The Observer XIII.IV - The Carrot and the Stick

THE OBSERVER

XIII.IV APRIL 2017

From the EDITOR Welcome to the final issue of The Observer’s XIII series, The Carrot and the Stick!

For our fourth issue we decided to apply the idiom, the carrot and the stick, as a lens to analyze world events. This idiom refers to policies of rewards and punishments in exchange for producing a desired behaviour. It is often associated with the image of a donkey pulling a cart, motivated by the carrot dangling in front of it. In its colloquial usage, the carrot and the stick is often associated with the realist theory of international relations as a method for analyzing a state’s decision to use hard power.

We begin this issue with a look at three countries that have exemplified the complex relationship between the carrot and the stick; Kayla Maria Rolland writes on France, Jacob D’Souza on The Gambia, and Monique Sereneo on the Phillippines.Then, both Gavrilo Randjelovic and Spencer Belyea take a look at Russia’s use of hard power with respect to Belarus and NATO, respectively. Next, we take a deep dive into United States’ (U.S.) policy. Sean Stead-Fecser analyzes Nikki Haley’s approach of “taking names” at the UN, Heather Park highlights a Mexican perspective to President Trump’s border wall policy, and Nick Pearce looks at the repercussions of U.S. nuclear policy. Finally, Sean Adessky and Rebecca Frost use ‘the carrot and the stick’ to analyze U.S. policy towards Israel and Iran, respectively.

I am incredibly humbled to present to you that last issue I worked on as Editor-in-Chief, the one that ends my three years of work within The Observer team. I want to take this opportunity to say a heartfelt thank you to the writers and editors I have had the privilege of working with this year; I have never been a part of such a dedicated and creative staff who have inspired me to continually better my work. These four issues in the XIII series have truly been an amalgamation of the best qualities of all who worked on them.

If you have any remarks or concerns please feel free to email contact@queensobserver.org.

We encourage you to consider writing for the next XIV series beginning in September 2017.

Please follow us on Facebook (Queen’s International Observer) and Instagram (theobserver_qiaa) for updates on our activity.

Happy reading!

Georgie Giannopoulos Editor-in-Chief Political Studies ‘17

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OUR TEAM

The views expressed by the authors are in character for the issue theme and do not necessarily reflect their personal views or the views of the Queen’s International Affairs Association.

Editorial Team Georgie Giannopoulos, Editor-in-Chief

Nicole Toole, Assistant Editor

Rebecca Frost, Intern

Kelley Humber, Assistant Editor

Georgie Giannopoulos is a fourth year political studies major and history minor and is the editor-in-chief of The Observer for 2016/2017. Her academic research interests include minority rights, ethnic conflict, international security, and constitutional law. She is completing an honours thesis discussing next steps in solving the ‘Cyprus Question’. Outside of the academic realm Georgie enjoys playing violin in the Queen’s Symphony Orchestra, volunteering at Martha’s Table, and is the Vice Chair of the Alma Mater Society’s Board of Directors.

Rebecca Frost is in her first year at Queen’s. She hoping to take a medial in Mathematics and Economics with a certificate in Global Development Studies.

Her eventual goal is to attend law school.

Her research interests lie with the study of global economic systems and the impact of economic policies on contemporary development practice. Rebecca is very excited to begin her involvement in the Queen’s community as a first-year intern with The Observer.

Nicole Toole is a third year undergraduate student studying a medial in Political Studies and Global Development with a Certificate in Business. Her passion towards international relations and development studies led to her join The Observer. Nicole is excited to be one of the Assistant Editors for the 2016/2017 year!

Alongside of her work with The Observer, Nicole is part of Queen’s Students for Literacy Prison Literacy Initiative, and a Supervisor for Helen Tuft Child Outreach Program.

Kelley Humber is a third year Political Studies and History medial, and one of The Observer’s Assistant Editors for 2016/2017. Her academic interests include Eastern European politics and Canadian ally relations. She spent her past summer as a Research Fellow with the Queen’s History Department working on a project about foreign aid to Soviet Russia. Apart from The Observer, Kelley is involved with Politicus Journal and is a member of the Queen’s Rowing Team.

Raine Storey, Layout Editor

Raine Storey is a graphic and visual artist who works in a variety of different mediums, specializing in illustration. Raine’s work features a range of visual narratives with a strong focus on realism. At fifteen, Raine began a custom illustration and graphic design business, Raine Storey Illustration. She is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Fine Arts (Hons.) as a Loran Scholar at Queen’s University.

Writers

Sean Adessky, Spencer Belyea, Jacob D’Souza, Rebecca Frost, Haleigh Johns, Heather Park, Nick Pearce, Gavrilo Randjelovic, Kayla Maria Rolland, Monique Sereneo, Sean Stead-Fecser April 2017

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CONTENTS 6

“ON EST CHEZ NOUS” Will Frexit follow Brexit?

By: Kayla Maria Rolland

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THE GAMBIA: A Textbook Example of Cooperation between Hard and Soft Power By: Jacob D’Souza

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TAMING TROUBLED WATERS: Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea By: Monique Sereneo

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RUSSIAN BLUES: Belarusian Ambitions in Putin’s World By: Gavrilo Randjelovic

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A SHIFT TO HARD POWER: Russia vs. NATO By: Spencer Belyea

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“TAKING NAMES”: Nikki Haley and the UN By: Sean Stead-Fecser

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A SOFT USE OF HARD POWER: Trump and the Executive Order By: Haleigh Johns

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TRUMPTY-DUMPTY SAT ON A WALL, Trying To Make Mexico Take The Fall By: Heather Park

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MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT By: Nick Pearce

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ISRAEL, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE PALESTINIANS: Who Gets the Carrot and Who Gets the Stick in Trump’s Administration?

By: Sean Adessky

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FROM “DUAL-TRACKING” TO BACK TRACKING: The Evolution of the United States’ Negotiation Strategy in Iran By: Rebecca Frost

April 2017

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“ON EST CHEZ NOUS”

Will Frexit follow Brexit?

By: Kayla Maria Rolland

After 10 years of tough austerity measures and a large scale humanitarian crisis that has enveloped Europe, many French citizens are questioning France’s position in the European Union (EU). The potential ‘Frexit’ may threaten the very existence of the 23-year-old EU. Considering France is a founding member, and the recent exit of Britain, more states may follow suit as France and Britain are two large contributors to the EU.

In the spring, France will elect a new president. One candidate, Marine Le Pen, has brought the notion of ‘Frexit’ to the forefront of French politics. Le Pen is the leader of France’s Front National Party - a right-wing populist party. The Front National was founded in 1972 and the first leader was Le Pen’s father, Jean-Marie Le Pen. The party’s foundation includes: tough on crime, reduced immigration, nationalist, and islamophobia ideals.

