enraged the Iraqi government, it was unable to act since Blackwater employees fell under US military jurisdiction and were immune to Iraqi law.

In 2009, the US convicted five Blackwater personnel on counts of manslaughter, attempted manslaughter, and weapons violations. A district judge dismissed the charges, because the case was built on sworn statements that the guards had given to the State

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Department in exchange for legal immunity. The case was re-opened in April 2011 after the Obama administration appealed the dismissal, and the new trial began mid-June of this year.

Jeremy Ridgeway, a former Blackwater guard involved in the Nisour Square incident, is the chief witness for the prosecution. Ridgeway initially denied that the guards were at fault, stating that they opened fire at Nisour Square because they were ambushed. In 2009, he formally rescinded his testimony and chose to testify against his colleagues in the current trial, pleading guilty to voluntary and attempted manslaughter. If convicted, the Blackwater personnel will be sentenced to a minimum of 30 years in prison.

After the Nisour Square incident, Blackwater changed its name to XE Services and then Academi, which merged with its rival Triple Canopy and eventually became part of Constellis Holdings. Although the company’s brand changes served to distance itself from previous tragedy, Iraqi and American officials will always remember what occurred.

While the Blackwater trial is still in progress, PMCs remain prosperous in the field of international security. They emerged in the 1980s with the paradigm shift to neoliberalism and efforts under Reagan and Thatcher to offload government responsibilities to the private sector. Since then, states, multinational corporations, and non-governmental organizations have all hired PMCs for their various

needs. PMCs have operated on every continent (with the exception of Antarctica) and offer a number of services including combat troops, logistical support, supplies, security services (bodyguards), and military operational advice. PMCs are typically hired to secure commercial interests and provide personnel to aid the government and army in reconstructing internal and external infrastructures.

While PMCs are beyond the jurisdiction of international law and therefore face fewer constraints than military actors, the placement of an unregulated actor in a warzone creates tense situations for diplomats and soldiers. Blackwater was the first major case in recent decades that saw the international community demand recourse for illegal actions by military contractors.

Regardless of the ongoing trial, PMCs will remain vital to international security and combat zones abroad, but they deserve greater scrutiny. Academi personnel are stationed around the world, most recently suspected of operating in Ukraine. It remains unconfirmed, however, whether the mysterious military contractors in Ukraine are actually American or just Russian propaganda. Dr. Nafeez Ahmed, a security expert from the Institute for Policy Research and Development, hinted at the former when he said, “It’s certainly not beyond the realm of possibility–Academi have been deployed in all sorts of theaters.”

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EMERGING TRENDS //

SOLDIER “

It’s certainly not beyond the realm of possibility–Academi have been deployed in all sorts of theaters.

”

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// GLOBAL HEALTH

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IMPROVING MATERNAL AND SEXUAL HEALTH IN RURAL PAKISTAN A

by Lindsay Ruiter, Kinesiology 15’

pproximately one out of every three girls in Pakistan is married before she turns eighteen. Young marriages often result in adolescent pregnancies, which are known to pose a very high risk in terms of both maternal and child health. According to USAID, approximately 70,000 girls die every year in Pakistan due to complications arising from adolescent childbirths and pregnancies. However, recent events in the Sindh province have provided women’s rights and health activists with a flicker of hope that change is on the horizon.

In February 2014, sex education classes for girls of eight years or more began in Johi, a small village in the Sindh province of Pakistan. Over 600

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girls have attended these classes that cover menstruation, sexual rights, and self-defense. This is a radical initiative for the small community, as publically accessible information is so minimal that many girls reach menstruation without knowing what it is and are married without understanding the mechanics of sex. The goal of these classes is to reduce the number of sexual assault and rape cases and to inform girls about safe sex practices, contraception use, and when to seek medical care. If girls learn at a young age about reproductive and sexual health, female health statistics in the region could improve.

Some argue, however, that simply teaching girls about sexual health and

reproduction is inadequate. A girl may learn that she should use a condom to avoid pregnancy, but many newly wed girls are unable to convince their husbands to adopt this practice.

According to UN Statistics, Pakistan has a teenage pregnancy rate of 20.3 per 1000 births. A lack of knowledge about sex and reproduction may partially account for this statistic, but simply informing women about these topics is unlikely to change it by any significant amount. To reduce teenage pregnancies and related complications, there are larger structures to examine, such as the practice of child marriages that is still fairly common in the rural and lower-income areas of Pakistan: 35.2% of married women between the ages of 25 and

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GLOBAL HEALTH // 49 were married before the age of 18.

In the Sindh province, a new law was passed this spring that prohibited males and females from marrying until the age of eighteen, at the risk of three years imprisonment’ for the facilitators of marriages that violated this law. The previous law allowed girls of 16 years or more to marry with very small fines for infractions.

If fully implemented, this law could initiate positive change in the lives of many girls in Pakistan. The current school drop-out rate is much higher for females vs males (56% vs 44%), because in many of Pakistan’s poorer areas, it is more financially sound for parents to marry off their daughters early than to keep them in school.

A law that forbade marriage until the age of eighteen would enable girls to

receive a longer education and become more physically mature, lowering their risk of complications during pregnancy and childbirth. Education is beneficial to female fertility and enhances a woman’s “ability to make reproductive choices,” according to Teresa Castro Martin from the Spanish Council for Scientific Research. Scholars who argue that policies must look beyond a direct approach to improving health and focus instead on widening access to education, such as Narjis Rizvi of Aga Khan University, support this form of upstream intervention.

Sex education classes, like the one in Johi, can potentially enhance women’s and children’s health in Pakistan.

The classes may inform and empower girls by starting a public conversation about sexual health. Further interventions are needed, howev-

er, to address some of the upstream causes of many problems in women’s health. The Sindh province is setting an example for creating change by restricting child marriages for both genders with large fines and jail time. By combining limits on child marriage with sex education classes, prospects for female health are brighter. Girls will be more informed and educated while high-risk teenage pregnancies may be reduced. Although such progress remains unique to this area of Pakistan at present, it is a start to improving the quality of life and health status of women throughout.

“A young girl pictured at a mobile health clinic in Sindh, Pakistan” by DFID – UKA Department for -RXIVREXMSREP (IZIPSTQIRX ZME *PMGOV 0MGIRWIH YRHIV '' &= 1SHM½IH JVSQ SVMKMREP

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