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Le Pen has vowed, if elected, a referendum on France’s continued membership in EU will be held Le Pen understands the EU as a threat to French identity and independence.

Moreover, she continues to communicate that French national identity is threatened and in jeopardy due to immigrants. Le Pen’s promise to contest radical Islam has resonated in a nation shaken by two major terrorist attacks since 2015. As many citizens grow weary of outsiders, there is further demand for France to exit the EU due to their mandatory refugee settlement quota.

While Le Pen has proclaimed that France has, “a thousand more reasons to want to leave the EU than the English,” there are also many compelling reasons for France to remain in the EU. Economic concerns are one of the primary influences to stay. Unlike Britain, France uses a common currency with much of Europe, and questions exist about what currency would be used by an independent France.

Many express concerns over currency fluctuations. Le Pen has previously considered the idea of an independent France that preserves the euro, or a national currency that would exist in conjunction with the euro. However, many critics have dismissed these claims labeling them as an unviable option and an attempt to pander to voters.

Furthermore, France has a written constitution - unlike Britain. The constitution directly states, “The Republic is part of the European Union.” As a result of the clause, if Le Pen were elected a modify the constitution would need to be pursued. Such a modification would require approval from the National Assembly and Senate, followed by the approval of 3/5 of Congress, or be approved by a referendum. Such a feat is predicted to be difficult, but not impossible.

Before Le Pen can achieve her dream of an independent France from the EU, her first task is to be elected President. Le Pen has been performing well in polls and is predicted to lead in France’s first round of voting – which set to be held on April 23rd. If no candidate wins a majority of the votes, a second round of voting will take place on May 7th.

Political forecasters envision the first round of voting in France’s multistage election process to be successful for Le Pen, but a second round victory is predicted to be a great feat.

While Le Pen still appears to be an underdog, the shock election of Donald Trump and the result of the Brexit referendum have caused concern that the waves of populism and anti-globalization that has engulfed much of the world will reach the shores of France.

April 2017

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THE GAMBIA: A Textbook Example of Cooperation Between Hard and Soft Power By: Jacob D’Souza

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oward the end of 2016, media was dominated by the 45th American Presidential transition.

However, on the other side of the world, another Presidential transition was significantly less placid.

A power struggle in the West African state of The Gambia had emerged.

On December 1 2016, President Yahya Jammeh – whom held reign since 1994- lost the Presidential election to Adama Barrow, a former real estate developer and pro-Western candidate.

Despite Jammeh accepting defeat in a televised speech on December 2, he made a reversal on December 9. Jammeh claimed there was voting irregularities and refused to step down at the end of his term. He challenged the result in Gambia’s Supreme Court, and stated he would remain President until the court delivered a ruling in February.

This would be well beyond the end of his term, which was scheduled to end on January 19.

The pending court ruling prompted the Gambian Parliament to vote in favour of extending his term for three months, and Gambia’s military chief assured President Jammeh he had his support. Jammeh has since stepped down, and Barrow has proceed as Gambia’s third President.

Numerous international actors responded to Jammeh’s refusal to allow his predecessor

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to assume office through strongly urging President Jammeh to leave office as scheduled. The United Nations Security Council, the United States, the African Union, the West-African regional bloc, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),a West African regional bloc, said they would not recognize Jammeh as President past the original end date of his term. Such a move would leave Jammeh unable to conduct foreign policy, and limit his ability to effectively manage domestic affairs.

Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari, led a delegation of ECOWAS leaders to discuss the current situation in Gambia in mid-January with President Jammeh. ECOWAS sought to negotiate for Jammeh to step down peacefully before the end of his term. However, no agreement was reached. The failure of ECOWAS negotiations prompted President-elect Barrow to flee to the neighbouring state of Senegal for safety, where he sought refuge in the Gambian embassy.

On January 19th, Adama Barrow was sworn in as the President in the Gambian embassy in Senegal as scheduled. On the same day, troops backed by ECOWAS and the UN entered Gambia, advancing towards the capital to forcefully remove Jammeh. Due to the increasing seclusion of Jammeh, he finally agreed during talks with ECOWAS leaders to resign on January 21, and left the for exile in Senegal. Barrow has now returned to Gambia to assume the Presidency, and a formal inauguration ceremony was held on February 18.

ECOWAS’ approach to resolving the Gambian presidential crisis used the correct balance of soft and hard power. Their first attempt to resolve the conflict peacefully via negotiations, demonstrated their ability to employ soft power. Having led Gambia for 22 years with authoritarian-like rule, Jammeh had become accustom to playing hardball.

He may have assumed that ECOWAS was bluffing and would not wish to engage in a conflict, on the premise that it had the potential to be costly and create a refugee exodus to neighbouring countries.

ECOWAS leaders responded to the initial failure of soft power with the threat of hard power through military action. Senegal’s public organization of ground forces in combination with Nigerian preparation of warships and planes clearly indicated to Jammeh that his position was untenable.

ECOWAS was indeed holding the hard power as a last resort, but more critically, they were not bluffing. West African leaders agreed that despite the risks, they were committed to removing Jammeh via force if necessary.

ECOWAS could have continued to employ hard power by advancing into the capital, Banjul, to arrest Jammeh. However, they understood that such an outcome would be undesirable. This was undesirable due to the chance that a small group of elite soldiers, known as the Gambian National Guard, would defend Jammeh as they came from the same ethnicity. Ethnic communities in many African states are of great importance, often entailing loyalty or opposition to an individual. Recognizing that the potential for violence would make for bad optics, ECOWAS decided to give soft power one last try and again opened negotiations. This time, the former President decided to save face and accepted an offer of asylum in Senegal.

ECOWAS’ skillful use of hard and soft power in tandem was admirable. It did not begin by using force, and offered diplomacy a chance.

When ECOWAS did resort to hard power, the hard power was used to accentuate its soft power.

The result was a successful Presidential transition in a timely, and ultimately peaceful, manner.

In the modern day and age, the relevance of international political unions has rightfully been called into question. The UN and Arab League are two examples of regional bodies which have struggled to successfully deal with member states who disregard democratic norms. However, ECOWAS demonstrated that regional groups can be extremely effective when members are on the same page, and use hard and soft power in the right quantities.

April 2017

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TAMING TROUBLED WATERS:

Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea By: Monique Sereneo

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ontrary to its name, China does not exclusively own the South China Sea - a sentiment Filipino fishermen would likely agree with. However, this fact has done little to prevent years of territorial disputes between China and the Philippines over its waters. Though the international community has generally sided in favour of countries privy to China’s attempts at hegemony, recently-elected Filipino president Rodrigo Duterte has adopted a stance on the issue that many criticize as counterintuitive to his case. That is, Duterte has conceded.

Located roughly 200km from the Philippine mainland and within the country’s exclusive economic zone, the waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal are where many Filipino fishermen can earn their livelihoods. This changed in 2012 after Filipino naval inspectors attempted to arrest Chinese fishermen for illegally harvesting endangered species in the area. In retaliation, Chinese coastguard blocked Filipinos from Scarborough Shoal and claimed sovereignty over the waters based on a “nine-dash line” that encompasses several disputed areas of the South China Sea within China’s control. The Philippine president of the day, Benigno Aquino III, spent the next four years taking a hardline approach in an attempt to regain control of the area. Utilizing the Philippines’ relationship with America, Aquino signed an Enhanced Defence Co-operation Agreement (EDCA), allowing American troops to operate out of Philippine military bases. Such an agreement was particularly useful when China began to build on the shoal and Aquino requested a military response from America. Under the Aquino administration, the Philippines also filed a complaint to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in a case known as the South China Sea Arbitration.

Despite these efforts, there is little to be said of the effectiveness of Aquino’s response to China’s blockade.

Four years later, Filipino fisherman were still barred from the waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal. The arbitral tribunal experienced a similar disappointment. While China declared in 2013 that it would not participate in the South China Sea Arbitration, the tribunal still forged ahead. By 2016, their persistence only yielded frustration when the tribunal ruled in favour of the Philippines and China merely rejected the ruling.

It was a fruitless battle until June of 2016 when Rodrigo Duterte was elected the president of the Philippines.

Though Duterte is notorious for his militarized “war on drugs” and disregard for decorum on the international stage, his approach to China’s blockade vastly differed from that of Aquino. With plans to rescind the EDCA and disband the USA-Philippine military partnership, Duterte shunned relations with America. Rather than threaten China with military action and appeals to international courts, Duterte vocalised his plans to leave the United Nations and join a new world order with China and Russia. These attempts at diplomacy, while misplaced, were rewarded in 2016 when China ended the four-year blockade on the shoal and promised billions of dollars in investments into the Philippine economy.

The public response has been divided. Although photos have emerged of Filipino fishermen returning from the shoal in apparent victory, other Filipinos have been critical of Duterte’s approach. In a 2016 survey, over 84% of respondents voted in favour of the Philippine government “upholding their rights” over the disputed waters. Furthermore, 76% of respondents said that they trust America above other foreign countries- an opinion that Duterte’s current actions fail to reflect. Although Duterte may be willing to abandon the Western power, America may not be so willing to reciprocate. Given their colonial history with the United States, the Supreme Court of the Philippines has warned Duterte that allowing China to control the Scarborough Shoal would be unconstitutional given their duty to protect American sovereignty.

It is possible that Duterte subservience in the South China Sea dispute was all intentional. A strategic kind of acquiescence that he could leverage to somewhat regain control of Scarborough Shoal without angering the larger nation. After all, his diplomatic approach did manage to end a four-year blockade. However, what Duterte has failed to consider is that the Philippines lacks the sort of power to stand unsupported on the international stage. This sobering realization has become all too clear given the recent announcement by the Philippines’ Defense Secretary, Delfin Lorenzana, that the United States would be allowed to build several new military construction projects within the country as per the EDCA. It’s a balancing act that Duterte currently faces, with China and America on either side. One can only hope, if only for the sake of the Filipino fisherman, that Scarborough Shoal will remain in the hands of the Philippines.

April 2017

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RUSSIAN BLUES:

Belarusian Ambitions in Putin’s World By: Gavrilo Randjelovic

Belarus occupies a precarious spot in European political affairs. The nation is the only state on the continent not to be a member of the Council of Europe; a human rights and culture organization whose ranks include even nations of dubious ‘europeanness’, such as Armenia and Azerbaijan. Belarus instead holds membership in the quasi-governmental Union State – a supranational agreement with Russia, its traditional ally and historical master.

The country has been described by The Economist as “Europe’s Last Dictatorship”, and its leader, President Alexander Lukashenko, has stayed in power largely unopposed since 1994. Indeed, the many peculiarities surrounding Belarus – a country that would fit in better among the Central Asian cluster of post-Soviet dictatorships than among European democracies – have given it quite a unique geopolitical position.Yet despite this, Belarus and its politics stay largely out of the public eye; there exists a tacit acceptance of the nation’s uniqueness in Europe and it remains outside of the EU’s targets for expansion.

Moving into the modern era, Belarus faces significant challenges. Having never truly abandoned the Soviet model of central planning, Lukashenko’s government continues to tightly control industry and the allocation of national resources – the country, from an economic and political perspective, exists almost as though communism had never ended.

Belarusian press freedoms are severely restricted and democracy is virtually non-existent. Although the country holds nominally free elections, Lukashenko regularly receives over 75% of the vote. Belarusian government officials have consistently denied that the elections are in any way staged. This denial continued even after the 2010 election, when seven opposition candidates were arrested along with hundreds of protestors prior to the actual ballot-casting.

Yet, all of this is only possible under the auspices of Russian geopolitical power. It is difficult to foster upheaval domestically when the autocrat in power single-handedly keeps the economy functioning with generous Russian energy subsidies. It is also difficult for the European Union to put pressure on Belarus when it is so politically and strategically intertwined with an increasingly aggressive Russia.

However, this stabilizing Russian support is fading despite how crucial it may be. The relationship has taken a huge blow as a result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military interventions in Ukraine. Belarus, a state with a 9% ethnic Russian minority and widespread Russian-language use, has reason to fear. After acting as a virtual vassal for Russia through the Union State, it is an obvious target for Russian expansionist ambitions.

Although public attitudes towards Russia are largely positive, Lukashenko’s concerns remain unabat-

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ed. He is fully aware of the unsustainability of his nation’s potentially dangerous dependence on Russia. Following Russia’s 2015 economic turbulence, Belarusian GDP has contracted more than 3% and official unemployment rates have doubled, giving Lukashenko an impetus to weaken ties between the two nations. In a wholly unexpected political move, he condemned the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and expressed his concern that it would set a negative precedent for the region – a statement made, ostensibly, with Belarus’ own territorial integrity in mind.

The obvious alternative to comfortable Russian hegemony is accession to the democratic union lying just to Belarus’ west. Their neighbour Poland has managed to, with the help of the EU, develop its economy substantially and significantly improve its citizens’ quality of life. The path for Belarus to do the same, however, would be long and winding.

Belarus lacks the democratic institutions, such as fair elections, that are prerequisites to greater involvement in the European community. It lacks a market economy that can effectively join the European economic area. Reforms would be a difficult and slow process for the country to undertake. And should it fail, it may end up more like nearby Ukraine than Poland; wrought with ethno-linguistic instability and without any powerful friends to protect its interests as it drifts midway between the east and west. A strong ally in the increasingly volatile and ambitious Putin may prove more fruitful than a mediocre relationship with both Russia and the EU. Alternatively, in its path towards the EU, Belarus has the opportunity to leverage precedents set by neighbours. If it is quick to embrace the necessary changes in governance, it may emulate fiercely democratic Poland’s rapid accession to the union in 2004. Taking note of the disastrous post-Communist privatization process in Russia and Ukraine and the myriad corrupt oligarchs it has created, Belarus may more effectively manage government assets if it transitions into a more liberal, capitalistic democracy.

Ultimately, however, it is questionable whether Lukashenko’s ambitions really lie with Belarusian integration into the European community. He has not set into motion any meaningful reforms and still runs Belarus with the same level of undemocratic authoritarianism. It is possible that his recent ‘opposition’ to Russian imperialism has largely been a show so as to maintain the illusion of Belarusian independence, presumably to maintain power. As time goes on, however, pressures will continue to mount on Lukashenko and Belarus as a whole to pick a suitable direction to follow, and any choice will carry with it a plethora of challenges. But until then, Belarus’ geopolitical ambiguity will be just one more peculiarity surrounding a state absolutely riddled with them.

April 2017

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A SHIFT TO HARD POWER: By: Spencer Belyea

Russia vs. NATO

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and NATO have been jockeying for influence and strategic position in Europe. Often with competing interests, the two sides in the past had tried to balance these to maintain a good relationship and cooperate on matters of common interest. This manifested itself in the NATO-Russia Council, an official diplomatic tool that was used for security issues and joint projects. However, as a result of Russian actions in Ukraine, NATO suspended all co-operation with Russia in April 2014. This rupture officially signalled what had been building for a long time – the end of the use of soft power as the main tool operating in Europe, with hard power replacing it as the dominant currency, so to speak. It showed that, on both sides, discussion and dialogue to find a common ground, offering inducements and compromises, had fallen out of favour, and that steps now would be taken

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through military posturing and occasional action, often by proxies.

Hard power, or the threat of hard power, has dominated the NATO-Russia dynamic in recent years, especially with regard to Ukraine and the Baltics. Force, and the threat of force, has been increasingly used. Seeing NATO as a hostile force, Russia uses their wide range of military capabilities as policy instruments – sometimes overtly, but often covertly. Russia has massed tens of thousands of troops on its border with Ukraine, sending an unambiguous message about what action it could potentially take. But it has also directly affected the fighting, as thousands of Russian soldiers have fought in Ukraine. The Kremlin has denied that they are there at all, but it has been proven that they have indeed been involved in the fighting, and the probability is high that they are there on the orders of Vladimir Putin.

This use of hard power in Ukraine has created chaos in the country and discord on how to respond. Russia’s hope is that, at minimum, Ukraine will be prevented from moving its foreign policy and politics westward – and the best-case scenario could be the guaranteed neutrality of Ukraine, or even a break-up of the country along ethnic and Ukrainian lines. NATO has constrained their response because Ukraine is not a member-state, relying mostly on economic sanctions, hoping that they will damage the Russian economy and financial pressures will influence a change in military action. There have been attempts at more soft power-style ideological appeals, but these have proved largely ineffective against Russia because it does not buy in to the same rigid standards of norms and international behaviour that NATO countries largely do, acting solely out of self-interest and often bending or breaking the rules in the process. Another NATO response, this one carrying a more resolute and actionable message, is the stationing of alliance troops in Eastern European member-states. Troops have been committed to the Baltics and Poland in an effort to deter Russian aggression in the region One interesting, if unsurprising dynamic in the use of hard and soft power is the reliance on soft power to appeal to countries not aligned to either side, most notably Ukraine. The West has used association agreements with NATO and the EU, with the attached military, economic, and social benefits to try to attract Ukraine, while Russia has countered with their Eurasian Union and other economic incentives, especially related to oil. Both sides present different visions of the world, and are trying to sway Ukraine ideologically with them, but of course, both have rewards for Ukraine if they choose it. Russia has taken the next step, however, using force and punitive sanctions when Ukraine has not come over to their side. It is yet to be seen whether this classic use of the carrot and the stick technique will work – but Ukraine is most certainly in an impossible situation, with the country being divided as to which path to take, all the while being pushed and pulled in

different directions by outside forces.

Looking forward, the important question is, with what combination of hard and soft power will Russia and NATO approach the situation, both the current conflict in Ukraine and relations in general? It would behoove NATO to focus more on hard power, although in targeted situations. There is no appetite for war, so they would have to be careful not to make any excessive provocations or aggressive actions – but, despite Russian protests, that has not happened yet and there is still room for further action before reaching this point. A combination of deterring troop deployments and economic sanctions are likely to prove to be the most effective tactic; appeals to ideology or norms are proven to not work, and proving that NATO will not crumble under pressure is the best way of showing that the alliance is still relevant. A balance has to be taken, however, as the west has to be careful not to isolate Russia – alone and backed into a corner, it could become even more dangerous.

Russia is sure to continue using hard power, backing the separatists in Eastern Ukraine and further stoking NATO fears by ratcheting up military exercises and deployments in strategic areas. It seems as if Russia’s strategy is to see how far NATO can be pushed before they respond harshly – and that point has not yet been reached. Although the economic sanctions have had an effect on the economy, it seems as if Putin does not mind or care, and he will continue to see how much he can gain, and how many cracks in the alliance he can create before it either puts forward a resolute response or crumbles under the pressure. With international institutions under increasing pressure, and the potential for a power-vacuum atop NATO ever-present, the actions of both sides will likely be rather unpredictable. But what seems likely is that they will continue to follow the path of using hard power to advance aims, creating an Eastern Europe more militarized and poised for conflict than we have seen in decades.

It seems as if Russia’s strategy is to see how far NATO can be pushed before they respond harshly

April 2017

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“TAKING NAMES”:

Nikki Haley and the UN By: Sean Stead-Fecser

nited States President Donald Trump has recently appointed Nikki Haley as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (U.N.). In her first remarks at the U.N. headquarters in New York, the ambassador gave a speech outlining the new U.N.- U.S. relations. Haley said, “You’re gonna see a change in the way we do business. Our goal with the administration is to show value at the U.N., and the way we’ll show value is to show our strength, show our voice, have the backs of our allies and make sure our allies have our back as well” Most notably, Haley remarked, “for those of you who don’t have our backs we’re taking names. We will make points to respond to that accordingly”.

It is evident from Haley’s speech that the U.S. wishes to reaffirm their dominance to the U.N. The U.S. holds a significant amount of power in the U.N., as they have contributed the most funds - giving 22% of the U.N.’s total budget.

The Trump administration has outlined the desire to decrease U.S. funds towards international organizations by 40% - meanwhile the U.S. only gives about 0.1% of their federal budget to the U.N. Two bills have been crafted by the Trump administration, “Auditing and Reducing U.S. Funding of International Organizations” and “Moratorium on New Multilateral Treaties”. These bills, if enacted, aim to cut funding to international organizations if they don’t meet certain criteria. The criteria ranges from an organization that is influenced by a state which sponsors terrorism, is in violation of human rights, and to organizations that have given full membership to Palestine.

Trump tweeted about the UN saying, “The United Nations has such great potential but right now it is just a club for people to get together, talk and have a good time. So sad!”.

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This tweet demonstrates that Trump may not fully respect the U.N. as an organization or governing body. His disregard for the U.N. may have influenced his administration’s plans to stop donating to the U.N., as Trump understands it as “a club for people to get together”.

Numerous concerns have been voiced if President Trump decides to reduce the U.S.’s funding towards the U.N. Many fear the U.S. will withdraw from the Paris Agreement, a milestone climate change doctrine, that has been signed by 175 members of the U.N.This agreement outlines taking global action against climate change, keeping the global temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius.

The Paris Agreement was a huge step forward for combatting climate change. If the U.S. were to back out of this agreement, other states might follow suit.

One of the more interesting points about the new U.N. ambassador, Nikki Haley, is that she has previously criticized Trump. Furthermore, she endorsed and helped to run Marco Rubio’s campaign in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Similarly, Trump has not withheld his thoughts towards Haley. Haley began as the Governor of South Carolina, and when Trump won the South Carolina primary, he tweeted, “Nikki Haley is an embarrassment to South Carolina”.

President Trump later repealed his statement, and said she is “a proven dealmaker and we look forward to making plenty of deals”.

The prior U.N. ambassador, Samantha Power, had an internationally renowned reputation for human rights, wrote an award winning book on humanitarian intervention, and advised Barack Obama on foreign policy for 5 years prior to the job. Haley does not have the same or similar qualifications to Power, leading many to be skeptical of her qualifications.

However, it is important to note is that Haley has some different views on foreign policy in comparison to President Trump. For example, Trump has shown admiration to his Russian counterparts, especially Putin. Notwithstanding, Haley’s first remarks to the UNSC condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and reaffirmed that U.S. sanctions on Russia will remain. Similarly, Haley has promoted the Iran nuclear deal that the Obama administration helped established, and continue to urge that the U.S. should monitor it. On the contrary, Trump has referred to the Iran nuclear deal as “dumb”, and suggested that he would consider pulling out of it.

Haley has told other U.S. senators that she is not afraid to disagree with Trump, and it is important to have an ambassador that differs on foreign policy ideas. It is vital to have an ambassador whom is not a puppet of President Trumps, as the U.S. needs to continue an ongoing democratic conversation in regards to foreign policy.

Nikki Haley has demonstrated a strong stance at the U.N., and has been beneficial in counteracting some of Trump’s more radical foreign policy ideas, such as the newfound Immigration Ban. It is vital for a sitting U.S. government to recognize the legitimacy and importance of the U.N.’s role in the international system, as the U.N.’s success may decline if the U.S. were to cut funding. Hopefully Haley’s time as ambassador will help to ensure the longevity of the U.N. and continue strong U.S.-U.N. relations.

April 2017

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A SOFT USE OF HARD POWER:

Trump and the Executive Order By: Haleigh Johns

President Elect DonaldTrump has been heavy-handed during his first few weeks in the Oval Office. In the first week after his inauguration alone, Trump ended the Affordable Care Act (colloquially known as “ObamaCare”), withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deal, prohibited American funding to foreign aid groups that provide abortion services, and froze federal government worker hiring.

These actions by Trump were all enacted via the executive order. In the American political system, the president possesses the power to issue an executive order, which immediately sets laws into motion. Executive orders are often used by incoming Presidents early in their first term to fulfill promises made during campaigns or to abolish any executive orders put into place by previous Presidents. These orders can overcome objections from Congress, and do not need to be approved by anyone other than the sitting President before they are brought into law.

This concentration of power in the hands of a single individual leads to controversy regarding the legitimacy of such actions.

In a broad sense, the executive order is a statement issued by the sitting president regarding the federal government’s agencies and resources. In other words, an executive order instructs the government how it will work. Although an executive order is considered binding and authoritative, they are still subject to legal review under the Supreme Court.

The executive order has been a power possessed by the American president since George Washington, and have been used by every single president who has held office. Although these orders have been used consistently throughout American political history, the lack of a constitutional definition for an Executive Order leads the action to be somewhat open to interpretation and therefore controversial. For example, during the Presidency of George W. Bush, an executive order was issued which gave the National Security Agency to lead warrantless searches against individuals. More recently, Barack Obama issued a hotly debates executive order which offered protection

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from deportation to more than 4 million undocumented immigrants.

On the surface, Trump’s use of executive orders seems to be an example of the president-elect exercising a high degree of individual, executive power. The executive orders that Trump has issued have also been interpreted as hostile towards other nations, especially regarding the President’s order to begin the construction on the wall on the American-Mexican border. However, most of the laws Trump has sought to enact via the Executive Order will be unable to come to fruition without approval from Congress.

To illustrate, Trump’s plan to build a wall on the American border with Mexico was enacted into law via an executive order. However, this wall will require an investment of billions of dollars of the federal budget – a decision that must be approved by Congress. Although the President possesses the power to appropriate a small amount of the federal budget without consulting Congress, the large expenditure that the wall necessitates would absolutely require approval from Congress.

The infamous wall is not the only executive order that will face obstacles in the near future. The highly controversial travel ban includes a suspension of the refugee program and a prohibition against citizens of Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Syria, and Sudan from entering the United States. Although Trump’s intention with this particular executive order was to unilaterally enforce immigration policy, federal judges have already moved to stop the denial of these citizens from crossing the border into the United States. The judicial system, like Congress, is using its own power to balance against Trump’s executive power.

Although Trump may be attempting to legislate on his own with the executive order, there are checks in place to limit the President’s own executive power, and Congress and the judiciary are evidence of this. These checks will result in an inability on the part of Trump to exercise complete individual power while in the Oval Office, therefore making his seemingly hard power-strategy much softer in reality.

April 2017

19

TRUMPTY-DUMPTY SAT ON A WALL,

Trying To Make Mexico Take The Fall By: Heather Park

H

On January 25th, 2017, President Donald Trump of the United States (U.S.) signed an executive order to begin construction of a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border.

istorically, Mexico, and the U.S. have enjoyed a highly integrated border relationship. President Trump’s aggressive rhetoric and uncompromising action surrounding a wall has made it challenging for Mexico to pursue any foreign diplomacy employing cooperation and enticements. Mexico could counter the negative impact President Trump’s wall would have on Mexican national interests with hardline foreign policy decisions addressing insecurities of the Trump administration.

Mexico can promote its national interests by targeting the U.S. economy, security, and fear surrounding immigration. Economically, leaving the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would negatively impact American businesses that outsource to Mexico for cheap labour. Leaving NAFTA would have lesser impact on the Mexican economy, considering NAFTA has failed to positively restructure the Mexican economy and cre-

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ate an economic surplus. Instead, it has enabled the U.S. to move production to Mexico for cheap labour, without constraints on the use of capital. This has expanded the U.S. production base, without leaving any economic surplus in Mexico to benefit the Mexican economy. Not surprisingly, poverty rates in Mexico remain unimproved, encouraging Mexican citizens to migrate to America.

Leaving NAFTA would put an end to the ability of U.S. businesses to outsource to Mexico for cheap labour, requiring a restructuring of the U.S. economy, and simultaneously increasing existing pressure on the U.S. border from Mexican migrants.

Recently, there has been a leftist political shift in Mexico. Currently, Mexican President Peña Nieto is perceived as too conciliatory towards America; however, he is ineligible for re-election in July 2018, and López Obrador is a leftist presidential hopeful, already enjoying

widespread popular support. He is recognized as anti-American, populist, and unsupportive of NAFTA. President Trump’s wall has stoked anti-American sentiment, and increased public support for more hardline Mexican leadership to stand up to the U.S. Current Mexican leadership does not want to leave or renegotiate NAFTA, and Trump remains unclear on his position. Considering those factors, Obrador’s election would increase the plausibility of Mexico leaving NAFTA, and the pursuit of more hardline foreign policies regarding the US. The close relationship between Mexico and the U.S. is central to both countries’ security efforts. Mexican intelligence sharing has aided U.S. counter-narcotics and counterterrorism efforts, such as the capture of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán. Therefore, it could be in Mexico’s national interest to kick The Drug Enforcement Administration out of the Mexican regions they are stationed in. One of President Trump’s aims of the wall is to stop the flow of illegal drugs and immigrants into the U.S.; however, an end to Mexican intelligence sharing would be counterproductive. Most drugs entering the U.S. pass through legal ports – something intelligence sharing has, and would continue to be, more effective at combatting than a physical wall. Fixation with a surface wall means President Trump has neglected to account for the many illegal tunnels under the border associated with drug and human trafficking. By fortifying physical barriers above ground, President Trump is driving insecurity underground where it is less visible, and harder to monitor for the U.S. Government – especially without the cooperation of Mexican intelligence.

Further, President Trump has failed to acknowl-

edge the utility of Mexico as a physical barrier between the U.S. and Central America. The Mexican Government actively detains and deports migrants from Central America crossing Mexico when attempting illegal entry into the U.S. By employing the psychological threat of increasing illegal immigrants at the U.S. border, Mexico can assert its national interests. The construction of a completely secure border wall will be a time consuming process, and intensified numbers of illegal immigrants trying to cross prior to wall completion could overwhelm U.S. border security efforts. Mexican immigration reform in 2011 tried to include transit visas for migrants from Central America, permitting them to travel unimpeded across Mexico to the U.S. border, to try their luck at crossing. While transit visas do not currently exist, this is an option Mexico could leverage against the U.S. to further pressure the U.S. border and utility of any existing wall.

It is easy for Mexico to dismiss economic, security, and immigration challenges associated with President Trump’s wall as northern problems specific to the US. If Trump is going to take such an aggressive anti-Mexican stance in the construction of his wall, unwilling to compromise or amicably negotiate, Mexico must take an equally hardline stance in response. Mexico has been scapegoated by President Trump as the sole source of disappeared American jobs, illegal drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. In reality, Mexico has assumed economic disadvantage through NAFTA, and served as a barrier to Central American immigrants trying to reach the U.S., in the interest of maintaining favorable and open border relations with the U.S.

April 2017

21

Midnight

MINUTES TO By: Nick Pearce

On January 20th, the hands of the Doomsday clock hit 2 ½ minutes from ‘midnight’ and a global catastrophe.

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, founded by ex-Manhattan Project scientists, created the Doomsday clock in 1947 to symbolize the shared threat of nuclear weapons. The organization explained that President Trump’s “disturbing comments” about nuclear weapons and climate change prompted the decision to move the hands forward.

The Presidents’ recent comments underscore the warning’s significance.

“The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes” Trump tweeted this statement a few days before last Christmas in response to Putin’s own promise to beef up Russia’s nuclear capabilities.

“Let it be an arms race,” Trump later added, “we will outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all” Trump’s hyperactive Twitter account should to be countered with realistic and constructive policy.This administration can reverse its tough-talk without contradicting its threatened proliferation. Instituting ‘No First Use’ nuclear policy, where a state refuses to be the first to fire its nuclear arsenal, can be an instance of real, commonsense international leadership.

Trump’s behavior has showcased his reckless and often contradictory foreign policy. The ‘progress’ so far has been too limited to warrant the word. In August, he questioned why the US cannot launch its nukes. He has since acknowledged, while trying to downplay tensions with Russia, that a nuclear holocaust “would be like no other” and a “bad thing.”

There are roughly 15,000 nuclear weapons in the world — Trump can launch about 6,800 of them.

The reality of nuclear weapon are a chilling reminder of the world’s most enduring existential threats.

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As the world teeters between resurgent right-wing nationalism and increased instability, national discussion and executive declaration spurred by concern citizens, can provide a sane alternative in ‘No First Use’ policy.

‘No First Use’ goes beyond Ivory Tower discussion and has real-world success.

China was the first to adopt the policy 1964, and has reiterated its commitment ever since. India followed in 1998. However, the world’s other nuclear powers have lagged behind.

The adoption of ‘No First Use’ by states may signal a willingness to cooperate with China and India as emerging global leaders. For Trump’s administration, it may help to smooth over recent gaffs, which including a phone call recognizing Taiwan. The call was controversial, blatantly ignoring the China’s ‘One China’ policy. The Chinese state claims there is only “China” — the mainland People’s Republic of China — and that the Republic of China or Taiwan is not an independent state.

Trump, perhaps excited by the recognition, broke a US foreign policy mainstay when he accepted the Taiwanese president’s congratulations. China’s peaceful transition into a global power is supported by careful policy, not ignorant ego boosting from a man who skips his security briefings.

Granted, He later acknowledged ‘One China’, but proactive action may speaker louder than a nervous correction. International peace between China and the US will define stability for the near future and ‘No First Use’ can support it.

While the policy y supports international cooperation, it is not overly idealistic pacifism. It simply sets the terms of conflict and allows the administration to still project the strength that appealed to its supporters.

The ‘No First Use’ policy goes extends beyond an agreement to not launching nuclear weapons first. It decreases the likelihood of launching missiles in a crisis, whether by accident or deliberate action.

Possible missteps ending in mass destruction are a real possibility — just look at recent history.

The last real scare of a nuclear weapons deployment was in 1995. Then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin opened a nuclear briefcase when at a Norwegian rocket studying the Northern Lights, and it was actually a nuclear missile launcher.

Yeltsin, a known drinker with several political blunders throughout his presidency, had the world in his hands.

Thankfully, he didn’t fire.

Adoption of the ‘No First Use’ has the potential to ease the risk-assessment in situations similar to the Norwegian Rocket Incident. Yeltsin could have known that the official position of the US, still its primary rival, was not to shoot first.

Furthermore, this policy would incentivize other countries to follow, ensuring international credibility and any nuclear power’s position as a responsible safeguard against possible exchanges.

If this leadership is successful, a strong position could encourage an international treaty guaranteeing ‘No First Use’ and impede nuclear escalation, leaving room for further disarmament.

The benefits even reach nonstate actors. Scott D. Sagan, Stanford professor and nuclear proliferation expert, says that a presidential declaration could even indirectly dissuade nuclear terrorism. He argues individuals and governments may be less inclined to provide terrorist groups nuclear materials if a new moral standard is created.

Barring this, a declaration could at least further marginalize any terrorist groups’ attempts at gaining a possible radioactive “dirty bomb”.

This has special value with Trump’s self-styled hardline on terror. His strong-man persona could contribute to what would be the ultimate deal: turning the doomsday clock’s hand back and capitalizing on American power. Conversely, a state like Pakistan or Russia adopting the policy may discourage possible American nuclear aggression and ensure its own national security.

Until then, it’s 2 ½ minutes to midnight.

Possible missteps ending in mass destruction are a real possibility — just look at recent history.

April 2017

23

ISRAEL, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE PALESTINIANS:

Who Gets the Carrot and Who Gets the Stick in Trump’s Administration?

By: Sean Adessky

For the United States, managing the Israel-Palestinian peace process is always a fine balancing act. An American administration needs to walk the line between supporting their strongest and most democratic ally in the Middle East, while at the same time supporting Arab allies in the Middle East and acting as a ‘check’ on Israel’s growing settlement expansion in the face of growing international condemnation. Additionally, many feel that an anti-Israel bias at the UN makes U.S support of Israel all the more important since the U.S frequently acts as the sole veto on UN resolutions condemning Israel. What all sides can agree on is that at the end of the day, only the United States is in a position to truly force Israel to make significant policy changes regarding any future Palestinian state. Thus, it has widely been seen as a decades-long system of carrots and sticks, dealt out to both sides to encourage the peace process and support U.S strategic goals in the region. U.S

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“carrots” to Israel include significant military aid in a wide variety of forms, support (often by way of veto’s of anti-Israel resolutions at the UN); with small sticks peppered in, usually in the form of criticizing settlement expansion.

Conversely, the Palestinians are typically given small carrots in the form of small amounts of aid money and some U.S criticism of Israel, but mostly receive a “stick” manifested by U.S refusal to force Israel to make any significant changes.

The past few months saw what had appeared to be a dramatic shift in this pattern of behavior. Back in November, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution condemning Israel’s settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The passage of the resolution was only made possible due to the U.S abstention from the vote, but it didn’t stop there, as just a day later then-Secretary of State John Kerry gave a speech explaining the decision by the U.S, in which he provided unusually

harsh criticism for the State of Israel. The Palestinians hailed the decision as a significant step for their cause as with the resolution passed, the first major carrot so to speak, the UN could now move forward and attempt to legally punish Israel for their settlements.

Likewise, the harsh reaction of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the vote demonstrated the significance of this decision by the United States; Netanyahu immediately summoned home his ambassador from New Zealand, a co-sponsor of the resolution, and decried that “Israel rejects this shameful anti-Israel resolution at the UN and will not abide by its terms” (NZherald). It was a stick the likes of which Israel had not seen in years.

This reaction solidified the notion that only the U.S can truly force Israel to change its policy. In this regard, the reaction by then-President elect Trump, who tweeted “We cannot continue to let Israel be treated with such total disdain and disrespect” and “Stay strong Israel, January 20th is fast approaching!” was incredibly important for the significant insight it provided into what U.S policy would be like under the Trump administration.

A month later, it appeared as if President Trump was intent on upholding his claim to unequivocally back Israel. All carrots if you will, not sticks. As noted by Al-Jazeera, merely a week after Trump’s inauguration, Israel announced the construction of 3,000 settlement homes in the West Bank, the fourth such announcement since the inauguration of Donald Trump. What was interesting about this decision was that it was a bill that Prime Minister Netanyahu had previously opposed, that now ‘suddenly’ had his support.

Al-Jazeera spoke with Hanin Zaobi, a Palestinian politician in Israel’s Knesset who explained very bluntly that Netanyahu “is no longer worried about international criticism” now that Donald Trump has become U.S president. (Al Jazeera).

The carrot and the stick approach has a clear trickle-down effect as well, as the bigger the carrot the U.S gives Israel, the bigger the stick the Israelis can then give to the Palestinians.

Speaking in a telephone interview with Newsweek January 31st, Chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat confirmed the drastic shift that has occurred in a month. Erekat lamented that the Trump administration has yet to criticize the settlement expansion, and noted that no Trump administration official has contacted them, nor returned any of their emails or letters. Meanwhile, Trump has spoken with Netanyahu by phone, and the two men met February 15th.

Erekat doesn’t mince words when describing the ominous warning Trump’s first week in office seemed to give, noting, “He’s only been there for a week. If that’s the trend of four years: God help us, God help the whole world.” (Times Of Israel).

In the same interview, Erekat responded to another potentially dramatic “who gets the carrot/who gets the stick” shift in regards to President Trump’s statement that he would move the U.S embassy in Israel from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem. Should the U.S decide to proceed with such an inflammatory move, Erekat stated, “the PLO will revoke its recognition of Israel, the prospect of a two-state solution will be over, and any hope of Israeli-Palestinian peace in the future will vanish.” (Times Of Israel) Yet for all of the verbal skirmishing, one really ought to question how much has actually changed, and what the United States’ position is, as the Trump administration continues to release conflicting statements. The administration recently noted that settlement activity was “probably not helpful” to the peace process and further indicated that any potential move of the U.S embassy in Israel was still in its earliest planning stages. Yet, at his February 15th press conference with Netanyahu, Trump announced he would be open to a two-state solution, a one-state solution, really whatever the parties can agree upon (an appearing deviation from longstanding U.S policy on how to achieve Mideast peace). Thus, it remains by no means clear, how much has really changed.

In the final analysis, whether it is vetoing an anti-Israel resolution in the UN, supporting or criticizing future settlements, moving the U.S embassy or something as seemingly mundane as to who gets the first call, the first email…one thing seems clear, there are many important carrots and sticks that the Israelis and Palestinians are both fighting for or against. Each is important in its on right, and the rest of the world will be eagerly watching every move by the United States to determine how to proceed in the Middle East.

April 2017

25

FROM “DUAL-TRACKING” TO BACK TRACKING:

The Evolution of the United States’ Negotiation Strategy in Iran

A

By: Rebecca Frost

ttempts to reign in the Iranian Government’s strides to gain economic and military power has been a hallmark of American foreign policy since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 ousted the United States-friendly monarchy and installed a theocratic Islamic government hostile to the West. With the resurgence of hardline policy towards Iran from the Trump administration causing hostilities between the two states to rise, it is important to reflect on the complex history of the United States’ (U.S.) reliance on coercion in efforts to curtail Iran’s geo-political, and most importantly, nuclear, ambitions.

In December 2016, the U.S. Congress renewed the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). The ISA extends existing sanctions against Iran past their original expiration date of December 31, 2016. It also gives the President the ability to impose new sanctions if deemed necessary, a highly significant detail to the Republican Party. Since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (J.C.P.O.A.), known colloquially as The Iran Nuclear Deal, was signed by the U.S., Iran, China, Russia, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom in 2015, it has had many vocal opponents within the U.S. government, mostly from ranks of the Republican Party.

The renewal of the Act can be seen as a direct reflection of the will that exists within the Republican Party to undermine the Iran Nuclear Deal. Their suspicion of the Deal is based in a fundamental distrust of the Iranian Government to keep its non-proliferation promises, and in concern about the ability of the U.S. to retaliate in the event of a breach. They argue that the Deal places too much faith in the presence of good-will within the Iranian government and that it provides an opportunity for Iran to garner significant economic might, thus increasing its potential to provide support for groups opposed to the American agenda in the Middle East, such as Hezbollah, the Houthi, and the regime

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of Bashar al Assad.

What these criticisms neglect is the troubled history unilateral American sanctions have in timeline of the American Government’s attempts to guarantee nuclear non-proliferation in Iran. Since 1979, the so-called “dual-track” approach taken by the U.S. Government has been to hit Iran with increasing restrictive sanctions, while leaving the door open for negotiation regarding the suspension of the state’s nuclear program. Despite the efforts of the U.S. to squeeze Iran to the negotiating table, the unilateral sanctions have tended to have either no effect, or a detrimental effect on Iran’s willingness to suspend or slow the development of its nuclear program.

Over the last 30 years, Iran has found ways to insulate its economy against U.S. sanctions. Additionally, the efforts of the U.S. to cripple Iran’s economy have tended to embolden the radical, anti-American rhetoric of Iran’s leadership. In an attempt to break with the formulaic approach of his predecessors, President Obama chose to harness the power of the international community in levying sanctions, while approaching Iran’s leadership with a sense of goodwill and a clear willingness to compromise.The Obama Administration continued the work of the previous Bush Administration in engineering a set of sanctions involving Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany that would put new kinds of pressure on the Iranian economy.

This reliance on international cooperation was a key shift in the coercive element of the U.S.’s strategy, and it was yielding results.

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, even publically admitted that the new sanctions were having on a detrimental effect on Iran’s economy, a sharp change in rhet-

oric from the previous Iranian political trend of denying any adverse effects of American sanctions and finding strength in resisting the U.S. From the time of its signing until the end of the Obama Administration’s term, the J.C.P.O.A. seemed to be satisfying the U.S.’ goal of (at least of the time being) preventing Iran from further destabilizing the Middle East by developing nuclear capabilities. Iran had been acting in its vested interest in honouring the J.C.P.O.A., due to the unprecedented growth it has experienced since signing it. The J.C.P.O.A. has also enjoyed widespread support from the international community; it was generally regarded as a success within the European Union (E.U.) and attracted a wide array of eager foreign investors to Iran.

Yet, despite the relative success of the Obama Administration’s approach, the incoming Trump Administration seems to have no appetite for maintaining the cordial rela-

tions with Iran that the development of the J.C.P.O.A. depended on. Donald Trump called the Deal a disaster during his campaign and has criticised Barrack Obama for being “too soft” on Iran. His stance is in line with the Republican Party’s distrust of both the J.C.P.O.A. and the Iranian government. While the criticism that the Deal does not allow the U.S. to easily re-impose sanctions in the event of a breach is a valid one, the Trump Administration has chosen to address this by opting for measures of drastic escalation rather than a continuation of the style of negotiation that brought the question nuclear non-proliferation in Iran out of a 30-year stalemate.

Given the rising anti-American sentiments brewing in Iran since President Trump took office, his failure to learn from history could turn out to be a deadly, destabilizing force in the region.

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O The Observer Metric 4: % growth in Iran’s GDP in 2016

15,000: Total nuclear warheads globally

6,800: Nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal

7,000: Nuclear warheads in the Russian arsenal

22: % of United Nations funding from the United States

22:Years in power for former Gambian President Yahya Jemmeh

55,000: Russian troops on Ukrainian border as of November 2016

2,100,000: Illegal immigrants detained in Mexico between 2000 and 2015

79.7: % of votes cast for Alexander Lukashenko in the 2010 Belarusian election

263,515: Votes cast for Adama Barrow in the 2016 Gambian Presidential Election

3,300,000,000: Dollars of US Federal Budget is given to the United Nations as of 2016

18: Executive orders and presidential memos signed by President Trump in his first 12 days in office 522: Migrants detained per day (on average) at the Mexican border with Guatemala in 2015 212,044: Votes cast for Yahya Jemmeh in the 2016 Gambian Presidential Election 57: % drop in value of the Ruble since Russia invaded Crimea in February 2014 5,300,000,000: USD in trade travels through the South China Sea annually 22:Years in power for Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko 3,200: Acres of new islands built by China in the South China Sea 90,000: Visa holders impacted by President Trump’s travel ban 400,000: Israeli settlers living in the West Bank as of 2016 26: % drop in Belarus’ exports between 2015 and 2016 794,341: Ethnic Russians living in Belarus as of 2016 130: Israeli settlements in the West Bank